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John Bell Hood: Extracting Truth from History

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John Bell Hood: Extracting Truth from History San Jose State University SJSU ScholarWorks Master's Theses Master's Theses and Graduate Research Summer 2011 John Bell Hood: Extracting Truth from History Thomas John Brown San Jose State University Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/etd_theses Recommended Citation Brown, Thomas John, "John Bell Hood: Extracting Truth from History" (2011). Master's Theses. 4040. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31979/etd.a3vw-nyef https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/etd_theses/4040 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Master's Theses and Graduate Research at SJSU ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of SJSU ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected]. JOHN BELL HOOD: EXTRACTING TRUTH FROM HISTORY A Thesis Presented to The Faculty of the Department of History San Jose State University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts by Thomas J. Brown August 2011 ©2011 Thomas J. Brown ALL RIGHTS RESERVED The Designated Thesis Committee Approves the Thesis Titled JOHN BELL HOOD: EXTRACTING TRUTH FROM HISTORY by Thomas J. Brown APPROVED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY SAN JOSE STATE UNIVERSITY August 2011 Dr. Libra Hilde Department of History Dr. Jeffrey Hummel Department of Economics Dr. Mary Pickering Department of History ABSTRACT JOHN BELL HOOD: EXTRACTING TRUTH FROM HISTORY by Thomas J. Brown The year 2011 brings us the Sesquicentennial celebration of the American Civil War. Surprisingly, one hundred and fifty years later, students continue to find themselves asking many of the same questions about the great national tragedy faced during the Centennial in 1961. For example, did slavery cause the great conflict, or did constitutional questions act as the catalyst? Does the Battle of Gettysburg represent the turning point of the War, or did that occur elsewhere? In connection with the last question, Lost Cause advocates, those great pro- Confederacy propagandists, found convenient villains to blame for the southern defeat. One of these, Confederate General John Bell Hood, plays an important role. This paper contends that in his case, the Lost Cause is wrong, and that Hood’s historical treatment has been false. Standard critical treatment of John Bell Hood over the years has tended to characterize the general as rash, overaggressive, and lacking in strategic imagination. For such critical historians, Hood appears as old-fashioned and someone limited logistically to the frontal assault. These accounts mainly stress his negative aspects as a soldier and tend to center around the Battle of Franklin. This thesis, by analyzing every battle that Hood commanded as a leader of the Army of Tennessee, particularly those fought around Atlanta, reveals him to have been a far more bold, imaginative, and complex leader than has previously been portrayed. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would first like to thank my dedicated thesis advisor Dr. Libra Hilde for her immeasurable help and support throughout the process of this paper. I am also appreciative of my two other committee members, Professors Mary Pickering and Jeffrey Hummel, for their in timely work evaluating my paper. Many thanks to my good friend Sam Hood of West Virginia, for guiding me to excellent sources, corresponding regularly, and sharing with me his knowledge and respect of his distant cousin, John Bell Hood. Dr. Brandon Beck, retired professor from Shenandoah University, provided me with his military expertise and overall knowledge of Civil War events. I extend sincere gratitude to my friend and fellow brother in the Sons of Union Veterans of the Civil War, Bob Nelson, for donating to me several excellent books from his precious collection, most notably a beautiful set of the Battles and Leaders Series . Last but not least, I must acknowledge my supportive family and friends, who have endured this lengthy journey with me. Love and thanks to my mother and father, Yvonne and Ed Brown, and my wife, Kathryn, for the countless hours she spent typing and editing my “masterpiece.” I am thankful for Dr. Amy Lin and her staff at UCSF who have monitored my health situation these past two years and made it possible for me to continue my educational program. Dr. Thomas Bradley and the staff of Community Hospital of the Monterey Peninsula also receive my deepest thanks. v TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS v INTRODUCTION: Historical Trauma 1 CHAPTER 1: Education 16 CHAPTER 2: Into the Vortex 33 CHAPTER 3: The Road to Franklin 73 CHAPTER 4: Nashville 115 CHAPTER 5: Battle and Retreat 147 CHAPTER 6: Through a Glass Darkly 168 CHAPTER 7: Conclusion 193 BIBLIOGRAPHY 205 vi Introduction Historical Trauma The standard portrait of Confederate General John Bell Hood created by historians reveals an emotionally troubled, over-aggressive, careless man possessing little regard for the welfare of his soldiers. Historical writer Wiley Sword, for instance, labels Hood “a fool with a license to kill his own troops.” 1 The Battle at Franklin, Tennessee, November 30, 1864, is examined in detail in this paper. Historian Thomas Robson Hay called it “an unnecessary and bloody fight, waged in an effort to make up for the hesitation the day before at Spring Hill.”2 Certainly Franklin stands as one of the bloodiest assaults of the war; nearly 2000 Confederates died, but its necessity is debatable. This battle is positioned at the center of all controversies surrounding General Hood. Franklin represented the end-result of three attempts by Hood to corner a 20,000 man Union army commanded by James Schofield, and prevent it from joining a greater force being assembled by General George H. Thomas at Nashville. Historian Winston Groom writes that “from Hood’s perspective…the elusive Schofield was there in plain sight ─ a desperate plan for desperate times.” 3 The argument presented in this thesis contends that Hood’s frontal assault, far from being wild or careless, stood as an impetus 1 Wiley Sword, The Confederacy’s Last Hurrah: Spring Hill, Franklin and Nashville (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 263. 2 Thomas Robson Hay, Hood’s Tennessee Campaign (Dayton, Ohio: Morningside Bookshop, 1976), 130. Hay’s work was originally published as an essay in 1920. 3 Winston Groom, Shrouds of Glory: From Atlanta to Nashville: The Last Great Campaign of the Civil War (New York: Grove Press, 1995), 218. 1 of a massed charge ─ if the attackers could get close enough to a defensive position ─ often tended to dislodge the defenders. 4 Historian Stanley F. Horn accuses Hood of lashing “out viciously at his subordinates, placing blame everywhere but where it belonged ─himself.” 5 As this study will show, Hood had good reason for being angry with some of his officers following failure at Spring Hill, but he also accepted responsibility. In a letter of resignation addressed to the troops at Tupelo, Mississippi, on January 23, 1865, in reference to the Tennessee Campaign, Hood stated “I am alone responsible for its conception.” 6 Finally, in his memoirs Hood declared plainly “I failed utterly to bring on battle at Spring Hill.” 7 Hood’s acceptance of blame for the entire campaign is generous. While the original conception may have been his, Confederate President Jefferson Davis, Secretary of War, James Seddon, and General Beauregard endorsed the plan. Hood could no more have carried out the campaign without their approval than could Sherman have undertaken the March to the Sea without the approbation of President Lincoln, Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton, and General Ulysses S. Grant. Another common assertion is made by Horn when he states that in deciding upon the assault at Franklin, “Hood was consumed with…burning impetuosity,” and further that “he could not wait…long enough to make further preparations.” 8 As stated above, Franklin represented Hood’s final opportunity to negate Schofield’s force. With daylight 4 Groom, Shrouds of Glory , 218. 5 Stanley F. Horn, The Army of Tennessee (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1953), 394. 6 The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies , Series I, Vol. XLV, part 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880), 805. Note: Hereafter cited as OR. 7 Lt. General John Bell Hood , Advance and Retreat (Edison: Blue and Gray Press, 1985), 287. 8 Horn, The Army of Tennessee, 398. 2 fast disappearing, and Union troops already moving across the Harpeth River toward Nashville, he could not afford to wait for his third corps. It would have arrived after dark, and placing artillery under those conditions would have been problematic and time consuming. By daylight, as Hood knew, Schofield would have been gone. Historian Thomas Connelly condemns Hood’s aggressiveness, commenting that he arrived in the western theater with a “reputation as a reckless individual.” 9 Connelly adds that Hood’s impetuosity developed with success enjoyed while in Lee’s army in Virginia and critically that “He had not abandoned his love of aggressive tactics” by 1864. Taking this further, he also accuses Hood of being a borderline “psychotic” who “associated valor with casualty figures.” 10 As will be discussed, historians Grady McWhiney and Perry Jamison argue persuasively that such aggressiveness was a common characteristic of Confederate officers, and moreover, that “southerners, imprisoned in a culture that rejected careful calculation and patience, often refused to learn from their mistakes.” 11 Thus Hood, far from being unusual, actually reflected the culture of his region. In short, southerners during the antebellum and Civil War years indulged in defensive-aggressive feelings toward the North, which they regarded as a threat to their way of life. Historian James Lee McDonough not only echoed his former professor, Thomas Connelly, but imitated a technique employed by Wiley Sword, using strings of anti-Hood 9 Thomas L.
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