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Derailed Transitional Justice in Indonesia Since the Fall of Soeharto Indonesia Derailed Transitional Justice in Indonesia Since the Fall of Soeharto

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Derailed Transitional Justice in Indonesia Since the Fall of Soeharto Indonesia Derailed Transitional Justice in Indonesia Since the Fall of Soeharto Derailed Transitional Justice in Indonesia Since the Fall of Soeharto INDONESIA Derailed Transitional Justice in Indonesia Since the Fall of Soeharto March 2011 A joint report by ICTJ and KontraS ICTJ - KontraS Acknowledgements ICTJ and KontraS would like to acknowledge the primary authors of this paper: Yati Andriyani, Ari Bassin, Chrisbiantoro, Tony Francis, Papang Hidayat, Puri Kencana Putri, and Galuh Wandita. Significant contributions and editorial support were also provided by Haris Azhar, Daud Bereuh, Karen Campbell-Nelson, Ross Clarke, Matthew Easton, Indria Fernida, Usman Hamid, Carolyn Nash, Ali Nursahid, Sri Lestari Wahyuningroem and Dodi Yuniar. Research and publication costs for this paper were supported by the European Union. The contents of this document are the responsibility of ICTJ and KontraS, under no circumstances can they be regarded as reflecting the position of the European Union. About the International Center for Transitional Justice The International Center for Transitional Justice works to redress and prevent the most severe violations of human rights by confronting legacies of mass abuse. ICTJ seeks holistic solutions to promote accountability and create just and peaceful societies. About KontraS KontraS (Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence) was established in 1998 by Indonesian human rights NGOs and student organizations in response to the increase in political violence and abductions committed toward the end of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime. KontraS is working toward a democracy based on people’s sovereignty, free from fear, oppression, violence, and human rights violations. To learn more, visit www.kontras.org. About EIDHR The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) is an initiative by the European Commission that aims to promote human rights, democracy and conflict prevention in non-EU countries by providing financial support for activities supporting these goals. ISBN: 978-602-97558-1-7 © ICTJ and KontraS 2011. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without full attribution. www.ictj.org D erailed Transitional Justice in Indonesia Since the Fall of Soeharto Contents Abbreviations and Key Terms Executive Summary .................................................................................................... 1 I. Goals and Methodology ........................................................................................ 7 A. Methodology ............................................................................................................. 7 B. Transitional Justice Framework .................................................................................. 8 II. Historical Context ................................................................................................. 11 A. Soeharto’s New Order Era .......................................................................................... 11 B. Three Waves of Reformasi .......................................................................................... 12 1. Momentous Change (1998-2000) ....................................................................... 12 2. Compromised Mechanisms (2001-06) ................................................................. 13 3. Stalled Reform in Jakarta (2007-11) .................................................................... 14 III. Truth-seeking ........................................................................................................ 17 A. Overview of Truth-seeking Mechanisms and Initiatives.............................................. 17 1. First-line Response: Fact-finding Teams and Investigative Commissions .............. 17 a. Joint Fact-finding Team for the Events of May 1998 ........................................ 18 b. Independent Commission for the Investigation of Violence in Aceh ................ 19 c. Fact-finding Team on the Assassination of Theys Eluay .................................... 20 d. National Investigation Team on Maluku .......................................................... 21 e. Fact-finding Team on Poso ............................................................................... 21 2. National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) ...................................... 24 3. National Commission on Violence Against Women (Komnas Perempuan) ......... 25 4. Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF) ....................................................... 26 5. National Truth and Reconciliation Commission .................................................. 29 6. Local TRCs .......................................................................................................... 31 B. Assessment of Truth-seeking Mechanisms and Initiatives ........................................... 32 1. Failure to Uncover Core Elements Behind Violations .......................................... 32 www.kontras.org ICTJ - KontraS 2. Lack of Cooperation from the Security Sector ..................................................... 33 3. Composition of Fact-finding Teams ..................................................................... 34 4. Pressure and Intimidation .................................................................................... 35 5. Failure to Release Findings ................................................................................... 36 6. Lack of Public Participation and Engagement with Victims ................................. 36 IV. Judicial Proceedings .............................................................................................. 37 A. Overview of Judicial Mechanisms and Processes ........................................................ 37 1. Human Rights Courts ................................................................................................ 37 a. The Legal and nstitutionalI Framework ............................................................ 37 b. The Record of the Human Rights Courts ......................................................... 46 i. Ad Hoc Human Rights Court for East Timor ............................................... 46 ii. Ad Hoc Human Rights Court for Tanjung Priok ......................................... 48 iii. Makassar Human Rights Court on the Abepura Case ................................. 48 iv. Results of the Human Rights Trials .............................................................. 49 v. Broken Promises for Human Rights Courts: Aceh and Papua ....................... 51 2. Military and Joint Military-Civilian Trials ............................................................ 51 3. Trials in the Criminal Courts ............................................................................... 54 4. Civil Trials ........................................................................................................... 55 5. Legal Action in Other Countries .......................................................................... 55 a. ATCA Cases in U.S. Courts ............................................................................. 55 b. Exxon Mobil Case in U.S. Courts .................................................................... 56 c. Investigations by Australian Federal Police ....................................................... 56 d. Investigation by UN Investigators .................................................................... 57 B. Assessment of Judicial Proceedings............................................................................. 58 1. Lack of Commitment from the AGO .................................................................. 59 2. Show Trials to Protect Those Most Responsible for Crimes .................................. 59 3. Lack of Political Support for Accountability ......................................................... 59 4. Weak and Corrupt Judiciary ................................................................................ 60 5. Intimidation and Poor Witness Protection ........................................................... 60 6. Lack of Transparency ........................................................................................... 61 7. Convictions Not Linked to Reparations ............................................................... 61 8. Absence of Trials for Sexual Violations ................................................................. 61 V. Reparations ........................................................................................................... 63 A. Overview of Reparations Mechanisms and Processes .................................................. 63 1. Legislation .................................................................................................................. 64 2. Reparations through the Courts .................................................................................. 65 a. Criminal Cases ................................................................................................. 65 b. Civil Cases ....................................................................................................... 65 www.ictj.org D erailed Transitional Justice in Indonesia Since the Fall of Soeharto 3. Compensating Victims under the Aceh Peace Process .................................................... 66 B. Assessment of Reparations ........................................................................................
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