DOCSLIB.ORG

Scomp: a Solution to the Multilevel Security Problem

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Scomp: a Solution to the Multilevel Security Problem While many multilevel security systems exist on paper and in the laboratory, the Honeywell Secure Communications Processor is the first of its kind to be offered commercially. Scomp: A Solution to the Multilevel Security Problem Lester J. Fraim, Honeywell Information Systems The Honeywell Secure Communications Processor ring structure supporting eight rings, and the Access supports a variety of specialized applications that require Isolation Mechanism that allows the definition of privi- the processing of information with multilevel security lege independent of other controls. Access control pro- attributes. A commercial hardware product, the Scomp vided by these mechanisms is interpreted by software but system is a unique implementation of a hardware/soft- enforced by hardware on each reference to information. ware general-purpose operating system based on the The hardware implementation includes a demand-paged security kernel concept. Scomp hardware supports a virtual memory capability that is invisible to the user Multics-like, hardware-enforced ring mechanism, virtual programs. memory, virtual I/O processing, page-fault recovery Although Project Guardian was never completed, the support, and performance mechanisms to aid in the use of Multics features to provide multilevel security was implementation of an efficient operating system. The pursued in a revised Scomp effort, a joint project of Scomp trusted operating program, or STOP, is a secur- Honeywell Information Systems and the Department of ity-kernel-based, general-purpose operating system that Defense (specifically, the Naval Electronics Systems provides a multilevel hierarchical file system, inter- Command, or Navelex). In this implementation, the process communication, security administrator func- Scomp is a trusted minicomputer operating system using tions, and operator commands. software verification techniques.* The idea for the Scomp system originated in a joint Originally the plan was to use the traditional approach Honeywell-Air Force program called Project Guardian, to building a trusted operating system: Namely, to build which was an attempt to further enhance the security of a security kernel and an emulator of an existing operating Honeywell's Multics system.' A secure front-end pro- system to run on top of the kernel. This approach was cessor was needed that would use the security kernel ap- taken by UCLA2 and Mitre in their early development proach to control communications access to Multics. programs and by Ford for KSOS-11.3 One conclusion Multics was designed to provide program and data drawn from these efforts was that an operating system sharing while simultaneously protecting against both emulator was many times slower than the emulated sys- program and data misuse. The system emphasizes infor- tem.4 This performance reduction can be attributed to a mation availability, applications implementation, data- variety of factors, including the incompatibility of the base facilities, decentralized administrative control, security kernel with the emulated system, the hardware simplified system operation, productivity, and growth. capabilities of the system, and the code generated by the The Multics system uses the combination of hardware implementation language. and to a software mechanisms provide dynamic multi- 'In August 1982, HoneyweU requested that the newly formed Depart- user environment. ment of Defense Computer Evaluation Center formally evaluate the The Multics security mechanisms, considered far more Scomp. This evaluation, which still is continuing, is using the "Draft Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria" (dated January 27, 1983) advanced than those available in most large commercial to determine whether the Scomp is a Class Al system. The evaluation is systems, use access control lists, a hardware-enforced expected to be complete in late summer 1983. 26 0018-9162/83/07(D-0026S01.00 © 1983 IEEE COM PUTER Authorized licensed use limited to: Penn State University. Downloaded on December 18, 2009 at 16:06 from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply. The planned interface for the Scomp system was a Bell with different security levels. These resources can be two Labs Unix emulator, the same type of emulator used by networks, two systems, or a system with users at a level KSOS-I 1. The goal was to provide a compatible interface lower than that of the systems. on both systems, thereby using the vast amount of soft- ware that exists on current Unix implementations. How- ever, KSOS-11 and other attempts to build Unix emula- The Scomp's basic security mechanism tors on secure systems have shown that certain Unix features (e.g., process family sharing of open-file seek The Scomp system is a unique implementation of the pointers) are incompatible with the requirements of security kernel approach because of the way in which the secure systems. Furthermore, the Unix notion of doing hardware functions support the software capabilities. I/O by copying data into a process address space is in- The Scomp system satisfies the requirements of the compatible with the Scomp demand-paging system. reference monitor by providing complete mediation, Rather than trying to achieve a full Unix compatibility, isolation, and verification of the system design. Honeywell has taken a new approach to building an in- Mediation is provided through the interaction of the terface for the Scomp. The SKIP, or Scomp kernel inter- Scomp hardware and software. The software provides face package, does not try to emulate a specific system. the initial mediation of a request for access using the Instead, it takes advantage of the underlying hardware kernel's internal data structures. It validates the request and security kernel architecture to provide an efficient for both the subject and the object of the requested ac- applications interface. tion (e.g., read or write). The software then builds a data The Scomp system, a solution to many multilevel se- element, in the form of a descriptor, for use by the hard- curity problems, contains the mechanisms necessary to ware in the continued mediation of the access. The allow controlled processing of different levels of descriptor consists of four words of information in- classified information. Implementing MLS applications cluding access permission (i.e., read, write, or execute) on the Scomp system can provide greater flexibility and and the location of the object. This cooperative media- efficiency than the current use of procedural and ad- tion of hardware and software is shown in Figure 1. The ministrative controls to protect information resources. hardware implementation provides performance advan- Many systems today overclassify both people and infor- tages over a mechanism implemented strictly in software. mation because the computer cannot maintain the sepa- Isolation is provided by the hardware implementation ration of information with different classifications. Most of a Multics-like four-ring mechanism,6 with ring 0 con- systems operate in a "system high" mode, in which the taining the security kernel. This implementation, which level of the system and all its users is cleared to the was developed from the Multics architecture to meet the highest level of any information in the system. Proced- needs of a Level 6/DPS 6 operating system, includes con- ural and physical controls are applied to protect the in- trolled ring-crossing to allow less privileged software to formation in the system. access an inner ring for a service function. A ring-bracket The Scomp system provides for the processing of in- mechanism controls operations of read, write, and ex- formation at its classification level, and it enforces the ecute using the ring of execution. separation of users with different security characteristics. The Scomp security-relevant software (the security In addition, the Scomp system can provide specialized kernel and trusted software) is verified with two technol- interfaces between systems of different classifications ogies. The first is the SRI International Hierarchical to provide more efficient management of information. Development Methodology.7 This method of verifica- Such MLS applications, referred to as guard systems,5 tion requires the development of a formal top-level provide the timely flow of information from resources specification, which defines the system from the view of Figure 1. Mediation implemented through a combination of hardware and software. The software establishes the descriptor, deriving physical permissions on the basis of subject/object security attributes. The hardware controls physical access on the basis of descriptors. July 1983 27 Authorized licensed use limited to: Penn State University. Downloaded on December 18, 2009 at 16:06 from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply. a user process. The FTLS, written in a nonprocedural All system components connect to the Level 6/DPS 6 language called Special, is then verified using tools bus, allowing access to I/O controllers, processors, and developed by SRI. The Scomp security kernel FTLS has memory. The Scomp hardware design uses all standard been verified, using this methodology, against a model of peripherals and provides the security mechanisms totally DoD security policy.8 through the special hardware. Consequently, we can The second verification technology involves trusted easily convert a standard Level 6/DPS 6 to a Scomp-the software, which is security-relevant software outside the standard processor is simply replaced with a modified security
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Multics System, 1975
    Honeywell The Multics System O 1975,1976,Honeywell Information Systems Inc. File No.:lLll - -- - ecure A Unique Business Problem-SolvingTool Here is a computer techniques are available to system that enables data all users automatically processing users to control through the Multics operating and distribute easily accessi- supervisor. ble computer power. The Because it is a unique Honeywell Multics System combination of advanced represents an advanced computing theory and out- approach to making the com- standing computer hardware, puter an integral, thoroughly Multics can provide an infor- reliable part of a company's mation service system more operation. advanced than any other yet The Multics System available. replaces many of the proce- Honeywell offers, as dures limiting conventional part of its advanced Series 60 systems and sweeps away line, two models for Multics - many of the factors that have the Model 68/60 and the restricted the application of Model 68/80. computers to routine data While contributing sig- processing assignments. nificantly to the application Now-with Multics - diversity of the Series 60 the computer becomes a family, these Multics systems responsive tool for solving also enable Honeywell to challenging business accommodate more efficiently problems. the computing needs of The Multics System today's businesses. incorporates many of the most user-oriented program- ming and supervisory tech- niques yet devised. These Multics is Transaction Processing -and More Although Multics is by Ease of accessibility, design a transaction oriented, featuring a simple and con- interactive information sys- sistent user interface for all tem, its functional capability types of services. There is no encompasses the full spec- job control or command trum of a general purpose language to learn and an computer.
    [Show full text]
  • Multics Security Evaluation: Vulnerability Analysis*
    * Multics Security Evaluation: Vulnerability Analysis Paul A. Karger, 2Lt, USAF Roger R. Schell, Maj, USAF Deputy for Command and Management Systems (MCI), HQ Electronic Systems Division Hanscom AFB, MA 01730 ABSTRACT operational requirements cannot be met by dedicated sys- A security evaluation of Multics for potential use as a tems because of the lack of information sharing. It has two-level (Secret / Top Secret) system in the Air Force been estimated by the Electronic Systems Division (ESD) Data Services Center (AFDSC) is presented. An overview sponsored Computer Security Technology Panel [10] that is provided of the present implementation of the Multics these additional costs may amount to $100,000,000 per Security controls. The report then details the results of a year for the Air Force alone. penetration exercise of Multics on the HIS 645 computer. In addition, preliminary results of a penetration exercise 1.2 Requirement for Multics Security of Multics on the new HIS 6180 computer are presented. Evaluation The report concludes that Multics as implemented today is not certifiably secure and cannot be used in an open This evaluation of the security of the Multics system use multi-level system. However, the Multics security was performed under Project 6917, Program Element design principles are significantly better than other con- 64708F to meet requirements of the Air Force Data Ser- temporary systems. Thus, Multics as implemented today, vices Center (AFDSC). AFDSC must provide responsive can be used in a benign Secret / Top Secret environment. interactive time-shared computer services to users within In addition, Multics forms a base from which a certifiably the Pentagon at all classification levels from unclassified to secure open use multi-level system can be developed.
    [Show full text]
  • Towards Comprehensible and Effective Permission Systems
    Towards Comprehensible and Effective Permission Systems Adrienne Porter Felt Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences University of California at Berkeley Technical Report No. UCB/EECS-2012-185 http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2012/EECS-2012-185.html August 9, 2012 Copyright © 2012, by the author(s). All rights reserved. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission. Towards Comprehensible and Effective Permission Systems by Adrienne Porter Felt A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science in the GRADUATE DIVISION of the UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY Committee in charge: Professor David Wagner, Chair Professor Vern Paxson Professor Tapan Parikh Fall 2012 Towards Comprehensible and Effective Permission Systems Copyright c 2012 by Adrienne Porter Felt Abstract Towards Comprehensible and Effective Permission Systems by Adrienne Porter Felt Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science University of California, Berkeley Professor David Wagner, Chair How can we, as platform designers, protect computer users from the threats associated with ma- licious, privacy-invasive, and vulnerable applications? Modern platforms have turned away from the traditional user-based permission model and begun adopting application permission systems in an attempt to shield users from these threats. This dissertation evaluates modern permission systems with the goal of improving the security of future platforms.
    [Show full text]
  • US Department of the Interior Geological Survey Mail Stop 964 Box 25046, Federal Center'denver, Colorado 80225
    U.S. Department of the Interior Geological Survey Mail Stop 964 Box 25046, Federal Center 'Denver, Colorado 80225 Program MARQDCLAG: Marquardt inversion of DC-Schlumberger soundings by lagged-convolution by Walter L. Anderson Open-File Report 79-1432 1979 Multics Documentation Page 2 Program MARQDCLAG CONTENTS DISCLAIMER 3 INTRODUCTION * 4 PARAMETERS AND DATA REQUIRED 5 PROGRAM FILES 5 DETAIL PARAMETER AND DATA DEFINITIONS 6 $parras parameters 6 $init parameters 10 DATA MATRIX NOTES 11 EXAMPLES OF INPUT PARAMETERS AND DATA ORDERING 11 SPECIAL OBJECT FORMAT PHRASES 12 MULTICS OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS 12 ERROR MESSAGES 13 PRINTED RESULTS ]4 REFERENCES 16 Appendix 1.-- Source listing 17 Source availability 17 Appendix 2.-- Conversion to other systems 53 Appendix 3.-- Test problem input/output listing 54 Multics Documentation Page 3 Program MARQDCLAG DISCLAIMER This program was written in Fortran IV for a Honeywell Multics 68/80 system*. Although program tests have been made, no guarantee (expressed or implied) is made by the author regarding accuracy or proper functioning of this program on all computer systems. * Brand or manufacturers' names used in this report are for descriptive purposes only and do not constitute endorsement by the U.S. Geological Survey. Multics Documentation Page 4 Program MARQDCLAG By Walter L. Anderson INTRODUCTION Program MARQDCLAG is a general-purpose program for the least squares inversion of direct-current (DC) Schlumberger sounding data obtained over one-dimensional horizontally stratified earth models. A modified Marquardt (1963) nonlinear least squares algorithm (MARQRT) is used for inversion of Schlumberger soundings. A digital filter developed by Anderson (1975) is employed, along with a fast lagged-convolution adaptive algorithm (RLAGH1), to efficiently and accurately evaluate the necessary Hankel transform integrals for a Schlumberger array configuration (see for example, Zohdy, 1975, p.
    [Show full text]
  • The Evolution of the Unix Time-Sharing System*
    The Evolution of the Unix Time-sharing System* Dennis M. Ritchie Bell Laboratories, Murray Hill, NJ, 07974 ABSTRACT This paper presents a brief history of the early development of the Unix operating system. It concentrates on the evolution of the file system, the process-control mechanism, and the idea of pipelined commands. Some attention is paid to social conditions during the development of the system. NOTE: *This paper was first presented at the Language Design and Programming Methodology conference at Sydney, Australia, September 1979. The conference proceedings were published as Lecture Notes in Computer Science #79: Language Design and Programming Methodology, Springer-Verlag, 1980. This rendition is based on a reprinted version appearing in AT&T Bell Laboratories Technical Journal 63 No. 6 Part 2, October 1984, pp. 1577-93. Introduction During the past few years, the Unix operating system has come into wide use, so wide that its very name has become a trademark of Bell Laboratories. Its important characteristics have become known to many people. It has suffered much rewriting and tinkering since the first publication describing it in 1974 [1], but few fundamental changes. However, Unix was born in 1969 not 1974, and the account of its development makes a little-known and perhaps instructive story. This paper presents a technical and social history of the evolution of the system. Origins For computer science at Bell Laboratories, the period 1968-1969 was somewhat unsettled. The main reason for this was the slow, though clearly inevitable, withdrawal of the Labs from the Multics project. To the Labs computing community as a whole, the problem was the increasing obviousness of the failure of Multics to deliver promptly any sort of usable system, let alone the panacea envisioned earlier.
    [Show full text]
  • Lessons from the Multics Security Evaluation
    Thirty Years Later: Lessons from the Multics Security Evaluation Paul A. Karger Roger R. Schell IBM Corp., T. J. Watson Research Center Aesec Corporation Yorktown Heights, NY 10598 Pacific Grove, CA 93950 [email protected] [email protected] ABSTRACT 2 Multics Security Compared to Now Almost thirty years ago a vulnerability assessment of Multics offered considerably stronger security than Multics identified significant vulnerabilities, despite the most systems commercially available today. What factors fact that Multics was more secure than other contempo- contributed to this? rary (and current) computer systems. Considerably more important than any of the individual design and imple- mentation flaws was the demonstration of subversion of 2.1 Security as a Primary Original Goal the protection mechanism using malicious software (e.g., Multics had a primary goal of security from the very trap doors and Trojan horses). A series of enhancements beginning of its design [16, 18]. Multics was originally were suggested that enabled Multics to serve in a rela- conceived in 1965 as a computer utility – a large server tively benign environment. These included addition of system on which many different users might process data. “Mandatory Access Controls” and these enhancements This requirement was based on experience from develop- were greatly enabled by the fact the Multics was designed ing and running the CTSS time sharing system at MIT. from the start for security. However, the bottom-line con- The users might well have conflicting interests and there- clusion was that “restructuring is essential” around a fore a need to be protected from each other – a need quite verifiable “security kernel” before using Multics (or any like that faced today by a typical Application Service Pro- other system) in an open environment (as in today’s vider (ASP) or Storage Service Provider (SSP).
    [Show full text]
  • Coecim\F 11 -~ 12 655 33'4 31 331/.- 1/2
    NOVEMBER 3, 1980 111\'2-1 6 18 323,i, 32'" 32118-:je an Gas 1.96 8 69 20 19~, 1934- 'I. l..opeIIICI .I" "U1 ''I FIlIPwI' :£.411 I 1/, JU'/2 '1'1\'2 XJU'II­ 5 88 15 14'A1 14'h ...... CinciMH .90 8 252 28 2634 27~-1:tt Ccpwld 1.28 I 2 18'12 18'12- '4 E FllP\..it 2.08 6 334 26~ 2614 26'12- =III 6 175 351f2 341J. 3511. ...... or Fill 2.40 7 129 29~ r29 29~- lie Corckwa .30 10 320 4 3la- ',II ESystm 1.20 22'frt- ~ F1aStei UO 6 11 15 243J& 25 - '4 .U 1434- =III ... 227 27=111 26~ 27 ...... Citicorp 1.16 72898 25'1. 23=111 p24la- ~ Corelnd EaglePc .76 AIor 1.20 8 267 35'" 34'4 3434- ~ CornG 1.688 ~-'I. .... 5 48¥e 48la 48?'e+!fa CitiesSy 3.20 7 318 54 53 531f.- J',~ 54'4+13Jo Easco 1.10 191f2- I~ FMC 1.20 6 269 24 221h p23¥a+ 'AI Corcrill 1.24 213J&-134 13 282 10'/. r8¥a 10 + 'I. CitytnYest 1 31056 I~ J21,'.1 gl~+ "It Eastern Air p91f2+ ~ FMCpf 2'4 .... 134 34 34 ...... 8 63 22lh r2J11. 21'4-1=111 City Illy wts .... 326 Pie 1 Pie ...... ~-'!iI EasApf 2.69 233Jo ..... FooteC UO 6 56 19=111 18'" 18'1.-1 10 392 13 12'4 12~- I/a City lily pf 2 .... 110 22lh r21 22lh- 34 ~C~~ 17!M1- 'I. EastGsF .80 13:tt ...
    [Show full text]
  • Al39-01C Contents
    HONEYWELL DPS/LEVEL 68 & DPS 8M MULTICS PROCESSOR MANUAL HARDWARE PREFACE This manual describes the processors used in the Multics system. These are the DPS/L68, which refers to the DPS, L68 or older model processors (excluding the GE-645) and DPS 8M, which refers to the DPS 8 family of Multics processors, i.e. DPS 8/70M, DPS 8/62M and DPS 8/52M. The reader should be familiar with the overall modular organization of the Multics system and with the philosophy of asynchronous operation. In addition, this manual presents a discussion of virtual memory addressing concepts including segmentation and paging. The manual is intended for use by systems programmers responsible for writing software to interface with the virtual memory hardware and with the fault and interrupt portions of the hardware. It should also prove valuable to programmers who must use machine instructions (particularly language translator implementors) and to those persons responsible for analyzing crash conditions in system dumps. This manual includes the processor capabilities, modes of operation, functions, and detailed descriptions of machine instructions. Data representation, program-addressable registers, addressing by means of segmentation and paging, faults and interrupts, hardware ring implementation, and cache operation are also covered. The information and specifications in this document are subject to change without notice. Consult your Honeywell Marketing Representative for product or service availability. 11/85 ©Honeywell Information Systems Inc., 1985 File No.:
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction and Overview of the Multics System Page1
    Introduction and Overview of the Multics System Page1 Introduction and Overview of the Multics System F. J. Corbató Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, Massachusetts and V. A. Vyssotsky Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc. Murray Hill, New Jersey Multics (Multiplexed Information and Computing Service) is a comprehensive, general-purpose programming system which is being developed as a research project. The initial Multics system will be implemented on the GE 645 computer. One of the overall design goals is to create a computing system which is capable of meeting almost all of the present and near-future requirements of a large computer utility. Such systems must run continuously and reliably 7 days a week, 24 hours a day in a way similar to telephone or power systems, and must be capable of meeting wide service demands: from multiple man-machine interaction to the sequential processing of absentee-user jobs; from the use of the system with dedicated languages and subsystems to the programming of the system itself; and from centralized bulk card, tape, and printer facilities to remotely located terminals. Such information processing and communication systems are believed to be essential for the future growth of computer use in business, in industry, in government and in scientific laboratories as well as stimulating applications which would be otherwise undone. Because the system must ultimately be comprehensive and able to adapt to unknown future requirements, its framework must be general, and capable of evolving with time. As brought out in the companion papers[1-5], this need for an evolutionary framework influences and contributes to much of the system design and is a major reason why most of the programming of the system will be done in the PL/I language.[6] Because the PL/I language is largely machine-independent (e.g.
    [Show full text]
  • Virtual Memory, Processes, and Sharing in MULTICS
    67. Proc. AFIPS 1966 Spring Joint Cornpnt. Conf., Vol. 28. 16. LONERGAN,W., AND KING, P. Design of the B5000 system. Spartan Books, New York, pp. 61-78. Datamation 7, 5 (1961) 28-32. 10. GL<SER, E. L., COULEUn, J. F., AND OLIVER, G. A. System 17. MAcKENzIE, F.B. Automated secondary storage manage- design of a computer for time-sharing applications. Proc. men~. Datamation 11, 11 (1965) 24 28. AFIPS 1965 Fall Joint Comput. Conf., Vol. 27, Part 1. 18. McCuLLOUGH,J. D., SPEIERMAN~K. H., AND ZURCHER, F. W. Spartan Books, New York, pp. 197-202. A design for a multiple user multiprocessing system. Proc. 11. GLUCK, S. E. Impact of scratehpad memories in design: AFIPS 1965 Fall Joint Comput. Conf., Vol. 27, Part 1. multifunctional scratchpad memories in the Burroughs Spartan Books, New York, pp. 611-617. B8500. Proc. AFIPS, 1965 Fall Joint Comput. Conf. Vol. 19. McGEe, W.C. On dynamic program relocation. IBM Syst. J. 27, Part 1. Spartan Books, New York, pp. 661-666. 4, 3 (1965) 184-199. 12. HOLT, A. W Program organization and record keeping for 20. O'NEILL, R.W. Experience using a time-sharing multipro- dynamic storage allocation. Comm. ACM 4, 10 (Oct. 1961), gramming system with dynamic address relocation hard- 422-431. ware. Proc. AFIPS 1967 Spring Joint Comput. Conf., Vol° 13. ILIFFE, J. K., AND JODEIT, J. G. A dynamic storage alloca- 30. Thompson Books, Washington, D. C. pp. 611-621. tion scheme. Comput. J. 5, 3 (1962) 200-209. 21. YYSSOTSKY, V. A., ConnATO, F.
    [Show full text]
  • Multics—The First Seven *
    Multics—The first seven * by F. J. CORBATO and J. H. SALTZER Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, Massachusetts and C. T. CLINGEN Honeywell Information Systems Inc. Cambridge, Massachusetts INTRODUCTION feel to be of special interest. We do not attempt detailed discussion of the organization of Multics; that is the In 1964, following implementation of the Compatible purpose of specialized technical books and papers.* Time-Sharing System (CTSS)1-2 serious planning began on the development of a new computer system specifi­ cally organized as a prototype of a computer utility. The GOALS plans and aspirations for this system, called Multics (for Multiplexed Information and Computing Service), The goals of the computer utility, although stated at were described in a set of six papers presented at the length in the 1965 papers, deserve a brief review. By a 1965 Fall Joint Computer Conference.3-8 The develop­ computer utility it was meant that one had a com­ ment of the system was undertaken as a cooperative ef­ munity computer facility with: fort involving the Bell Telephone Laboratories (from 1965 to 1969), the computer department of the General (1) Convenient remote terminal access as the normal Electric Company,* and Project MAC of M.I.T. mode of system usage; Implicit in the 1965 papers was the expectation that (2) A view of continuous operation analogous to that there should be a later examination of the development of the electric power and telephone companies; effort. From the present vantage point, however, it is (3) A wide range of capacity to allow growth or clear that a definitive examination cannot be presented contraction without either system or user re­ in a single paper.
    [Show full text]
  • An Interview With
    An Interview with W. EARL BOEBERT OH 460 Conducted by Jeffrey R. Yost on 28 April 2015 Computer Security History Project Albuquerque, New Mexico Charles Babbage Institute Center for the History of Information Technology University of Minnesota, Minneapolis Copyright, Charles Babbage Institute W. Earl Boebert Interview 28 April 2015 Oral History 460 Abstract Computer security pioneer Earl Boebert discusses his education at Stanford University before the bulk of the interview focuses on his work within the Air Force and at Honeywell. Among the topics he discusses are the Air Force Undergraduate Navigator Training System, efforts to save and market Multics (and the inherent challenges given GE’s existing systems and the economics of the mainframe business), PSOS, Sidewinder, the formation of Secure Computing Corporation. Also discussed is his role in the broader computer security research community including serving on many National Research Council committees, including the one producing the influential 1991 Computers at Risk. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 1116862, “Building an Infrastructure for Computer Security History.” 2 Yost: My name is Jeffrey Yost from the Charles Babbage Institute at the University of Minnesota, and I’m here this afternoon on April 28, 2015 with Earl Boebert in Albuquerque, New Mexico. This is for CBI’s NSF-funded study “Building an Infrastructure for Computer Security History.” Earl, can you begin by just giving me some basic biographical information, where and when you were born? Boebert: I was born in Elko, Nevada in 1939. My father was a railroad policeman. I’m an only child.
    [Show full text]