Geneva Laboratory of Political Science Master’s Thesis Series Green Lab The Rise of Challenger Parties in the European Union It’s the economy, stupid. Isn’t it? Davy-Kim Lascombes N° 2 • 2017 Afin de mieux se présenter, le Département de science politique de l'Université de Genève a lancé en 2009 deux nouvelles publications. Sous le nom de Geneva Laboratory of Political Science, ces publications aideront à diffuser les travaux qui se font au sein du Département et à nourrir les échanges avec l'extérieur. Le nom souligne la vocation de « laboratoire » de ces textes, c’est-à-dire de lieu de réflexion, d'expériences et de débat. La publication se distingue par deux couleurs. La série Blue Lab a été créée afin de favoriser la diffusion de travaux en cours de la part des membres du Département. Il peut s’agir de communications présentées à des colloques ou d’autres textes théoriques ou de recherche. La série Green Lab accueille des travaux plus achevés et généralement plus longs. Elle est destinée en particulier à la publication des meilleurs mémoires de Master des étudiantes et étudiants qui achèvent leurs études auprès du Département. The Rise of Challenger Parties in the European Union It’s the economy, stupid. Isn’t it? ________________________ Davy-Kim Lascombes Mémoire de Master en Science politique Directeur de Mémoire: Nathalie Giger Copyright © Davy-Kim Lascombes, 2017 Editor Département de Science Politique et Relations Internationales Université de Genève Boulevard du Pont d'Arve 40 1211 – Genève 4 Switzerland ISSN 1663-649X (Printed Version) ISSN 1663-8751 (On-line Version) Abstract: This master thesis has for objective to understand the rise of the challenger parties and the collapse of the governmental parties in the European Union. More particularly, it studies the evolution of the electoral behavior of the European citizens at the European Parliamentary elections. First, it highlights the effect of an economic punishing vote against the mainstream parties, then it assesses the effect of the post-industrial cleavage. Analyzing the European Election Studies of 2004, 2009, 2014 at an individual level, this paper finds results supporting that the Great recession enforced the two above-mentioned effects. DECEMBER 19, 2016 DAVY-KIM LASCOMBES Master of Political Science Acknowledgment: In the long process of researching, recoding, analyzing and writing this thesis I would like to sincerely thank all the people who supported me directly and indirectly. First of all, I would like to thanks Dr. Nathalie Giger. I met her during the first semester of my Master program. I was her student, then assistant and she ended up to be my thesis supervisor. She is the one who gave me the passion and the skills to conduct researches and quantitative analysis. She always supported me and guided me through my researches. She offered me key advices at key moments of my thesis even during her busiest period. Without her, this thesis would have not been possible. I would like also to thanks the University of Geneva and the department of Political Science and International Relations. Besides giving me opportunity to study in Beirut, they provided me an intellectually stimulating environment with high standing courses, dedicated teachers and a strong methodological formation. It encouraged me to work hard on this thesis. Finally, nothing would have been possible without the moral supports of my family and friends, here and abroad. I would like to extend a special thank you to my parents and my grandmother. Without them and their devoted attentions I would have not found the energy to finish this thesis. 2 Table of Contents Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 5 I Literature review and theoretical frame ................................................................................... 7 I.1 Economic voting in period of crisis and its dynamics ...................................................... 7 Economic voting in period of crisis ................................................................................... 7 Dynamics of economic voting in period of crisis .............................................................. 8 Literature limitation .......................................................................................................... 10 I.2 “Punishing the system” in the economic vote model ...................................................... 11 I.2.A Definition and dynamics. ........................................................................................ 11 I.2.B System economic voting ......................................................................................... 14 I.2.C The rise of challenger parties: economic voting and what else? ............................. 20 II Methodology ......................................................................................................................... 23 II.1 Economic voting at the European Parliamentary elections and the EES ...................... 24 Economic voting at the European parliamentary elections .............................................. 24 The European Electoral Studies ....................................................................................... 25 II.2 Operationalization ......................................................................................................... 26 Dependent variables: System punishment vote and challenger parties ............................ 26 Independent variables ....................................................................................................... 27 II.3 Design ............................................................................................................................ 28 III Analyses .............................................................................................................................. 29 III.1 Economic voting and challenger parties ...................................................................... 29 The sociotropic model ...................................................................................................... 30 The egocentric model and its interaction with the sociotropic model .............................. 33 The perception of responsibility ....................................................................................... 35 Conclusion on the economic vote models ........................................................................ 38 III.2 The post-industrial cleavage and its impact on the vote for challenger parties and the system economic voting ....................................................................................................... 39 3 Rural/Urban ...................................................................................................................... 39 Social class ....................................................................................................................... 42 Occupation ....................................................................................................................... 46 General cleavage model ................................................................................................... 51 III.3 Political attitudes .......................................................................................................... 54 Partisan identification and the shield effect ..................................................................... 54 Left right self-positioning ................................................................................................. 57 III.4 General model .............................................................................................................. 59 IV Conclusion and discussion .................................................................................................. 61 IV.1 Empirical discussion .................................................................................................... 63 IV.2 Theoretical discussion .................................................................................................. 63 IV.3 Contribution to the literature and other perspectives ................................................... 67 Annex: ...................................................................................................................................... 69 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................. 88 4 Introduction The 4th December 2016, the Green candidate, Alexander Van der Bellen, won the presidential elections in Austria with 53.8% of the vote. This race for presidency was out of norms and full of twists. During the first round of the elections, the two mainstream parties, the Social Democratic Party and the Austrian People’s party collapsed and gathered less than 12% of the votes each. In the same time, the candidates of two challenger parties qualified for the second turn. The second turn and then “third turn” opposed Norbert Hofer, representing the populist right wing party the FPO to the Green candidate. The victory of the last one was considered as a release for many European chancelleries but also a warning for the coming elections. This story is just one among many others in the European democracies. The rise of the challenger parties and the collapse of the mainstream parties shook many party systems this last decade. Podemos,