DIRITTO DEL COMMERCIO INTERNAZIONALE ISSN 1593-2605 Anno XXXV Fasc. 1 - 2021

Marco Lopez De Gonzalo

USO E ABUSO DELLA GIURISDIZIONE PER CONNESSIONE

Estratto REGNO UNITO - HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION, COMMERCIAL COURT, sentenza 29 maggio 2020 - Mr. Justice Waksman, Senior Taxi Aereo Executivo Ltda, Synergy Helicopters II LLC e Synergy Aerospace Corp. v. Agusta Westland s.p.a., Agusta Westland Ltd., Leonardo s.p.a., Agusta Westland NV e Agusta s.p.a. (*).

Giurisdizione - Art. 8.1 Regolamento (UE) n. 1215/2017 - Domanda nei confronti dell’anchor defendant - Applicabilità del Merits Test.

Il criterio di collegamento giurisdizionale della connessione, di cui all’art. 8.1 del 187 Regolamento (UE) n. 1215/2012 non può essere utilizzato quando la domanda nei confronti del convenuto domiciliato nello Stato membro del giudice (“anchor defendant”) sia manifestamente infondata.

INTRODUCTION 2. The Third Claimant, a Panama company, was the original purchaser of the 1. The proceedings before me arise Helicopter from the First Defendant, out of the fatal crash of an Agusta W est- AgustaWestland S.p.A. (“AW S.p.A.”), an land AW 139 twin turbine helicopter (“the Italian company, pursuant to a contract Helicopter”) on 19 August 2011, during a flight from the Petrobras P-65 offshore oil dated 1 September 2006. By an assignment platform in the Atlantic, west of Rio de made between A W S.p.A., the Third Janeiro, to Macae Aerodrome in Brazil. Claimant and the Second Claimant, A The Helicopter crashed into the sea in the Delaware company, the purchase contract Campos Basin, killing both pilots and both was assigned to the Second Claimant which passengers. CENIPA, which is the Brazil- then leased the Helicopter to the First ian equivalent of the UK Air Accidents Claimant, a Brazilian company, pursuant Investigation Branch, produced an interim to a lease agreement made on 4 June 2007. report following its initial investigation of The First Claimant was the operator of the the accident, on 25 August 2011. Its final Helicopter at all material times, as well as report was not published until 22 June being the lessee. It makes the primary 2017, almost 6 years after the accident. claims in this action and such claims are

(*) Vedi il commento che segue di Marco Lopez de Gonzalo. COMMENTI E RASSEGNE

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also made further, or in the alternative, by (2) the TRB broke off during the the Second and Third Claimants. For pres- flight causing an immediate yaw to the ent purposes, I can treat all Claimants to- right; gether and so refer to them collectively as (3) within a second or less, the vibra- “Senior”. tion of the remaining tail rotor blades 3. The Second Defendant, presently ripped off the tail rotor assembly, severing known as AgustaW estland Limited (“AW the pipework of the No. 1 and No. 2 hy- Limited”) is an English company. The draulic systems which power the aircraft Third Defendant, Leonardo S.p.A. controls; (“Leonardo”) is another Italian company. (4) the fluid in the No. 1 hydraulic The First to Third Defendants are all part system drained away immediately render- of the Leonardo group of companies. The ing it useless; Fifth Defendant is the same corporate en- (5) for about 7.5 seconds, the tail rotor tity as AW S.p.A., simply being its former shut-off valve (TRSOV) involved in the name and can thus be disregarded. The No. 2 hydraulic system operated to retain Fourth Defendant was a Dutch company, fluid power in the system, probably allow- part of the same group but which now no ing the pilots to regain control of the air- longer exists, so it can equally be disre- craft; garded. (6) the TRSO V then failed, because 4. On 21 November 2012, Clyde & of a (further) manufacturing or design de- Co., then acting for Senior, wrote to A W fect emptying out the remainder of the S.p.A. and also Agusta Westland do Brazil hydraulic fluid in No. 2, and depriving the 188 Ltda, a Brazilian company, intimating a pilots of any means of control ling the claim against either or both of them. They aircraft; made a further claim letter on 9 July 2013. (7) as a result, the aircraft fell, uncon- No proceedings were issued anywhere at that time. On 21 July 2016 Senior’s Italian trolled, into the sea; lawyers wrote to AW S.p.A. and Leonardo (8) there have been at least two prior in order formally to interrupt the running similar instances of defective rotor blades of time for the purposes of any Italian on AW 139 aircraft breaking off, each re- proceedings. Following publication of the sulting in the immediate detachment of the CENIPA final report, those lawyers wrote tail rotor assembly: again to interrupt time on 24 July 2017, 2 (a) B-MHJ (East Asia Airlines) July 2018 and 24 June 2019. No proceed- which ditched in Hong Kong Vittoria Har- ings have yet been commenced in Italy. bour on 3 July 2010 with 2 pilots and 11 passengers; and RELEVANT CORPORATE HIS- (b) A7-GHA in Qatar on 2 May TORY 2011. (Omissis) 10. The TRB which broke off here, numbered Q1018, was a replacement. It THE ACCIDENT had originally been fitted to a different 9. CENIPA’ s final report concluded helicopter in September 2008 and then to a essentially as follows: further helicopter in August 2010. It was (1) one of the tail rotor blades of the later repaired and put back into circulation Helicopter (“the TRB”) was compromised as a warranty replacement part on a yet by manufacturing defects including poros- further helicopter. Finally, it was fitted to ity, voids, torsion box damage and delami- the Helicopter on 22 April 2011 and re- nation, giving rise to cracks and breakage; mained on it until the flight in question. COMMENTI E RASSEGNE

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THE CLAIM (2) Loss of value of the Helicopter at between US$8-11 m; 11. Paragraph 10 of the Particulars (3) Search and Rescue costs; of Claim alleges that at the material time, (4) Wreckage storage costs (to be AW Ltd’s business included the design and quantified), and manufacture of its own helicopters and the (5) Business losses including loss of provision of helicopter research and design profits (to be quantified). services to others and made reference to its 14. The Defendants, among other December 2003 accounts. Paragraph 21 al- things, deny that AW Ltd had any role in leges that “the Defendants” were design- relation to the design manufacture, supply ers, manufacturers re-manufacturers, sell- or marketing of the Helicopter or the TRB. ers, suppliers repairers, maintainers of the AW Ltd’s Defence states that it did not AW 139 helicopter type, its parts and com- provide any relevant research or design ponents and were suppliers of connected services and also that the Particulars of services. Paragraph 22 alleges that the Claim fails to articulate any coherent alle- AW139 was at the material times marketed gation against it. Paragraph 16 says that the by “the group” as the Agusta W estland generic expression “the Defendants” is AW139 and parts were marketed as Agusta wholly inadeguate. Paragraph 17 says that Westland parts. Paragraph 34 alleges that AW Ltd at no time marketed the A W139 the AW139 tail rotor blades, as “designed, and it was never represented as a helicop- manufactured (etc) by [the] Defendant[s] ter produced or supplied by it. It further appeared frequently to contain defects”. denied in paragraph 26 that it assembled or 189 Paragraph 35 alleges that “the Defen- delivered it. It said that it was clear that the dants” should have recognised the exis- Helicopter had been manufactured by AW tence of such defects prior to the accident. S.p.A. In paragraph 27, AW Ltd denied any 12. Paragraph 43 cited the two pre- involvement in the design manufacture vious accidents where tail rotor blades had supply or lifting of the TRSOV or tail rotor broken off leading to the immediate de- blades. Paragraph 35, without prejudice to tachment of the tail rotor assembly. Para- the earlier denials, alleged that the claim graph 44 alleges that by then at the latest, included a claim for damages in respect of “the Defendants” should have been aware personal injuries and so any claim in neg- of this. Paragraph 56-58 alleged negligence ligence was now time-barred. against the Defendants with 51 separate 15. AW Ltd then pleaded further de- particulars together with reliance upon res tailed points as to the non-availability ipso loquitur. Paragraphs 59-60 alleged as against it of any claim under the 1987 Act against all Defendants breach of European or other relevant provisions. Further limi- Directive 85/374, the Consumer Protection tation points were taken as well as alleging Act 1987 (“the 1987 Act”) and/or Italian that the claimed losses included irrecover- law as suppliers of defective products, able claims for pure economic loss. namely the Helicopter and/or the TRB. THE ISSUES ON THE APPLICA- 13. Again as against all Defendants, TIONS Senior claims the following losses: (1) An indemnity in respect of the 16. There are before me, two appli- monies paid out by way of compensation to cations: the families of the deceased put at about (1) AW Ltd’s application to strike-out Brazilian Reals R$6.2m (“the Indemnity the claims against it or have them summar- Claim”); ily dismissed pursuant to CPR Part 24 COMMENTI E RASSEGNE

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(“the Strike-out Application” and “the THE LAW Summary Judgment Application”); Strike-out (2) The other Defendants’ application to set aside the proceedings against them 27. A claim will be struck-out if it for want of jurisdiction (“the Jurisdiction discloses no reasonable grounds for bring- Application”). ing the claim. See CPR 3.4 (a). Another 17. As refined in argument, A W basis for striking-out a claim is where it is Ltd’s essential contentions are these: an abuse of process. AW Ltd invokes this (1) On the Strike Out Application, ground as well, but on the basis that the there is no properly articulated claim claim made against it is part of an abusive invocation of Article 8 (1), so as to bring in against it and/or there is an abuse of pro- the other Defendants. I consider that issue cess, so that the Particulars of Claim should in the context of both sets of applications. be struck out; (2) In the alternative, and pursuant to Summary Judgment the Summary Judgment Application, there 28. Part 24 provides that the Court is in any event no viable or sustainable may give summary judgment if claim at all against it. It has no real pros- “(a) it considers that— pect of success because (a) on the facts AW (i) that claimant has no real pros- Ltd had nothing to do with the design or pect of succeeding on the claim or issue; or manufacture of the Helicopter, the TRB or (ii) that defendant has no real pros- the TRSOV and (b) all or part of the claim pect of successfully defending the claim or 190 is now time-barred or fails for other rea- issue; and sons. (b) there is no other compelling 18. Senior denies all of this. It adds reason why the case or issue should be that on the Summary Judgment Applica- disposed of at a trial.” tion even if the claim has no real prospect 29. So far as the existence or other- of success, there are other compelling rea- wise of a real prospect of a successful de- sons for a trial. This latter contention is fence (or, as here, claim) is concerned, I denied, in turn, by AW Ltd. can take the relevant principles from para- 19. As for the Jurisdiction Applica- graph 29 of A W Ltd’s skeleton argument tion, A W S.p.A. and Leonardo, contend which refers to the decision of Lewison J that: (as he then was) in Mellor v Partridge (1) Article 8(1) of the Recast Brussels [2013] EWCA Civ 477 at paragraph 3 (and as summarised by me): Regulation (“the Regulation”), was the ba- (1) there must be a “realistic” as op- sis for service of these proceedings out of posed to “fanciful” prospect of success; the jurisdiction against them, as foreign- (2) the former is one which carries domiciled companies; but it could only be some degree of conviction and more than invoked if there was, at the outset, a prop- merely arguable; erly pleaded and viable claim against AW (3) to decide this, the court must not Ltd as the “anchor Defendant”; conduct a “mini-trial” (2) However, there is no such claim (4) but this does not mean that the here and accordingly Article 8 (1) does not court must take at face value and without operate. analysis everything that the party facing 20. For its part, Senior denies both the application for summary judgment says propositions. in his statements. Sometimes it may be (Omissis) clear that there is no real substance in COMMENTI E RASSEGNE

REGNO UNITO - HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE factual assertions, particularly if contra- sufficient under this head just as it is not dicted by contemporaneous documents; sufficient to show a real prospect. (5) however, the court must also take Article 8 (1) and “the Merits Test” into account any evidence that can reason- ably be expected to be available at trial Introduction though not before it then; 31. Article 8 (1) provides as follows: (6) the court should hesitate to make a final decision without a trial even where “a person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued: there is no obvious conflict of fact at the (1) where he is one of a number of defen- time of the application, where reasonable dants, in the courts for the place where any one grounds exist for believing that a fuller of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and investigation into the facts of the case determine them together to avo id the risk of would add to or alter the evidence avail- irreconcilab le judgments resulting from sepa- able to the judge and so affect the outcome rate proceedings.” of the case; 32. The Defendants’ contention is (7) on the other hand if there is a short that in order for Article 8 (1) to apply at all, point of law or construction and the court the claim against the anchor defendant must has all the evidence necessary to decide it, at least be a sustainable one. I described this the court should grasp the nettle and do so; as “the Merits Test”. For present purposes, if it is possible to show by evidence that, the requirement of sustainability can be while there is not presently any material in equated with “viability”, “a real prospect of the form of documents or oral evidence to success”, a “serious issue to be tried” or a show the documents in another light, such “good arguable case”. Neither party sought 191 material is likely to exist and can be ex- to argue that any fine point of distinction pected to be available at trial, it would be between these various expressions was rel- wrong to give summary judgment because evant here. As already noted, the Defen- there would then be a real prospect of suc- dants allege that there is no viable claim and cess. But it is not enough to argue that the accordingly, there is no jurisdiction as case should be allowed to go to trial because against AW S.p.A. or Leonardo. something may turn up which would have a 33. Senior, for its part denies the bearing on construction. existence of a Merits T est as asserted by 30. So far as another compelling rea- the Defendants although it accepts that the son for a trial is concerned, this arises for application of Article 8 (1) can fail where it consideration, strictly, only when the Court constitutes an abusive attempt to bring in has decided that there is no real prospect foreign defendants - but this is not one of of success. There was no extended argu- those cases. ment before me about the scope of “com- 34. Senior also contends, if neces- pelling reason” but in practice it will only sary, that if the claim is not struck out or be exceptionally that a Court will permit a dismissed and is permitted to go to trial claim or defence to proceed to trial where because (and only because) there is a com- it is not viable on the merits. That follows pelling reason for a trial, the absence of from the use of the word “compelling”. It merit in the underlying claim cannot be a may be because of the same issues arising reason to oust the operation of Article 8 anyway with other parties. It may be be- (1) even if it otherwise would be. That cause there is something about the case subsidiary point of law only arises if there that requires the “full glare of publicity” is such a compelling reason and I prefer to but on the other hand, a Micawberist hope address it in that context later in this judg- that “something may turn up” at trial is not ment. COMMENTI E RASSEGNE

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35. In order to deal with the Merits 40. It appears (from the Austrian Test, it is necessary to consider a number of judgment at first instance) that the claim- English and EU authorities. ant was unaware that the anchor defendant was bankrupt when the proceedings were The Case-law issued. This probably explains the last sen- 36. I propose to deal with this tence of paragraph 32. chronologically. 41. In F reeport v Arnoldsson [2008] 37. In Reisch Montage v Kiesel QB 634, the CJEU dealt again with the [2007] I.L.Pr 10, the claim against the an- interpretation of Article 6 (1). The first chor defendant in Austria was held to be question is not relevant save that it should inadeguate under Austrian law because be noted that the Court observed this: that defendant was in fact already bank- “41. It is for the national court to assess rupt. By the time this point emerged, the whether there is a connection between the dif- ferent claims brought before it, that is to say a claimant had joined the guarantor of the risk of irreconcilable judgments if those claims anchor defendant’s debts, a German com- were determined separately and in that regard to take account of all necessary factors in the pany, under Article 6 (1) of the Brussels case file which may, if appropriate, yet without Regulation (the same provision is in Ar - its being necessary for the assessment, take into consideration the legal basis of the actions ticle 8 (1) and where I refer simply to brought before that court.” Article 6 (1) because of the context, that must be borne in mind). 42. The second question asked was whether, in addition to its express require- 38. In deciding that the claim against ments, there was a requirement that the the non-anchor defendant should not be 192 sole object of its invocation was not simply dismissed, the CJEU held that: to bring in the foreign defendants, out of (1) there was no express wording in their “home” jurisdiction as it were. I refer Article 6 (1) requiring the “admissibility” to this as the “Sole Object Prohibition”. of the claim against the anchor defendant; The Court said that there was no such (2) the scope of Article 6 (1) had to be prohibition (cf the Court in Reisch). determined independently and not by ref- 43. The third question was whether erence (for example) to a domestic provi- the likelihood of success on the claim as sion governing admissibility. against the anchor defendant was relevant 39. The Court concluded thus: to the determination of the risk of irrecon- “32. However, the special rule on jurisdic- cilable judgments. The Court considered tion provided for in Art.6(1) of Regulation 44/ that it was not necessary to deal with that 2001 cannot be interpreted in such a way as to allow a plaintiff to make a claim against a num- question. ber or defendants for the sole purpose of remov- 44. The Adv ocate-General’s Opin- ing one of them from the jurisdiction of the ion was that there was a Sole Object Pro- courts of the Member State in which that defen- dant is domiciled... However, this does not seem hibition. He argued at paragraph 61 that if to be the case in the main proceedings. there was no such prohibition then the risk 33. In the light of all of the above consid- of fraud or abuse could not be eliminated. erations, the answer to the question referred must be that Art.6(1) of Regulation 4/2001 must 45. In Brown v InnovatorOne [2010] be interpreted as meaning that, in a situation EWHC 2281, the issue was (a) whether, on such as that in the main proceedings, that pro- the application of Article 6 (1) it was nec- vision may be relied on in the context of an action brought in a Member State against a essary to show a viable claim against the defendant domiciled in that state and a co-de- non-anchor defendant and (b) if so, fendant domiciled in another Member State whether there was such a claim there. even when that action is regarded under a na- tional provision as inadmissible from the time it Hamblen J (as he then was) held that it was is brought in relation to the first defendant.” necessary to show an arguable claim but COMMENTI E RASSEGNE

REGNO UNITO - HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE there was not such a claim in that case. He tion of an interlocutory application by the also held that there was no realistic possi- relevant defendant (for example to strike bility of proceedings elsewhere anyway. out the claim on the merits). Reliance was However, he also made the following obiter placed on the decision in Reisch. As to observations as to the position in relation that, Flaux J first observed: to the anchor defendant, albeit that the “79. Before considering that decision, it claimant there had already conceded that it seems to me there are two obvious objections to needed to show a serious issue to be tried: this argument. First, there are a number of decisions of “25. I accept that in order to show that it is the English courts to the effect that in order to expedient to hear the claims together, it will invoke the jurisdiction under Article 6(1) the generally be necessary for the claimant to estab- claimant must show a sustainable claim against lish that there is a serious issue to be tried the anchor defendant, in the sense of a serious against the co-defendant as well as the anchor issue to be tried or a rea) prospect of that claim defendant. This is because, if the court con- succeeding: see for example per T uckey LJ in cludes that the claim against the co-defendant is FKI Engineering Ltd v De Wind Holdings Ltd not seriously arguable, then it is unlikely to be [2008] EWCA Civ 316 at [18]. It is difficult to see expedient to determine it together with the how that requirement can be satisfied if the claim against the anchor defendant since there is court has decided that the claim against the no sufficiently arguable claim to found the req- anchor defendant should be struck out, as on the uisite connection, and there is unlikely to be any hypothesis that the BPI application had suc- risk of irreconcilable judgments since, even if the ceeded would be the position here. Second, proceedings could be and were brought else- since the proviso to Article 6(1) clearly postu- where, the outcome would be the same, if there lates that it is expedient to hear and determine is no seriously arguable claim. the claims together to avoid the risk of irrecon- 26. Briggs & Rees on Civil Jurisdiction and cilable judgments, it is difficult to see how that Judgments (5th ed.) summarises the matter as proviso can ever be satisfied if the claim against follows at para.2.202: the anchor defendant has been struck out. A “To begin with, there must be a genuine fortiori, if one claim has been struck out, the two 193 claim or a claim which is properly brought claims will never be heard whether together or against the defendant who is being sued in the separately and there is no risk of irreconcilable courts of his domicile. It is obvious that the claim judgments.” against this anchor defendant cannot be allowed to be an entirely spurious one and if there is no 47. Having then referred to Reisc h proper claim against the one defendant it will be he said that he found it hard to reconcile impossible to satisfy the requirement that it be necessary to hear and determine the claims the reasoning in that case with his para- against two defendants together to avoid the risk graph 79. He concluded thus: of irreconcilable judgments resulting from sepa- rate proceedings.” “83. If the issue had arisen directly (which Then at the end of that paragraph: it does not because I have concluded the claim- “There must of course also be a proper ants have a fully arguable case against BPI, the basis for making a claim against the co-defen- anchor defendant) I would have decided that dant for just the same reason.“ Reisch Montage w as distinguishable because it was only purporting to determine the position 46. In Bor d v British Polythene where an otherwise sustainable claim against the [2012] EWHC 3346, one of the jurisdic- anchor defendant was precluded for some pro- cedural reason under the national law. it was not tional challenges made by the non-anchor purporting to decide that, if the claim against the defendant was as to the application of Ar- anchor defendant was unsustainable because substantively, as opposed to procedurally, it had ticle 6 (1). In the event, that challenge no rea) prospect of success.. the requirements of failed because it was parasitic on the suc- Article 6(1) were nonetheless satisfied. Accord- cess or otherwise of a separate application ingly, if contrary to my decision on BPI’s appli- cation, I had concluded that the claim against which itself failed. Nonetheless, Flaux J (as BPI was not arguable, I would have concluded he then was) decided the po int since it has that jurisdiction under Article 6(1) could not be maintained.” been fully argued. One aspect of the argu- ment was that the question of the applica- 48. Kolassa v Barclays Bank 28 tion of Article 6 (1) had to be decided as at January 2015, C-375/13 did not directly the time of the issue of the proceedings and concern Article 6 (1). Rather, it dealt with not later, for example, as at the determina- specific heads of jurisdiction concerned COMMENTI E RASSEGNE

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with consumer claims. But one question are instituted, claims are connected within the meaning of article 6(1) of Regulation No 44/ asked was whether, in the context of its 2001, the court seised of the case can find that consideration of jurisdiction under Articles the rule of jurisdiction laid down in that provi- 25 and 26, the court should conduct “a sion has potentially been circumvented only where there is firm evidence to support the comprehensive taking of evidence in rela- conclusion that the applicant artificially fulfilled, tion to disputed facts which are of rel- or prolonged the fulfilment of, that provision’s applicability. evance both for the question of jurisdiction 30 In the case in the main proceedings, and for the existence of a claim..or some of the parties allege that, before the action whether, [it should] start from the premise in the proceedings was brought, an out-of-court settlement was reached ... and that the parties that the facts as asserted by the applicant purposefully delayed the formal conclusion of are correct?”. The Court’s answer to that that settlement until proceedings had been insti- tuted, for the sole purpose of securing the juris- point was: diction of the court seised of the case as against “65. Having regard to the foregoing, the the other defendants. answer to Question 4 is that in the context of the 31 In order to be able to exclude the ap- determination of international jurisdiction... it is plicability of the rule of jurísdiction laid down in not necessary to conduct a comprehensive tak- article 6(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, an allega- ing of evidence in relation to disputed facts that tion of that nature must ne vertheless be sup- are relevant both to the question of jurisdiction ported by firm evidence that, at the time that and to the existence of the claim. It is, however, proceedings were instituted, the parties con- permissible for the court seised to examine its cerned had colluded to artificially fulfil, or pro International jurisdiction in the light of all the long the fulfilment of, that provision’s applica- information available to it, including, where ap- bility. propriate, the allegations made by the defen- 32 Although it is for the court seised of the dant.” case to assess such evidence, it must nevertheless be made clear that simply holding negotiations 49. In Cartel Damage v Akzo [2015] with a view to concluding an out-of-court settle- 194 ment does not in itself prove such collusion. QB 906, involving the same constitution of However, it would be otherwise if it transpired the CJEU, the claimant had brought a that such a settlement had, in fact, been con- cluded, but that it had been concealed in order claim in Germany against the anchor de- to create the impression that the conditions of fendant and also a number of companies application of article 6(1) of Regulation No 44/ not domiciled there on the basis of Article 2001 had been fulfilled.” 6 (1). It subsequently settled its claim 50. I refer to the exception to the against the anchor defendant. The other operation of Article 6 (1) set out above as defendants applied to set aside the claim “the Artificial Fulfilment Exception”. against them on jurisdictional grounds, in- 51. I turn next to the decision of the cluding the allegation that the settlement Court of A ppeal in Sabbagh v Khoury had in fact been agreed prior to the com- [2017] EWCA C iv. 1120. The claims all mencement of proceedings and its conclu- concerned alleged misappropriation of the sion was simply delayed until proceedings assets of the claimant’s father who had were instituted and Article 6 (1) could be died intestate. The First Defendant consti- invoked. The court stated as follows in the tuted the anchor defendant. Jurisdiction light of the earlier case-law: over all except one of the non-anchor de- “28 The court has nevertheless stated that, fendants was asserted on the basis of ar- where claims brought against various defendants ticle 6 (1). Jurisdiction in respect of the are connected within the meaning of article 6(1)... when the proceedings are instituted, the remaining (non EU) non-anchor defen- rule of jurisdiction laid down in that provision is dant was on the basis of CPR 6.37 and applicable without there being any further need paragraph 3.1 of 6BPD. For the purpose of to establish separately that the claims were not brought with the sole object o f ousting the the latter, there was an express require- jurisdiction of the courts of the member state ment that there be a “real issue” between where one of the defendants is domiciled: Free- port... the claimant and the relevant defendant 29 It follows that where, when proceedings “which it is reasonable for the Court to COMMENTI E RASSEGNE

REGNO UNITO - HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE try”. It was common ground that to that in a claim, then there is no real risk of an extent, a Merits Test as against the anchor irreconcilable judgment because the deci- defendant had to be satisfied. sion (that there is no merit) will be or is 52. The Judge held that the claim likely to be the same elsewhere; made against the anchor defendant was (3) In Freeport, the CJEU did not devo id of merit and should be struck out. have to, and did not, address the Merits On that footing, she held that there was no Test question at ali. As to Kolassa, all it jurisdiction against any of the non-anchor precluded was a “full review of the evi- defendants. In effect, therefore, so far as dence” which could be equated with the jurisdiction under Article 6 (1) was con- prohibition of a “mini-trial” in the context cerned, she held that it, too, contained a of summary judgment. But that did not Merits Test. mean that there should not be any assess- 53. On appeal, the Court of Appeal ment of the merits and Kolassa, therefore, held unanimously that the Judge had been did not establish that there is no need for wrong to strike out the claim because it did such an assessment or that national courts in fact have merit. That being so, jurisdic- could not look at the merits when deciding tion was otherwise established against all whether they had jurisdiction under Article non-anchor defendants. That made it un- 6 (1); necessary to decide the separate point as to (4) As for Cartel Damage, while the whether, for the purpose of Article 6 (1) Court had focused on the Artificial Fulfíl- there was a Merits Test requirement. How- ment Prohibition because of what arose in ever, because the point been fully argued that case, it did not follow from this that the Court of Appeal delivered an obiter the Court was also ruling out a Merits Test; 195 judgment in that regard, too. Here, how- (5) The majority differed from the ever, it was not unanimous. The majority obiter view of Aikens LJ in Aeroflot v Be- (Patten and Beatson LJJ) decided that rezovsky [2013] EWCA 784 that the Court there was such a test whereas the minority is not concerned with the merits of the (Gloster LJ) held that there was not. claim against the anchor defendant, just as 54. The majority view, set out in it is not concerned with the merits of the paragraphs 32-72 of the judgment, may be claims against the non-anchor defendants, summarised as follows: which was the point at issue. In particular, (1) Article 6 (1) expressly requires it in paragraph 66 of the judgment, the ma- to be “expedient” to hear the claims to- jority considered that there was a signifi- gether in the jurisdiction of the anchor cant distinction because the claim against defendant. It is hard to see how this could the anchor defendant was fundamental to be made out if the claim against that de- establishing jurisdiction over claims against fendant had been struck out as having no foreign co-defendants, away from their do- merit, and reference was made here to micile. If the claims against one or more InnovatorOne and Bord; foreign co-defendants fell away that would (2) Reisch was a case of a “procedural not affect the claim against the anchor de- bar”. That should be distinguished from fendant or other foreign co-defendants. In the substantive merits or otherwise of the contrast, without a legitimate claim against underlying claim because the purpose of the anchor defendant there was no reason Article 6 (1) was to avoid the risk of irrec- for the foreign co-defendants to be ousted oncilable judgments. A procedural bar may from their home jurisdiction. It could not still create a risk because there may be no be expedient to determine a claim against such procedural bar in another jurisdiction. an anchor defendant that is not seriously On the other hand, if there is no merit at all arguable together with a claim against a COMMENTI E RASSEGNE

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foreign-co-defendant over whom there done is to prevent the claim proceeding would otherwise be no jurisdiction; against that defendant, regardless of merit. (6) That the majority then went on to There is no finding on the merits at all. say this: Therefore, (if Article 6 (1) did not apply) 69. It is important, and the CJEU is clearly the procedural bar imposed could not concerned to ensure, that Article 6(1) is not thereby affect any claim made against the misused. In our judgment, it would be a misuse non-anchor defendants in a different of Article 6(I) to allow hopeless claims to oust the jurisdiction of domicile of foreign co-defen- Court. There is really no irreconcilability at dants. T o allow the claim to proceed in the all. And yet, the Court in Reisch still found present appeal would undermine the principle that a defendant may be sued only before the that there was. All the more so, then, courts for the place where he is domiciled. It is where it is not a procedural bar but a said that the merit of an approach which eschews merits bar, as it were; any examination of the merits of the claim ab- sent evidence of abuse or fraudulent intention to (3) Further, it will not always be clear artificially fulfil the requirement of connection where to draw the line, for example, if the under Article 6(1) is that it avoids the risk of irreconcilable judgments and protracted dis- issue is whether the alleged contract affect- putes about the substance of a claim at the ing all defendants fulfilled a formal re- jurisdiction stage. But it does so by a bright line quirement without which it could not be binary rule which does not address the fact that derogations from the genera! principle that civil valid. Different courts might reach differ- actions are to be bought against defendants in ent conclusions as to whether the formal the courts of the place where they are domiciled must be restrictively interpreted. It is open to requirement was fulfilled, which would be question whether this is justified or whether this a real case of irreconcilability; is the true import of the decisions of the CJEU (4) The CJEU in Freeport must have which have not directly addressed the question 196 that is before us. It is also said that defendants impliedly taken the view that the merits of may, subsequently, if they wish, attempt to strike the claim against the anchor defendant out the claims. That, however, would simply shift to strike out and summary judgment applica- were irrelevant since it rejected the Sole tions what is said to be undesirable and imper- Object Prohibition which itself could only missible in the context of jurisdiction... operate if there were no merits; 71. It is certainly not artificial to bring a claim which ultimately fails, but maybe artificial (5) In truth, the Court in Kolassa did to the claim which is hopeless, though not abu- not suggest that an assessment of merits sive.” was relevant. Nor did the Court in Cartel 55. As against that view, the judg- Damage; rather, the only, implied restric- ment of Gloster LJ included the following tion on the operation of Article 6 (1) was points, first in relation to fraudulent abuse, not (also) the application the state of EU case-law: of national rules on the merits of the claim (1) The distinction drawn by the ma- against the anchor defendant; jority between procedural bars and lack of (6) Thus, there was clear EU author- substantive merits in the context of the risk ity that Article 6 (1) could be used to of irreconcilable judgments was not sound. establish jurisdiction against non-anchor While on the merits, another Court might defendants even if the claim against the be likely to reach the same conclusion, it anchor defendant will not proceed, unless was not necessarily such. And the tenor of the claimant is engaged in a fraudulent the EU case-law was that any risk of irrec- abuse thereof. oncilable judgment’s should be eliminated 56. Gloster LJ then turned to the and not merely reduced; majority’s argument that there could be no (2) In fact, a procedural bar problem risk of any irreconcilable judgments from a should be regarded as less serious from the dose connection between the claims point of view of irreconcilable judgments. against the defendants because there was All the court of the anchor defendant has now no claim against the anchor defendant COMMENTI E RASSEGNE

REGNO UNITO - HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE at all; so there would never be a judgment the existence of a Merits T est. She con- on it which could possibly be inconsistent cluded in paragraph 218 that: with some other judgment elsewhere “the English court will have jurisdiction against the non-anchor defendants. She under Article 6(1) if the claims are so closely considered that argument to be incorrect connected that it is expedient to hear and deter- mine them together to avoid the risk of irrecon- because, among other things, cilable judgments resulting from separate pro- (1) if it were correct, there could be ceedings. In verifying whether this requirement no point of distinction between procedural is satisfied, the court will use all available infor- mation and take a common-sense approach. and merits bars; However, the court will not have regard to (2) what is to be evaluated is the na- whether the claim against the anchor defendant ture of the claims as enunciated at the or the claim against the non-anchor defendant will fail due to a procedural bar or due to a lack outset. What happens to any of them there- of merit. As a matter of EU law, whether a claim after is irrelevant; will succeed is irrelevant to the question of whether the claims are closely connected, be- (3) the logic of this argument means cause the function of Article 6(1) is to avoid a the there should also be a Merits T est in risk of irreconcilable judgments. If the require- respect of the claims against the non-an- ment is fulfilled, the English court can only deny the application of Article 6(1) if the sole purpose chor defendants and yet (because of Aero- of bringing a claim against the anchor defendant flot) there was now no such test; was to remove the non-anchor defendants from (4) it was true that Article 6 (1), is a the courts of their member state(s) of domicile, in the sense articulated by Reisch Montage, Free- derogation from the overarching principle porl and CDC.” that a defendant should be sued in the country of its domicile, and so should be 58. She sa id that such an outcome interpreted restrictively; but the imposition would promote certainty and predictabil- 197 of a Merits T est is in reality a restriction ity. It would also remove the peculiarity in imposed by national rules not an indepen- the instant case where the non-anchor de- dent principle of Brussels Regulation juris- fendants could take the point on merits prudence. The addition of the Merits Test whereas the anchor defendant could not would also increase unpredictability and because (not itself being domiciled here) uncertainty about the outcome of a puta- could not challenge the claim against it tive application of Article 6 (1). without submitting to the jurisdiction. 57. Finally, Gloster LJ dealt with the 59. Finally I deal with JSC v Kolo- argument that proceeding against an an- moisky [2019] EWCA C iv. 1708. At first chor defendant where there was no merit instance, the Judge had set aside the pro- in the claim was itself a fraudulent abuse of ceedings on the basis, among other things, Article 6 (1) which was a recognised excep- that where Article 6 (1) of the Lugano tion to its operation. She pointed to the Convention (to the same effect as Article 8 fact that the Court in Cartel Damage made (1)) was in play, the claim against the an- clear that this was a narrow exception chor defendants was not permitted to have based on the position as at the time of been brought with the sole object of join- instituting the proceedings. Moreover, in ing in the relevant non-anchor defendants. the instant case, the Judge had found that Thus the Court of Appeal had to decide the the claim against the anchor defendant was correctness or otherwise of the inclusion of unsustainable as a result of evidence the Sole Object Prohibition. A majority emerging since the claim had been issued. (David Richards and Flaux LJJ) held that And if the argument was correct, it is hard there was no such prohibition while Newey to see how the decision in Reisch was cor- LI held that there was. But again, and as rect. She also supported the obiter view of with Sabbagh this was strictly obiter since the court in Aeroflot which did not support the Court of Appeal unanimously held that COMMENTI E RASSEGNE

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there was no sole object on the facts here represent the correct position as regards article 6(1) of Brussels 1 and of the Lugano Convention anyway. and article 8(1) of the Recast Brussels Regula- 60. At paragraph 22, the Court tion. An artificial fulfilment of the express con- noted that the claimant had established a dition of a close connection will not permit reliance on article 6(1). However, if the question good arguable case that there have been a is asked, is a claimant with a sustainable claim fraudulent scheme “on an epic scale”. In against an anchor defendant, which it intends to the course of discussing the Reisc h case, pursue to judgment in proceedings to which a foreign defendant is joined as a co-defendant, the Court expressed the view at paragraph entitled to rely on article 6(1) even though the 63 that paragraph 32 of the decision of the claimant’s sole object in issuing the proceedings CJEU was r eferring to the fact that, as against the anchor defendant is to sue the for- eign defendant in the same proceedings, we stated by the Austrian Court below, it had consider that the question should be answered not been established and could not be as- affirmatively... sumed that the claimant knew from the 111. Accordingly, we conclude in the pres- ent case that the Bank, which has a sustainable outset that the claim against the anchor claim against the English Defendants and which defendant was inadmissible because he was intends to pursue the claim to judgment against those defendants in combination with its claims bankrupt. The implication was that if this against Mr Kolomoisky and Mr Bogolyubov, is had been the case then the implication of entitled to rely on article 6(1) even if its sole Artic le 6 (1) may have been found to be object in commencing the proceedings against the English Defendants is to be able also to sue abusive and impermissible. The majority those individuals at the same proceedings.” considered that the only implied exception to the application of Article 6 (1) was the 62. For his part, in paragraphs 270- narrow one of the Artificial Fulfilment Pro- 278 of the judgment, Newey LJ took the 198 hibition as distinct from the wider Sole view that the relevant EU authorities con- Object prohibition. Thus they stated in firmed the continued existence of the Sole paragraph 87: Object Prohibition. 63. On a fair reading of paragraph “Other examples of an artificial fulfilment might be the hypothetical case posited by the 102 of the judgment, I consider that it does Advocate General in F reeport of proceedings proceed on the assumption that apart from being commenced against a fictitious anchor de- anything fendant and a claimant in a case such as Reisch else, the claimant does need a Montage commencing proceedings against the sustainable claim against the anchor defen- anchor defendant knowing that such proceed- dant before being able to invoke Article 6 ings were inadmissible against him.” (1). It was submitted to me that this is not 61. I refer to the following para- correct and that the reference to “sustain- graphs of the judgment which are impor- able claim” in paragraph 102 was only tant: there because paragraph 101 had re- “101. As regards the test of artificial fulfil- hearsed the argument made by the defen- ment of the express condition of connected dants that “the fact that the claim against claims under article 6(1) set out in Carte! Dam- age, Mr Howard submitted that it was simply the anchor defendant has merit would not another way of expressing the sole object test. affect” the Sole Object Prohibition. I do They were two sides of the same coin. Artificial agree and consider that it is a general fulfilment was not limited to collusive conduct of not the type contemplated by the CJEU in Carte! reference. This is supported by the refer- Damage. It encompassed the situation where a ence, again, to a “sustainable claim” in claimant commenced an action in the court of one state against an anchor defendant for the paragraph 111. Nor do I detect in the mi- sole purpose of subjecting a foreign defendant to nority judgment of Newey LJ any disagree- the jurisdiction of that court. The fact that the claim against the anchor defendant had merit ment with that assumption. would not affect the application of the sole ob- ject test. Analysis 102. While we see the force in these sub- missions, we have concluded that they do not 64. In the light of all that, I venture COMMENTI E RASSEGNE

REGNO UNITO - HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE to set out my own observations on the paragraphs 25 and 26 of the judgment of issue. Hamblen J in Innovatrone cited above and paragraph 79 of the judgment of Flaux J in In Principle Bord. This was the reasoning adopted by 65. First, it must be accepted that the majority in Sabba gh at paragraphs 43 there must be some sort of implied limita- and 44. A likelihood of such a result at least tion on the operation of Article 8 (1). At was recognised by Gloster LJ in her para- the very least, it is the Artificial Fulfilment graph 179. Prohibition. This is unsurprising. It would 68. A frequent reason why the risk be very odd indeed if any kind of abuse or of conflicting judgements might arise is bad faith in invoking Article 8 (1), itself a because, for example, the claims against all derogation from the general principle, did defendants depend on some finding of fact not have consequences. Commencing a common to all of them. So that if Article 8 claim which the claimant knows is hopeless (1) is not applied, the court here might find is likely to fall within that prohibition in my facts which mean there is no claim against view. ft is, analytically, no different from the anchor defendant; yet, when the claim- commencing a claim against a fictitious ant sues the non-anchor defendant else- defendant although the latter example is where (as it would now putatively be more extreme. forced to do) the court there finds facts 66. However, I have to deal in prin- which establish the claim against those de- ciple with the Merits T est which, while it fendants and which mean that the claim has been approved in some English cases, against the anchor defendant would be es- has never been made subject to a gloss tablished as well. 199 which requires also, a finding of abuse, bad 69. But in the context of the Merits faith or matters of that kind. The reason is Test a decision that there is no viable claim because if it exists at all, it is an implied at all is different from one reached after a exception whose judicial base is and must trial and consideration of all the evidence. be different. It is that the claim simply does not get off 67. The first and main basis for the the ground. That is why the risk of irrec- existence of the Merits T est and the one oncilable judgements is either low or non- which has found the most support is what I existent. will call the “Irreconcilable Risk Ar gu- 70. In that regard, take this case as ment”. This states that where there is no an example. The claims made against ali arguable claim against the anchor defen- three Defendants are composed of differ- dant there is, in truth, no “close” connec- ent elements or causes of action but the tion because there is no connection. More- core points are the same. One or more of over, there is no risk of irreconcilable them designed and/or manufactured the judgements because if the proceedings Helicopter and the TRB, and did so negli- (against the other defendants) have to be gently.AW Ltd says that it had no design or brought elsewhere, the outcome (as against manufacturing role. The other Defendants those other defendants) would be the agree and say that AW S.p.A. had this role. same. Assuming for present purposes that If I find those contentions are clearly es- the same governing law would apply, tablished so that there is no viable basis for whether the court of the anchor defendant saying that AW Ltd had any such role, the assesses the merits or whether the court of notion that an Italian Court could or would the non-anchor defendants does so, if there find that in fact, A W S.p.A. had no such is no merit in the case at all, both courts are role (in which case, of necessity, AW Ltd, likely to reach the same conclusion. See or some other entity did) is in real terms COMMENTI E RASSEGNE

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impossible. In reality there is no risk of mencement of the proceedings because of irreconcilable judgements at all. stays, extensions of time etc is irrelevant. 71. I accept that, depending on the Take this case, there has been a delay but it particular merits points it may be that one remains the position that the proceedings cannot guarantee that the outcome would are effectively paused at an early stage be the same, just that they are likely to be because of these extant applications. so. Unlike Gloster LJ, I do not see this as 74. Next, the fact that in connection an obstacle to the existence of the Merits with a Merits Test, it would be logical for Test. the anchor defendant to apply itself to 72. I now deal with some objections discharge the proceedings against it makes in principle to the Merits T est. First it is no difference. The relevant “home” for the true that the Merits T est does not, after Merits T est, is the jurisdiction challenge Aeroflot, apply to non-anchor defendants. brought by the non-anchor defendant. If However, I respectfully agree with the rea- the failure of the Merits Test then has the soning of the majority in Sabbagh at para- consequence that the claim against the an- graph 66 to the effect that there is a real chor defendant goes nowhere that does not difference between the question of merits alter the fact that this will be decided at an as against the anchor defendant on the one early stage. For that reason, the spectre of hand and the non-anchor defendants on jurisdiction somehow being undone some the other. way down the line because of an applica- 73. Equally, I do not accept that the tion of the Merits Test late in the proceed- Merits T est is ruled out because Artide 8 ings, is an unrealistic one. Hence the ob- 200 (1) refers to a dose connection between the servations of the majority in Sabba gh at “claims” which must therefore be evalu- paragraph 71. For the same reason, the fact ated at the outset. I do not see that this that a claim may later be settled, or struck excludes the Merits Test. If the claim fails out because of non-compliance with an the Merits Test, it is artifícial to refer to it “unless” order, for example, is irrelevant. as a “claim”. Paragraph 205 of the judg- That cannot entail the application ofthe ment of Gloster LJ shows that her concern Merits Test in relation to jurisdiction. is about applying the Merits Test at some 75. On the other hand, if, on a juris- later point in time. I see that, but the diction challenge, the claim is found to be Merits T est, properly applied will be con- unsustainab le as a result of evidence not fined to the initial stage of the proceedings. adduced at the outset that makes no differ- This is because it can only arise at two ence. The issue is not when the evidence possible stages: (a) the claimant’s own as- emerges but what is decided at the hearing sessment of the application of Article 8 (1) of the jurisdictional challenge. which it must certify as applicable when 76. A further objection (and one issuing the Claim Form (which by defini- enunciated by Gloster LJ) is that a Merits tion involves no assessment by the Court) Test would introduce an unacceptable de- and (b) on any subsequent jurisdiction gree of uncertainty and unpredictability. challenge. The latter has to be made and With respect I disagree. Regardless of na- decided at an early stage because that is tional procedural rules for the obtaining of what the rules provide. The decision of the a strike-out or summary judgment (which Court on such a challenge is the end of the may differ as to scope or even availability) matter so far as jurisdiction is concerned. the fact that there is simply nothing in the Absent fraud, it cannot be revisited later. claim at all — because it is hopeless — is The fact that the hearing of the jurisdiction different from seeking to predict the ulti- challenge may be some time alter com- mate outcome of what is at least a viable COMMENTI E RASSEGNE

REGNO UNITO - HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE claim. And in my experience, most Courts tion so far as the EU authorities are con- that are subject to the Brussels Recast cerned. Regulation are familiar with the notion of a 80. None of them in my view rule claim or defence which is so lacking in out the Merits Test in any way, save possi- substance that it should not proceed. bly for Reisch to which I therefore turn. 77. So as a matter of principle, I That decision has not been overturned or consider that the “Irreconcilable Judge- criticised as to the result, so far as I am ments Argument” is a sound basis for the aware, in any subsequent decision of the existence of the Merits T est. It may be CJEU. implied in one sense but it arises from a 81. In Reisch, and as noted above, proper application of the words of Article the CJEU there disagreed with the Opin- 8 (1). ion ofthe Adv ocate-General that the pro- 78. It might be said that there is no cedural bar to civil litigation against bank- need for the Merits T est because of the rupts was an obstacle to the operation of Artificial Fulfilment Prohibition. But the Article 6 (1). The Court also had addressed former it is not the same as latter. For to it the Irreconcilable Judgements Ar gu- example, suppose a claimant brings a claim ment; see paragraph 17 of the judgment. against the anchor defendant which is p The view of the French Government (cited lainly well-founded, for example a claim in at paragraph 19), was that there were in debt and the defendant is the principal effect no restrictions on the operation of Artide 6 (1) provided only that the claims debtor, a company with little or no assets were connected. There was no Sole Object and in liquidation. The prospect of any Prohibition. The Commission, while also 201 recovery is next to nothing. Suppose also agreeing that Article 6 (1) did apply here, that it is agreed between the claimant and said that there was a Sole Object Prohibi- the defendant that the latter will not de- tion, but the national court had not decided fend the claim and in return the claimant that point. will not seek to enforce any judgment it 82. The view of the CJEU was that obtains and it will seek no costs against the there was no express qualification on Ar - defendant. The claimant by this inexpen- ticle 6 (1) by reference to admissibility sive means hopes to bring in the foreign under national law. And while some provi- guarantor under Artic le 8 (1). That sce- sions of the Regulation made express ref- nario may well move into the territory of erence so as to allow for the operation of artificial fulfilment, abuse or bad faith. But national rules, this one did not. Accord- the Merits T est would be satisfied and a ingly, Article 6 (1) could apply. The Court different princ ip le would be needed to also agreed that there was a Sole Object prevent the operation of Article 8 (1). Prohibition but it did not apply here. How- Equally, I do not believe that the Merits ever, it did not address the Irreconcilable Test should be justified as in fact a part of Judgements Ar gument. The Court’s con- the Artif icial Fulfilment Prohibition. Nor, clusion was clearly based on the content of for that matter, can it be also justified as a national provision which rendered a being within the Sole Object Prohibition claim inadmiss ib le. (as the majority in Sabbagh thought) not 83. As with Flaux J in Bord, I do not least because of the obiter vie w of the find the reasoning of the CJEU here per- majority in Kolomoisky. suasive and I consider that the decision should be distinguished if possible. It can EU Case-Law be distinguished because it is very clear 79. I now turn to consider the posi- from the judgments that the focus was on a COMMENTI E RASSEGNE

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national rule as to admissibility of the former (for example as enunciated by the claim. Even allowing for differences of lan- CJEU in Reisch) necessarily entailed an guage, the expression “procedural bar” is absence of merits as well as the relevant not apt to include a lack of any substantive motive (as Gloster LJ had suggested in merit. Reisch is not therefore an obstacle to Sabbagh). The two things are separate and deciding that there is a Merits Test. indeed it could be argued that non-avail- 84. There is, in addition, a real dis- ability of the Sole Object T est almost as- tinction between a procedura! bar and the sumed that there was a Merits T est (see Merits T est in my view. It is not so much Kolomoisky above). because with a procedura! bar there re- 87. So in my view the EU cases do mains a risk of irreconcilable judgements not rule out the existence of the Merits while the same is not true of the applica- test. English Cases tion of the Merits T est, as stated by the 88. I have set these out above. There majority in Sabba gh at paragraph 43. In is no direct authority on the point but that regard, and with respect, I see the substantial obiter support for the Merits force of the answer given by Gloster LJ to Test. that point at her paragraph 180. 85. Instead, I consider that the rea- Article 36 (1) of the Regulation soning of the court in Reisch was con- 89. A further argument in support of cerned more with what it simply saw as an the existence of the Merits Test was that an illegitimate incursion of a domestic proce- Italian Court would (now) be bound to dural rule (a bankrupt cannot without recognise any judgment here dismissing 202 more be sued in ordinary litigation) into the operation of Artide 6 (1). That, in and summarily the claim against A W Ltd and of itself decided the point. It was a question so again there could be no risk of irrecon- of form and not substance. But the Merits cilable judgments. Indeed Mr Marland ar- Test is a matter of substance. gued that this was a point that would have 86. I would just add some further been determinative in Sabbagh had it been observations: run. In the light of my conclusions above, it (1) I do not see Cartel Damage as is not necessary for me to address this ruling out the Merits Test; it did not do so further argument and I do not do so. either expressly or impliedly by the articu- Conclusion lation of the Artificial Fulfilment Test; (2) The fact that the Sole Object Test 90. Accordingly, there is a Merits has been rejected does not in any way Test which must be satisfied before Article imply that the Merits T est must be taken 8 (1) can be invoked. not to exist either. I do not accept that the (Omissis)

Uso e abuso della giurisdizione per connessione

SOMMARIO: 1. Premessa. — 2. La giurisdizione per connessione nel Regolamento (UE) n. 1215/2012. — 3. La giurisprudenza della Corte di Giustizia. — 4. La giurisprudenza inglese. — 5. I diversi possibili limiti all’operatività della connessione come criterio di collegamento giurisdizionale. — 6. Implied limitations e poteri di indagine del giudice nazionale.

1. Premessa. — Il 19 agosto 2011 si verificò un grave incidente aereo nel quale un elicottero si schiantò nelle acque di Campos Basin in Brasile e quattro persone persero COMMENTI E RASSEGNE

REGNO UNITO - HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE la vita. Il proprietario e l’utilizzatore dell’elicottero convennero in giudizio nel Regno Unito cinque società del gruppo Agusta Westland, tra le quali la società di diritto inglese Agusta Westland Ltd. Secondo la prospettazione degli attori, una volta radicata la giurisdizione inglese nei confronti del convenuto Agusta Westland Ltd. sulla base del domicilio, la stessa giurisdi- zione inglese si sarebbe estesa nei confronti degli altri convenuti, domiciliati in Italia e nei Paesi Bassi, per effetto dell’art. 8.1 del Regolamento (UE) n. 1215/2012 (di seguito il “Regolamento”). I convenuti contestarono tale prospettazione, argomentando che l’inesistenza di un “viable or sustainable claim” nei confronti della società inglese convenuta sulla base del domicilio (“anchor defendant”), facesse venir meno la possibilità di utilizzare il criterio della connessione nei confronti degli altri convenuti non domiciliati nel Regno Unito. Il tema posto all’attenzione della Commercial Court era dunque quello dei limiti alla utilizzabilità del criterio di collegamento giurisdizionale della connessione, con partico- lare riferimento alle ipotesi in cui la domanda nei confronti dell’anchor defendant non appaia seriamente fondata, tanto da ingenerare il sospetto di una sua natura puramente strumentale, funzionale ad attrarre altri convenuti nella giurisdizione ritenuta più favo- revole dall’attore. In mancanza di un qualche meccanismo di selezione, il criterio della connessione si presterebbe infatti all’esercizio del forum shopping (1), sottraendo il convenuto che costituisce il reale obiettivo dell’attore al “foro naturale” del suo domicilio. Tale oppor- tunità si presenta in modo particolarmente evidente quando (come nel caso deciso dalla 203 Commercial Court) la controparte sia un gruppo multinazionale con società costituite ed operanti in diversi ordinamenti nazionali: l’attore potrà allora instaurare il giudizio nei confronti del convenuto effettivo nella giurisdizione nella quale si trovi un’altra società del gruppo, anche se quest’ultima abbia avuto un ruolo marginale (o del tutto inesistente) nel rapporto controverso. 2. La giurisdizione per connessione nel Regolamento (UE) n. 1215/2012. — Come si vedrà, l’art. 8.1 del Regolamento non fornisce risposte univoche agli interrogativi cui si

(1) Nella sentenza 13 luglio 2006, causa C-539/03, Roche Nederland c. Primus, la Corte di Giustizia afferma che un’applicazione troppo estesa della norma in tema di connessione pregiudicherebbe la certezza del diritto, in quanto “offrirebbe all’attore un’ampia possibilità di scelta, incoraggiando in tal modo una pratica di forum shopping”. Va peraltro segnalato che la possibilità di forum shopping sembra essere in qualche misura accettata nell’ambito dello spazio giudiziario europeo. Si vedano, con specifico riferimento alla norma in tema di connessione, le conclusioni dell’AG Mengozzi nella causa C-98/06 Freeport c. Arnoldsson (“Entro certi limiti il forum shopping, inteso ... come elezione di un foro in funzione dei vantaggi che possono derivare dal diritto sostanziale, o anche processuale ivi applicato ... è indubbiamente lecito”) e dell’AG Jaaskinen nella causa C-352/13, Cartel Damage Claims c. Evomik Degussa (“l’esistenza del vincolo di concessione prescritto dall’art. 6 punto 1 del regolamento Bruxelles I offre un’opzione a favore dell’attore, il quale ha facoltà ... di esercitare tale opzione nel modo che ritiene più opportuno e proficuo .. senza che ciò costituisca di per sé una violazione della norme sul foro competente”); per altre affermazioni più risalenti nello stesso senso cfr. le conclusioni dell’AG Colomer nella causa C-440/97, GIE Groupe Concorde c. c.te “Suhadiwarno Panjan” e dell’AG Tesauro nella causa C-406/92, The owners of the cargo lately laden on board the ship “Tatry” c. The owners of the ship “Maciej Rotaj”. COMMENTI E RASSEGNE

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è fatto cenno ed anche la giurisprudenza della Corte di Giustizia non riesce a chiarire del tutto quali siano i limiti di operatività della norma. Le coordinate all’interno delle quali si sviluppa l’analisi sono costituite da quattro esigenze non sempre agevolmente conciliabili: (i) la necessità di evitare “decisioni incompatibili” (2), (ii) l’interpretazione restrittiva delle eccezioni alla regola fondamen- tale della giurisdizione fondata sul domicilio (3), (iii) la certezza del diritto (4), (iv) l’uniformità di applicazione delle norme (5). L’art. 6.1 della Convenzione di Bruxelles del 1968 era al riguardo estremamente laconico, disponendo semplicemente che “il convenuto .. potrà inoltre essere citato: 1) in caso di pluralità di convenuti, davanti al giudice nelle cui circoscrizione è situato il domicilio di uno di essi”. La norma non prevedeva alcun ulteriore requisito. Per contro, il successivo paragrafo 2 dell’art. 6, in tema di azioni di garanzia o chiamata in causa, introduceva la limitazione che la domanda principale “non sia stata proposta per distogliere il convenuto dal giudice naturale del medesimo”. Di qui il dubbio se una limitazione della stessa natura potesse (o dovesse) essere letta in via analogica anche nell’art. 6.1 della Convenzione (6). Il primo, rilevante, intervento della Corte di Giustizia in relazione all’art. 6.1 della Convenzione di Bruxelles è costituito dalla sentenza Kalfelis. I paragrafi da 8 a 13 della motivazione toccano tutti i temi del dibattito. La Corte infatti: ribadisce che le eccezioni al principio della competenza fondata sul domicilio devono essere interpretate in modo da non porre a repentaglio l’esistenza stessa del principio; osserva che “ciò potrebbe verificarsi qualora un attore avesse la facoltà di citare in giudizio più convenuti al solo 204 scopo di sottrarre uno di questi convenuti alla competenza dei giudici dello Stato in cui risiede; afferma la necessità di una interpretazione autonoma della nozione di connes- sione; conclude, facendo riferimento alla relazione Jenard, che l’art. 6.1 si applica “allorché le domande promosse nei confronti di più convenuti siano connesse al mo- mento del loro esperimento, vale a dire se sussiste un interesse ad un’istruttoria e ad una pronuncia unica per evitare il rischio di soluzioni eventualmente incompatibili se le cause

(2) L’esigenza di evitare il rischio di decisioni incompatibili quale ratio fondamentale dell’art. 6.1 della Convenzione di Bruxelles del 1968 viene affermata per la prima volta dalla Corte di Giustizia nella sentenza 27 settembre 1988, causa 189/97, Kalfelis c. Bankhaus Schroeder; l’affermazione della Corte venne poi riversata nella riformulazione della norma (oggi l’art. 8.1 del Regolamento (UE) n. 1215/2012). (3) Anche questo concetto viene affermato dalla Corte di Giustizia fin dalla sentenza Kalfelis (cit. alla nota 2) e più volte ribadito; tra le più recenti cfr. le sentenze 1 dicembre 2011, causa C-145/10, Painer c. Standard Verlag e 12 luglio 2012, causa C-616/10, Solvay c. Honeywall Fluorine Products. (4) In questo senso cfr. le sentenze della Corte di Giustizia Roche Nederland (cit. alla nota 1), 13 luglio 2006, causa C-103/05, Reisch Montage c. Kiesel Baumaschinen, 22 maggio 2008, causa C-462/06, Glaxosmithkline c. Ronard. Painer (cit. alla nota 3) e Solvay (cit. alla nota 3). In argomento cfr. anche S.M. CARBONE - C.E. TUO, Il nuovo spazio giudiziario europeo in materia civile e commerciale, Torino, 2016, p. 161. (5) Il tema emerge con particolare rilevanza nella sentenza Reisch Montage (cit. alla nota 4). Nel senso della interpretazione autonoma della norma in tema di connessione cfr. anche la sentenza 21 maggio 2015, causa C-352, Cartel Damage Claims c. Akzo Nobel. (6) In questo senso, nella giurisprudenza italiana, Cass. 17 novembre 1999 n. 785, Cerbi c. M.B.J. International Broker, in Dir. mar., 2001, p. 1388 e in Riv. dir. int. priv. proc., 2000, p. 1023 e Cass. 2 dicembre 2013 n. 26937, Z.C. c. LGT Bank, in Dejure. COMMENTI E RASSEGNE

REGNO UNITO - HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE fossero decise separatamente”. Il ragionamento seguito dalla Corte nella sentenza Kalfelis viene ripreso, senza modifiche o precisazioni, nella sentenza Reunion Europe- enne (7). La definizione di connessione, elaborata dalla Corte di Giustizia nelle sentenze Kalfelis e Reunion Europeenne, si riverserà in una modifica della norma, tanto che oggi l’art. 8.1 del Regolamento richiede che “tra le domande esista un collegamento così stretto da rendere opportuna una trattazione unica e una decisione unica onde evitare il rischio di giungere a decisioni incompatibili derivanti da trattazione separata”. Non altrettanto è avvenuto invece per la precisazione relativa alla necessità di evitare che un contenuto venga sottratto troppo facilmente alla giurisdizione dello Stato ove è domici- liato (8). Il Preambolo al Regolamento non fornisce lumi circa l’interpretazione della norma in tema di connessione, limitandosi a richiamare i principi generali in tema di prevedi- bilità e certezza del diritto (9). 3. La giurisprudenza della Corte di Giustizia. — La formulazione dell’art. 6.1 del Regolamento (CE) n. 44/2001 e, successivamente, quella del tutto analoga del Regola- mento (UE) n. 1215/2012 non danno quindi risposte definitive all’interrogativo se sia possibile, opportuno o addirittura doveroso, leggere come implicito nella norma un ulteriore requisito analogo a quello previsto al paragrafo successivo per le azioni in garanzia e le chiamate in causa. Alcune decisioni della giurisprudenza italiana sembrano propendere per una rispo- sta affermativa (10) (e, come si vedrà meglio, lo stesso vale per la giurisprudenza inglese). 205 È però soprattutto alla giurisprudenza della Corte di Giustizia che occorre fare riferimento ed in particolare alle sentenze Reisch Montage, Freeport (11), Painer, Solvay e Cartel Damage Claims. Nella sentenza Reisch Montage, la Corte, da un lato, afferma che l’operare dell’art.

(7) Sentenza 23 ottobre 1998, causa C-51/97, Reunion Europeenne c. Spliethoff. (8) Al paragrafo 70 della Relazione Pocar alla Convenzione di Lugano del 30 ottobre 2007 si legge che “Il Gruppo ad hoc non ha ritenuto necessario, contrariamente all’avviso espresso dalla Commissione, di codificare l’altro principio enunciato nella Relazione Janard, per il quale la competenza si giustifica solo se la domanda non ha per solo scopo di sottrarre uno dei convenuti al suo giudice naturale. Lo stretto legame che deve esistere tra le domande, unitamente al requisito che il giudice adito deve essere quello del domicilio di uno dei convenuti, appare infatti una garanzia sufficiente ad evitare abusi nell’applicazione della norma”. T uttavia la nota 79 allo stesso passaggio della Relazione precisa che “Questa considerazione non è intesa nel senso che l’art. 6.1 possa essere interpretato in modo da consentire a un attore di intentare un’azione contro una pluralità di convenuti dinanzi al giudice competente per uno di essi al solo scopo di sottrarre gli altri convenuti al loro giudice naturale”. (9) Il paragrafo 16 del preambolo al Regolamento si limita ad affermare che “Il criterio del foro del domicilio del convenuto dovrebbe essere completato attraverso la previsione di fori alternativi, basati sul collegamento stretto tra l’autorità giurisdizionale e la controversia, ovvero al fine di agevolare la buona amministrazione della giustizia. L’esistenza di un collegamento stretto dovrebbe garantire la certezza del diritto ad evitare la possibilità che il convenuto sia citato davanti a un’autorità giurisdizionale di uno Stato membro che non sia per questi ragionevolmente prevedibile”. (10) Cfr. le sentenze cit. alla nota 6. (11) Sentenza 11 ottobre 2007, causa C-98/96, Freeport c. Arnoldsson. COMMENTI E RASSEGNE

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6.1 del Regolamento (CE) n. 44/2001 non è impedito dalla circostanza che la domanda nei confronti dell’anchor defendant sia dichiarata inammissibile per effetto di norme proces- suali nazionali; dall’altro, richiama però la sentenza Kalfelis nella parte in cui precisa che la norma in tema di connessione “non può essere interpretata in modo tale da poter consentire ad un ricorrente di proporre una domanda nei confronti di più convenuti al solo fine di sottrarre uno di questi ai giudici dello Stato membro ove egli è domiciliato”. Un anno dopo, la Corte sembra mutare orientamento con la sentenza Freeport, ove afferma che “l’art. 6 punto 1 del Regolamento n. 44/2001 si applica qualora le domande promosse nei confronti di più convenuti siano connesse ... senza che sia inoltre necessario verificare ulteriormente che dette domande non siano state presentate esclusivamente allo scopo di sottrarre uno di tali convenuti ai giudici dello Stato in cui egli ha il suo domicilio”. Per arrivare a questa conclusione la Corte, oltre a “dimenticare” un passaggio della precedente sentenza Reisc h Montage, rilegge la sentenza Kalfelis nel senso che l’esigenza di evitare un uso strumentale della norma sarebbe soddisfatto della precisa- zione della nozione di connessione quale requisito per l’operatività della norma. Nessuna traccia si ritrova invece nella decisione della Corte delle articolate argo- mentazioni dell’Avvocato Generale in tema di utilizzo abusivo o fraudolento delle norme in tema di giurisdizione (12). L’andamento a zig-zag della giurisprudenza della Corte di Giustizia prosegue con le sentenze Painer e Solvay, dove ritorna il riferimento alla sentenza Kalfelis negli stessi termini di cui alla sentenza Reisch Montage, mettendo invece tra parentesi la sentenza 206 Freeport, così da affermare nuovamente che la norma in materia di connessione non può essere applicata in modo che consenta al ricorrente di citare in giudizio più convenuti al solo scopo di sottrarre uno di questi alla competenza dei giudici dello Stato in cui risiede. Infine, con la sentenza Cartel Damage Claims, la Corte di Giustizia si sforza di conciliare le diverse posizioni che emergono dalla sua stessa precedente giurispru- denza (13). Se, da un lato, le sentenze Reisch Montage e Painer hanno ribadito che la norma in tema di connessione non può essere utilizzata per sottrarre un convenuto al giudice del suo domicilio, ma, dall’altro, la sentenza Freeport ha escluso che un’indagine di questo tipo sia necessaria in presenza del vincolo di connessione richiesto dalla medesima norma, il punto di equilibrio viene trovato nel consentire al giudice nazionale di “constatare un’eventuale elusione della norma ... solo in presenza di indizi concludenti che gli consentano di giungere alla conclusione che l’attore abbia creato o mantenuto artificiosamente le condizioni di applicazione di tale disposizione”; ciò si verifica (per esempio) quando sia dimostrata l’esistenza di una collusione tra l’attore e l’anchor defendant.

4. La giurisprudenza inglese. — I giudici inglesi hanno avuto non poche difficoltà a ricostruire una posizione univoca sulla base della giurisprudenza della Corte di Giustizia appena ricordata; tali difficoltà, derivanti dalle incertezze della stessa Corte e dall’ambiguità di alcuni passaggi delle motivazioni, sono state forse ulteriormente au-

(12) Cfr. in particolare i paragrafi 47-66 delle conclusioni dell’AG Mengozzi. (13) Nella sentenza 15 ottobre 2019, JSC Commercial Bank, la Court of Appeal inglese osserva che le sentenze Reisch Montage e Freeport esprimono “conflicting principles”, tesi e antitesi, rispetto ai quali la sentenza Cartel Damage Claims costituirebbe la sintesi. COMMENTI E RASSEGNE

REGNO UNITO - HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE mentate dalla impossibilità di ricorrere a valutazioni di tipo discrezionale, come quelle ad essi consentite quando si muovono al di fuori dello spazio giudiziario europeo (14). Due recenti decisioni della Court of Appeal illustrano bene queste difficoltà. Nel caso Sabbagh (15), la maggioranza (LJ Patten e Beatson) dopo aver sottolineato preli- minarmente come ciascuna sentenza della Corte di Giustizia prenda in considerazione soltanto “a limited question” ed occorra quindi cautela nel generalizzarne le conclusioni, ritiene che, qualora la domanda nei confronti dell’anchor defendant sia “hopeless”, ci si trovi in una situazione equivalente a quella della domanda proposta al solo scopo di sottrarre un altro convenuto alla giurisdizione dello Stato ove è domiciliato e quindi, sulla base della sentenza Reisch Montage, il criterio della connessione non possa operare. Tuttavia, la minoranza (LJ Gloster) giunge alla opposta conclusione, ritenendo che l’unico limite all’applicabilità dell’art. 6.1 del Regolamento (CE) n. 44/2001 sia costituito dalla prova di un “fraudolent abuse” da parte dell’attore, senza che sia invece consentita una valutazione di merito circa la totale infondatezza della domanda nei confronti dell’anchor defendant. Nel successivo caso JSC Commercial Bank (16), la Court of Appeal (anche questa volta a maggioranza) evidenzia come la differenza tra il primo ed il secondo paragrafo della norma sulla connessione sia frutto di una scelta deliberata, motivata da esigenze di certezza del diritto (17), con la conseguenza che non sia possibile estendere all’art. 6.1 del Regolamento (CE) n. 44/2001 il requisito che l’azione nei confronti dell’anchor defendant non sia proposta al solo scopo di sottrarre un altro convenuto alla giurisdizione dello Stato del suo domicilio. L’opinione di minoranza, sulla base di una lettura “riduttiva” delle sentenze Freeport 207 e Cartel Damage Claims, ritiene che, seppure con qualche precisazione introdotta da tali decisioni in merito ai poteri di indagine al riguardo del giudice nazionale (18), resti valido il principio, enunciato a partire dalla sentenza Kalfelis e fino alle sentenze Reisc h Montage e Painer, della impossibilità di utilizzare la norma sulla connessione al solo scopo di sottrarre uno dei convenuti alla giurisdizione dello Stato del suo domicilio. Infine, nella decisione oggetto di questa nota, la Commercial Court individua quattro possibili sbarramenti, o criteri di selezione, all’operare dell’art. 8.1 del Regola- mento e cioè: a) the Irreconcilable Judgements Argument b) the Sole Object Prohibition c) the Artificial Fulfilment Exception d) the Merits Test Molto sinteticamente (e con le precisazioni che verranno svolte nel paragrafo successivo): il primo corrisponde al criterio enunciato dalla Corte di Giustizia nella sentenza Kalfelis e poi tradotto nella riformulazione della norma; il secondo è quello previsto dall’art. 8.2 del Regolamento per le azioni in garanzia e la cui applicabilità anche al primo paragrafo della norma è oggetto di discussione nelle sentenze Reisch Montage, Painer, Solvay e Freeport; il terzo è quello del “fraudolent abuse” o della collusione tra le

(14) A questo riguardo cfr. M. LOPEZ DE G ONZALO, Spazio giudiziario europeo e forum non conveniens: una difficile convivenza, in Dir. comm. int., 2019, p. 841. (15) Court of Appeal - Civil Division 28 luglio 2017, Sabbagh c. Khoury. (16) Court of Appeal - Civil Division 15 ottobre 2019, cit. alla nota 13. (17) A questo riguardo si fa riferimento alla Relazione Pocar (cit. alla nota 9). (18) Cfr. più ampiamente infra, al paragrafo 6. COMMENTI E RASSEGNE

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parti, di cui alla sentenza Cartel Damage Claims; il quarto è quello ritenuto comunque applicabile dalla maggioranza della Court of Appeal nel caso Sabbagh e specificamente oggetto di dibattito di fronte alla Commercial Court. Dopo aver enunciato la premessa che “it must be accepted that there must be some sort of implied limitation on the operation of Article 8(1)” ed aver condotto una accurata analisi dei precedenti, il giudice Waksman giunge alla conclusione che il Merits Test non sia escluso dalla giurisprudenza della Corte di Giustizia (che non avrebbe mai esplicita- mente trattato l’argomento) e trovi autorevole supporto nella sentenza della Court of Appeal nel caso Sabbagh. 5. I diversi possibili limiti all’operatività della connessione come criterio di collega- mento giurisdizionale. — L’enunciazione, nella sentenza della Commercial Court, di quattro possibili criteri di sbarramento all’operatività dell’art. 8.1 del Regolamento è certamente utile a districarsi nel difficile compito di fare chiarezza in merito alla rilevanza ed utilizzabilità dei possibili limiti all’utilizzo della giurisdizione per connessione. Se infatti è facile concordare sull’affermazione di principio che “there must be some sort of implied limitation on the operation of Articole 8(1)”, assai meno facile è determinare quale sia esattamente tale “implied limitation”. Occorre quindi chiedersi, per ciascuno dei quattro criteri sopra ricordati, da un lato, se e come si differenzi dagli altri e, dall’altro, se e in che misura sia compatibile con la norma. Il compito è relativamente agevole per il criterio degli Irreconcilable Judgements, dal momento che non è in realtà una implied limitation ma è invece esplicitato nella 208 formulazione della norma (19). Si tratterà piuttosto di valutare se esso escluda in radice altre implied limitations o in qualche modo le assorba. Ben più complessa è l’analisi relativa al criterio del Sole Purpose, sul quale permane una notevole ambiguità (20). Il criterio è espressamente previsto nel secondo paragrafo della norma (dove forse è poco utile) ma non nel primo (dove avrebbe potuto svolgere una funzione più rilevante) e non è chiaro fino a che punto tale differenza sia deliberata e quale significato le vada attribuito. Dal canto suo, la Corte di Giustizia, pur senza mai rinnegare la sentenza Kalfelis, sembrerebbe aver escluso la rilevanza del criterio con la sentenza Freeport. Una possibile chiave di lettura, che consenta di riconciliare decisioni di segno apparentemente opposto, potrebbe consistere nel considerare che il criterio di sbarra- mento del Sole Purpose sia assorbito da quello degli Irreconciliable Judgements, nel senso che la presenza di vincolo di connessione sufficientemente stretto possa far ritenere che la domanda nei confronti dell’anchor defendant non sia proposta al solo scopo di sottrarre un altro convenuto ai giudici del suo domicilio (21). Resterebbe però da vedere se si tratti

(19) Come ricordato, il rischio di decisioni inconciliabili costituiva una “implied limita- tion” nel testo della Convenzione di Bruxelles del 1968, venne fatto emergere dalla Corte di Giustizia a partire dalla sentenza Kalfelis e poi reso esplicito della riformulazione della norma. (20) Nelle sue conclusioni nella causa Cartel Damage Claims l’AG Jaaskinen definisce “ambigua” la soluzione adottata dalla Corte nella sentenza Freeport. (21) Una indicazione in questo senso si può trarre già dal par. 9 della sentenza Kalfelis, ove la Corte rileva che la necessità di accertare che vi sia connessione tra le domande serve lo scopo di evitare che la norma venga utilizzata allo scopo di sottrarre uno dei convenuti alla competenza dei giudici dello Stato di residenza. Cfr. anche il passo della Relazione Pocar cit. alla nota 9. COMMENTI E RASSEGNE

REGNO UNITO - HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE di una presunzione assoluta (22) o di una presunzione relativa (23), suscettibile di essere superata in alcune circostanze. Inoltre, sul piano pratico, si possono immaginare circostanze nelle quali la domanda nei confronti dell’anchor defendant, pur indubbiamente connessa (sotto il profilo del rischio di decisioni inconciliabili), appaia dettata dal solo fine di attrarre altri convenuti nella giurisdizione ritenuta più favorevole dall’attore (24). Il criterio dell’Artificial Fulfilment corrisponde con buona approssimazione a quello dell’abuso del diritto o dell’utilizzazione fraudolenta o abusiva dei “titoli di giurisdi- zione”. Il requisito della frode o dell’abuso del diritto è evidentemente qualcosa di più e di diverso rispetto al criterio del Sole Purpose (25). L’esistenza di uno sbarramento fondato sul criterio dell’Artificial Fulfilment trova una certa rispondenza nella sentenza Cartel Damage Claims, ove si afferma che la connessione non può operare come titolo di giurisdizione quando “l’attore abbia creato o mantenuto artificiosamente le condizioni di applicazione di tale disposizione”, come si verifica nel caso di collusione tra attore e anchor denfendant. Uno spunto (peraltro poco approfondito) in questo senso si trova anche in una decisione delle Sezioni Unite (26). Seppure se ne escluda la autonoma rilevanza, la sussistenza del Sole Purpose rispetto alla domanda nei confronti dell’anchor defendant potrebbe avere un valore indiziario rispetto al diverso e più rigoroso test dell’Artificial Fulfilment; o, forse, il secondo assorbe completamente il primo, aggiungendovi però ulteriori elementi di valutazione (27). Non mi sembra invece possibile ricondurre né al testo della norma né alla (pur sfaccettata, per non dire ambigua) giurisprudenza della Corte di Giustizia, il Merits Test. Le Corti inglesi hanno affermato la rilevanza del Merits Test sulla base dell’argomento 209

(22) S.M. CARBONE - C.E. TUO, op. cit., p. 164 ritengono che “la comprovata sussistenza ... di un adeguato vincolo di connessione tra le domande deve giudicarsi condizione necessaria e sufficiente a escludere la possibilità di un’utilizzazione fraudolenta o abusiva del titolo di giurisdizione fondato sull’art. 8 n. 1”. (23) In questo senso il par. 60 delle conclusioni dell’AG Mengozzi nella causa Freeport. (24) Così per es. nella vicenda oggetto di questa nota, la domanda nei confronti della società inglese del gruppo Agusta W estland era ragionevolmente connessa con quella nei confronti della società italiana, ma verosimilmente strumentale. (25) L’AG Mengozzi (al par. 62 delle conclusioni nella causa Freeport), si esprime in termini di “manipolazione dei criteri di collegamento tale da creare artificiosamente il titolo di giurisdizione”; l’AG Jaaskinen (al par. 88 delle conclusioni nella causa Cartel Damage Claims) parla di “manovra ingannevole”. (26) Cass. S.U. 9 febbraio 2015 n. 2360, D. G. c. Chevron Nigeria, in DeJure, ove la Corte afferma che “risulta infatti costante, nella giurisprudenza di questa Corte, l’affermazione che il principio surricordato, di attrazione alla giurisdizione nazionale, per ragioni di connes- sione, della domanda proposta anche nei confronti dello straniero, non opera allorquando la prospettazione della domanda sia artificiosamente finalizzata a sottrarre la controversia al giudice precostituito per legge”; è singolare notare la assenza di qualsiasi riferimento alla giurisprudenza della Corte di Giustizia, ed in particolare alle sentenze Reisch Montage e Freeport. (27) Sulla sovrapponibilità o meno del criterio del Sole Purpose con quello dell’Artifi- cial Fulfilment cfr. le contrastanti opinioni della maggioranza e della minoranza della Court of Appeal inglese nel caso JSC Commercial Bank (cit. alla nota 13). Secondo l’AG Mengozzi (par. 64-65 delle conclusioni nel caso Freeport), l’applicazione analogica del criterio del Sole Purpose previsto per le azioni in garanzia consentirebbe di escludere l’applicazione del primo paragrafo della norma “ove risulti diretta a soddisfare interessi non meritevoli di tutela”. COMMENTI E RASSEGNE

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che le decisioni della Corte di Giustizia non hanno mai affrontato espressamente il tema e quindi non hanno mai esplicitamente escluso l’ammissibilità di questo tipo di valuta- zioni (28). A ben vedere, però, la riluttanza manifestata dalla Corte di Giustizia ad ammettere implied limitations (in aggiunta al criterio esplicito degli Irr econciliable Judgements) all’operare della giurisdizione per connessione, dovrebbe condurre alla soluzione opposta (29). Uno spazio di rilevanza potrebbe residuare per il Merits T est come indizio per la valutazione nella applicazione del criterio dell’Artificial Fulfilment, ne senso che la manifesta totale infondatezza della domanda nei confronti dell’anchor defendant po- trebbe costituire al più una spia dell’intento fraudolento dell’attore (30). 6. Implied limitations e poteri di indagine del giudice nazionale. — Il tema della individuazione degli eventuali limiti all’operare della giurisdizione per connessione è intrecciato con quello della definizione dei poteri di indagine del giudice nazionale circa la sussistenza in concreto di tali limiti. La riluttanza della Corte di Giustizia (e prima ancora del legislatore europeo) a riconoscere l’esistenza di sbarramenti ulteriori rispetto a quello, esplicitamente previsto, del rischio di decisioni inconciliabili, si spiega in qualche misura anche con il timore che consentire un tale ordine di valutazioni al giudice nazionale possa, da un lato, aprire la strada al ricorso a norme interne (a scapito dell’uniformità) e, dall’altro, compromettere la certezza del diritto, aprendo la strada ad un “mini-trial” sul merito delle domande in una fase processuale in cui il dibattito dovrebbe essere limitato alla questione della sussistenza della giurisdizione. 210 Queste preoccupazioni emergono con estrema chiarezza nella sentenza Ko- lassa (31), ove la Corte rileva che “l’obiettivo di certezza del diritto esige che il giudice nazionale adito possa pronunciarsi agevolmente sulla propria competenza, senza essere costretto a procedere all’esame della causa nel merito” e che “un obbligo di procedere, già in tale fase del procedimento, ad un’istruzione probatoria dettagliata degli elementi di fatto pertinenti, afferenti sia alla competenza sia al merito, rischierebbe di pregiudicare l’azione di quest’ultimo”, con la conseguenza che “il giudice nazionale adito non è dunque obbligato ... a procedere ad un’istruzione probatoria in sede di determinazione della competenza” (32). In questa prospettiva acquistano contorni più definiti alcuni passaggi delle sentenze

(28) Secondo questa analisi, la sentenza Reisch Montage avrebbe trattato solo il caso in cui la domanda nei confronti dell’anchor defendant sia inammissibile per motivi riconducibili alle norme procedurali nazionali, mentre le sentenze F reeport e Cartel Damage Claims avrebbero esaminato la Sole Purpose Prohibition e la Artif icial Fulfilment Exception, senza prendere posizione in merito al Merit Test; cfr. le sentenze Sabbagh (cit. alla nota 15) e JSC Commecial Bank (cit. alla nota 13). (29) Cfr. però l’affermazione, seppure incidentale, al par. 70 delle conclusioni dell’AG Mengozzi nella causa Freeport nel senso che l’esame del rischio di decisioni incompatibili “possa comportare anche una valutazione delle possibilità di accoglimento della domanda nei confronti del convenuto domiciliato nello Stato membro del giudice adito... ove risulti che detta domanda è manifestamente irricevibile o priva di ogni fondamento”. (30) In questo senso cfr. la decisione di maggioranza nella sentenza Sabbagh (cit. alla nota 15). (31) Sentenza 28 gennaio 2015b causa C-375/13, Kolassa c. Barclays Bank. (32) La sentenza K olassa non si riferisce ad un caso relativo alla giurisdizione per connessione, ma le affermazioni ivi contenute hanno portata generale e vengono ampiamente COMMENTI E RASSEGNE

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Freeport e Cartel Damage Claims. Nella prima, la Corte, dopo aver richiamato la sentenza Kalfelis, anche nella parte relativa alla limitazione del Sole Purpose, ritiene che, una volta accertata la sussistenza della necessaria connessione tra le domande, non “sia inoltre necessario verificare ulteriormente che dette domande non siano state presentate esclu- sivamente allo scopo di sottrarre uno di tali convenuti ai giudici dello Stato membro in cui egli ha il suo domicilio”. Il discorso sembra quindi spostarsi dal piano dell’interpretazione della norma a quello dei poteri di indagine del giudice nazionale, nel senso che l’accertamento della connessione determini una presunzione circa l’assenza del Sole Purpose (o, più in generale, di un utilizzo abusivo della norma), escludendo quindi la necessità di ulteriori indagini. Nella sentenza Freeport, la Corte non si spinge fino a precisare se ed in quali casi tale presunzione possa essere vinta, ma qualche indicazione viene fornita nella successiva sentenza Cartel Damage Claims, dove il punto di equilibrio tra la riaffermazione della Sole Purpose Prohibition e la esclusione della necessità di verificare la sussistenza di tale Sole Purpose viene trovato nel potere (rectius “potere-dovere”) del giudice nazionale di escludere l’applicazione della norma in tema di connessione in presenza di “indizi concludenti che gli consentano di giungere alla conclusione che l’attore abbia creato o mantenuto artificiosamente le condizioni di applicazione di tale disposizione”. Mentre sul piano sostanziale si verifica uno slittamento (non è chiaro fino a che punto consapevole e meditato) da Sole Purpose ad Artificial Fulfilment, sul piano processuale sembra che il potere di indagine del giudice nazionale sia limitato ai casi in cui vi sia la “prova liquida” dell’utilizzo abusivo o fraudolento della norma in tema di 211 concessione (33).

MARCO L OPEZ DE G ONZALO

citate dalla Court of Appeal nelle sentenze Sabbagh (cit. alla nota 15) e JSC Commercial Bank (cit. alla nota 13) e dalla Commercial Court nella sentenza oggetto di questa nota. (33) Nel senso che la sentenza Cartel Damage Claims sia principalmente una sentenza in tema di onere della prova si esprime la decisione di minoranza della Court of Appeal nella sentenza JSC Commercial Bank (cit. alla nota 13).