TIME REFERENCE ACROSS LANGUAGES LOT summer school, Tilburg, June 19-30, 2000 Jürgen Bohnemeyer, MPI Nijmegen http://www.mpi.nl/world/persons/profession/bohnem.html mailto [email protected]

DAY 4: FUTURE TIME REFERENCE AND MODALITY

! introducing the basic problem: modal attitudes of future time reference (English, Spanish) ! theoretical issues: intentions, schedules, possible worlds, branching futures ! the role of obligatoriness (English, German) ! modal commitment, non-assertive modality, irrealis (Spanish, Yukatek) ! future time reference and the realis-irrealis distinction (Burmese, Caddo, Dani, Ewe, West- Greenlandic, Wichita); ! a true future-non-future system (Hua); ! modality running the show of time reference: Turkish ! interactions of future time reference, modality, and aspect (Greek, Russian, Yukatek)

Readings: Comrie (1985: 43-55); Dahl (1985: 103-112); Optional & advanced: Bohnemeyer (1998a: 313-330, 366-398); Bybee, Perkins, & Pagliuca (1994: ch. 6-7); Chafe (1995); Chung & Timberlake (1985: 241-255); Fleischman (1982: ch. 4, 6); Mithun (1995)

PUZZLES FOR STARTERS

(1) According to traditional reference grammars, the construction werden + infinitive is “the GER future tense” of German. The utterances below refer to future events, yet the verbs are inflected for “present” tense. How can this apparent clash of data and traditional analysis be reconciled?

a. Wenn du diesen Pilz (jetzt) ißt, bist du morgen mittag tot. if youthis mushroomnow eat(PRS) are(PRS) youtomorrow noon dead ‘If you eat this mushroom (now), you will be dead (by tomorrow noon).’

b. Nächstes Jahr schreibe ich ein Buch über Semantik. next year write(PRS) I a book on semantics ‘Next year, I’ll write a book on semantics.’

c. Laut Fahrplan fährt der Zug um zehn. according to the schedule leaves(PRS) the train at ten ‘According to the schedule, the train leaves at ten.’ Time reference across languages

d. Ich nehme dich mit nach Glasgow. I take(PRS) youalong to Glasgow ‘I’ll give you a lift to Glasgow.’

(2) The so-called future tense of Spanish also occurs with present-time reference. How so? SPA And what does this imply for the future-tense analysis?

Estará con sus amigos. (s)he be(FUT) with his/her friends ‘He will be with his friends (e.g. tomorrow) / he would/must be with his friends (i.e. now).’ (Matte Bon 1992a: 37)

(3) In Yukatek, the terminative aspect marker (a), which roughly has a perfect meaning, and the imperfective aspect marker (b) (and all other aspect marker except for the perfective) may occur with future time reference in main clauses. In contrast, the perfective aspect marker cannot have future time reference in main clauses, but it may occur with future time reference in subordinate clauses, such as in the conditional protasis in (a). How can this distribution be explained? And does the perfective aspect marker t- in fact mark past tense?

YUK a. Le káa t-uy a’l-ah u ts’o’k-s-ik [DEF káa PRV-A.3 say-CMP(B.3.SG) A.3 end-CAUS-INC(B.3.SG)

le ba’x k-u bèet-ik-e’, ts’o’k in kim-il. DEF what IMPF-A.3 do-INC(B.3.SG)]-TOP TERM A.1.SG die-INC

‘By the time (lit. (when) it says that) he finishes what he is doing, I shall be dead.’ (Andrade 1955: 118)

b. Wáah t-in kax-t-ah hun-p’éel-e’ ALT PRV-A.1.SG find-APP-CMP(B.3.SG) one-CL.IN-TOP

k-in tàas-ik tèech. IMPF-A.1.SG come:CAUS-INC(B.3.SG) you

‘If I find one, I will bring it to you.’ (Andrade 1955: 113)

(4) In West-Greenlandic, a verb form not marked for modality or aspect can have present or past time reference, but not future time reference. For future time reference, a variety of modal markers may be used, including the suffix -ssa. With future time reference, -ssa may express an obligation (a), but also a prediction (b). But -ssa may also occur with past time refence, e.g. in habitual

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(c) or counterfactual contexts. How can this distribution be explained? And does -ssa express future tense?

a. Inna-jaa-ssa-atit. GRE go.to.bed-early-OBL-2.SG.IND ‘You must/shall go to bed early.’ (Fortescue 1984: 292)

b. Tuqu-ssa-atit. die-OBL-2.SG.IND ‘You will die (i.e. if you drink the poison).’ (Fortescue 1984: 274)

c. Mulu-guni mulu-guni tiki-ssa-aq atisa-i stay.away-SS.COND stay.away-SS.COND come-OBL-3.SG.INDclothes-PL.3.SG.POSS

ataniiruti-vis-sima-llutik. be.without.connection-really-PERF-SS.CONT

‘(After) staying away for ages he would arrive home, his clothes all falling apart.’ (Fortescue 1984: 281)

(5) In Russian, the simple ‘present tense’ form of perfective verbs has future time reference, never present time reference. Conversely, the ‘present tense’ form of imperfective verbs can only have present time reference. For future time reference, the infinitive of the imperfective verb is combined with the auxiliary bud- (which in turn is incompatible with perfective verbs). What’s going on here? And what is the tense meaning of the so-called ‘present tense’ of Russian?

RUS Búdu itát’ stat’jú, nadéjus’, to pro- itáju. FUT I read(IMPF) article(ACC) I hope COMP TERM-I read(PRV) ‘I shall read/be reading the article and hope I shall get it finished.’ (Wade 1992: 298)

INTRODUCING THE BASIC PROBLEM: MODAL ATTITUDES OF FUTURE TIME REFERENCE

! The fundamental problem

• Whenever somebody refers to an event in the future, some kind of modal attitude is involved.

• This is not even a fact of language - it’s a fact of cognition: future events are not facts! We can’t have knowledge about them in the same way that we can have knowledge about present events (through perception) and past events (through memory or through

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somebody else’s report).1

• Because of this difference in mental attitude, we also tend to interpret statements about the future different from statements about the past:

(6) a. (How has the wheather been here lately? -) It rained yesterday. b. (I’m planning to go on a hiking trip. I wonder what the weather will be like. -) It will / is going to / rain tomorrow.

• For example, we tend to interpret (6, 8, 31, 32, 33a) as a claim about a fact, and will assume that the speaker has probably experienced the event himself or herself. (S)he might also have obtained the information from somebody else. Or perhaps, the statement is purely inferential, in which case we might be annoyed, on finding out later, that it wasn’t marked that way (I think/believe/guess it probably/perhaps rained yesterday). Or the speaker is simply making it up. Depending on which of these we assume to be the case, we will react in different ways if we receive evidence later on that the statement was false.

• But (6, 8, 31, 32, 33b) is a different story altogether. We understand the statement to be a prediction. We will assume that the speaker has evidence for this prediction; for example, that (s)he heard it on the weather forecast, or that (s)he has lived in this place for 30 years and knows about the significance of a particular type of clouds and wind coming from a particular direction. Whichever, we won’t be able to evaluate the statement further until the time it was asserted for has passed by. If by then the predicted event hasn’t occurred, we still don’t necessarily assume the speaker to have lied to us. Instead, we will ask the question whether the evidence the speaker had based the prediction on was sufficient to support it. If we find out that the speaker had insufficient evidence to claim (6, 8, 31, 32, 33b), we might be annoyed. And if it turns out that the speaker had in fact evidence contradicting the prediction, then we will indeed consider him or her a liar.

• Properly speaking, both reference to future events and reference to present or past events involves modal attitudes of some sort. Whenever somebody asserts a proposition, a modal attitude is involved. But our cognitive system has a bias towards facts - we tend to strongly separate propositions we consider facts from those we

1 However, there are also important cases in which our attitude towards certain past events may be rather similar if not identical to our attitude towards future events, because more canonical forms of evidence for the reality of these events is lacking: conjectures and dreams are possible cases in point (but whether those are indeed treated as insufficiently supported by evidence is a culture-specific question!).

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don’t.2

• So all Future Time Reference (FTR) is invariably accompanied by a non-factual modal attitude. This has led many people to think that future tenses a priori don’t exist - whatever operators are used for FTR must be modal operators, they argue.

• This is a non-sequitur, rooted in a confusion of semantics with cognition. Just because an operator is used under the understanding of a non-factual modal attitude doesn’t mean that it expresses that attitude.

• There is no theoretical reason why there shouldn’t be an ideal future tense which is used in any kind of FTR, irrespective of the particular modal attitude. Let us take stock of some of the attitudes towards different kinds of propositions involving FTR:

(7) a. Predictions, If you eat this mushroom, (I believe) you (will) die.3 expectations, etc. . If you eat this mushroom, (I believe) you are going to die. b. Intentions: I’m planning to write a book on semantics. . I’m going to write a book on semantics. ?âI will write a book on semantics. c. Schedules: According to the schedule, the train leaves at 10am. . The train is going to leave at 10am. . The train will leave at 10am. d. Willingness, I’m willing/ready/prepared to give you a lift to Glasgow. promise ?.I’m going to give you a lift to Glasgow. ?.I will give you a lift to Glasgow. e. Fears: I’m afraid that she might leave me. â She is going to leave me. but: I’m afraid that she is going to leave me. â She will leave me. but: I’m afraid that she will leave me. f. Desires: I want/would like to be/wish I were / a fireman. â I’m going to be a fireman. â I will be a fireman. g. Warnings: Careful! It might break! â It is going to break. but: Careful! It is going to break! â It will break. but: ?Careful! It will break!

2 This is perhaps not universally true, but it has been found at least prima facie true in a great number of cultures as different from each other as cultures get to be.

3 Note that will becomes more obligatory as soon as the event is calendrically timed: If you eat this mushroom now, you will be (?/are) dead by noon tomorrow.

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h. Permission: You may/can come in. â You’re going to come in. â You will come in. i. Obligations: I’m supposed to / I should / I have to / call my boss tomorrow. â I’m going to call my boss tomorrow. â I will call my boss tomorrow. j. Deontic It may/could rain tomorrow. / It’s possible that it rains tomorrow. possibility: â It’s going to rain tomorrow. â It will rain tomorrow. k. Deontic (In order to survive), I must / have to / need to / eat soon. necessity: â I’m going to eat soon. â I will eat soon. l. Epistemic I may have to cancel our appointment (it’s a possibility, I don’t know possibility: yet). â I’m going to have to cancel our appointment. â I will have to cancel our appointment. m. Epistemic (Aftermath of a party:) Larry drank a lot tonight. But I know he necessity: wouldn’t want to miss the meeting tomorrow. If he doesn’t show up at the meeting, he must have a hangover. â He’s going to have a hangover. â He will have a hangover. but: If he doesn’t show up at the meeting tomorrow, he will (/?is going to) have a hangover. n. Indirect I heard it said he would come tomorrow. evidence: â He’s going to come tomorrow. but: I heard it said he is going to come tomorrow. â He will come tomorrow. but: I heard it said he will come tomorrow. o. Hypotheses (If I were a professor,) I would take a long vacation in summer. & Counter- â I’m going to take a long vacation in summer. factuals â I will take a long vacation in summer.

• Suppose an ideal future tense would (a) occur with FTR in all these contexts but would (b) not occur under non-FTR, neither with any of these modal meanings nor otherwise. Then there would be no reason to assume that any of the modal attitudes of the above examples would be entailed by this marker. In fact, we couldn’t give a coherent modal analysis of the marker in question, except by saying that it conveys “some kind of modal attitude toward FTR”. After application of Occam’s razor, this would equate to saying that the meaning of this morpheme or construction is simply FTR. Q.e.d.

• Of course, it is not likely that the entire set of readings inspected above would ever be conflated in the semantics of a single future tense marker. The set of modal attitudes inspected above is probably way too heterogenous, and the individual readings are too

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inconsistent and partially contradictory among each other.4 However, that does in no way preclude the possibility that a single future tense morpheme might co-occur with morphemes marking all the various modal attitudes listed above.

• Yet, such an ideal future tense has not been attested to date. If it should prove not to exist, that would be an intriguing non-trivial empirical finding about human language, unpredicted by any theory and demanding explanation.

• In the absence of the ability to pursue this question any further, let us examine what the data in (7) can teach us about the two candidates for future tenses of English that have been considered in previous research and that are featured in (7): the will construction and the construction be going to + infinitive.

• In the absence of any further context, the present tense form of will in a finite declarative clause expresses a prediction, and be going to is used to convey intentions (and, as discussed on Day 3, prospective aspect). The be going to construction is compatible with predictions as well, and will is pragmatically possible in intentional contexts.5 Both may also be used to express the subject’s readiness to realize an event, and in reference to events that occur according to a schedule of some kind. Furthermore, in appropriate contexts, they are compatible with utterances that express fears or warnings. In addition, will may be used in the appropriate context to refer to a future event under evidential necessity.

• Will and be going to are not “normally” used, however, to utter permissions, express desires, or talk about obligations or deontic possibility or necessity.6 This means, on the one hand, they are less-than-ideal candidates of future tenses, because their meanings only cover certain portions of the FTR domain. On the other hand, they are

4 There is no theory as of yet that would provide a systematic classification of modal attitudes or criteria that would allow to distinguish them. There is likewise no systematic classification of types of FTR. The list provided above is given under the understanding that it is neither exhaustive nor particularly clear.

5 The question is, though, whether the construal is the same. This seems very hard to assess.

6 “Normally” because we’re treading once again on the calamitous dividing lines between semantics, pragmatics, and world knowledge. Of course you may say I’ll see my dentist tomorrow, and your interlocutor won’t fail to understand that you have an appointment and might cancel it should conditions arise that you deem worthy of such measure. But that implicature cannot be attributed to the use of will or any other part of the expression. See Levinson (2000: 12-21) on the Gricean distinction of generalized and particularized conversational implicatures (only the former directly derive from the use of linguistic structures of a particular kind).

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free from all these other modal shadings. So if they are modal operators, they are operators of predictive and intentional modality.7 But even if that is all their semantics really provides for, their pragmatics seems to go beyond that. Take for example questions about future events, such as the following:

(8) Where will you be / are you going to be / on June 29, 2000, at 2pm?

• Of course it is to some extent possible to mark modal attitudes even in wh-questions. But there is also good reason to believe that there must be neutral ways to ask such questions, and (8) illustrates one way to do it. In this and other situations, there probably must be some default way of referring to the future. As the example shows, will and be going to do the trick in English.

• Independently of this argument from the default category for FTR, there appears to be a general consensus in the recent typological literature (in particular, Bybee, Perkins, & Pagliuca 1991; 1994: ch. 6-7; and Dahl 1985) on the assumption that if a language has a dedicated FTR marker (to wit: a future tense), then the contexts that are the best predictors for the occurrence of this marker are the contexts of prediction and intention. So if we find that in language L, a morpheme or construction is consistently used in the coding of predictions and intentions, but is not obviously restricted to these contexts, and yet is (by and large) restricted to FTR (so it is not used, for example, to talk about past intentions), then we have reason to assume that the category in question is an (impure and perhaps incipient) future tense.

• Conversely, if a morpheme or construction in language L is restricted to any particular of the modal contexts in (7), and/or if it does not cover the putative bona fide instances of FTR, i.e. predictions and intentions, and/or it is clearly not restricted to FTR, and has exactly the same modal meanings that it has under FTR also under past time reference, then there is reason not to consider this marker a future tense.

• The constraint on covering the ‘best instances’ of FTR is methodologically problematic, because it is ad hoc - it is not justified by an independent theory of modality and FTR (to be more precise, it is not predicted by any such theory that these readings are the best instances of FTR, simply because there is no such theory). It is nevertheless important because in many languages, a future tense has grammaticalized

7 And Coates (1983: ch. 7) treats them exactly as that - as ‘modals of volition and prediction’. - A note on terminology: ‘modality’, e.g. ‘irrealis modality’, ‘predictive modality’, etc., denotes a semantic category (or a set of semantic categories). ‘Modal operator’ is polysemous: it refers both to a part of the ‘logical structure’ of the modality (a semantic entity) and to a possible expression of a modality. Mood is traditionally restricted to modalities marked inflectionally.

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out of a marker of obligations (such as English shall).8 The constraint says that in such a case, the marker should not be considered a future tense unless it has been extended to cover contexts of prediction and intention.

• In contrast, the analytical power of the restriction to FTR is in practice much weaker than it might appear to be on face value. This is because many modal attitudes (in particular: obligations, along with desires and fears, permissions, warnings, and others) are inevitably associated with relative FTR:

(9) a. I was afraid that she might leave me. b. I wanted to be a fireman. c. I was supposed to call my boss the next day. d. I was allowed to enter. e. She warned me that the thing might break.

• Even under absolute past time reference, these modal attitudes still concern events in the relative future of the time for which the attitude is asserted. There is therefore no a priori reason why the operators expressing such attitudes should not grammaticalize into relative future tenses. This makes it particularly hard to distinguish between relative future tenses and another cross-linguistically recurrent category that may also extend across various of the modal attitudes of (7): the irrealis. This issue will be explored below.

• Finally, before going on to consider other factors, let’s take a look at the distribution of resources for FTR in a system slightly different from that of English. Like English, Spanish provides three different constructions for the expression of FTR without overt marking of a particular modal attitude (at least according to the reference grammars): the present tense, the so-called simple or synthetic future tense (formed by adding a special series of person desinences to the infinitive), and the so-called analytical future tense, ir a + infinitive, an exact cognate of the English prospective construction.

• The simple future is used for predictions, but also for conjectures, guesses, etc., and is generally said to convey an element of epistemic uncertainty.

(10) a. Lloverá en el norte, y en el sur descenderán las temperaturas. SPA rain(FUT) in the north and in the south descend(FUT) the temperatures ‘There will be rain in the north, and the temperatures in the south will drop.’ (Matte Bon 1992a: 36)

8 See Bybee, Perkins, & Pagliuca (1994: 258-264) for examples and discussion.

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b. Supongo que el jefe vendrá a la reunión. I suppose(PRS) that the boss come(FUT) to the meeting ‘I suppose the boss will come to the meeting.’ (Kattán-Ibarra & Pountain 1997: 424)

• This seems to be a general tendency in Western European languages: predictions are treated on a par with guesses and conjectures, thereby lowering the ‘threshold strength’ of the speaker’s epistemic commitment. However, the synthetic future can also have present time reference, namely in contexts where it serves to express, again, conjectures (inferential modality):

(11) Estará con sus amigos. SPA (s)he be(FUT) with his/her friends ‘He will be with his friends (e.g. tomorrow) / he would/must be with his friends (i.e. now).’ (Matte Bon 1992a: 37)

• This suggests that a monosemous account of the Spanish simple future may involve the notion of inferential modality, but not necessarily FTR.9 The same point will be made below with respect to the werden + infinitive construction in German.

• The so-called simple future of Spanish differs from the English will construction and German werden + infinitive in that it is used with relatively greater preference to express willingness and promises:

(12) Se lo traeré mañana sin falta. SPA to you(POLITE) it I bring(FUT) tomorrow without fail ‘I’ll bring it for you tomorrow without fail.’ (Kattán-Ibarra & Pountain 1997: 83)

• Scheduled events are referred to by present tense forms more regularly than in English:

(13) Esta noche habla el presidente. SPA this night speaks(PRS) the president ‘Tonight the president will speak.’ (Kattán-Ibarra & Pountain 1997: 426)

• The analytical future may also be used in reference to scheduled events, but it’s primary domain is the expression of intentions and plans:

9 But notice that this again presupposes a theory of modality which would ascertain that the modal commitment has indeed a common denominator shared across all uses of the synthetic future. There is no theory, as of yet, that would allow to verify this! - Observe also the interaction of time reference and aspect in the cases in question: the simple future can only have present time reference under imperfective aspect.

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(14) ¿Qué vas a hacer en las próximas vacaciones? SPA what you go(PRS) to do(INF) in the next vacations ‘What are you going to do during the next vacations?’ (Matte Bon 1992b: 171)

• All other modal attitudes towards FTR require the use of modal verbs or adverbs, often in combination with subjunctive mood (which expresses ‘non-assertive’ modality, to be discussed below).

! Theoretical issues: intentions, schedules, possible worlds, branching futures

• Many modalized assertions are in some sense statements about the present (or the ‘topic time’ TT for which the assertion is made) rather than the future. This is in particular true of assertions of intentions, schedules, obligations, desires, etc. For example, for the truth conditions of (15a), it is irrelevant what the speaker does at the time specified inside the scope of the modal operator (next summer) - what matters is that (s)he is entertaining a particular plan at TU. Similarly, a change of the train schedule between TU and the specified time doesn’t clearly invalidate (15b); as long as (15b) confirms to a valid schedule at TU, it can be taken to be a valid statement.

(15) a. I’m planning to write a book on semantics next summer. b. The train to Warsaw leaves at 10am tomorrow.

• In such cases, the time specified inside the scope of the modal operator can’t really be taken as the ‘event time’ or ‘time of the situation’ TSit. No entailment of event realization is made by such statements. The modal operator creates a truth-functionally opaque context for reference to the event (cf. Lyons 1977: 192; Roberts 1986). However, the dating index is nevertheless part of the truth conditions of the statement. In Bohnemeyer (1998a: 372), the term ‘modal time index’ (MTI) is proposed for this phenomenon. With operators of the type illustrated above, TT and the MTI necessarily diverge, just as with a prospective aspect. Schematically, this may be represented as follows:

F1. Temporal interpretation of modal operators with TT-MTI divergence

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• Operators of deontic or epistemic necessity or possibility are generally considered to be quantifiers over possible worlds, the possibility operators being existential quantifiers (“there is a possible world in the model with respect to which the statement is evaluated in which p is true”), the necessity operators universal quantifiers (“p is true in all possible worlds”). Deontic operators concern the realization of events in possible worlds, epistemic operators the truth of propositions (see e.g. Kratzer 1978).

• It might seem that predictions should be operators of either epistemic or deontic necessity. But that is not in any obvious way the case. Predictions typically (arguably, by definition) concern ‘contingent’ events. Suppose the weather forecast says (16):

(16) There will be rain in the north tomorrow.

• The point is that the “weather guy” will be aware that the prediction is only reliable at such-and-such a percentage of chance, and even the exact percentage cannot be determined (humanly according to current standards of knowledge and technology). (It’s not clear how much would be gained by saying that (16) means that it is likely to rain.)

• But (16) could mean something like this: “There’s this rain front moving north, currently at such-and-such speed. There’s this high pressure area in the west, but that hasn’t moved much over the last two days, and I see no reason why it should move in the next 12 hours. Because of the air pressure and the condition of the higher layers of the atmosphere, the day-time temperature in the north has been such-and-such for a while. The temperature and air pressure in the north are such that it would rain if there were rain clouds. Therefore, if the rain front keeps moving like it has been, and the high pressure area doesn’t suddenly move in from the west and pushes it away, and the day-time conditions of the higher layers of the atmosphere over the north don’t change, it will rain in the north tomorrow.” In short, (16) means it must rain “all else being equal”, i.e. “if none of those forces interfere that we know may well interfere but have currently no reason to assume they will”.

• Perhaps this idea is best captured with the notion of inertia worlds (or inertia futures) that Dowty (1979: 145-154) develops when discussing truth conditions for the progressive in contexts such as (17):

(17) The chicken was crossing the street when it was run over by a truck.

• Given that the chicken never did cross the street, what does it mean to utter (17)? According to Dowty, (17) is true if in all the inertia worlds following the moment the

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truck hits, the chicken does cross the street. Inertia worlds are worlds which are exactly like the real world of (17) up to the moment the truck hits, and in which the “future course of events after this time develops in ways most compatible with the past course of events” (148), i.e. in which neither the truck hits nor some other unexpected thing happens. Dowty also ventures a branching-futures model to illustrate this idea: F2. Branching futures à la Dowty (1979: 151)

• PROG (φ) (e.g. (17)) is true at I (e.g. the time the truck hits) iff φ is true at some larger interval in all inertia futures of I. It might be possible to capture the truth conditions of predictions in a similar fashion.

• This approach has a number of further implications of the theory of FTR that remain to be explored. For example, it excludes one type of FTR that in a pre-theoretical sense would certainly seem to instantiate the category of predictions, namely reference to future events that are clearly “disconnected” from the “course of events” at the time the assertion is made (meaning at that time, there is no reason to assume that the event would occur), e.g., possible future events seen in visions or dreams. Perhaps prophecies can serve as a make-shift label for this type of FTR assertions.

! The role of obligatoriness

• Everything that has been said so far goes independently of whether a marker evaluated for being a future tense is obligatorily used whenever FTR is invoked. That is, contrary to widespread belief, there is absolutely no good reason to assume that a true future tense cannot be optional.

• In particular, the fact that will and be going to are not parts of the morphological tense paradigm of English (which is quite simply past -ed or past stem form for the irregular

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verbs vs. non-past form plus person desinences), and that in some cases, the unmarked non-past tense of the lexical verb or of some auxiliary or modal verb is compatible with FTR, has in first approximation nothing to bear on the semantic analysis of these markers - and it is exclusively the latter which has to determine whether or not they express future tenses.

• Will is by itself clearly just another modal verb governing a bare infinitive, just like can, may, and must. It has formally a past tense, would, and can have past time reference in combination with have + participle, under an epistemic-necessity (or inferential modality, indirect evidence, etc.) reading:

(18) He would/?will have left by now.

• None of these facts say anything about whether will + infinitive expresses a future tense. (That is, (18) may, if it can be analysed compositionally. But it is generally assumed that it can’t.)

• A slightly different case is that of German. The unmarked choice in the expression of future time reference in German is the present tense, not the construction werden + infinitive that is considered a future tense in traditional reference grammars. According to Dahl (1985: 110), German is among those languages which do not obligatorily mark future time reference. None of the contexts in (7) requires werden. To express predictions, intentions, scheduled events or willingness, the non-past (‘present’) tense is perfectly fine and indeed the stylistically neutral choice, except that durative verb forms in the non-past tense may receive a present imperfective interpretation unless context prevents that, for example due to the presence of time adverbials:10

(19) a. Wenn du diesen Pilz (jetzt) ißt, bist du morgen mittag tot. GER if youthis mushroomnow eat(PRS) are(PRS) youtomorrow noon dead ‘If you eat this mushroom (now), you will be dead (by tomorrow noon).’

b. Nächstes Jahr schreibe ich ein Buch über Semantik. next year write(PRS) I a book on semantics ‘Next year, I’ll write a book on semantics.’

c. Laut Fahrplan fährt der Zug um zehn. according to the schedule leaves(PRS) the train at ten ‘According to the schedule, the train leaves at ten.’

d. Ich nehme dich mit nach Glasgow.

10 Cf. Ehrich (1992), Klein (1994: 115-116), and Leiss (1992).

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I take(PRS) youalong to Glasgow ‘I’ll give you a lift to Glasgow.’

• At the same time, the werden construction may also be used with present time reference, as a signal that the main proposition is derived by inference. Even if future time reference is obtained, frequently a nuance of supposition is conveyed, as in (20):

(20) Er wird morgen/gerade an seinem Buch arbeiten. GER He FUT tomorrow/right now on his book work(INF) ‘He will work on his book tomorrow / he will be working on his book right now.’

• This makes it possible to provide a monosemous analysis of the werden construction as expressing inferential modality and supposition (as argued e.g. by Vater (1975) and Engel (1988: 468-470)), rather then of future time reference.

• This illustrates the relevance of a particular methodological assumption for this type of analysis: the monosemy bias advocated in Ruhl (1989). This approach does not deny the existence of polysemy, but simply urges the researcher to always start from the assumption that a morpheme or construction has a monosemous meaning, and to attempt a monosemous analysis unless and until it becomes incompatible with the facts. The justification of the monosemous bias derives from Occam’s razor: monosemous analyses are more parsimonious than polysemous ones. However, in lexical semantics, there may be all sorts of reasons that give preference to polysemy. Polysemous accounts may reflect the diachrony of a morpheme or construction more adequately, they may reflect the mental lexicon better, they may simplify the job of syntactic analysis and processing or parsing studies. But in time semantics, if you want to know whether something expresses tense or mood or aspect, the monosemy bias is the framework of choice.

! Modal commitment, non-assertive modality, irrealis

• With the exception of the perfective AM, all AM markers are compatible with coding time as the point of reference, as well as with any topic time prior or subsequent to coding time. Thus, in (3, 21a), the terminative occurs with a reference point in the future of coding time, and in (3, 21b), a prospective is employed for reference to an event in the past of coding time. The same holds for stative clauses, as in (c):

(21) a. Le káa t-uy a’l-ah u ts’o’k-s-ik YUK [DEF káa PRV-A.3 say-CMP(B.3.SG) A.3 end-CAUS-INC(B.3.SG)

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le ba’x k-u bèet-ik-e’, ts’o’k in kim-il. DEF what IMPF-A.3 do-INC(B.3.SG)]-TOP TERM A.1.SG die-INC

‘By the time (lit. (when) it says that) he finishes what he is doing, I shall be dead.’ (Andrade 1955: 118)

b. Le mukah chúun-ul le cha’n-o’, [DEF PROSP(B.3.SG) begin\ACAUS-INC DEF spectatcle]-D2

ba’x t-uy a’l-ah le chàanràaton-o’ (...)? what PRV-A.3 say-CMP(B.3.SG) DEF small mouse-D2

‘While the movie was going to start, what did the little mouse say?’ (Mag_ss /com 1)

c. Ma’ uts kéen k u’y-ik bàab NEG good(B.3.SG) SR.IRR A.1.PL feel-INC(B.3.SG) swim

chéen k’uch-uk-o’n te ha’ sáamal-o’, SR.IRR arrive-SUBJ-B.1.PL LOC:DEF water tomorrow-D2

tuméen inw ohel síis sáamal. CAUSE A.1.SG knowledge cold(B.3.SG) tomorrow

‘Swimming won’t be nice (lit. It’s not nice that we’ll feel swimming) when we get to the water tomorrow, because I know it will be cold.’ (Tama 36 / Futa 8)

• The perfective aspect does not occur with future time reference in main clauses, but it is compatible with reference to events subsequent to coding time when used in subordinate clauses.

(22) Wáah t-in kax-t-ah hun-p’éel-e’ ALT PRV-A.1.SG find-APP-CMP(B.3.SG) one-CL.IN-TOP

k-in tàas-ik tèech. IMPF-A.1.SG come:CAUS-INC(B.3.SG) you

‘If I find one, I will bring it to you.’ (Andrade 1955: 113)

(23) Le káa t-uy a’l-ah u ts’o’k-s-ik DEF káa PRV-A.3 say-CMP(B.3.SG) A.3 end-CAUS-INC(B.3.SG)

le ba’x k-u bèet-ik-e’, ts’o’k in kim-il. DEF what IMPF-A.3 do-INC(B.3.SG)-TOPTERM A.1.SG die-INC

‘By the time he finishes what he is doing, I shall be dead.’ (Andrade 1955: 118)

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D1. The Modal Commitment Constraint: Assertion of the realization of an event posterior to TT requires specification of the speaker’s modal attitude with respect to it. The speaker may mark the assertion as a prediction, or (s)he may assert the target event to occur with necessity, or promise that the target event be realized, etc.

• The MCC does not affect: • reference to future events in non-assertive context (e.g. certain subordinate clauses, as in the above examples) • the use of AM markers that do not entail event realization (e.g. progressive AM, prospective AM, modal AM markers) • the predication of states (e.g. clauses with lexical stative predicates; terminative AM marker)11

• One way to mark modal commitment in FTR: modal AM markers

(24) Modal AM predicates

a. Yan in xok-ik le periyòodiko-o’. Obligative OBL A.1.SG read-INC(B.3.SG) DEF newspaper-D2 ‘I /have/had/will have/ to read the paper’, ‘I will/would read the paper.’

b. Táak in xok-ik le periyòodiko-o’. Desiderative DES A.1.SG read-INC(B.3.SG) DEF newspaper-D2 ‘I /want/wanted/will want/ to read the paper.’

c. He’ in xok-ik le periyòodiko-o’. Assurative ASS A.1.SG read-INC(B.3.SG) DEF newspaper-D2 ‘I /promise/promised/will promise/ to read the paper.’

d. K’a’náan in xok-ik le periyòodiko-o’. Necessitive NEC A.1.SG read-INC(B.3.SG) DEF newspaper-D2 ‘I /need/needed/will need/ to read the paper.’

e. Bíin in xok-E le periyòodiko-o’. Predictive PRED A.1.SG read(SUBJ)(B.3.SG) DEF newspaper-D2 ‘I will/would read the paper.’

11 Stative predications are not affected by the MCC for a purely structural reason: neither aspect nor modality can be marked with them. However, in actual usage, whenever the future realization of a state is at issue, speakers prefer to use a dynamic form that refers to the state in question as the result of a state change, and in this case, the MCC of course applies.

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f. Óolak in xok-E le periyòodiko-o’. Penative PEN A.1.SG read(SUBJ)(B.3.SG) DEF newspaper-D2 ‘I (will have) almost read the paper.’ (Bohnemeyer 1998a: 366-367)

• The obligative AM marker is used to express obligation and to refer to scheduled events. It also seems to function as the default AM marker for FTR in main clauses. The assurative AM marker is used to express willingness and promises. The penative AM marker has a counterfactual meaning. The other markers mean more or less what their labels suggest. Intentions are mainly expressed by using the prospective AM marker mukah (discussed on Day 3).

• But none of these markers expresses future tense. They can all occur with past TTs.12 And even though they have relative FTR, they clearly don’t function as relative future tenses, since they do not entail event realization under past-time reference:

(25) ATe semàanah màan-o’, Pedro-e’ yan ubin YUK LOC:DEF week PRV pass(B.3.SG)-D2 Pedro-TOP OBL A.3 go

Carrillo lùunes. BChéen ba’l-e’ ma’ h yàan-chah Carrillo Monday only thing-TOP NEG PRV EXIST-PROC.CMP(B.3.SG)

tyèempo ti’ u bin tak myèerkoles. CMyèerkoles-e’ káa time LOC A.3 go even Wednesday Wednesday-TOP káa

h bin Carrillo túun. DByèernes-e’ káa t-uy a’l-ah PRV go(B.3.SG) Carrillo CON Friday-TOP káa PRV-A.3 say-CMP(B.3.SG)

Pedroti’ Pablo-e’: E”Yan ka’ch im bin Carrillo lùunes-ak, Pedro LOC Pablo-D3 OBL formerly A.1.SG go Carrillo Monday-ak

chéen ba’l-e’ ma’ h bèey-chah-ih, only thing-TOP NEG PRV thus-PROC.CMP-B.3.SG

tak myèerkoles-ak káa h bin-en.” even Wednesday-ak káa PRV go-B.1.SG

‘ALast week, Pedro, he was to go to Carrillo on Monday. BHowever, he did not find the time to go until Wednesday. CSo on Wednesday, he went to Carrillo. DOn Friday, Pedro said to Pablo, E”I was supposed to go to Carrillo last Monday, but that did not work out,

12 This goes probably with the exception of the predictive AM marker bíin. Predictions cannot be asserted (as opposed to reported or quoted) in retrospect, i.e. with absolute past time reference. For the same reason, a speaker uttering a bíin clause must be absolutely committed to the realization of the event. Notice that this marker does not occur in everyday conversation, but is largely restricted to a genre of prophecies (cf. Bohnemeyer 1998a: 389-396).

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it was only on Wednesday that I (eventually) went”.’ (Bohnemeyer 1998a: 373)

• In a number of contexts that do not allow AM marking (including relative clauses, focus constructions and toplicalized subordinate clauses), FTR and habitual or generic readings elicit the irrealis subordinator kéen. In (26), kéen corresponds to prospective mukah in an unfocussed clause (intention). As the example shows, kéen does not entail event realization. In (27), kéen occurs with habitual reference.

(26) Káa h tàal-ech a xíimbat-en te YUK káa PRV come-B.2.SG A.2 walk:APP-B.1.SG LOC:DEF

semàanah máan-o’, óox-p’éel k’ìin kéen in week PRV pass(B.3.SG)-D2 three-CL.IN sun SR.IRR A.1.SG

mèet-i Mérida ka’ch-il. Chéen ba’l-e’ make(SUBJ)(B.3.SG) Mérida formerly-REL only thing-TOP

ma’ h bin-en-i’, tuméen h tàal-ech tèech. NEG PRV go-B.1.SG-D4 CAUSE PRV come-B.2.SG you

‘(When) you came to visit me last week, I was going to spend three days in Mérida. Only I didn’t go, because you came.’ (Bohnemeyer 1998a: 493)

(27) Pedro-e’ sáan-sáamal-e’ le kéen hàan-ak-e’, Pedro-TOP RED-tomorrow-TOP DEF SR.IRR eat-SUBJ(B.3.SG)-TOP

k-u xok-ik le periyòodiko-o’. IMPF-A.3 read-INC(B.3.SG)DEF newspaper-D2

‘Pedro, every day, (when) he eats, he reads the paper.’ (Bohnemeyer 1998a: 496)

• The irrealis subordinator kéen triggers subjunctive ‘status’ marking on the verb.13 Subjunctive status in turn marks, at least in first approximation, non-assertive modality. Non-assertive modality occurs in declarative clauses whose proposition is blocked from (co-)assertion. Paradigm cases are counterfactual contexts, such as with the ‘penative’ AM marker óolak in (24f), and in the protases of counterfactual conditionals:

13 The Yukatek verb inflection category of ‘status’ conflates an aspectual contrast (bounded vs. unbounded) and a modal contrast (assertive modality vs. non-assertive modality). Cf. Bohnemeyer (1998a: 287-312).

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(28) Wáah káa xi’k-en ka’ch-e’ ts’o’k in kim-il-e’. ALT SR go.SUBJ-B.1.SG formerly-TOP TERM A.1.SG die-INC-D3 ‘If I had gone, I would have died.’ (context: the bus the speaker had missed subsequently had an accident) (Bohnemeyer 1998a: 300)

• The concept of non-assertive modality was first developed in analyses of ‘non-factive’ complement clauses (cf. Hooper 1975, Farkas’s 1992; Kiparsky & Kiparsky 1971; Noonan 1985; Roberts’s 1986; Terrell & Hooper 1974). A paradigm case of grammaticalization of non-assertive modality is the Spanish subjunctive.

(29) a. Permitame que le diga algo. allow(IMP) me that you(POLITE.OBL) I say(SUBJ) something ‘Allow me to tell you something.’ (Kattán-Ibarra & Pountain 1997: 91)

b. Imaginate que te pida dinero. imagine(IMP) you(OBL) that you(OBL) he asks(SUBJ) money ‘Suppose (s)he asks you for money.’ (Kattán-Ibarra & Pountain 1997: 92)

! The subjunctive is also used with hypothetical conditionals and with relative clauses the antecedent of which does not carry existential presupposition:

(30) a. En caso de que necesites ayuda, hablaré con él. in the event that you need(SUBJ) help I speake(FUT) with him ‘If you need help, I’ll speak to him.’ (Kattán-Ibarra & Pountain 1997: 96)

b. No conozco a nadie que tenga tanta paciencia. not I know(PRS) nobody(OBL) that has(SUBJ) so much patience ‘I don’t know anyone who has such patience.’ (Kattán-Ibarra & Pountain 1997: 99)

• Counterfactual conditionals are expressed with past forms of the subjunctive. If the counterfactual protasis has present or future time reference, the imperfect subjunctive is used (b), if it has past time reference, the pluperfect subjunctive (a):

(31) a. Si me lo hubieras pedido te habría ayudado. if me it you had(PLUPERF.SUBJ) asked(PTC) you(OBL) I had(COND) helped(PTC) ‘If you had asked me I would have helped you.’ (Kattán-Ibarra & Pountain 1997: 98)

b. Si te invitaran, ¿aceptarías? if you(OBL) they invite(IMPERF.SUBJ) you accept(COND) ‘If they invited you, would you accept?’ (Kattán-Ibarra & Pountain 1997: 98)

• Finite temporal clauses with (relative) FTR are in the subjunctive:

(32) María se había ido antes de que lo supiera Pablo. María REFL had(IMPERF) gone(PTC) before it knew(IMPERF.SUBJ) Pablo ‘María had left before Pablo knew.’ (Kattán-Ibarra & Pountain 1997: 96)

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• In main clauses, the subjunctive mainly has optative and jussive functions:

(33) Que no tardes mucho. that not you take(SUBJ) time much ‘Don’t take too long. (Lit. Would that you don’t take too long.)’ (Kattán-Ibarra & Pountain 1997: 100)

• In all these cases, the event expressed by the subjunctive-marked VP is not entailed to be realized at TT. In the sense that non-assertive modality always blocks entailments of event realization, it is semantically inevitably associated with irrealis modality. It has even been argued that non-assertiveness is the core meaning of irrealis modality:

“When grams are described in terms of realis/irrealis, the claim is made that these grams are categorizing events as actual or non-actual, as occurring or not in the real world, as though the speaker’s choice of a mood depends on the truth value of the proposition. Considerable evidence suggests that it is not the domain of truth or fact that is the relevant domain for mood, but rather the domain of assertion and non-assertion that is relevant (...) That is, mood does not index the truth value of a proposition in any abstract sense, but rather tells us the extent to which the speaker is willing to ASSERT the truth of a proposition.” (Bybee, Perkins, & Pagliuca 1994: 239)

• The case of Spanish suggests that the existence of a grammatical category of non- assertive modality in a language does not necessarily mean that that category has to cover the bulk of FTR.

• Cases that have been described under the label of irrealis modality may fall outside the scope of non-assertiveness. Many languages use irrealis moods for the entire range of FTR, including e.g. predictions which do make a strong assertive commitment.

• It therefore seems better to reserve the term ‘irrealis modality’ to cases in which an event is referred to as unrealized (or not referred to as realized!) at topic time TT. To the extent that non-assertively modalized propositions do not entail event realization outside the scope of the modal operator, non-assertiveness could then be taken to always imply irrealis.

D2. An event e is realized at a time interval I iff there is an interval I’ such that I is a final subinterval of I’ and e can be asserted at I’. An event e is unrealized at a time interval I iff e is not realized at I.

D3. Irrealis modality is the meaning of a modal operator that entails that an event

Page 21 of 38 Time reference across languages

referred to by an event description inside its scope is unrealized.

• The Yukatek example (26) above shows that irrealis modality is not restricted to absolute FTR, but also covers relative FTR.

FUTURE TIME REFERENCE AND THE REALIS-IRREALIS DISTINCTION

! Burmese

• The realis particles te/th|/ta/hta can only be used with non-FTR: an MCC obtains.

(34) a. S|neineí-taìñ mye’ hpya’-te. BUR Saturday-every grass cut-REALIS ‘(He) cuts the grass every Saturday.’

b. Da-caúñmoú m|-la-ta. that-because of not-come-REALIS ‘Because of that (they) didn’t come.’ (Comrie 1985: 51)14

• For FTR, the irrealis particles me/m|/hma are used:

(35) M|ne’hpañ sá-me. tomorrow begin-IRR ‘(We) will begin tomorrow.’ (Comrie 1985: 51)

• But the irrealis particles me/m|/hma are not restricted to FTR and therefore cannot be future tenses:

(36) a. Hmañ-leíñ-me. BUR be true-undoubtedly-IRR ‘That may well be true.’

b. M|cìhthì sà-hpù-me htiñ-te. tamarind fruit eat-ever-IRR think-REALIS ‘(I) think (he) must have eaten tamarinds before.’ (Comrie 1985: 51)

• Note that in both cases, the irrealis forms do not even have relative FTR, and likewise in both case, the proposition is expressed under non-assertive modality.

! Ewe

14 Comrie gives Okell (1969: 173, 354-357, 424-428) as reference for the Burmese data.

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• In Ewe, unmarked verb phrases have non-future reference (perfective or imperfective, depending on the dynamicity, as illustrated on Day 2).

(37) Dynamic clauses: unmarked forms for perfective reference (a), marked progressive forms EWE for imperfective reference (b-c)

a. Kofí kp] TV ets]. Kofi see TV yesterday ‘Kofi watched TV yesterday.’

b. Esi me-yi k]fí gb] ets] lá é-n] TV kp]-m3. when 1.SG-go Kofi place yesterday TP 3.SG-AUX TV see-PROG ‘When I went to see Kofi yesterday he was watching TV.’

c. Kofí le TV kp]-m3. Kofi AUX TV see-PROG ‘Kofi is watching TV.’ (Essegbey p.c.)

• An MCC obtains: unmarked verb phrases cannot have FTR. Various categories are used for FTR, all of which have modal meanings. The most common one is the ‘potential’ prefix â- (misinterpreted as a future tense in Westermann 1930). As example (c) shows, â- in its turn is not restricted to FTR:

(38) a. Kofí â-yi Ge est]. EWE Kofi POT-go Accra tomorrow ‘Kofí will/may go to Accra tomorrow.’

b. Kofí â-yi Ge xóxó. Kofi POT-go Accra already ‘Kofí would have gone to Accra already.’

c. Tsi â-n] dza-dza-m3 fífíá. water POT-AUX RED-fall-PROG now ‘It may be raining now.’ (Essegbey 1999: 34-35)15

• Essegbey (1999) proposes that â- serves to ‘locate an event in a possible world’. It is, however, not clear that this marker should be considered to express irrealis mood.

! West-Greenlandic

15 The progressive auxiliaries le and n] are glossed ‘present’ and ‘non-present’, respectively, in Essegbey (1999). But as the last example shows, n] also occurs with present time reference. The precise meanings of these items remain to be clarified.

Page 23 of 38 Time reference across languages

• The case of West-Greenlandic is rather similar to that of Ewe: main clause verb forms that carry no morphological markers of aspect or mood have non-future reference. They are perfective or imperfective, depending on the telicity of the verb:

(39) Aspectually unmarked telic verb forms are interpreted perfectively. For imperfective GRE reference, the verb has to be marked, e.g. with ingressive -lir-

a. Tuqu-puq. die-3.SG.IND ‘He died.’

b. Tuqu-lir-puq. die-ING-3.SG.IND ‘He is/was dying.’ (Fortescue 1984: 278)

(40) Conversely, aspectually unmarked atelic verb forms are interpreted imperfectively, and the GRE stems have to be marked for perfective reference, e.g. with -sima-:

a. Aggir-puq. be.coming-3.SG.IND ‘He is/was coming.’ (Fortescue 1984: 272)

b. Aggir-sima-vuq. be.coming-PERF-3.SG.IND ‘He came / has come.’ (constructed)

• For FTR, a variety of different suffixes may be used, all of which have modal meanings and which are not restricted to FTR. The obligative suffix -ssa seems to serve as the default. (4, 41a) shows -ssa expressing obligation, (4, 41b) has -ssa with a predictive interpretation, and in (4, 41c), -ssa has habitual past-time reference.

(41) a. Inna-jaa-ssa-atit. GRE go.to.bed-early-OBL-2.SG.IND ‘You must/shall go to bed early.’ (Fortescue 1984: 292)

b. Tuqu-ssa-atit. die-OBL-2.SG.IND ‘You will die (i.e. if you drink the poison).’ (Fortescue 1984: 274)

c. Mulu-guni mulu-guni tiki-ssa-aq atisa-i stay.away-SS.COND stay.away-SS.COND come-OBL-3.SG.INDclothes-PL.3.SG.POSS

ataniiruti-vis-sima-llutik. be.without.connection-really-PERF-SS.CONT

‘(After) staying away for ages he would arrive home, his clothes all falling apart.’

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(Fortescue 1984: 281)

• The cases of Burmese, Ewe, and West-Greenlandic illustrate that a language may impose a modal commitment constraint, requiring overt marking with FTR, without having to use either a future tense or a general irrealis mood for this purpose.

! Caddo16

• Caddo has two sets of verb prefixes that conflate person and grammatical ‘macro role’ (or ‘case’). One set, labelled ‘realis’ in Chafe (1995), is associated with assertive modality, one with non-assertive modality, termed ‘irrealis’ by Chafe. Every verb form includes exactly one such prefix. Therefore, every verb form is obligatorily marked for ‘realis’ or ‘irrealis’ mood.

• The domain of irrealis mood includes all polar questions, all negative statements, obligations, prohibitions, and conditions:

(42) a. Sah’-yi=bahw-nah? CAD 2.AGENT.IRREALIS-see-PERF ‘Have you seen him?’ (Chafe 1995: 354)

b. Kúy-c’í-t’a-yi=bahw. NEG-1.AGENT.IRREALIS-see ‘I don’t see him.’ (Chafe 1995: 355)

c. Kas-sa-náy=’aw. OBL-3.AGENT.IRREALIS-sing ‘He should/is supposed to sing.’ (Chafe 1995: 356)

d. Kaš-sah’-yi=bahw! PROHIB-2.AGENT.IRREALIS-see ‘Don’t look at it!’ (Chafe 1995: 356)

e. hí-t’a-yi=bahw COND-1.AGENT.IRREALIS-see ‘if I see it’ (Chafe 1995: 356)

• However, there are various markers in the language that Chafe (1995) glosses as ‘future’ tenses, and these co-occur with the realis prefixes:

16 Caddo is spoken nowadays by a few people in Oklahoma. It forms the southern branch of the Caddoan family, whose northern branch includes Wichita and Pawnee.

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(43) a. Ci-yi=bahw-’a’. 1.AGENT.REALIS-see-FUT ‘I’ll look at it.’

b. Ci-yi=bahw- ah. 1.AGENT.REALIS-see-INTENTION ‘I’m going to look at it.’ (Chafe 1995: 358)

• It might therefore seem more appropriate to consider the modal meaning of the Caddo person prefixes one of non-assertive rather than of irrealis modality.

! More complex systems: Dani, Wichita

• It is often argued in descriptive and typological studies that certain languages have, instead of a binary opposition of realis vs. irrealis mood, an n-nary system of distinctions of graded assertiveness or likelihood of event realization. An example is the Dani system described in Foley (1986):17

F3. ‘Status’ marking in Dani according to Foley (1986: 163)

Status

real likely possible

-h -E -l

remote near remote near past past future future

-ik -E -hvp -VkVn

• ‘Status’ is Foley’s term for the super-category of realis and irrealis mood. He gives the following examples to illustrate his analysis of the Dani system:

(44) a. Wat-h-i.

17 Dani is a family of closely related Papuan languages spoken in the central highlands of Irian Jaya in New Guinea. In terms of the modal distinctions of ‘possible’ vs. ‘likely’ vs. ‘real’, with the ‘likely’ category being used for predictions etc., Chafe’s (1995) discussion of the Northern Iroquoian languages (Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, Seneca, and Tuscarora) of New York, Ontario, and Quebec is strikingly similar.

Page 26 of 38 Day 4: future time reference and modality

DAN kill-REALIS-1.SG.A ‘I killed him.’

b. Was-i-i. kill-LIKELY-1.SG.A ‘I will kill him.’

c. Wa’-l-e. kill-POT-1.SG.A ‘I may kill him.’

d. Wat-h-ik-i. kill-REALIS-REM-1.SG.A ‘I killed him long ago.’

e. Was-i-ikin. kill-LIKELY-NEAR-1.SG.A ‘A singular someone will kill him.’

f. Wat-i-hvp. kill-LIKELY-REM.FUT ‘Someone will kill him in the distant future.’ (Foley 1986: 163)

• Predictions are framed, on this account, as being likely to be realized. This is a modal category, provided it occurs also with present or past time reference (which we can’t know based on the data Foley presents).

• Foley assumes a conceptual continuum from real to unreal:

(45) real Z necessary - likely - possible Y unreal (Foley 1986: 158)

• Both the realis and the ‘likely’ category are subdivided by distance-based ‘metrical tense’ distinctions (cf. Day 5). An even more complex system in which tense distinctions are also embedded under modal distinctions is found in the northern Caddoan language Wichita, according to Rood (1975):

Page 27 of 38 Time reference across languages

F4. Wichita verb infection according to Rood (1975: 129).

• This is actually meant by Rood in the sense of a flow chart that determines which combinations of prefixes and suffixes marking mood and evidentiality, tense, and aspect are to be used with what propositions, so it shouldn’t be read as a taxonomy of categories. The terminal nodes of the tree represent the possible combinations of 14 prefixes and 5 suffixes; both prefixes and suffixes range over the entire spectrum of modality, aspectuality, and event order. Note that like in Caddo (which is genetically related to Wichita), the future tenses are not (necessarily) overtly modalized.

A TRUE FUTURE-NON-FUTURE SYSTEM: HUA

• All languages inspected so far today are either tenseless (Caddo, Ewe, West- Greenlandic, Yukatek) or have a basic past-non-past split (with or without an additional weekly grammaticalized future tense). The reverse case, a future-non-future tense system, seems to be exceedingly rare among the languages of the world. Comrie (1985: 49-50) mentions only one instance: Hua (of the Gorokan family of Papuan languages, spoken in the East Highland Province of Papua New Guinea).

• Hua apparently obligatorily uses marked forms for FTR. These have modal meanings, but do not apparently occur with non-FTR:

(46) a. hu+gu+e HUA do.1.SG+PRED+NEUTRAL.DES ‘I will do’

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b. hi+su+e do.1.SG+SUBJ+NEUTRAL.DES ‘may I do, let me do’ Haiman 1980: 141)

• The examples illustrate the contrast of two of the ‘auxiliaries’, gu for predictions and su for wishes.

MODALITY RUNNING THE SHOW OF TIME REFERENCE: TURKISH

• Turkish contrasts a simple past tense, -D , with an indirect-evidence marker -m ş. The latter implies that the speaker has not witnessed the event, but has evidence for it that (s)he does not doubt. Because the evidence is often somehow available to the speaker at the time for which the proposition is asserted, -m ş clauses often have perfect-like aspectual properties (see Slobin & Aksu 1982). By implicature, simple past statements are strengthened in the speaker’s commitment to the truth of the proposition. The indirect-evidence marker occurs, however, also with present and future time reference.

(47) a. John hasta. TUR John sick ‘John is sick.’

b. John hasta-ydõ. John sick-PAST ‘John was sick.’ (Yavas 1980: 9)

(48) a. John evlen-m š. TUR John marry-INEVID ‘John has gotten married (I was told so or it is obvious from circumstantial evidence and I have no reason to doubt it).’

b. John hasta-ym š. John sick-INEVID ‘John is sick (I was told so or it is obvious from circumstantial evidence and I have no reason to doubt it).’

c. John çalõş-õyor-muş. John work-PROG-INEVID ‘John is studying (I was told so or it is obvious from circumstantial evidence and I have no reason to doubt it).’

d. John Türkiye-ye gid-ecek-miş. John Turkey-DAT go-PRES-INEVID ‘John will go to Turkey (I was told so or it is obvious from circumstantial evidence and I have no reason to doubt it).’ (Yavas 1980: 41-42)

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• One way to express predictions is by using the ‘presumption’ marker -(y)EcEk. Like the Spanish simple ‘future’ and the werden construction in German (and, to a lesser extent, the will construction in English), -(y)EcEk is not restricted to FTR. In fact, it also occurs with past time reference.

(49) a. Başla-yacak. TUR begin-PRES ‘(s)he will begin.’

b. John şimdi kütüphane-de ol-acak. John now library-LOC be-PRES ‘John will be at the library now.’

c. John dün-kü sõnav-õ geç-miş ol-acak. John yesterday-REL exam-ACC pass-INEVID be-PRES

ki yüz-ü gül-üyor. COMPL face-pass smile-PROG

‘John must have passed yesterday’s exam, that is why he looks happy.’ (Yavas 1980: 72)18

• The so-called ‘aorist’ in -er occurs with habitual and generic refence.

(50) a. İki kere iki dört ed-er. TUR twotimes twofour make-AOR ‘Two times tow makes four.’ (Yavas 1980: 98)

b. Baba-m iş-e otobüs ile gid-iyor. father-POSS.1.SG work-DATbus with go-PROG ‘My father is going to work by bus.’

c. Baba-m iş-e otobüs ile gid-er. father-POSS.1.SG work-DATbus with go-AOR ‘My father goes to work by bus (e.g. every morning).’ (Yavas 1980: 99)

d. İki sene-dir sigara iç-er-im, twoyear-for cigarette smoke-AOR-1.SG

ama bir kere bile öksür-me-di-m

18 In examples such as this, it is not obvious that -m ş maintains its evidential function. It is often argued that there are really two -m ş, one expressing indirect evidence and one perfect. But this proposal seems somewhat implausible (see e.g. Aksu-Koç 1988). Perhaps the case is one of true polysemy.

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but time even cough-NEG-PAST-1.SG

‘I have smoked for two years (now), but I haven’t coughed even once.’ (Yavas 1980: 100)

• Again, the aorist is not restricted to present or past time reference. With FTR, the aorist may express intention or readiness, in contrast to the -(y)EcEk form, but may also be used to express pure predictions.

(51) a. San-a borç para ver-ece™-im. TUR you-DAT loan money give-PRES-1.SG ‘I’m going to give you money (e.g. as agreed/planned).’

b. San-a borç para ver-ir-im. you-DAT loan money give-AOR-1.SG ‘I’ll give you money (I’m willing to do so).’

c. Ben bu sõnav-dan geç-er-im. I this exam-ABL pass-AOR-1.SG ‘I will pass this exam.’

• Habitual and generic reference appear to be grouped together with irrealis modality in many languages; see Fleischman (1995) and Givón (1994). Another instance of this cross-linguistically recurrent correlation showed up in the Yukatek example (27) above.

INTERACTIONS OF FUTURE TIME REFERENCE, MODALITY, AND ASPECT

• We have seen several instances today of what appears to be non-trivial interactions of modality and aspectuality. One example is the perfective AM marker of Yukatek, which cannot occur with FTR in main clauses, unlike all other aspect markers. Another example is the non-past tense of German, which is out of context ambiguous between FTR and present time reference with telic verb phrases, but has a preference for a present-time interpretation with atelic verb phrases. Now consider the cases of Russian and Greek:

• In Russian, the present (or rather non-past) form of morphologically perfective verbs is used for FTR, as opposed to morphologically imperfective verbs, which express FTR in combination with the auxiliary bud-, which in turn is incompatible with perfective verbs:

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(52) Búdu itát’ stat’jú, nadéjus’, to pro- itáju. RUS FUT I read(IMPF) article(ACC) I hope COMP TERM-I read(PRV) ‘I shall read/be reading the article and hope I shall get it finished.’ (Wade 1992: 298)

• Like Russian, Modern Greek has a marked past and an unmarked non-past form. Both forms can occur with unmarked imperfective as well as marked perfective stems. The imperfective non-past has present progressive and habitual readings. The perfective non-past only occurs with FTR and/or in the scope of modal operators, and has to be accompanied by modal particles. The most simple case is the particle ›a, assumed in Holton et al. (1997) to express future tense, even though it also occurs under past time reference in counter factual conditionals.

(53) a. Graf-o. write.IMPF-1.SG.NONPAST ‘I am writing (right now) / I write (generally).’

b. ›a graf-o. FUT write.IMPF-1.SG.NONPAST ‘I will be writing.’

c. ›a grap-s-o. FUT write-PRV-1.SG.NONPAST ‘I will write.’ (Holton et al. 1997: 221)

• A distribution such as in these Greek and Russian data is often explained with reference to the incompatibility of perfective aspect with present time reference. This incompatibility does not, strictly speaking, obtain across all languages. It does in Greek (A. Giannakidou p.c.), but in Yukatek, for example, the perfective aspect marker is possible with present time reference in the so-called sports-caster scenario:

(54) AMukah-en inw a’l tèech ba’x k-inw il-ik YUK PROSP-B.1.SG A.1.SG say(B.3.SG) youwhat IMPF-A.1.SG see-INC(B.3.SG)

te béentana be’òora-a’. BHun-túul xib+pàal y-éetel LOC:DEF window now-D1 one-CL.AN male+child A.3-with

hun-túul x-ch’úupal táan u bàaxal-o’b te kàaye-o’. one-CL.AN F-female:child PROG A.3 play-3.PL LOC:DEF street-D2

CBe’òora-a’ le xib+pàal-o’ ts’-u ch’a’-ik le now-D1 DEF male+child-D2 TERM-A.3 fetch-INC(B.3.SG) DEF

bòola-o’, i t-u pul-ah te x-ch’úupal-o’. ball-D2 and PRV-A.3 throw-CMP(B.3.SG) LOC:DEF F-female:child-D2

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DBe’òora-a’le x-ch’úupal-o’, t-u pul-ah te now-D1 DEF F-female:child-D2 PRV-A.3 throw-CMP(B.3.SG) LOC:DEF

xib+pàal pàach-il ti’-o’. male+child back-REL LOC(B.3.SG)-D2

‘AI’m going to tell you what I see in the window right now. BA boy and a girl are playing in the street. CRight now, the boy has grabbed the ball, and he throws it to the girl. DNow the girl, she throws it back to the boy.’ (Bohnemeyer 1998a: 324)

• Notice also the following interactions of telicity, event realization, and time reference:

F5. Interactions of telicity, time reference, and event realization

EXERCISES

(55) Some of the languages we looked at today contrast a modally unmarked future tense form with temporally underspecified modal operators. This holds most clearly in the case of Wichita, but may be said as well, with some qualification, of English or Spanish (suppose the will construction were indeed a future tense expression, then the contrast of He will go and He may go would illustrate the point). The existence of the modally marked alternative implies for the use of the modally unmarked future tense marker? What is the mechanism that accounts for this pragmatic relationship? Apply the same analysis to the contrast of the simple past tense and the indirect evidential marker in Turkish!

(56) How exactly is it that the indirect-evidence marker in Turkish comes to be used in instances of past time reference in which English would use a perfect?

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(57) There is a cross-linguistically recurrent alignment between habitual/generic reference and irrealis modality. For example, the so-called aorist of Turkish is used both with FTR and habitual/generic reference; in Yukatek, subordinate clauses with habitual/generic reference take the irrealis subordinator kéen; and in West- Greenlandic, the modal suffix -ssa occurs both with future time reference and with habitual (or e.g. counterfactual) past-time reference. Another much-quoted (but also debated!) instance is the use of would with past time habitual reference. Can you explain what motivates this pattern?

(58) In Central Pomo, a language of the Pomoan family spoken in northern California, realis and irrealis modality are distinguished by two sets of switch-reference markers on the verbs in dependent (though not necessarily syntactically embedded) clauses. Within each set, same subject and different subject are distinguished, and also simultaneity vs. sequential ordering. Discuss the following set of data (involving two questions and two negative assertions) with reference to the question whether the modal distinction made by the switch-reference markers of Central Pomo can be motivated with respect to assertiveness. (You may also want to compare the Central Pomo data to the Caddo data quoted above from Chafe (1995)). Consider the implications of your conclusion for the question of what the relationship between irrealis modality and non-assertive modality is.

a. ’Í=wa ma ša- ó-t=’khe POM be=Q 2.AGENT swinging-whip-MULTIPLE.EVENT=FUTURE ‘Are you gonna whip us

ya-l a="l dé-m-ma-hi? 1.PL-PATIENT house=to lead.PL-M.E.-CO-SAME.IRREALIS when you take us home?’

b. Thaná da"-sé-" 0-ba=wa hand pulling-wash-RFL-SAME.SEQ.REALIS=Q ‘Did you wash your hands and

ma ’é" h’ól-" 0-i-w? 2.AGENT hair comb-RFL-PFV comb your hair?’

c. Ma me"n’í-w hó-w=hla 2.AGENT such do-PFV not-PFV=DIFF.IRREALIS ‘If you don’t do that,

ma bé=da ma" baséÛ, Ûhabá"’ ,i-w ph-wí-w=’ke. 2.AGENT this=at things bad lie-INCH-PFV VIS-perceive-PFV-FUT you’re going to see some bad things happening around here.’

Page 34 of 38 Day 4: future time reference and modality d. Ranch=’el q+dí yhé-t-a + hó-w ’í-n ranch=DEF good do-M.E-IMPF.PL not-PFV be-SAME.SIM.REALIS ‘Because they didn’t keep up the rancheria,

ya-l qó="lm á-w dá-"’- +i-w. 1.PL.PATIENT out=to throw.PL-PFV want-RFL-IMPF.PL-PFV they wanted to throw us out.’ (Mithun 1995: 373-375)

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