Country Advice Pakistan – PAK37591 – Shia –

Quetta – Internal relocation – – State protection – Lashkar e-Toiba 11 November 2010

1. What are conditions like for Shia/Hazaras in ?

Hazaras are reportedly not indigenous to Quetta, having migrated from Afghanistan over the last century. Around 450,000 Hazaras live in Quetta, but not all are recognised as citizens of Pakistan. The Hazara tribe was recognised as “local” by Baluchistan‟s government in 1962 and Hazara residents at that point became Pakistani citizens. This decision did not have an official cut-off point, but more recent Hazara arrivals have found themselves unable to register legally for National Identity Cards (NICs) or access other services. People without NICs face barriers to obtaining legal employment and establishing a business. It was estimated by a local contact that around half the Hazara population in Quetta had NICs. Employment opportunities for Hazaras in Quetta have been described as „limited‟. The Hazara community in Quetta is described as close-knit and Hazaras do not distinguish between new arrivals and long term residents. The bulk of Hazaras in Quetta are Shias, although they have been described as largely non-practicing, with only older Hazaras regularly attending mosques.1 Hazaras in Quetta are politically active and have a political party called the Hazara Democratic Party.2 Hazaras have been affected by sectarian killings of Shia by armed Sunni groups along with targeted killings of outsiders and minorities by ethnic Baluchi elements. In relation to the security situation, it is stated in a DFAT advice from July 2010 that:

The security situation in Baluchistan, particularly Quetta, is generally poor. The Hazaran community is specifically affected by sectarian killings of Shi‟a by armed Sunni groups as well as targetted killings of minorities and „outsiders‟ by ethnic Baluchi elements. According to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, since the year 2003 more than 260 people belonging to the Hazara community in Quetta have been killed in targeted shootings and more than 1000 people injured. There have been no convictions for any of these killings so far. Hazara community leaders have urged their people to refrain from responding violently to these attacks. Hazaras are also affected by kidnappings for ransom, which have become a lucrative way for armed militant groups in Baluchistan to raise money.

The combination of the security and economic situations in Quetta has led to the Hazara community seeking to migrate, either legally or illegally.3

1 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2010, Conditions for Asylum Caseloads: Hazaras in Quetta, 30 July – Attachment 1 2 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2010, The Hazara Community, 20 May – Attachment 2 3 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2010, Conditions for Asylum Caseloads: Hazaras in Quetta, 30 July – Attachment 1

Page 1 of 11 Recent advice from DFAT in September 2010 indicates that because of the security situation in Baluchistan, the Post is unable to travel regularly to Quetta and provide further information regarding the situation for Hazaras.4

An RRT country advice dated 14 October 2010 includes information on attacks against Hazaras in Quetta.5 Another RRT country advice dated 30 March 2010 provides information on targeted killings of Hazaras in Quetta.6

2. What are the prospects for relocation in any parts of either Pakistan or Afghanistan?

Afghanistan

The law in Afghanistan provides for freedom of movement within the country, emigration, foreign travel, and repatriation. The government, however, limited citizens‟ movement because of security interests, and the freedom of movement of many women was limited by social custom. According to the US Department of State 2009 report on human rights practices in Afghanistan, “[t]he greatest restriction to movement in some parts of the country was the lack of security. In many areas insurgent violence, banditry, land mines, and IEDs [improvised explosive devices] made travel extremely dangerous, especially at night.”7

In relation to Hazaras in Afghanistan, security is reported to have deteriorated in some Hazara areas in recent years, although this affects all religious and ethnic groups within those areas. Insurgents control most Pashtun districts in Ghazni province, and travel between Ghazni and Kabul has become increasingly challenging. DFAT reports that the Hazara districts in Ghazni province are relatively stable compared to the Pashtun- dominated districts, and have better access to services. The threats facing the Hazara community are reported to vary across different provinces and districts, and according to the protection arrangements brokered with local commanders. There is a lack of effective state protection in Ghazni, but most of the Hazara districts are controlled by Hazara strongmen. It was considered unlikely that there would be wholesale violence against the Hazara community in Ghazni, given the strength of the commanders and their flexible relationships with other insurgency and factional networks, including the Taliban. In relation to Kabul, it has a cohesive Hazara community and it was assessed by a Hazara human rights contact that new arrivals could integrate into the city relatively easily, where they can move freely. The conditions for the Hazara communities in Afghanistan had improved significantly since the Taliban‟s fall. Security challenges, limited employment opportunities and a perception of discrimination, however, encouraged Hazara migration from Afghanistan.8

DFAT has also reported that Bamyan is widely regarded as secure, and it would be difficult for the Taliban to infiltrate the Hazara-majority province without detection. It can

4 DIAC Country Information Service 2010, Country Information Report No. 10/60 – AFG10736: The Hazara, (sourced from DFAT advice of 28 September 2010), 29 September – Attachment 3 5 RRT Country Advice 2010, Country Advice PAK37541, 14 October, (Question 1) – Attachment 4 6 RRT Country Advice 2010, Country Advice PAK36448, 30 March – Attachment 5 7 US Department of State 2010, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2009 – Afghanistan, March, Section 2(d) – Attachment 6 8 DIAC Country Information Service 2010, Country Information Report No. 10/60 – AFG10736: The Hazara, (sourced from DFAT advice of 28 September 2010), 29 September – Attachment 3

Page 2 of 11 be dangerous to travel to and from Bamyan, and this has become more challenging with the broader deterioration in security in Afghanistan.9

Professor William Maley in a paper dated 27 June 2010, however, indicates that the Taliban are active in parts of Ghazni and “[n]o part of Ghazni can realistically be considered safe for Hazaras, even in districts where they might seem numerically predominant.”10

UNHCR, in its July 2009 eligibility guidelines for assessing the international protection needs of asylum-seekers from Afghanistan, indicates that it considered “that an internal flight or relocation alternative (IFA/IRA) is not available within certain parts of Afghanistan due to a number of factors.” The guidelines continue:

These include the overall ability of agents of persecution to perpetrate acts of violence with impunity, the widespread violence caused by armed conflict, serious and targeted human rights violations, risks associated with travel throughout the country, and the hardship faced by Afghans in ensuring basic survival, evidenced by the social, political and economic upheavals plaguing the country. In general, IFA/IRA will also not be available if the persecution feared originates from State actors. With regard to persecution feared from non-State actors, there is a strong likelihood that non-State agents of persecution could extend their reach beyond the areas they control... Even in those exceptional cases where relocation to an accessible area might be considered as viable to eliminate the existing threat, such area can only be a reasonable alternative in cases where the claimant has strong family, social or tribal links in the area of displacement, permitting relocation without undue economic and social hardship.11

Pakistan

The law in Pakistan provides for freedom of movement within the country, emigration, foreign travel and repatriation, although the government is reported to limit these rights in practice.12

Most Hazaras in Pakistan live in and around Quetta. There are other Hazara settlements in Karachi, Lahore and Multan.13

In relation to Karachi, Shias make up approximately 30% of Karachi‟s Muslim population. According to a July 2010 article, most of a spate of targeted killings in Karachi during the previous four to five months had been directed at Shia professionals. Taliban fighters are moving to Karachi in increasing numbers, but the article indicates that it is unlikely they would be involved in the targeted killings as Karachi is a sanctuary for them and they would not like to be the main focus of law-enforcement agencies. The involvement of sectarian anti-Shia organisations closely allied with the Taliban was possible.14

9 DIAC Country Information Service 2010, Country Information Report No. 10/62 – Country Reporting: The Hazara Community in Bamyan, (sourced from DFAT advice of 24 October 2010), 25 October – Attachment 7 10 Maley, W. 2010, „On the Position of the Hazara Minority in Afghanistan June 2010‟, 27 June – Attachment 8 11 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2009, UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan, July, p. 11 – Attachment 9 12 US Department of State 2010, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2009 – Pakistan, March, Section 2(d) – Attachment 10 13 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2010, The Hazara Community, 20 May – Attachment 2 14 Shah, T.A., „Karachi Emerges as Pakistan‟s New Tinderbox of Violence and Extremism‟ in The Jamestown Foundation 2010, Terrorism Monitor, Volume VIII, Issue 26, 1 July, pp. 5-6

Page 3 of 11 In September 2010, it was reported that Pakistan‟s Taliban had claimed responsibility for recent attacks across the country, the deadliest of which targeted Shiite Muslims. On 1 September 2010, 35 people were killed in a triple suicide attack at a Shiite ceremony in Lahore, and on 3 September 2010, at least 65 Shiite Muslims were killed in a suicide bombing at a procession in Quetta.15 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon strongly condemned the bombings in Lahore and Quetta, which he said had deliberately targeted Shiite Muslims. Media reports indicate that the Pakistani Taliban had said it carried out the bombings in revenge for the killing of a Sunni Muslim leader in 2009.16

The RRT Country Advice PAK37541 dated 14 October 2010 includes information on whether a Shia Hazara from Quetta could relocate within Pakistan.17

3. What is the status of protection for Hazaras in either Pakistan or Afghanistan?

Afghanistan

Security is reported to have deteriorated in some Hazara areas in Afghanistan in recent years, although this affects all religious and ethnic groups within those areas. Insurgents control most Pashtun districts in Ghazni province, and travel between Ghazni and Kabul has become increasingly challenging. Alternative routes, including through Bamiyan, take several days of travelling. The Hazara districts in Ghazni province are relatively stable compared to the Pashtun-dominated districts, and have better access to services. The threats facing the Hazara community are reported to vary across different provinces and districts, and according to the protection arrangements brokered with local commanders. DFAT reports that there is a lack of effective state protection in Ghazni, but most of the Hazara districts are controlled by Hazara strongmen. It was considered unlikely that there would be wholesale violence against the Hazara community in Ghazni, given the strength of the commanders and their flexible relationships with other insurgency and factional networks, including the Taliban. The conditions for the Hazara communities in Afghanistan had improved significantly since the Taliban‟s fall. Security challenges, limited employment opportunities and a perception of discrimination, however, encouraged Hazara migration from Afghanistan.18

An Afghan Member of Parliament familiar with Ghazni province who spoke to DFAT in July 2010 said that people had lost trust with the Afghan National Security Forces and ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in the area, and that the Afghan National Police (ANP) appeared to have failed to react effectively to Taliban activity. In Jaghori, the ANP were very weak, and consisted of only about 70 personnel. The MP said that

http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,PAK,,4c72280112,0.html – Accessed 11 October 2010 – Attachment 11 15 Khan, R. 2010, „Official says women, children among 17 dead in bombing at police complex in northwest Pakistan‟, Associated Press Newswires, 8 September – Attachment 12 16 „UN chief deplores deadly attacks against Pakistan‟s Shiite Muslims‟ 2010, UN News Service, 3 September http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,PAK,,4c84aca21a,0.html – Accessed 11 October 2010 – Attachment 13 17 RRT Country Advice 2010, Country Advice PAK37541, 14 October, (Question 3) – Attachment 4 18 DIAC Country Information Service 2010, Country Information Report No. 10/60 – AFG10736: The Hazara, (sourced from DFAT advice of 28 September 2010), 29 September – Attachment 3

Page 4 of 11 Hazaras in Ghazni did not possess armed defence forces because of disarmament programs, in contrast to Pashtun areas in the province.19

UNHCR, in its July 2009 eligibility guidelines for assessing the international protection needs of asylum-seekers from Afghanistan, indicates that on the whole, state protection was not available in Afghanistan in relation to harm feared from non-state actors. State agents were also accused of carrying out human rights transgressions, and “[c]onsequently, an Afghan asylum-seeker should not be expected to seek the protection of the authorities”. In relation to Hazaras, the guidelines indicate that “the absence of State presence and rule of law in many areas” meant that the rising power of warlords could pose a direct threat to the Hazara community. There continued to be reports of social discrimination against Hazaras, and despite significant government efforts to address historical tensions affecting Hazaras, some Hazara community leaders accused President Karzai of giving preferential treatment to Pashtuns.20

A DFAT advice from February 2010 indicates that Hazaras in Afghanistan did not live in fear of violence or systemic persecution as under the rule of the Taliban, but did claim to face economic, social and political barriers to community development and upward mobility. The advice refers to comments by various contacts in relation to the situation of Hazaras in Afghanistan.21 Professor William Maley, in his paper dated 27 June 2010, queries the use of the contacts in the DFAT advice in assessing the general situation for Hazaras, and indicates that the scale of abuse of power and persecution in Afghanistan tends to be under-reported. Professor Maley also indicates that “[n]o part of Ghazni can realistically be considered safe for Hazaras, even in districts where they might seem numerically predominant.”22

Social discrimination against Shia Hazaras during 2009 “continued along class, race, and religious lines. Ethnic Hazaras reported occasionally being asked to pay additional bribes at border crossings where Pashtuns were allowed to pass freely.” The Afghan National Police has primary responsibility for internal order in Afghanistan, although it was increasingly engaged in fighting the insurgency. Official impunity was reportedly pervasive, with many observers believing that ANP personnel were largely unaware of defendants‟ rights under the law and their responsibilities. There was continuing international support for professionalising the police force, and police abuses generally declined following international police training efforts. Afghanistan‟s formal justice system was relatively strong in urban centres and weaker in rural areas. Nationwide, fully functioning police forces, courts and prisons were rare.23

Deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan during 2009 because of increased insurgent attacks was reported to have posed a major challenge for the central government, hindering its ability to govern effectively, deliver services and extend its influence, particularly in rural areas. Insurgents targeted government officials, and the

19 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2010, Situation in Ghazni Province - views of Member of Parliament, 15 July – Attachment 14 20 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2009, UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan, July, pp. 19 & 53 – Attachment 9 21 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2010, Situation of the Hazara Minority, 21 February – Attachment 15 22 Maley, W. 2010, „On the Position of the Hazara Minority in Afghanistan June 2010‟, 27 June – Attachment 8 23 US Department of State 2010, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2009 – Afghanistan, March, Sections 1(d) (e) & 2(c) – Attachment 6

Page 5 of 11 Ministry of Interior reported that 964 police were killed and 1,787 were injured in insurgent attacks.24 A September 2010 report of the UN Secretary-General indicates that the security situation has continued to deteriorate in many parts of Afghanistan, with a 69% increase in the number of security incidents compared to the same months in 2009.25

An RRT Country Advice AFG36497 dated 28 April 2010 includes information on state protection in Afghanistan.26

Pakistan

In Pakistan, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan reported an increase in violent attacks on religious minorities in 2009, with the government failing to take effective preventive measures. In relation to violence against Shias, on 28th December 2009, at least 40 people were killed and 60 injured when a suicide bomber targeted the main Ashura procession in Karachi. “It was the third sectarian attack on the minority community in three days in Karachi in spite of police and security agencies‟ efforts at maintaining a massive vigil over the traditional procession route.” In Balochistan, since 2003, more than 260 people from the Hazara community in Quetta had been killed in targeted shootings and more than 1000 people injured.27 There had so far been no convictions for these killings.28 The Hazara community was reported to believe that the government and security agencies were protecting and patronising persons who had committed crimes against the Shia community. It was believed that the escape of two convicted members of the anti-Shia organization, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, from a well guarded jail in Quetta Cantonment implied that they were assisted by some elements within the security agency. A number of Shia Hazara lawyers were killed in targeted shootings during 2009, with sectarian hit men said to be responsible, and the Shia-Hazara community in Balochistan reportedly seemed to have lost trust in the capability of the provincial government to bring perpetrators of the crime to justice.29

A recent UK Home Office operational guidance note indicates that while there were many banned groups that remained active in Pakistan, there was legislation to combat actions intended to incite religious hatred. Implementation of the legislation, however, is often weak, particularly in religious hatred cases. The operational guidance note also indicates

24 US Department of State 2010, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2009 – Afghanistan, March, Introduction & Section 1(g) – Attachment 6 25 UN General Assembly Security Council 2010, „The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security - Report of the Secretary-General‟, United Nations website, A/64/911- S/2010/463, 14 September, p. 4 http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep10.htm - Accessed 27 October 2010 – Attachment 16 26 RRT Country Advice 2010, Country Advice AFG36497, 28 April, (Question 3) – Attachment 17 27 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 2010, „State of Human Rights in 2009‟, HRCP website, February, pp. 123 & 132 http://www.hrcp-web.org/pdf/Annual%20Report%202009.pdf - Accessed 10 May 2010 – Attachment 18 28 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2010, Conditions for Asylum Caseloads: Hazaras in Quetta, 30 July – Attachment 1 29 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 2010, „State of Human Rights in 2009‟, HRCP website, February, pp. 132-133 http://www.hrcp-web.org/pdf/Annual%20Report%202009.pdf - Accessed 10 May 2010 – Attachment 18

Page 6 of 11 that “[a]pplicants who claim a fear of the Taliban or Extremist Muslim groups should be able to seek protection from the authorities in most instances.”30

The police in Pakistan have the primary responsibility for internal security in most areas of the country. The effectiveness of the police reportedly “varied greatly by district, ranging from reasonably good to ineffective.” There was rampant corruption within the police. Some police committed human rights abuses or responded to political interests. The police were reported to often fail to protect the members of religious minorities, including Shias, from societal attacks. The refusal of police at times to prevent violence and harassment against members of religious minorities or charge persons who committed such actions led to an atmosphere of impunity.31 A July 2008 International Crisis Group report refers to Pakistan‟s police force being “incapable of combating crime, upholding the law or protecting citizens and the state against militant violence.”32 Another report indicates that although notoriously corrupt, Pakistan‟s police had “gathered vital intelligence on militant plots and captured key Taliban leaders in the past.”33

The RRT Country Advice PAK37541 dated 14 October 2010 includes information on state protection in Baluchistan.34

4. Who are the Laskar Toibi, and how active are they around Quetta and other parts of Pakistan? Are they active in Afghanistan?

Information was not located on a group named Laskar Toibi. Information was found on Lashkar-e-Taiba or the Army of the Pure, also known as Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Lashkar e- Toiba or Lashkar-i-Taiba.35

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LT) is reported to be the military wing of Markaz-ad-Dawa-wal-Irshad, a Pakistani Islamist organisation founded in 1989 which recruited volunteers to fight alongside the Taliban,36 and opposed the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. LT was formed in the late 1980s or early 1990s,37 and became active in 1993.38 It focused on operations

30 UK Home Office 2010, Operational Guidance Note: Pakistan, 1 October, Paragraph 3.12.7 http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/countryspecificasylumpolicyogns/pakist anogn?view=Binary – Accessed 27 October 2010 – Attachment 19 31 US Department of State 2010, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2009 – Pakistan, March, Sections 1(d) & 2(c) – Attachment 10 32 International Crisis Group 2008, „Reforming Pakistan‟s Police‟, Asia Report N°157, ICG website, 14 July, p. i http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/getfile.cfm?id=3516&tid=5570&type=pdf&l=1 – Accessed 15 July 2008 – Attachment 20 33 Humayun, A. 2010, „Saving Pakistan‟s Heartland‟, Foreign Policy, 8 February http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/04/saving_pakistans_heartland?print=yes&hidecomments=yes& page=full – Accessed 15 October 2010 – Attachment 21 34 RRT Country Advice 2010, Country Advice PAK37541, 14 October, (Question 2) – Attachment 4 35 Bajoria, J. 2010, „Backgrounder – Profile: Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure) (a.k.a. Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Lashkar e-Toiba; Lashkar-i-Taiba)‟, Council on Foreign Relations website, 14 January http://www.cfr.org/publication/17882/profile.html - Accessed 8 July 2010 – Attachment 22 36 Bajoria, J. 2010, „Backgrounder – Profile: Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure) (a.k.a. Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Lashkar e-Toiba; Lashkar-i-Taiba)‟, Council on Foreign Relations website, 14 January http://www.cfr.org/publication/17882/profile.html - Accessed 8 July 2010 – Attachment 22 37 US Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 2010, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, August, p. 263 – Attachment 23 38 Bajoria, J. 2010, „Backgrounder – Profile: Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure) (a.k.a. Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Lashkar e-Toiba; Lashkar-i-Taiba)‟, Council on Foreign Relations website, 14 January http://www.cfr.org/publication/17882/profile.html - Accessed 8 July 2010 – Attachment 22

Page 7 of 11 against India‟s control of Kashmir,39 and is reportedly “one of the largest and most proficient of the traditionally Kashmiri-focused militant groups.”40 The October 2010 UK Home Office operational guidance note indicates that “the externally-oriented Lashkar-e- Taiba has not been known to attack Pakistani targets.”41

Experts have said that during the 1990s, Pakistan‟s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) provided the group with instruction and funding in exchange for a pledge to target Hindus in Jammu and Kashmir and to train Muslim extremists in India. The Pakistani government has repeatedly denied allegations that it supports terrorism.42

Since 1993, LT has conducted operations against Indian troops and civilian targets in Jammu and Kashmir, and has carried out several high profile attacks inside India.43 The LT was banned by Pakistan in 2002 after the group was added to the United States Foreign Terrorist Organisations List, and it was declared a terrorist organisation by the United Nations in 2005. Experts have said that the LT subsequently went underground, splintered, used different names, and no longer claimed responsibility for attacks.44 The organisation‟s name was reportedly changed to Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD) and it began humanitarian projects to avoid restrictions. Terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India in November 2008 were attributed to LT, and after the attacks, the Pakistani government banned the JUD. The United Nations Sanctions Committee agreed to list the group and several persons associated with it. Pakistani officials also cracked down on an LT camp in Muzzafarabad and detained or arrested more than 50 LT or JUD leaders in Pakistan, but many of them were subsequently released. The LT reportedly continued to plan regional operations from within Pakistan.45

In relation to how active LT is around Quetta and other parts of Pakistan, the group is reportedly based in Punjab,46 in Muzaffarabad and Muridke, which is near Lahore in Pakistan. It also has a strong operational network through South Asia.47 According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, the LT has training camps and recruitment centres/offices across Pakistan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir, including in Quetta. Other locations include Muzaffarabad, Lahore, Peshawar, Rawalpindi, Islamabad, Karachi, Gujranwala,

39 Katzman, K. 2010, „Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy‟, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 17 September, p. 28 – Attachment 24 40 US Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 2010, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, August, p. 263 – Attachment 23 41 UK Home Office 2010, Operational Guidance Note: Pakistan, 1 October, Paragraph 3.12.3 http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/countryspecificasylumpolicyogns/pakist anogn?view=Binary – Accessed 27 October 2010 – Attachment 19 42 Bajoria, J. 2010, „Backgrounder – Profile: Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure) (a.k.a. Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Lashkar e-Toiba; Lashkar-i-Taiba)‟, Council on Foreign Relations website, 14 January http://www.cfr.org/publication/17882/profile.html - Accessed 8 July 2010 – Attachment 22 43 US Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 2010, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, August, p. 263 – Attachment 23 44 Bajoria, J. 2010, „Backgrounder – Profile: Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure) (a.k.a. Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Lashkar e-Toiba; Lashkar-i-Taiba)‟, Council on Foreign Relations website, 14 January http://www.cfr.org/publication/17882/profile.html - Accessed 8 July 2010 – Attachment 22 45 US Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 2010, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, August, pp. 159-160, 211 & 263 – Attachment 23 46 „Pakistan: A guide to main militant groups‟ 2010, IRIN News, 13 October http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=90760 – Accessed 14 October 2010 – Attachment 25 47 US Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 2010, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, August, p. 264 – Attachment 23

Page 8 of 11 Multan, Sialkot, and Gilgit in the northern area of Pakistan occupied Kashmir. The LT was reported to have 2,200 offices across Pakistan.48

Although the United Nations declared JUD as an alias for LT after the Mumbai attacks in November 2008, reports in the Indian media have indicated that JUD has continued to provide humanitarian aid through the Falah-i-Insaniyat Foundation charitable organisation.49 The LT is reported to be heavily involved in post-flood relief work and in other charitable work.50

In relation to whether the LT is active in Afghanistan, the group is reported to operate in Indian-held Kashmir and possibly Afghanistan.51 Other reports refer to the LT being said to be increasingly active inside Afghanistan,52 and being one of the insurgent groups that continued to use territory “in Pakistan as a base from which to plot and launch attacks within Afghanistan and beyond.”53 An article from June 2010 refers to LT expanding its operations in Afghanistan, with the group “believed to have planned or executed three major attacks against Indian government employees and private workers in Afghanistan in recent months”. This has prompted suspicions that LT has become a Pakistan proxy to counteract India‟s influence in Afghanistan. Some intelligence officials have also said that factions of LT have possibly broken away and are acting more independently, although the focus on Indian targets, Indian and Afghan authorities say, is being interpreted as a direct challenge from Pakistan.54

An RRT country advice dated 28 July 2010 provides information on Lashkar e-Taiba, including its status and objectives.55 An RRT research response dated 27 August 2009 includes information on Lashkar e-Toiba‟s formation, objectives, area of operation, training and strategies.56 Another RRT research response dated 28 September 2009 provides further information on the JUD.57

48 „Lashkar-e-Toiba “Army of the Pure”‟ (undated), South Asia Terrorism Portal http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/lashkar_e_toiba.htm – Accessed 27 August 2009 – Attachment26 49 Bajoria, J. 2010, „Backgrounder – Profile: Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure) (a.k.a. Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Lashkar e-Toiba; Lashkar-i-Taiba)‟, Council on Foreign Relations website, 14 January http://www.cfr.org/publication/17882/profile.html - Accessed 8 July 2010 – Attachment 22 50 „Pakistan: A guide to main militant groups‟ 2010, IRIN News, 13 October http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=90760 – Accessed 14 October 2010 – Attachment 25 51 „Pakistan: A guide to main militant groups‟ 2010, IRIN News, 13 October http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=90760 – Accessed 14 October 2010 – Attachment 25 52 Katzman, K. 2010, „Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy‟, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 17 September, p. 28 – Attachment 24 53 US Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 2010, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, August, p. 211 – Attachment 23 54 Rubin, A.J. 2010, „Militant group expands attacks in Afghanistan‟, The New York Times, 15 June – Attachment 27 55 RRT Country Advice 2010, Country Advice PAK37011, 28 July, (Question 2) – Attachment 28 56 RRT Research & Information 2009, Research Response PAK35396, 27 August, (Question 5) – Attachment 29 57 RRT Research & Information 2009, Research Response PAK35521, 28 September – Attachment 30

Page 9 of 11

Attachments

1. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2010, Conditions for Asylum Caseloads: Hazaras in Quetta, 30 July. (CISNET Pakistan CX246851)

2. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2010, The Hazara Community, 20 May. (CISNET Pakistan CX243899)

3. DIAC Country Information Service 2010, Country Information Report No. 10/60 – AFG10736: The Hazara, (sourced from DFAT advice of 28 September 2010), 29 September. (CISNET Afghanistan/Pakistan CX250228)

4. RRT Country Advice 2010, Country Advice PAK37541, 14 October.

5. RRT Country Advice 2010, Country Advice PAK36448, 30 March.

6. US Department of State 2010, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2009 – Afghanistan, March.

7. DIAC Country Information Service 2010, Country Information Report No. 10/62 – Country Reporting: The Hazara Community in Bamyan, (sourced from DFAT advice of 24 October 2010), 25 October. (CISNET Afghanistan CX251970)

8. Maley, W. 2010, „On the Position of the Hazara Minority in Afghanistan June 2010‟, 27 June.

9. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2009, UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan, July.

10. US Department of State 2010, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2009 – Pakistan, March.

11. Shah, T.A., „Karachi Emerges as Pakistan‟s New Tinderbox of Violence and Extremism‟ in The Jamestown Foundation 2010, Terrorism Monitor, Volume VIII, Issue 26, 1 July http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,PAK,,4c72280112,0.html – Accessed 11 October 2010.

12. Khan, R. 2010, „Official says women, children among 17 dead in bombing at police complex in northwest Pakistan‟, Associated Press Newswires, 8 September. (FACTIVA)

13. „UN chief deplores deadly attacks against Pakistan‟s Shiite Muslims‟ 2010, UN News Service, 3 September http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,PAK,,4c84aca21a,0.html – Accessed 11 October 2010.

14. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2010, Situation in Ghazni Province - views of Member of Parliament, 15 July. (CISNET Afghanistan CX246263)

15. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2010, Situation of the Hazara Minority, 21 February. (CISNET Afghanistan CX240092)

16. UN General Assembly Security Council 2010, „The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security - Report of the Secretary-General‟,

Page 10 of 11 United Nations website, A/64/911-S/2010/463, 14 September http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep10.htm - Accessed 27 October 2010.

17. RRT Country Advice 2010, Country Advice AFG36497, 28 April.

18. Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 2010, „State of Human Rights in 2009‟, HRCP website, February, http://www.hrcp-web.org/pdf/Annual%20Report%202009.pdf - Accessed 10 May 2010.

19. UK Home Office 2010, Operational Guidance Note: Pakistan, 1 October http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/countryspecificas ylumpolicyogns/pakistanogn?view=Binary – Accessed 27 October 2010.

20. International Crisis Group 2008, „Reforming Pakistan‟s Police‟, Asia Report N°157, ICG website, 14 July http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/getfile.cfm?id=3516&tid=5570&type=pdf&l=1 – Accessed 15 July 2008.

21. Humayun, A. 2010, „Saving Pakistan‟s Heartland‟, Foreign Policy, 8 February http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/04/saving_pakistans_heartland?print=yes &hidecomments=yes&page=full – Accessed 15 October 2010.

22. Bajoria, J. 2010, „Backgrounder – Profile: Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure) (a.k.a. Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Lashkar e-Toiba; Lashkar-i-Taiba)‟, Council on Foreign Relations website, 14 January http://www.cfr.org/publication/17882/profile.html - Accessed 8 July 2010.

23. US Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 2010, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, August.

24. Katzman, K. 2010, „Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy‟, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 17 September.

25. „Pakistan: A guide to main militant groups‟ 2010, IRIN News, 13 October http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=90760 – Accessed 14 October 2010.

26. „Lashkar-e-Toiba “Army of the Pure”‟ (undated), South Asia Terrorism Portal http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/lashkar_e_toib a.htm – Accessed 27 August 2009.

27. Rubin, A.J. 2010, „Militant group expands attacks in Afghanistan‟, The New York Times, 15 June. (CISNET Afghanistan CX245154)

28. RRT Country Advice 2010, Country Advice PAK37011, 28 July.

29. RRT Research & Information 2009, Research Response PAK35396, 27 August.

30. RRT Research & Information 2009, Research Response PAK35521, 28 September.

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