Moldes, Christopher Introduction “As a member of the great family of the world's Communists, the CPSU1 has always acted, is now acting and will continue to act in a way that will properly justify the attention and trust of Communists of all countries.”2 This is how the author of an article in Pravda3ends his piece on proletarian internationalism. There are phrases about commitment to freedom, the struggle against capitalism, and the like, which are characteristic of Soviet publications. As with all these state sponsored publications, the interpretation of this article is multifaceted. On one level, the ending statement is significant, however, because it reflects the prevailing narrative promoted by the Communist bloc during the Cold War: that of a unified Communist front throughout the world. Written to reiterate this ineffable solidarity with Communist movements outside the direct jurisdiction of the Soviet Union, the article comes at a time when the United States’ clout in foreign affairs had diminished considerably as a result of the Vietnam War. Cold War relations between Communist East and Capitalist West can best be described as a ceaseless ebb and flow of influence. This dynamic meant that as America’s foreign policy was scaled back, the Soviet Union and its allies looked for new battlegrounds. By the 1970s, the canvas upon which Cold War rivalries were being played out had shifted. Europe had hardly deviated from the status quo of post-World War II arrangements. Southeast Asia had just bore the brunt of two decades of interplay between the great powers, with Vietnam closing the door 1 Communist Party of the Soviet Union 2 Zagladin, V. The Current Digest of the Russian Press(formerly The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press), No. 16, Vol.28, May 19, 1976, pg. 40 3 The official periodical of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Pravda translates to “Truth”. 1 Moldes, Christopher on this chapter of Cold War history. With most of Latin America under the sway of American foreign and economic policy, it appeared to the Soviet Union that the only opportunity for expanding their influence on the global arena was to concentrate on the Middle East and Africa. Of the two regions, Africa proved to be more fertile ground for communist activities. The parts of Africa most vulnerable to outside intervention of this sort were those that had become actively involved in liberation from European colonization, such as Angola, Mozambique, and the Congo. Along with these and other African nations, Angola was undergoing radical restructuring. Having been involved in a war for liberation from Portugal since 1961, tensions created by this conflict were fueled by the realization of emancipation in 1974, culminating in an all-out civil war for control of the nation. On one side was the MPLA, or the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, initially led by Agustinho Neto and after his death, by Jose Eduardo dos Santos. An overtly Marxist-Leninist organization, the MPLA hoped to bring Angola closer to the socialist camp. A myriad of forces were arrayed against the MPLA, such as the UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) and the FNLA (National Liberation Front of Angola), both of which hoped to organize Angola around traditional tribal ties. Cuba and the USSR had already established a presence in Angola prior to hostilities, so the outbreak of war in 1975 naturally drew more attention than before. For the next fifteen years, Cuba and the Soviet Union found themselves playing an ever increasing role in shaping the course of Angolan history. The enormity of their commitments to Angola, both in terms of 2 Moldes, Christopher finances, manpower and material, made this African nation a focal point of the latter period of the Cold War. On one level, it appeared as though their intervention in Angola was motivated primarily by their respective desires to promote communism in this part of Africa. To that end, both nations initiated massive domestic propaganda campaigns designed to reflect the supposed egalitarian nature of the mission to Angola. It is on the basis of this self-professed mission in the name of Communism that their entire efforts rested upon. Thus, this investigation should be seen as an analysis of the two major Communist states that intervened in Angola, and not about the Angolan Civil War itself. It is an investigation of Communism as a guiding principle in these two nations, using their actions in the Angolan Civil War as a litmus test to assess these nations’ adherence to their own principles. That said, the central question being investigated here is whether or not the Soviet Union and Cuba truly acted in accordance with Marxist principles to which they subscribed. Cuba professed Communism as the primary motivator for intervention in conjunction with secondary geopolitical goals, whereas the Soviet Union tended to place more importance on pragmatic matters when dealing with their involvement in Angola. Cuba, as a result of its revolutionary tradition and relative minority on the international arena, entered Angola with the intentions of helping the MPLA hold on to power. To this end, they sent large numbers of teachers, doctors, and builders along with the army. This civilian corps worked to augment the ailing Angolan infrastructure, all the while the government continued providing men and weapons for the MPLA to wage its war against UNITA and South Africa. Even the process of sending soldiers and civilians to Africa showed an inherent adherence to the doctrine of proletarian internationalism. All were volunteers, and their ethnic 3 Moldes, Christopher makeup reflected that of Cuba itself. This led to a positive perception of the Cubans amongst the people of Angola. Of course, pragmatism also played a large role in Cuba’s participation and management of the Angolan Civil War. Rather than committing Cuban forces to Angola only in the name of an ideal, Castro also wanted to carve himself a place in history, and to this end worked diligently to construct an image of a Third World benefactor. On a more general level, many of those that volunteered to fight in Angola did so for socioeconomic reasons. Above all this group went because they believed it would facilitate their upward mobility back home. Also, their participation would shield them from any political backlash that would be generated from refusing such a mission. Thus, Cuba’s interest in helping Third World liberation movements should be seen through this lens as well. Whereas pragmatism carried equal weight along with egalitarianism with Cuba, it was the Soviet Union’s primary motivating factor. Again, this was largely a result of the position the Soviet Union occupied in the bipolar hierarchy of the Cold War. As the “motherland of all workers”, the Soviet Union had time and again stressed that it alone embodied true Communism, and as a result warranted emulation by other Communist movements. This placed it at the head of the Communist hierarchy, a position similar to the United States’ in the Western world. Therefore, it is understandable why the Soviet Union was apprehensive to throw its full weight behind the MPLA. By virtue of its position, it had less maneuvering room than Cuba had. This is why its humanitarian efforts were greatly eclipsed by Cuban efforts, and why the Soviet Union initially allowed Cuba to lead the military excursion. As time went on and Western inaction became more evident, the Soviets eventually took over strategic command. 4 Moldes, Christopher However, this alone does not explain why the Soviet’s actions on the ground corresponded less with their official narrative than Cuba’s did. The Soviet Union begrudgingly followed Cuba into Angola. Already mired down in Afghanistan by the time they took control of the military situation in Angola, the Soviet Union was extremely reluctant to divert resources to this relatively strategically unimportant area. To further compound issues, the Soviet Union underwent a radical restructuring during the latter half of the 1980s known as perestroika4. The upper echelons of Soviet society reevaluated their commitment to Communist ideals, and this was reflected in the tapering off of support for the MPLA. Finally, the Soviets had no success building effective relationships with the Angolans, many of which felt that the Soviets were demeaning and negligent in their treatment of civilians and MPLA fighters alike. All this leads to my thesis that Cuba acted more in line with their revolutionary beliefs than did the Soviets. In researching this theme, I have relied on a variety of sources. The two most significant sources are Granma, the official periodical of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, and The Current Digest of the Russian Press (formerly Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press), an electronic database containing English language translations of several Soviet periodicals, such as Pravda and Izvestia. Through these articles, one can trace the development of the official narrative and rationale of events in the respective countries being assessed. In the case of Granma, only articles from the years 1975, 1987, and 1988 will be used. These years are significant, in that they represent the beginning of the Angolan campaign (1975) and 4 Transliteration from the Russian перестройка; means restructuring 5 Moldes, Christopher the years when Cuba regained control of the military situation from the Soviet Union (1987- 1988). Other important sources include soldier memoirs, from Russian servicemen that transferred to Angola from Afghanistan, to Cuban military commanders. An especially useful consulting work is Soviet Perspectives on National-Liberation Revolutions in Africa: Theoretical Aspects 1960-1990. This secondary source is an examination of Marxist-Leninist ideology, as defined by the Soviet Union, and how the National Liberation Movements in Africa fit into the grand scheme of proletarian internationalism.