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George Carver's Defense O James J. Analeton Guised As a Review of -'Nom Mangold's "Cold Warrior," Foeikn Intelligence

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George Carver's Defense O James J. Analeton Guised As a Review of -'Nom Mangold's George carver's defense o James J. analeton guised as a review of 'nom- Mangold's "Cold Warrior," Foeikn Intelligence Literary Scene, Vol. 1U, No. 5, 1991. This is worse than an unbalanced defense of Angleton and the havoc he wrought within the CIA. It is dishonest.ItItmakes clear thAt Carver himself wan an angletonian, not only in personal support but in adhering to the sane devastating beliefs and ppolicies. There is no mintion, for example, of angleton's damage to US intelligence. Carver supports Angleton's tragic and paranoid mistakes, like allowing himself to be dominated by the obviously sick-in-the head Golitsyn. He seeks to cover these flaws in his conclusion, where he says that Algleton had his failings and faults and was overly influenced by Golitsyn but (g this does not cover Carver's flaws, biases and dishonest&:Land all that preceeds it IA written without regard to the consequences of Colitsyn's insanity and its domination of Angleton and what he did *a did not do as head of Counterintelligence. Another major failing and a serious dishonesty Carver's misrepresentation in his last sentence, that Mangold's sources "broke their oaths of secrecy." Had this been true they'd have been prosecuted. The book is an obvious defense ofthe CIA made possible by the CIA, which used Mangold ty blame all its many errors on Angleton personally. Basically and knowingly dishonest is Carver's statement (7) that "Nosenko (about whom he says nothing good and only evil, omitting all referenfe to what the CIA learned through him) was handled by the CIA's Soviet Division in a manner apuorved by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Department of Justice." John Lemon linrt's testimony before the House Select committee on Assassinations, official CIS testimony, is that what was Bone to Nosenko over a three-years period was not ap)roved by anyone and was inhuman be- yon0 belief. He omits also that Angleton dominated the CIA's Soviet Division and that some of its people were also forced into retirement and became sources fer the Angleton/Carver view of Nosenko. Mangold' book is excellent in its exposure of Angleton et al and the harm done to US intelligence under Golitsyn's domination bas Carver, of course, does not mention, obvious VItir is, Mangold also exculpate° the CIA for all its errors, sane extraordinar- ily significant, even dangerous, and heaps them onkr:Angleton only, thus exculpating the CIA. I think Carver is wrong (but I'm not sure) in saying that Nosenko claimed to have had the ILB's Oswald file in his poseesion twice. My recollection is that he said that after/Oswald was identified in 1963 this file, in iiinek, was flown to Noscow where Nos- enko road it in haste and turned it over for bucking upward within the KGB. Carver is so dishonest he refers to the incredible abuses of Nosenko as "arguably excessive." When this treatment, as described officially by the CIa to the MnUa, no detial A Carter's "review," ranged from driving Nosenko crazy to flying bim over the ocean and dropping him into it, "arguably" is hardly the word! d / J4') 100/ FOREIGN INTEUIGENCE LITERARY SCENE A BIMONTHLY NEWSLETTER1BOOK REVIEW Volume 10, Number 5 National Intelligence Study Center. Publisher 1991 of the United States making it, for better Reshaping American Intelligence or worse, the guardian of its and its allies' strategic interests." The earlier Cold War bipolarity was much easier for strategists and the by Peter A. Lupsha intelligence community to understand and cope with. Between 1947 and 1990 a series of alliance regimes, contain- The end of the Cold War, the lessening of Cold War tensions and the ment strategies, deterrence systems, fracturing of the Warsaw Bloc, and demise of the Warsaw Pact would mean along with the Cold War education of changes in the Soviet Union underscore a lessening of threat and tensions, but the national will, had taken place. But the need and opportunity to reshape actually the reverse is far more likely, with this ideological structure now American intelligence. The key is the and U.S. intelligence will increasingly washing away, historical patterns necessity to redefine and broaden the have its mettle tested. The question is, reminiscent of those of late nineteenth concept of national security from one cam the present architecture of the century Europe are reemerging in the focused narrowly on defense and global American intelligence community meet East, and a fractious but economically military-strategic issues to include that test? For example, Ted Shackley, powerful European Community is those wider traditional interests of former Associate Deputy Director of emerging in the West. These changes earlier intelligence eras, economic Operations, CIA, recently noted, "90 place new demands on the structure of markets, and regional political stability. percent of the existing intelligence U.S. intelligence there and elsewhere. The importance of political and requirements for Eastern Europe are Cold War intelligence architecture economic intelligence was recognized now obsolete." essentially ignored the real issues facing not only by George Pet= and Sherman the Third World Less Developed Kent, two of the classic writers in the Bipolar to Unipolar World Countries (LDCs) unless they served as field, but more currently, by Walter U.S. intelligence has been driven surrogate theaters in the East-West Laqueur and Loch Johnson.' The latter by East-West conflict and the power plays. Today, these LDCs are the defines the first mission of strategic containment of Communism since future stages of regional conflict and intelligence to be "knowledge for...a before the signing of the National instability that cannot be ignored. The world of competing and distrustful Security Act of 1947. This bipolar gangster politics of Saddam Hussein sovereign states." This definition world view, now in flux, is likely to be and Manuel Antonio Noriega does not implicitly contains a balance of all three replaced at some future point with a fit neatly into oar traditional strategic perspectives, military, multipolar perspective. In the intelligence world view. These and political, and economic. meantime, we live in a unipolar world other "grey-area" political challenges One might assume that the with the strategic strength and resources on the horizon demand new In This Issue Reshaping American Intelligence 1 The Role of Police Intelligence 10 A Great Soviet--U.S. Face-Off 4 NISCINT 10 The Prosecution's Case 7 Periodicals and Documents 11 The Prosecution's Case by George A. Carver, Jr. Mangold, Tom. Cold Warrior, Switzerland in 1962, recontacted the entertain Golitsyn's conspiracy and James Jesus Angleton: The CIA's Agency in January 1964, and came to penetration theories whose prince and Master Spy Hunter. New York: Simon the United States soon thereafter. leading guru was James Jesus Angleton. & Schuster, 1991. 356 pp. 524.95. Golitsyn, for whom Angleton Nobly arrayed against these forces of developed a high regard, came bearing darkness were the forces of light -- i.e., The legendary James Angleton, tales of a Soviet and KGB "master plan" Angleton's critics, and Mangold's who headed the Counterintelligence for unrelenting efforts, some of them sources -- whose defining hallmark was Staff of the CIA's Operations already successful, to penetrate and (and is) a conviction that Yuri Nosenko, Directorate from 1954 until 1974 and manipulate various Western govern- despite any apparent evidence to the who died in May 1987, has been the ments and intelligence services, contrary, was purer than the driven subject of innumerable articles, several including the CIA. Golitsyn also snow. Mangold further seems to believe novels, and parts or all of several warned that he would be followed by that in this legion of light, no one was purportedly non-fictional books, the "false defectors," dispatched by the nobler than Leonard McCoy -- a former latest being by British investigative KGB to undercut him and spread Soviet Division reports officer who journalist Tom Marigold. disinformation. became Deputy Chief of the The counterintelligence trade Nosenko claimed, among other Counterintelligence Staff (in 1975) exacts a severe psychic toll on its things, to have twice seen the KGB's after Angleton's departure and appears practitioners — as 1 know from having file on Lee Harvey Oswald and hence to to have been Mangold's principal been one -- since to be effective, a know that the Soviets had had no hand source. counterintelligence officer must in President John Kennedy's November Mangold has clearly done a harness two quite antithetical human 1963 assassination (two months before formidable amount of research, traits and become, while operating Nosenko recontacted the CIA in reflected in a host of endnotes, but professionally, a controlled paranoid. If Geneva).This latter allegation made the virtually all of his most damaging and either the control or the paranoia slips, CIA consider it imperative to establish detailed charges against Angleton are a counterintelligence officer is asking or refute Nosenko's authenticity, by any based on highly classified, still- for trouble -- putting that officer's means required. (Some of the means closely-held reports and documents service and country at risk. employed were harsh and arguably (e.g., Angleton's deposition to the Though by no means bereft of excessive; but Nosenko was handled by House Select Committee on admirers, Angleton had, and still has, the CIA's Soviet Division in a manner Assassinations, which
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