“As a Member of the Great Family of the World's Communists, The

Home , Angolan Civil War, Manuel Pedro Pacavira

Moldes, Christopher

Introduction

“As a member of the great family of the world's Communists, the CPSU1 has always acted, is now acting and will continue to act in a way that will properly justify the attention and trust of Communists of all countries.”2 This is how the author of an article in Pravda3ends his piece on proletarian internationalism. There are phrases about commitment to freedom, the struggle against capitalism, and the like, which are characteristic of Soviet publications. As with all these state sponsored publications, the interpretation of this article is multifaceted.

On one level, the ending statement is significant, however, because it reflects the prevailing narrative promoted by the Communist bloc during the Cold War: that of a unified Communist front throughout the world. Written to reiterate this ineffable solidarity with Communist movements outside the direct jurisdiction of the Soviet Union, the article comes at a time when the United States’ clout in foreign affairs had diminished considerably as a result of the Vietnam

War.

Cold War relations between Communist East and Capitalist West can best be described as a ceaseless ebb and flow of influence. This dynamic meant that as America’s foreign policy was scaled back, the Soviet Union and its allies looked for new battlegrounds. By the 1970s, the canvas upon which Cold War rivalries were being played out had shifted. Europe had hardly deviated from the status quo of post-World War II arrangements. Southeast Asia had just bore the brunt of two decades of interplay between the great powers, with Vietnam closing the door

1 Communist Party of the Soviet Union 2 Zagladin, V. The Current Digest of the Russian Press(formerly The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press), No. 16, Vol.28, May 19, 1976, pg. 40 3 The official periodical of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Pravda translates to “Truth”.

Moldes, Christopher on this chapter of Cold War history. With most of Latin America under the sway of American foreign and economic policy, it appeared to the Soviet Union that the only opportunity for expanding their influence on the global arena was to concentrate on the Middle East and Africa.

Of the two regions, Africa proved to be more fertile ground for communist activities. The parts of Africa most vulnerable to outside intervention of this sort were those that had become actively involved in liberation from European colonization, such as Angola, Mozambique, and the Congo.

Along with these and other African nations, Angola was undergoing radical restructuring. Having been involved in a war for liberation from Portugal since 1961, tensions created by this conflict were fueled by the realization of emancipation in 1974, culminating in an all-out civil war for control of the nation. On one side was the MPLA, or the Popular

Movement for the Liberation of Angola, initially led by Agustinho Neto and after his death, by

Jose Eduardo dos Santos. An overtly Marxist-Leninist organization, the MPLA hoped to bring

Angola closer to the socialist camp. A myriad of forces were arrayed against the MPLA, such as the UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) and the FNLA (National

Liberation Front of Angola), both of which hoped to organize Angola around traditional tribal ties.

Cuba and the USSR had already established a presence in Angola prior to hostilities, so the outbreak of war in 1975 naturally drew more attention than before. For the next fifteen years, Cuba and the Soviet Union found themselves playing an ever increasing role in shaping the course of Angolan history. The enormity of their commitments to Angola, both in terms of

Moldes, Christopher finances, manpower and material, made this African nation a focal point of the latter period of the Cold War. On one level, it appeared as though their intervention in Angola was motivated primarily by their respective desires to promote communism in this part of Africa. To that end, both nations initiated massive domestic propaganda campaigns designed to reflect the supposed egalitarian nature of the mission to Angola. . It is on the basis of this self-professed mission in the name of Communism that their entire efforts rested upon. Thus, this investigation should be seen as an analysis of the two major Communist states that intervened in Angola, and not about the Angolan Civil War itself. It is an investigation of Communism as a guiding principle in these two nations, using their actions in the Angolan Civil War as a litmus test to assess these nations’ adherence to their own principles. That said, the central question being investigated here is whether or not the Soviet Union and Cuba truly acted in accordance with Marxist principles to which they subscribed. Cuba professed Communism as the primary motivator for intervention in conjunction with secondary geopolitical goals, whereas the Soviet

Union tended to place more importance on pragmatic matters when dealing with their involvement in Angola.

Cuba, as a result of its revolutionary tradition and relative minority on the international arena, entered Angola with the intentions of helping the MPLA hold on to power. To this end, they sent large numbers of teachers, doctors, and builders along with the army. This civilian corps worked to augment the ailing Angolan infrastructure, all the while the government continued providing men and weapons for the MPLA to wage its war against UNITA and South

Africa. Even the process of sending soldiers and civilians to Africa showed an inherent adherence to the doctrine of proletarian internationalism. All were volunteers, and their ethnic

Moldes, Christopher makeup reflected that of Cuba itself. This led to a positive perception of the Cubans amongst the people of Angola. Of course, pragmatism also played a large role in Cuba’s participation and management of the Angolan Civil War. Rather than committing Cuban forces to Angola only in the name of an ideal, Castro also wanted to carve himself a place in history, and to this end worked diligently to construct an image of a Third World benefactor. On a more general level, many of those that volunteered to fight in Angola did so for socioeconomic reasons.

Above all this group went because they believed it would facilitate their upward mobility back home. Also, their participation would shield them from any political backlash that would be generated from refusing such a mission. Thus, Cuba’s interest in helping Third World liberation movements should be seen through this lens as well.

Whereas pragmatism carried equal weight along with egalitarianism with Cuba, it was the Soviet Union’s primary motivating factor. Again, this was largely a result of the position the

Soviet Union occupied in the bipolar hierarchy of the Cold War. As the “motherland of all workers”, the Soviet Union had time and again stressed that it alone embodied true

Communism, and as a result warranted emulation by other Communist movements. This placed it at the head of the Communist hierarchy, a position similar to the United States’ in the

Western world. Therefore, it is understandable why the Soviet Union was apprehensive to throw its full weight behind the MPLA. By virtue of its position, it had less maneuvering room than Cuba had. This is why its humanitarian efforts were greatly eclipsed by Cuban efforts, and why the Soviet Union initially allowed Cuba to lead the military excursion. As time went on and

Western inaction became more evident, the Soviets eventually took over strategic command.

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However, this alone does not explain why the Soviet’s actions on the ground corresponded less with their official narrative than Cuba’s did. The Soviet Union begrudgingly followed Cuba into Angola. Already mired down in Afghanistan by the time they took control of the military situation in Angola, the Soviet Union was extremely reluctant to divert resources to this relatively strategically unimportant area. To further compound issues, the Soviet Union underwent a radical restructuring during the latter half of the 1980s known as perestroika4.

The upper echelons of Soviet society reevaluated their commitment to Communist ideals, and this was reflected in the tapering off of support for the MPLA. Finally, the Soviets had no success building effective relationships with the Angolans, many of which felt that the Soviets were demeaning and negligent in their treatment of civilians and MPLA fighters alike. All this leads to my thesis that Cuba acted more in line with their revolutionary beliefs than did the

Soviets.

In researching this theme, I have relied on a variety of sources. The two most significant sources are Granma, the official periodical of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of

Cuba, and The Current Digest of the Russian Press (formerly Current Digest of the Post-Soviet

Press), an electronic database containing English language translations of several Soviet periodicals, such as Pravda and Izvestia. Through these articles, one can trace the development of the official narrative and rationale of events in the respective countries being assessed. In the case of Granma, only articles from the years 1975, 1987, and 1988 will be used. These years are significant, in that they represent the beginning of the Angolan campaign (1975) and

4 Transliteration from the Russian перестройка; means restructuring

Moldes, Christopher the years when Cuba regained control of the military situation from the Soviet Union (1987-

1988).

Other important sources include soldier memoirs, from Russian servicemen that transferred to Angola from Afghanistan, to Cuban military commanders. An especially useful consulting work is Soviet Perspectives on National-Liberation Revolutions in Africa: Theoretical

Aspects 1960-1990. This secondary source is an examination of Marxist-Leninist ideology, as defined by the Soviet Union, and how the National Liberation Movements in Africa fit into the grand scheme of proletarian internationalism. The author, South African Pierre T. Botha, does a wonderful job of analyzing the rationale used by Soviet analysts to explain the relevance of

National Liberation Movements. In other words, it is a historiography of a Communist nature.

A wealth of other secondary sources is being drawn upon. Some deal with the history of Cuban and Soviet involvement in Africa as a whole, while others assess the overall course of the civil war.

This essay begins with a summary of the historical background to the Angolan conflict.

The first chapter will also be concerned with establishing an understanding of the hierarchy of the Communist world. A short analysis of the positions Cuba and the Soviet Union held in the hierarchy of the Communist world will follow, wherein the constraints within which these respective nations will be introduced. It is hoped this will help to explain both why and how these two Communist countries decided to intervene in Angola’s Civil War. The second chapter will be a treatment of the Cuban situation in Angola. Attention will be given to the historical role of Cuba’s revolutionary tradition, Fidel Castro’s personal effect on politics, and how all

Moldes, Christopher these combined to create a unique concept of proletarian internationalism. From this, Cuba would then act as it saw fit to promote the ideals of this policy.

The next section will deal exclusively with the Soviet Union’s experience in Angola.

Space will be dedicated to understanding how the Soviet Union understood and applied

Marxism. This will be followed by a synopsis of the Soviet treatment of African history and national liberation movements, with special attention to Angola and the situation created by

Cuban deployment. This assessment will lay the groundwork for the final section, in which the roles played by Cuba and the Soviet Union will be contrasted, with emphases placed on the different goals and perspectives of the respective entities.

Throughout it will be important to understand the role of ideology. Our understanding of the Cold War is immensely aided if we can identify the aims and limitations that nations imposed upon themselves. If we can determine just how much these nations followed their doctrine, their actions throughout history will become clearer. Given the extent of their influence during the 20th century, I feel it is necessary to treat Communism as more than just the ideology of the “other”. It must be seen as a powerful guiding force that led many to sacrifice much in the name of its ultimate goal. By using this particular instance in history when both nations acted in concert, the Angolan Civil War, it is my hope that a clear framework for understanding Communist nations emerges.

Moldes, Christopher

Angola: The Story Thus Far

The Angolan Civil War has its origins in the anti-colonialist wars that had started in 1961.

It was during the time period between the beginning of the liberation movement and liberation itself in 1974 that many groups came to the forefront of Angolan politics. After liberation, these groups would struggle against one another for control of the newly independent nation.

These groups were the MPLA, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola5, and the

FNLA, the National Liberation Front of Angola6. The MPLA was a revolutionary group dedicated to both the liberation of Angola and the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Its leader was

Agustinho Neto, a man with ties to the Angolan Communist Party7, often attributed as unwavering in his commitment to traditional Communist values8. As a result of this, the group had enjoyed contact with the Communist world since the early 1960s. The FNLA, by contrast, drew its appeal on the basis of tribal bonds9.

The wars of liberation in Africa occupied much of Portugal’s attention. Domestically, discontent with continued involvement in these wars exacerbated tensions within the mother country. The Soviet Union, ever focused on foreign developments, wagered that the left in

Lisbon could be goaded into overthrowing the colonial regime. Their assumption was borne out by events, as elements of the Portuguese military overthrew the rigidly authoritarian

5In the original Portuguese: Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola 6 In the original Portuguese: Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola 7 George, Edward. The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale. London: Frank Cass, 2005., p. 7 8 United States of America. Central Intelligence Agency. Office of Regional and Political Analysis. Soviet and Cuban Intervention in the Angolan Civil War. 1977. Feb. 2001. Web. 11 Feb. 2013, p. 25 9 IBID., p. 7

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Estado Novo regime in Portugal in 1974. Whereas their influence with the Portuguese

Communist Party had contributed to conditions that initiated and continued the revolution, the

Soviets were forced to cut their losses when the situation escaped their control. Their initial plan was to concentrate on expanding influence inside of Portugal itself. When it became apparent that the PCP was making few inroads there, however, the Soviets shifted their interests to newly liberated countries in Africa. This was especially true of Angola, a country which appeared ripe for revolutionary change among communist lines. Liberation did not spell tranquility for the Angolans. The abrupt collapse of colonial rule meant that the remaining infrastructure proved wholly inadequate in meeting the demands of the populace. Everything from hospitals, schools, and food distribution suffered when the Portuguese authority left.

These problems were compounded by infighting between rival groups vying for control of

Angola. The MPLA and its one time ally, the National Union for Total Independence of Angola10, or UNITA, began to violently struggle for control.

The Soviets were not alone in taking an interest in the outcome of Angola’s civil war.

The MPLA’s struggle had long ago drawn the attention of the Cuban government. After the success of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, Fidel Castro and Che Guevara strove to spread their revolutionary ideals to any and all countries engaged in the fight against imperialism.

Colonialism was seen as the modern application of imperialism, so the liberation movements in

Africa naturally attracted their attention. They provided training and supplies for numerous liberation movements throughout Africa during the early 1960s, including the MPLA in Angola.

Several years later, as the final stage of decolonization drew to a close in Angola, Cuban-MPLA

10 In the original Portuguese: União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola

Moldes, Christopher relations were reinvigorated, and Angolan soldiers arrived in ever increasing numbers in Cuba for training. The Soviet Union also sowed the seeds for continued relations, sending aid and accepting soldiers for training.

These actions did not sit well with neighboring South Africa and Namibia. As noted by then American Assistant Secretary of State of African Affairs Chester Crocker, conflicts in

African nations inevitably spill across borders and draw in other nations11. South Africa, ever the ardent anti-Communist nation, invaded Angola in an attempt to topple the new regime centered on the MPLA dominated capital, Luanda. At the same time, UNITA renewed its efforts to oust the MPLA. The South Africans hoped to work in concert with UNITA and the FNLA, believing these groups would be more favorable to South African demands than the MPLA.12

This led to Castro’s decision to send tens of thousands of Cuban forces into Angola in late 1975 to protect the Angolan socialist government. With their hands forced by Cuba’s independent venture, the Soviet Union found itself more intimately involved in Angolan affairs than it had previously anticipated.

At the time, the Soviet Union regarded itself as the head of the socialist world order.13

This authority was derived not only from the success and survival of the Bolshevik Revolution of

1917, but also from the fact that the Soviet Union had been able to consolidate control and influence over a wide swath of territory from Eastern to Central Europe following World War II,

11 George, Edward. The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale, p. 172 12 United States of America. Central Intelligence Agency. Office of Regional and Political Analysis. Soviet and Cuban Intervention in the Angolan Civil War., p. 17 13 Dr. Botha points out on page 27 of Soviet Perspectives on National-Liberation Revolutions in Africa that “the dominant tendency, in Soviet literature anyway, was to refer to the ‘socialist world system’, and especially the role that the Soviet Union played therein, as the principal component of the process. For example, it was evidence from the use of words like ‘guiding force’, ‘decisive’ and ‘most important’ force when reference was made to the world socialist system.”

Moldes, Christopher creating a system that remained relatively unchallenged until the late 1950s. Since 1949, Mao’s

China had joined the ranks of the world’s communist countries. Though initially under the tutelage of the Soviet Union, over time China began to challenge Soviet domination of the socialist system. Its growing separation from the Soviet Union in the late 1950s owed something to the de-Stalinization movement initiated in 1956 by Nikita Khrushchev. Promoting a break with Stalinist policies, this new course did not sit well with the Chinese, who had modeled their power structures in this manner. A debate began, wherein the Chinese accused the Soviets of revisionism and of abandoning their Communist mission. Perhaps closer to the point, the growing split seemed to emerge from a perceived sense of inferiority on the part of the Chinese. The emerging foreign policy of the Soviet Union suggested that “China would be a mere ‘transmission belt’ of Soviet power.”14 By 1959, the tension between the two Communist states culminated in the rupture known as the Sino-Soviet Split, which continued to intensify throughout the 1960s. China repeatedly challenged the assertion that the Soviet Union was the true head of the Communist movement. This led to numerous instances of clashing foreign policy interests, particularly in Africa, which was seen as the focal point of Chinese foreign policy at the time15.

Cuba was also an anomaly in this arrangement. Whereas the Eastern Bloc nations had some historical relationship, Cuba was geographically and culturally distant. The only

Communist nation in the Western hemisphere, Cuba gave the Soviet Union a foothold near the

United States. As a result of this special circumstance, the Soviet Union gave Cuba

14 Hamrell, Sven, Carl G. Widstrand, and W A. C. Adie. The Soviet Bloc, China and Africa. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1964, p. 50 15 Pearson, Roger. Sino-soviet Intervention in Africa. Washington, D.C: Council on American Affairs, 1977, p. 23

Moldes, Christopher unprecedented leeway in internal decisions. It even became the primary financier of the now ostracized Caribbean nation16. This effectively allowed Cuba to act in a manner unthinkable to

Eastern bloc nations. As the subsequent sections will illustrate, Cuba was able to challenge

Soviet decisions and receive little in the way of reprimand. It was this unique arrangement that influenced Cuba’s decision to undertake its most daring adventure to date: intervention in the Angolan Civil War.

16 Diaz-Briquets, Sergio. Cuban Internationalism in Sub-Saharan Africa. Pittsburgh, Pa: Duquesne University Press, 1989, p. 30

Moldes, Christopher

Cuba’s Internationalist Commitment

With the situation in Angola fully fleshed out, it may still not be clear what initially compelled Castro to stake his countrymen for the survival of another regime. In order to answer this question, one must first take into account how Castro and the Cuban Communist

Party interpreted the Cuban role in the historical process. Since their struggle for liberation from Spain, Cuba’s cultural character had an undeniable revolutionary slant. American intervention in Cuban affairs after independence only exacerbated this, leading to the idea that

Cuba had experienced an interrupted revolution in 189817. The subsequent decades were seen as a façade, a pale imitation of what could have been. By rebelling against the Batista regime in

1955, Castro and his 26th of July Movement hoped to bridge the gap between Cuba's revolutionary past and the present. When this revolution succeeded in 1959, Castro immediately went about dismissing so called foreign imperialists from Cuba. The main priority of Fidel Castro’s new government was to imbue a sense of permanent revolution in Cuba, so as to protect the gains made in the Cuban Revolution.

Fulfilling his promises to expel foreign control of Cuba’s resources, Castro’s reformist program set Cuba on the path to confrontation with the United States. Various governmental positions were filled by 26th of July compatriots, the most notable of which, for the purposes of this investigation, was Ernesto Guevara. If Fidel was the lynchpin of the revolution, Guevara personified the internationalist ideals and beliefs of the revolutionary regime. A known

17 Pérez, Louis A. The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba in History and Historiography. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1998, p. 125

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Communist sympathizer18, Guevara developed the notion of socialist internationalism, a doctrine that would come to dominate Cuba’s foreign policy. Since the revolution was Cuba’s first foray into communist politics, its leaders had rather idealistic views of spreading revolution, comparable to the Soviet Union’s first few years. Whereas the Soviet Union had, by this time, abandoned its unabashed support for the export of revolution, Cuba saw this as part and parcel of its dedication to Communism. Pleased with the direction revolutionary Cuba was taking, Guevara propagated his theory, “urging proletarians to shed their nationality and fight in a common cause against class oppression.”19 Of the relationship between internationalism and Communism, Gabriel Garcia Marquez wrote:

“The spirit of internationalism is a traditional quality of the Cubans. Although the revolution strengthened and defined it in accordance with the principles of Marxism, the essence of this spirit was already well established in the actions and writings of Jose Marti.”20

This relationship was developed alongside the increasing radicalization of Castro’s populist revolutionary government, which quickly adopted anti-imperialist colorings and eventually “converted” to Communism, allowing the Cuban regime to become sympathetic to anti-imperialist struggles around the globe. This should be read this as a sign of initial pragmatism, as United States-led efforts to ostracize the increasingly radical Cuban government left Castro with little choice but to cast his lot with the Third World, and most notably, the

Soviet Union. Thus, survivability of the revolution extended beyond the domestic sphere and

18 Pérez-Stable, Marifeli. The Cuban Revolution: Origins, Course, and Legacy. New York: Oxford UP, 1993, p. 72 19 George, Edward. The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale p. 17 20 Deutschmann, David. Changing the History of Africa: Angola and Namibia. Melbourne, Vic., Australia: Ocean Press, 1989, p. 44

Moldes, Christopher dictated the course of Cuba’s foreign policy.21 Internationalism became the byword of this foreign policy. By virtue of its revolutionary beliefs and dire international situation created by the American embargo, Cuba had a duty to help other movements with similar goals. In the bipolar Cold War Cold War environment, Cuba had no hope competing amongst the client states of the United States and the Soviet Union, so it turned its attention to the Third World.

To rationalize this new approach, Cuban ideologues in the Communist Party citied a long history of internationalism in Cuban history, saying that the: “internationalist tradition of our people dates from an earlier era. More than 1,000 Cubans went to Spain as combatants at the time of the Civil War, to defend the Republic. In proportion to its population at the time, Cuba was the country that sent the most volunteers to Spain.”22 Others have noted that the regime used examples from as far back as the 1700s to create a narrative of ceaseless internationalism.23

Internationalism became an official part of Cuban foreign policy in 1976, when an amendment to the Cuban constitution was added, stating: “The Republic of Cuba espouses the principles of proletarian internationalism and militant solidarity of peoples.”24

The institutionalization of internationalism coincided with the rapid decolonization of

Africa, which had created numerous liberation movements on the continent. During the first few years of its existence, Castro’s Cuba established relations with numerous African movements, though it should be noted that relations were only opened with movements that

21 Diaz-Briquets, Sergio. Cuban Internationalism in Sub-Saharan Africa, p. 12 22 Deutschmann, David. Changing the History of Africa: Angola and Namibia, p. 13 23 George, Edward. The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale, p. 13 24 “Republic of Cuba - Political Constitution of 1976”. Nov. 2008. Web .

Moldes, Christopher were deemed sufficiently revolutionary.25 Spurred into action by the assassination of Patrice

Lumumba in the Congo in 1961, Guevara began a tour of Africa in the 1960s. Starting in the

Congo, which Che “saw as the epicenter of the liberation of all Africa”26, he came into contact with many revolutionary groups. The fruits of this tour quickly manifested itself. Jorge

Risquet, Secretary of International Affairs of the Communist Party of Cuba, asserts that by 1961, contact with the MPLA had been made; by 1965, after Guevara’s tour, Cuba had sent a battalion to the Congo for the dual purpose of assisting Lumumbists, and training Angolan guerillas in the MPLA.27

What, in the eyes of the Cubans, qualified the MPLA as revolutionary? It was not the only group striving for independence from Portugal. As mentioned in the previous section, groups such as the FNLA had various visions for Angola’s future. Perhaps the most obvious factor that contributed to attracting Cuban support was that the MPLA had intimate ties with the Angolan Communist Party.28 More importantly, it was the particular brand of Communism they subscribed to that made them “worthy” in the eyes of the Cubans: Marxism-Leninism. The other groups, in comparison, were organized around ethnic and tribal ties, alliances that the

Cubans considered detrimental to the world socialist struggle and thus disqualified these groups from receiving Cuban aid.29 Although the industrial focus of Marxism-Leninism

25 Diaz-Briquets, Sergio. Cuban Internationalism in Sub-Saharan Africa, p.14 26 El-Tahri, Jihan, dir. "Cuba! Africa! Revolution." Storyville. BBC. 1 May 2007. 27 Deutschmann, David. Changing the History of Africa: Angola and Namibia, p.1-3 28 James, W M. A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, 1974-1990. New Brunswick, N.J., U.S.A: Transaction Publishers, 1992., p. 46 29 LeoGrande, William M. Cuba's Policy in Africa, 1959-1980. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1980., p. 14

Moldes, Christopher prohibited a strict application to African history30, the fact that the MPLA sought to establish a society along these lines was what led Cuba to establish a supporting role in the development of the MPLA.31

However, until the Portuguese yoke was overthrown, the MPLA had little hope of achieving its goal of controlling Angola. Moreover, Cuba could not provide all the assistance required to assist the MPLA in fighting their mother country. By 1974, Portugal was in dire straits. Years of military action in an attempt to prevent the forces of anticolonialism from taking root had drained the economy and morale of the Portuguese. The military, fatigued by years of conflict in Africa, organized a bloodless revolution that came to be known as the

Carnation Revolution in April 1974. The process of decolonization continued without delay, and

Angola attained its independence on January 15, 1975. This initiated the Angolan Civil War.

Despite Soviet aid and Cuban advisors, the MPLA was off to a rough start. Agustinho Neto repeatedly asked the Cuban government for a wider commitment to assist in his efforts to gain control of Angola. Castro was reluctant to commit to a larger presence, and waited for the initial turmoil to recede.32

With so many groups vying for control, it was not until August that the MPLA was able to secure the capital of Luanda and therefore ostensible control of the nation. Now Castro’s interest was fully drawn to Angola. Interestingly enough for a renowned revolutionary, Castro’s reluctance has been attributed to his desire to work within the confines of legality. Until the

30 Diaz-Briquets, Sergio. Cuban Internationalism in Sub-Saharan Africa, p.18 31 LeoGrande, William M. Cuba's Policy in Africa, 1959-1980, p. 11 32 Spikes, Daniel. Angola and the Politics of Intervention: From Local Bush War to Chronic Crisis in Southern Africa. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 1993, p. 147

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MPLA had control of the capital, they could not be called the true representation of the people of Angola. For Cuba to assist them would be tantamount to mercenary work. However, now that the MPLA was, to all intents and purposes, in charge of Angola, “Havana would promptly recognize Neto’s government, which would in turn issue an appeal for help, to which the

Cubans could ‘legally’- that is, overtly – respond.”33 No crisis presented itself yet, so Castro, enjoying the legality of his commitment, kept the numbers of Cubans on the ground in Angola to a minimum, mostly as advisory personnel in charge of helping the Angolans use newly developed Soviet equipment.

The impetus for what would become Cuba’s largest foreign commitment was the South

African invasion of Angola on the eleventh of August, 1975, ostensibly in support of UNITA.

After one of the first engagements, South African forces found several dead Cuban soldiers, which confirmed suspicions in the West that Cuba was taking a more intimate role in the war.34

It is at this time that mentions of Angola in the Cuban press increased dramatically. Numerous editorials advocating stronger support for Angola were published in Granma, including one that proclaimed: “all states really interested in the liquidation of colonialism should resolutely aid the Angolan people and its only legitimate representative, the MPLA.”35 This increase in press activity reflected the beginning of a greater campaign on the part of the Cubans. Responding to a direct request for assistance from the MPLA’s Politburo, Castro acquiesced and began

33 Spikes, Daniel. Angola and the Politics of Intervention: From Local Bush War to Chronic Crisis in Southern Africa, p. 243 34 George, Edward. The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale, p. 72 35 "Cuba En La ONU: Solicita Apoyo Para El MPLA, Denuncia Ayuda Yanqui a Africa Del Sur." Granma [Havana] 10 Oct. 1975

Moldes, Christopher planning a more direct Cuban intervention. Thus, on November 4, Castro initiated Operation

Carlota, the first Cuban adventure in Angola.

Cuba’s decision to enter Angola defies conventional views of Cuba as the subservient lackey of the Soviet Union. Without a doubt, the Soviet Union enjoyed the upper hand in this relationship, supplying Cuba with much needed aid. Regarding Operation Carlota, Jorge

Risquet recalled how, despite this dynamic, “we didn’t even consult the Soviet Union. There was a communication…to the Soviet Union, after our troops were on the way.”36 His recollection was substantiated by Fidel Castro and former Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister,

Georgi Kornienko, who claims that the Cubans notified the Soviets as the planes were en route.37 The complications this introduced to the Soviet-Cuban relationship will be examined in a later section.

The very nature of the Cuban route to Angola indicates a high level of dedication. For

Cuba, a tiny Caribbean island nation, consistently sending aid to a nation 6,000 miles away proved to be a logistics nightmare. The Cubans used the entirety of their merchant marine fleet to facilitate troop and supply transport to Angola, and the air path from Cuba to Angola was impossible to complete in one trip, necessitating the use of layovers (until protest from the

United States made air transport impossible).38 The first wave of troops sent to Angola was composed of Special Forces, “skilled fighters with a high ideological and political level.”39 The

Cuban regime has insisted that all troops sent on the internationalist mission were volunteers.

36 Deutschmann, David. Changing the History of Africa: Angola and Namibia, p. 14 37 George, Edward. The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale, p. 79 38 LeoGrande, William M. Cuba's Policy in Africa, 1959-1980, p. 22 39 Deutschmann, David. Changing the History of Africa: Angola and Namibia. p. 48

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The selection criteria were listed by Gabriel Garcia Marquez: “not only military qualifications and physical and moral attributes, but also work record and political formation were taken into account by the committees.”40

Whether or not the process was completely voluntary, even critical observers like

Edward George noted that “there is ample evidence that the call-up was extremely popular.”41

The fact that Cuba was dedicating its most valuable and effective troops to a foreign country thousands of miles away speaks volumes to the commitment to the ideals of the revolution. It is also indicative that the revolutionary dogma alluded to earlier had indeed been accepted by the Cuban volunteers. One soldier, recounting his voyage home from Angola, saw his mission as one that had been set in motion by his grandfathers’ grandfathers, lending credence to the notion that Cuba’s revolutionary spirit was “reborn” in the Revolution and reinvigorated by participation in the Angolan Civil War.42 Another noted how his interest in politics was minimal until the call for internationalists went out, and that he constantly receives letters from his parents, in which they “exhort me to press forward, to maintain my post firmly, and to represent the family with dignity. I can’t fail them, or the Revolution.”43

Aside from their garrison duties, soldiers were expected to contribute to the larger internationalist mission of helping Angola grow. A Cuban editorial titled “From Angola: On the

Side of Reason” stated: “It isn’t strange….to find a small group of soldiers working on

40 Deutschmann, David. Changing the History of Africa: Angola and Namibia, p. 49 41 George, Edward. The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale, p. 81 42 Menéndez, Tomassevich R, and Blanco J. A. Gárciga. Patria Africana. La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2006., p. 155 43 Febles Hernandez, Miguel. "Desde Angola: Maquinista, Pescador E ¡internacionalista!" Granma [Havana, Cuba] 18 June 1987: 3.

Moldes, Christopher carpentry… the tankist, infantry man, and artillery crews transform, when the moment requires it, into efficient bricklayers, [and] plumbers.”44 Coupled with civilian contractors, their output rate was estimated to at 2,000 housing units per year45. The civilian population also played an important role in this mission. The existing infrastructure in Angola was insufficient for the demands of its citizens, so Castro sought to alleviate some pressure. Teachers, contractors, and doctors were all sent en masse to assist the ailing nation. To place this in perspective, of all the public health personnel serving abroad under the Cuban banner, 30% were stationed in Angola alone46. The reasoning for this was clear: after independence, there was only one doctor per

100,000 Angolans.47 In the academic sphere, Cuba provided scholarships for Angolans, wherein they would travel by the thousands to receive formal higher education in Cuba.48

Castro rationalized this bold commitment as emanating from solidarity shared by the

Cuban-Angolan people. He compared the initial stages of the Angolan Civil War to the Bay of

Pigs invasion, saying “the victory in Angola was the twin sister of the victory at Giron49. For the

Yankee imperialists, Angola represents an African Giron. At one time we said that imperialism has suffered its great defeats in the month of April: Giron, Viet Nam, Cambodia, etc. This time the defeat came in March [1976].”50 African leaders, for the most part, responded favorably to

Cuba’s intervention. Representatives from various nations and organizations, from Nigeria to the African National Congress of South Africa, from Botswana to Algeria, praised Cuba for

44 Febles Hernandez, Miguel. "Desde Angola: Al Lado De La Razon." Granma [Havana, Cuba] 23 Jan. 1987: 2 45 Mesa-Lago, Carmelo, and June S. Belkin. Cuba in Africa, p. 164 46Diaz-Briquets, Sergio. Cuban Internationalism in Sub-Saharan Africa, p.58 47 George, Edward. The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale, p. 158 48 "Cuba En El Mundo." Granma [Havana, Cuba] 03 July 1987: 6. 49 Giron is the location of the invasion, and the name used in Cuba to refer to the event 50 Castro, Fidel. Angola--africa Girón. La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1976, p. 13

Moldes, Christopher assisting the peoples of Angola in the face of imperialism.51 Aside from sharing the common menace in the form of South Africa, the African nations may have felt a racial solidarity with the

Cuban people, a point heavily propagated by the Cuban media. In a speech detailing the life of

Agostinho Neto, Castro emphasized the racial bonds between Cubans and Angolans, saying:

“After all, who were our people, our nation? Who but Africans, to a great extent, constituted our nation? And who but the old African slaves – or their descendants – fought in great numbers in our wars of independence in 1868 and 1895? And who knows how many descendants of Angolans were among them!”52

Even the name of Cuba’s first intervention, Operation Carlota, was homage to Cuban-African ties.53 It should be noted that these claims are true to an extent, as Cuban census records indicate more than fifty percent of the population is black. Racism part and parcel of Cuban society, however; less than fifteen percent of government posts are held by those of black descent.54

Lofty idealism notwithstanding, others involved in the mission recognized the immediate advantages of assisting. Civilians who volunteered for service abroad received several material benefits, notably a twenty percent increase in pay and preferential distribution of materials and housing.55 The prospect of an adventure abroad also factored into the decisions of both soldiers and civilians to volunteer, given that Cubans have little chance to explore the world.56 Ironically for those hoping for adventure, internationalist soldiers were

51 Abudu, Paul B. Cuban Policy Toward Africa and African Responses, 1959-1976. , 1985, p. 208-209 52 Deutschmann, David. Changing the History of Africa: Angola and Namibia, p. 78 53 Carlota was the name of a slave that instigated a rebellion in Cuba during Spanish rule 54 Diaz-Briquets, Sergio. Cuban Internationalism in Sub-Saharan Africa, p.31 55 Mesa-Lago, Carmelo, and June S. Belkin. Cuba in Africa. Pittsburgh, Pa: Published by the Center for Latin American Studies, University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh with support from the Howard Heinz Endowment, 1982., p. 172 56 Diaz-Briquets, Sergio. Cuban Internationalism in Sub-Saharan Africa, p.130

Moldes, Christopher required to relinquish their passports upon entry to Angola57. Perhaps the greatest material incentive, from a material perspective, was Angola’s wealth of natural resources. An article that appeared before the launch of Operation Carlota included a long exposition on the natural resources of Angola, specifically petroleum58. Heavily dependent on the USSR for subsidized oil,

Cuba would naturally have been interested in obtaining an alternate source of petroleum.

Independent observers noted, however, that this scenario did not likely come to fruition, as:

“Angola needs to receive world market prices for its oil and not to grant subsidies to Cuba, whereas Cuba needs to receive oil subsidies and not to confront world market prices.”59

Petroleum did allow for some sort of reimbursement, via revenue collected from sales.

Although Castro repeatedly emphasized that Angola was not compelled to pay for services rendered60, he later withdrew these remarks, admitting Cuba received upwards of $20 million per year (other sources estimate $300 million) until 1984, when Angola’s economic straits made it clear that it would be unable to continue payments61.

Other tangible benefits unrelated to proletarian internationalism involved the enlargement of Cuban political clout in the international arena. Being heavily involved in the

Non-Aligned Movement, Castro performed a delicate balancing act with his decision to aid

Angola. His claims of independence could easily be debunked if others interpreted his actions as furthering the Soviet agenda. William LeoGrande notes that “Cuba has argued that nonalignment does not mean neutrality toward imperialism or neo-imperialism, and has

57 George, Edward. The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale, p. 149 58 Casals, Rudy. "Por Que Angola." Granma [Havana, Cuba] 01 Nov. 1975: 8 59 Mesa-Lago, Carmelo, and June S. Belkin. Cuba in Africa, p. 168 60 Diaz-Briquets, Sergio. Cuban Internationalism in Sub-Saharan Africa, p.55 61 George, Edward. The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale, p. 150

Moldes, Christopher maintained that the socialist camp led by the USSR is the Third World’s natural ally.”62

However, by becoming allies with movements that had garnered sufficient support in Africa,

Castro avoided the stigma of being associated with imperialism, Eastern or Western. When his actions received no condemnation from either the Organization of African Unity or the United

Nations, Castro emerged victorious, and was temporarily heralded as the leader of the Third

World.

This pragmatic approach to Angola became more transparent as time went on.

Whereas Castro had declared victory in March of 1976, this was extremely premature. South

Africa continued to launch incursions into southern Angola, and the United States eventually overcame the bitter taste for foreign adventurism that had been left by its experience in

Vietnam. Cuba had become ensnared in a conflict for the foreseeable future. By 1984, the

Soviet Union was displeased with Cuba’s relative lack of progress, and took control of the military situation. By this point, the Cubans were weary of involvement Angola. Soviet management only exacerbated the MPLA’s position in Angola63. By 1987, the Soviets had abandoned their mission, allowing Cuba to once again take the reins. The Cubans’ attitude toward Angola was no longer ambivalent, as evidenced by the testimony of the Deputy

Commander of the Cuban Air Force after defecting, stating “that senior Cuban officers were openly declaring the war to be lost.”64 Cuban troops stationed in Angola now realistically assessed their Angolan allies, believing them to be unworthy due to their poor fighting

62 LeoGrande, William M. Cuba's Policy in Africa, 1959-1980, p. 30 63 These events will be analyzed in subsequent chapters dealing with Soviet involvement and the relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union. 64 George, Edward. The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale, p. 201

Moldes, Christopher capabilities65. This is a markedly different assessment from the official narrative presented in

Granma at around this time, where the Angolans are praised for their combat performance and level of commitment.

As the Soviet Union’s power waned, Castro was forced to reconsider his commitments.

Without its primary financer, Cuba would be unable to continue grand foreign policy adventurism. By 1988, a suitable resolution had been found, and Cuba agreed to begin withdrawing troops during the next two years. Almost immediately, references to internationalism disappeared from Cuban media66, an indication that Cuba would begin winding down its impressive foreign policy campaigns. Interviews conducted with returning soldiers revealed a greater rift between reality and narrative than had previously been imagined.

According to Juan M. Del Aguila, “interviewees seldom spoke in ideological terms, and did not associate service abroad with the justifiable expansion of Marxist-Leninist principles.”67 Del

Aguila’s claims should be taken with a grain of salt, however, for he later goes on to claim that

“altruism and dedication were not…the principal reasons behind someone’s decision to become an internationalist.”68 This nullifies observations made by Edward George, an equally vociferous critic of the Cuban regime’s actions in Angola, who states:

“While some doggedly cling on to the fading values of internationalism, others express bitterness and a sense of betrayal at the way they were used as proxy forces for the Soviet Union…Unsurprisingly, those who still believe whole-heartedly in the cause predominantly come from the two groups which enjoyed the best conditions in Angola: the professional military and the civilian internationalists…it is even easier to

65 Diaz-Briquets, Sergio. Cuban Internationalism in Sub-Saharan Africa, p.139 66 George, Edward. The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale, p. 256 67 Diaz-Briquets, Sergio. Cuban Internationalism in Sub-Saharan Africa, p.142 68 IBID., p.130

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understand why civilian veterans view Angola in an overwhelmingly positive light, as the work they carried out was humanitarian.”69

In reference to the “betrayal” mentioned above, this resulted from the negligent mention of internationalists and their sacrifices immediately following their return. Although memorials have been erected in each of Cuba’s provinces70, the internationalists and their mission were promptly ignored, as Cuba adjusted to a world without the Soviet Union. The last Cuban troops returned in June of 1991, and the Soviet Union was dissolved in December of that year.

Without the Soviet Union to prop up its economy, Cuba was forced to abandon its internationalist agenda and become a reclusive, isolationist state71.

Cuba’s adventure in Angola was a genuine manifestation of Cuba’s proletarian internationalism, the logical extension of the new revolutionary fervor that guided Cuban politics. With his commitment to Communism, Fidel Castro imbibed Cuban society with ideals that suggested a desire to strengthen the Communist sphere. When the MPLA-controlled state of Angola was confronted with destruction, Castro believed it necessary to step in and aid his socialist comrades. This act was afforded to Cuba as a result of its degree of maneuverability in the international arena, a quality not enjoyed by the Soviet Union. As a result, the Soviet Union followed Cuba in to Angola, once it became clear that both nations’ interests would be better served from such an arrangement. Although the cause may not have had as large a following as Castro and the Cuban media would suggest, the fact of the matter is that those who served in Angola did so out of a desire to help and to continue the revolutionary legacy of their nation.

That legacy was altered to further the cause of global communism, and the mission to Angola

69 George, Edward. The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale, p. 283 70 IBID., p. 267 71 Pérez-Stable, Marifeli. The Cuban Revolution: Origins, Course, and Legacy, p. 189

Moldes, Christopher inevitably became colored by Marxist-Leninist rationale. By examining the actions of those in

Angola and those in Havana, it is apparent that Cuba and its people acted in accordance with their ideals. Weariness of the mission set in when the timetable for involvement grew exorbitantly, turning Angola into Cuba’s Vietnam. Despite this, its cause served as a rallying point for Cubans and Africans alike. In helping Angola defend against South Africa, “Cuba was the Third World’s David defeating the South African Goliath.”72

72 LeoGrande, William M. Cuba's Policy in Africa, 1959-1980, p. 30

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The Soviet Union’s Approach

Whereas Cuba was still in its nascent revolutionary stage by the late 1960s, the Soviet

Union had long ago abandoned the practice of exporting revolution by means of any purportedly Communist movement outside the Soviet sphere of influence73. Communist rhetoric was treated like a science in the Soviet Union, as all the nuances of the ideology were meticulously analyzed and reinterpreted to explain international events. The reason for this was that, more often than not, predictions and policies based on Marxist doctrine did not correspond with reality; thus, reformulations were necessary to account for the discrepancies.

In a sense, when reality did not mesh with Communist rhetoric, “the Communist line is made to square with it.”74 It is important to note that in the Communist world, ideology was the exclusive domain of the Soviet Union. Its client nations and republics were forced to either emulate the Soviet Union and receive benefits, or interpret Communism on their own and face being ostracized or even forcibly suppressed.75

This authority stemmed from the status of the Soviet Union in the Communist world.

Being the oldest Communist nation, the leaders of the Union felt that their state had a keener understanding of communist theory and application. As a result, the USSR “provided a successful example of how socialism should be built in practice.”76 To this end, a Communist hierarchy was carefully constructed throughout the decades, with the Soviet Union at the

73 This policy shift was most noticeable during the transitional period from Lenin to Stalin, during which time Stalin formulated his “Socialism in One Country” thesis in 1924 as a response to the failure of exporting revolutions beyond the Russian steppe 74 Hamrell, Sven, Carl G. Widstrand, and W A. C. Adie. The Soviet Bloc, China and Africa, p. 31 75 See: Yugoslavia, Albania, Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968) 76 Botha, Pierre T. Soviet Perspectives on National-Liberation Revolutions in Africa: Theoretical Aspects 1960-1990. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 1999, p. 29

Moldes, Christopher forefront, and the Eastern Bloc and other client states like Cuba placed in strictly subservient roles. The Soviets referred to this hierarchy as the “world socialist community”, which was ideally a community of socialist nations that mutually supported one another in a hostile, capitalist world. In reality, however, the balance of power was heavily skewed to favor the

Soviet Union at the expense of the client states. The Chinese revolution introduced complications to this dynamic, which were exacerbated after the Sino-Soviet Split of 1959. This effectively created two parallel Communist power structures, the existence of which heavily influenced the allocation of aid and resources during the proxy wars of the Cold War. The full ramifications of these power struggles will be evaluated in a later section.

The wave of anticolonialism that swept the globe after World War II further complicated the Soviet Union’s world view. Having witnessed firsthand the capabilities of the American policy of containment during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, it is understandable why the Soviet

Union was apprehensive to fully support every revolutionary movement in Africa. Coupled with its perceived loss of authority due to the Sino-Soviet split, the Soviet Union treaded carefully in

Africa. Its leaders, however, realized the potential presented by Africa. Not only was the continent rich in resources, it also presented an opportunity to improve the image of the Soviet

Union. By allying with the perceived underdog, the Soviet Union hoped to portray itself as the protector of developing nations. As the atmospheres of détente blossomed in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Soviets began to equate the anti-colonialist struggle with the principles of détente, stating in an article in Izvestia77:

77 Izvestia translates to “news” or “tidings”

Moldes, Christopher

As far as detente is concerned, isn't the struggle against racism and apartheid and the defense of and respect for the sovereignty of young independent countries a contribution to the easing of tension and to the creation on our planet of the necessary conditions for a peaceful, happy life for all peoples, large and small?78

Eager to stake a claim in Africa, the Soviet Union was extremely methodical in its assessment of national liberation movements in Africa. A marked increase of African studies departments was observed in various Soviet universities from the 1960s onwards, indicating that the regime was increasingly interested in understanding the effects of African liberation.79

During Nikita Khrushchev’s tenure80, a department for aiding national liberation movements was organized.81 Through these institutions, the Soviets were able to learn a great deal about the African situation. Like the Cubans, Soviet ideologues came to understand that Africa’s infrastructure did not fit the traditional Marxist concept of development. Aside from a lack of industrialization and material wealth, the most pressing concern for Soviet Marxists was the general lack of a powerful working class, the impetus for any Communist movement.82 Without the traditional Marxist structures to fall upon, it seemed that communism would have to be adapted to Africa, thus rendering the Soviet Union and China ill-equipped to take advantage of the situation on the continent.

To remedy this, the Soviets developed the theory of alternative paths of development, which posited that Africa could initiate a process similar to what had occurred in Russia. By following a socialist plan for development, the African nations could theoretically bypass

78 Current Digest of the Russian Press, The (formerly The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press), No. 1, Vol.28, February 04, 1976, page(s): 5-5 79 Matusevich, Maxim. Africa in Russia, Russia in Africa: Three Centuries of Encounters. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2007, p. 117-118 80 1955-1964 81 El-Tahri, Jihan, dir. "Cuba! Africa! Revolution." Storyville. BBC. 1-2 May 2007. 82 Hamrell, Sven, Carl G. Widstrand, and W A. C. Adie. The Soviet Bloc, China and Africa., p. 36

Moldes, Christopher capitalism completely.83 For this to occur, however, decolonization had to be escalated. The prevailing interpretation of decolonization among Soviet circles was that it was a manifestation of the continuation of the crisis of capitalism, a part of Marxist historical analysis that lay central to the Soviet Union’s ideological fundamentals. To this end, the Soviets increased their contacts with socialist elements in Portugal, hoping to influence events to their benefit.

The situation in Angola during the 1950s eventually drew the attention of Nikita

Khrushchev. The Soviets had been active in establishing the Angolan Communist Party in the early 1950s84, and according to CIA reports, the FNLA was a likely candidate for Soviet support when war first began in 1961. When they rejected Soviet advances, however, the MPLA became the new beneficiary.85 This relationship was very cool, though, as the Soviet Union was not particularly fond of Agustinho Neto as a result “of his willingness to seek aid from all sources, including arch enemies such as China.”86 Furthermore, when fissures appeared in the

MPLA leadership, the Soviets were on the verge of supporting a coup against Neto, until he was able to reassert dominance with Cuban assistance. Meanwhile, progress in Portugal was slow.

The Portuguese Socialist Party had increased their political clout in the nation, but not to the extent the Soviets desired. The Soviets thus became disenchanted with both them and the

83 Botha, Pierre T. Soviet Perspectives on National-Liberation Revolutions in Africa: Theoretical Aspects 1960-1990, p. 76 84 Spikes, Daniel. Angola and the Politics of Intervention: From Local Bush War to Chronic Crisis in Southern Africa, p. 10 85 United States of America. Central Intelligence Agency. Office of Regional and Political Analysis. Soviet and Cuban Intervention in the Angolan Civil War, p. 7 86 George, Edward. The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale, p. 46

Moldes, Christopher

MPLA, and began to distance themselves, precisely at the moment when the Portuguese military overthrew the Caetano regime in the Carnation Revolution of April 1974.87

MPLA support was reinitiated, especially when it became known that the Chinese were courting the FNLA. This support can best be described as meager, however, as the Soviets held high hopes that the Portuguese revolution would help end the conflict without further escalation.88 This soon proved not to be the case, given the withdrawal and abandonment of administrative functions in Angola, which only led to more fighting. Despite this unexpected turn of events, the Soviets received a reprieve of sorts. The United States, as a result of its experiences in Vietnam during the 1960s and 1970s, was entering a period of relative isolationism. The Kremlin thus reasoned that Washington would be unlikely to seriously respond to an increase in Soviet presence throughout the globe, as the Americans were wary of foreign adventurism. As a result, the Soviets increased their aid to numerous African nations, including Angola in 197589.

Events on the ground in Angola went from bad to worse, with the aforementioned

South African invasion in August of 1975. The event that seemingly initiated Cuban intervention, it would also have repercussions for Soviet aid to Angola. While the Politburo was reluctant to commit to a greater presence, the Soviet army had no such qualms. Soviet high command, perhaps emboldened by the sheer size of forces at their disposal, wanted a chance to prove their worth. The nascent era of détente threatened to strip the military of its essential

87 George, Edward. The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale, p. 341 88 Spikes, Daniel. Angola and the Politics of Intervention: From Local Bush War to Chronic Crisis in Southern Africa. p. 108 89 IBID., p. 144-146

Moldes, Christopher status, something the high command was understandably not fond of. Even in 1971, Soviet

Minister of Defense, Andrei Grechko, had declared that the mission of the Soviet Armed Forces was expanding “to prevent the ‘export of counterrevolution’ and to defend and support the

‘national liberation movement’.”90 On the basis of this expanded directive, members of the

Soviet military were in communication with their Cuban counterparts throughout the fall of

1975.

When Cuba initiated its massive commitment in late 1975, the Soviet Politburo was taken off guard, and many (including then KGB Chief Yuri Andropov and the aforementioned

Grechko) scrambled to vocalize their misgivings. Unbeknownst to them, however, Soviet military personnel were already in the process of assisting the Cuban airlift.91 It can therefore be said that Cuba’s actions, in conjunction with the Soviet military’s, forced the Politburo to reconsider the Angolan situation sooner than originally planned. . To avoid claims of illegal aid, the Soviets had hoped to withhold significant aid and material until after the legally agreed upon independence day of Angola (November 11, 1975), after which the USSR could recognize

“the MPLA as the official Angolan government, …[and then] represent its assistance to the

MPLA as state-to-state aid rather than intervention in a civil war.”92

The Politburo’s hesitancy can be attributed to a fear of unraveling détente. Despite the ideological retreat of the United States, the CIA and other clandestine Western services could still make their presence felt in regions of interest, such as Angola. The CIA had already

90 Spikes, Daniel. Angola and the Politics of Intervention: From Local Bush War to Chronic Crisis in Southern Africa, p. 75 91 George, Edward. The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale, p. 79 92 United States of America. Central Intelligence Agency. Office of Regional and Political Analysis. Soviet and Cuban Intervention in the Angolan Civil War., p. 20

Moldes, Christopher funneled several hundred thousand dollars to the FNLA in the hopes of counteracting the increasing Soviet and Cuban aid in Angola.93 Thus, at the time, it seemed every increase in

Soviet aid would be met by an equal increase by the opposite side. This changed in 1976, when the United States Congress passed the Clark Amendment, which expressly forbade the CIA from engaging in any activity in Angola. With this loose end tied up, the Soviet Union’s leadership took a collective sigh of relief, and fully entrenched themselves in Angola, as evidenced by the formalization of an alliance with Cuba and the MPLA concerning Angola.94

Soviet military aid to Angola remained relatively meager, however, in comparison with

Cuban numbers. Although 1976 represented the peak of Soviet aid for the 1970s (around half a billion dollars of material), it diminished to about a quarter of a billion and plateaued until the early 1980s.95 Soviet media sources were also quick to point out that Soviet aid remained, for the most part, material and not personnel in nature. An article in Pravda from January 30th,

1976 resolutely denied rumors of a Soviet military presence on the ground in Angola, saying:

“These assertions have absolutely no basis in fact. The U. S. S. R.'s position on the Angolan question is well known to everyone. We would like to point out once again that no Soviet persons are fighting on Angolan soil. For this reason, one can only be amazed at the…utterly groundless claim that some mythical "Soviet troops" are in Angola…”96

The reasons for the Soviet Union’s steadfast position regarding personnel in Angola are twofold. First, given Cuba’s tactical command of the situation, the Soviet Union could defer to its only ally in the Western Hemisphere, yet still reap the rewards for assisting Angola.

93 Spikes, Daniel. Angola and the Politics of Intervention: From Local Bush War to Chronic Crisis in Southern Africa, p. 131 94 George, Edward. The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale, p. 101 95 IBID., p. 303 96 Current Digest of the Russian Press, The (formerly The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press), No. 4, Vol.28, February 25, 1976, page(s): 13-13

Moldes, Christopher

Secondly, the fear of upsetting détente would always cause the Soviet leaders hesitation, despite signs that the Americans were, for the meantime, indisposed regarding Angola.

Throughout the early phase of the Angolan campaign, Soviet media sources and state documents continuously referenced a desire to uphold détente. One such document, the

Declaration on the Principles of Friendly Relations and Cooperation between the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics and the People’s Republic of Angola, stresses the commitment to détente from both involved parties, with point number three stating: “The sides will contribute in every way possible to the deepening of international détente and its implementation through concrete forms of mutually advantageous cooperation among states.”97.

As the Angolan conflict continued past the 1970s and into the 1980s, the Soviets’ hands off approach began to fade. This did not only apply to Angola, but also to other regions of the world, as evidenced by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Coming at a time of renewed Cold War tensions, Soviet actions abroad were set against the backdrop of this invasion. This in turn shattered the perception that the Soviet Union was not interested in territorial expansion, causing the Union to lose clout and prestige with Africa.98 Nevertheless, the fact remained: the Soviet Union had become willing to send its military into contested regions throughout the globe. With respect to Angola, this new thinking was influenced by the fact that the Cubans had entered a military quagmire, which was further exacerbated by yet another South African invasion. The Soviets grew impatient with the lack of resolution. As a result of this dissatisfaction with Cuban management, the Soviets began in 1984 to escalate

97 Current Digest of the Russian Press, The (formerly The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press), No. 22, Vol.28, June 30, 1976, page(s): 22-22 98 Eribo, Festus. In Search of Greatness: Russia's Communications with Africa and the World. Westport, Conn: Ablex Pub, 2001., p. 93

Moldes, Christopher their arms shipments and monetary aid to unprecedented levels, indicating the beginning of a shift to Soviet control of the tactical situation.99

As the number of Soviet personnel increased throughout the mid1980s, the official narrative often clashed with the reality faced by the soldiers. As they arrived in Angola, they were dismayed at the lack of cleanliness of the city, remarking how this contrasted with the official picture of Africa they had been presented with.100 With respect to actions on the ground, Soviet personnel’s interactions with the locals did not seem to be based off of mutual respect. This experience could not differ more in comparison to the Cuban experience.

Observers noted how Soviet officers sequestered themselves from the Angolans, even going so far as to cordon “off sections of beach to create ‘Soviet only’ areas, and even demanding that swimming pools which had been used by Angolans be drained and refilled before they would use them.”101 Concerning the fighting capabilities of their Angolan counterparts, one soldier stated: “They weren’t really doughty warriors. Angolans were terrified of South Africans!”102

This assessment was in line with the Cuban assessment of Angolan fighting prowess, which was also at odds with official narratives. However, the Soviets took this one step further, abandoning Angolan forces during thick fighting at the Battle of Cuito Canavale103. Despite these actions and sentiments, the Soviet military personnel believed in the validity of their mission (like their Cuban counterparts). In an interview, a former Soviet Lieutenant recalls

“that there was some kind of belief that we are doing a needful deed. Among all the actions of

99 George, Edward. The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale, p. 183 100 Shubin, G. V. The Oral History of Forgotten Wars: The Memoirs of Veterans of the War in Angola. Moscow: Memories, 2007, p. 14 101 George, Edward. The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale p. 161 102 Shubin, G. V. The Oral History of Forgotten Wars: The Memoirs of Veterans of the War in Angola., p. 19 103 George, Edward. The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale, p. 207

Moldes, Christopher the military advisers at the time I never heard questions like: “Why are we here? Why are we fighting this war?”104

If these thoughts were not in the heads of Soviet servicemen, they were certainly growing in the minds of Soviet politicians. By the late 1980s, perestroika was in full swing, and all aspects of Soviet life were being called into question; foreign policy and commitments were certainly no exception. Mikhail Gorbachev, the architect of perestroika, stated: “When we began perestroika, one of the first steps we took was to declare an end to intervention in the internal affairs of our allies, to what was known was the Brezhnev doctrine.”105 In Gorbachev’s mind, the application of ideology to foreign affairs was both impractical and wasteful. In an interview with an Algerian magazine, Gorbachev elaborated upon this idea further, saying: “we will not make our plans contingent on the intentions of other states with respect to our country.”106 The primary motivator for this shift in policy was economic. In the words of Dr.

Pierre T. Botha:

“The proliferation of socialist oriented countries during the second half of the 1970s that laid claim to economic aid from the Soviet Union, just at a time when the latter was experiencing economic difficulties, was undoubtedly the reason for the sudden shift in emphasis.”107

By diminishing the importance of ideology on relations between the Soviet Union and other nations, Gorbachev essentially spelled doom for the entire Marxist-Leninist system. The new foreign policy being pursued by the Soviet Union looked for commonalities between

104 Shubin, G. V. The Oral History of Forgotten Wars: The Memoirs of Veterans of the War in Angola., p. 26 105 Gorbachev, Mikhail On My Country and the World New York: Columbia University Press, 2000, p. 42 106 Current Digest of the Russian Press, The (formerly The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press), No. 14, Vol.38, May 07, 1986, page(s): 19-21 107 Botha, Pierre T. Soviet Perspectives on National-Liberation Revolutions in Africa: Theoretical Aspects 1960-1990, p. 243

Moldes, Christopher states, communist or capitalist.108 That is, the Soviet Union would now work with those states that had common interests, rather than those that simply shared an ideological viewpoint. By

1989, a foreign affairs article written by a Soviet commentator stressed that “the age of national-liberation wars is over.”109 The article goes on to implore both the United States and the USSR to cease aid to trouble spots around the globe. Similar sentiments are echoed in a later article, which criticizes Soviet aid, as the author feels this only further destabilized regions rather than aided them.110 Furthermore, with the myriad of problems to contend with within the Union itself, the USSR had little time and energy left to devote to African commitments.111

This meant that Angola could no longer look forward to unconditional Soviet support.

Cuba, as a result of Castro’s preferences, was adamantly opposed to the new path being ventured upon by the Soviet Union. The ramifications this had on Cuban-Soviet relations will be further explored in the next section. Suffice it to say that with the Soviet Union backing out of its Angolan commitment, the Cubans could no longer afford to maintain such a vested presence in the region. As the Angolan adventure tapered off, many in the Soviet Union turned a critical eye towards the situation. In a particularly critical article in a Leningrad periodical, a commentator calls into question the amount of debt owed to the USSR as a result of its overly

108 Botha, Pierre T. Soviet Perspectives on National-Liberation Revolutions in Africa: Theoretical Aspects 1960-1990, p. 226 109 Current Digest of the Russian Press, The (formerly The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press), No. 5, Vol.41, March 01, 1989, page(s): 23-23 110 Current Digest of the Russian Press, The (formerly The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press), No. 2, Vol.42, February 14, 1990, page(s): 15-15 111 Matusevich, Maxim. Africa in Russia, Russia in Africa: Three Centuries of Encounters, p. 326

Moldes, Christopher generous foreign aid program throughout the years. The author divides recipient nations into two categories, socialist and developing. Angola is listed second under developing nations.112

The Soviet adventure in Angola represented an attempt to effectively influence a promising region in an important sphere of influence. It is important to note, however, that the

Soviet Union was reluctant to enter. Ideological considerations aside, the Soviet Union had to operate within the confines of the international arena, boundaries that were more flexibly applied to Cuba. Rather than being seen as a traditional follow the leader adventure, the

Angolan situation should be seen as originating from a convergence of interests. Whether or not Cuba had acted as it had, the Soviet Union already had an interest in Angola. Cuba’s intervention was simply a catalyst for greater Soviet involvement. Sooner or later, the Soviet

Union would have acted in Angola in some manner. The ideological basis of the state demanded as much. Dr. Pierre Botha notes that while the Soviets hoped to portray themselves as merely interested parties observing a historical process, they often intervened to give “the historical process a push.”113 Communism was the reason for the USSR’s existence. It therefore had to act accordingly with these principles, regardless of international reaction or general attitude in the Union itself. It is with this in mind that the Soviet intervention in Angola should be evaluated.

112 Current Digest of the Russian Press, The (formerly The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press), No. 9, Vol.42, April 04, 1990, page(s): 9-9 113 Botha, Pierre T. Soviet Perspectives on National-Liberation Revolutions in Africa: Theoretical Aspects 1960-1990, p. 235

Moldes, Christopher

Clash of Ideologies: Cuba and the Soviet Union

“The USSR and Cuba will take all possible steps to further strengthen the unity and solidarity of the socialist countries on the basis of Leninist principles and to promote their closer cooperation in the international arena.”114 So begins an editorial in Pravda discussing

Soviet-Cuban involvement in Angola. Officially, the two nations regarded each other as allies with almost equal standing vis-à-vis one another. As highlighted in previous sections, the reality was not so clearly defined. The Soviet Union, aside from being strategically and politically more powerful than Cuba, was the primary financier for the island nation. From this financial relationship emerged influence that the Soviet Union could use to curtail some of

Cuba’s radical policies, namely the incessant attempts at instigating revolutions abroad that characterized Cuban foreign policy throughout the 1960s. The Soviet Union’s client states more or less adhered to Soviet policy, so it stood to reason that Cuba should do so as well. Otherwise,

Cuba’s insistence on independent policy risked reintroducing the concept of polycentric

Communism into the Eastern Bloc115, an idea the Soviet Union had worked long and hard to suppress.

The changes necessary from the Soviet point of view were facilitated in part by Cuba’s own domestic problems. Cuba’s foreign policy had enjoyed little success in the 1960s, and the

Cuban economy suffered from numerous failed harvests and unmet production quotas, being kept afloat only by persistent Soviet aid. Attempts to free Cuba from Soviet economic dependence met with disaster when the Soviets either decreased or delayed trade for brief

114 Current Digest of the Russian Press, The (formerly The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press), No. 16, Vol.30, May 17, 1978, page(s): 19-20 115 LeoGrande, William M. Cuba's Policy in Africa, 1959-1980, p. 4

Moldes, Christopher periods, during which “Cuba was once again reminded of its dependence.”116 When in 1972

Cuba joined the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, favorable debt repayments were issued. Afterwards, Cuba abandoned its ambitious foreign policy aims, establishing new protocols along lines similar to those of the Soviet Union. In Africa, this meant establishing normative relations with several African nations, rather than just those sympathetic to

Marxism-Leninism. This foreign policy paradigm also included siding with the Soviet Union on the issue of the Sino-Soviet Split.117 Whether or not this was explicitly related to entry into

COMECON cannot be directly verified, though it can be said that it certainly influenced Cuba, given the economic pitfalls of the 1960s.

Cooperation in Africa did have benefits for Cuba as well. Aside from the economic aid granted by adhering to Soviet standards, normalization of relations allowed Cuba to carve a greater position for itself within Africa. By allying with movements and nations that were not necessarily Communist, Castro was able to build a supporting base for his actions on the continent, particularly in Angola. As international tension increased after Cuba’s intervention in Angola in 1975, William Ratliff noted that “many African states do not perceive Cuba as a

Soviet surrogate, but as an overseas African state linked to African bloc interests in the Third

World.”118 These impressions served dual purposes. First and foremost, it gave Castro the political prestige and clout he had long desired. Cuba had gone from being politically insignificant to taking center stage in the Third World in less than a decade. This perception in turn passed on to the Soviet Union. With Cuba occupying a position of prominence within such

116 Pérez-Stable, Marifeli. The Cuban Revolution: Origins, Course, and Legacy, p. 117 117 George, Edward. The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale, p. 43 118 Ratliff, William E. Follow the Leader in the Horn: The Soviet-Cuban Presence in East Africa. Washington, DC: Cuban American National Foundation, 1986, p. 11

Moldes, Christopher organizations as the Non-Aligned Movement and being associated with the Soviet Union by the aforementioned economic and ideological ties, it was able to “push the non-aligned movement closer to the Soviet bloc.”119 The Cuban media worked actively to facilitate this impression of the Soviet Union as having the Third World’s interests at heart, with one article praising the

Union: “In this vein they acknowledged the initiatives for peace, for the end of the arms race, to save humanity from nuclear holocaust, and to cultivate the security of the people, which the

Soviet Union promotes with wisdom and firmness.”120

With the enhanced clout the Soviet Union received on behalf of its efforts and by proxy through Cuba, the Soviets in turn granted Cuba greater maneuverability121. This relationship was much celebrated in the Soviet press: A Joint Soviet-Angolan Communique writes “The USSR and Angola place a high value on the role of the Cuban internationalist forces that are in Angola to help ensure the country's security in conditions of the persisting threat of aggression from outside.”122 Another article that appeared in Izvestia took these sentiments further, titled

Cuba’s Positions Grows Stronger, comments on Cuba’s increased prestige among Third World nations, particularly those in Africa123. These sentiments would come to define the Cuban-

Soviet relationship during the Brezhnev era. Despite different attitudes towards the Angolan situation, both governments came to realize each stood to benefit from the actions of the other in Africa. Tensions between the two nations still existed, however, over such issues as Neto’s

119 Abudu, Paul B. Cuban Policy Toward Africa and African Responses, 1959-1976, p. 41 120 "Comunicado Sobre Las Conversaciones Cubano-angolanas." Granma [Havana, Cuba] 4 Apr. 1987: 1 121 LeoGrande, William M. Cuba's Policy in Africa, 1959-1980, p. 63 122 Current Digest of the Russian Press, The (formerly The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press), No. 20, Vol.35, June 15, 1983, page(s): 14-23 123 Current Digest of the Russian Press, The (formerly The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press), No. 47, Vol.37, December 18, 1985, page(s): 27-28

Moldes, Christopher leadership style, which led the Soviets to initially try to replace him with someone more amicable to their wishes. These tensions would surface as the Angolan Civil War moved into the mid-1980s.

This later period is important to evaluate because of the increase in tensions between

Cuba and the Soviet Union that came with it. The changing dynamic of the Cuban-Soviet relationship served to accentuate policy differences that had not been immediately apparent before. This change was initiated by the introduction of glasnost and perestroika by the new

General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, in 1986.

Perestroika presented a problem for Cuba for a variety of reasons. First, Castro had, at Soviet insistence and after domestic methods failed124, organized Cuba’s political and economic structures to be more in line with traditional Communist models. By the mid-1980s, as evidenced by the situation in the Soviet bloc, these models had proven to be ineffective, hence the impetus for change. Nevertheless, Cuba continued “to embrace orthodox and outmoded socialist economic models, while the world [became] increasingly convinced that the solution to a host of contemporary problems lies in market mechanisms.”125 Castro resisted this change at every turn. The reasons for this obstinacy are clear. Fidel had equated the Cuban regime with his personage; Cuba was “a regime which drew its legitimacy and ideological direction from that one man.”126 The possibility of being openly questioned about his policies threatened to destabilize the whole regime, as was the case in Eastern Europe. Another primary factor for

124 Pérez-Stable, Marifeli. The Cuban Revolution: Origins, Course, and Legacy, p. 122 125 Diaz-Briquets, Sergio. Cuban Internationalism in Sub-Saharan Africa, p. 4 126 George, Edward. The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale, p. 266

Moldes, Christopher

Castro’s resistance to perestroika was that it allowed some in the Soviet Union to call into question the nature of Cuban-Soviet finances.

A Soviet article entitled For Discussion: Generosity or Wastefulness? Notes on Soviet

Economic Aid pointed out that over 12 billion dollars, or 1.4% of the GNP, had been earmarked for foreign aid127. Of this 12 billion, a reported 3 billion goes annually to Cuba, though the author is quick to point out that these estimates come from Western sources, as there is no official Soviet source documenting these finances. The author goes on to mention that “state budget subsidies to Kirgizia in 1990 will amount to 555,453,000 rubles, and to Tadzhikistan,

405,784,000 rubles. In other words, the two Soviet republics combined will receive only a third as much money as the distant island in the Caribbean Sea.” Clearly, a paradigm shift concerning

Cuba was occurring. The Soviet bureaucracy appeared to be prioritizing its shambling economy, and Cuba was no longer making the list.

As mentioned in the previous section, Angola did not escape scrutiny, and this also perturbed the Cuban leadership. After the botched Soviet offenses in Angola of the mid 1980s,

Cuban military officials held a grim view of the war. Understandably upset at having had the situation wrested from their control and then handed back in worse shape, they completely attributed the military failures to “the poor Soviet strategy that the Cuban command was subordinated to.”128 Reciprocating in kind to these accusations, Soviet media sources attributed the failures to a lack of coordination and efficacy between the armed forces of Angola and

127 Current Digest of the Russian Press, The (formerly The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press), No. 2, Vol.42, February 14, 1990, page(s): 15-15 128 Diaz-Briquets, Sergio. Cuban Internationalism in Sub-Saharan Africa, p.109

Moldes, Christopher

Cuba.129 As the conflict dragged on, both states grew tired of their commitments, prompting the Soviet Union to begin the peace process.

The entire peace process, stimulated by meetings between Gorbachev and Reagan in the wake of renewed South African aggression, was denounced by Castro, who stated:

The action could be considered inappropriate. It was the worst possible time for a decision of this kind. The question was, either we make the decision or we face the consequences of letting the South Africans operate with impunity and decide the struggle in Angola militarily.130

Perhaps as a result of being sidelined during the peace process (which the Soviet press attributed solely to US-USSR cooperation)131, Castro had his forces draw up plans to prolong the

Angolan conflict by means of invading neighboring Namibia under the pretenses of assisting rebel forces against the South Africans132. These plans never amounted to anything, and a cooler attitude prevailed among the Cuban leadership. A timetable for withdrawal was agreed upon within four months. Coinciding with this de-escalation of civil war in Angola, Pravda quickly published a piece praising Cuba for adhering to the agreed upon withdrawal timetable.133

In this atmosphere of shifting commitments, Castro vociferously reevaluated his nation’s relationship with the Soviet Union. Summarizing one of his speeches in 1990, TASS134 reported:

129 Diaz-Briquets, Sergio. Cuban Internationalism in Sub-Saharan Africa., p. 111 130 Deutschmann, David. Changing the History of Africa: Angola and Namibia, p. 109 131 Current Digest of the Russian Press, The (formerly The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press), No. 25, Vol.41, July 19, 1989, page(s): 30-31 132 George, Edward. The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale, p. 246 133 Current Digest of the Russian Press, The (formerly The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press), No. 2, Vol.41, February 08, 1989, page(s): 21-21 134 The Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union; acronym transliterated from the Russian ТАСС

Moldes, Christopher

The Cuban leader dwelled on the processes occurring in European socialist countries. He said that "one must now add" to the imperialist blockade of Cuba "a crisis that has arisen in the socialist camp, from which we can expect only negative consequences in the economic sphere." The processes of improving socialism under way in Cuba, F. Castro stressed, "cannot be carried out while slandering socialism, destroying its values, and depriving the party of its authority." The people of Cuba, he noted, owe everything they have to the revolution and to socialism and will defend them to their last drop of blood.135

The occasion of the speech was to commemorate Cuban internationalists who had been killed in action in Africa. Its contents reflect a budding siege mentality, as Castro acutely reasoned that Cuba would soon be left to its own devices with the departure of its primary ally. He saw the Revolution as being at stake, and placed the fault with the reforms of the Soviet Union.

Castro soon found allies within the Soviet Union. These were the groups that stood to lose a great deal of power if Gorbachev’s reforms continued: the military and conservative

Communists. Having established close ties with both groups during the Angolan conflict136,

Castro was in a good position to throw his support behind the August Coup of 1991. After the failure of this last ditch effort to stop the disintegration of the Union, Gorbachev exacted his revenge and withdrew all Soviet personnel from Cuba without consulting Castro.137

Within a couple of months, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ceased to exist, and

Cuba was forced to adjust to a world without a giant to protect and sustain it. The Angolan Civil

War had already wound to a close, and with it ended the era of Cuban Internationalism. The civil war had tested the limits of both Cuba and the Soviet Union, and their working relationship. Set against the backdrop of a constantly changing Cold War, from détente to

135 Current Digest of the Russian Press, The (formerly The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press), No. 49, Vol.41, January 03, 1990, page(s): 31-31 136 George, Edward. The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale, p. 259 137 IBID., p. 259

Moldes, Christopher reescalation to end, the Angolan Civil War provided a great opportunity to witness Communist fraternity first hand.

Moldes, Christopher

Conclusion

The Cold War has often been portrayed in terms of a black and white struggle between the systems of Capitalism and Communism. According to this two dimensional view, the communist world as a whole was an undifferentiated bloc united under the leadership of the

Soviet Union. It was therefore assumed that the foreign policies of the USSR’s client states were conducted under the watchful and controlling eye of Moscow. During the Cold War, this assumption informed western interpretations of Cuba’s decision in the 1970s to intervene in

Angola on behalf of the MPLA. For example, according to the scholars who contributed to the anthology entitled Follow the Leader in the Horn: The Soviet Cuban Presence in East Africa,

Cuba’s intervention was done in order to serve the Soviets’ foreign policy objectives. This mistaken assumption fails to account for the nuances and characteristics that defined the policies and practices of two very different communist states. Despite the fact that the foreign policies of both the Soviet Union and Cuba were guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism, it is wrong to assume their respective decisions to intervene in Angola’s civil conflict were based on the same set of objections.

As the foregoing essay has attempted to make clear, the joint participation of Cuba and the Soviet Union in Angola can more accurately be described as a convergence of two independent foreign policies which were united by their common interests. Given the worldview shared by the two respective nations, this is not surprising. The foreign policies of both countries were above all concerned with promoting communist ideals. Yet, as I have argued elsewhere, what distinguished their policies was the manner in which they approached this goal. The Soviet Union was one of two influential superpowers during the Cold War, seeing

Moldes, Christopher itself as a counterbalance to the United States. As a result of this status, the Soviet Union was expected to act in a manner becoming of its position. Being held to this higher standard effectively limited the courses of action available to the Soviet Union. However, it is the opinion of the author that the most important factor that contributed to the Soviet Union’s caution towards its foreign policy was the threat of an equal reaction by the United States. As evidenced in earlier sections, only when the United States appeared to return to isolationism did the Soviet Union embark on aggressive foreign adventures. This is evident by the abandonment of pretenses with respect to Angola, shown by the exponentially increasing aid and eventual deployment of troops into the region. The invasion of Afghanistan during this same time period lends further credence to this notion.

Cuba, on the other hand, was not influenced by geopolitical forces to the same degree that the Soviet Union had been. As a result of events such as the imposition of the embargo on

Cuban goods in 1960 and the subsequent Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961, Cuba’s revolution had placed the state in survival mode. Threatened by the looming possibility of further action by the United States, the Cuban government felt that it could not afford to tread carefully in the international arena if it hoped to continue maintaining power. From its very inception, it actively promoted revolution to its neighboring states, just as the Soviet Union during its earlier years. However, the aforementioned proximity to the United States proved to be a major obstacle for the exportation of revolution. Kept afloat by subsidized sales of sugar to the

Soviet Union, Cuba looked for a new outlet for expressing its foreign policy.

Moldes, Christopher

By the 1970s, Cold War struggles had played out in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. The only “unclaimed” areas were the Middle East and Africa. Naturally, states on both sides during the Cold War turned their attention to these areas. It is because of this that Castro sought to establish relations with numerous African liberation movements during the era of decolonization. The success of these groups would increase Cuban prestige, giving Cuba a larger role to play in the international arena. For this same reason was the Soviet Union attracted to the region. Decolonization could be tied to the fight against imperialism, itself part of the larger struggle against capitalism in general.

In the case of Angola, Castro saw an opportunity to get a return on his investment. The country was no longer a colony of Portugal, and the MPLA had a chance at seizing control. The

Soviets were also keen on seeing the MPLA reach victory, but were restrained by their fear of upsetting the balance held with the United States. Cuba had no such reservations, and continued planning an outright invasion. Elements of the Soviet military, disenchanted with being kept on the sidelines due to the prevailing atmosphere of détente, worked in conjunction with their Cuban allies to see the plan come to fruition. Once Cuba initiated Operation Carlota, the Soviet Union could not afford to publicly break with its only ally in the Western hemisphere, and therefore approved of the venture. Rather than the traditional interpretation of Cuba following the Soviet Union’s lead in Angola, it was Cuban action that compelled the Soviet

Union to explicitly commit to supporting the MPLA. Once it became clear that the United

States would not react for the time being, the Soviets put a strong emphasis on the success of the civil war in Angola.

Moldes, Christopher

Another important factor which came into play during the Angolan conflict is the internal struggle within the Communist world between China and the Soviet Union. With

China denouncing the Soviet Union at every turn and actively seeking allies in the Third World,

Moscow could not afford to lose its standing as the premier communist country in the global community. Taking notice of increased Chinese interest in Angola, the Soviet Union was quick to respond to the situation. Unable to match the Soviet Union’s massive financial commitment, China was eventually forced out of the area, granting a small victory to the Soviet

Union in its ongoing rivalry with its Asian counterpart.

As this essay has shown, while the Soviets and Cubans had similar interests in Angola, mean that Cuba’s actions were subordinated to those of the Soviet Union. Castro’s cooperation with the Soviet Union went no further than simply keeping them appraised of his actions.

Cuba’s political and economic systems were based on traditional, Stalinist methods, whereas the Soviet Union was slowly changing throughout the 1970s and 1980s. When this change increased its pace, Castro was adamantly opposed to applying these changes to his system. His avid denunciation of glasnost and perestroika culminated in his support of the August Coup against Gorbachev. This signaled the end of traditional Cuban-Soviet relations, but also indicated the level of independence Castro believed his government should have.

The situation in Angola presented an opportunity for two Communist nations to exert their influence in a part of the world that was increasingly open to Cold War rivalries. This case is interesting, because never before had Cuba undertaken such a massive commitment abroad, let alone in tandem with the Soviet Union in pursuit of the same goals. A cursory glance would

Moldes, Christopher indicate that this was a manifestation of the united Communist front often propagated by the

Soviet Union, yet a closer look dispels these notions. Each nation had a particular strategy in realizing their goals, and these differences led to fractures within the Communist fraternity.

Moving beyond these internal struggles, the Angolan Civil War presented the Communist world with yet another opportunity to test the limits of Western resolve and attempt to expand influence beyond traditional areas like Europe and Asia. In the words of William Ratliff, “Africa became a testing ground for communist world cooperation in an international setting characterized by a lack of unity and direction among noncommunist nations.”138

138 Diaz-Briquets, Sergio. Cuban Internationalism in Sub-Saharan Africa, p. 45

Moldes, Christopher

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