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Soviet Deception and Its Implications for National Security

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Soviet Deception and Its Implications for National Security Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 1988 Perceptions management: Soviet deception and its implications for national security Walters, Cathy Darlene. Monterey, California : Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/23088 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey , California THESIS PERCEPTIONS MANAGEMENT: SOVIET DECEPTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY by Cathy Darlene Walters March 1988 Thesis Co-Advisors: Brian D. Dailey Norman K. Green Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. T239309 — SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF 'n.S 3 AG£ REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE la. REPORT SECURITY CLASSlF.CATiON lb RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS UNCLASSIFIED 2a- SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY 3 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release; 2b DECLASSIFICATION /DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE Distribution is unlimited. 4 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 5 MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 6a NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 6b OFFiCE SYMBOL 7a NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION (If applicable) Naval Postgraduate School 56 Naval Postgraduate School 6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 7b ADDRESS (C/fy, State, and ZIP Code) Monterey, California 93943-5000 Monterey, California 93943-5000 8a. NAME OF FUNDING /SPONSORING 8b OFFICE SYMBOL 9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ORGANIZATION (If applicable) 8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 10 SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS PROGRAM PROJECT TASK vVO"K UNIT ELEMENT NO NO NO ACCESSION NO 11 TITLE (Include Security Classification) Perceptions Management: Soviet Deception and its Implications for National Security 12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) WALTERS, Cathv D, 13a. TYPE OF REPORT 13b TIME COVERED 14 DATE OF REPORT ( Year, Month, Day) 15 P4GF <"OUNT Master's FROM TO Thesis 12M Mfurh 113 16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION The views expressed in this Thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or thP U..S, nnvprnm»nt- 17 COSATI CODES 18 SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)- FIELD GROUP SUB-GROUP Perceptions management; Soviet Deception; U.S. - U.S.S.R, relations; Active measures; Disinformation; Propaganda; 19 ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) This thesis is an attempt to broaden awareness of Soviet pe rceptions management. Perceptions management activities are desi gned to inf 1 u ence public and policy-maker opinion unfavorab ly t oward the United States and favorably toward the Soviet Union, The resource s devoted to active measures, propaganda, and disinforma t ion extend t hroughout the Soviet bureaucratic structure and are dire cted both int ernal ly and abroad. Soviet courting of public opinion wi t hin a dem ocrac y is designed to turn an open political system agai nst itself . If the United States is to function effectively as a demo c ra t ic ro le model an increased , awareness is needed of the partic ular strength s and weaknesses of democracy, along with a rededeca t ion to democ ra t principles. ic Documentation of lies told to the det r iment of democ racy 20 DISTRIBUTION /AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT 21 A8STRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION O UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED D SAME AS RPT D DTIC USERS UNCLASSIFIED 22a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL 22b TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 22c OFFICE SYMBOL Professor James Tritten (408) 646-2521 Code 56TR APR until DO FORM 1473. 84 mar 83 edition may oe used exhausted SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE All other editions are obsolete (TUS Government Printing Olllct 19ifi 606-243 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED II CUHITY CLAUDICATION OF TMI» FAOt #18. SUBJECT TERMS (cont. ) National Security; Public opinion. #19. ABSTRACT (cont.) is necessary for the continuing education of the voting public This thesis is submitted in the belief that public exposure of disinformation can contribute to a more balanced consideration of U.S. - U.S.S.R. relations. IINCLASSTFTEI) SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Perceptions Management: Soviet Deception and its Implications for National Security by Cathy Darlene Walters Lieutenant, United States Navy B.A., Agnes Scott College, 1978 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL March 1988 ABSTRACT An attempt to broaden awareness of Soviet perceptions manage- ment. Perceptions management activities are designed to influence public and policy-maker opinion unfavorably toward the United States and favorably toward the Soviet Union. The resources devoted to active measures, propaganda, and disinformation extend throughout the Soviet bureaucratic structure and are directed both internally and abroad. Soviet courting of public opinion within a democracy is designed to turn an open political system against itself. If the United States is to function effectively as a democratic role model, an increased awareness is needed of the particular strengths and weak- nesses of democracy, along with a rededication to democratic princi- ples. Documentation of lies told to the detriment of democracy is necessary for the continuing education of the voting public. This thesis is submitted in the belief that public exposure of disinformation can contribute to a more balanced consideration of US-USSR relations. DTJ.DLIT RY TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION 9 A BACKGROUND 9 B. PURPOSE 10 C. SCOPE 11 II. IDEOLOGY, GOALS AND TARGETS 12 A INTRODUCTION 12 B. DEFINITIONS 14 C. THE IDEOLOGICAL BASIS OF DECEPTION 15 1. The Democratic Threat 15 2. Internal Propaganda 16 D. TARGETS AND GOALS OF PERCEPTIONS MANAGEMENT 18 1. Making Active Measures Work 19 E. SUMMARY 21 III. THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 23 A INTRODUCTION 23 1. The Relation of the Central Committee to Agitation and Propaganda 24 B. POLICY SETTING 26 1. Politburo 26 2. Central Committee 27 C. POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 27 1. International Department 30 2. Propaganda Department 31 3. Committee for State Security (KGB) 33 4. Changes to the Propaganda Team 36 D. SUMMARY 38 IV. DECEPTION CHANNELS, THEMES, AND CAMPAIGNS 40 A. DECEPTION CHANNELS 40 1. Front Organizations 41 a. World Peace Council 44 2. Friendship Societies and Concerned Citizens 48 3. Soviet and Western Media 50 a. Soviet Journalism 51 b. Soviet Manipulation of Western Journalism 53 B. DECEPTION THEMES 55 1. Evolution of the Soviet State 56 a. Communist Ideology Does Not Determine Soviet Behavior 56 b. Moderates vs. Conservatives in the Kremlin 58 2. US-Soviet Tensions Are the Fault of the West 59 3. The USSR is Against Nuclear Weapons and For Military Balance 61 C. DECEPTION CAMPAIGNS 65 1. The Anti-NATO INF Campaign 69 2. The Anti-SDI Campaign 72 a Soviet Anti-SDI Arguments 73 D. SUMMARY 75 V. WESTERN RESPONSE TO DISINFORMATION 78 A Democratic Vulnerability 78 1. The Nature of Democracy 79 2. Strengths Made Weaknesses 80 3. Perceptual and Ethical Limitations 82 a Ethical Differences 82 b. Perceptual Limitations 84 B. RESPONDING TO DISINFORMATION 86 1. Identification 86 2. Increasing Democratic Self-Confidence 89 3. Restriction of Soviet Interference in Domestic Politics 90 C. THE CHALLENGE OF GLASNOST 92 D. SUMMARY 95 VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 98 LIST OF REFERENCES 102 BIBLIOGRAPHY 108 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST Ill LIST OF TABLES TABLE I OVERVIEW OF SOVIET DECEPTION 13 TABLE II POLICY SETTING STRUCTURE 28 TABLE III POLICY IMPLEMENTATION STRUCTURE 29 TABLE IV MAJOR SOVIET INTERNATIONAL FRONTS 45 8 I. INTRODUCTION A. BACKGROUND The study of active measures and disinformation in the United States government and academic circles has been undergoing a resur- gence unseen since the 1950s and 1960s. 1 This resurgence was fueled initially by information provided to the US intelligence commu- nity, and in Congressional testimony, from Soviet and Eastern bloc defectors who had been involved with disinformation efforts. 2 The closed nature of the Soviet political system is such that hard, detailed information on the current inner workings of their disinfor- mation effort is difficult to acquire. For this reason, among others, there is a tendency in Western governments to ignore or disbelieve that Soviet active measures are officially endorsed, ongoing, and extensive. x In 1956, 1960, and 1961, the Senate Judiciary Committee heard testimony on the Scope of Soviet Activity in the US . The Technique of Soviet Propa-ganda . Communist Influence on Anti-nuclear Testing , and Communist Forgeries . Full citations are provided in the government documents section of the bibliography. 2 Congressional testimony was received in 1959, 1980, 1982, and 1985 on The Kremlin's Espionage and Terror Organizations . Soviet Covert Action , and Soviet Active Measures . Full citations are provided in the government documents section of the bibliography. Prominent defectors include: Ladislav Bittman (Czechoslovakian State Security, 1968), Arkady Shevchenko (UN Undersecretary General, 1978), and Stanislav Levchenko (KGB, 1979). All of these individuals have made new careers as consultants and educators in the field of Soviet active measures. Soviet active measures follow five basic themes established in the early days of Bolshevik power consolidation. These themes are as applicable in the 1980s as they were in the 1920s: • Influence the policies of the target government. • Undermine confidence in the target government's leaders and institutions. • Disrupt relations between nations. • Discredit or weaken
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