How Canada Built Its Supermax Prisons Jeffrey Ian Ross, Ph.D

University of Baltimore From the SelectedWorks of Jeffrey Ian Ross Ph.D. 2013 How Canada Built its Supermax prisons Jeffrey Ian Ross, Ph.D. Available at: https://works.bepress.com/jeffreyianross/96/ Chapter 3 How Canada Built Its Supermax Prison 鐅鐺鐓鐸鐓鐅鑔鑗鐅鑆鑕鑕鑑鑎鑈鑆鑇鑑鑊鐅鑈鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅鑑鑆鑜鐓 Jeffrey Ian Ross As one of the world’s leading advanced industrialized democracies, Canada has not missed its opportunity to build and run its own supermax facility.1 However, unlike its neighbor to the south, a country in which almost every state has a supermax facility either as a stand-alone structure or as separate wing or annex of an existing correctional facility (Ross 2007b), only one supermax facility currently exists in Canada. At the present time, Canada operates a Special Handling Unit (SHU), which is located in Sainte-Anne-des-Plaines, Québec ( just outside of Montréal). The fact that Canada only has one supermax prison while its neighbor to the south, with which it shares many cultural, economic, and legal similarities, has a federal supermax and a supermax facility in almost each state is somewhat unusual. 鑕鑊鑗鑒鑎鑘鑘鑎鑔鑓鐅鑋鑗鑔鑒鐅鑙鑍鑊鐅鑕鑚鑇鑑鑎鑘鑍鑊鑗鐑鐅鑊鑝鑈鑊鑕鑙鐅鑋鑆鑎鑗鐅鑚鑘鑊鑘鐅鑕鑊鑗鑒鑎鑙鑙鑊鑉鐅鑚鑓鑉鑊鑗 The sequence of events surrounding and leading to this current state of affairs is long and complicated. This chapter reviews the process by which Canadian correctional practitioners experimented with different supermax-like facilities and recounts the events that led to the construction of the current facility in Sainte-Anne-des-Plaines. In order to accomplish this goal, this study primarily relies upon a review of secondary data. The research focuses on scholarly materials, publicly available government documents, newspaper and magazine articles, and materials available on the World Wide Web concerning the construction and manage- ment of SHUs in Canada.2 The Development of the Canadian Special Handling Unit Similar to the United States, Canada has both provincial and federal prisons. Individuals convicted of crimes warranting sentences of two years less 鐨鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅鐥鐅鐗鐕鐖鐘鐓鐅鐷鑚鑙鑌鑊鑗鑘鐅鐺鑓鑎鑛鑊鑗鑘鑎鑙鑞鐅鐵鑗鑊鑘鑘鐓鐦鑑鑑鐅鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鑘鐅鑗鑊鑘鑊鑗鑛鑊鑉鐓鐅鐲鑆鑞鐅鑓鑔鑙鐅鑇鑊鐅鑗鑊鑕鑗鑔鑉鑚鑈鑊鑉鐅鑎鑓鐅鑆鑓鑞鐅鑋鑔鑗鑒鐅鑜鑎鑙鑍鑔鑚鑙鐅 a day are sent to provincial prisons, operated by the provincial governments’ 25 鐪鐧鐸鐨鐴鐅鐟鐅鑊鐧鑔鑔鑐鐅鐨鑔鑑鑑鑊鑈鑙鑎鑔鑓鐅鐍鐪鐧鐸鐨鐴鑍鑔鑘鑙鐎鐅鐒鐅鑕鑗鑎鑓鑙鑊鑉鐅鑔鑓鐅鐛鐔鐖鐖鐔鐗鐕鐖鐞鐅鐞鐟鐕鐚鐅鐦鐲鐅鑛鑎鑆鐅鐦鐳鐹鐮鐴鐨鐭鐅鐺鐳鐮鐻鐪鐷鐸鐮鐹鐾鐦鐳鐟鐅鐚鐙鐘鐗鐖鐞鐅鐠鐅鐷鑔鑘鑘鐑鐅鐯鑊鑋鑋鑗鑊鑞鐅鐮鑆鑓鐓鐠鐅鐹鑍鑊鐅鐬鑑鑔鑇鑆鑑鑎鑟鑆鑙鑎鑔鑓鐅鑔鑋鐅鐸鑚鑕鑊鑗鑒鑆鑝鐅鐵鑗鑎鑘鑔鑓鑘鐦鑈鑈鑔鑚鑓鑙鐟鐅鑘鐝鐝鐜鐞鐘鐚鐝鐓鑒鑆鑎鑓鐓鑊鑍鑔鑘鑙 26 Jeffrey Ian Ross Ministry of Corrections, and those who commit crimes with sentences of two years or longer are sent to federal prisons operated by the Correctional Services of Canada (CSC). In 2008 and 2009 (the most recent statistics available), 22,240 inmates were supervised by CSC; 13,531 convicts were behind bars, and 8,709 fell under various kinds of community corrections supervi- sion. The prison system costs Canadian taxpayers about Can$3.85 billion, or roughly US$3.94 billion (http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/res/cor/rep/2010- ccrso-eng.aspx#b1). Out of the fifty-seven federal correctional facilities (sev- enteen minimum security, nineteen medium, eight maximum, and sixteen multilevel), only one is designated a supermax penitentiary (Calverley 2010). 鐅鐺鐓鐸鐓鐅鑔鑗鐅鑆鑕鑕鑑鑎鑈鑆鑇鑑鑊鐅鑈鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅鑑鑆鑜鐓 The CSC is governed by two federal statutes: the Correctional and Condi- tional Release Act (CCRA) and the Correctional and Conditional Release Regulations. Neither of these documents outlines the role of supermax facilities. Needless to say, the CSC considers the supermax as a type of maximum-security facility. Canada’s history with supermax facilities can be described as constantly evolving. The development of corrections and, by extension, control units in Canada can be broken up into a number of periods. Although others (e.g., Ekstedt and Griffiths 1988) have divided the history of Canadian penal philosophy into separate eras, for simplicity’s sake the discussion below is organized according to decades starting with the 1960s. One final caveat is in order. The reader must keep in mind that the com- position of prisoners in Canada is not the same as it is in the United States. According to John Lowman and Brian MacLean (1991, 134), “Gang affilia- tions in U.S. prisons are not, for the most part, nearly as important in Canada in shaping prison social structure. The proportion of African American, His- 鑕鑊鑗鑒鑎鑘鑘鑎鑔鑓鐅鑋鑗鑔鑒鐅鑙鑍鑊鐅鑕鑚鑇鑑鑎鑘鑍鑊鑗鐑鐅鑊鑝鑈鑊鑕鑙鐅鑋鑆鑎鑗鐅鑚鑘鑊鑘鐅鑕鑊鑗鑒鑎鑙鑙鑊鑉鐅鑚鑓鑉鑊鑗 panic, and Native prisoners far outweighs their proportion in the general population; in Canada, it is primarily First Nations (i.e., Native people) who are vastly overrepresented. Yet the differences between the two systems are far more dramatic than this.” 1960s The origins of the ideas behind the first SHU in Canada can be traced back to a handful of federal government reports (e.g., “The Fauteux Report” 1956), senior-level discussions between the federal minister of justice and the attorney generals of the provinces (i.e., Dominion Provincial Conference 1958), the creation of a Correctional Planning Committee in the Depart- ment of Justice (1960), and the writing and release of a “10 Year Plan of Insti- tutional Development” ( Joseph 1983, 1–2).3 The original plan called for the construction of four “Special Correctional Units” specifically designed to house disruptive prisoners; the units were to be geographically distributed among four designated regions (Atlantic, Québec, Ontario, and Western). 鐨鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅鐥鐅鐗鐕鐖鐘鐓鐅鐷鑚鑙鑌鑊鑗鑘鐅鐺鑓鑎鑛鑊鑗鑘鑎鑙鑞鐅鐵鑗鑊鑘鑘鐓鐦鑑鑑鐅鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鑘鐅鑗鑊鑘鑊鑗鑛鑊鑉鐓鐅鐲鑆鑞鐅鑓鑔鑙鐅鑇鑊鐅鑗鑊鑕鑗鑔鑉鑚鑈鑊鑉鐅鑎鑓鐅鑆鑓鑞鐅鑋鑔鑗鑒鐅鑜鑎鑙鑍鑔鑚鑙鐅 The first of these institutions was built in Laval, Québec (a suburb located 鐪鐧鐸鐨鐴鐅鐟鐅鑊鐧鑔鑔鑐鐅鐨鑔鑑鑑鑊鑈鑙鑎鑔鑓鐅鐍鐪鐧鐸鐨鐴鑍鑔鑘鑙鐎鐅鐒鐅鑕鑗鑎鑓鑙鑊鑉鐅鑔鑓鐅鐛鐔鐖鐖鐔鐗鐕鐖鐞鐅鐞鐟鐕鐚鐅鐦鐲鐅鑛鑎鑆鐅鐦鐳鐹鐮鐴鐨鐭鐅鐺鐳鐮鐻鐪鐷鐸鐮鐹鐾鐦鐳鐟鐅鐚鐙鐘鐗鐖鐞鐅鐠鐅鐷鑔鑘鑘鐑鐅鐯鑊鑋鑋鑗鑊鑞鐅鐮鑆鑓鐓鐠鐅鐹鑍鑊鐅鐬鑑鑔鑇鑆鑑鑎鑟鑆鑙鑎鑔鑓鐅鑔鑋鐅鐸鑚鑕鑊鑗鑒鑆鑝鐅鐵鑗鑎鑘鑔鑓鑘鐦鑈鑈鑔鑚鑓鑙鐟鐅鑘鐝鐝鐜鐞鐘鐚鐝鐓鑒鑆鑎鑓鐓鑊鑍鑔鑘鑙 How Canada Built Its Supermax Prison 27 south of Montréal), and it opened in 1968. The planners originally intended that this facility would hold 160 inmates. The Special Correctional Unit in Laval was subsequently evaluated, and the construction of the remaining three institutions was dependent on the success of the first one ( Joseph 1983, 3–4). Initially, the Laval facility was to be populated with prisoners transferred from the other regions who were to be placed in a specially designed, four-phase program of treatment. However, it was soon determined that “there were not enough ‘dangerous offenders’ to fill the institution. Many of the inmates in the Special Correctional Unit were in fact protective custody inmates, not dangerous offenders” ( Joseph 1983, 7). 鐅鐺鐓鐸鐓鐅鑔鑗鐅鑆鑕鑕鑑鑎鑈鑆鑇鑑鑊鐅鑈鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅鑑鑆鑜鐓 1970s In the 1970s, well-publicized riots rocked Canadian penal institutions (Culhane 1985). One of the most famous altercations occurred at Kingston Penitentiary (Ontario). It started on April 14, 1971, and lasted ninety-six hours. In the end, “two prisoners were murdered; sixteen sex offenders were stalked, bound, and beaten; several correctional officers were taken hostage; and major sections of the institution were destroyed” (Welch 2004, 260). The riot was finally quelled with the assistance of the Canadian army. The riots were investigated by a royal commission of inquiry that was headed by Justice J. W. Swackhamer (1972). Both Swackhamer and other observers attributed the causes of the riot to harsh conditions, punitive treatment, and prisoner resistance to the construction and implementation of the maximum- security prisons. Within four days of the riot’s termination, four hundred prisoners were transferred to Millhaven Prison, a maximum-security prison 鑕鑊鑗鑒鑎鑘鑘鑎鑔鑓鐅鑋鑗鑔鑒鐅鑙鑍鑊鐅鑕鑚鑇鑑鑎鑘鑍鑊鑗鐑鐅鑊鑝鑈鑊鑕鑙鐅鑋鑆鑎鑗鐅鑚鑘鑊鑘鐅鑕鑊鑗鑒鑎鑙鑙鑊鑉鐅鑚鑓鑉鑊鑗 in Bath, Ontario (outside of Kingston), which was in the final stages of construction. To punish the inmates who had participated in the Kingston upris- ing, correctional officers repeatedly beat the newly arrived inmates. One shocking example of the brutality involved prisoners who were forced to run a gauntlet (i.e., a situation where correctional officers would line a hallway and officers would beat prisoners as they walked or ran through). Over the next six years, there were numerous disturbances and outbreaks of prison violence, not only at Millhaven but in other prisons across Canada as well (MacGuigan 1977). In 1972, a CSC report evaluating the Special Correctional Unit in Laval was completed. The document concluded that although the facility should continue to house the same types of inmates as it had in the past, the prisoners should henceforth be required to undergo a “therapeutic community ori- entation” program. In order to carry out this change in rehabilitation, the institution was slated for renovation. In June 1973, however, five inmates escaped, forcing the CSC to put the construction plans on hold. All of the 鐨鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅鐥鐅鐗鐕鐖鐘鐓鐅鐷鑚鑙鑌鑊鑗鑘鐅鐺鑓鑎鑛鑊鑗鑘鑎鑙鑞鐅鐵鑗鑊鑘鑘鐓鐦鑑鑑鐅鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鑘鐅鑗鑊鑘鑊鑗鑛鑊鑉鐓鐅鐲鑆鑞鐅鑓鑔鑙鐅鑇鑊鐅鑗鑊鑕鑗鑔鑉鑚鑈鑊鑉鐅鑎鑓鐅鑆鑓鑞鐅鑋鑔鑗鑒鐅鑜鑎鑙鑍鑔鑚鑙鐅 convicts were removed from the Special Correctional Unit and placed in 鐪鐧鐸鐨鐴鐅鐟鐅鑊鐧鑔鑔鑐鐅鐨鑔鑑鑑鑊鑈鑙鑎鑔鑓鐅鐍鐪鐧鐸鐨鐴鑍鑔鑘鑙鐎鐅鐒鐅鑕鑗鑎鑓鑙鑊鑉鐅鑔鑓鐅鐛鐔鐖鐖鐔鐗鐕鐖鐞鐅鐞鐟鐕鐚鐅鐦鐲鐅鑛鑎鑆鐅鐦鐳鐹鐮鐴鐨鐭鐅鐺鐳鐮鐻鐪鐷鐸鐮鐹鐾鐦鐳鐟鐅鐚鐙鐘鐗鐖鐞鐅鐠鐅鐷鑔鑘鑘鐑鐅鐯鑊鑋鑋鑗鑊鑞鐅鐮鑆鑓鐓鐠鐅鐹鑍鑊鐅鐬鑑鑔鑇鑆鑑鑎鑟鑆鑙鑎鑔鑓鐅鑔鑋鐅鐸鑚鑕鑊鑗鑒鑆鑝鐅鐵鑗鑎鑘鑔鑓鑘鐦鑈鑈鑔鑚鑓鑙鐟鐅鑘鐝鐝鐜鐞鐘鐚鐝鐓鑒鑆鑎鑓鐓鑊鑍鑔鑘鑙 28 Jeffrey Ian Ross other facilities across Canada, and the institution was mothballed until 1975. In 1976, 110 inmates who had participated in a riot at the nearby Laval Penitentiary were transferred to the Special Correctional Unit, which was subsequently called the Correctional Development Centre (CDC) ( Jackson 2002a, 8). Michael Jackson (2002a, 8) states that “[a]lthough conceived as an alternative to long-term

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