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Home , George Blake, James Jesus Angleton

George carver's defense o James J. analeton guised as a review of 'nom- Mangold's "Cold Warrior," Foeikn Intelligence Literary Scene, Vol. 1U, No. 5, 1991. This is worse than an unbalanced defense of Angleton and the havoc he wrought within the CIA. It is dishonest.ItItmakes clear thAt Carver himself wan an angletonian, not only in personal support but in adhering to the sane devastating beliefs and ppolicies. There is no mintion, for example, of angleton's damage to US intelligence. Carver supports Angleton's tragic and paranoid mistakes, like allowing himself to be dominated by the obviously sick-in-the head Golitsyn. He seeks to cover these flaws in his conclusion, where he says that Algleton had his failings and faults and was overly influenced by Golitsyn but (g this does not cover Carver's flaws, biases and dishonest&:Land all that preceeds it IA written without regard to the consequences of Colitsyn's insanity and its domination of Angleton and what he did *a did not do as head of . Another major failing and a serious dishonesty Carver's misrepresentation in his last sentence, that Mangold's sources "broke their oaths of secrecy." Had this been true they'd have been prosecuted. The book is an obvious defense ofthe CIA made possible by the CIA, which used Mangold ty blame all its many errors on Angleton personally. Basically and knowingly dishonest is Carver's statement (7) that "Nosenko (about whom he says nothing good and only evil, omitting all referenfe to what the CIA learned through him) was handled by the CIA's Soviet Division in a manner apuorved by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Department of Justice." John Lemon linrt's testimony before the House Select committee on Assassinations, official CIS testimony, is that what was Bone to Nosenko over a three-years period was not ap)roved by anyone and was inhuman be- yon0 belief. He omits also that Angleton dominated the CIA's Soviet Division and that some of its people were also forced into retirement and became sources fer the Angleton/Carver view of Nosenko. Mangold' book is excellent in its exposure of Angleton et al and the harm done to US intelligence under Golitsyn's domination bas Carver, of course, does not mention, obvious VItir is, Mangold also exculpate° the CIA for all its errors, sane extraordinar- ily significant, even dangerous, and heaps them onkr:Angleton only, thus exculpating the CIA. I think Carver is wrong (but I'm not sure) in saying that Nosenko claimed to have had the ILB's Oswald file in his poseesion twice. My recollection is that he said that after/Oswald was identified in 1963 this file, in iiinek, was flown to Noscow where Nos- enko road it in haste and turned it over for bucking upward within the KGB. Carver is so dishonest he refers to the incredible abuses of Nosenko as "arguably excessive." When this treatment, as described officially by the CIa to the MnUa, no detial A Carter's "review," ranged from driving Nosenko crazy to flying bim over the ocean and dropping him into it, "arguably" is hardly the word!

d / J4') 100/ FOREIGN INTEUIGENCE LITERARY SCENE

A BIMONTHLY NEWSLETTER1BOOK REVIEW

Volume 10, Number 5 National Intelligence Study Center. Publisher 1991

of the making it, for better Reshaping American Intelligence or worse, the guardian of its and its allies' strategic interests." The earlier bipolarity was much easier for strategists and the by Peter A. Lupsha intelligence community to understand and cope with. Between 1947 and 1990 a series of alliance regimes, contain- The end of the Cold War, the lessening of Cold War tensions and the ment strategies, deterrence systems, fracturing of the Warsaw Bloc, and demise of the Warsaw Pact would mean along with the Cold War education of changes in the underscore a lessening of threat and tensions, but the national will, had taken place. But the need and opportunity to reshape actually the reverse is far more likely, with this ideological structure now American intelligence. The key is the and U.S. intelligence will increasingly washing away, historical patterns necessity to redefine and broaden the have its mettle tested. The question is, reminiscent of those of late nineteenth concept of national security from one cam the present architecture of the century Europe are reemerging in the focused narrowly on defense and global American intelligence community meet East, and a fractious but economically military-strategic issues to include that test? For example, Ted Shackley, powerful European Community is those wider traditional interests of former Associate Deputy Director of emerging in the West. These changes earlier intelligence eras, economic Operations, CIA, recently noted, "90 place new demands on the structure of markets, and regional political stability. percent of the existing intelligence U.S. intelligence there and elsewhere. The importance of political and requirements for are Cold War intelligence architecture economic intelligence was recognized now obsolete." essentially ignored the real issues facing not only by George Pet= and Sherman the Less Developed Kent, two of the classic writers in the Bipolar to Unipolar World Countries (LDCs) unless they served as field, but more currently, by Walter U.S. intelligence has been driven surrogate theaters in the East-West Laqueur and Loch Johnson.' The latter by East-West conflict and the power plays. Today, these LDCs are the defines the first mission of strategic containment of since future stages of regional conflict and intelligence to be "knowledge for...a before the signing of the National instability that cannot be ignored. The world of competing and distrustful Security Act of 1947. This bipolar gangster politics of Saddam Hussein sovereign states." This definition world view, now in flux, is likely to be and Manuel Antonio Noriega does not implicitly contains a balance of all three replaced at some future point with a fit neatly into oar traditional strategic perspectives, military, multipolar perspective. In the intelligence world view. These and political, and economic. meantime, we live in a unipolar world other "grey-area" political challenges One might assume that the with the strategic strength and resources on the horizon demand new

In This Issue

Reshaping American Intelligence 1 The Role of Police Intelligence 10 A Great Soviet--U.S. Face-Off 4 NISCINT 10 The Prosecution's Case 7 Periodicals and Documents 11 The Prosecution's Case

by George A. Carver, Jr.

Mangold, Tom. Cold Warrior, in 1962, recontacted the entertain Golitsyn's conspiracy and James Jesus Angleton: The CIA's Agency in January 1964, and came to penetration theories whose prince and Master Spy Hunter. New York: Simon the United States soon thereafter. leading guru was James Jesus Angleton. & Schuster, 1991. 356 pp. 524.95. Golitsyn, for whom Angleton Nobly arrayed against these forces of developed a high regard, came bearing darkness were the forces of light -- i.e., The legendary James Angleton, tales of a Soviet and KGB "master plan" Angleton's critics, and Mangold's who headed the Counterintelligence for unrelenting efforts, some of them sources -- whose defining hallmark was Staff of the CIA's Operations already successful, to penetrate and (and is) a conviction that Yuri Nosenko, Directorate from 1954 until 1974 and manipulate various Western govern- despite any apparent evidence to the who died in May 1987, has been the ments and intelligence services, contrary, was purer than the driven subject of innumerable articles, several including the CIA. Golitsyn also snow. Mangold further seems to believe novels, and parts or all of several warned that he would be followed by that in this legion of light, no one was purportedly non-fictional books, the "false defectors," dispatched by the nobler than Leonard McCoy -- a former latest being by British investigative KGB to undercut him and spread Soviet Division reports officer who journalist Tom Marigold. disinformation. became Deputy Chief of the The counterintelligence trade Nosenko claimed, among other Counterintelligence Staff (in 1975) exacts a severe psychic toll on its things, to have twice seen the KGB's after Angleton's departure and appears practitioners — as 1 know from having file on and hence to to have been Mangold's principal been one -- since to be effective, a know that the Soviets had had no hand source. counterintelligence officer must in President John Kennedy's November Mangold has clearly done a harness two quite antithetical human 1963 assassination (two months before formidable amount of research, traits and become, while operating Nosenko recontacted the CIA in reflected in a host of endnotes, but professionally, a controlled paranoid. If ).This latter allegation made the virtually all of his most damaging and either the control or the paranoia slips, CIA consider it imperative to establish detailed charges against Angleton are a counterintelligence officer is asking or refute Nosenko's authenticity, by any based on highly classified, still- for trouble -- putting that officer's means required. (Some of the means closely-held reports and documents service and country at risk. employed were harsh and arguably (e.g., Angleton's deposition to the Though by no means bereft of excessive; but Nosenko was handled by House Select Committee on admirers, Angleton had, and still has, the CIA's Soviet Division in a manner Assassinations, which is still under many critics, plus quite a few enemies. approved by the Director of Central seal), and on "confidential sources," not Mangold seems to have interviewed Intelligence and the Department of further identified, in a manner nearly every one of these critics and Justice -- not, as Mangold suggests, exemplified by note 4 to Chapter 22: enemies in the course of writing what is dictated or directed by James Angleton "The non-attributable quotations in this much more an unrelenting prosecutor's and the Counterintelligence Staff.) chapter have been collected from brief than a balanced biography of a After five years of wrangling, friends and colleagues of the primary gifted and dedicated, but very complex, Nosenko was officially ruled to be bona sources -- and have been carefully human being. fide, though the debate over his cross-checked." (p. 431) authenticity continued into the 1980s, Golitsyn and Nosenko Cases and James Angleton believed until his Verification Impossible dying day that Nosenko had been a Angleton was at the heart of the In developing his case against KGB plant — as Golitsyn had averred many counterintelligence controversies Angleton, furthermore, Mangold makes from the time of Nosenko's . that arose during his two decades as the frequent use of the "Bob Woodward West's leading counterintelligence gambit" -- attributing damaging details officer, notably the still-divisive Sources: The Critics to remarks allegedly made by, or controversy over the motives and bona Mangold takes a decidedly contained in reports and studies written fides of two key Soviet defectors: Manichean view of these complex by, people now safely dead and hence Anatoli Golitsyn, a KGB major who controversies, and the people involved unable to contradict any of Mangold's defected (in Finland) in December in them. On one side, in his eyes, were assertions about their opinions (e.g., 1961; and Yuri Nosenko, a KGB (and are) the forces of darkness -- John Bross, Joe Burke, Jack Fieldhouse, captain (who claimed to be a lieutenant "fundamentalists," of several and George Winters). The heart of colonel) who first contacted the CIA in nationalities, paranoid enough to Mangold's case, in short, is based on

7 detailed allegations that no reader can throughout Western Europe and around Angleton guru and his principal source! cross-cheek for accuracy or context. the world. (p. 407) In short, it was Leonard In their determination to denigrate McCoy, not James Angleton, who first Angleton, neither Mangold nor his Loginov Case flagged Loginov's CIA relationship to sources let themselves be deterred by All the just-discussed traits of public, hence Soviet, attention -- with accuracy. No indiscretion by Angleton Mangold and his anti-Angleton sources Tom Marigold then adding the juicy was responsible for the fate of TOP come into sharp focus in Mangold's details. Should Loginov still be alive, HAT, a Soviet GRU officer run by the treatment of what he terms (in Chapter that fact would add considerable FBI, whom the Soviets tried for treason 14) "The Loginov Scandal." Yuriy support to the belief of Angleton, and executed in 1988. Mangold Nikolayevich Loginov was a then- among others, that he was always acting attributes TOP HAT's downfall to a young KGB officer who defected in under KGB direction, If Loginov has February 1978 New York magazine Helsinki in April 1961 and agreed to be now been tried and imprisoned, or article by , which a "double," whom the Soviets worse, the responsibility for his fate lies Mangold contends must have been subsequently assigned to South Africa. with Leonard McCoy and Tom based on an unconscionable leak by The CIA's Soviet Division, along with Mangold -- not with James Angleton. some "fundamentalist." Angleton's Counterintelligence Staff, By 1978, of course, Angleton had became convinced that Loginov was a The 1950s and 1960s Climate retired, and Epstein has always stoutly provocation working under KGB In his tunnel-visioned attack on denied that Angleton was his source; direction. Loginov was hence identified Angleton, Marigold ignores the context "but, one must ask". counters Mangold, as a Soviet illegal, but not as a CIA asset, and climate within which Angleton "is it possible that such an astonishing to the South Africans, who imprisoned lived and worked, professionally. leak could have come from other Loginov, interrogated him, and then, in Angleton took over the CIA's dedicated Fundamentalists without their 1969, turned him over to the West Counterintelligence Staff in 1954, in the former chief's tacit approval?" Germans -- who, on 13 July 1969, wake of the still-reverberating shock of Actually, as Mangold subsequently exchanged him for eleven West German the flight to three years earlier admits -- in an endnote -- the nail to TOP agents held by the Communists in HAT's coffin was probably provided by two British diplomats, Pastern Europe. and , and amid growing the Soviets by , a In using Loginov as a club with renegade CIA Soviet Division officer though then-still-unproven doubts which to beat Angleton, however, about the trustworthiness of who defected to Moscow in 1985. Mangold has to engage in some fancy Mangold and at least some of his -- a senior officer in Britain's Secret verbal footwork to cope with the Intelligence Service (SIS, or MI6), who sources are so obsessed with awkward information provided by KGB had been the SIS/M16 liaison officer in denigrating Angleton that they not only Colonel Oleg Gordievskiy, one of the ignore reality but become seemingly Washington when Burgess and most knowledgeable and reliable of all Maclean fled and whom Angleton had oblivious to the damage they Soviet defectors, that Loginov had not long regarded as a friend. themselves are demonstrably doing in been tried when he reached Moscow in 1954 was the year in which Otto the process. According to Mangold, for 1969, let alone executed, because the example, one such source told him John, the first head of 's Soviets were not aware that Loginov FBI (the BfV) defected to East precisely how many human assets (Le., had been serving as a CIA agent -- and agents) the CIA was running in the Germany. 1961, the year of Golitsyn's as of the mid-1980s, a very live Loginov defection, was the year in which Heinz Soviet Union in the late 1960s -- was teaching English in Gorky. Felfe -- head of the Soviet Counter- something no intelligence officer with a Gordievskiy's information gives shred of professional integrity should intelligence Section of West Germany's Mangold a tricky problem, which he external service, the BND -- was ever have divulged to any journalist, no tries to solve by asserting: arrested as a Soviet spy, as was the matter what that officer may have "The CIA were so convinced that Briton George Blake, another senior thought of James Angleton. [Loginov] had been shot that they Also, Mangold is very free with the SIS/MI6 officer. In 1963, Philby's flight allowed confirmation of his defection to Moscow removed all doubts about adjective "unconscionable" when and recruitment by the agency to be applying it to Angleton, but he the former head of MI6's Soviet openly printed (in all good faith) in 1988 Counterintelligence Section's having apparently sees nothing wrong with his in an unclassified article in CIRA, the been a long-time Soviet agent, a fact publicizing the long, close, and hitherto newsletter of the Central Intelligence secret relationship that Angleton had further confirmed in 1968 by the Retirees Association." (p. 226) publication of Philby's smug, smirking with a leading American labor figure In the back-of-the-book (note 48, to who died in 1990 and had spent years autobiography My Silent War. Chapter 14), not in his main text, Several writers have argued, as working quietly with Angleton and the Mangold acknowledges that the author CIA in a commendable common effort does Mangold, that the realization of of the article in question was none other how completely he had been gulled by to slow or reverse the spread of Soviet than now-retired Leonard McCoy -- influence in labor movements his supposed friend Kim Philby was a Mangold's greatly admired anti- psychological shock from which

8 Angleton never recovered, and which added considerably to Angleton's CIA's Counterintelligence Staff, there colored all of his subsequent behavior, prestige, but nothing in this aspect of his was no known Soviet penetration of that but this allegation, at a minimum, is work had a direct bearing on the subject agency, though Angleton went to his considerably overdrawn. In the overall matter of this narrative." (p. 362) grave convinced that there were some climate of the 1950s and 1960s, quite Mangold makes no mention such penetrations that he had failed to apart from Philby, James Angleton whatsoever of the fact that through his identify -- and indeed, a long-term would have been derelict in the Israeli contacts, Angleton played an Czech penetration, contract employee discharge of his professional re- instrumental role in the public surfacing Karel Koecher, was identified in 1984. sponsibilities if he had not been of Nikita Khruschev's 1956 "secret Also, a long-term Chinese Communist concerned about Soviet penetrations speech" denouncing Stalin's crimes. penetration, Larry Wu-tai Chin -- a staff and covert moles. The publication of that speech sent employee of the Foreign Broadcast Mangold dismisses as "paranoia" shock waves throughout the Soviet Information Service, which the CIA Angleton's concerns about possible Union, and the Communist movement administers -- was identified in 1985. Soviet influence over, even worldwide, whose continuing manipulation of, various Western reverberations contributed significantly Summation of Record political figures and leaders including to the eventual collapse of Communism James Jesus Angleton had his West Germany's Chancellor, Willy in Eastern Europe in 1989 and then in failings and faults, many of them. He Brandt. He neglects to mention, the Soviet Union itself in the summer of was overly influenced by Anatoly however, that in 1974 — the year of 1991. Nothing in "this aspect" of Golitsyn and as a result, too suspicious Angleton's enforced retirement -- Angleton's work may "have had a direct of some of his colleagues (though it is Brandt was compelled to relinquish his bearing" on the subject matter of Cold ironic that while berating Angleton for Chancellorship to Helmut Schmidt Warrior, but it certainly had a direct, these suspicions, Marigold also faults because Brandt's close, long-time beneficial bearing on the course of him for not being suspicious enough personal assistant, Guenter Guillaume, world history. about Philby). In the final years of his was discovered to be an officer in East Mangold also gives scant attention career, he let his control slip and his Germany's intelligence service and to another major "aspect of paranoia predominate. Indeed, it would convicted of . [Angleton's] work" that has a direct, doubtless have been better for the unquestionable bearing on Cold Agency, as well as for him personally, Angleton's Successes Warrior's subject matter -- an aspect if James Angleton had been gently but flagged by Oleg Gordievskiy. Marigold In Marigold's eyes, Angleton did firmly eased into retirement -- with quotes Gordievskiy as saying "that little, if anythi ng, right -- in his personal, eminently appropriate ruffles and Angleton's reputation alone was one of family or professional life. Angleton's flourishes -- in the late 1960s. By 1974, the main reasons the Soviet bloc had achievements, of which there were he probably did have to go: though such little success in penetrating the many, Marigold either blandly ignores when he was compelled to retire, it was Western intelligence services or cursorily dismisses. From 1951 until after its a great mistake to scatter his staff and postwar triumphs. His name became a his retirement in 1974, for example, destroy the bulk of his files -- thus legend at No. 1 Dzerzhinsky Square Angleton did a brilliant job in handling eviscerating the institutional memory [KGB headquarters] even before his the "Israeli account,"--a job Mangold without which no counterintelligence fame spread around his own dismisses in one sentence: "Angleton's office can hope to be effective. institution's offices." (pp. 61-62) ties with the Israelis gave him James Angleton was a complex Mangold neglects to mention, considerable prestige within the CIA product of his time and his however, that Gordievskiy made this and later added significantly to his responsibilities, who deserves to be comment in 1988, the year after expanding counterintelligence empire." regarded, and evaluated, in perspective (p. 49) Angleton's death and fourteen years -- in light of his achievements as well as after his retirement. Hence it reflects In a subsequent, back-of-the-book his failings. He does not deserve the Gordievskiy's and, presumably, the note (6, to Chapter 4), Mangold does relentless posthumous savaging that KGB's summary judgment on acknowledge that Angleton "was held Tom Mangold gives him in in immense esteem by his Israeli Angleton's overall effectiveness during Cold Warrior-- a savaging that does far more colleagues and by the state of , his entire counterintelligence career -- a to discredit Tom Marigold, and those which was to award him profound judgment very different from that of who broke their oaths of secrecy to abet honors after his death." The note into Mangold and his anti-Angleton sources. Mangold's vendetta, than it does to stain which this acknowledgment is tucked, One of the intelligence profession's the memory of James Jesus Angleton. however, begins with a sentence that many peculiarities is the fact that an (A condensed venial of this review was reads: intelligence officer's, particularly a published in The Wall Street Journal "The distinction of being placed in counterintelligence officer's, greatest on October 22, 1991.) charge of the CIA's Israeli Desk, and his triumphs lie in things that do not George Carver, a former intelligence officer, is the handling of this new and important happen. During James Angleton's two John M. Olin Senior Fellow at the Center for Counterintelligence Staff function, decade-long tenure as the head of the Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

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