Fire Research Fuel Models Fire Research Forecasting Suppression Costs Smoke Management
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California Fire Siege 2007 an Overview Cover Photos from Top Clockwise: the Santiago Fire Threatens a Development on October 23, 2007
CALIFORNIA FIRE SIEGE 2007 AN OVERVIEW Cover photos from top clockwise: The Santiago Fire threatens a development on October 23, 2007. (Photo credit: Scott Vickers, istockphoto) Image of Harris Fire taken from Ikhana unmanned aircraft on October 24, 2007. (Photo credit: NASA/U.S. Forest Service) A firefighter tries in vain to cool the flames of a wind-whipped blaze. (Photo credit: Dan Elliot) The American Red Cross acted quickly to establish evacuation centers during the siege. (Photo credit: American Red Cross) Opposite Page: Painting of Harris Fire by Kate Dore, based on photo by Wes Schultz. 2 Introductory Statement In October of 2007, a series of large wildfires ignited and burned hundreds of thousands of acres in Southern California. The fires displaced nearly one million residents, destroyed thousands of homes, and sadly took the lives of 10 people. Shortly after the fire siege began, a team was commissioned by CAL FIRE, the U.S. Forest Service and OES to gather data and measure the response from the numerous fire agencies involved. This report is the result of the team’s efforts and is based upon the best available information and all known facts that have been accumulated. In addition to outlining the fire conditions leading up to the 2007 siege, this report presents statistics —including availability of firefighting resources, acreage engaged, and weather conditions—alongside the strategies that were employed by fire commanders to create a complete day-by-day account of the firefighting effort. The ability to protect the lives, property, and natural resources of the residents of California is contingent upon the strength of cooperation and coordination among federal, state and local firefighting agencies. -
Post-Fire Treatment Effectiveness for Hillslope Stabilization
United States Department of Agriculture Post-Fire Treatment Forest Service Rocky Mountain Effectiveness for Research Station General Technical Hillslope Stabilization Report RMRS-GTR-240 August 2010 Peter R. Robichaud, Louise E. Ashmun, and Bruce D. Sims A SUMMARY OF KNOWLEDGE FROM THE Robichaud, Peter R.; Ashmun, Louise E.; Sims, Bruce D. 2010. Post-fire treatment effectiveness for hill- slope stabilization. Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-240. Fort Collins, CO: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station. 62 p. Abstract This synthesis of post-fire treatment effectiveness reviews the past decade of research, monitoring, and product development related to post-fire hillslope emergency stabilization treatments, including erosion barri- ers, mulching, chemical soil treatments, and combinations of these treatments. In the past ten years, erosion barrier treatments (contour-felled logs and straw wattles) have declined in use and are now rarely applied as a post-fire hillslope treatment. In contrast, dry mulch treatments (agricultural straw, wood strands, wood shreds, etc.) have quickly gained acceptance as effective, though somewhat expensive, post-fire hillslope stabilization treatments and are frequently recommended when values-at-risk warrant protection. This change has been motivated by research that shows the proportion of exposed mineral soil (or conversely, the propor- tion of ground cover) to be the primary treatment factor controlling post-fire hillslope erosion. Erosion barrier treatments provide little ground cover and have been shown to be less effective than mulch, especially during short-duration, high intensity rainfall events. In addition, innovative options for producing and applying mulch materials have adapted these materials for use on large burned areas that are inaccessible by road. -
Community Wildfire Protection Plan and Other Natural Disasters
Laguna Beach Community Wildfire Protection Plan And Other Natural Disasters Table of Contents I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 3 1. Laguna Beach History......................................................................................................... 3 2. Covered Area ...................................................................................................................... 3 3. CWPP Purpose .................................................................................................................... 3 II. CITY RECOMMENDATIONS.............................................................................................. 3 1. Fire ...................................................................................................................................... 3 2. Floods ................................................................................................................................ 39 3. Tsunamis ........................................................................................................................... 41 4. Earthquakes ....................................................................................................................... 47 5. Evacuation Plan ................................................................................................................ 53 III. PUBLIC RESOURCES ................................................................................................... -
Cert Petition
No. 18-____ IN THE Supreme Court of the United States SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent. On Petition for a Writ Of Certiorari to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI Jeffrey N. Boozell Kathleen M. Sullivan QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART Counsel of Record & SULLIVAN, LLP Stephanie N. Solomon 865 S. Figueroa St., 10th Floor QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART Los Angeles, CA & SULLIVAN, LLP (213) 443-3200 51 Madison Ave., 22nd Floor New York, NY 10010 (212) 849-7000 kathleensullivan@ quinnemanuel.com April 30, 2019 Counsel for Petitioner i QUESTION PRESENTED Whether it is an uncompensated taking for public use in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend- ments for a State to impose strict liaBility for inverse condemnation on a privately owned utility without ensuring that the cost of that liaBility is spread to the Benefitted ratepayers. ii PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING The following were parties to the proceeding Be- fore the California court of appeal: 1. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (“SDG&E”), Peti- tioner in this Court, was Petitioner Below. 2. The Public Utilities Commission of the State of California, Respondent in this Court, was Respond- ent Below. 3. Protect Our Communities Foundation was a Real Party in Interest Below. 4. The Utility Reform Network was a Real Party in Interest Below. 5. Utility Consumers Action Network was a Real Party in Interest Below. 6. Ruth Hendricks was a Real Party in Interest Below. 7. San Diego Consumers’ Action Network was a Real Party in Interest Below. -
PROPOSED DECISION Agenda ID #15940 (Rev
ALJ/SPT/SL5/ek4 PROPOSED DECISION Agenda ID #15940 (Rev. 1) Ratesetting 11/30/20172017, Item #40 Decision PROPOSED DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES’ TSEN AND GOLDBERG (Mailed 8/22/17) BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA Application of San Diego Gas & Electric Company (U902E) for Authorization to Application 15-09-010 Recover Costs Related to the 2007 Southern California Wildfires Recorded in the Wildfire Expense Memorandum Account (WEMA). DECISION DENYING APPLICATION 198906427197851767 - 1 - RA.15-09-010 ALJ/SPT/SL5/ek4 PROPOSED DECISION (Rev. 1) Table of Contents Title Page DECISION DENYING APPLICATION 1 PROPOSED DECISION DENYING APPLICATION 2 Summary 2 1. Factual Background 2 2. Procedural Background 3 3. Burden of Proof 8Legal Standards Applied9 4. Reasonableness Review: Prudent Manager Standard 9 5. Discussion and Analysis 911 5.1.4.1. Witch Fire 911 5.1.1.4.1.1. Witch Fire Background 911 5.1.2.4.1.2.SDG&E’s Position on its Operation and Management of its Facilities 4.1.3 ORA’s Position on SDG&E’s Operation and Management of its Facilities Prior to the Witch Fire 1321 5.1.3.4.1.4.Intervenors’ Position on SDG&E’s Operation and Management of its 5.1.4.4.1.5.Reasonableness Review: SDG&E’s Operation and Management of its 5.2.4.2. Guejito Fire 2729 5.2.1.4.2.1. Guejito Fire Background 27 5.2.2. SDG&E’s Position on its Operation and Management of its Facilities Prior to the Guejito Fire 29 5.2.3. -
Wildfires City of Newport Beach, California SECTION 8: WILDFIRES
Natural Hazards Mitigation Plan Section 8 – Wildfires City of Newport Beach, California SECTION 8: WILDFIRES Table of Contents Why Are Wildfires a Threat to Newport Beach? ............................................ 8-1 Historic Fires in Newport Beach and Vicinity ......................................................................... 8-1 Historic Fires in California ............................................................................................................ 8-2 Wildfire Characteristics ..................................................................................... 8-6 The Interface ................................................................................................................................... 8-6 Fuel ..................................................................................................................................................... 8-7 Topography ...................................................................................................................................... 8-7 Weather ............................................................................................................................................ 8-8 Urban Development ....................................................................................................................... 8-8 Wildfire Hazard Identification and Regulatory Context................................. 8-9 HUD Study System ....................................................................................................................... -
The 2007 Southern California Wildfires: Lessons in Complexity
fire The 2007 Southern California Wildfires: Lessons in Complexity s is evidenced year after year, the na- ture of the “fire problem” in south- Jon E. Keeley, Hugh Safford, C.J. Fotheringham, A ern California differs from most of Janet Franklin, and Max Moritz the rest of the United States, both by nature and degree. Nationally, the highest losses in ϳ The 2007 wildfire season in southern California burned over 1,000,000 ac ( 400,000 ha) and property and life caused by wildfire occur in included several megafires. We use the 2007 fires as a case study to draw three major lessons about southern California, but, at the same time, wildfires and wildfire complexity in southern California. First, the great majority of large fires in expansion of housing into these fire-prone southern California occur in the autumn under the influence of Santa Ana windstorms. These fires also wildlands continues at an enormous pace cost the most to contain and cause the most damage to life and property, and the October 2007 fires (Safford 2007). Although modest areas of were no exception because thousands of homes were lost and seven people were killed. Being pushed conifer forest in the southern California by wind gusts over 100 kph, young fuels presented little barrier to their spread as the 2007 fires mountains experience the same negative ef- reburned considerable portions of the area burned in the historic 2003 fire season. Adding to the size fects of long-term fire suppression that are of these fires was the historic 2006–2007 drought that contributed to high dead fuel loads and long evident in other western forests (e.g., high distance spotting. -
Major Fires in San Diego County History
Major fires in San Diego County history September 1913: Barona fire burned 65,470 acres. September 1928: Witch Creek fire near Santa Ysabel charred 33,240 acres. September 1928: Beauty Peak fire near the Riverside County border in the North County blackened 67,000 acres. October 1943: Hauser Creek fire in the Cleveland National Forest, at least 9 firefighters dead (including 7 marines), 72 injuries and 10,000 acres burned. August 1944: Laguna Junction fire burned 60,000 acres August 1950: Conejos Fire charred 64,000 acres. [Month unknown] 1952: Cuyamaca fire burned 64,000 acres November 1956: Inaja fire killed 11 firefighters and burned 43,904 acres near Julian. September 26-Oct. 3 1970: The Laguna fire, the county's largest fire in modern times, burned 175,425 acres, killed eight people and destroyed 382 homes. In 24 hours the fire burned from near Mount Laguna into the outskirts of El Cajon and Spring Valley. September 1978: PSA Crash in North Park June 1985: Normal Heights fire destroyed or damaged 116 houses, causing $8.6 million in damage. October 1993: Guejito fire east of Escondido charred 20,000 acres and destroyed 18 houses. Estimated $1.25 million damage. October 1996: Harmony Grove fire burned 8,600 acres, from Harmony Grove west of Escondido to La Costa, destroying nearly 110 homes and killing one man. August 1997: Lake Wohlford fire northeast of Escondido - an arson blaze - destroyed seven houses and burned 500 acres. October 1999: La Jolla Fire (La Jolla Indian Reservation) burned approximately 7,800 acres and 1 firefighter died. -
Evergreen Fire Protection District Jefferson and Clear Creek Counties, Colorado
2020 Evergreen Fire Protection District Jefferson and Clear Creek Counties, Colorado F Community Wildfire Protection Plan EVERGREEN FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT COMMUNITY WILDFIRE PROTECTION PLAN 2020 UPDATE Prepared for Evergreen Fire/Rescue 1802 Bergen Pkwy, Evergreen, Colorado 80439 Prepared by Forest Stewards Guild 170 2nd Street SW Loveland, CO 80537 1 CONTENTS Evergreen Fire Protection District ............................................................................................................................1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................5 Evergreen’s Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) .......................................................................................................6 Fire History ..................................................................................................................................................................8 Catastrophic Wildfire – Common Factors .........................................................................................................9 Ignition Prevention ................................................................................................................................................. 10 Evergreen’s Preparedness for Wildfire ................................................................................................................. 11 Community Accomplishments since first CWPP ......................................................................................... -
Volume-1-San-Diego-Main-Report
Folsom (Sacramento), CA Management Consultants Regional Fire Services Deployment Study for the CountyCounty ofof SanSan DiegoDiego OfficeOffice ofof EmergencyEmergency ServicesServices Volume 1 of 3 – Main Report May 5, 2010 2250 East Bidwell St., Ste #100 Folsom, CA 95630 (916) 458-5100 Fax: (916) 983-2090 This page was intentionally left blank TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page VOLUME 1 of 3 – (this volume) PART ONE—EXECUTIVE SUMMARY i. Executive Summary ......................................................................................... 1 Policy Choices Framework .................................................................... 2 Overall Attributes of the County of San Diego’s Fire Services............. 2 Accomplishments to Date ...................................................................... 3 Main Challenges..................................................................................... 3 Fire Plan Phasing.................................................................................. 17 ii. Comprehensive List of Findings and Recommendations ........................... 19 PART TWO—PROJECT BACKGROUND Section 1 Introduction and Background to the Regional Deployment Study .......................................................................................... 37 1.1 Project Approach and Research Methods.................................. 38 1.2 Report Organization................................................................... 38 1.3 Project Background................................................................... -
Lessons from the October 2003 Wildfires in Southern California
Lessons from the October 2003 Wildfires in Southern California Jon E. Keeley, C.J. Fotheringham, and Max A. Moritz The Southern California fires of late Oct. 2003 burned 742,000 ac and destroyed 3,361 homes is the focus of this article. and 26 lives. Factors leading up to this event were very different between forests, which com- prised about 5% of the area burned, and shrublands. Three lessons are (1) although these Separating Forest Fires from Shrubland fires were massive, they were not unprecedented, and future fires of this magnitude are to be Burning expected; (2) the current fire management policy is not effective at preventing these massive These southern California fires fires; and (3) future developments need to plan for these natural fire events much the same burned through diverse plant commu- way we currently incorporate engineering solutions to earthquakes and other natural cata- nities. The proportion of different veg- strophes. etation types was not proportional to ABSTRACT the media coverage and thus there is widespread belief that these were forest Keywords: firestorm; fuel mosaics; historical fires; Santa Ana winds; policy fires. However, coniferous forests com- prised only about 5% of the total acreage burned (frap.cdf.ca.gov). he southern California fires of interface. A total of 3,361 homes and 26 Media focus on these forest fires was late Oct. 2003 were, cumula- lives were lost in this event. It is without undoubtedly due to the fact that they Ttively, the single largest event in a doubt the costliest disaster to befall burned in unnaturally intense and California’s recent history. -
News Headlines 11/9/2016
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ News Headlines 11/9/2016 Measure A: Town voters say yes to fire tax - overwhelmingly Family of 6 displaced in San Bernardino apartment fire Firefighters Rescue Man Pinned Under SUV These 13 states have the most homes at risk from wildfires 2016 Wildfire Season Not Likely to Top Record-Setting 2015 Season 1 Measure A: Town voters say yes to fire tax - overwhelmingly Matthew Cabe, Daily Press Posted: November 8, 2016, 12:01 AM APPLE VALLEY — Voters are saying yes to the tax measure designed to bolster emergency services in the town, according to unofficial election results posted at 10 p.m. Tuesday. With more than 34 percent of precincts reporting, Measure A has received overwhelming approval, amassing 10,364 votes, which translates to 77 percent of the vote, according to the San Bernardino County Elections Office. Measure A needed a two-thirds majority to pass. Doug Qualls — former Apple Valley Fire Protection District Chief and Measure A’s principal officer — told the Daily Press things are “going well” in the district as a result of the voting. “The threshold of reaching two-thirds of the voters is an extraordinary effort,” Qualls said. “To get two-thirds of the people to agree on something, and we far exceeded that expectation, that’s by commitment to the community.” Qualls called Tuesday’s outcome the result of a reality wherein fire stations need to be reopened; currently just three of the district’s seven fire stations are opened, and emergency-response times are below the national averages. “In 1997,” Qualls said, “the fire district promised the voters that they would deliver the best service they can deliver with the resources provided.