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The Salafi-Jihad As a Religious Ideology

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The Salafi-Jihad As a Religious Ideology FEBRUARY 2008 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 3 The Salafi-Jihad as a The Functions of Ideologies Ideology may help create significant Ideologies have several core functions, divides between adherents and non- Religious Ideology of which the first is to raise awareness adherents. According to Christopher to a particular group of people that a Flood, individuals who are especially By Assaf Moghadam certain issue deserves their attention. convinced by an ideology can exhibit Ideologies explain to that “in-group” why “a remarkable ability to ignore, deny, in recent years, a growing number of social, political, or economic conditions or reinterpret information which is analysts and policymakers have referred are as they are. Since individuals often incompatible with tenets of their belief to the doctrines guiding al-Qa`ida and seek explanations in times of crisis, system.”6 Ideologues themselves, its associates as an ideology, and they ideologies are particularly appealing meanwhile, “tend to be explicit in their appear to have influenced the Bush when a group of people perceives itself cognitive claims, exclusionary in their administration into adopting the term as to be in a predicament. The second membership, authoritarian in their well. In an address at the Capital Hilton function is a diagnostic one, whereby leadership, rigorous in their ethical in Washington, D.C. in September the ideology attributes blame for the mandates, and insistent on the rightness 2006, for example, President Bush present predicament of the in-group of their causes.”7 characterized the 9/11 suicide hijackers upon some “out-group.” The out-group as men who “kill in the name of a clear is identified with a certain behavior To the in-group, ideology confers 1 and focused ideology.” In the National that, according to the narrative offered identification with a particular cause, Strategy for Combating Terrorism by the ideology, undermines the well- and thus a sense of purpose. That shared (NSCT) released in the same month, being of the in-group. A third function sense of purpose can form a common the authors described al-Qa`ida’s set of ideology lies in the creation of a group identity among the members, while at of beliefs as “an ideology of oppression, identity. At the same time that the out- the same time heighten opposition and 2 violence, and hate,” as well as “a form group is blamed for the predicament of feelings of separation from individuals of totalitarianism following in the path the in-group, the ideology identifies and who do not share these beliefs. 3 of fascism and Nazism.” highlights the common characteristics of those individuals who adhere to, or are The Salafi-jihad: Religion or Ideology? Although descriptions of the precepts potential adherents of, the ideology. The The Salafi-jihad is more akin to an and beliefs guiding al-Qa`ida and its fourth and final function of ideologies is ideology than to a religion because like associates as ideological in nature a programmatic one. It consists of the other ideologies it is a by-product of the certainly hit the mark, few serious ideology offering a specific program of industrialization that swept through attempts have been made to justify the action said to remedy the in-group of its Europe beginning in the 19th century and use of the term “ideology” in connection predicament and urges its adherents to is hence an outgrowth of modernity. It is with the Salafi-jihad—the guiding implement that course of action.5 intimately linked to the dislocating and doctrine of al-Qa`ida, its affiliates, turbulent effects of globalization, which 4 associates and progeny. This article Ideologies are links between thoughts, introduced rapid changes in the social, will discuss the nature of ideologies and beliefs and myths on the one hand, political and economic realms of life. examine the extent to which the Salafi- and action on the other hand. They Those transformations have challenged jihad can be compared to other ideologies can be instruments of preservation in established and rooted notions of such as fascism or communism. It as far as they can help a given group identity associated with traditional concludes that the Salafi-jihad is best to preserve its political power. More social structures. described as a religious ideology rather commonly, however, ideologies are than a secular ideology such as fascism used as instruments of competition and The Salafi-jihad is an ideology because or National Socialism. The final part conflict, whereby a group can utilize its functions are essentially congruent will explain why a proper labeling of ideology as a means of opposition and with those of other ideologies. Analogous the Salafi-jihad has important policy contestation. Once a group internalizes to the first, explanatory function of implications. the sets of beliefs associated with a ideology, the Salafi-jihadists’ goal is given ideology, that ideology provides to raise awareness among Muslims a “cognitive map” that filters the way that their religion has been on the social realities are perceived, rendering wane. Whereas Islam used to be at its 1 “President Discusses Global War on Terror,” Septem- that reality easier to grasp, more peak during the first centuries of its ber 5, 2006, available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/ coherent, and thus more meaningful. It existence, Salafi-jihadists urge Muslims releases/2006/09/20060905-4.html. is for that reason that ideologies offer to understand that the tide has turned, 2 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, Septem- some measure of security and relief in and that Islam is in a constant state of ber 2006, p. 5, available at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/ the face of ambiguity—particularly in decline in religious, political, military, nsct/2006/nsct2006.pdf. times of crisis. economic and cultural terms. 3 Ibid., p. 11. 4 For the purposes of this article, the terms Salafi-jihad, Salafi-jihadists and Salafi-jihadist refer to the core doc- 6 Christopher G. Flood, Political Myth: A Theoretical In- trines and beliefs of al-Qa`ida and its associated move- 5 A similar categorization of the functions of ideology is troduction (New York and London: Garland, 1996), p. 20. ments—i.e., its ideology. It does not refer to the larger used in Terence Ball and Richard Dagger, Political Ide- 7 Bruce B. Lawrence, Defenders of God: The Fundamental- social movement comprised of al-Qa`ida and its associ- ologies and the Democratic Ideal, 3rd ed. (New York: Long- ist Revolt against the Modern Age (Columbia, SC: Univer- ates. man, 1999). sity of South Carolina Press, 1995), p. 77. FEBRUARY 2008 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 3 Secondly, and analogous with the Like leaders of other ideologies, on the part of the individual member. diagnostic function of modern Usama bin Ladin and leading figures Ideologies, like religions, demand verbal ideologies, the Salafi-jihad identifies the of Salafi-jihadist groups ignore, assent from their members, but more alleged source of Islam’s conundrum in deny, or reinterpret information that than religions ideologies also demand the persistent attacks and humiliation of counters or could potentially weaken complete control over the thoughts, Muslims on the part of an anti-Islamic their argument. For instance, Salafi- words and deeds of their adherents.12 alliance of what it terms “Crusaders,” jihadists ignored Western support to This characteristic also applies to al- “Zionists” and “apostates.” Muslim Indonesia in the aftermath of Qa`ida and like-minded groups, who the 2004 tsunami. They interpret their have prominently adopted an approach The third function of the Salafi-jihad violence on other Muslims as religiously of “you are either with us or against also parallels that of other ideologies, sanctioned, ignoring sections of Muslim us.” namely its attempt at creating a new holy texts that prohibit internecine identity for its adherents. Several fighting or the killing of civilians. Second, religions tend to support scholars have argued that Muslims They single-handedly blame the West existing orders, while ideologies tend and Western converts adopting Salafi- for each and every misfortune that has to confront them. “Ideologies are not jihadist tenets suffer from a crisis of befallen Muslims. merely world-reflecting but world- identity.8 To those who are disoriented constituting,” wrote Lawrence. “They by modernity, the Salafi-jihad provides As an ideology, the Salafi-jihad has much tend to have a ‘missionary’ zeal to show a new sense of self-definition and in common with radical leftist ideologies others what they need to do, to correct belonging in the form of membership to of 20th century Europe. Like the radical and help them to that end.”13 Thus, a supranational entity. Salafi-jihadists left, the Salafi-jihad describes its action unlike religious leaders, Bin Ladin goes attempt to instill into Muslims the notion in part as a revolt against injustice, and beyond merely disagreeing with those that the only identity that truly matters it rejects bourgeois values, imperialism who do not share his beliefs—he battles is that of membership in the umma, the and materialism. The goal of both the them. global Islamic community that bestows leftist movements and Salafi-jihadists comfort, dignity, security and honor is essentially an elusive quest to help Yet, while the Salafi-jihad is distinct upon the downtrodden Muslims. bring about a more just society— from Islam due to the former’s ideological violence is seen as a justified means nature, it also differs from ordinary Finally, like all ideologies, Salafi- to an end. Both Salafi-jihadists and ideologies in an important respect—it jihadists present a program of action, radical leftist revolutionaries believe tends to use religious words, symbols namely jihad, which is understood that the scope of their activities and the and values to sustain itself and grow.
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