Robert Kennedy History and Remembrance
Interviewee: John Reilly Interviewer: lack McMackin Instructor: Doug Litowitz February 10, 2003 McMackin 2
Table of Contents
Table of Contents 2
Contract 3
Statement of Purpose 4
Biography 5
Historical Contextualization 6
Interview Trmiscription 17
Interview Analysis 41
Bibliography 48 McMackin 3
Interviewee Release Form: May be used without restriction McMackin 4
Statement of Purpose
The purpose of this oral history project is to gather a unique and personal perspective of a certain aspect of history that might be overlooked by a historimi's second-hand study of it. It allows one to experience history through the eyes of someone who lived it, and, therefore, obtain a more complete and thorough understanding of the subject in question. McMackin 5
Biography
Mr. Reilly has been Of Counsel to Baker & McKenzie since 1993. He had been
with the law firm of Winston & Strawnforthe previous 20 years. From 1972 through
1986, he was the managing partner of Winston Sc Strawn's Washington, D.C. office mid,
most recently, was Of Counsel. Prior to that, he was a partner in the law firm of Pierson,
Ball & Dowd. From 1964 to 1967, he served as a Commissioner of the Federal Trade
Commission. From 1961 to 1965, he was an Assistmit to the Attorney General, Robert .F
Kennedy, and was Director of the Executive Office for the Attorney General. Mr. Reilly
has extensive experience in antitrust, trade, legislative, and regulatory maters.
Over the past thirty-five years, Mr. Reilly has been involved in numerous national
political campaigns, including the presidential campaigns of John F. Kennedy, Robert F.
Kennedy, Edmund Muskie mid Walter Mondale. Mr. Reilly was senior political advisor to former Vice President Walter F. Mondale during the national presidential elections in
1976, 1980, and 1984.
Mr. Reilly is originally from Dubuque, Iowa and attended Loras College - State
University of Iowa, and the Law College of the State University of Iowa, where he was a
member of the Iowa Law Review and graduated in 1955. McMackin 6
Historical Contextualization
To many students of today's generation, Robert Kennedy's name is associated
with only a few facts. He is known as the brother of an assassinated president, who was
assassinated himself in his own attempt to win the presidency. But to those of the
Babyboomer generation RFK was as a symbol of the Sixties, and, to many of them, an
important pmt of their lives. He was a vigorous liberal who fought hard for his
convictions. He embodied the "new way" of thinking and brought about chmige in a time
when it was much needed. He became a leader on pressing issues such as civil rights and
U.S. involvement in Vietnam. He developed as a major political figure both as a top aid to his brother and a political leader in his own right, and almost became the major
political figure of his time, but for his tragic murder in 1968.
RFK stood as a symbol of the Sixties, and a key political figure, in 1968.
Robert Frmicis Kennedy was bom on November 20, 1925, the third son and
seventh child of Joseph and Rosemary Kennedy. Joseph Kennedy was a prominent
Catholic businessman, who survived the depression, and had high aspirations for his
sons. For most of his childhood Robert was overshadowed by his two brothers, Joe and
Jack. Joseph Kennedy had a vision that one of his sons would be president some
day—^that is, one of the two oldest sons, Joe Jr. and Jack. It was said that he "lacked the jaunty, glowing air of a young Kennedy" (Thomas 31). McMackin 7
Kennedy did not do well at school. This was not for lack of intelligence; he had a very good mid practical mind. He was well rounded, t^ing pmt in activities such as football, track, mid sailing.
Bobby Kennedy desperately wanted to fight in WWII like his older brothers. So when he turned 18, he joined the Navy. Unfortunately for Bobby, he missed the war by months. He served on a destroyer called the Joseph P. Kennedy Jr. Joe, Sr. pulled many political strings to get the ship named for his son who had died while flying a combat mission. Bobby left the Navy in the spring of '46, because he was required at home.
In 1946, Jack began his political cmeer when he ran for congress. RFK was informed by his father that he was to help. JFK was less then happy about his little brother helping out in his campaign. He told an aid, "You take Bobby out to the movies or whatever you want to" (Thomas 49). Over time, however, RFK would gain his brother's trust.
In 1952 RFK becmne JFK's senate campaign manager. He also served as a mediator between Joe Sr. and Jack. Jack was becoming increasingly independent of his father and Jack used Bobby as the buffer between him and his father. This mutual distancing between father and son was beneficial for the campaign - which would have been harmed if voters perceived Joe Kennedy to be running the show behind the curtain.
Jack was particulmly concerned about this after being called "Jawn the Pawn" during his congressional race. (Thomas 49).
The relationship between Jack and Bobby at this time was still a rocky one. As a good friend, Kenny O'Donnell pointed out: "Bobby didn't know what Jack was doing.
Jack didn't know Bobby was doing, and neither one cmed very much what either one was McMackin 8
doing. I had been under the impression that they were peas in a pod. They certainly
weren't" (qtd in Thomas 49). Still, a strong personal relationship between the two had yet to foster. Despite that, RFK did a solid job as campaign manager and JFK beat Henry
Cabot Lodge to become the new senator from Massachusetts.
In 1953, RFK became an assistant counsel to the Senate Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations led by Joseph McCarthy. Bobby's father got him the job by making a
few phone calls. The McCmthy hearings mainly focused on finding Communist spies
who had infiltrated the country, but were bitterly criticized for it's tactics of falsehood
and innuendo (Heymann 69). After five months, RFK decided to leave the committee. He
was later asked how he could be involved in any way with Senator Joe McCarthy. His
response was this: "Well, at the time, I thought there was a serious internal security threat to the United States, mid Joe McCmlhy seemed to be the only one who was doing
anything about it." After a second of reflection he added, "I was wrong" (Thomas 64).
In 1955, Robert Kennedy became chief counsel for the senate select committee.
It was the committee in charge of investigations of illegal activities. Kennedy quickly
found an area that interested him—gangster's extortion from employers mid labor unions.
Mobster Racketeering which included, "lomi-sharking, extortion, prostitution, gambling,
and, during Prohibition, bootlegging. (Thomas 71) Muckrakers's reports showed the
problems with big labor unions that were controlled by gangsters. Kennedy was in a
dilemma, though- To prosecute leaders of big labor organizations would be "politically
risky" because of their huge influence in the Democratic party. Also, this action could
cause the Kennedys to lose the support of the labor unions and political machines, which
would be crucial for Jack Kennedy's eventual run at the Presidency. Eventually, RFK McMackin 9
decided that, nonetheless, mob infiltration of labor unions was a problem that needed to
be dealt with. Subpoenas were handed out, mid mobsters began to fall. In a particularly
famous encounter, Jimmy Hoffa, a mobster who had ties to the Teamsters (the largest
labor organization), was put on trial for bribery. He hired the best criminal defense
lawyer in the country to defend him. He put on a great show, and the jury ended up
voting to acquit. Hoffa would eventually go to jail for bribing a jury, and Kennedy kept
working to get mobsters behind bars. With McClellan Committee, RFK found a job he
excelled at. "Bobby was the driving force behind the McClellan committee.. .He could be
a bit like a bull in a china shop the way he charged forward with his questions, but he got the job done" (Heymann 92).
Despite the sometimes tense relationship between JFK and RFK, it says
something that JFK trusted RFK to run his presidential cmiipaign. Through the campaign,
JFK realized Bobby's value to him. As brothers, they had a way to communicate with
each other like no one else could. "Bobby was not only the campaign manager, he was
his brother's buffer, protector, adviser, and one of the few people who would say no, no,
no" (Martin 188). Evan Thomas summarizes the brothers' role in the cmiipaign the best:
"Jack was noble, Bobby was tough. Jack was the visionmy, Bobby was the enforcer.
Jack's job was to move forward, bobby's to cover his back" (Thomas 91). John Kennedy
had to appem reserved and dignified. It was Robert Kennedy's job to get done what had to be gotten done. He was once heard muttering, "I don't care if anyone mound here likes
me as long as they like Jack" (Thomas 61).
The Campaign strategy was a very delicate one. The elders of the Senate did not
look at Jack Kennedy too favorably. They did not like Kennedy's "zip in and zip out" use McMackin 10 of the senate as a stepping stone to the White House. So, the Kennedys looked for a new way to run a campaign that did not involve getting lifted on the shoulders of Senate and political machines. They decided it was time to try to appeal the "new generation" of voters. (Thomas 92) At the same they did not want to alienate the political bosses. They would worry about the new generation and Joe Kennedy would worry about the political bosses.
The campaign had to walk another fine line. Bobby knew the religious issue could make or break the campaign. The Kennedys were Catholic. No Catholic had ever been elected President. The polls showed Kennedy and Nixon dead even. They had to get the
Catholic vote, but at the same time they had to convince Protestants and Jews that
Kennedy being Catholic was not an issue. The Kennedy campaign made race enough of an issue, but not too much of an issue, to win the election—one of the closest in history.
John F. Kennedy, the newly elected president, was apprehensive about giving his younger brother a place in his new administration. It was obvious that Bobby was not the most experienced mid traditionally qualified person for a high level job. But, Joe
Kennedy insisted. RFK becmne Attorney General, and his main focus would be civil rights. Over time he became JFK's most trusted advisor and dealt with issues both domestic mid international. JFK would later say about RFK, "I don't know why people are so mad at me for making Bobby Attorney General. Ijust wanted to give him some legal experience before he practiced" (qtd inThomas 111).
A clear example of the two working together occurred in 1961. The CIA advised
President Kennedy that they could ret^e Cuba from the Communist dictator Fidel
Castro. The CIA trained and armed Cuban refugees and, on President Kennedy's orders. McMackin 11 stormed the beaches of Cuba. The operation, which becmne known as the "Bay of Pigs," was a complete failure. After this militmy mid political failure on the part of the administration, there were many ill feelings in the White House. Many generals and advisors urged the president to commit Americmi Marines to expel Castro. Bobby
Kennedy gave the president different advice. "We [cmi't] plunge into an irresponsible action just because a fanatical fringe puts so-called national pride above national reason"
(Schlesinger 488).
The issue of Cuba would haunt the Kennedy brothers throughout JFK's tenure as
President. The Cuban Missile Crisis was a scary time for Americmis, because never before had the world been so close to nuclem war. The Soviet Premier, Nikita
Khrushchev, placed medium-rmige nuclear warheads in Cuba with the ability to hit half of the cities in the U.S. within minutes. Many within the Kennedy administration pushed for a first strike to try to knock out the missiles. RFK, who by this time had developed a strong personal relationship with his brother, cautioned him to take a more diplomatic line. He was afraid a first strike on Cuba could trigger a nuclear war. During security counsel meetings he was known as being the moderator.
He tended to be low-key. He didn't have a take-charge dominate-the-discuss ion
point of view. Rather, he tried to encourage everybody to express himself. He
would roam around the room shooting questions or m^ing comments. In other
words he wasn't trying to force a consensus. He just wmited everybody to think
and talk it out. (Heymann 272) McMackin 12
He recommended a blockade of the island. On one late night during the crisis, RFK
struck a deal with the soviet ambassador. The next day the soviet leader accepted the
deal, and after 13 days the Cuban missile crisis was over.
When JFK was assassinated in 1963, RFK decided to remain Attorney General
for the end of his term. After that, he ran to be a senator from New York. RFK won
easily. He did not fit in well in the Senate, mainly because he was used to being number two under Kennedy and now he was expected to be at the bottom of 100 senators. He
decided to focus on the "deplorable state of public education" (Roberts 130).
Robert Kennedy always believed "All men are created equal" (Schlesinger 307),
but civil rights was just not a major issue of his until he entered his brother's
administration. His work at the Justice department mid afterwards as a senator to fight
racial discrimination would cause him to be a hero among many African Americans. And
for good reason. He protected those in danger from the "mob" of segregationists. He
enforced anti-discrimination laws. And he did not just speak "the word" from his desk,
but rather, he went into the inner-city, taking joyrides with cops and, during his own
campaign for president, make speeches and meeting with the people of the inner city. On
April 4, 1968, in front of a crowd of cheering supporters, RFK got the news that Martin
Luther King had been assassinated. The following me excerpts from his speech to
supporter in the ghetto of Indianapolis:
For those of you who are black and me tempted to be filled with hatred and
distrust at the injustice of such an act, and all white people, I can say that I feel in
my own heart the smne kind of feeling. I had a member of my family killed [JFK] McMackin 13
by a white man. But we have to make an effort in the U.S, we have to make an
effort to understand and go beyond these rather difficult times.
What we need in the U.S. is not division; what we need in the U.S. is not hatred;
what we need in the U.S. is not violence or lawlessness; but love and wisdom.,
compassion toward one another, and a feeling justice towmd those who still suffer
within our country, whether they be white or they be black. (Kennedy)
With these simple words, RFK consoled a race and reinforced his role as one of the
sixties greatest civil rights advocates.
Kennedy was very undecided on if or when to run for president. "He had hovered near the brinkof declaring himself a candidate for much of 1967." (Dooley 113) When he
finally made his official decision to run in 68, a few primaries had already occurred and
he personally viewed his chances to win it all as low because of it. When Kennedy
decided to run against Johnson he tried to make it clear that he was running against
Johnson's policies not his person. "I do not run for the Presidency merely to oppose any
man but to propose new policies" (Dooley 119)
Much of the media what not behind RFK when he first "jumped" in the race.
Mmiy still supported Senator Eugene McCarthy, as he had already been in the race for a
while as the traditional candidate. As a New York Times article at the time explained,
"The movement that has made Senator McCarthy its symbol exemplifies rationality,
courage, morality. The movement Senator Kennedy commands exemplifies irrationality,
opportunism, amorality.. .American intellectuals.. .must choose between morality and
amorality, between McCarthy and Kennedy" (NY Times). This type of characterization
was not uncommon early in the cmnpaign. McMackin 14
Undoubtedly, the issue of the campaign was the war in Vietnam. Kennedy saw it as a war with no end. He was dead against President Johnson's policy of endless escalation. Kennedy was especially concerned with the harm that the wm was doing at home - he believed that the draft unfairly put the burden of fighting it in the hands of the lower class. "Every night we watch the horror on the evening news. Violence spreads inexorably across the nation, filling the streets and crippling our lives." The only solution the Johnson administration had was "[expand] the use of military force." (Schlesinger
862).
Kennedy was connecting in every way with the "common man." Even the way the
Kennedy's cmnpaign had been thrown together was appealing to some. "A candidate without orgmiization or delegates had no choice but to demonstrate irresistible populm appeal" (Schlesinger 864). The Kennedy campaign hinged on this "appeal to the common man." He visited inner-cities on a regular basis. Every night on the evening news,
Kennedy would be shown being mobbed by "common man" supporters during his campaign stops.
RFK's run for the Presidency reached it's first climax on June 5, 1968. It all came down to California. If Kennedy could win there and secure the state's numerous electoral votes, the nomination and presidency would be very likely his. Just before midnight he received the news that he had won. He stepped to the podium of a hotel ballroom to give his last speech:
What I think is quite clear; we can work together in the last analysis, and that
what has been going on within the U.S. over a period of the last three years—^the
division, the violence, the disenchmitment with our society; the divisions, whether McMackin 15
it's between backs mid whites, between the poor mid the more affluent, or
between age groups or on the war in Vietnmn—is that we can stmt to work
together. We are a great country, an unselfish country, and a compassionate
country. I intend to make that my basis for running." (qtd in Schlesinger 982)
And with that he thanked the crowd and stepped down from the podium. He exited a back way—^through a kitchen. As he was leaving a mmi by the name of Sirhan Sirhan stepped out of the crowd and fired eight shots at Kennedy. Robert Kennedy fell, mortally wounded. (Hill 1)
In his memorial speech, made by Robert's brother Senator Edward Kennedy, he repeated the words his brother lived by: "Some men see things as they are and say why. I dremn things that never were and say why not." (E. Kennedy)
Historimi's judgment of RFK appears mixed. This is quite appropriate for someone who had many dimensions mid who was killed as his public life was just beginning. One of the most positive endorsements from an historian comes from David
Halberstram in The Best and The Brightest. In this well-known book, Halberstram evaluates the political leaders of the Vietnam era. Robert Kennedy comes off very well.
He raves: "Perhaps no one person reflects the embryonic change in Administration and
American attitudes toward the Cold Wm as did Robert Kennedy, the chmige from tough and aggressive and anti-Communism towmd a more modest view of the American role, and a sense of the limits mid dangers of American power" (Halberstram 273).
Halberstram praises Kennedy in other ways:
There were several qualities that set him apml from others in office. .. .an absolute
insistence on being well mid thoroughly briefed. A capacity...to se the world McMackin 16
events in human terms. And such he retained his common sense, it was at least as
strong as his ideology. .. .Out of all this came the final characteristic, the capacity
to grow and change and admit error (Halberstram 274)
In mutual Contempt, a book concerning the long-standing feud between RFK mid
Lyndon Johnson, RFK, in general, comes out better. For instance, Shesol portrays
Kennedy as willing to put aside his personal feelings about LBJ in order to support his brother's successor: " Still as The Nation pointed out... Robert Kennedy could put aside personal politics - for mercy's s^e. He supported the Great Society even when its funding and philosophy struck him as inadequate" (Shesol 475). He concludes that
"Robert Kennedy, by his courage mid his martyrdom, had long ago won the hears of
Democrats" (Shesol 475).
Mmiy people believed that there was, and still is, something special about the
Kennedy family. There is something more then just a President and a Senator. Haynes
Johnson, a reporter/ historian who has followed the Kennedy's sense the very beginning, recently reflected on the Kennedy legacy as he saw it:
[The Kennedy Legacy] is something that goes way beyond politics. I think it
transcends politics, I think that it transcends Jack and Bobby mid the rest. I think
this is such a human story; that is our story. We can't escape it. Anyone who is
alive at the time John Kennedy was murdered shared in that moment in a way that
you will never forget it. You cmi't put it into sort of an easy, historical, or
journalistic context. This is a fable. This is a human drama. (News Hour 1) McMackin 17
Jack McMackin U. S. History
1-9-03
Interviewer: Jack McMackin (JM)- 11 grade student at St. Andrew's Episcopal
School
Interviewee: John R. Reilly (JRR) - Lawyer at Baker & McKenzie Law Firm, former
aide to Robert F. Kennedy
JM: First, Ijust want to know about your history, what you did and how you
became associated with Robert F. Kennedy.
JRR: I have embellished these facts so many times over the yems I'm not sure I
can remember the real truth. I first met Bob Kennedy when he was
counsel to the McClellan Committee on Capitol Hill. I was in Chicago,
and was working at the University of Chicago. I was working with an
organization called the National Association of Attorneys General.
McClellan decided that there was a great need for a kind of clearing house
of criminal information. California didn't know what Illinois was doing,
people being mrested or not arrested and so on. And McClellan wanted to
explore the idea of establishing a clearing house. Hoover objected to it,
really objected to it, and killed it. But, since I was with the State Attorney
Generals and since he was with McClellan, we began to get to know each
other. And then, when his brother minounced his candidacy for president
(I was living in Chicago at the time) he asked me if I wanted to join the
merry crowd. And with my great astute political genius, I said no. I had
three children who were small and so on. But I said as soon as the McMackin 18
convention was over, I would join the cmnpaign and I did. I worked for
Larry O' Brien, who was the campaign chairman, he was one of the Irish
Mafia. Towmd the end of the campaign, in sixty. Bob Kennedy, who was
running the campaign, got tired of being office bound and begmi to travel.
And I began to travel with him and the primary reason was I cmne from
the Midwest and I knew someone in every capital because of my job. We
traveled together. He gave speeches and so on, mid I was his aide. When
Jack Kennedy won, Bobby asked me what I wanted to do now with the
victory. I said "I don't cme, I'm going to go with you". And I asked him
"what are you going to do?". This was before he decided that he was
going to be Attorney General. He said he was up in the air and he did not
know. But, I remember so well: his telling me to go back to Chicago, sell
my house, and move to Washington, which I did. That was a pretty big
jump, when you have three little kids. Anyhow, when he became
Attorney General, I was named by him, I think the title was, Assistmit
Deputy Attorney General. I was in charge of, or head of the Executive
Office of U. S. Attorneys, of which there were 93 in the U. S. Most of my
time in the first year was taken up arranging for the new U. S. Attorneys.
(Pause.) So, that is how I hooked-up with him.
JM: Interesting. What exactly was your role in the first Kennedy campaign?
So you went around with Bobby but, what did you do specifically?
Mr. Reilly made minor stylistic revisions to this paragraph during an edit, as he did with many of his answers. Wherever there was a substantive change, it will be footnoted. McMackin 19
JRR: Well, several things. I worked for Larry O'Brien. He was the campaign
chairmmi on the political side. Bobby was the overall head. I essentially
sat at a desk outside Bobby's and Larry's office and kept the bad people
away. Well, I can't call it that, but that was one of the things I did. And
then I did some advance work. Are you fmniliar with advance work?
JM: Scouting out the area before the candidate comes.
JRR: Yes, you go ahead of the cmididate, and you really set-up everything that
is going to go on. So, I did some of that. And that's when Bob Kennedy
asked me to travel with him. That mnounted to nothing more then make
sure we had some communication and transportation, to make sure we
caught the airplane, etc.. This was long before the days of the Secret
Service being involved in a campaign so that all that stuff had to be done
by the cmnpaign people. If you wanted a car, you had to get someone to
give you a car. You know, it was altogether different then than how it is
now, when the Secret Service handles everything when the candidate
travels.
JM: What would you say was the strategy of the JFK campaign, and what role
did RFK play? McMackin 20
JRR: If there was a strategy (laughs), it was pretty much a liberal strategy, by
that I mean a strategy that pointed up John Kennedy's abilities with a left
twinge as opposed to someone who is on the right. And, in addition to
that, one of the things JFK did as candidate was to put back together a
Democratic party which was all over the lot. An awful lot of people came
to his side of the ballgame. In those days, there were powerful politicimis
- city bosses, smoke-filled rooms mid so on - as opposed to now where
that all has passed. But, they were terribly, terribly powerful in the
nominating process and therefore, important. At first there was a serious
problem, people were worried about the fact that JFK was Catholic which
would hurt him and so on. One of the things that the campaign did was
get a number of non-Catholics to make clear that it did not bother them.
Lawrence in Philadelphia and Pennsylvmiia, and Mike DeSalle in Ohio.
In those days governors were a hell of a lot more important in the
nomination of a candidate than they are now. There were only three or
four primaries you know. Although, they obviously helped JFK, they
were not the only test, miother test was if Mayor Daley in Chicago was
supporting you or, the Mayor of New York was supporting you. That was
much more important than it is today.
JM: So, the way you describe it, JFK being Catholic was a major issue. How
did you deal with that, strategically? McMackin 21
JRR: They faced it, made no bones about it. They did several things, one of the
most important times was, I'm going to get this wrong, he gave a speech
to a Minister's Conference, in Houston. He attacked the thing right away
saying, "I'm Catholic, but the Pope isn't going to move in with me." So on
and so forth, and it blew them away. After that, there was very little
conversation about, or worries about the fact that he was Catholic. Jack
Kennedy supposedly said, one time, when someone asked "What me you
gonna do if you lose?" and he said "I'm gonna call the Pope and tell him
to unpack." I don't think you should resemch that, it probably never
happened (laughs). But, the success at the Houston's Ministers' meeting
was a big, big thing.
JM: OK, to chmige the subject, let's talk about civil rights. Tell me about their
views on civil rights mid how much they made it an issue, both JFK and
RFK, when did they decide, 'OK this is something they want to focus on,
instead of this is something we want to put on the back burner'?
JRR: It's hard to pick a decision-m^ing process, it's entirely part of President
Kennedy's attitude towards becoming the President of the United States
and what he had to do about civil rights if and when he did win. At that
time there was much activity in the black community. I mean it wasn't
that he started it up, it was happening, and the leadership of the black
community was working hard to get his Administration to do things, and McMackin 22
so I think it was soon after that when the first Civil Rights Bill cmne
along, emly '62 or late '61 maybe, the Congress was deeply involved too,
it wasn't as if Kennedy was out there leading the chmge, he was leading
pmt of the charge. In the Movement, not all agreed on how mid where it
should go. I think most of the Black leadership would agree with what I
just said. It was Bobby Kennedy, as Attorney General, who was all
together different, he had of course, a bit of power and exercised it as well
as he possibly could, against segregation. Federal action was crucial to the
Civil Rights Movement.
JM: Now, let me get your take on the book (takes out the book Robert
Kennedy: His Life by Evan Thomas and reads the fiollowing excerpt).
"Now RFK involved himself in the specifics, "Where are the marchers
going to go to the bathroom?" he asked in the secret plmining session. The
Pentagon General suggested digging slit trenches, but portable toilets were
arranged, if the oratory got out of hand, Kennedy aide John Reilly
stationed beneath the speakers platform had a tape of Mahalia Jackson,
singing He's Got the Whole World in His Hands, ready to pipe it over the
loud speaker system. Years later Kennedy aides chuckled over the length
over which he had gone to control the march, that turned out to be a model
of civility and decorum. They laughed about bringing in Mayor Daley's
experts on riot control. "He'd [mess] up a two car funeral," joked Reilly.
Mr. Riley added this sentence in the edit. McMackin 23
In Kennedy's compartmentalized world all the lieutenants were unawme
of the more drastic and secretive steps to reign in on King." Page 251
JRR: Where is that? Give me a page. I remember doing the Mahalia Jackson
thing but I don't remember telling it to Evan. I didn't say things like that
(laughs). I think Evmi might have been a little misled. Let's t^e a few
minutes, if you don't mind because it was a very exciting time. It began
when Philip Randolf and Bayard Rustin who were leaders of the Civil
Rights Movement had decided that this March on Washington to make
demands on the Administration and Congress mid to show unity. And the
Leadership: Rustin, King and John Lewis, who is up at the Hill now as a
Congressman, Philip Randolf, Walter Reuther and others ran the
preparations for the March. There was a meeting with the President mid
Robert Kennedy and several of his staff. They were talking about how
they were going to handle the Civil Rights Bill which was coming up in
that session. And President Kennedy turned to Bobby at one point and
asked, "What are we doing about this March?" and he said, "Nothing, it is
theirs and it would look terrible if we tried to handle it." And the
President turns to him and says well, "You got to get into the thing and
give them all the help we can. What are we going to do with the Civil
Rights Bill if all of those people come down here and pee on the
Washington Monument?" Now that is a very touchy thing to say because
it sounds a bit crude but it was a good point. How me we going to make McMackin 24
sure this March works so it doesn't turn into something detrimental to the
Civil Rights Movement. So, Bob took us to his office, about three or four
of us, and our assignment from that point on, which was about a month's
preparation, was for us to become involved in the March, but not publicly.
And, we successfully did that. The Black leadership was for the most part
very appreciative. So, the Mahalia Jackson story is mostly true. But, the
funny part was years later, I was going through a stack of records and I
found the Mahalia Jackson record and I was floored because the plastic
was still on it. And well, you are too young, but to open one of those
things was almost impossible. (Laughs.) And I thought if I had had
trouble and if I did have to put it over the spe^er, I would have still been
there trying to get it off. But the March went off well and it was a very,
very big, important thing. One of the most important events in Black
history, I think. And I was very proud that we were in it. We had some
real trouble right at the very end. John Lewis who at the time was the
head of SNIC was going to be a spe^er at the event at the Lincoln
Memorial. And he told members of the pmade leadership what his speech
was going to be about. The speech was very critical of the Kennedy
Administration and the mminer in which they were hmidling Civil Rights.
And it was apparent to the Movement leaders that it would have blown the
whole thing. Not by us, but by people like King and Reuther
(Autoworkers). Cardinal O'Boyle was to do the opening prayer after this
Mr. Reilly added Mr. Rustin's name. Mr. Reilly added this sentence. McMackin 25
great unbelievable picture of people coming down the reflecting pool from
the Washington Monument to the Lincoln Memorial. O'Boyle was to
have the opening prayer. And when he heard what John Lewis was going
to do he refused to be a part of it. Now, this was within hours of the
opening of the whole thing mid there were thousands of people coming
into town. King, Reuther, etc., sat down with John Lewis the morning of
the event mid convinced him to tone down his rhetoric. And, O'Boyle
who was in quarters up at St. Matthew's came down and gave the prayer,
about ten minutes after he was scheduled. I mean it was just a very touchy
time.
JM: Getting back to one sentence in the book. {JM rereads last sentence ofi
quote firom Evan Thomas book.) Would you say that this is the way
Kennedy operated - "compmtmentalizing" and "secretive"? Is this the
way he dealt with his aids?
JRR: Yeah, there were very few of his aides who knew everything he was
doing. I think one of the things that came out of this book {Holds up Evan
Thomas book) that surprised so many of us was that we all thought that
what we were doing with him was the most important thing in the world.
And that was all that he was thinking about. I mean we know he was
working with the CIA and trying to get the prisoners out of Cuba and a
vmiety of other things. But, this book points out frmikly, more than McMackin 26
anything I have every hemd or talked about with the others that he often
had several important things going on at one time, which were essentially
compartmentalized. Now there were people in his office, I mean Ed
Guthmmi, his Press Secretary, and John Seigenthaler, his Administrative
Assistant, who always knew, I think, what was going on. It was mnazing
to me because I think we all thought that the focus was on whatever we
were doing. But, the fact is there were many very, very importmit things
that he was deeply involved in going on at the same time mid it blew my
mind to find that out. I have talked to several of the others who were
around in those days, mid they agreed.
JM: OK, so moving on in RFK' career, what was your role during the Senate
Campaign?
JRR: I had very little to do with that. President Kennedy named me to the
Federal Trade Commission before he died [I was serving on it throughout
RFK's tenure as Senator]. Though I was involved with it, I had to be very
careful because it was a non-pmtisan job. We remained friends and talked
to each other often. No, it was not until he decided to run for president that
I left the FTC.
Mr. Reilly added names to the job descriptions. McMackin 27
JM: In the book, it said he had trouble as a Senator because he was used to
being the Attorney General, being basically, as someone said, the 'second
president'.
JRR: Not really. He had two fellas working for him. Adam Walinsky and Peter
Edelman. And, they were really good. He brought them into his Senate
office. There was a short period of time when RFK did the "get along, go
along" but then he became quite active and kind of champed at the bit mid
idea that you had to sit back. And, I think he was considered by most to
be a very good and decent Senator. He obviously was helping New York.
JM: Were you involved in his decision to run for President? Did he ever
discuss it with you?
JRR: Yeah, a couple of times. But, never did we have a private conversation
about it. I mean, I was involved in several conversations, along with other
people, who would meet with him. There was one incident, I don't know
whether it was in the book, that I think tells about that period of time,
when he was deciding whether to go or not. There was a Jefferson-
Jackson dinner in Iowa. And, RFK was invited to give the dinner speech,
this was when people were talking about something had to happen as fm
as Johnson was concerned. And. at this dinner there were about four or McMackin 28
five governors from surrounding states, Missouri and South D^ota and so
on, as well as from Iowa. I traveled out with him on that, which I did
occasionally on events of that nature. We met in a hotel room after the
speech with the governors and they were all saying to him you've got to
run. It was not public that he had been thinking about it. And, they were
all on him "Johnson has gone goofy". And, "We want you to run". He
kept ducking and dodging. And when it was over, John Seigenthaler mid
I were the two aides who were in the room, he turned to us and said "What
the hell is wrong with you guys? " And I asked, "What do you mean?"
"Why didn't you ask them how mmiy delegates they had, why didn't you
ask them what they were willing to do if I rmi?" And we said, "That's not
the role we are used to playing here." And he said, "But that is what I
used to do for Jack." I never forgot that, never forgot that. He expected
us to be out there in front saying 'Goddamit Governor, how mmiy
delegates are you going to give us if we run?' And he didn't have
anybody like that. He was that person for JFK in a meeting like that, he
would be kind of tough and asking what are you going to do for us?
JM: OK, cmi you tell me a bit about Kennedy's '68 campaign mid your role in
that? I got the impression that it was a little "loosy-goosy".
JRR: Yeah, very. {Laughs). I resigned from the Federal Trade Commission to
go work on Bobby's campaign. And I was asked by Bob to do the Hill McMackin 29
and to work its members. Well, one of the problems [with the cmnpaign]
was that there were three different groups involved. There was the old
Jack Kennedy Group, who successfully helped elect the President. The
Kenny O'Donnells and the Larry O'Brien's mid all of those people. And then, there was Bobby's Group and then there was Teddy's. And it was
rather interesting because each of them had their own kind of political
gurus. Which made the cmnpaign, as short as it was, exceptionally
difficult because everyone had different ideas and you couldn't very well tell the fellas who elected Jack Kennedy that they were pretty stupid and
doing things wrong. Teddy's people were aggressive. And there were a
lot of people who didn't wmit to miss the boat, which made it very
difficult. At any rate, we went into the cmnpaign with very little
preparation, because he was making up his mind, m^ing up his mind.
One of the guys who were most influential on him at the time was the
speaker of the House of California, his nmne was Jess Unruh. He had helped Jack Kennedy in his election. And Jess was one of the smartest
pols I have ever met. He was the guy who originated the line "money is the mother's milk of politics." Anyway, he cmne out here and met with
Bob Kennedy mid he did more thmi anyone to convince him to run. So there were these three groups vying for attention plus the fact that that
candidate in the short period of time that he had, was traveling. So, there
was the traveling squad, there was the one back at home, there was the
Teddy people. Had he lived, the Cmnpaign would have had to change McMackin 30
substmitially before the New York Primary, which was coming after
California. So it made it difficult. But, I don't want you to think of these
people as disloyal people. But, they all kind of had their own place. And
it was a campaign that had enough places. But there was some backbiting
and so on. And maybe it sounds self aggrandizing, but I don't think the
Robert Kennedy people were as troublesome, because we knew him best.
We worked for him. At miy rate, I was practicing law. {Pause) God, I
haven't thought of some of these things for a long time. So, he asked me
if I would stay here in Washington with Kenny O'Donnell, who was one
of my best friends and Jack Kennedy's Appointments Secretary. And
work the Hill. But, both of us were to go out in the boonies when the
California Primary was over. Anyway, what was the question? I'm just
rambling {Laughs) [RFK] knew about it. I mean, he knew what was
happening. He knew it was not the smooth well-oiled machine that
everyone thought it was. In fact, it was anything but. But he had planned,
after California, to go to New York mid straighten out the cmnpaign and
he never got to.
JM: OK, Vietnam. We all know that it was one of the major issues of his '68
Campaign. I know that he was in the Navy earlier in his life. Did his
opposition to the war in Vietnam signal a shift in his philosophy towards
war in general? Or, was it that he was just against this specific war? McMackin 31
JRR: At first, RFK was for the wm. But, as he progressed, as he got into it
more, that's when he changed and by the end he was completely against it
and fighting it.
JM: During the cmnpaign it was apparent that RFK had a strong connection
with the common mmi. There are stories of Kennedy campaigning out on
the streets shaking hands mid getting mauled a few times. I know you
were back in Washington for a lot of the early campaign but, did you
experience miy of these scenes?
JRR: Oh yes, it was unbelievable, unbelievable. Of course, it all started with
Jack Kennedy and the "jumpers". But, it was also the days before Secret
Service. There wasn't the protection, so the staff had to do most of it. But
anyhow, when Bob ran it just became.. .there will never be anything like it
again. He would stand up in the back of the convertible and get to the
point where the cars in the motorcade would not be able to move because
of the crowd. And he would give a little speech and ask for them to vote.
There was a guy named Bill Berry, who was a good friend of mine. He
was an FBI agent. We got to know him in New York when Bobby was
Attorney General. And he resigned from the FBI to become Bob
Kennedy's bodyguard on the campaign trail. He was a big husky guy.
But, he would get down in the back seat of the convertible and he would
be like this {raises one hand in the air) with his hand on the back of Bob McMackin 32
Kennedy's belt to steady him, or else the people that grabbed his hands
would have pulled him off the car. Berry was an expert at that job. But
that wasn't just when he was running. When he was Attorney General, we
used to travel a lot to see the U. S. Attorneys, to see the FBI offices, all
over the country, when we had the chance. He would ask me to set-up a
three day trip and every minute had to count. That was one of the things
that drove everybody crazy about him. He would say, "What do we do
now?" get to the airport early and it was "Why are we here?" Good
naturedly, he wasn't stomping on his staff. We would go to, lets say St.
Louis, the U. S. Attorney's Office in St. Louis, and we would walk into
the Federal building. And the lobby would be filled with people, waiting
for him to come through, mid that was when he was Attorney General. I
mean it was just amazing. And you had a hard time getting through
because word came out that he was going to be in town and be there. It
was always a major surprise.
JM: What do you think it was about him that everyone was so attracted to him?
JRR: I think well... some of it was the whole Kennedy charm rubbing off at the
time.
JM: Were they looking for Jack in Bobby?
' Mr. Reilly added the term "jumpers." McMackin 33
JRR: No, they trusted him for himself. During the '68 campaign we were
worried about the South because of the Civil Rights actions that he had
taken mid he wasn't liked in the South. But, after his death, we looked at
some polls that were t^en prior to his death. And it showed that he would
have run substmitially better than anyone would have anticipated. The
reason was, they trusted him. They trusted him even though it was about
something that they didn't like. But, they felt he would be fair. It was just
amazing stuff that came in the polls. Part of it was the Kennedy thing.
It's not all of it. We used to go to the U. S. Attorneys Offices and the
lovely ladies who worked there for 20-40 yems, I was talking to one there
and she said "I've been here for 30 years mid this is the first Attorney
General I have ever met." Nobody traveled like RFK did. None of them
ever did.
JM: Youjust won the California Primary, mid I'm sure many people in the
country thought it would be a walkover. But, the Evan Thomas book
indicates that people in the camp were worried that he wasn't going to
win. What was the feeling in the camp about this?
JRR: There is no question. It wasn't a walk away, he had a lot do yet. In those
days there were fewer primmies. So, there were decisions being made
about whom the delegates would support in different states and
conventions and caucus, for instmice we received a hell of a beating in McMackin 34
Pennsylvania in a convention by Hubert Humphrey, and that had to be
changed around. We were set in Illinois, not too many people knew that.
Mayor Daley would have run the thing for us. But, it wasn't a lay down at
all. Humphrey was a hell of a campaigner. Having lost Oregon, to win
California, and then come back east to New York, which was the next
primary he would have won. And then, we would have worked on the
conventions in Pennsylvania and Ohio. We were m^ing good moves in
there but by no means was it over.
JM: But, you think you would have won though?
JRR: Yeah, I do. I do.
JM: What were the best moments on the presidential cmnpaigns, or the best
encounters that you had with him?
JRR: I don't think that there will ever be such excitement as there was for his
candidacy. That doesn't mean everyone liked him. One time I went out
because he was flying into Lincoln, Nebraska, and I went out to meet him
for some reason, I can't remember, to tell him something and this is what
used to happen all the time. Because the road from the airport to
downtown Lincoln, which was probably fifteen miles, it took him two and
a half hours to get from the airport to downtown because people were on McMackin 35
the side of the road and slowing the traffic, even though the cops had
cleared the roads. We were still barely, barely moving. And that is the
kind of excitement that you never see in politics. You never see that
anymore. There is no charisma like that. I hate that word. When he had a
thought, when he had an idea, when he had something he felt very
strongly about, he made no bones about it. You know, doing straight talk,
and you don't see that now. One of the trips I took with him early on in
Mm^ch to Kmisas University, mid we did a lot of colleges in the beginning
because we had no schedules. This one was at the medical school in
Kansas, I'm almost positive about that, miyhow, it was an open thing, I
mean students, all kinds of students, cmne in but there were a number of
fellas in white coats who were obviously going to med school. And Bob
Kennedy was giving a speech about how we had to start doing "betta" at
taking care of people who don't have money. Who can't afford medical
treatment. And the he opens it for questions. And there was some smart
alec student who stood up mid said "You talk about all these things you're
going to do and who is going to pay for all this?" and Bobby said, "You
are!" You don't hear any of these guys now talking like that now.
JM: Did you have any memorable personal encounters with
Robert Kennedy? McMackin 36
JRR: Yeah, a lot of them. It used to be pretty loose, pretty relaxed. They all run
together though- When I first started to travel with him, he would never
have any money, and I would end up dishing out the money, to the
bellhops and greeters, and all those people. I used to call him "fishhooks"
because he never got his hands out of his pockets. After about three trips
like that, he was costing me money, of course he was unawme. I got hold
of Kenny O'Donnell, who was at the White House and asked him how do
I get RFK to tip, so I don't have to pay for these tips all over the place.
And he said, "Well, you get hold of his secretary and tell her 'he owes me
forty-seven dollars' and she'll get you the forty seven dollars." And I
said, " Yeah, but goddamn it, what the hell kind of a guy is this, he doesn't
even think about it." And he said, "Did you ever stop to think what you
would be like if, from the day you were bom, you never had to think about
money?" and this was an eye opener to me, it was just so different for
these people, like the Kennedy's, and the fact that they cmed about others.
But, we had fun. I was watching a football game the other day.
Washington was the home team and I remembered a trip there with RFK.
Scoop Jackson was the Senator who asked us to go to the University of
Washington football game, and everyone was having a good time. I had a
program and I said, "My kids would get a kick out of this, why don't you
sign this." And he said OK. So I gave it to him and when he gave it back
to me it said, "To John from his friend, Robert Kennedy, AA". And I said,
"What the hell is this, what does AA mean?" and he said. "All Americmi." McMackin 37
It was just that kind of relaxed times I miss so much. I'm sure as soon as
we hang it up here, I'll remember fifty of them.
JM: What was RFK's motivation? What kept him going?
JRR: I think he felt strongly, the older he got, about the world and what was
happening. Really, all you have to do is read some of the speeches he
made in his trip to Africa. You know he thought the world could be a
better place. People had to make it a better place. People had to start
doing so, mid little things would be helpful; the little things would be the
start. And he believed all that. He put that above things like whether
there should be a tax cut, which is what we would talk about today. It
wouldn't have been something people would have normally talked about,
it wasn't on the tip of their tongues.
JM: Where were you on the night of June fifth, when he won the Primary?
JRR: Well, it was kind of a strmige time in my life. I had come back from
California, my 40 birthday was the fourth of June, so I came back
because my wife was having a birthday party for me. After the party my
secretary called me mid said, "Turn on the TV, Bob Kennedy has been
Mr. Reilly moved these stories together in the editing. McMackin 38
shot." And, as a result of the shock of that I had, well, what do you call it,
I had a valve closure, it is just that I still don't know to this day, not a
blockage but... So, my wife called a doctor mid, fortunately there was a
doctor who lived across the street who was a heart doctor and he came and
they took me to Georgetown, and I spent the funeral time in Georgetown,
but I had no subsequent problems. It wasn't a heml attack, it was called
an occlusion. So, I never went to the funeral, I was in the hospital, nor
was I in California when he died.
JM: If he had not been killed what would he have done as president that would
have maybe changed history? What would he have done differently?
JRR: Well, I think he would have seen more of a transition to kind of a people
administration, a people presidency, cause I think he would have done
many of the things he had hoped to do. I think it would have made a
major difference in the manner in which the South was treated, I don't
think he would have allowed that. I think, obviously, I went down to
Appalachia with him one time, and it was the poorest of the poor. And, I
watched him mid his reaction, you know he is a rich kid from Boston.
And, it was obvious that he knew he had gone down there for a specific
reason, to see how terrible it was there and what could be done but, he was
so unbelievably touched that, I know he would have been able to do things McMackin 39
to change that type of living, whether it be in Appalachia or downtown
Washington. To me he would have been a different president.
JM: Would he have ended the war in Vietnam as soon as he was elected?
JRR: I think so, frankly, I'm not the military type, so I don't know what that
would have entailed, if it could have been done, I'm sure he would have.
And, he made no bones about that. I mean that was where he mid Johnson
differed. That's a book you ought to read, the Johnson books.
JM: Some say LBJ and RFK were mchenemies. Tell me a little about their
relationship as you saw it.
JRR: Well, the relationship was not good. But, it was more on the side of
Johnson. He hated RFK, couldn't figure him out and he didn't like him.
Bobby liked to play games, he was not as serious about it, I memi he
thought Johnson was a dope and a buffoon but, he also thought he had
done something in his life.
JM: Well, that's it. Is there anything else that you would like to say?
JRR: Well, we have talked a lot about everything {Pause). I'm proud of the
time I spent with RFK. I had the honor (and the good luck) to pmticipate McMackin 40
in several world chmiging events including the 1962 integration of the
University of Mississippi and the 1963 Mmch. I think he was one of the
few people, at least in my era who were heroes. Today there me no
heroes. But, in those days, there were. It was him and his brother. I think
in politics, maybe I'm exaggerating, but people have no heroes now. In
those days we did.
Mr. Reilly shortened this answer, which had been more elaborate. Mr. Reilly added the previous two sentences. McMackin 41
Historical Analysis
Webster's defines history as "the branch of knowledge dealing with past events."
Like most kinds of knowledge, however, history is filled with uncertainty, judgment, selectivity and interpretation. History is a very useful science; it is not, however, an absolute science. There will always be present an element of subjectivity in miy historical account. Historians know that the "truth" that they seek will never be fully attained - but it is (or should be), nevertheless, the goal of the historimi to come as close to this "truth" as possible. Oral history, or spoken history, serves as a supplement to written history - and it can be an invaluable tool in our attempt to achieve as balmiced, as "true" a history as possible. Its purpose is to get the story of history from individuals who lived it. Instead
of learning about a period or person by reading about it in an academic text on the subject, oral history allows one to experience history through a unique perspective—a first-hand perspective. It is, in a sense, bypassing historians and going to the historians' sources.
John Reilly experienced a unique part of history—Robert Kennedy, and his decade—^the sixties. Robert Kennedy played a key role in mmiy of the defining issues of his times, and became a strong leader who fought for mid shaped the ideals of the
Democratic Party. Nonetheless, much of the recent writing about Robert Kennedy is negative. Books like RFK: A Candid Biography ofiRobert F. Kennedy by C. David
Heymann and The Dark Side ofiCamelot by Seymour M. Hersh tend to emphasize McMackin 42
Kennedy's faults and question his importance or greatness. The most recent biography of
RFK, Robert Kennedy: His Lifie, by Evan Thomas, on the other hand, gives a more
balanced, and positive, portrayal of its subject. The interview with Mr. Reilly is an
attempt to obtain evidence from one direct witness to the public life of Robert Kennedy to help us decide which portrait is more accurate, mid, at the same time, to discover some
details of the important events in which Kennedy was involved. While discussing many
of these important events, the interview is concerned mainly on the character of Robert
Kennedy, from a first-hand perspective, mid the legacy that he left those who were close to him.
Among the important events discussed by Mr. Reilly were vmious aspects of the two Kennedy presidential cmnpaigns, John Kennedy's in 1960 and Robert Kennedy's in
1968. RFK was the mmiager of his brother's 1960 presidential campaign mid John Reilly
assisted him. It was Reilly's job to make sure they got mound the country efficiently..
Mr.Reilly also did some advmice work. Aides would go to a location were a candidate
was headed and scout it out. Also, it was their job to set up everything for the candidate.
He comments that now these logistics are all handled by the secret service, but back then
it was hmidled by one person - Reilly. Mr. Reilly says that the strategy of the cmnpaign
was one that "pointed out John Kennedy's abilities, with a left wing twist" (McMackin
3). He says that it was also importmit to get the control of the city bosses.
Through both cmnpaigns, the fact that the Kennedys were Catholic was a major
issue. Reilly says that they with the Catholic issue not by running away from it but by
facing it. Reilly asserts that the fact the Kennedys were so blunt about it was one of the
reasons they were able to overcome it so successfully. McMackin 43
On the issue of civil rights, Reilly says that there was really never any epiphmiy
for JFK. He simply viewed it as one of the issues he had to deal with if he wanted to
become president. While JFK is known for his pro-civil rights stance, Reilly says, "It
wasn't as if Kennedy was out there leading the charge; he was leading part of the charge"
(McMackin 5). There were the civil rights leaders such as King and the Congress that
were deeply involved as well. RFK, later in the decade, was all together different. On
many occasions, as Attorney General, RFK would exercise his powers to the benefit of the anti-segregation movement.
RFK's deliberations on whether to run for president were prolonged. He was tom
on the issue of running against his brother's successor, Lyndon Johnson. Even when he
was not officially running, he still would criticize his aides, such as Reilly, if they were
not acting as if he were running.
When the campaign started, it was quite disorganized. Reilly makes a very
interesting comment regarding the power dynamic of the leaders of the campaign. In
Reilly's analysis, there were three groups in the Kennedy clan: Jack Kennedy's group,
Bobby's, mid Ted's. Jack's group had successfully elected a president, so it was hmd to
disagree with them, and Ted's group was very aggressive. There were a lot of people who
did not want to "miss the boat," but Reilly says, there simply weren't enough spaces. At
any rate, he says it made the campaign very interesting. In general, Reilly commented that the campaign was not the "smooth, well-oiled machine" (McMackin 12) that
everyone thought it was.
Robert Kennedy's role in the Kennedy administration's deliberations over the
Vietnam Wm is one of the most debated elements of his legacy. Reilly said that RFK McMackin 44
really did have a change of heart on the war. At first, RFK was for the war, but as time
went by, Reilly says, the chmige was really noticeable: a leading hawk became a leading
dove.
The value of this interview is not so much to leam about the established facts of
Kennedy's life, but rather to view these famous events from the perspective of someone
who was on the "inside." That is, to experience history from the inside out, to discuss it
with it sources, not to read the digested version written by someone else.
The interview with John Reilly allows one to not only gain insight on the history
of the time, but it also allows one to better understand the lesser know personal qualities
of RFK. We get a better understanding of what motivated him, what kept him going, and his dream or vision of how to make the world a better place. It is apparent from the
interview that RFK did indeed have a vision, feeling that he could make a difference in
people's lives. And by most accounts he did.
One of the most surprising revelations of the interview was learning just how
much RFK meant to so mmiy people. Mr. Reilly described the scene as throngs of people
came out to catch a glimpse of RFK as he drove by in his convertible. "Oh yes, it was
unbelievable, unbelievable... there will never be anything like it again. He would stand
up in the back of the convertible and get to the point where the cars in the motorcade
would not be able to move" (McMackin 13). Later on in the interview he revisits this
memorable time:
The road from the airport to downtown Lincoln was fifteen miles. It took him two
and a half hours to get from the airport to downtown because people were on the
side of the road and there was traffic, even though the cops had cleared the roads. McMackin 45
We were still barely moving. And that is the kind of excitement that you never see
in politics. You never see that anymore. (McMackin 16)
Mr. Reilly also points out that there was just something about RFK that people
were attracted to. Even when he was attorney general, if word got out that he would be
walking through the lobby of some hotel, there would be a mass of people there hoping to
get a glimpse of him. When asked a specific question about what exactly it was that made
people so attracted to him, he responded, 'T think well... some of it was the whole
Kennedy thing rubbing off (McMackin 14)." But after a second of thought he said. "They trusted him. And [even] they [the South] trusted him even though it was about something that they didn't like. But they feh he would do it fairly" (McMackin 14). Kennedy's
charisma has been much commented upon. Reilly's comment indicates something
further: Kennedy may have had the ability to make even some of his opponents respect
his motives. If this is true, Kennedy would have had as significant advantage in his quest
for the presidency.
The most interesting part of the interview occurred when Mr. Reilly described a
dinner he attended with Robert Kennedy in Iowa. Kennedy had been invited to give a
speech. This was the time when many were putting pressure on him to run for president
because they felt something had to be done about Johnson. At this dinner there were five
governors mid others who were telling him just that. However, this was before he had
ever spoken of plans for running; he "ducked and dodged" their questions. When the
dinner was over Kennedy turned to Mr. Reilly and John Seigenthaler (another Kennedy
aide who was there) and said, "What the hell is wrong with you guys?" And Mr. Reilly
said, "What do you mean?" "Why didn't you ask them how many delegates they had. McMackin 46
why didn't you ask them what they were willing to do?" And we said, "That's not the
role we are used to playing here." And he said, "But that is what I used to do for Jack."
Reilly then explains in the interview that, "I never forgot that. He expected us to be out there in front saying Goddamit governor how many delegates me you going to give us if
we run. And He didn't have anybody like that. He was that person" (McMackin 11). This
pmt of the interview, above all else, shows how shrewd and calculating Robert Kennedy
was, the political abilities he brought to his role mid that he would have brought to the
bigger role he would have played in history—had he won the election.
But it is the quote below, that best captures the Imger qualities of Bobby
Kennedy: When asked what motivated RFK, Mr. Reilly responded with a very interesting
answer:
I think he felt strongly, the older he got, about the world and what was happening.
You know he thought the world could be a better place. People had to m^e it a
better place. The little things would be helpful; the little things would be a start.
And he believed all that. I think he put that above, whether there should be a tax
cut, which is what we would talk about today (McMackin 17).
Kennedy does believe that there are more important issues then just, "should there be a tax cut." He cared about people mid wanted to make their lives better. In the interview
Mr. Reilly talks a lot about RFK's connection with the common man. It was quite
extraordinary how a person who had lived a life of such privilege—never having to worry
about money—would genuinely care about the poorest of the poor.
When Mr. Reilly was asked if he had miy final thoughts about RFK, this is what
he said: "We were lucky, today there me no heroes. But in those days there were, and it McMackin 47
was him and his brother. I think in politics, maybe I'm exaggerating, but people have no
heroes now. In those days we did" (McMackin 21). Mr. Reilly is not only saying that
RFK and his brother were good politicians but that they were different politicians—^they
were heroes. Mr. Reilly saw first hand what these two brothers meant to people, and he
claims that he has seen nothing like it since. It is said that no mmi is a hero to his valet.
Mr. Reilly was far more than a valet, but like a valet he closely shmed public life with his
boss - mid he still describes him as a genuine hero.
The process of oral history is one that can be at times tedious but is in the end
very rewmding. It is a personal experience for the interviewer. I found John Reilly to be
entirely believable. He came across as humorous, good-natured, humble and completely
honest. And, his testimony certainly did tend to confirm the Evmi Thomas portrayal of
Kennedy as flawed but great. Everyone does indeed have a story to tell. And listening to this story, and, for a second, reliving the moment in time, is something that can really
remain with a person - to be remembered throughout one's life. The perspective gained
by learning a person's story is one that it is difficult to match through any other manner
of learning history. I learned the story of a man who knew Robert Kennedy well. And through the process I learned about both of their lives. It is the story, or at least the partial
story, of two lives that I will never forget. McMackin 48
Works Cited
Dooley, Brian. Robert Kennedy: The Final Years. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.
Hill, Gladwin. "Kennedy Is Dead, Victim of Assassination." The New York Times [New York] 6 June 1968, Late City Edition ed.: 1+20.
Halberstam, David. The Best and the Brightest. New York: Ballmitine Books, 1992.
Heymann, David C. RFK: A Candid Biography. New York: A Dutton Book, 1998.
Johnson, Haynes. "The Kennedy Legacy" Washington D.C: The News Hour, 1999.
Kennedy, Edward M. "Tribute to senator Robert F. Kennedy." New York City. 8 June 1968.
Kennedy, Robert F. "Statement on the Assassination of Mmtin Luther King, Jr." Indimiapolis,Indiana. 4 Apr. 1968.
Martin, Ralph G. A Hero For Our Time. New York: Macmillan, 1983.
Roberts, Allen. Robert Francis Kennedy: Biography of a Compulsive Politicimi. Brookline Village: Braden Press Inc., 1984.
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. Robert Kennedy and His Times. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1978.
Shenton, James, and Leq Benson. Advertisement. The New York Times [New York] 20 Mm. 1968: 20.
Shesol, Jeff. Mutual Contempt. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997.
Thomas, Evan. Robert Kennedy: His Life. New York: Touchstone, 2000.