This is a repository copy of Breaking the Model : finalisation and a taxonomy of security attack. White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/72498/ Version: Published Version Monograph: Stepney, Susan orcid.org/0000-0003-3146-5401, Clark, John Andrew orcid.org/0000-0002- 9230-9739 and Chivers, Howard (2004) Breaking the Model : finalisation and a taxonomy of security attack. Report. York Computer Science Technical Report . Department of Computer Science, University of York Reuse Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record for the item. Takedown If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing
[email protected] including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request.
[email protected] https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ Breaking the Model: finalisation and a taxonomy of security attacks John A. Clark Susan Stepney Howard Chivers Department of Computer Science, University of York, Heslington, York, YO10 5DD, UK. [jac|susan|chive]@cs.york.ac.uk Abstract It is well known that security properties are not preserved by re- finement, and that refinement can introduce new, covert, channels, such as timing channels.