Nationalism and Nostalgia in the Tatar Republic
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Nationalism and Nostalgia in the Tatar Republic By Charles J. Sullivan Doctoral Candidate in Political Science The George Washington University Comparative Politics Workshop Work in Progress Please Do Not Cite or Circulate --Abstract-- The purpose of this essay is to offer an analysis concerning the extent to which as well as the reasons why ethnic minorities of the Russian Federation (namely Tatars) harbor feelings of nostalgia for the Soviet Union today. Accordingly, I hypothesize that in spite of the rampant nationalism which gripped the Tatar populace in the wake of the Soviet collapse such sentiments have since faded from the political scene, only to be replaced by feelings of nostalgia for the Soviet Union. On this point, I contend that instead of longing for the establishment of an independent republic, many Tatars instead prefer for a return to Soviet rule, primarily because they yearn for the social protections of the Soviet welfare state. In terms of methodology, this essay presents an overview of survey research conducted by the Levada Analytical Center in May of 2012 at my request alongside my fieldwork carried out in Kazan (the administrative center of the Republic of Tatarstan) in both October-November of 2011 and January of 2013. 1 Rumor has it that President Boris Yeltsin ordered the deployment of Russian tanks along the border of the Republic of Tatarstan in March of 1992, just after Tatar President Mintimer Shaimiev along with sixty-one percent of the population of this former Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic declared their homeland to be sovereign.1 In quoting Colton (2008), Shaimiev, who initially had supported the 1991 August coup plotters but only embraced the Tatar nationalist cause after it became evident that the putsch would fail, admitted that “the night before the vote was the scariest of his life.”2 In retrospect, it is rather ironic that the Tatars (Russia’s largest ethnic minority),3 who Yeltsin had told earlier in the midst of his battling against General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to “take as much sovereignty as they could swallow,” did just that after he assumed the presidency.4 Yet somehow, in the eleventh hour, Kazan was spared the terrible fate that befell Grozny, the capital of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, several years later. More than twenty years later, the Republic of Tatarstan, once Russia’s most restive ethnic republic prior to the onset of the Chechen Wars, is shockingly quite docile today. In truth, much has changed over the course of the past generation. Tatars are no longer calling for their independence, Shaimiev (who served as president until March of 2010) has departed from the highest office, the Day of Sovereignty is no longer celebrated as an official public holiday, and the capital of Kazan (which hosted the 2013 Summer Universiade Games) has recently 1 Daniel Treisman, The Return: Russia’s Journey from Gorbachev to Medvedev (New York: Free Press, 2011), 276. In regards to the referendum, the question posed to the Tatar population was as follows: “Do you agree that the Republic of Tatarstan is a sovereign state, a subject of international law, building its relations with the Russian Federation and other republics and states on the basis of treaties between equal partners?” See Sabirjan Badretdinov, “Tatarstan Sovereignty, Twenty Years Later,” The Kazan Herald (21 Mar. 2012), <http://kazanherald.com/2012/03/21/tatarstan-sovereignty-twenty-years-later/> (Accessed 18 Jun. 2013). 2 Timothy J. Colton, Yeltsin: A Life (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 270-271. 3 According to the results of the 2010 Russian Census, Tatars constitute the largest ethnic minority in the Russian Federation, comprising 20.3% of all ethnic minorities. See “Russian Census 2010 Final Results,” RIA Novosti (2013), <http://en.rian.ru/infographics/20111222/170405728.html> (Accessed 17 Jun. 2013). 4 Colton, Yeltsin, 270. 2 undergone somewhat of a religious revitalization. Nowadays, the minarets of mosques dot the skyline of this predominantly Muslim federal subject, while the Islamic Call to Prayer echoes across the city throughout the hours of the day. Newlyweds of the Islamic faith are also permitted to marry within their respective places of worship (though a religious ceremony carries no legal authority in the eyes of the Russian state) and practice their religion quite freely. In fact, Tatars (regardless for the most part as to whether they are practicing Muslims) annually observe Islamic holidays such as Ramadan and Eid al-Adha (or Kurban Bayram), and the most pious (or financially endowed) can make the pilgrimage to Mecca (a journey sponsored by the Tatar government) if they so choose. In brief, Tatarstan in general and Kazan in particular appear to be very far away from the Soviet Union, that is, at first glance anyways. However, upon closer inspection, feelings of Soviet nostalgia run very deep in Tatarstan, and very much so among Tatars. Overall, the purpose of this essay is to offer an analysis concerning the extent to which as well as the reasons why ethnic minorities of the Russian Federation (namely Tatars) harbor feelings of nostalgia for the Soviet Union today. Accordingly, I hypothesize that in spite of the rampant nationalism which gripped the Tatar populace in the wake of the Soviet collapse such sentiments have since faded from the political scene, only to be replaced by feelings of nostalgia for the Soviet Union. On this point, I contend that instead of longing for the establishment of an independent republic, many Tatars instead prefer for a return to Soviet rule, primarily because they yearn for the social protections of the Soviet welfare state. Methodologically speaking, this essay presents an overview of survey research conducted by the Levada Analytical Center in May of 2012 at my request alongside my fieldwork carried 3 out in Kazan in both October-November of 2011 and January of 2013.5 In terms of an outline, I initially set out to discuss the concept of “nostalgia” and review some scholarly works on this topic of study. Thereafter, I present my survey findings, revealing the extent to which Russian citizens in general and ethnic minorities in particular harbor feelings of Soviet nostalgia today. Upon doing so, I then present my fieldwork findings and engage in a discussion pertaining to how Russians in general and Tatars in particular evaluate the prevailing socioeconomic order in post-Soviet Russia. Lastly, I conclude with a summary of my research findings, coupled with a brief discussion on the future of Soviet nostalgia as a phenomenon in contemporary Russian society. Nostalgia for the USSR Over the course of the past two decades, Russia has undergone a dramatic transformation. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly renamed Communist Party of the Russian Federation has come to serve as a loyal opposition party within Russia’s new political system, the Stalinist command economy has been replaced with a new statist market economy, and many Russian citizens have chosen to venture outside of their country in search of a better life. On the surface, it thus appears as if most people view the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as an extinct entity. Yet if one tours the streets of any city in Russia today, they can see that pieces of the USSR remain very much alive. The vast majority of Russia’s population still resides in 5 In total, my May 2012 survey consists of 1,604 participants and includes a nationally representative sampling of 130 cities and towns across the Russian Federation. I conducted thirty interviews in the Republic of Tatarstan (twenty in October - November 2011 and ten in January 2013). In terms of recruitment, prospective candidates were initially asked by local contacts of mine if they would like to participate in my study by agreeing to sit for an interview. Interviews were then scheduled with those who expressed interest to take part in my study. All interviewees were provided with Russian language consent forms prior to participating in my interviews. 4 Soviet era apartment units. City districts continue to bear the names of Kirov, Dzerzhinsky, Voroshilov and other prominent Soviet era figures. Statues of V.I. Lenin and grandiose memorials commemorating the Soviet Union’s victory in the Second World War remain erect. And although the Marxian ideal of “from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs” appears to ring quite hollow, many people nonetheless express feelings of admiration towards the Soviet Union. In my observance of such features, I thus pose the following research question: To what extent does the Russian citizenry yearn for the USSR today, and why do some Russian citizens long for a return to the Soviet Union? In the spirit of social scientific investigation, I begin my analysis by defining my key concept, that being Soviet nostalgia. Perhaps the most interesting thing about nostalgia as it is discussed in political science today is that it has yet to be truly defined.6 On this point, scholars commonly reference nostalgia in studies concerning post-Soviet Russia, but only in a passive manner. For instance, Mendelson and Gerber (2005-2006) argue that the presence of Soviet nostalgia is somehow hindering Russia’s prospects in terms of experiencing democratic consolidation. Yet nowhere in their work do they actually define Soviet nostalgia. Instead, much of their analysis focuses on how Stalin is remembered by the Russian populace, popular opinions on democracy and authoritarianism, and how U.S. developmental aid should be targeted so as to achieve greater headway in terms of promoting democratic ideals and values (particularly among the Russian youth).7 In contrast, I maintain that just because some Russians view Stalin in a positive light does not necessarily imply that they also harbor feelings of nostalgia towards the Soviet Union.