Psychological Review >85 b> the American Psychological Association, Inc. 1985. Vol. 92. No. 3. 389-413 0033-205X/85/M0.75

Prime Theory: An Integrated View of Motivation and Emotion

Ross Buck University of Connecticut

Motivation and emotion are viewed as different aspects of a single process in which emotion involves the "readout" of motivational potential inherent in hierarchically organized primary motivational/emotional systems (primes). The most basic readout, Emotion 7, involves adaptive-homeostatic functions. In species where communication about the state of certain primes became important, Emotion II, involving their outward expression, evolved. With cognition, a third type of readout evolved, Emotion III, involving the direct experience of certain primes. A model of the interaction between primes and cognition is presented, and the unique role of language in human motivation-emotion is discussed.

In recent years there has been a virtual models include that of Stellar (1954), which explosion of new information relevant to the posited specific drive systems for hunger, analysis of motivation and emotion that has thirst, and sex, based on excitatory and in- left attempts at theoretical integration far hibitory centers within the hypothalamus; behind. In the realm usually termed motiva- arousal theory (Hebb, 1955; Lindsley, 1957), tion, there has been increasing realization based on the brainstem reticular formation; that behavior can be initiated by external and the analyses of reward-punishment stimuli and cognitive processes as well as by mechanisms, beginning with J. Olds and Mil- the biological deficits that have served as the ner (1954). Each of these models has proved cornerstone of the drive-reduction model. useful and has gained some degree of empir- Mogenson and Phillips (1976) pointed out ical support, but none is sufficient to consti- that any contemporary analysis of motivation tute a general physiological model of moti- must account for behavior based on the ex- vation. pectation of reward (incentive motivation: At the same time, there have been events Bindra, 1968; Bolles, 1972) and for adaptive that have made the concept of emotion behavior that anticipates homeostatic deficits more acceptable to behaviorally oriented psy- before they occur. The apparent ability of chologists. Darwin's (1872/1965) theory in animals to make responses that anticipate Expression of the Emotions in Man and their needs suggests that they must use pro- Animals formed the basis of several proposi- cesses that "represent within the brain the tions that have gained considerable support: nature of the outside world" (Oatley, 1973, (a) Emotion is based on activity in neuro- p. 12). In this article I argue that such chemical systems in the central nervous sys- processes involve phenomena that have been tem, (b) these systems are the product of traditionally relegated to the realm of emo- evolution and reflect survival requirements tion. within each species, and (c) activity in these The major physiological models of moti- systems can be modified by learning. These vation have generally avoided the concept of basic elements appear in Tomkins's (1962, emotion, with its taint of subjectivism. These 1963) pioneering theory of affect, in Izard's (1971, 1977) evolutionary-develop- mental view of emotion, and in Ekman and I would like to thank a number of colleagues including Reuben Baron, Paul Ekman, Phoebe Ellsworth, several Friesen's (1969, 1975) neurocultural theory, anonymous reviewers, and particularly, Carroll Izard and and they are consistent with much recent the Editor for their valuable comments and suggestions work in ethology (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1970, 1972). on this article. These investigators have demonstrated that Requests for reprints should be sent to Ross Buck, Department of Communication Sciences, Box U-85, 850 the facial and gestural expressions associated Bolton Road, University of Connecticut, Starrs, Connec- with certain basic emotional/motivational ticut 06268. states or primary affects are widely generalized

389 390 ROSS BUCK within the human species, thus supporting a neocortex). More recent analyses of central major thesis of Darwin's. However, these nervous system mechanisms of emotion, such investigators have not considered the physio- as those of Gray (1982) and Panksepp (1981, logical bases of emotion in great detail, tend- 1982), can be viewed as progressive develop- ing to emphasize facial expression and other ments of this general line of reasoning. expressive movements in their studies of This article suggests a basis for integrating emotion. Also, they have typically emphasized these various views of motivation and emotion specific primary emotions or affects (such as in terms of a readout of information relevant Ekman's happiness, sadness, fear, anger, sur- to bodily adaptation and homeostasis (Buck, prise, disgust) as distinct from drives (hunger, 1980, 198la, 1984a, 1984b). It is not argued thirst, sex). that any of these views is incorrect, rather Another major type of approach to emotion that they are substantially correct as far as emphasizes the role of cognition in interaction they go, but that they are incomplete and with physiological factors. This approach has that it is possible to arrive at a comprehensive ties to the classical James-Lange theory of model of motivation and emotion by taking emotion (James, 1884), which posited that aspects of each of these views into account. the subjective experience of emotion involves The goal of this article is to present an the cognitive awareness of bodily responses. integrated way of thinking about motivation Schachter's (1964) self-attribution theory and and emotion in their various physiological, Lazarus's (1966) theory of coping have ana- expressive, and cognitive aspects. It is not my lyzed emotion in terms of the cognitive ap- intention to suggest specific hypotheses that praisal and labeling of external and internal derive from the present position or data that stimuli. Mandler (1975) and Averill (1980), would disconfirm it. I would hope instead among others, have expanded on this theme. that this position is judged by its ability to This approach is powerful and is able to serve as a metatheory, an integrative mecha- address a wide range of phenomena. However, nism to show the relation between theories as we shall see, it cannot easily deal with that are designed to handle more specific emotional phenomena that seem to be a ranges of phenomena. No new information product of brain activity alone. is being presented; rather, this is an attempt A third type of theory of emotion, empha- to organize concisely and efficiently what is sizing central nervous system mechanisms, known and, in so doing, to present a new derives from the classic position of W. B. and coherent way of looking at the phenom- Cannon (1927). In contrast with James, Can- ena of motivation and emotion. non argued that emotional stimuli cause brain This article is structured in a series of changes that, among other things, are a direct propositions with their associated reasoning source of subjective emotional experience. and documentation being relatively brief and Cannon suggested that emotional stimuli often limited to a few explanatory sentences cause subcortical systems to simultaneously with references. The intent is to present a and independently inform the cortex (result- general viewpoint without becoming involved ing in emotional experience) and the relevant with extended discussions of specific points. peripheral bodily systems (resulting in bodily responses). Papez (1937) suggested that the bodily response involves the hypothalamus, General Nature of Primary Motivational/ which controls the autonomic and endocrine Emotional Systems systems, whereas the experience of emotion involves the limbic system. MacLean (1968, 1970, 1973, 1981) later proposed the triune Biologically based primary motivational/ theory, which views the brain as a hierarchy emotional systems (primes) have evolved that has appeared successively over the course within each species with the basic role of of evolution: a reptilian portion (brain-stem, bodily adaptation and maintenance of ho- midbrain, and basal ganglia), a paleomam- meostasis. The common characteristics of malian portion (including the limbic system), primes may be summarized as follows: (a) and a neomammalian portion (including the They evolve according to requirements for MOTIVATION AND EMOTION 391 bodily adaptation and homeostasis, (b) they nal stimuli, including what have been termed involve active internal processes, (c) they tmpisms, taxes, endogenous automatic move- generally require internal or external stimuli ments, and reflexes (cf. Cofer & Appley, to become activated, (d) they are based on 1964). These are based on relatively simple innate mechanisms organized in the subcorti- neural systems and perform highly specific cal and paleocortical regions of the brain, functions vital to the organism. At a more and (e) they are special-purpose systems that complex level of organization, there are the serve a specific function in the species. These instincts or fixed action patterns, which in- characteristics are discussed in this section volve innate tendencies to perform specific and in the next two sections. actions. These involve a number of coordi- The term prime is suggested both because nating neural mechanisms culminating in an it serves as an acronym for the phrase primary orderly series of behaviors. These built-in motivational/emotional system and because sequences of behavior are characteristic of a prime has the proper connotations in that it given species and may be quite complex, but suggests both an irreducible minimum that they are highly stereotyped when examined is the biological basis of the systems and an closely. At the next level are primary drives, active internal process that requires external which involve internal bodily disturbances stimuli to reach expression (i.e., "he or she resulting from natural tissue needs, such as was primed to respond"). The unity of the the need for food, water, sleep, sex, air, concept comes from (a) the common evolu- temperature regulation, and pain avoidance. tionary origin in bodily adaptation and ho- Drives do not result in a built-in behavior meostasis, (b) the notion of a special-purpose sequence, but rather energize behavior, caus- processing system based on a physiological ing the organism to search the environment substrate, and (c) the fact that, whatever their for stimuli (food, water) that satisfy the need. level of organization, the primes involve both This satisfaction or drive reduction serves to motivational and emotional phenomena. reinforce the responses that preceded it and The reasoning behind the notion of primes thus encourages learning that is relevant to proceeds as follows. Each species has evolved the satisfaction of the need. Thus the goal of systems of behavior that respond to challeng- the drive is fixed, but sequence of behavior ing stimuli in ways that are adaptive to that leading to the goal is learned.' particular species. Adaptive responses are At the next level are affects, which are the "those which bring the animal into contact motivational systems most commonly asso- with stimuli relevant to its survival (approach) ciated with emotion. The primary affects and those which remove it from stimuli which include happiness, sadness, fear, anger, sur- are threatening to its survival (withdrawal)" prise, and disgust (cf. Ekman & Friesen, (Glickman & Schiff, 1967, p. 102). Because 1975; Tomkins, 1962, 1963). Primary affects of general similarities in species requirements are based upon specific hard-wired systems within the ecosystem of the Earth, and rela- in the brain, but instead of serving highly tions between species during the course of specific functions, they involve general re- evolution, some of these systems are relatively sponse tendencies vis-a-vis the environment. universal (i.e., the needs for food, water, and The capacity to experience these affects is oxygen among animals). However, others are innate and unlearned, and each has been quite specific, reflecting the unique require- shown to be associated with highly generalized ments of a given species. Examples include expressive displays (i.e., facial expressions, the systems underlying the migratory patterns postures; cf. Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen, in many birds, the resistance to pain in the 1969). However, the circumstances under camel, the gnawing and burrowing behavior of small rodents, and the long period of attachment to the young in primates. 1 In the case of acquired or secondary drives, the As these examples imply, primes exist at organism learns not only the sequence of behavior needed various levels of organization. At one extreme to satisfy the goal, but also the value of the goal itself: Initially neutral stimuli in the environment that are there are automatic unconditioned actions associated with the reinforcement of a biological drive that are released by specific external or inter- come to be reinforcing (incentives) in themselves. 392 ROSS BUCK which they are experienced and the ways in flexibility and openness to influence from the which they are expressed involve learning. environment and self are hard-wired into the At another level is a kind of prime system, system. For example, in the case of a socially analogous in many respects to drives, but in relevant affect such as anger, the affect per se which the natural tissue need is difficult to is a prime based on a specific neural system specify. Some have suggested that it involves that is universal to the species. The ways in a need for stimulation on the part of the which this system is aroused is, however, nervous system itself. Thus, R. White (1959) based on learning, and the social expression discussed the inability of the concepts of of anger is channeled by learned display rules instinct and drive to explain the tendencies (although it may leak out in expressive be- of animals and humans to explore, seek haviors not closely monitored by the individ- stimulation, and manipulate the environment, ual; cf. Ekman & Friesen, 1975). As we shall and suggested that the common property of see, even the experience of anger may be these behaviors is that they have an effect affected by learning: Some individuals may upon the environment. He proposed that learn to ignore angry feelings or label them there is an intrinsic need, termed effectance as something other than anger. The aspect of motivation, for an effective interaction with the angry response that is least affected by the environment, which makes exploration, learning is its impact on adaptive/homeostatic stimulus seeking, and a wide variety of related systems. The presence of arousal in the anger behaviors intrinsically rewarding. The result system may potentially place the body under of effectance motivation is competence in physical stress—that is, perhaps suppressing dealing with the environment in effective the immune system—even if it is not mani- ways. White suggested that effectance moti- fested in other ways. vation is the motivational force that underlies To recap briefly, the prime systems are cognitive development, noting Piaget's (1971) seen to be organized in a hierarchical manner, views regarding the development of a cognitive in which phylogenetically older and newer representation of oneself and the external systems occur at different levels of the hier- world. archy. A visual representation of this hierarchy The primes are special-purpose systems is presented in Figure 1. At the lower levels that have evolved to serve specific functions are systems designed to perform relatively and are associated with specific biological specific functions, whereas at the upper levels structures—neurochemical systems—that can are systems that interact with general-purpose in principle be identified within the nervous systems, reflecting the organism's experience system. As one moves from reflexes and in the environment. Thus one can think of a fixed-action patterns to primary drives, ac- continuum in which learning and cognition quired drives, primary affects, and effectance play a progressively larger role as one goes motivation, the prime systems in question up the hierarchy. interact to an increasing extent with general- Each prime is associated with a physiolog- purpose systems of conditioning, learning, ical system or substrate. These substrates and cognition, which have evolved to enable are neurochemical circuits that may be ana- the organism to construct an internal repre- tomically distinct or intertwined with one sentation of certain important aspects of the another. They may also appear at a number external and internal environment (including of levels in the nervous system; neural mech- the state of the special-purpose systems). The anisms directly related to sex, for example, nature and complexity of this representation have been identified from the lower spinal varies with different species. This interaction cord to the limbic system. Such systems may allows the behavior in question to become be characterized by their arousability or ca- increasingly flexible and open to both envi- pacity to become active, and arousal or actual ronmental influence and processes of self- state of activity (cf. Whalen, I966).2 regulation. This flexibility is not contrary to the notion 2 Arousal is often used to refer to an undifferentiated that the prime systems are themselves biolog- state of activation, but this is not the case here. Instead, ically built-in, special-purpose processing sys- each motivational/emotional substrate is considered to tems. Indeed, with the higher levels of primes, be associated with a particular sort of response. MOTIVATION AND EMOTION 393

LINGUISTICALLY-BASED MOTIVES AND EMOTIONS.

EFFECTANCE MOTIVATION "NEW" BRAIN LEARNING STRUCTURES MORE PRIMARY AFFECTS IMPORTANT i ACQUIRED DRIVES I PRIMARY DRIVES I INSTINCTS LEARNING 'OLD" BRAIN LESS REFLEXES STRUCTURES IMPORTANT

Figure I. Hierarchy of motivational/emotional systems.

Variations in arousability function to in- of the neurochemical mechanisms underlying crease or decrease the range of environmental motivation and emotion, and new techniques stimuli that trigger psychophysiological, sub- for studying the nervous system promise rev- jective, and/or overt responses. For example, olutionary advances in the near future. For von Hoist and von Saint Paul (1962) dem- example, the brainstem reticular formation onstrated that a stuffed polecat elicited no contains arousal mechanisms involved in at- attack from a rooster until neural systems in tention and sleep-wakefulness, as described the rooster associated with aggression were by Lindsley (1951, 1957) and others, and the artificially stimulated. In the absence of the specific regions and chemical substances in- stuffed polecat, the same brain stimulation volved are being actively explored (cf. Van- caused only motor restlessness in the rooster. derwolf & Robinson, 1981). Also, fiber tracts Spontaneous activity in similar circuits in coursing through the hypothalamus are in- humans has been associated with subjective volved in reward-punishment systems, where feelings of anger and a heightened readiness a reward system is one in which activity is to react to aggression-eliciting stimuli (King, associated with reinforcement and a punish- 1961). Cases of violence associated with dis- ment system is one in which activity is asso- orders in the temporal lobe have been attrib- ciated with frustration, punishment, or uted to fextreme hyperactivity to very mild nonreward (M. Olds & Fobes, 1981; Routten- aggression-eliciting stimuli caused by spon- berg, 1978). The details of how these systems taneous activity in aggression circuits, which work are not yet clear, but there is evidence is caused in turn by abnormal electrochemical that the reward-punishment system contains activity in the brain. Mark and Ervin (1970) neurochemical systems that affect intracranial cited a number of cases of temporal lobe self-stimulation, mood, learning, and memory disease in which mild stimuli (a baby crying, in systematic ways (cf. Panksepp, 1981, 1982). a brush against the arm) have elicited vicious Also within the brainstem and hypothala- attack. Studies of the electrical stimulation mus are a variety of neurochemical substrates of the brain in humans have demonstrated that underlie species-specific behavior pat- that apparently complete subjective and ob- terns. Valenstein, Cox, and Kakolewski (1970) jective emotional responses can be elicited suggested that electrical stimulation of the that vary with the region stimulated (cf. hypothalamus activates a wired-in hierarchy Buck, 1976). of behaviors specific to the species. The re- The arousability of a neurochemical system sponse that is elicited is the prepotent response is dependent on a large number of factors, for that species (i.e., eating behavior). How- including long-term influences (heredity, dis- ever, if the goal object for that response is ease, early experience), short-term influences removed, the second response in the hierarchy (blood chemistry, drugs), and interactions often appears: Rats show gnawing and hoard- with other neurochemical systems (Moyer, ing, roosters crow, gerbils thump their feet, 1971). and so forth. Other authors (Glickman & Much has been learned about the nature Schiff, 1967; Wise, 1968) have pointed out 394 ROSS BUCK

that these results could be due to independent emotional/motivational states (sex, fear, anger, neurochemical circuits in the closely packed etc.). Thus it is not surprising that emotion hypothalamus being activated to differing de- reflects both kinds of structure. grees by the stimulating electrode. The oc- Motivation is a potential inherent in the currence of these species-specific responses structure of the primes. Motivation is a may be internally reinforced, perhaps via the general term for the forces controlling—ac- species-specific mechanism itself, perhaps via tivating and directing—behavior. It is defined more general reward-punishment systems, or here as a potential that is inherent in the both (cf. Buck, 1976, pp. 76-77; Panksepp, structure of systems of behavior control—in 1981). this instance, inherent in the primes. This The limbic system includes paleocortical conception of motivation as a potential is structures (old cortical structures with 3-5 analogous to the notion of potential energy layers) plus the amygdala (Grossman, 1967). in physics. Matter may have potential energy MacLean (1968, 1969, 1970) suggested that by virtue of its physical arrangement (i.e., a the limbic system includes neurochemical coiled spring) or its position (i.e., a weight circuits involving aggression and fear (partic- raised to a height). The potential energy is ularly involving the amygdala) and circuits actualized by an appropriate stimulus, releas- involving sociability and sex (particularly in- ing the spring or dropping the weight. volving the septal area). Details of the evi- In the same way, the primes are seen as dence relating to these systems is summarized having motivational potential by virtue of in Buck (1976, pp. 79-92). Briefly, it is well their particular qualities. These qualities of established in both humans and animals that the primes have evolved to respond to stimuli electrical stimulation of the amygdala often and events that have proved challenging over produces rage, whereas bilateral lesioning of the course of evolution. Their function is to the same region lessens aggression (cf. Mark activate homeostatic responses, expressive be- & Ervin, 1970, and Terzian & Dalle Ore, haviors, and subjective experiences that have 1955, for studies relating to humans). Con- proved adaptive in the face of these challenges. versely, lesions of the septal area in animals Motivation is the potential for the activation is associated at least initially with heightened of these responses that is built into the primes aggression, whereas stimulation of that area and is released by challenging events. Chal- in humans elicits pleasurable reactions, often lenging events can be anything from the with sexual content (Heath, 1964a, 1964b). neurologist's tap on the knee (activating a This consideration of the neurochemical relatively simple spinal reflex), to a receptive systems underlying motivation and emotion sexual partner or menacing enemy, to a lack is relevant to understanding the differences of food, to Piaget's ailments (activating the between typological approaches to the clas- process of assimilation and accommodation sification of emotion such as those of leading to cognitive growth). The primes that Tomkins, Ekman, and Izard, which assume these events challenge get progressively more fundamentally different emotion types (fear, complex, of course, and the effects of the anger, surprise, etc.), versus dimensional ap- individual's prior learning experiences get proaches, which assume that emotions vary progressively greater. quantitatively from each other along bipolar Thus, the primes are seen to be the basis dimensions (strong-weak, pleasant-unpleas- of biological motives, in that they are the ant; cf. Russell, 1979, 1983; Russell & Mehr- sources of the biological forces controlling— abian, 1977; Schlosberg, 1952). A considera- activating and directing—behavior. I argue tion of the neurochemical structures suggests that other sorts of motives are inherent in that both kinds of system occur. The reticular the structure of another system of behavior system appears to vary along an arousal or control, that of language. intensity dimension (strong-weak) and the Input from the primes is organized and reward-punishment system may vary along integrated at higher levels in the nervous an evaluation dimension (pleasant-unpleas- system. Evidence indicates that the right ant). The hypothalamus and limbic system, and left cerebral hemispheres play markedly in contrast, contain neurochemical systems different roles in motivation and emotion. associated with relatively distinct types of There is evidence that the input of the primes MOTIVATION AND EMOTION 395 to higher brain mechanisms is lateralized. variety of experimental measures and subject The ascending aminergic fiber tracts impor- populations have shown that the right hemi- tant in motivation and emotion (i.e., the sphere plays a special role in both the expres- media) forebrain bundle) are right lateralized, sion and recognition of emotion. For example, and Denenberg and his colleagues (Denen- the following findings have been reported: (a) berg, 1981; Denenberg, Garbanti, Sherman, Facial asymmetry orfacedness is significantly Yutzey, & Kaplan, 1978) have shown that left sided during the posing of emotional right-hemisphere damage causes decreased expression in normal right-handed subjects, emotionality even in rats. Recent studies have suggesting relative right-hemisphere activation demonstrated anatomical assymetries in the (or, perhaps, relative left-hemisphere inhibi- brain in most right-handed humans. The tion). The question of whether this is true of Sylvian fissure rises more steeply on the right spontaneous expression as well, is unresolved side of the human brain than on the left, and (cf. Borod & Caron, 1980; Borod, Caron, & this is associated with a larger area on the Koff, 1981; Campbell, 1978; Ekman, 1980; top surface of the temporal lobe—called the Ekman, Hagar, & Friesen, 1981; Sackheim, plenum temporale—on the left (Galaburda, Gur, & Saucy, 1978). (b) In normal right- LaMay, Kemper, & Geshwind, 1978). This handed subjects, right-hemisphere activation region forms part of Wernicke's area—an occurs when subjects answer emotion-related area long associated with language—and mi- questions (cf. Schwartz, Davidson, & Maer, croscopic studies have demonstrated cellular 1975) and are under stress (Tucker, Roth, abnormalities in this area in dyslexics (Gal- Arneson, & Buckingham, 1977). Also, there aburda & Kemper, 1979). In addition, the is considerable evidence that emotional in- left hemisphere has been found to be longer formation is processed more efficiently when than the right and wider in the posterior presented to the right hemisphere via the left region in most right-handed humans, whereas ear (Carmon & Nachson, 1973; Haggard & in contrast, the right hemisphere tends to be Parkinson, 1971; Safer & Leventhal, 1977) wider in the frontal regions (Geshwind, 1979). or the left visual field (cf. Safer, 1981, for The frontal cortex, in turn, has long been references), (c) In cases of hysteria, conversion known to be important in emotion. Geshwind systems tend to occur more frequently on the (1979) suggested that this characteristic shape left side (Galin, Diamond, & Braff, 1977; of the human brain reflects the right hemi- Stern, 1977). (d) Patients with certain kinds sphere's specialization for emotion and the of right-hemisphere damage and also persons left hemisphere's specialization for language. It has long been known that the left hemi- 3 The controversy between Lazarus (1982, 1984) and sphere is involved with linguistic functions, Zajonc (1980, 1984) is relevant here. Lazarus (1984) with damage being associated with crip- argued that cognitive appraisal is a necessary condition pling linguistic communication disorders— for emotion: "To experience an emotion, people must the aphasias. The functions of the right hemi- comprehend . . . that their well being is implicated in a transaction" (p. 124). Such comprehension need not sphere were not as apparent, and for many involve a "highly differentiated symbolic process," in fact years it was relegated to the status of the it may take the form of a "primitive evaluative perception" minor, silent hemisphere. Recent evidence (p. 124). Zajonc (1984) replied that cognition must suggests that the right hemisphere acts as a require some kind of mental work in the form of a synthesizer, organizing input into complex transformation of sensory input and that "Lazarus has broadened the definition of cognitive appraisal to include and global wholes, and that this kind of even the most primitive forms of sensory excitation" (p. syncretic conceptualization is involved in 117). This controversy would be clarified by the distinction emotion (Tucker, 1981). Thus Sperry, Zaidel, between syncretic and analytic cognition: Both Zajonc and Zaidel (1979) demonstrated that the dis- and Lazarus appear to agree that some form of sensory information is necessary for emotion; what they appear connected right hemisphere is capable of to disagree about is what would constitute cognition. producing an awareness—including an affec- The concept of syncretic cognition might satisfy both, tive aura—in the absence of the verbal cog- for it involves more than mere sensation, yet does not nition of the left hemisphere. I use the term require a transformation of input, involving instead syncretic cognition to refer to this sort of directly perceived analog information (see Footnote 9). 3 Analytic cognition, in contrast, involves the linear and conceptualization. sequential organization of digital information (cf. Buck, A large number of studies using a wide 1984a; Tucker, 1981). 396 ROSS BUCK whose right hemispheres are temporarily in- follow Tucker (1981) in terming the latter activated by intracarotid injections of amo- analytic cognition. barbitol have manifested symptoms of emo- tional indifference (Gainotti, 1969, 1972; Emotion as a Readout Device Galin, 1974;Rossi&Rosandini, 1967;Terzian, 1964; Terzian & Ceccotto, 1959). (e) Right- Emotion is a readout mechanism associated hemisphere damage is associated with reduced with motivation. Emotion is generally defined skin conductance responding to pain (Heil- in terms of subjective experiences or feelings, man, Schwartz, & Watson, 1978) and emo- goal-directed behaviors (attack, flight), ex- tionally loaded color slides (Morrow, Vrtunski, pressive behavior (smiling, snarling), and Kim, & Boiler, 1981). (f) Right-hemisphere- physiological arousal (heart rate increases, damaged patients have particular difficulties sweating). One of the major assumptions of with emotional speech as opposed to prepo- the present analysis is that emotion has sitional speech (Heilman, Scholes, & Watson, evolved as a readout mechanism carrying 1975; Tucker, Watson, & Heilman, 1977) and information about motivation—that is, about with the recognition and discrimination of the state of the primes—in a kind of running emotional faces and pictures (Benowitz, Bear, progress report. The source of the information Rosenthal, & Mesulam, 1983; Cicone, Wap- is the motivational potential as activated by ner, & Gardner, 1980; DeKosky, Heilman, a challenging stimulus. Motivation and emo- Bowers, & Valenstein, 1980). tion are thus seen to be different aspects of Buck and Duffy (1980) demonstrated that the primes, in that motivation is the potential left-hemisphere-damaged patients are more for behavior inherent in the neurochemical expressive on measures of spontaneous com- structure, and emotion involves the means munication than are right-hemisphere-dam- by which that potential is realized or read aged patients, even though there is much out, when activated by challenging stimuli. evidence that the former are much less able The relation of motivation and emotion in to communicate via intentional gesture and this view is analogous to the relation of pantomime (cf. Duffy, Duffy, & Pearson, energy and matter in physics: Just as energy 1975). This observation suggested the basic is a potential that manifests itself in matter, importance of a distinction between sponta- motivation, as seen here, is a potential that neous and intentional symbolic communica- manifests itself in emotion.5 Thus motivation tion (Buck, 1982a, 1984a). Data in the Buck and emotion are seen to be two sides of the & Duffy study also suggested that the right same coin, two aspects of the same process. hemisphere is responsible for spontaneous In contrast to those who argue that emotion emotional expression, whereas the left hemi- occurs only when a motivational sequence is sphere acts to alter, modulate, and inhibit disrupted, this view suggests that emotion is such spontaneous expression with facial man- a constantly occurring phenomenon, reflecting agement strategies, such as those described peacefulness and contentment when the or- by Ekman and Friesen (1975). It is possible ganism is satisfied, as well as alarm when that the left facedness observed in posed adaptation is necessary. The organism may emotional expression may be related to the tend to ignore emotional information under inhibitory action of the left hemisphere on conditions of satisfaction, just as one tends the right side of the face (Buck, 1982b). This to ignore the feeling of comfortable shoes on view is compatible with the suggestion by one's feet, but attention can easily be drawn Tucker and his colleagues that the left hemi- to both. sphere is associated with anxiety and the I have suggested in another context that verbal modulation of the emotionality of the facial expression involves an external readout right hemisphere (Shearer & Tucker, 1981; Tucker, 1981; Tucker & Newman, 1981).4 In effect, the syncretic cognition associated with 4 See Gray (1982) for a discussion of the neurophysi- the right hemisphere interacts with the se- ological bases of anxiety. quential, analytical, and verbal sort of cog- 51 am grateful to Gary Schwartz for suggesting this nition associated with the left hemisphere. I analogy. MOTIVATION AND EMOTION 397 of those motivational/emotional processes 1965) argued that certain kinds of emotional that have had social implications during the expression allow a coordination of behavior course of evolution (Buck, 1980). This con- between individuals that is necessary to spe- cept is here extended to include three different cies survival. The threatening and submissive kinds of readout of motivational/emotional displays of many species allow the establish- states that have appeared successively during ment of dominance without harmful fights, evolution: Emotion I, involving bodily adap- courtship displays allow the coordination of tation and homeostasis; Emotion II. involving sexual behaviors, certain displays of infants facial expression and other mechanisms of encourage caregiving, and so forth. In his outward expression; and Emotion III, involv- analysis of primate expressions, Andrew ing an internal cognitive readout. Thus, al- (1963, 1965) noted that the use of facial though the source of the emotional readout expression and other kinds of communicative is the motivational potential inherent in the displays is a function of the extent of social- primes, the targets of the readout are of three ization of the given species and the commu- sorts: systems of bodily adaptation and ho- nication demands of the environment, with meostasis, systems of outward expression, the consequent need to coordinate social and systems of subjective experience. I discuss behavior. Social species show a greater range each of these in turn. of displays than do species that lead solitary Emotion I involves systems directly respon- lives. The highly social plains-dwelling ba- sible for bodily adaptation and the mainte- boon, for example, has a wider range of nance of homeostasis. The basic evolutionary displays than the more solitary forest-dwelling function of the primes involves the adaptation mandrill and drill baboon. of the organism to the environment, insuring Thus overt emotional expression may be a proper homeostatic balance involving food, seen as an external readout device, with the water, oxygen, temperature, and so forth. prime state being reflected in the overt be- Thus, the most primitive and universal kind havior. The nature and extent of the external of readout of motivational/emotional states readout depends on the ecological require- involves the systems directly concerned with ments associated with a given species: Turtle the maintenance of homeostasis, and this infants have little need of adult caretakers, remains true in the nervous system of more thus there is no signaling system associated complex creatures. In all mammals including with infant needs that may be seen in birds, humans, Emotion I involves the influence of mammals, and particularly in primates, with the motivational/emotional systems on bodily the long periods of helplessness of the infant. functioning via the endocrine, immune, and Emotion III is a direct internal cognitive autonomic nervous systems. readout of the primes that evolved in ways The Emotion I systems, like other kinds that are analogous to their external readout. of readout mechanisms, show species differ- Another major assumption of this analysis is ences that are consistent with ecological re- that a cognitive readout of motivational/emo- quirements. Thus, species adapted to warm tional states has evolved as an internal readout versus cold climates have differences in their in much the same way that external expressive systems of temperature regulation, species behavior evolved, and that this readout is adapted to dry versus wet environments have direct, involving syncretic as opposed to an- differences in systems of water retention and alytic cognition. In effect, I am suggesting regulation, and so forth. that the above analysis of the evolution of Emotion II involves an external readout, emotional expression may be applied also to with the state of the primes reflected in overt an internal syncretic-cognitive registration of expressive behavior. Once the survival of a motivational/emotional states that is a kind species requires the coordination of behaviors of direct subjective experience of emotion. between individuals (for sexual reproduction, The reasoning is as follows: Once the nervous care of the young, etc.), it becomes necessary system of a species has evolved sufficiently for certain motivational/emotional states to to develop even the rudiments of a general- be expressed outwardly, allowing communi- purpose cognitive system—an internal rep- cation between conspecifics. Andrew (1963, resentation of reality—1 suggest that it be- 398 ROSS BUCK

comes important that that cognitive system flight response must be necessary in social have direct access to the state of the primes. species where fighting and fleeing must be This process is presumably based particularly regulated for the good of the group. The on the right hemisphere, although the details analysis of such emotion "sending abilities" of this are still unclear. and their implications for personality and This kind of arrangement would seem to social functioning in humans is just beginning have at least two major advantages. First, the (Buck, 1979). readout of the prime state in syncretic cog- This kind of control is presumably part of nition would presumably facilitate its handling what is learned by the infant rhesus monkeys via analytic cognition. In effect, the syncret- studied by Harlow and his colleagues (Harlow ically experienced state becomes an object & Mears, 1983). These studies demonstrated for analytic cognition. This would encourage how the maturation of emotion systems cognitive participation in adaptive functions within the brain is coordinated with social and increase the organism's capacity for self- experience in young rhesus monkeys. The regulation. Thus we appear to know we are infant monkey experiences an initial period hungry not via stomach contractions or other in which fear and aggression are absent, and signals of tissue deficit, but through a more it is in this period that a lifelong attachment direct, albeit little understood, form of syn- with other monkeys is formed. Harlow argued cretic information. Such information may be that this provision for social experience has necessary for the kinds of adaptive anticipa- evolved within the species as a necessary tory behavior and incentive motivation dis- feature of the rhesus monkey's social orga- cussed above that precede homeostatic deficits nization: In effect the individual must learn and that have been recognized in animals how to use in a social context the complex (Mogenson & Phillips, 1976) and certainly of displays and feelings associated with certain occur in humans. Thus it may be that the primes (Buck, 1983). Emotion III readout is useful and perhaps The readout process is summarized in necessary for analytic cognition to influence Figure 2. The source of the readout is biolog- bodily adaptation and engage in self-regula- ical motivation, which involves potentials for tion. the activation and direction of behavior that Second, this system would allow analytic- are inherent in the hierarchically organized cognitive control over the outward expression neurochemical systems that I have termed of the prime state. I noted the importance of primes. When activated by challenging stim- facial management techniques by which one uli, this potential is read out to the appropriate controls one's outward display to fit the re- target systems in the body; this readout pro- quirements of the situation by intensifying, cess is emotion. There are three general sorts deintensifying, substituting for, or masking of targets for this readout: systems involved one's true feelings (Ekman & Friesen, 1975): in adaptation and homeostasis (Emotion I), We look sad at funerals and happy at parties systems involved in external expression even though we may feel quite differently. (Emotion II), and systems involved in syn- Observation suggests that the same phenom- cretic cognition (Emotion III). The functions enon occurs in animals; a frustrated and of these readout processes involve, respec- apparently angry monkey may express its tively, (a) bodily adaptation and the conse- "true feelings" only to a lower-ranking mem- quent maintenance of homeostasis, (b) ber of the group. Thus Delgado (1969) re- spontaneous communication and consequent ported that a monkey's aggressive reaction to social coordination, and (c) subjective expe- electrical stimulation in aggression-eliciting rience and consequent self-regulation. The brain areas is affected by the dominance of readout process involves special-purpose pro- the individuals in the immediate vicinity: A cessing systems that do not in themselves relatively dominant animal will attack others include general-purpose systems of learning when stimulated in such areas, whereas a or cognition. However, these do of course relatively submissive animal will be attacked interact with one another. Indeed, I suggest by others when so stimulated. Some degree that the Emotion III process has evolved in of analytic-cognitive control over the fight-or- part to foster this interaction. MOTIVATION AND EMOTION 399

midiml Soure. RMdouI Function

S^nc^ion [ S^l™^.™

]~ Spontaneous commumcatio II Expressive beDavi 1 Social coordination

Autonomic/endocrlmie/ f Adaptation! immune sys. responis: e 1 hornaoatasia

Figure 2. The readout process: Source, target, and functions served.

Emotion and Subjective Experience reported that an epinepherine injection by a dentist (which causes sympathetic nervous- Each type of emotional readout is asso- system arousal) produced an as if emotional ciated with a distinct type of subjective emo- experience—he felt as if he was joyful, or tional experience. I suggest that Emotion I angry, or afraid, but the cognitive element is particularly associated with interoceptive was absent and the emotional experience was feedback from autonomic and endocrine re- incomplete. This latter phenomenon is at the sponses. Emotion II is particularly associated heart of Schachter's (1964) self-attribution with proprioceptive feedback from the skeletal theory of emotion, which suggested that a muscles involved in the external expression complete emotional experience involves an of the prime state, and Emotion III is asso- interaction between a state of autonomic ciated with a direct syncretic cognitive regis- arousal plus cognitions associated with that tration of emotion experience that is relatively state of arousal. Schachter's theory seems distinct for each prime state. consistent with most of the findings concern- ing the contributions of autonomic feedback Emotion I: Visceral Feedback to emotional experience, but it cannot handle all forms of emotional experience. The role of autonomic feedback in emo- tional experience involves the classic contro- versy between the James-Lange theory of Emotion II: Facial/Proprioceptive Feedback emotion (James, 1884) and Cannon's (1927) critique of that theory. Essentially, the James- The importance of proprioceptive feedback Lange theory argued that emotional experi- from external expression in determining ence is based on feedback from the bodily emotion experience was suggested by Darwin response (both the visceral and skeletal muscle (1872/1965, p. 365), emphasized by Tomkins response) to an emotion-arousing situation, (1962, 1963), and has been widely accepted whereas Cannon argued that the effects of by contemporary investigators (Izard, 1977; this feedback are negligible. The considerable Kleinke & Walton, 1982; Kraut, 1982, Laird, research devoted to this issue has suggested 1974; Lanzetta, Cartwright-Smith, & Kleck, that autonomic nervous-system feedback does 1976). These authors argued that the subjec- indeed contribute to some kinds of emotion tive experience of emotion depends on feed- experience, although it clearly is neither nec- back from the expression of that emotion, essary nor sufficient for all kinds of emotion particularly its expression on the face. The experience (Buck, 1976, 1980). For example, strongest form of this facial feedback hypoth- Hohmann (1966) noted that veterans with esis holds that if there is no expression of spinal cord injuries reported a lessening of emotion, the emotion would not exist (cf. emotional experience that was directly related Tomkins, 1983). to the degree of loss of bodily sensation The evidence for the facial feedback hy- caused by the spinal lesion; Delgado (1969) pothesis has not been conclusive, and there cited the case of a man who underwent a is reason to doubt the stronger statements of unilateral sympathectomy for cancer, who the hypothesis (cf. Buck, 1980; Ellsworth & later reported that he could no longer be Tourangeau, 1981; Tourangeau & Ellsworth, thrilled by music on the sympathectomized 1979). It would seem to imply, for example, side of his body; and Bertrand Russell (1927) that facially nonexpressive persons would 400 ROSS BUCK

show less evidence of emotion on other mea- However, stimulation of limbic system struc- sures of emotion than would expressive per- tures has led to dramatic alterations in emo- sons. However, there is evidence that facially tional behavior, expression, and apparent ex- nonexpressive persons show larger autonomic perience, which at least in some cases seem (skin conductance and heart rate) responses beyond the control of the patient. Stimulation than do expressive persons (Buck, 1979, in the circuit associated by MacLean (1968) 1980). Also, the facial feedback hypothesis with fear and anger (i.e., the amygdala) has would seem to imply that a person's emo- resulted in uncontrolled rage; one female tional experience should mirror his or her patient stimulated in such an area via te- outward expression: If one looks happy, one lemetery while playing a guitar suddenly should feel happy. However, despite the sen- smashed her guitar against the wall (Mark & timents of the song "Whistle a Happy Tune," Ervin, 1970); another woman stimulated dur- the ubiquity of the facial management tech- ing an interview demanded papers to rip up niques of Ekman and Friesen (1975) described and pleaded "don't let me hit you" to the above must guarantee that many facial interviewer (King, 1961). In contrast, stimu- expressions occur in contexts unrelated to lation in the circuit associated with sociability the actual state of the primes. Several of the and sex (i.e., the septal area) often induces investigators who have advanced the facial sexual thoughts (Heath, 1964a). One de- feedback hypothesis in the past have recently pressed male patient restated their positions in response to the described his father's near-fatal illness and condemned results of the Tourangeau and Ellsworth himself as somehow responsible, but when the septal (1979) study, and in no case has the strong region was stimulated, he immediately terminated his version of the hypothesis been defended (Iz- conversation and within 15 seconds exhibited a broad ard, 1981; Hagar & Ekman, 1981; Tomkins, grin as he discussed plans to date and seduce a girl 6 friend. When asked why he changed the conversation so 1981). abruptly, he replied that the plans concerning the girl suddenly came to him. [Another depressed patient] smiled Emotion HI: Direct Syncretic- broadly and related a sexual experience of his youth Cognitive Readout within one minute after onset of septal stimulation. It is difficult to substantiate the claim that (Heath, 1964b, p. 225) there are central sources of emotional expe- Other evidence comes from observations rience that directly reflect the state of the of patients whose left and right cerebral primes in syncretic cognition apart from any hemispheres were surgically separated to peripheral visceral or proprioceptive feedback. combat epilepsy. Gazzaniga (1972) cited the Perhaps the closest one can come to demon- case of a female patient who was occasionally strating such experience is with the direct shown a picture of a nude women in the manipulation of motivational/emotional states middle of a series of pictures of ordinary via the artificial electrical or chemical stim- objects. She had an amused reaction to the ulation of the brain in humans. nude whether it was presented to the left or The effects of drugs in this regard are right hemisphere, although she could verbally readily recognized. There is a substantial report the reason for her reaction only if it literature on drug effects that makes it clear was presented to the left hemisphere. that certain drugs affecting the central nervous Sperry et al. (1979) cited similar instances system can cause experiential effects that, in which emotionally loaded photographs— although not completely independent of cog- of the patient; of his or her relatives, pets, or nitive expectations, can be overwhelming. belongs; of pretty girls or fat women in swim Regarding electrical stimulation, several suits; of public figures like Hitler, Churchill, relevant findings stand out (cf. Buck, 1976, pp. 77-102; Moyer, 1971; Valenstein, 1973). First, it appears that strong emotional expe- 6 It is interesting that although the James-Lange theory rience is not usually evoked by stimulation also suggested that feedback from the skeletal muscles of the body should also contribute to emotional experience, of the hypothalamus in humans, even though most of the research has focused on the face. Studies by substantial autonomic changes have been ob- Riskind and his colleagues (cf. Riskind & Ootay, 1982) served (Sem-Jacobsen, 1968; J. White, 1940). are beginning to address the role of the body. MOTIVATION AND EMOTION 401 or Richard Nixon—produced appropriate coordination function; it would clearly be emotional expressions and reports of subjec- maladaptive if the expressions reflecting hap- tive experience, even though the subject could piness and sadness were similar, for example. not verbally explain the reactions. Sperry et For analogous reasons, the syncretic-cognitive al. noted that "if anything, the emotional registration of different prime states would responses from the right hemisphere were be expected to differ from one another, to somewhat more intense and less restrained foster self-regulation. and qualified than those from the left" (p. However, just as the external expression of 157). This seems consistent with the notion emotion may differ for different individuals that the left hemisphere exerts a verbally due to temperament and social learning (wit- mediated control of the emotionality of the ness Harlow's monkeys), the subjective ex- right (Buck & Duffy, 1980; Tucker, 1981), perience of emotion may also come to differ and it suggests, in contrast to Schachter's for different individuals. (1964) theory, that emotional experience may Motivational/emotional experience consti- occur in the absence of verbalizable (i.e., tutes a kind of knowledge by acquaintance, analytic) cognitions associated with that emo- which then interacts with knowledge by de- tion. scription. I suggested that the direct experi- Each prime state is associated with a par- ential readout of motivation and emotion ticular pattern of expressive behaviors and a involves the holistic, syncretic conceptualiza- particular quality of directly registered emo- tion associated with right-hemisphere func- tional experience. Whereas the interoceptive tioning, as opposed to the verbal and analytic feedback that constitutes the subjective ele- cognition associated with left-hemisphere ment of the Emotion 1 process may be rela- processing (cf. Tucker, 1981). Syncretic cog- tively similar for different motivational/emo- nition may be associated with what has long tional states, it has been well established that been termed knowledge by acquaintance, in- patterns of expressive behavior differ for dif- volving the self-evident presentation of im- ferent states (Ekman & Friesen, 1975). Thus mediate experience. William James described the proprioceptive feedback that constitutes knowledge by acquaintance as follows: the subjective element of the Emotion II process must differ for different motivational/ I know the color blue when I see it, and the flavor of a pear when I taste it ... but about the inner nature of emotional states and could serve as one means these facts or what makes them what they are I can say by which different states could be subjectively nothing at all ... I cannot impart acquaintance with differentiated. However, due to the aforemen- them to anyone who has not made it himself ... At tioned difficulties with the facial feedback most, I can say to my friends, "Go to certain places and hypothesis, it seems probable that the primary act in certain ways, and these objects will probably come." (1890, p. 221). means of subjective differentiation of moti- vational/emotional states is through the In contrast, analytic cognition may be as- Emotion III process, that is, through the sociated with knowledge by description, which different qualities of directly registered emo- involves the interpretation of sense data, re- tional experience associated with the different quires inference, and is prepositional in that prime states. knowledge by description can be false. The This proposition is consistent with the distinction between knowledge by acquain- evidence presented above regarding the sub- tance and knowledge by description has been jective effects of different kinds of psychoactive made as far back as St. Augustine in De drugs and brain stimulation. Also, it logically Magistro (Marsh, 1956), and it is reflected in follows from the present line of argument. many languages, for example, the French Thus, I am arguing that the internal cognitive connaitre versus savoir (James, 1890). More readout of emotion evolved in a way analo- recently, it occupied a central place in Ber- gous to the external expressive readout; it is trand Russell's (1912, 1956) epistemological useful for self-regulation just as the expressive theory. readout is useful for social coordination. The Both James and Russell suggested that pattern of expressive behaviors differs for knowledge by description depends on knowl- different prime states because of this social edge by acquaintance and follows it in time: 402 ROSS BUCK.

"Feelings are the germ and starting point by One area where some study has been done cognition, thoughts the developed tree" is in the relation between cognitive and ex- (James, 1890, p. 222). This is consistent with pressive responding on the one hand, and the evidence presented by Zajonc (1980) that autonomic and endocrine responding on the affective responses precede cognitive opera- other. It is interesting that the results are tions in time and determine their character relevant to the analysis of some of the classic (cf. Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980; Wilson, defense mechanisms and to how they might 1979). However, in addition to contrasting contribute to emotion-related physical disor- affect and cognition, it is important to rec- ders. For example, denial and intellectual- ognize the differing roles of syncretic and ization might be thought of as response pat- analytic cognition (Tucker, 1981, see Foot- terns that emphasize the cognitive handling note 3). of the prime state, and it is noteworthy that In applying this point of view to the analysis studies by Lazarus and his colleagues (Lazarus of motivation and emotion, it seems reason- & Alfert, 1964; Lazarus, Opton, Nomikos, & able to suggest that the basic, raw experience Rankin, 1965; Spiesman, Lazarus, Mordkoff, of these states involves knowledge by ac- & Davidson, 1964) have demonstrated that quaintance. The brain knows how to experi- such coping strategies can reduce the auto- ence such states, just as it knows how to nomic response to an emotional stimulus. characterize the color blue or the taste of a Conversely, repression might be conceptual- pear. However, as suggested above, this ex- ized as a process in which expressive and perience itself can become an object of cognitive responses are suppressed, and it knowledge by description; the responder may might be expected that reliance on basic learn much about motivation and emotion homeostatic and adaptive response may be that may (or may not) be useful and adaptive. increased under those circumstances. This is There are important implications of this supported by the findings noted above that view that there are multiple potential sources facially and/or verbally expressive persons of emotional experience. One is that the have smaller autonomic and endocrine re- responder may learn to attend to some of sponses to emotional stimuli than do nonex- them and to ignore others. Also, different pressive persons (Buck, 1975, 1979, 1981b; aspects of emotion and motivation are differ- Buck, Miller, & Caul, 1974; Frankenhauser, entially accessible to the responder, both be- 1978). Together, these findings suggest the cause of the nature of the response systems general hypothesis that the strength of the involved and because of social and cultural Emotion I process may be negatively corre- factors. My next points deal with these issues, lated with the strength of the Emotion II and on which relatively little work has been done. . Emotion III processes. Put another way, the degree of autonomic/endocrine responding Using Emotional Information to a prime state may be negatively related to the expressive and cognitive responses to that The extent to which emotional experience state.8 depends on Emotion I processes (feedback This autonomic/endocrine response could from adaptive responses), Emotion II pro- well have disruptive effects, perhaps involving cesses (feedback from expressive behavior), or the immune system, which could contribute Emotion III processes (direct registration in syncretic cognition) may differ according to the individual, the situation, and the motiva- 71 have argued elsewhere that Emotion II and Emotion tional/emotional state involved. There is little III responses tend to vary together because both are open to social influence, albeit in different ways, whereas information available on how these different physiological responses (Emotion I) remain relatively free readout mechanisms might interact with each of such influences (see Buck, 1971, 1984a). Much more other in determining how emotional infor- research is needed in this area. 8 mation is managed. Studies are needed that It should be noted that these studies used between- subjects designs. Thus they suggest negative intersubject simultaneously analyze autonomic, expressive, correlations between autonomic and other modes of and cognitive responses to a variety of moti- response and are not relevant to the analysis of intrasubject 7 vational/emotional states. relations between these variables (cf. Buck, 1980). MOTIVATION AND EMOTION 403 to disease (Hurst, Jenkins, & Rose, 1976; with Emotion II and syncretic-cognitive re- Selye, 1976). Impaired emotional expression sponses associated with Emotion III) may or has been associated with a number of quite may not be accessible to others depending on different disease processes. McClelland (1982) the responder's expressive behavior and self- has reported relations between inhibited per- reports. As a result, learning to deal with sonality patterns, sympathetic activation, im- hunger, pain, sexuality, anger, and so forth, paired immune system functioning, and car- is not a simple matter from an observational diovascular disease. Sifneos (1973) coined the learning point of view (Buck, 1971, 1981a, term alexithymia to describe the inability to 1983). express one's feelings verbally. This quality Many studies of modeling and imitation has been found to be prevalent in patients imply that the ways in which children learn with a variety of psychosomatic illnesses to deal with emotional information—to ex- (Flannery, 1977; Pierloot & Vinck, 1977; press emotion to others and attend to emo- Wolff, 1977), and Anderson (1981) has sug- tional information in themselves—must be gested that "impairment in the expression of affected by the ways that others around them affect is a necessary but not sufficient factor respond. In a 1933 study of muscle relaxation, in the development of psychosomatic disease" M. A. Wenger (cited in Wenger & Bagchi, (p. 149). There is also evidence that a limited 1961) was surprised to note that the ability ability to express depression, anger, and anx- of a student from India to control his physi- iety is associated with a predisposition to the ological activity far surpassed the ability of development of cancer (Hagnell, 1966; Tho- the American students in the study. Later mas & Greenstreet, 1973), and the loss of studies performed in India confirmed that significant personal relationship and feelings the Yogic exercises and other practices learned of hopelessness often occur near the time of in that culture allow substantial control of the clinical onset of cancer (Bahnson & autonomic activity (Wenger & Bagchi, 1961; Bahnson, 1966; Greene, 1966; LeShan & Wenger, Bagchi, & Anand, 1961). Perhaps in Worthington, 1956; Schmale & Iker, 1966). the course of such learning, the responder Emotional expression is also important in comes to attend to interoceptive and proprio- the process of coping with cancer and may ceptive information regarding the motiva- play a significant role in its clinical course tional/emotional states to a greater extent (Mclntosh, 1974; Peterson, Popkins, & Hall, than an American student would be likely 1981; Weisman, 1976; Weisman & Sobel, to do. 1979; Weisman & Worden, 1977). Such an education of attention could po- Social learning relevant to motivation and tentially lead to markedly different sorts of emotion is influenced by the accessibility of emotional experience in different persons. the responses involved in the life of the indi- Thus there is evidence that adult males in vidual. The apparent medical consequences our culture are less facially and verbally of unhealthy forms of emotional expression expressive and more physiologically responsive lend urgency to the understanding of how than are females to certain affective stimuli, positive patterns of expression might be fos- and that this difference may begin to appear tered in the developing child. The importance in childhood (Buck, 1975, 1977, 1981b; of social learning by observation and imitation Frankenhauser, 1978). Perhaps this is asso- are well-known (Bandura, 1977; Bandura & ciated with the dearth of male models that Walters, 1963). One of the features of the show expressive behavior or discuss their realm of motivation and emotion that con- ways of coping with certain motivational/ tributes to its complexity is that many of the emotional states. Conversely, young females relevant responses are virtually invisible or in our culture may have relatively few adult inaccessible to observers under most condi- models for coping openly with achievement tions, and may be only vaguely experienced strivings or anger. Thus, although, as noted by the responder. This is particularly the case above, an affect like anger is based on a with the Emotion I types of autonomic, en- specific neural system common to all and the docrine, and immune system responses. Other experience of anger caused by arousal in this responses (expressive responses associated system is similar in all and is to some extent 404 ROSS BUCK self-explanatory, an individual may learn to latter finding supports the notion that expo- attend to or to ignore this experience to sure to the music videos involves a kind of different extents, and may learn to label the exploratory behavior—a process of exploring experience incorrectly. Thus it is quite con- one's own feelings. Apparently, the explora- ceivable that a child would never connect the tion even of feelings of fear, sadness, and verbal label anger with that experience. Thus, aggression can be highly rewarding, and this learning about how to handle emotional in- may explain the high levels of interest in formation may vary greatly from individual some persons in horror movies, tear jerkers, to individual. aggressive films, and the like. All of these Models in the mass media may have con- films could thus contribute to the emotional siderable impact in this area. It seems possible education of the viewer, and this process that much of the powerful interest in music, could in the long run have important personal drama, and literature shown by humans de- and social consequences. rives from the fact that they can make acces- sible aspects of emotion and ways of handling emotional information that are otherwise The Interaction Between Primary hidden, providing in fantasy a model of mo- Motivational/Emotional Systems and tivational and emotional experience and Cognition: A Model expression that is informative about many things that remain inaccessible in normal Complex motives and emotions can be life. One can follow the experiences and conceptualized as an interaction between the thoughts of the characters in a novel or in a prime states and analytic cognition. To recap soap opera, or witness displays of feeling on briefly, the primary motivational/emotional the stage or screen, that in normal life are at systems (primes) are innate, biologically based least fragmented and often unavailable, and special-purpose systems whose state of arousal can compare these to one's own experiences, is read out via adaptive-homeostatic respon- thoughts, and feelings. McClelland's (1961) ses, expressive behavior, and direct subjective finding that high levels of achievement in a experience. However, these responses are af- culture are preceded by high levels of fected by analytic cognition. Cognition can achievement imagery in literature is consistent be regarded as a general-purpose system in- with the notion that the content of these tales volving the ability to represent the nature of may provide important models for the indi- the external and internal environment within vidual; the child who learns how it feels to the brain, to paraphrase Galley's (1973) terms achieve through such models may be more quoted above. Analytic cognition involves likely to be an achiever. knowledge by description, which is achieved McClelland's methods could be employed via learning and is particularly dependent on to analyze the social consequences of different the sequential processing associated in hu- models of emotional expression on the emo- mans with the left cerebral hemisphere tional education within a society (Buck, (Tucker, 1981). It is the interaction between 1983). It is noteworthy in this regard that in analytic cognition and the primes that makes a study of the emotional responses to music possible incentive motivation and anticipatory videos, I found that the degree to which a adaptive behavior in both animals and hu- music video evokes the emotion it was ap- mans. In humans, our larger analytic cognitive parently meant to evoke is related to the capacity—combined as we shall see with the liking of the video, even if the emotion revolutionary impact of language—underlies evoked is negative. Thus, just as a happy a great repertoire of motivational and emo- video is liked if it elicits rated feelings of tional phenomena. happiness, a frightening video is liked if it A general model of this interactive relation elicits feelings of fear, and a sad video is liked between the primes and the cognitive system if it elicits feelings of sadness. Moreover, is presented in Figure 3. The model assumes liking for all of the music videos was strongly that internal and external affective stimuli related to rated feelings of interest, regardless initially impinge on the primes directly and of their emotional appeal (Buck, 1985). The without cognitive mediation (cf. Gibson, 1966, MOTIVATION AND EMOTION 405

Obtnvid Observed Events within the organism stimuli responses

COAL-DIRECTED BEHAVIOR

SELF-REPORTS

FACIAL EXPRESSIONS, BODY MOVEMENTS, POSTURE, Etc.

PHYSIOLOGICAL RESPONSES

Figure 3. The interactions between the primes and the cognitive system.

1979; Zajonc, 1980).9 The responses of these his or her overt emotional/motivational be- systems is determined by their state of arousal havior to fit the requirements and expectations and arousability, which in turn is determined of a given social situation. At the same time, by a variety of situational and constitutional the labeled emotional/motivational state may factors. The initial response to the stimuli is become an internal stimulus in itself, begin- also influenced by classically conditioned as- ning another cycle of response. sociations with the affective stimuli that are The fundamental difference between animal unique to the individual. Together, the primes and human motivation/emotion involves lan- and these conditioned responses determine guage. The interaction between the primes the impact of the affective stimuli for that particular individual in that particular situa- tion. 9 Certain cognitive approaches to emotion deny that This impact is registered at both cognitive affective stimuli per se can cause emotion without some and emotional levels. On the emotional level, kind of cognitive mediation, such as Lazarus's (1984) adaptive/homeostatic mechanisms are acti- appraisal process. Gibson's theory, however, argued that the organism naturally detects information that is eco- vated (Emotion I), there are tendencies toward logically significant—the perceptual system has evolved spontaneous expressive behaviors (Emotion to be attuned to such information—and that this process II), and subjective experiences occur, both is direct and requires no cognitive mediation (cf. Gibson, directly in syncretic cognition from the acti- 1966, 1979; Shaw & Bransford, 1977). This argument applies to affectively relevant information, and indeed vation of the primes (Emotion III) and indi- there is considerable evidence of an innate preparedness rectly via proprioceptive and autonomic feed- to respond appropriately to affective displays in others back (dashed lines). On the analytic-cognitive (Buck, 1984a, pp. 40-46). Sackett (1966) demonstrated level, the individual understands and inter- that isolated monkeys react with appropriate fearful prets, or appraises, the stimuli on the basis behavior when confronted with a photograph of a large male making a threat display, and Perrett, Rolls, & Caan of past experience, the present situation, and (1982) found that cells in a specific area of the temporal the subjective emotional experience. Once lobe in monkeys respond only to faces. In humans, facial the stimulus is understood and appraised, or expressions of fear and anger are more readily associated labeled, the individual has a basis for making with aversive events than are happy or neutral expressions appropriate goal-directed coping responses in classical conditioning studies (Lanzetta & Orr, 1980; Ohman & Dimberg, 1978). It appears to be critical that and self-reports describing the response to the face is directed toward the subject in these studies. the stimulus. These overt responses are af- Dimbetg & Ohman (1983; Dimberg, 1983) found that fected by display rules the individual has the differential effects of happy versus angry faces are learned in that particular situation, which reduced or lost when the face is directed away from the subject, and Perrett et al. found reductions in response may also interfere with spontaneous expressive as the facial stimulus was rotated away from a direct tendencies. That is, the individual may alter orientation. 406 ROSS BUCK

and cognition portrayed in Figure 3 can be did learn language it would cause a funda- applied to both animals and humans. How- mental change in the animal's behavior, be- ever, from the time of the Greeks, Western cause that behavior would then be influenced thought has distinguished between rational by a different sort of structure—a different processes unique to humans and the processes principle of organization—in addition to the governing animal behavior (cf. Cofer & Ap- principles of organization that had previously pley, 1964). Both Plato and Aristotle denied determined the animal's behavior. The new rational souls to animals, but they granted principles of organization inherent in language them lesser souls capable of caring for basic are functionally independent of the old prin- bodily functions. Following them, St. Thomas ciples or organization inherent in the primes. Aquinas equipped animals with a sensitive The development and maintenance of these soul and humans, in addition, with a ra- linguistic control systems also requires a kind tional soul. Descartes' dualism was similarly of motivation that is absent in animals: Needs grounded in the distinction between the de- for understanding and for cognitive consis- terminants of animal and human behavior. tency, for example, underlie the uniquely Part of the revolutionary impact of Dar- human attributes of logic and reason. Such win's theory was that it challenged the long- motivation is a potential inherent in the standing conviction that humans have a ra- structure of linguistic control systems, just as tional soul that is absent in animals. Most the biologically based motivation considered have accepted this notion and regard humans above is a potential inherent in the structure as complicated animals, and that is perhaps of the primes. Linguistic control systems also accurate. However, there is one thing that all have emotionlike feelings associated with these groups of humans have that no other animals motives: feelings of amusement, satisfaction, have, and that is language. Only in humans or dissonance associated with linguistic ma- does behavior come so completely under the nipulation, for example. There may also be control of factors that are mediated by lan- feelings of anxiety associated with the lin- guage, including logic, reasoning, and social guistic control of the primes. The relation of rules. This fact is at the crux of the under- these linguistic motives and emotions to the standing of the uniquely human aspects of biologically based primes is an issue of great motivation and emotion. Human motivation interest. and emotion are based on biological systems, I have argued that language makes humans as they are in all animals. In both humans different in fundamental ways from animals and animals, learning and cognitive factors because it allows behavior to come under the build up an internal representation of reality control of principles of logic and reasoning that influences these motives and emotions. that are mediated by language and are func- This kind of cognitive-emotional interaction tionally independent of biology. With language is clearly not unique to humans. What is also comes the patterning of social behavior unique to humans is language, which has according to the conformity and obedience created a culturally patterned system of be- to linguistically patterned social rules (cf. havior control that is functionally independent Milgram, 1974; Buck, 1976, pp. 400-414). of biology and is fundamentally different Perhaps this is what Plato, Aristotle, and from anything seen in animals. Linguistic others meant by the human rational soul. control systems enable humans to transcend There is irony here, for most of these philos- personal experience, allowing the symbolic ophers assumed that the rational soul was the sharing of experience and the contemplation source of good and the animal passions the of possibilities that have never been and source of evil. However, it is reason, logic, could never be experienced. and obedience to the rules that enable humans This is not to say that there is a funda- to execute and claim justification for a holo- mental biological gap between humans and caust, the development and use of nerve gas, animals—that clearly is not the case—nor is or the dropping of an atomic bomb. The it necessarily the case that animals cannot animal passions play little part in the most learn language. The point is that if an animal monstrous of human acts. MOTIVATION AND EMOTION 407

Differences With Other Approaches analysis emphasizes the importance of the interaction between cognitive factors and The present point of view differs from both physiological systems. However, the present traditional physiological approaches to mo- approach considers the biological bases of the tivation and recent approaches to emotion. latter and the various aspects of response— In contrast to Tomkins's (1962, 1963) theory physiological, expressive, and subjective—in and similar analyses of emotion, the present more detail. Also, different aspects of cogni- view (a) regards reflexes, instincts, and drives, tion, syncretic versus analytic, are considered. as well as primary affects, to be motivational/ Furthermore, whereas these approaches as- emotional states, (b) regards homeostasis and sume that cognition precedes emotion—one adaptation to be the raison d'etre for both must know what it is before one can respond motivation and emotion, (c) regards major emotionally—the present analysis agrees with aspects of the experience of motivational/ the Gibsonian view and with Zajonc's (1980, emotional states to be a function of a direct 1984) data, that initial emotional responding experiential readout independent of external precedes cognition. expressive tendencies, and (d) argues that This approach has more substantial differ- motivation/emotion can occur without an ences with theories of emotion that emphasize external readout and that indeed there may the analysis of emotion terminology (i.e., be motivational/emotional states in which no DeRivera, 1977; Plutchik, 1980; Roseman, external readout has evolved. In contrast with 1979). The lists and structures of emotion theories that define emotional states according generated by such analyses usually differ sub- to whether their overt expression can be stantially from one another, perhaps because reliably differentiated, the present analysis they reflect analytic-cognitive factors, the lan- defines primary emotional (and motivational) guage of emotion, rather than prime systems states according to biological criteria. The per se. present analysis does not arrive at a single The hierarchical view of motivation and list of primary motivational/emotional states; emotion presented in this article is analogous such a list would differ according to the in some respects to Maslow's (1954) theory species and the level of analysis involved. For of motivation, although there are significant example, gnawing seems to be a more im- differences as well. According to Maslow, portant phenomenon in hamsters than in human needs are arranged in a hierarchical humans, some states may be present at a fashion, including (from the bottom) physi- physiological level (Emotion I) but not ex- ological needs; safety needs; needs for love, pressed in behavior (Emotion II), and so belongingness, and esteem; aesthetic and cog- forth. nitive needs; and needs for self-actualization. There is considerable controversy about Maslow suggested that these needs are inborn what is emotion and what is not. Lazarus and universal, or instinctoid, and that they (1984, pp. 124-25) questioned whether the will always appear under favorable conditions. preferences studied by Zajonc and his col- However, the higher growth needs are not leagues should be regarded as emotions, and strong enough to appear until the lower deficit Ekman (in press) discussed how the startle is needs are satisfied. When a lower need is a reflex rather than emotion. The emotional regularly satisfied, it in effect is eliminated status of pain has also been questioned. The from further status in the determination of present analysis includes a much broader the organism's behavior (Cofer & Appley, range of phenomena under the rubric of 1964). The present analysis agrees that human emotion than is generally the case, and con- motivation is based on universal aspects of siders the distinction between reflexes, drives, human nature; it also agrees with the hier- and primary affects to concern levels of emo- archical aspects of Maslow's theory. However, tion systems (primes) rather than emotion it does not agree with the implication that versus nonemotions. when lower needs are satisfied they cease to Like the approaches of Schachter (1964), affect the individual's behavior, or with the Lazarus (1966, 1984), and others, the present notion that higher needs are absent until the 408 ROSS BUCK

lower needs are satisfied. Instead, various tential when activated by challenging stimuli. levels of behavior control are seen to be Three kinds of such readout have evolved, simultaneously present and interacting with the most basic (Emotion I) being the readout each other. of motivational/emotional states to adaptive In contrast to classical physiological ap- and homeostatic mechanisms. The other kinds proaches to motivation, the present view em- of readout have evolved as needed by partic- phasizes the importance of phenomena usu- ular species, an external expressive readout ally linked with emotion, even in the case of (Emotion II) occurring in social species, and such basic motives as hunger and thirst. Also, an internal syncretic-cognitive readout (Emo- it emphasizes the rich potential of using the tion III) occurring to the extent of the species' rigorous and detailed analysis of emotional/ cognitive abilities. It is suggested that each of motivation expression in the study of pro- these kinds of readout is associated with a cesses usually approached at a physiological distinct type of subjective emotional experi- level. Many animal studies of brain function- ence and that each prime is associated with ing, to say nothing of human studies, are a particular pattern of expressive behavior based on analyses of emotional expression, and a particular quality of Emotion III ex- from Hess's (1928) observations of hissing perience. Thus, the experience of a particular and spitting cats, to Kluver and Bucy's (1939) state (i.e., anger, surprise, happiness, hunger, observations of docility in amygdalectomized sex) represents an amalgam of feelings from monkeys, to J. Olds's (1956) descriptions of interoceptive stimuli (Emotion I), proprio- frantic bar pressing. Recent authors have ceptive stimuli (Emotion II), and experience emphasized the importance of describing such directly registered in syncretic cognition behaviors more completely than they have (Emotion III). This amalgam differs for dif- been described in the past (e.g., Vanderwolf ferent states, with Emotion III generally being & Robinson, 1981). An example of such an more important for the differentiation of analysis is Teitelbaum's use of a movement state than Emotion I stimuli or Emotion II notation system originally developed for ballet stimuli, although this can be influenced by choreography to demonstrate specific simi- learning to attend to one aspect of emotion larities in the akinesic gait of rats lesioned in or another. dopaminergic systems and in human patients It is recognized that analytic-cognitive fac- with Parkinson's disease (cf. Schallert, Whis- tors interact with the prime systems, and haw, Ramirez, & Teitelbaum, 1978). It is indeed it is suggested that Emotion III has important to note that such observations can evolved to foster such interaction. A general involve intact subjects, behaving freely and model of the interaction between the cognitive spontaneously in their natural environments. system and emotion suggests that it is in the The rigorous analysis of the behaviors ex- context of such an interaction that complex pressive of emotion/motivation may allow human motivation and emotion can be most significant increases in the understanding of profitably understood. In particular, the ability physiological systems in both animals and to use language in interaction with the primes humans. is suggested to underlie uniquely human as- pects of motivation and emotion. Time will tell whether this ability will lead to the further Summary advancement of the human species or to its This article has presented the view that destruction. each species has evolved a set of primary motivational/emotional systems, or primes, References which are special-purpose systems serving the Anderson, C. D. (1981). Expression of affect and physi- basic functions of bodily adaptation and ho- ological response in psychosomatic patients. Journal meostasis. It is assumed that the primes are of Psychosomatic Research, 25, 143-149. based on neurochemical substrates, that mo- Andrew, R. J. (1963). The origin and evolution of the calls and facial expressions of the primates. Behaviour, tivation consists of the potential for behavior 20, 1-109. inherent in the prime, and that emotion Andrew, R. J. (1965). The origins of facial expressions. involves the readout of this motivational po- Scientific American, 213, 88-94. MOTIVATION AND EMOTION 409

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