Radenko Šćekić DOI: 10.2298/BALC1546079S Original scholarly work Žarko Leković http://www.balcanica.rs Historical Institute of Montenegro Podgorica

Marijan Premović Faculty of Philosophy Nikšić

Political Developments and Unrests in Stara Raška (Old Rascia) and Old Herzegovina during Ottoman Rule

Abstract: During the centuries of Ottoman rule the Tara and Lim river valleys (or Potarje and Polimlje respectively), the Pešter Plateau and Old Herzegovina saw much turbulence, wars, rebellions, population migrations. This chaotic situation was combined with the arbitrary and repressive conduct of local Ottoman feudal lords. Migrations, interethnic contacts and mixing of populations as well as an intensified Islamization process caused by a number of factors greatly complicated the situation. Albanian northward penetration along the Lim and into Pešter as well as the expan- sion of the Vasojevići tribe into the Upper Lim valley added to the complexity of the ethnic and demographic picture of the region. Perpetual rebellions against the Otto- man occupation eventually led to the liberation of the Serbian Orthodox population of these areas. Keywords: Stara Raška (Old Rascia), Brda (Highlands), Old Herzegovina, Ottoman Empire, rebellions, migrations

Introduction or the sake of clarity let us first define some terms used in this article. Stara Raška (Old Rascia) is the old name for the area between the riv- ersF Drina and Ibar, the Tara and Zapadna (West) Morava. The backbone of the area is the river Lim, Pešter Plateau and Mt Zlatar. The area was the nucleus of Serbian statehood and culture both in the middle ages and later, and it has been known as a “link” connecting Serb-inhabited areas. Brda or Highlands is the old name for the area of present-day Montenegro between the rivers Lim and Tara in the north and the rivers Zeta and Morača in the south. It encompassed the tribal territories of Bjelopavlići, Piperi, Rovčani, Moračani, Kuči, Bratonožići and Vasojevići. The name became established in the eighteenth century for the areas of those highland tribes that did

* [email protected] 80 Balcanica XLVI (2015) not manage to unite with the semi-autonomous region known as Nahiye Montenegro. In his History of Montenegro of 1754, the Montenegrin ruler and metropolitan Vasilije Petrović Njegoš describes the river Morača as the boundary between Montenegro and Brda. Piperi and Bjelopavlići united with the semi-autonomous Montenegrin state in 1779 de facto and in 1796 formally. By 1878 all Brda tribes were integrated within the Principality of Montenegro. Until the conquest of Buda in 1541, the Ottoman Empire’s Balkan possessions formed part of the eyalet of Rumelia with its centre in So- fia, and subsequently were divided into several newly-established eyalets (pashaliks). Pashaliks were subdivided into sanjaks, and these into smaller subdivisions such as kazas and nahiyes and administrative areas adminis- tered by mutesellims. Judicial districts, kadiliks, were considerably larger than nahiyes. Urban settlements were classified by importance and size into sehers, pazars and kasabas. By the end of the fifteenth century Ottoman rule in the Lim Polim( - lje) and Tara (Potarje) river valleys had been consolidated.1 The process of consolidation was accompanied by the construction or renovation of towns and fortresses which were to serve as administrative and military centres. The town of Brskovo had been taken in 1399, Bihor in 1455. In 1530 the Bihor garrison held eight timars, and the town developed and became the centre of the kadilik of Bihor. Livestock breeders in the area between the rivers Piva and Tara and in the Middle Lim valley were organized into the nahiye of Nikšići or Limski Nikšići.2 It was registered as a nahiye within the landholding of Isa Bey Isaković. The Upper Lim valley at first was incorpo- rated into the sanjak of Prizren.3 Tarski Nikšići encompassed several villages gravitating towards the river Tara.4 It may be assumed with much certainty that the Kuči tribe recognized Ottoman authority after the fall of the forti- fied town of Medun in 1457, and that Ottoman rule in Zeta and Brda was consolidated after the conquest of Scutari.

1 In the fifteenth century in these regions the construction of tribal society began on the ruins of the medieval Serbian feudal system. The organization of Ottoman rule in the tribal areas was based on lower self-governing units: nahija, knežina and village. Cf. Branislav Djurdjev, “Postanak i razvitak brdskih, crnogorskih i hercegovačkih plemena” (Titograd: CANU, 1984), 156. 2 Hazim Šabanović, Bosanski pašaluk (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1959), 34. 3 Miomir Dašić, Vasojevići od pomena do 1860. godine (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1986), 99. 4 E.g. the villages of Tvrtkovici, Bistrica, Stričina, Bobanovići, Gojakovići, Bratojevići, Zorojevići, Kulizići, Lepenac, Obod, Cer, Ravna Reka. Cf. Žarko Šćepanović, “Pregled prošlosti Bijelog Polja i okoline do 1918. godine”, in Bijelo Polje (Belgrade: Stručna knjiga, 1987), 105. R. Šćekić, Ž. Leković & M. Premović, Political Developments 81

Territorial expansion of Montenegro

After the Ottoman conquest the town of Pljevlja was renamed Tasli- ja. The Slavic name Bijelo Polje was translated into Ottoman Turkish and so it figures in Ottoman administrative and court documents as Akova. Over time it developed as an extension of better-known Nikolj-pazar.5 During the seventeenth century it grew into a major commercial centre of Bihor, and in the eighteenth century had the status of a kasaba (palanka, varoš). Documents of 1707 and 1717 already refer to the fortress of Akova, its garrison and commanding cadre. In 1707 its military commander was Cap- tain Suleiman Agha, and later documents make mention of the kadi of Bijelo Polje.6 The Orthodox merchants of the economically well-developed commercial quarter of Bijelo Polje had good commercial connections and traded in wax, hides, wool, livestock and furs. They would take their goods to the markets of Scutari and Dubrovnik (Ragusa), and return with weapons, clothing and copper. It has been estimated that their share of the wool im-

5 I. Stijepčević and R. Kovijanić, “Prvi pomeni Nikolj-pazara i Bijelog Polja”, Istorijski zapisi 7.10 (Cetinje 1954), 610–611. 6 Istorija Crne Gore, vol. III (Titograd: Istorijski institut, 1975), 519. 82 Balcanica XLVI (2015) ported into Dubrovnik in the eighteenth century was at least ten per cent.7 The nahiye of Komarani was in the Middle Lim valley, occupying most of today’s Bijelo Polje and Prijepolje areas.8 Budimlja was from the beginning of Ottoman rule the centre of the eponymous nahiye and kadilik, as well as the seat of an Orthodox bishopric. In 1477 it was referred to as being situated in the sanjak of Herzegovina, in the kadilik which had its seat at Prijepolje. Somewhat later, it was incorpo- rated into the sanjak of Prizren, and in the seventeenth century became the seat of a kadilik.9 In sixteenth- and seventeenth-century sources it figures as a pazar, or market place. Retaining a rural character, it never became developed enough to be granted the status of a kasaba and eventually lost all importance and was reduced to an ordinary village.10 There were in the Upper Lim valley three nahiyes: Budimlje (or Komnin), Plav and Zla Rijeka (or Zlorečica). Upon the establishment of the sanjak of Scutari, the nahiye of Budimlja, the abovementioned nahiyes and the nahiye of Komarani con- stituted the kaza of Bihor. At the end of the seventeenth century the kadi of Prijepolje had jurisdiction over Budimlja and the nahiye of Vraneš. There- fore Budimlja belonged to the sanjak of Herzegovina at the time, and later, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, to that of Scutari.11 Rožaj (Trgovište) figures as a fortification in the first half of the -sev enteenth century, and in the eighteenth century as a strong, heavily garri- soned fortress, especially during the Austro-Ottoman war of 1718–1739.12 The town of Plav was built in the early seventeenth century, by the order of the Ottoman central authority, on the site where the caravan route from Kotor to Metohija intersected with the road that ran along the river Lim and across the Prokletije Mountains to Scutari. The newly-built for- tress, whose construction had been overseen by Bosnian Mustafa Pasha, had a permanent garrison tasked with watching and keeping in check restive tribes in northern Albania and Brda.13 Fortress Gusinje built in 1611 was subsequently enlarged, and in the eighteenth century had a permanent garrison with aghas and a captain.

7 V. Vinaver, “Trgovina Bara”, Istorijski zapisi 6/9, 2, p. 472; M. Lutovac, Privreda, saobraćaj i naselja u Rožaju i Bihoru (Belgrade: Državna štamparija, 1930), 32. 8 Dašić, Vasojevići, 100. 9 Šabanović, Bosanski pašaluk, 165. 10 Istorija Crne Gore, vol. III, 518. 11 Dašić, Vasojevići, 99, 100, 211. 12 Gligor Stanojević, “Pokret brdskih i albanskih plemena uoči Kandijskog rata”, Istoriski zapisi XVII (1960), 523–522; N. K. Kostić, Naši gradovi na jugu (Belgrade: Državna štamparija, 1922), 77. 13 Evlija Čelebija, Putopis (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1957), 261, 262, 385, 404. R. Šćekić, Ž. Leković & M. Premović, Political Developments 83

Over time the village below the fortress grew into a small town thanks to its position on a caravan route.14 During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Gusinje was not only a military but also a political and admin- istrative centre of the whole Upper Lim valley controlling the Vasojević tribal area. The fortress of Kolašin in the nahyie of Nikšići built by the Ottomans in the mid-seventeenth century had a permanent garrison which was sup- ported by the yearly tax (jizye) levied on the Christians of the nahiye of Peć. In judicial terms, it belonged to the kadilik of Prijepolje.15 The building and garrisoning of Kolašin strengthened the Ottoman feudal class in the Tara valley, creating “a fierce and deadly Muslim frontier” which exerted a strong pressure on the Orthodox areas of Rovca and Morača.16 There was also an Ottoman fortification on the Tara, on the site where the river was crossed by the trade route running from Risan via Onogošt and Jezero to Pljevlja. It was referred to as the Tower of the Bridge of the river Tara. In 1707 its gar- rison numbered some fifty soldiers and, until the mid-nineteenth century, it enjoyed the status of captaincy.17 Prijepolje was the centre of a kadilik and a transit area on the “Bos- nian road” between the south-eastern Morava–Ibar and north-western Bosnian regions. In early 1470 the conquered territory in Herzegovina was formed at first into a vilayet, and then a sanjak. Incorporated into it was also the market (town) Pljevlja as the seat of the nahiye of Kukanj. The kadilik of Pljevlja was established in the early decades of the sixteenth century and in the late seventeenth century encompassed three nahiyes: Krička, Poblaće and Podpeć.18 In 1576, until 1833, the seat of the sanjak of Herzegovina was moved from Foča to Pljevlja.19 At the beginning of the eighteenth cen- tury the kadilik of Pljevlja encompassed the nahiyes of Pljevlja, Kukanj,

14 Istorija Crne Gore, vol. III, 521. 15 G. Elezović, “Kolašin na Tari i Kolašin na Ibru, Južni pregled 1 (Skoplje 1931), 19, after Istorija Crne Gore, vol. III, 522. 16 Dašić, Vasojevići, 12. 17 “Turski popis gradova, kula i palanki bosanskog vilajeta iz 1707. godine” (ANU BiH, p. 113), after Istorija Crne Gore, vol. III, 525. 18 After Istorija Pljevalja (Pljevlja 2009), 91, 92. 19 T. Popović, “Kada je sedište hercegovačkog sandžaka premešteno iz Foče u Pljevlja”, Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju 10–11 (Sarajevo 1961), 267–270, after Istorija Pljevalja, 92. 84 Balcanica XLVI (2015)

Vraneš, Krička, Poblaće, but Ottoman documents also mention the nahiyes of Drobnjak20 and Bukovica.21 Tribes generally evolved from livestock breeders’ villages and sum- mer pasture camps, as pastoral communities based mainly on kinship, for defence and economic purposes. Livestock-breeding population that settled in agricultural lowland areas in the first century of Ottoman rule sought to preserve their tax privileges (filuri tax paid per household and not per head). The “vlach” herdsmen had even greater privileges than previously enjoyed in the medieval Serbian state, at least in the initial period of Ottoman con- solidation in this area. Because of that policy, the ethnic picture of the Lim, Tara and Morača river valleys and Old Herzegovina (part in present-day Montenegro) remained largely unaffected,22 although some demographic change took place over time.23 But if the Ottomans did not interfere much in the life of pastoralists scattered in mountainous regions, which were not a promising source of revenue anyway, they treated differently the popula- tion that inhabited more fertile agricultural areas. Therefore the transition of pastoralists to the agricultural way of life marked the beginning of the reduction of their former privileges. During the Ottoman-Venetian War of Cyprus, 1570–73, the tribes of these regions fought against the Otto- mans. The end of the sixteenth century saw a broad rebellion led byvojvoda

20 The area occupied by Drobnjak can be traced only from the second half of the fif- teenth century, i.e. from the Herzegovina defter of 1477, which is when the area was seized by the Ottomans. Drobnjak or the nahiye of Komarnica for the most part over- laps with the Drobnjak tribe in the nineteenth century. Cf. Žarko Leković, Drobnjak u prvoj polovini 19. vijeka (Podgorica: Grafo Crna Gora, 2007), 11. 21 Within the broader historic area of the Drobnjak tribe there eventually formed four groups and entities: Drobnjak, Šaranci, Jezera and Uskoci tribes. For more see Jovan R. Bojović, “Petnjica – postojbina Vuka Karadžića”, Istorijski zapisi (1987), 4; Šabanović, Bosanski pašaluk, 230; and Istorija Pljevalja, 150. 22 Herzegovina encompasses areas from Duvno and Prozor in the west to the Lim in the east (Banjani, Piva, Drobnjak, part of sanjak of Novi Pazar, the Nikšić area etc.). Its boundaries generally coincide with the former boundaries of Herceg Stjepan’s lands. Regardless of administrative and political divisions, the local people were aware of the historical ties, psychological traits and customs which distinguished them from Bos- nians and Montenegrins, cf. J. Dedijer, “Hercegovina”, Etnografski zbornik XII (1909), 6. After the death of emperor Dušan in 1355, the region of Drobnjak, Piva and Onogošt (Nikšić) was successively ruled by the Vojinović family, Nikola Altomanović, Prince Lazar Hrebeljanović, Sandalj Hranić (end of the fourteenth century), who was suc- ceeded by Stefan Vukčić Kosača in 1435, until the fall of Herzegovina to the Ottomans in 1482. Cf. Leković, Drobnjak, 28. 23 Miomir Dašić, “Političke i društvene prilike u oblastima današnje Crne Gore u drugoj polovini XIV i prvoj polovini XV vijeka”, in Kosovski boj u istoriji, tradiciji i stvaralaštvu Crne Gore (Titograd: CANU, 1990), 63. R. Šćekić, Ž. Leković & M. Premović, Political Developments 85

Grdan.24 The Cretan War inspired further rebellions of Christian subjects against Ottoman rule and a broader cooperation with the Republic of Ven- ice. Yet, occasional tribal alliances during the rebellions did not have any stronger support of Venice, even though the tribes of Herzegovina and Brda saw Venice as liberator and were ready to unite with it. Venice, for its part, pursued its own interests and saw the Balkan Christians merely as a tool against the Ottoman Empire, ignoring their liberation aspirations.25 Rus- sian influence in the region began to grow at the beginning of the eigh- teenth century, especially after the 1711 mission of the Russian emperor’s envoy, Captain Miloradović. The geopolitical developments and conflicting interests of the great powers only added to the everyday tribulations of the Christian population.26

The processes of islamization and population migration, rebellions and unrests The ethnic composition of the population of the Lim river valley remained largely unchanged until the end of the seventeenth century.27 The Ottoman conquest kicked off the process of islamization, which reached its peak in the eighteenth century. It should be noted that the acceptance of Islam was not only religious but also a state issue because it required of its adherents not to separate religion from politics. Conversion to Islam was expected to improve one’s financial position (e.g. exemption from taxes levied on non- Muslims) and bring greater personal and legal security.28 Some families converted to Islam either to preserve or to acquire privileges, but it was not at all unusual to find Orthodox Christian and Muslim family members living together in the same household or extended family community. A reason for conversion to Islam was also to avoid the so-called blood tax

24 Leković, Drobnjak, 30. 25 The War of Candia (1644–1669) marked the beginning of a Venetian-Montenegrin military and political alliance which would last until the beginning of the eighteenth century. Cf. Istorija Crne Gore, vol. III, 115. 26 In the first half of the eighteenth century these areas were ravaged by famine and plague, and the emigration rate was high. Cf. Arhiv Srbije [Archives of Serbia; hereafter AS], Zbirka Andrije Luburića [Andrija Luburić Collection; hereafter: ZAL], N.P. 408. 27 Vujadin Rudić, “Istorijsko-geografske karakteristike bjelopoljskog kraja”, Zbornik ra- dova Geografskog fakulteta 45 (Belgrade 1995), 61–62. 28 Petar Vlahović, “Etnički procesi i etničke odrednice muslimana u Raškoj oblasti”, in Etnički sastav stanovništva Srbije i Crne Gore i Srbi u SFRJ (Belgrade: Geografski fakultet & Stručna knjiga, 1993), 28. 86 Balcanica XLVI (2015)

(devshirme), levy of Christian boys taken away from home for training in the imperial administration or the janissary corps.29 According to the 1485 Ottoman census, there were no Christian converts to Islam in the nahiye of Limski Nikšići and Bihor, while in the nahiye of Budimlja, which included the market place and 28 surrounding villages, there were 858 Serbian and four Muslim (Turkish) houses. Accord- ing to the 1582/3 census, there were in the nahiye of Budimlja 32 villages with a total of 530 households, five heads of villages or group of villages (knez) and seven musellims. The 1614 report of a Venetian public servant and native of Kotor, Mariano Bolizza (or Marijan Bolica) also claimed that the number of Christians converts to Islam in this area was small. After the 1690 migration of Serbs led by patriarch Arsenije III Čarnojević the pro- cess of islamization gained momentum as a result of the strong influence of some Muslim families who had resettled in the largely depopulated Bihor area from the parts of Montenegro and the areas on the other side of the Sava and Danube rivers recaptured from the Ottomans.30 The process of islamization in Bihor and Korita ran at a fast pace in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and members of one family of both faiths often lived side by side, even in the same household.31 Non-islamized Serb popula- tion tended to migrate mostly to Serbia, especially during the Cretan War (1645–69) and the Austro-Turkish wars of 1690, 1714 and 1737. In the first decades of the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire found itself in a crisis due to the declining authority of the central gov- ernment and considerable territorial losses after the Treaties of Karlowitz (1699) and Passarowitz (1718). This led to a rise, often unlawful, in taxation by unruly local authorities. The Orthodox population revolted, notably dur- ing the Austro-Turkish war of 1737. One of the inspirers and organizers of the uprising was the Serbian patriarch Arsenije IV Jovanović Šakabenta. In late July 1737 he and chiefs of the Vasojevići and other Brda tribes went to join the Austrian forces led by Field Marshal Seckendorff whose headquar- ters was in the village of Tešić near Niš. The Austrians soon took Niš and entered Novi Pazar. The metropolitan of Raška Jeftimije (Damjanović), in cooperation with Atanasije Rašković, the knez of the historic region of Stari Vlah, stirred Orthodox Christians of his diocese to rebellion. They drove the Ottomans out of Novi Pazar, suffering a loss of eighty men. Theoberkapetan Staniša Marković Mlatišuma and his Serbian militia entered the town on

29 Šćepanović, “Pregled prošlosti Bijelog Polja”, 104. 30 Dašić, Vasojevići, 246. 31 Milisav Lutovac, Bihor i Korita (Belgrade: Naučno delo, 1967), 40. R. Šćekić, Ž. Leković & M. Premović, Political Developments 87

28 July. They were joined by knez Rašković with his 1,500 insurgents and two Austrian colonels with their forces.32 The local Ottoman authority in the Upper Lim valley and Bihor was quickly broken down. The new situation encouraged the insurgents from the Vasojevići, Kuči, Piperi and Bratonožići tribes, i.e. from the region of Brda, led by the Kuči vojvoda Radonja Petrović, to head for Stara Srbija (Old Serbia) to meet the Austrian forces.33 When Arsenije IV and some 3,000 Highlanders arrived in Novi Pazar, the town was empty because the Austrians had withdrawn a day earlier. Fearing the Ottomans, the patriarch chose to catch up with the Austrian army and a part of the chiefs and people of Brda. The rest of the Highlanders chose to return. In the general confu- sion Vasojevići and Kuči plundered and burned Bihor.34 The rebels attacked Bijelo Polje, and “cut down Turks, and partly destroyed their fortresses from Brodarevo to Prijepolje”.35 There are some data about the clergy of the Metropolitanate of Bel- grade from the 1730s, i.e. the short-lived period of Austrian rule over north- ern Serbia, mentioning priests from the environs of Bijelo Polje, Pećarska, Bihor and Vraneš. The building and growth of Kolašin as a fortified place was one of the reasons for the emigration of Orthodox population because it put an end to their relatively free way life and movement in the Tara river valley. The villages in the Mojkovac area found themselves trapped between the Otto- man fortified towns of Kolašin, Bijelo Polje and Pljevlja, and local popula- tion mainly migrated to the area of Ibarski Kolašin, Jasenica and Kosmaj.36 Along with emigration from the Lim and Tara river valleys, there was a con- stant inflow of settlers from Brda, most of all from Morača, Rovci, Drobn- jaci, Bratonožići and Piperi. From the beginning of the eighteenth century there was a steady increase in Muslim population in this area. Many land- owning Muslim families resettled there from the territories across the Sava and Danube rivers that the Ottoman Empire had lost, such as Hajdarpašić, Šehović, Ćorović beys and others. Mehmed Ćor-Pasha came to Bihor from Osijek in Slavonia in the late seventeenth century, and was given a grant of

32 Istorija srpskog naroda, vol. IV-1 (Belgrade: SKZ, 1994), 149 (KA, AFA, 1737, 11, 25v, f. 393). 33 Dašić, Vasojevići, 281. 34 M. Kostić, “Ustanak Srba i Arbanasa u Staroj Srbiji protiv Turaka 173–1739 i seobe u Ugarsku”, Glasnik Skopskog naučnog društva 7-8 (1930), 208–210, after Istorija Crne Gore, vol. III, 294 35 Istorija srpskog naroda, vol. IV-1, 150. 36 Šćepanović, “Pregled prošlosti Bijelog Polja”, 112. 88 Balcanica XLVI (2015) land as compensation for the property he had held in Slavonia.37 The defeat of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslim forces, among which were a consid- erable number of sipahis and members of distinguished bey families from the Lim and Tara river valleys, by the Russians at Ochakov in 1737 made a strong impression in the region. From 1757 to 1831, the Upper Lim valley was part of the pashalik of Scutari.38 Due to the deterioration of the traditional Ottoman feudal system, the subjugated population bore the burden of ever heavier taxation, which gave rise to rebellions and banditry. It was recorded that in Bijelo Polje in 1690, during the Great Turkish War, “people died from the plague in such numbers that the living could not manage to bury the dead”.39 What re- mained of the Christian Orthodox population after migrations from this area was subjected to Ottoman reprisals. The late-twelfth-century church of St. Peter in Bijelo Polje, known for its founder’s famous illuminated manu- script, Miroslav’s Gospel, was converted to a mosque named Fethiye, or “victory mosque”, and was not reconverted until liberation in 1912.40 It was in that period, more precisely in 1738, that the Šudikova monastery near Budimlja, which had an important scriptorium, was burned down.41 The main factors that affected the demographic, ethnic and religious situation in the Middle and Upper Lim valley in the seventeenth and eigh- teenth century are: the construction of a line of Ottoman fortified towns: Akova (Bijelo Polje)–Bihor–Trgovište (Rožaj)–Plav–Gusinje; the building of mosques and the bringing of religious officials from elsewhere, which helped the process of conversion to Islam; unrests, rebellions and emigra- tion of Christian Orthodox and immigration of Muslim population; the beginning of the process of settlement of north-Albanian tribes; the rise and territorial expansion of the Vasojevići tribe from the area of Lijeva Rijeka into the Lim valley, especially during the second half of the eigh- teenth century. The expansion of such a robust and numerically strong tribe led to their conflicts with the Klimenti/Kelmendi who were being pushed out of the Middle Lim valley. The settlement of the Vasojevići and other Brda tribes and their mixing with the native population gave a boost to the Orthodox element, raising its spirits, strengthening internal cohesion and military power, the effects of which would be manifest in the nineteenth century leading to definitive liberation from the centuries-long Ottoman

37 Lutovac, Bihor i Korita, 16, 31. 38 Dašić, Vasojevići, 211, 278. 39 Šćepanović, “Pregled prošlosti Bijelog Polja”, 109. 40 Jovo Medojević, Crkve u bjelopoljskom kraju (Prijepolje: Muzej u Prijepolju, 2000), 22. 41 Mirko Barjaktarović, “Etnički razvitak Gornjeg Polimlja”, Glasnik cetinjskih muzeja 6.VI (1973), 178. R. Šćekić, Ž. Leković & M. Premović, Political Developments 89 occupation. The expansion of the Vasojevići from the mountainous area into the fertile Lim valley also caused rivalries with the native Orthodox popu- lation (Srbljaci, Ašani). As a natural reaction to the aggressiveness of the better-organized Vasojevići, native population began to form groups. Such alliances were not an exception considering that tribes in Old Herzegovi- na, such as Banjani, Pješivci and Grahovljani, were formed from unrelated members under similar conditions.42 The defence of the Upper and Middle Lim valley against aggressive inroads and violent immigration of Albanian tribes helped the Vasojevići to become stronger as a tribe and to expand to the north, along the Lim, as far as the river Lješnica. The years 1737, 1738, 1768 and 1790 stand out by the extent of brutality and destruction inflicted to the Upper and Middle Lim val- ley. 43 After the war years 1737/38 there was a mass emigration of Or- thodox population from this area. At the end of 1737 Hodaverdi Pasha Mahmudbegović (Begolli) ravaged the Vasojević area. In 1768 Kariman Pasha Mahmudbegović attacked the area with a force of some 15,000 men (which was equal to the total population of the area)44 from three direc- tions, ravaging and plundering the villages of Trepča, Trešnjevo, Zabrdje and Slatina, Šekular, Dapšići and Polica. The region was also ravaged by the Bushatli Pasha of Scutari in 1790.

Rebellions and the oppression by local Ottoman feudal lords and Albanians Domestic historiography has tended to focus on hajduks as a phenomenon associated with the Orthodox Christian reaya seen as a symbolic indica- tor of the people’s patriotic consciousness and aspiration for liberation and socio-economic emancipation from the Ottoman Empire. However, no less important was the predatory behaviour of Muslim population, as the dominant class, especially because it frequently caused local rebellions and unrests. It was a clear sign of the profound economic and social crisis of the declining Ottoman Empire, and of the political decomposition of the state and society. Every new rebellion further weakened the Empire. In the first decades of the eighteenth century, this area was afflicted by a wave of Albanian brigandage. As is well known, in 1700 the unruly Kelmendi/Klimenti45 were resettled by Hodaverdi Pasha Mahmudbegović

42 Petar Šobajić, “Bjelopavlići”, Srpski etnografski zbornik 27 (1923), 257, 314, 326. 43 Radovan Bakić, “Stanovništvo opštine Berane”, Tokovi 2 (2009), 51. 44 Dašić, Vasojevići, 288, 302. 45 Klimenti (Alb. Kelmendi) is a region in Albania (Alb. Mali i Kelmenit) and the name of the eponymous tribe whose members live in Albania, Montenegro and Kosovo. Ac- cording to their tradition recorded in 1685 (August Theiner, Vetera monumenta Slavo- 90 Balcanica XLVI (2015) to the Pešter Plateau46 in order to separate them from the tribe’s rebellious core. But they did not abandon their previous lifestyle as eshkiyas, brigands, and the practice spread into the future sanjak of Novi Pazar. The resettled Kelmendi were under constant pressure to convert to Islam. The Ottoman census of 1703 mentions two villages near Plav inhabited by Kelmendi: Novšići and Martinovići.47 Some researchers believe that the Kelmendi met with strong resistance from local Serbian population, and even were pushed out, and that they therefore began to settle in the neighbouring region of Rugova.48 Albanian plundering raids into the Upper Lim val- ley started from their core lands, but they also had bases in the villages of Zabrdje, Slatina and Trešnjevo in the environs of present-day Andrijevica. In 1708 they attacked many houses in Bihor and Trgovište (Rožaje), killing many inhabitants, and they robbed travellers travelling from the direction of Kosovo towards Bosnia. Nine years later, in 1717, the aghas of the fortresses of Rožaje, Plav, Bijelo Polje and Kolašin, and local ayans, submitted a peti- tion to the Sublime Porte begging that the brigands be caught and appro- priately punished.49 The area around the source of the river Ibar, Rožaje and its environs began to be settled by Kuči, Klimenti and Hoti, Kuči mainly on the left and Klimenti on the right side of the Ibar. This is why these areas were popularly known as “Kučnija” and “Latinija” (from “Latin”, because

num Meridionalium historiam illustrantia), the Kelmendi are of Serbian origin. They claim their descent from a single ancestor who moved there from the upper Morača river valley, married a woman from the Kuči tribe and had a son, Kliment, whose de- scendants founded two villages with Serbian names and after whom the tribe was named, Klimenti. The ancestor who had moved from Morača was an Orthodox Chris- tian. Under the influence of the bishop of Scutari and very active Catholic missionaries, his descendants converted to Roman Catholicism. The missionaries taught them not only to see the Turks as enemies but also not to see the Orthodox as friends. In 1685 they helped the sanjak-bey of Scutari Suleiman Bushatli to defeat the Montenegrins at the Battle of Vrtijeljka, where the famous hajduk Bajo Pivljanin was killed. In 1692 they helped him to take Cetinje from a joint Montenegrin and Venetian force. Cf. Jovan Tomić, O Arnautima u staroj Srbiji i Sandžaku (Priština: Panorama, 1995; 1st ed. Bel- grade: Geca Kon, 1913); Georg von Gyurkovics, Albanien, Schilderungen von Land und Leute (Vienna 1881), 160; Janez Rotar, “Slavensko-albanski nacionalni odnosi prema našoj putopisnoj literaturi (do 1914)”, in Stanovništvo slovenskog porijekla u Albaniji (Ti- tograd: Istorijski institut Crne Gore, 1991). 46 Tomić, O Arnautima. 47 Spomenik Srpske akademije nauka 42 (1905), 64, 74; after Barjaktarović, “Etnički raz- vitak Gornjeg Polimlja”, 177. 48 Andrija Jovićević, “Plavsko-gusinjska oblast”, Srpski etnografski zbornik 21 (1921), 407. 49 Bogumil Hrabak, “Nemirno stanje u kasabama na sjeveru Crne Gore u doba krize i naseljavanja (XVIII vek)”, Istorijski zapisi 4 (1987), 64–66. R. Šćekić, Ž. Leković & M. Premović, Political Developments 91 the Klimenti were Roman Catholic at the time of settlement).50 “On the entire left side of the Ibar are Kuči, a huge islamized clan, and on the right side, a smaller, much smaller part which descends from Klimenti” (Vladimir Ćorović, Istorija Srba, vol. 1). Over time, Kuči prevailed, and so Klimenti and Hoti, although Albanians, came to speak Serbian as their first language. Jovan Tomić observed that by 1765 almost all resettled Albanians of Catho- lic faith in the area of Pešter and Rožaje had converted to Islam.51 In 1725 some Muslims of the Bijelo Polje area engaged in banditry crossed into the kadilik of Bihor and attacked the local courthouse, took all the money and humiliated the kadi.52 Local feudal families, keen on hav- ing local affairs under their own control, did not look benevolently to the Porte’s sending officials from elsewhere to fill vacant positions. It is known, for example, that the former agha of the Rožaje martolos Ibrahim and his son Omer were engaged in illegal activities. They not only refused to comply with the imperial order to appear in court, but they killed the new martolos agha, managed to attract some fifty nefers (soldiers) of Albanian origin from Rugova (they themselves probably were of the same origin) as well as thirty Christians, and the gang besieged the fortress of Rožaje. A weak central government in murky times provided much opportunity for abuse of power on local level, the brunt of which was borne by the Orthodox reaya. Military commanders in small towns were linked with representatives of the feudal apparatus, sipahis and zaims. Thus, in 1730 in the kadilik of Prijepolje the reaya who lived on the zeamet of zaim Mehmed, in the village of Žudže, revolted against payment of taxes. They attacked the fortress in Morača be- cause its aghas and soldiers raided their villages, pillaging and carrying out violence. The trouble for the Porte was in that the rebelled reaya fomented unrest among the Orthodox population in neighbouring areas. In order to calm down the situation the Porte ordered the governor of Herzegovina and the kadi of Prijepolje to conduct an investigation.53 There is evidence for the Empire’s troubles with ruthless Albanian settlers around the fortress of Onogošt (present-day Nikšić) as well.54 At the time, Onogošt was in the nahiye of Drobnjak and under the jurisdiction

50 Barjaktarović, “Etnički razvitak Gornjeg Polimlja”, 193. 51 Tomić, O Arnautima, 91–92; Dašić, Vasojevići, 247. 52 Jovan Tomić, Crna Gora za Morejskog rata (Belgrade: Srpska kraljevska akademija, 1907), 249–274, after Istorija Crne Gore, vol. III, 558. 53 Hrabak, “Nemirno stanje u kasabama”, 70 (Komisija za istoriju Bosne i Hercegovine pri ANBiH, inv. no. 139/6). 54 After a failed siege of the fortified town of Nikšić (Onogošt) by Herzegovina and Brda tribes in 1789, the Orthodox population experienced much hardship and Trebješani from its surroundings emigrated to Upper Morača. Cf. M. Vujačić, “Dvije 92 Balcanica XLVI (2015) of the kadi of Pljevlja. As reported to the Porte by the Bosnian mutesellim, a few Albanian families that had moved there from the troubled Albanian mountains would go on the rampage and rob Muslim families. Rioting, thefts and robberies were also recorded in the area of Kolašin fortress. In 1776 Kolašin Turks became so swollen-headed that they refused obedience to the Porte, and were ruthlessly sowing fear and causing bloodshed. The Porte ordered the Bosnian vizier to punish the lawbreakers severely. The vizier passed the sultan’s order to Džafer Pasha Čengić. With the help of Herzegovina tribes (Drobnjaci,55 Pivljani, Grahovljani, Banjani), Čengić defeated the renegade Kolašin Turks. Ten of them were hanged on the spot, and another forty somewhat later, in Travnik.56 Rožaje, which belonged to the sanjak of Prizren, was a veritable nest of Albanian bandit groups. By robbing and murdering travellers and traders they made the roads in the area of Bihor and Stari Vlah that led to the vilayet of Bosnia unusable,57 and all traffic had to be moved to less vulnerable routes. Thus, in the eighteenth century, trade from Bihor and Bijelo Polje to Podgorica and Scutari was re- directed from the Adriatic road which ran via Brskovo to the route through the Lim and Cijevna river valleys. Abuses by fortress garrisons in rural ar- eas did not stop even in the middle of the century: in 1744 the captain of the fortress in the kadilik of Budimlja reported criminal behaviour of some from the fortress under his charge. Those prone to abuse of power, theft, robbery and violence used their belonging to the state religion or the state’s military or administrative ap- paratus to pursue their own unlawful interests. The end of the eighteenth century was a period of chaotic circumstances in the European part of the Ottoman Empire, a period of a noticeably weakening central government, unrests and rebellions. At that time the feudal Bushatli family became vir- tually independent in northern Albania and sought to enlarge territory un- der its control. Mahmud Pasha Bushatli sent his commander Hasan Hot to attack Sjenica, Prijepolje and Pljevlja, while Bijelo Polje was under his control. A unit of Sarajevo soldiers, from the expedition sent against Hasan razure Trebješana i postanak plemena Uskoci u Crnoj Gori”, Glas CCLXXX (Belgrade: SANU, 1971), 267. 55 Drobnjak is a tribe in Montenegrin Herzegovina. Its eastern boundaries, finally es- tablished in 1860, are Šaranci and the upper Morača valley, in the south Nikšićko Polje and Župa, in the west the river Piva, and in the north the river Tara. For more see Leković, Drobnjak, 11; Svetozar Tomić, “Drobnjak, antropogeografska ispitivanja”, in Srpski etnografski zbornik 4 (1902), 6. 56 Leković, Drobnjak, 36. 57 Hrabak, “Nemirno stanje u kasabama”, 80 (Komisija za istoriju Bosne i Hercegovine pri ANBiH, inv. no. 139/5, p. 212–213). R. Šćekić, Ž. Leković & M. Premović, Political Developments 93

Hot, was harrying the area of Vraneš.58 In 1786, representatives of Akova and other towns in the sanjak of Scutari along with people from Plav and Gusinje submitted a petition begging the sultan to pardon Bushatli and let him retain his position, claiming that “the population of these areas are prone to troublemaking and feuding” and that it was the Bushatlis who had succeeded in suppressing disorder and banditry. Expeditions against Brda were often sent from the Lim river valley, such as those carried out by the Ćorovićs of Bihor which were even sung about in epic poetry. A major one was carried out in 1796 during Mahmud Pasha Bushatli’s second campaign against Montenegro.59 An Ottoman force mustered in the Lim valley, Pljevlja and Kolašin was sent to Bushatli’s aid in the direction of the effectively independent Katun nahiye. However, in the village Lopate near Lijeva Rijeka they were engaged and routed by a joint Vasojevići, Moračani and Rovčani force. The metropolitan of Cetinje Petar I proved to be an exceptionally capable organizer of the struggle of Montenegrin, Brda and Herzegovina tribes, their unifier and conciliator. Two important victories in 1796, at Martinići and Kruši, allowed the uni- fication of the Bjelopavlići and Piperi tribes with the four Montenegrin nahiyes. In that period Uskoci, Vasojevići and Moračani repulsed the attack of an Ottoman Herzegovinian force at the Battle of Lopate.60 The introduction of the chiftlik system and abuse by Ottoman au- thorities had been exerting increasing pressure on the Brda and Herze- govina tribes, causing people to resist. Četovanje (from četa, a small armed unit) was not uncommon both as a subsistence strategy and as a liberation struggle, and it became more widespread in the region of the Lim and Tara valleys. In the area of Bihor, Rožaje and Tara valley the chiftlik system had become dominant in the first half of the eighteenth century and eventually prevailed in the Lim valley towards the end of the century. Throughout the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was slowly declining despite occasional recoveries. The well-advanced process of con- verting land into chiftliks, unrests, general social insecurity and gross dis- regard for all law by local military and judicial officials created a state of anarchy which paved the way for a popular uprising at the beginning of the

58 Šćepanović, “Pregled prošlosti Bijelog Polja”, 117. 59 At the end of the eighteenth century, eastern Herzegovina suffered much in Mahmud Pasha Bushatli’s campaign. Cf. Arhiv SANU, Belgrade [Archives of the Serbian Acad- emy of Sciences and Arts], Legacy of Ignjat M. Žugić, p. 504. 60 In February 1794 an assembly of the heads of Herzegovina and Brda tribes at the Morača monastery voiced their grievances to the Montenegrin guvernadur (governor) Radonjić and Austrian General Vukasović as to the plight of their tribes. Cf. Nikola Tomić, Pleme Drobnjak (Temekula, 1980), 73. 94 Balcanica XLVI (2015) following century. The Empire was going from one socio-economic crisis to another, and the attempts to fill the imperial coffers by levying additional taxes directly affected the peasantry, primarily the Christian reaya. Amid these crises, the Empire’s military power was also declining. The lack of central control encouraged the ambitions of local lords, even some pashas appointed to high positions in the Balkan provinces mostly from the ranks of prominent Albanian feudal families. Having acquired a wealth through plundering and corruption, they created their own mercenary armies at- tracted by the prospect of loot. Occasional riots and mutinies of janissaries only added to the anarchy. This situation, which particularly affected the Orthodox population, created additional religious tensions and class an- tagonisms, inevitably leading to a general popular uprising.

Towards final liberation The First Serbian Uprising, or Serbian Revolution, which broke out in 1804 resonated widely and strongly in Montenegro and in all neighbouring areas in which it had a political or any other influence. It was then that closer political ties and cooperation between the two national states in the making were established. The great interest in the First Serbian Uprising among the tribes of Brda and Herzegovina also stemmed from the fact that it opened the opportunity for settlement in uninhabited and fertile areas in Serbia with no feudal obligations. The alliance between the tribes of historic Stara Crna Gora (Old Montenegro) and Brda, patiently and persistently built in the struggle against the Ottomans throughout the eighteenth century, would eventually grow into a small national state, in fact a union of tribes. This union was achieved by Petar I Petrović, and with pleas and curses rather than through the exercise of his authority as a ruler. The society of the Montenegro of the time, which was touched by the wave of the First Serbian Uprising, espe- cially the northern and north-eastern area of present-day Montenegro, had not been integrated into a single community. There was Old Montenegro (four nahiyes) on the one hand and Brda on the other as two geographic and historic regions which would figure in the name of the state (Crna Gora i Brda) until the 1880s. The Brda tribes, especially the Vasojevići, Moračani, Drobnjaci and Rovci, established firmer links with insurgent Serbia. A glimpse of the situation in the Lim and Tara valleys at the time is provided by an inscription on the wall of the Morača monastery dated 1803. According to the anonymous chronicler, there was a great hunger and R. Šćekić, Ž. Leković & M. Premović, Political Developments 95 a “great bloodshed” and “worse than hunger was unrest”.61 From the testi- monies left by contemporaries in the books of the monasteries of the Holy Trinity in Pljevlja and Nikoljac in Bijelo Polje, it appears that the previous year, 1802, had hardly been any better. The Kolašin captaincy was the site of bloody fighting, instigated by local Muslims. Villages waged wars with one another, clans with clans, and all of them together with local authori- ties. Robberies, thefts and murders were a daily occurrence. The chaos in the Kolašin captaincy stirred unrest in Bijelo Polje and Pljevlja as well. During the First Serbian Uprising the unrests ceased because the feuding Muslims came to see the Uprising as a threat to them all. Until then alliances were not uncommon between Orthodox Christians and Muslims against some other village, be it Orthodox or Muslim. However, after the Uprising broke out, religion prevailed as the criterion for their grouping together. That Petar I Petrović was informed of preparations for an uprising in Serbia is evidenced by a letter he sent to the hegumen of the monastery of Dečani on 10 January 1804: “Montenegrins and, on the part of Belgrade, Serbs have the intention of rising to arms against the Turks.”62 Apparently the Vasojevići tribal leaders were also familiar with the preparations for a general uprising. There are indications that the monastery of Djurdjevi Stu- povi maintained close ties with the monasteries of Morača, Ostrog, Piva and especially with those of the Patriarchate of Peć and Visoki Dečani. The Vasojevići also maintained direct communication with some leaders in Serbia, primarily those of their tribal origin, which would play a marked role in the course of the Uprising. A similar role was played by the Drobnjak leaders with respect to Herzegovina. The First Serbian Uprising echoed broadly in the Lim valley and among the Brda tribes from the beginning of the armed conflict with the renegade janissary leaders (dahi), in the pashalik of Belgrade. The Uprising was also of great importance for relations between the Montenegrins and Brda tribes because it contributed to their closer cooperation. News about the rebellion of the Serbs in the pashalik of Belgrade in February 1804 was brought to the Lim valley by herdsmen and some hajduks who were spending winter in Serbia: Kara­djordje’s rebels had seized a few thousand sheep from some herdsmen from the nahiye of Gusinje, and the herds- men returned home empty-handed in early spring.63 The Uprising stirred up guerrilla actions and brigandage in the Lim and Tara valleys. The tribes

61 Ljubomir Stojanović, Stari srpski zapisi i natpisi, vol. II (Belgrade: Državna štamparija, 1903), no. 3805. 62 Miomir Dašić, Ogledi iz istorije Crne Gore (Podgorica: Istorijski institut Crne Gore, 2000), 85. 63 Ibid. 86. 96 Balcanica XLVI (2015) of Brda and Herzegovina were ready to fight the Ottomans as early as the first half of 1804, and their chiefs only waited for a signal and support from Prince-Bishop Petar I. But as a result of Russia’s strong diplomatic pressure on Petar I through the emissary Marko Ivelić, their urges bore no fruit. Pe- tar I was unable to take any serious step without Russia’s approval. Russia, the protector power of the Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire, had a treaty of friendship with the Ottoman Empire since 1774. Petar I and his Montenegrins, as well as the Brda tribes in which he had a great influence, were advised to remain neutral. The Russian intelligence service controlled communication between Kara­djordje and Petar I and channels of communication between Serbia and Montenegro on the one hand and Brda and Herzegovina on the other. The calming down of rebellious fer- ment in Brda was certainly the consequence of Montenegro’s political reli- ance on Russia. At war with France, Russia sought to maintain peace with the Ottoman Empire in order to avoid being engaged on two fronts.64 For these reasons, Montenegro could not even in 1806 provide assistance to the Serbian uprising, which had by then grown into a large-scale military con- flict. Prince-Bishop Petar I was in a delicate position. The Serbs in Serbia and also in Herzegovina expected his (Montenegrin) participation in the struggle against the Turks. Aware of his position, and advised by Russia to maintain peace with the Ottoman Empire, the Prince-Bishop was re- proached by Kara­djordje: “We always have it in our heart and our mind that you will be, at some point, big and powerful support to the Serbian people and liberation.” In the summer of 1805 the insurgent ferment in Brda and Herzegov- ina grew into an open rebellion of some tribes.65 The vizier of Scutari Ibra- him Pasha quelled the unrest in the areas under his responsibility by arms. Conflicts between Brdjani (Highlanders) and Turks were a normal occur- rence at the time. In the Lim valley and Brda, hajduk groups flourished. This social phenomenon, a combination of guerrilla warfare and brigandage, resulted both from the dysfunction of local Ottoman authorities and from the need to survive. Among the Muslim population in the Lim and Tara valleys there was a feeling of great uncertainty and insecurity, as indicated by a contemporary reference to the situation in Bijelo Polje in 1806: “That summer we were building fortifications around Bijelo Polje, and the poor suffered much hardship and oppression, and we guarded border posts all

64 AS, ZAL, b. IV, no. 32. 65 In 1805 the Russian Consulate was opened in Kotor. Chiefs of Brda and Montene- grin tribes wrote to it about frequent border fights with the Turks. Cf. Arhiv i biblioteka Državnog muzeja, Cetinje [Archives and Library of the State Museum; hereafter; ABO DMC], Petar I, 1804, 983. R. Šćekić, Ž. Leković & M. Premović, Political Developments 97 year long”.66 Hajduk bands in the Lim and Tara valleys and the area of Stara Raška in general were highly mobile. They were robbing and raid- ing Ottoman territory, crossing into Šumadija and fighting there against the Ottomans under Kara­djordje’s banner. According to some data, several hundred hajduks from the Lim valley and Brda tribes fought in the 1806/7 battles for Belgrade alone, and in those years many families emigrated from these areas. In March 1807, the insurgent Serbian army began an offensive from southwest Serbia towards Bosnia and the river Lim, but there was no contact between the Montenegrin and Serbian forces. In the spring of 1809 Kara­djordje launched an offensive in the di- rection of Sjenica, Novi Pazar, the Lim and Tara rivers, hoping to rouse to arms the entire area to the border of Old Montenegro and northern Al- bania. The beginning of a Russo-Turkish War in 1806 had created favour- able conditions for a closer cooperation between Cetinje and Kara­djordje’s Serbia. The Serbian Orthodox population of the Lim and Tara valleys and the surrounding Brda and Herzegovina tribes followed the insurgents’ lib- eration struggle with much sympathy. Only direct communication and syn- chronized military operations of Serbians, Montenegrins, Brda tribes and Herzegovinians67 had a real chance of success. Therefore Kara­djordje asked Petar I to take his Montenegrins and instigate the people from Brda to join the fight against the Turks, proposing that they meet somewhere on the Lim or the Tara.68 He also believed that the time had come to join forces and strike out at the enemy together. Kara­djordje addressed Bishop Petar I again: “For that reason we recommend that You too show love for the Christian people and strike out at the enemy and, advancing towards us, stir up all fellow Christians so that we could all strike out at the unbaptized enemy from all sides.”69 The truth is that it did not take too much trouble to rouse the Or- thodox population of the Lim valley to rebellion in 1809 because the area had already been in ferment. Large-scale fighting took place in April 1809, when Kara­djordje’s offensive towards Sjenica threatened fortified Novi -Pa zar, Sjenica and the Imperial Road that connected the eyalet of Bosnia with Constantinople. He tried to take advantage of the fact that the bulk of the

66 Ž. Šćepanović, Srednje Polimlje i Potarje (Belgrade: SANU, 1979), 175. 67 In 1805 a large army under the command of Suleiman Pasha was sent from Bosnia to quell the rebellious tribes of Herzegovina. Cf. Arhiv Istorijskog instituta u Podgorici [Archives of the Historical Institute, Podgorica; hereafter: AIIP], folder no. 134. 68 Gedeon Ernest Maretić, Istorija srpske revolucije (Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 1987), 177. 69 The region gained in geostrategic importance with the spread of the First Serbian Uprising to the south because it threatened to cut off the eyalet of Bosnia from the rest of the Ottoman Empire. Cf. ABO DMC Petar I, 1804, 1026. 98 Balcanica XLVI (2015)

Ottoman army was engaged on the Russo-Ottoman front to drive out the Ottoman forces from the territory of Old Montenegro. His war plan envis- aged major operations in the direction of the Lim and Tara rivers, where his forces were supposed to meet with the Brda and Montenegrin rebels. He was convinced that the Orthodox population would take to arms as soon as his army entered Stara Raška. That fear reigned in the region seems to be evidenced by Kara­djordje’s letter to Russian Field Marshal Prozorovsky, commander of the Army of Moldavia engaged in fighting on the Danube: “in some places the Turks, when they heard I was coming with an army with many guns, did not even dare wait for me but fled, leaving many places empty, and those that stayed waiting for me were destroyed by our arms.”70 In the first phase of the offensive the insurgents liberated Sjenica and Nova Varoš and reached the Lim near Prijepolje, as evidenced by Kara­ djordje’s letter to vojvoda Antonije Pljakić dated 23 April 1809: “Turks are nowhere to be seen all the way to the Lim.”71 Ottoman sources also confirm that in April 1809 Kara­djordje’s army took Nova Varoš and Sjenica, and besieged Prijepolje. Thus the road between Bosnia and Constantinople was cut off, and the insurgent army’s next goal was to advance further in order to join forces with Montenegrins. The advancement, however, was halted because the Ottoman forces in the region of Raška had in the meantime received reinforcement with troops from Bosnia and Peć. This compelled Kara­djordje to withdraw from the environs of Sjenica on 29 April and return to Belgrade to confer with the Governing Council about further military and political action. The insurgent military leaders, vojvodas, Vujica Vulićević, Miloš and Milan Obrenović remained in the Sjenica area in order to proceed towards Prijepolje and Pljevlja. Vojvoda Milan Obrenović re- ceived a delegation from Vasojevići. Thevojvoda of Stari Vlah Hadži-Prodan Gligorijević, a Vasojević by origin, was assigned to lead an insurgent force from Stari Vlah to Bijelo Polje and Bihor, and to call the Orthodox popula- tion there to rise to arms. The operations of the insurgents around Sjenica and Novi Pazar had caused ferment among the Christians of the Lim and Tara valleys. Hajduks and others who had been keeping track of the devel- opments since the beginning of the Uprising now set out to rouse people to arms. At the same time, the Ottoman authorities in Scutari, through Plav and Gusinje beys and aghas, put pressure on the recruited Christians who fought against the insurgent army that was moving towards the Lim. The pressure was particularly strong on the chiefs of the Vasojević tribe, who were required to prevent the spread of the uprising in their respective areas.

70 M. Djordjević, Srbija u ustanku 1804–1813 (Belgrade: Rad, 1979), 265. 71 Dašić, Ogledi, 102. R. Šćekić, Ž. Leković & M. Premović, Political Developments 99

In the second half of May Kara­djordje returned to the position near Sjenica to resume operations for the liberation of the area between the Lim and Ibar rivers. Even though the Russian military headquarters raised objections to his placing the focus of operations on that area, he kept considering the offensive in the direction of Old Montenegro as his priority. Immediately upon his return to the environs of Sjenica, he had to prepare defence against an attack of the Bosnian army which had held back the Serbian forces on the river Drina.72 In the area between Sjenica and Prijepolje he first defeated the Bosnian army, and then, on 27 May 1809, at Suvodol, Numan Pasha’s (Mahmutbegović) forces that were head- ing from Pljevlja to the aid of the Ottoman Bosnian army. The defeat of two Ottoman armies within a short span of time gave further boost to the insurrectionary movement in the area of Bihor, Bijelo Polje and Vasojevići. The news of Numan Pasha’s defeat at the Battle of Suvodol was received with joy in the Lim valley. A contribution to the success of the rebel army was made by units from Brda, Vasojevići and Morača, which attacked the Ottomans in the rear. During the Battle of Suvodol forcibly conscripted Orthodox men from Bihor and Korita deserted from Numan Pasha’s army and, led by oborknez Jovan-Sava, joined Kara­djordje and contributed to the Ottoman defeat. Shortly after the Battle of Suvodol, more than 350 rebels from Brda arrived in Kara­djordje’s headquarters in the environs of Sjenica. As evi- denced by the letter of archimandrite Spiridon (Filipović) to Bishop Petar I dated 30 May 1809, and the testimony of a participant in the battle, An- tonije Protić, Brdjani, Vasojevići and Moračani arrived in the rebel camp. Kara­djordje received the Brda tribal chiefs and informed them about the plan for further operations in the direction of the Lim valley and Brda. He confirmed their old tribal titles and conferred new titles and ranks on some of them. In any case, this meeting convinced him that his insurgent army could count on full support of the population of the Lim valley and Brda. The rebel army’s victories fuelled ferment in the area between the rivers Ibar, Lim and Tara. The cutting off of the imperial road between Rumelia and Bosnia had been confirmed by French sources as well. In fact, it seems that a French messenger sent by General Marmont to Constantinople was forced to give up his mission because the road was cut off by insurgents.73 It was only in the late summer of 1809 that the Ottomans retook control of the road between Constantinople and Sarajevo, which was celebrated by Muslims in the whole of Bosnia. Battles and turbulence in the Lim and

72 Stojan Novaković, Vaskrs države srpske (Belgrade: Kultura, 1986; 1st ed.: SKZ, 1904), 112. 73 Petar Popović, Francusko-srpski odnosi za vrijeme Prvog srpskog ustanka (Belgrade 1933), 105. 100 Balcanica XLVI (2015)

Tara valleys, Stari Vlah and Brda made all land routes between Bosnia and Scutari impassable, so all traffic was carried out by sea via Dubrovnik. By the Treaty of Pressburg signed in December 1805 Austria had ceded the Gulf of Kotor to the French. In the entire area between Old Montenegro and the border of insur- gent Serbia Ottoman forces were completely distraught. The pashas sent from Albania to the aid of the commander of the Ottoman Bosnian army Suleiman Pasha, fearful of the strong rebel movement in Brda, the Lim and Tara valleys, withdrew from Donji Kolašin without fight. According to a French source, Suleiman Pasha, having been defeated between Sjenica and Prijepolje, retreated to the vicinity of Bijelo Polje and encamped there for more than two months in anticipation of the outcome. This concentration of forces prevented the insurgents from liberating Bijelo Polje in the sum- mer of 1809, although they controlled all of Bihor and the Middle Lim valley. After his first meetings with the Brda tribal leaders, Kara­djordje sent troops to the Lim valley, Vasojevići and Morača, which greatly encour- aged the uprising in the Lim, Morača and Tara valleys. The establishment of direct military cooperation between Kara­djordje’s insurgents and Brda tribes boosted the combative spirit in the whole area towards Montenegro. In early June 1809 Kara­djordje’s troops arrived in the Lim valley together with the 350 soldiers from Vasojevići and Brda who had joined him near Sjenica in late May. On their way, these forces liberated Pešter, Korita and Bihor. Some Muslim clans, such as the Muratbašić of the village of Godi- jevo, joined the insurgents, and the insurgent army spared their homes and property.74 This apparently was not the only case of Bihor Muslims’ cross- ing to the side of the insurgents, especially considering that the process of islamization was still on-going and that Islam in this area had not been deeply rooted. The Orthodox population of Bihor and Korita hailed the uprising en masse. After the Ottoman defeat at Suvodol, the insurgent units in this area were led by oborknez Jovan Sava, a native of the village of Crnča, whose earlier title was confirmed by Kara­djordje on account of his joining the insurgents’ side during the Battle of Suvodol. There are indications that Kara­djordje personally led the insurgent army through Bihor and, in the village of Crnča, met members of his own clan, the Gurešić. Tradition has it that on that occasion Kara­djordje gave his relatives a gift of arms and am- munition. What of all this is true is difficult to establish because there are no written sources. However, there are indications that Kara­djordje’s ancestors had moved from the Lim valley to Šumadija during the Austro-Ottoman war of 1737–39, where he was born as Djordje Petrović (later nicknamed

74 Dašić, Ogledi, 103. R. Šćekić, Ž. Leković & M. Premović, Political Developments 101

Kara­djordje or Black George), the family name Petrović being derived from his father’s name Petar.75 It is quite certain that following the Ottoman defeat at Suvodol rebel forces penetrated into the Upper Lim valley via Korita and Bihor. This is confirmed by a succinct contemporary record that in the summer of 1809 “Vasojevići and Has turned renegade and Šijaci [Serbians] arrived in Vasojevići and people from Vasojevići and Has burned down and looted Bihor”. Vasojevići welcomed Serbian rebel forces at Polica in a ceremonial manner and under arms. Kara­djordje’s vojvodas convened several popular assemblies in Vasojevići, explaining the objectives of the general uprising to people. The vojvodas bestowed insurgent banners on some of the most prominent Vasojević leaders and clans, which were then, as well as later, seen as symbols of the liberation struggle in this area. Kara­djordje’s seven banners were kept there until the mid-nineteenth century, when, accord- ing to the research done by Pavle Rovinski, ten banners were bestowed on Vasojevići and their area became the centre from which the movement for the liberation of Brda and Old Herzegovina spread. A part of the insurgent forces was transferred from the Lim valley to Lijeva Rijeka, Morača and Brda to strengthen the insurrectionary movement. The other part remained in Vasojevići until autumn 1809. In this phase, Russia was content with the movement and encouraged cooperation between Kara­djordje’s and Mon- tenegrin insurgents, expecting that their joint effort against the Ottomans would prove successful. In June 1809, a Russian army officer, notified that Kara­djordje’s army had reached the Lim valley, wrote to Petar I advising him to take his army to Kara­djordje’s aid. Kara­djordje’s commanders were in contact with Petar I through Vasojevići and Moračani. The rebel army as- signed with operations in the direction of the Lim valley and Brda was quite large by contemporary standards: about 9,000 men with artillery and suffi- cient amounts of ammunition; or as many as 20,000 men according to some sources. At that point, the bulk of the rebel army was on the move towards the Tara with the intention of taking Kolašin and proceeding to operations for the liberation of Brda and Herzegovina. The rebels’ base camp was in Has, probably at the monastery of Djurdjevi Stupovi. This is also suggested by Vuk Karadžić’s statement that Kara­djordje also came to the Lim valley at the time.76 The military expedition against the insurrectionary movement in the Lim valley launched in May and June by the vizier of Scutari Tahir Pasha apparently failed to produce the desired result, because all indications are that the rebellion in the region was general and that it was given a boost by

75 Momir Jović, Srpske zemlje i vladari (Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, 1990), 156. 76 Dašić, Ogledi, 109. 102 Balcanica XLVI (2015) the arrival of Kara­djordje’s army units. However, Kara­djordje had to stop his operations in the southwest direction and to rush to the eastern border where the insurgent army had suffered a defeat. The defeat of the rebel army near Niš proved much worse than it seemed at first, and therefore Kara­ djordje was not able to realize his plan to join forces with Petar I on the Tara to liberate fortified Kolašin. Namely, the rebel army leaders, having been defeated at the gates of Niš on 19 May 1809 and, to make things worse, quarrelling with each other, had begun to retreat before the Ottoman army. Kara­djordje was thus compelled to abandon operations in the direction of Brda and to transfer the bulk of his army from the Lim valley to Deligrad. In his letter of September 1809 Kara­djordje informed Petar I about these events and explained him why he had been forced to leave the liberated Lim valley. He expressed his gratitude to the Montenegrin, Vasojević and Brda rebels for managing to hold back the Ottoman, Scutari and Herzegovina army and thus prevent it from reaching Serbia when it was due. The rebel army’s defeats on the eastern front led to the weakening of the liberation struggle in the Lim valley and Brda and to Petar I’s concilia- tory attitude towards the Ottomans in Herzegovina. The withdrawal of the rebel army from the Lim valley encouraged the vizier of Scutari to launch a campaign against the liberation movement in the region. The aim of the campaign was to force the rebels into submission. Faced with such a threat, Vasojević tribal chiefs managed to win over some leaders of the Krasniqi and Hoti tribes who then persuaded other Albanian local leaders to give up the attack on the Lim valley. After Kara­djordje’s withdrawal, the lib- eration movement in Vasojevići had been losing the initial self-confidence and enthusiasm, and in September was already in the phase of subsidence. A considerable number of insurgent families from the Lim valley, Bihor, the Tara valley and other areas of the sanjak of Novi Pazar had withdrawn with Kara­djordje. Some insurgents stayed in the area of Morača during the autumn of 1809, and together with Brdjani looted Turkish spoils. They only returned to Serbia in 1812, and by sea, via Austria.77 In the autumn of 1809, fearing Turkish reprisals, many Orthodox Christians of Bihor moved to Kara­djordje’s Serbia under their leader, oborknez Jovan Sava Bihorac, which weakened the Orthodox element in the area. There also was a mass migra- tion from Donji Kolašin and the Middle Lim valley to Stari Vlah. It ap- pears that the brotherhood of the monastery of Djurdjevi Stupovi and their hegumen also fled to Serbia. During the winter of 1809/10 the uprising in Brda and the Lim valley quieted down. As we have already seen, in late 1809 the vizier of Scutari managed to re-establish his authority in the Lim valley. The pre-uprising chiftlik system was also re-established and the peas-

77 Ibid. 113. R. Šćekić, Ž. Leković & M. Premović, Political Developments 103 ants had to pay their overdues to the state and landowners. Petar I wrote to Kara­djordje about the dire situation of the Orthodox population in Brda and Old Herzegovina and about his inability to help them because these areas were completely surrounded by enemies. However, the fear that the entire Orthodox population would move to Kara­djordje’s Serbia forced the Ottoman authorities to show some lenience. In 1810, when the fortunes of war tilted towards the rebels owing to a stronger Russian force deployed in Serbia, the insurrectionary spark in the Lim valley and Brda was rekindled. The local Orthodox population were convinced that the Serbian rebel army would once again reach their parts and made secret preparations to greet it. This seems to be confirmed by the fact that in 1810 hajduk and smaller rebel groups, mainly those composed of men that had fled to Serbia the year before, were very active in the Lim valley, but we have no information about any large-scale movement. After the conclusion of the Treaty of Bucharest in 1812 and Na- poleon’s Russian campaign, Kara­djordje’s Serbia was left to cope with the Ottoman army by itself. Petar I’s preparations for recapturing the Gulf of Kotor with his Montenegrins, which he would achieve in 1813, also con- tributed to the dwindling of insurrectionary ferment in Brda and the Lim valley. That is why a strong Ottoman force was able to be sent from Herze- govina and the sanjak of Scutari against Serbia in 1813. The First Serbian Uprising was militarily defeated in 1813. The collapse of the First Serbian Uprising echoed gloomily in Brda and the Lim valley. In the following years the Ottomans consolidated their power and stepped up the exploitation of the Orthodox population, espe- cially in the Lim and Tara valleys, which led to further islamization and Orthodox emigration. But popular resistance did not cease altogether even then. Many remained in the woods and formed hajduk bands. It was quite certain that some hajduk bands from these regions took part in Hadži- Prodan’s Revolt in 1814. The restoration of the Ottoman feudal system and administrative organization meant the restoration of local nahiye and knežina self-government in this area. Those who opposed Ottoman au- thorities in any way were subjected to rigorous measures, which blunted resistance. For these reasons, neither Hadži-Prodan’s Revolt in 1814 nor the Second Serbian Uprising in 1815, which was the continuation of the 1804 revolution, found a stronger echo in the Lim valley and Brda.78 Cor- respondence between Prince Miloš Obrenović and Prince-Bishop Petar I

78 The Tara and Lim river valleys at the time were an area where interests of three pashaliks intersected: those of Herzegovina (the area of Mojkovac, Šahovići, Vraneš and Ravna Rijeka), Bosnia (Bihor) and Scutari (which included Bijelo Polje). Cf. Leković, Drobnjak, 105. 104 Balcanica XLVI (2015) offers no evidence of concrete cooperation, it only reveals their views on contemporary political developments. The temporary liberation of the Lim valley and part of Brda in 1809 with the support of Kara­djordje’s forces left a deep impression in the minds of the local population. The memory of Kara­djordje’s stay in this area lin- gered on for a long time, as evidenced by a number of toponyms, folk songs and the keeping of Kara­djordje’s flags as symbols of the joint struggle against the Turks. After the collapse of the First Serbian Uprising the population of the Lim valley and Brda would carry on the liberation struggle mainly with reliance on Montenegro. The experience from cooperation with leaders of the Serbian Upris- ing was important for broader political strivings and prospects of the libera- tion struggle. After the defeat of the Ottoman campaign against Morača and Rovca in 1820/1, these tribes formally became part of effectively free Montenegro, which exerted a strong liberation influence on the Tara valley and the sanjak of Novi Pazar.79 Rivalries among Ottoman notables and lo- cal feudal lords’ breaking away from the central authority affected the Ot- toman towns of Scutari and Kolašin as well. The year 1830 was a bad one for the Herzegovina tribes, especially the Drobnjaci and Uskoci, who suf- fered severely from Ottoman attacks. The period from 1831 to 1851 was marked by the Ottoman central government’s military intervention against unruly local feudal lords. It was also the period of the reign of Petar II Petrović Njegoš, who sought to bind the Herzegovina and Brda tribes to Montenegro. He established political ties with Husein-kapetan (captain) Gradaščević through the hegumen of Djurdjevi Stupovi Mojsije (Zečević) for joint action against the sultan. After the death of Ismail Aga Čengić at Mljetičak, the following years, especially 1847/8, were also marked by conflicts between Christians and Ottomans in this region.80 During the liberation wars of 1875–78 and 1912, these regions were finally liberated from the centuries-long Ottoman occupation.

Conclusion The centuries of Ottoman occupation left an indelible mark on these ar- eas manifest in demographics, religious diversity, cultural heritage, customs, many words of Turkish origin, epic poetry. The long-standing liberation struggle was inspired by the memory of the powerful medieval Serbian

79 AS, Knjaževa kancelarija [Prince’s Chancery], XXXII, 78, 79. 80 “Typical of these areas was četovanje which differed from hajdučija in that četniks did not leave their homes, whereas the hajduks would be absent from home for several years.” Cf. AIIP, printouts from Bogišić’s library in Cavtat, folder 233. R. Šćekić, Ž. Leković & M. Premović, Political Developments 105 state, the Battle of Kosovo, and over time Russia came to be idolized as protector. The Serbian Orthodox Church subsisted through those centuries, acting as a pillar of identity and traditional customs but also as the focus for popular rallying and inspirer of the hope of liberation. The tribal divi- sion created after the Ottoman invasion was a source of some peculiarities by comparison with other areas of the Balkan Peninsula. The Lim and Tara valleys, Old Herzegovina and Pešter were the source of constant migration of population to western, southern and central Serbia, Šumadija. On the whole, the period from 1455 to 1912 was marked by a permanent struggle for liberation, although some areas had been gradually liberated even before or were semi-free. UDC 94:323.22](497)(=512.161)

Sources

Arhiv Istorijskog instituta Crne Gore, Podgorica [Archives of the Historical Institute of Montenegro]: Printouts from Bogišić’s Library, Cavtat Arhiv i biblioteka Državnog muzeja, Cetinje [Archives and Library of the State Mu- seum in Cetinje]: Petar I, 1804 Arhiv Biblioteke Istorijskog instituta, Podgorica [Archive of the Library of the Histori- cal Institute] Arhiv Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti, Belgrade [Archives of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts]: Legacy of Ignjat M. Žugić Arhiv Srbije [Archives of Serbia]: Andrija Luburić Papers; Prince’s Chancery

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The Austro-Hungarian Occupation Regime in Serbia and Its Break-Down in 1918

Abstract: This paper discusses the occupation of Serbia during the First World War by Austro-Hungarian forces. The first partial occupation was short-lived as the Serbian army repelled the aggressors after the Battle of Kolubara in late 1914, but the second one lasted from fall 1915 until the end of the Great War. The Austro-Hungarian occupation zone in Serbia covered the largest share of Serbia’s territory and it was organised in the shape of the Military Governorate on the pattern of Austro-Hun- garian occupation of part of Poland. The invaders did not reach a clear decision as to what to do with Serbian territory in post-war period and that gave rise to consider- able frictions between Austro-Hungarian and German interests in the Balkans, then between Austrian and Hungarian interests and, finally, between military and civilian authorities within Military Governorate. Throughout the occupation Serbia was ex- posed to ruthless economic exploitation and her population suffered much both from devastation and from large-scale repression (including deportations, internments and denationalisation) on the part of the occupation regime. Keywords: Serbia, Austria-Hungary, occupation of Serbia 1915–1918, Military Gov- ernorate, Great War he Austro-Hungarian attack on Serbia in 1914 was perhaps the most convincing confirmation of the truism that war is but a continuation of peacetimeT politics by extraordinary means. The declaration of war on Serbia was an attempt to resolve the precarious internal, national and social issues of the Habsburg Empire by violence. However, these issues would remain open during the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Serbia in the First World War. The Austro-Serbian conflict in 1914 was an expression of deep-root- ed contradictions in the recent historical development of the Balkans and Central Europe. The Balkan states of the nineteenth century were born in national and agrarian revolutions resulting from the application of the na- tionality principle which was increasingly predominant in modern Europe. By contrast, the Habsburg Empire was founded on the principle of histori- cal legitimism and it of necessity had to come into conflict, sooner or later, with the developments on its own soil and in the Balkans. The formation of Serbia and Montenegro in the nineteenth century turned into an external and internal threat to Habsburg legitimism: externally, because it hindered aggressive tendencies towards the south; internally, because it benefited the process of emancipation of the peoples under the Habsburg crown. There- 108 Balcanica XLVI (2015) fore, Serbia and Montenegro were not such a danger for the vast thousand- year-long Central European Empire in themselves, but rather as part of that broad and general movement for social and economic emancipation of the nations in Central and South-Eastern Europe. This was all the more so as the aggressive tendencies of the Habsburg Empire themselves foundered on the dilemma between demands for quelling these movements and impos- sibility to do so. Unresolved nationality issues within the Empire prevented the accretion of additional Slav population which, in turn, did not allow for a radical solution of the Balkan question. On the other hand, at the stage of European imperialism reached at the turn of the century the Balkan ques- tion was increasingly becoming part of European high politics. Blocked from within by resistance of the ruling circles of “historic nations” to the trialist solution for the internal structure of the Empire, suppressed from outside by rivalry on the part of Russia and western democracies opposed to Ger- man Drang, Austria-Hungary was forced to conduct status quo policy in the Balkans which manifested itself in stifling local development, suppressing Russia and attempting economic penetration in competition with stronger opponents. Such static and basically negative policy was bound to come into conflict with dynamical development of the new national states in South- Eastern Europe. The consequence of such policy was an attempt to resolve not just the Serbian but also the Yugoslav and Balkan question by violence, by declaring war in 1914. In the conditions of international tension and struggle for redistribution of world power, the Austro-Hungarian attack on Serbia was as good excuse as any for the outbreak of the First World War.1 This short introduction is necessary for understanding Austria-Hun- gary’s occupation policy in Serbia in 1915–18 because it reflected the same unresolved difficulties which had burdened the Habsburg Empire in the pre-war period. The war and the occupation of Serbia perhaps just high- lighted those difficulties more clearly.

I Entering into war against Serbia in 1914 Austria-Hungary had only one clearly defined goal – military annihilation of Serbia. There was an utter confusion as to what policy should be pursued further and what the Em- pire’s permanent objectives in Serbia were. There were three different con- ceptions regarding the future of Serbia. The military, in particular the Chief of General Staff Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, advocated a long-lasting military occupation of Serbia with pronounced annexationist ambitions and

1 D. Djordjević, “The Serbs as an integrating and disintegrating factor”,Austrian History Yearbook 3/2 (Houston 1967), 48–82. See more in D. Djordjević, Révolutions nationales des peuples balkaniques, 1804–1914. Belgrade: Institut d’histoire, 1965. D. Djordjević, The Austro-Hungarian Occupation Regime in Serbia 109

Austro-Hungarian occupation zones intention to permanently secure the possession of the strategically impor- tant Morava-Vardar valley and eliminate any potential influence of Serbia on her co-nationals in the Monarchy. The Hungarian ruling circles headed by Prime Minister, István Tisza, set their faces against it refusing to have the Slav population of Austria-Hungary increased and seeing it as a threat of trialism. Rejecting the annexation of the entire country, Budapest envisaged annexing a smaller part of north-western Serbia to Hungary (the so-called bridgehead at Šabac and Belgrade). The Foreign Ministry in Vienna was in favour of a free hand policy towards Serbia refusing to prejudge her ultimate fate given the uncertain outcome of the war and peace negotiations and not excluding the existence of a rump weakened Serbia closely attached to the Empire through economic and political agreements. Divergence of views and interests in relation to the future position of Serbia came to the fore and found its expression in the conclusions of the joint Ministerial Council’s sessions held on 19 July 1914 and 7 Janu- ary 1916. They contained the following provisions: 1) Serbia would not be annexed to the Monarchy; 2) a prospective peace settlement could provide for a rump independent Serbia; 3) the territories to be annexed in the south 110 Balcanica XLVI (2015) would be annexed to Hungary, but their position would be determined by the legislative bodies of both constituent parts of the Monarchy.2 Lack of clarity and incompleteness of these provisions, and especially the contra- diction of interests from which they emerged caused considerable friction within the occupation authority and influenced, to a large degree, direction and extent of its operation.

II The organisation of administration over certain occupied regions of Serbia was carried out in November 1914 when the Serbian Army was retreat- ing to Mt Suvobor in preparation for the decisive Battle of the Kolubara. The entry into abandoned Belgrade on 2 December was declared a great victory by the Austro-Hungarian Supreme Command.3 Penetrating into the interior of Serbia, however, the invader found desolate land because population was retreating along with the army which made it difficult to establish new authorities.4 The conquered area was divided into five county commands (Etappenbezirkskommando) headed by Military Governorate in Belgrade. Field-Marshall Stjepan Sarkotić was appointed Governor by im- perial decree. Administrative staff was supposed to be recruited from civil servants from Austria, Hungary, Bosnia and Herzegovina.5 But they did not have enough time to make it to Serbia and take up their duties because the Serbian army’s counteroffensive at the Kolubara River resulted in the liberation of the whole country on 15 December. 6

2 N. Petrović, “Zajednički austro-ugarski kabinet i Jugoslovensko pitanje 1912–1918”, in Jugoslovenski narodi pred prvi svatski rat, Department of Social Sciences series vol. 61 (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1967), 733–739. 3 D. Milikić, “Beograd pod okupacijom u prvom svetskom ratu”, Godišnjak grada Beogra- da V (1958), 263; see also Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv Wien (HHSTAW) Polit. Ar- chiv Liasse Krieg 2a (1914–1916), Telegramm von Masirevich, Koviljača 2. XII. 1914. 4 HHSTAW, P. A., K. 973, Krieg 32a, Masirevich an den k. u k. Minister des Aeus- sern Grafen Berchtold, Koviljača 26. XI. 1914 – “Part of the country from the Drina to Valjevo,” Masirević wrote, “is completely deserted and without population.” County commands were located in Loznica, Šabac, Valjevo, Užice and Belgrade. 5 HHSTAW, P. A., K. 973, Krieg 32a, Abschrift eines Telegrammes des Feldzeugmei- sters Potiorek vom 25. November 1914 an den Herrn k. u k. Ministerpräsidenten; ibid. Der Vertreter des k. u k. Ministeriums des Äussern in der Nachrichten Abteilung des Operationsoberkommando B Gruppe, Koviljača 6. XII. 1914; ibid. Militär Kanzlei Sr. Majestät No 3637, 24. XI. 1914. 6 D. Djordjevic, “Vojvoda Putnik. The Serbian High Command and Strategy in 1914”, in Béla K. Király & Nandor Dreisziger, eds., East Central European Society in the First World War, Boulder: East European Monographs, 1985, 569–589. D. Djordjević, The Austro-Hungarian Occupation Regime in Serbia 111

The second occupation of Serbia lasted much longer – from fall 1915 to fall 1918. The Austro-Hungarian occupation area stretched up to the Morava River (from Smederevo to Stalać) and the line descending on Mt Jastrebac and, partly, Mt Kopaonik to the south-east of Kosovska Mitrovica and above Prizren to the Albanian border. Regions in the east and south including Ser- bian Macedonia were ceded to Bulgaria. The establishing of occupation zones in Serbia, Montenegro and Albania was informed by the frontiers established in Bucharest in 1913.7 The new administration was gradually formed in step with development of military operations through the so-called Ettapen system of county commands. Finally, the Military General Governorate for Serbia was formed on 1 January 1916 on the model of Austro-Hungarian occupa- tion of the Russian part of Poland.8 It was under jurisdiction of the Supreme Command and headed by General-Governor with the rank of a corps com- mander appointed by the Emperor. A civilian commissary and chief of staff were added as auxiliary organs. Under General-Governor in Belgrade were the Command of the City of Belgrade, county commands and municipalities. The prior Serbian administrative division into counties was maintained for the sake of efficiency with certain modifications in the counties bordering on the territory ceded to Bulgaria.9 The Governorate encompassed four admin- istrative departments: military, political, economic and judicial. The military one was under the command of the chief of staff and consisted of presidial, transportation, gendarmerie and supply sections; the political department headed by a staff officer had its intelligence and political-police sections (with offices for educational, cultural, police and medical matters); the economic department had economic and financial sections: the former had offices for trade, agriculture, forestry, mining and military production plants; the latter had offices for direct and indirect taxes. Finally, the judicial department had sections for criminal and civil law matters. County commands had executive and judicial authority in their respective counties. At the bottom of this ladder were municipalities with their mayors, elected from the ranks of reliable local people, and municipal court.10

7 HHSTAW, P. A. I, K. 975, Krieg 32g, Evidenzbureau des k. u k. Generalstabes, Haup- tmann Julius Ledineg an das k. u k. Armeeoberkommando. 8 Ibid. Armeeoberkommando, General-Oberst Conrad an den Militär Generalgouver- neur im Belgrad 1. I. 1916. A similar General Military Governorate was also established in Montenegro. See V. N. Rakočević, “Crna Gora pod austrougarskom okupacijom 1916–1918” (unpublished doctoral dissertation, p. 355ff). 9 Ibid. Der Vertreter des k. u k. Ministeriums des Äussern an den Minister des Äussern Baron Burián, Belgrad den 5. November 1915. 10 Ibid. P. A., K. 973, Krieg 32a, B. Behörden – Organisation und allgemeine Grundsät- ze für Ihren Wirkungskreis. Besides the Command of the City of Belgrade, there were 112 Balcanica XLVI (2015)

In such organisation of the occupation administration the army played a dominant role which was understandable in view of wartime cir- cumstances. But because of the conflict of interests and aspirations in the conquered area frictions soon emerged in interpretation of the basic aims and tasks of the occupation. Those frictions came to pass first between Austro-Hungarian and German interests in the Balkans, then between Austrian and Hungarian interests and, finally, between military and civilian authorities.

III Military operations carried out from 1914 onwards demonstrated Austria- Hungary’s increasing dependence on its German ally. This caused among the ruling circles of the Habsburg Empire not just a sense of dwindling prestige, but also a fear that Germany would impose solutions which ex- clusively suited her own interests. On two occasions such fear was not un- founded: during German attempts to conclude a separate peace with Serbia and thus shake off the burden of the Balkan front and during German eco- nomic exploitation of the conquered Serbian land. 1) The failure of a rapid war operation on the Western front, the need to engage ever increasing number of troops against Russia and the siding of Italy with the Entente Powers made the Central Powers in May 1915 con- sider the possibility of a separate peace on the less important Serbian battle- field. The German plan was quite a large-scale one: to regroup the Balkan forces and form another Balkan alliance under the aegis of Germany for the purpose of pressurising Romania, relieving the forces on the Italian front and blocking the Entente’s Balkan plans. These objectives could be achieved through a separate peace with Serbia which would obtain an outlet to the sea across northern Albania, unify with Montenegro and establish close ties with the Monarchy. Serbia would, in return, cede Serbian Macedonia to Bulgaria while Greece would receive southern Albania.11 Doubting that it was possible to settle scores both with Italy and Serbia at the same time Viennese diplomacy was inclined to such solution as it believed that the Monarchy’s prestige would not suffer following the success of the Central Powers on the Eastern front and preferring the entrenchment in Albania of a small Serbia to that of Italy.12 Although in agreement with those com-

12 counties: Belgrade, Kragujevac, Gornji Milanovac, Novi Pazar, Šabac, Užice, Čačak, Kruševac, Mitrovica, Prijepolje, Smederevo, Valjevo. 11 Ibid. P. A., K. 952, Krieg 25g, Auszug aus Aufzeichnung über die 24. V. 1915. erfolgte Unterredung in Pless; Ibid. Gesanschaft in Stockholm, Bericht n0 43 A-C/P, 18. VI. 1915. 12 Ibid. Krieg 25g, Promemoria des Grafen Hoyos über die Möglichkeit eines Separat- friedens mit Serbien 22. Mai 1915. D. Djordjević, The Austro-Hungarian Occupation Regime in Serbia 113 binations Vienna was rather suspicious of German feelers cast through the intermediary of the Greek king and, even more so, German agents in the Balkans.13 In fall 1915, on the eve of the offensive against Serbia, Vienna and Budapest opposed the renewed German attempts to pre-empt military operation with negotiations. The Hungarian Prime Minister Tisza accused Germany of “intriguing” in Serbia behind the back of Austria-Hungary.14 Prince Hohenlohe openly requested from the German Foreign Minister, Gottlieb von Jagow, in Berlin that “German agents in the Balkans stop with this practice”.15 On the contrary, German diplomacy was dismayed by the lack of Austria-Hungary’s concrete plans for Serbia. When von Jagow in- structed his Ambassador Tschirschky to sound out Vienna’s stance if Serbia in the last moment, facing annihilation, sought for a peaceful solution, the Foreign Minister, Count Burián, simply replied that he was against half- measures that would harm the Monarchy’s prestige.16 Vienna wanted an of- fensive, destruction of Serbia and occupation of her entire territory.17 After another German insistence, in October 1915, Vienna again evaded giving a specific reply.18 That was hardly surprising as Vienna did not have a clear idea as to her Balkan intentions. In early November, when General Falken- heyn urgently asked for conditions to be put forward before expected Ser- bian parliamentarians, von Jagow reproached Prince Hohenlohe stressing that “we must be clear in our mind as to what we want”. The only answer he received was a repetition of general request for “complete military capitu- lation of Serbia”.19 Informing Prince Hohenlohe in November 1915 that the fate of Serbia, Montenegro and Albania would be discussed at a forth-

13 Ibid. Telegramm Silaschi, Athenes 28. September 1915; Hohenlohe an Burián, Berlin 3. VIII. 1915; Ibid. 6. X. 1915; Burián an Czernin und Tarnowski, Wien 16. VIII. 1915. 14 Ibid. Krieg b-I, Tisza an Burián 2. X. 1915. Tisza threatened that German attempts to negotiate behind the back and on behalf of Austria-Hungary militate against the Mon- archy’s favourable attitude towards Serbia. He requested that the two allied countries determine their objectives in the Balkans. 15 Ibid.. P. A. I., Krieg 25g, K. 952, Note des k. u k. Ministeriums des Äussern an Graf Tisza in Budapest. 16 Chiffre-Telegramm ddto Berlin 27 September 1915, Prinz Hohenlohe an das k. u k. Ministerium des Äussern (Streng geheim). Hohenlohe was sceptical about ‘prestige’ since the subjugation of Serbia could only be carried out with Germany’s intervention. 17 Ibid. Telegramm in Ziffern des Ministers des Äussern Baron Burián an Prinzen Ho- henlohe in Berlin, ddto Wien 28. September 1915, Geheim. 18 Ibid. Telegramm in Ziffern an Gottfried Prinzen Hohenlohe in Berlin, ddto Wien 30. Oktober 1915, Geheim! Ibid. Chiffre Telegramm des Prinzen Hohenlohe ddto Ber- lin 31. Oktober 1915. 19 Ibid. Prinz Hohenlohe an Minister Baron Burián, Geheim – Berlin 3. November 1915. 114 Balcanica XLVI (2015) coming meeting in Berlin, Burián limited his instructions to opposition to unification of these countries and demand for continuation of military operations.20 Fearing that Germany might act on her own, the Ministry in Vienna demanded to have a representative in Field-Marshal August von Mackensen’s army with the view to taking part in the acceptance of Serbian capitulation.21 However, contrary to expectations of the Central Powers, the Serbian government and Supreme Command did not offer capitulation but rather proceeded to retreat across Albania. The eagerly expected Serbian parliamentarians did not turn up at all.22 2) The conquest of Serbia posed other problems before the Austro- German allies, particularly in the matters of administration, division of war spoils and economic exploitation of the occupied area. The Hungarian Prime Minister Tisza was the first one to be alarmed having heard that German military administration would be introduced in Serbia. On 7 November 1915, he vehemently protested in the Supreme Command requesting from Conrad von Hötzendorf to explain to the Germans that Serbia was in the Hungarian sphere of interest.23 In a conversation held on 8 November with Conrad von Hötzendorf in Pless, General Falkenheyn accepted an Austro-Hungarian oc- cupation administration in Serbia, but he refused to commit himself in writ- ten on 12 November using the on-going military operations as an excuse.24 Besides, Germany did not intend to dispute Austria-Hungary’s right to Ser- bia; she just wanted to buy some time in order to extract as much loot as pos- sible and secure economic advantages in the occupation regime. Burián was, however, very suspicious; he insisted in Berlin on 18 November that, given its “immediate interests and contiguous position” Serbia belonged to the Mon- archy which would introduce its own administration there in accordance with Falkenheyn’s statement of 8 November.25 Austro-Hungarian reports from this period were rife with bitter accusations on account of German ruthless exploitation of Poland and Serbia. According to those reports, the Germans had devastated forests, taken all food, coal, petroleum, introduced unrealistic exchange rate for ruble, damaged industry and deprived it of raw materials, transported field workers to Germany and imposed high railway and custom

20 Ibid. Notiz: I. Herrn von Tschirschky; II. Prinz Hohenlohe, Burián Wien 5. XI. 1915. 21 Ibid. Baron Mussulin an Graven Thurn, Armeeoberkommando, Wien 28. X. 1915. 22 News of two Serbian parliamentarians coming to negotiate on 11 November caused a great stir, but it turned out to be false. 23 Ibid. K. 973, Krieg 23a, Abschrift – Note an Grafen Thurn, Wien 7. XI. 1915. 24 Ibid. Der Vertreter des k. u k. Ministeriums des Aeussern beim k. u k. Armeeober- kommando, Teschen 15. November 1915 (Wiesner an Burián). 25 Ibid. Abschrift eines streng vertraulichen Erlasses an Prinzen Gottfried Hohenlohe, Wien 18. November 1915; Ibid. Telegramm Hohenlohe, Berlin 21. XI. 1915. D. Djordjević, The Austro-Hungarian Occupation Regime in Serbia 115 tariffs as well as tax rates. The Germans behaved the same way in Serbia and appropriated all resources, commandeered all wheat, flour, wine, cattle, salt, petroleum etc. The reports predicted that famine and permanent impoverish- ment of the population would reach such level that it would not just threaten the current situation but also cause infinite consequences in the future.26 It would be Austria-Hungary that would suffer worst because of that as she counted on this area in post-war period. The reports of Austro-Hungarian occupation authorities reflected struggle between the allies over the loot in Serbia. To bring that conflict to an end Conrad von Hötzendorf stated to General Falkenheyn on 20 December 1915 that the Austro-Hungarian mili- tary administration in Serbia was an accomplished fact warning the German Command at the same time to moderate requisitions of Serbian supplies.27 The German Command was prepared to cede Serbia to Austria-Hungary if the latter fulfilled certain conditions: 1) free and uninterrupted German tran- sit for civilian and military purposes; 2) opening of the Serbian economic area to Germany for the purpose of supplying with foodstuff and raw materials; 3) equality of customs conditions in case a separate customs zone was created in Serbia; 4) the Smederevo-Niš-Skoplje railway and Kragujevac and its railway network remained in German hands; 5) German right to exploit copper in the mine of Bor.28 The request for economic exploitation, particularly that of mines and railway, was a major concern for Vienna.29 Ballhausplatz accused the Germans of deliberate procrastination with their temporary military ad- ministration in Serbia with the view to keeping railways and mines in their possession for as long as possible.30 In order to back their mining requests, the Austrians invoked the pre-war rights of their StEG company (Österreichisch- ungarische Staatseisenbahngesellschaft)31 and fought tooth and nail in the Su-

26 Ibid. On the economic exploitation of “Russian” Poland in Serbia on the part of the German army – a copy of a strictly confidential report to Prince Gottfried Hohenlohe, Wien 27. XII. 1915. 27 Ibid. General Oberst Conrad an den Chef des Generalstabes des Feldheeres Herrn Erich von Falkenheyn, Standort des AOK, 20. XII 1915. 28 Ibid. Notiz auf die Notizen vom 21. November, 24. November, 1. December und 12. December d. J. – Berlin 28. XII. 1915. The civilian and military views in Germany diverged. Civilians wanted Bor for Germany and were willing to cede Majdanpek to Austria-Hungary and Plakatnica to Bulgaria. The military insisted on maintaining con- trol over Majdanpek mine. Germany granted to Austria-Hungary a third of copper from mine of Bor. 29 Ibid. Thurn an den Minister des Äussern Baron Burián, Teschen 10.Jänner 1916. 30 Ibid. Baron Burián an Grafen Thurn – Telegramm, Wien 11. XII. 1915. 31 StEG had signed contracts with the Serbian government in 1912 for exploration of the mining basin of Krajina in eastern Serbia, with the Belgian Company for explora- 116 Balcanica XLVI (2015) preme Command to secure exploitation of Majdanpek mine for themselves.32 As for the railways, an agreement was reached in January 1916 which left the railway from Smederevo to the Greek border in German hands as long as German troops were engaged on the Balkan front. The Bulgarian ally was not fully trusted either. Although the For- eign Ministry in Vienna did not oppose forced Bulgarisation of eastern and southern Serbia in principle, and even condoned it,33 a number of docu- ments in the Vienna archives point out the great extent to and suspicion with which Bulgarian propaganda in the provinces of Kosovo, Metohija and Serbian Macedonia populated by Albanians was followed.34

IV Just as the Hungarians feared in 1915 that Germany might present them with an accomplished fact, the Austrians suspected Hungarians of do- ing the same. Alarm was caused by Korrespondenzbureau on 10 November 1914, confirmed by the Magyarorszag nine days later, that the authori- ties in the occupied region of Mačva were of Hungarian character with a Hungarian commander, gendarmerie and clerks.35 On 19 November, the Austrian Prime Minister, Baron Stürgkh, filed an energetic protest with the Foreign Ministry, the Budapest government and the southern front command describing such action as “a flagrant infringement on Austria’s rights” and warning that he would “deny his consent to any solution which would not be unequivocal about the fact that the conquered land was ad- ministered on behalf of the Monarchy through its plenipotentiaries and delegates”.36 Facing resistance Tisza tried in early December to achieve his goal in a roundabout way. Complaining about bulkiness and inefficiency of the administrative apparatus consisting of clerks from Austria, Hungary, Bosnia and Herzegovina he suggested to Count Berchtold some sort of internal division of spheres of interest: Hungarian clerks in Serbia, Aus- tion of Majdanpek as well as with the Majdanpek company. See ibid. The exploitation of mines in Serbia. 32 Ibid. Von Falkenheyn an Gen. Oberst Conrad, Teschen 28. XII 1915; Der Vertreter des Ministeriums des Äussern beim Armeeoberkommando Wiesner an Baron Burián, Teschen 29. XII 1915, 33 Ibid. K. 975, Krieg 32, Vize-Consul in Nisch an Grafen Czernin, 20. III. 1918. 34 Ibid. K. 975, Krieg 32-i. 35 Ibid. K. 973, Krieg 32a, Telegramm des Korrespondenzbureau 10. XI. 1914. 36 Ibid. Note des k. u k. Ministerpräsidenten Baron Stürgkh an den Minister des Äus- sern Grafen Berchtold, Wien 19. November 1914. Berchtold instantly admonished the commander of the southern front, General Potiorek – Note des Ministers des Äussern an den Ministerpräsidenten in Wien, Str. Vertraulich, Wien 20. November 1914. D. Djordjević, The Austro-Hungarian Occupation Regime in Serbia 117 trian in the so-called “Russian” Poland.37 The proposal was rejected in Vi- enna.38 In winter 1915/16, conflict broke out between military and civilian authorities in General Military Governorate in Serbia. The reasons for this conflict were twofold. First, Austro-Hungarian rivalry; then, annexationist plans of the military command in Serbia – all resulting from the divergence of views in respect of general policy towards Serbia i.e. the aims and tasks of occupation. Imposing an occupation regime, the Supreme Command unequivocally started introducing a regime of long-lasting military ad- ministration with annexationist objectives. The Hungarian government set their faces against it as it preferred – and it was backed by the joint Foreign Ministry – to keep the Serbian question open until the end of the war. That is how that dispute turned into the conflict between military and civilian authorities over the jurisdiction of civilians within military administration, educational policy in the Governorate and, in general, the regime in the occupied area. Above all, soldiers took a dim view of civilian interference with what they considered exclusively military matters. In mid-October 1915, the Foreign Ministry in Vienna appointed its delegate with the Intelligence Department of the Third Army Command to represent its “administrative and political interests”. In early 1916, General Consul, Ladislaus Györgyey, replaced Von Storck and the latter was succeeded by Plenipotentiary Minis- ter, Ludwig Graf Szechenyi, in February.39 The statute of the Military Gov- ernorate envisaged the position of a civilian commissary and that duty was taken up by historian Thalloczy. It should be noted that these posts were filled by Hungarians alone. However, militaries systematically sabotaged the work of civilians, particularly that of the Foreign Ministry restraining its activities in Belgrade at every step. The Foreign Ministry complained to the Supreme Command on several occasions that its representative was blocked at every turn and that he had carried out his orders by constantly pleading with military authorities which censured his reports.40 Typical of this kind of relations was the dispute over the Serbian state archives that arose in

37 Ibid. Note des ungarischen Ministerpräsidenten Grafen Tisza an den Minister des Äussern Grafen Berchtold, Vertraulic, Budapest 2. XII. 1914. Tisza proposed the same to Potiorek. 38 Ibid. Tisza an Erherzog Friedrich, Budapest 26. Mai 1916. 39 Kriegsarchiv, Wien, Operationsabteilung des Armeeoberkommando, No 19867, Jän- ner 1916; ibid. Berichte Wiesner, Teschen 3. I. 1916; ibid. Akt des Armeeoberkomman- do (No 21540), 13. II. 1916. 40 Ibid. Operationsabteilung des AOK, No 21302, Graf Thurn ddto Teschen, 5. II. 1916; HHSTAW, P. A. I, K. 973, Krieg 32a, Abschrift eines Erlasses an Grafen Thurn, ddto Wien 18. IV. 1916. The censure of those reports did not stop before 25 May 1916. – 118 Balcanica XLVI (2015) late November and early December 1915. Since the military opposed the transfer of the archives to Vienna as it intended to look into their content in Belgrade, Von Storck had cases full of archival material secretly, under the cover of night, transported to Zemun and thence to Austria.41 Annexationist policy of the Military Governorate in Serbia caused a sharp conflict. The most prominent participants were Tisza, Burián, Szech- enyi and Thalloczy. When Governor Salis-Seewis and the War Minister Krobatin referred to Serbia as “an area annexed to the Monarchy”,42 Count Tisza seized on that opportunity with vigour to point out to the War Min- istry the inaccuracy of such a statement and invoke the conclusions reached by the joint Ministerial Council.43 Educational projects of the Military Governorate provided another reason for intervention. In mid-January 1916, the occupation authorities produced a plan for opening elementary and secondary schools in Serbia. The exposition of this plan stressed that it was “the main task of elementary schools to educate children for civic life and create useful members of hu- man society, then general education and the strengthening of character, an emphasis being on maintaining discipline, cleanliness and upbringing in terms of orderly conduct”.44 The plan encompassed a broad education pro- gramme and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) were appointed as school staff. The Supreme Command approved the plan on 27 January45 and the first of the envisaged schools was ceremoniously opened in Bitoljska Street in Belgrade as early as 10 February.46 School curriculum banned the use of Cyrillic alphabet. In a memo- randum produced by the army which Count Thurn forwarded to Baron

Kriegsarchiv, Operationsabteilung des AOK, No 25388, Armeeoberkommando an das Militärgouvernment Serbien 25. V. 1916. 41 HHSTAW, P. A. K. 822, Krieg 2 (1914–18), Privatschreiben. Von Storck, Wien 4. XII. 1915. 42 Ibid. P. A. I, Krieg 32 b, d, e, k. u k. Militärgouvernment in Serbien an das Armee- oberkommando, 16. I. 1916. 43 Tisza spoke against “showering good deeds [sic] on the fanatical hatred of the Serbian people which is guilty of this war”. – Ibid. P. A. I, Krieg 32 b, d, c, K. 974, Tisza an den Feldzeugmeister und Kriegsminister Alexander Freiherrn Krobatin, Budapest 13. II. 1916. 44 AS, MGG/S, box 1/48 Plt. 48, Die Grundsätze für die Errichtung der Normal und Mittelschulen in Serbien. Ibid. MGG/S an das AOK, Belgrad 14. I. 1916. 45 Ibid. MGG/S, box 1/48 Plt, Armeeoberkommando, Standort des AOK, 27. I. 1916. 46 HHSTAW, P. A. K. 974, Krieg 32 a-f, Vertreter des Ministeriums des Äussern Graf Szechenyi, Belgrad 10. II. 1916. – The representative of the Foreign Ministry was not invited to take part in this ceremony. For more detail about the opening of schools see AS, Plt box 2/205, 20. IV. 1916. D. Djordjević, The Austro-Hungarian Occupation Regime in Serbia 119

Burián, Cyrillic alphabet was termed staatsgefährlich [dangerous to the state] because under the aegis of Serbian ecclesiastical and school auton- omy in Vojvodina it had served as an instrument of agitation for the Serb cause, it provided a link between the Vojvodina Serbs with Serbia and, in general, contributed to preservation of national individuality of Serbs in the Habsburg Empire. By banning Cyrillic alphabet and advancing the edu- cational programme the army openly demonstrated its intention to annex Serbia on the grounds of “general benefit for Austria-Hungary and not par- ticular interests of one of her nations”, a clear allusion to Hungarians.47 The action of military circles met with resistance in Budapest and Vi- enna. The civil commissary in Belgrade Thalloczy warned Governor Salis- Seewis that this measure would draw Serbs closer to Bulgarians.48 Stürgkh, Burián and Tisza each made strong protest to the Supreme Command. These protests underscored principled importance of that matter and the army was warned not to prejudice the future status of Serbia by measures which were not in keeping with the temporary character of military occupa- tion. Burián used the opportunity to point out the existing divergence be- tween military and civilian authorities in Serbia.49 Tisza was even harsher: repeating Burián’s arguments, he disputed educational competence of sol- diers, accused the army of eschewing deliberately Hungarian teachers and demanded the implementation of a “strict regime in Serbia” because “the Serbs must feel the consequences of their offences” in order to “break down the power of Serbdom and build a strong bulwark against it”.50 Exposed to such criticism, Conrad von Hötzendorf found himself in an unexpected position to defend the army from reproaches for its “kind treatment of Serbia”. In a reply to Tisza, he fully agreed with the policy of harsh rule in that country: “At the beginning of the offensive against Serbia,” Conrad von Hötzendorf wrote on 15 March 1916, “the Supreme Command ordered ruthless exploitation of the area. The Military Gover- norate is now carrying out disarmament of population and securing the area by employing draconic measures while material resources of Serbia would be utilised to maximum extent regardless of population.” He explained the educational policy of the Governorate as resulting from aspiration to pre-

47 HHSTAW, Krieg 32 b, d, e, Graf Thurn an den Minister des Äussern Grafen Burián, Teschen 11. IV. 1916. 48 Ibid. Graf Szechenyi an Baron Burián, Belgrad den 24. II. 1916. 49 Ibid. K. 973, Krieg 32a, Abschrift eines streng vertraulichen Erlasses: 1. An den Ver- treter des k. u k. Ministerium des Äussern in Belgrad; 2. An den Vertreter des k. u k. Ministerium des Äussern bei dem k. u k. Armeeoberkommando, Wien 18. III. 1916. 50 Ibid. K. 974, Krieg 32e, Kon. Ung. Ministerpräsident an das k. u k. Armeeoberkom- mando, Budapest 3. III. 1916. 120 Balcanica XLVI (2015) vent passive resistance and enable the full use of local economic resources. He regarded the use of NCOs as teaching staff in accordance with edu- cation of “Serbian children in the spirit of discipline and order”. As for banning Cyrillic alphabet, it had already been prohibited in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the imperial decree of 15 October 1915 just like it had been similarly removed from schools in Dalmatia.51 In a directive issued on the same day, Hötzendorf did not conceal annexationist intentions: Serbia had to be ruled with firm hand and economically exploited as much as possible, but it had to be taken into account that she was necessary to the Monarchy as an economic area in the future. Serbian intelligentsia should be dealt with severely whereas peasants and commercial circles should be won over. In the matter of schools it was necessary to limit them to elementary, and possibly vocational, schools, but Serbian teachers must be completely excluded “for they are imbued with hatred of us”.52 Such policy of the Supreme Com- mand and Governorate in Serbia only deepened the conflict with the Hun- garians and civilian authorities.53 Tendencies of military authorities in Serbia to transfer responsibility for some local administration to native people caused further suspicious- ness. Some members of conservative Serbian circles were employed in occu- pation administration. Claiming that such measures were devoid of politi- cal inspiration, Governor Salis-Seewis argued that local population could not be completely excluded from internal administration if full economic exploitation of the land was to be effected. They were “carefully selected persons” which “did not discredit themselves politically in the past with outbursts against the Monarchy”.54 The municipal committee in Belgrade formed immediately after the conquest of the city on 10 October 1915, and reorganised into two bodies (Uprava and Odbor) in February 1916, was enlarged, following the resigna- tion of Dr. Stevan Leway, with a number of well-known Serbian politi- cians from the pre-war period. Along with the president, Vojislav Veljković, formerly finance minister and one of the leaders of the Popular Party, the committee was joined by Mihailo Popović, also a former finance minis- ter and prominent Radical, Vasilije Antonić, formerly foreign minister and

51 Ibid. Krieg 32 b, d, e, Conrad von Hötzendorf an Grafen Tisza, Standort des AOK, 15. III. 1916. 52 Ibid. Conrad von Hötzendorf an das k. u k. Militärgouvernment in Belgrad, Standort des AOK, 15. III. 1916. 53 Ibid. Abschrift eines Erlasses an Grafen Thurn, 28. III. 1916. 54 Milikić, “Beograd pod okupacijom”, 280, 298–299. Szechenyi took a favourable view of the previous work of all members of the committee – HHSTAW, K. 973, Krieg 32a, Graf Szechenyi an Minister Baron Burián, Belgrad 18. März 1916. D. Djordjević, The Austro-Hungarian Occupation Regime in Serbia 121 well-known Independent Radical, Živojin Perić, Progressivist and universi- ty professor, Pavle Denić, formerly construction minister, and others.55 The Zentralwoltätigkeits-Komitée was then formed for the purpose of collecting and distributing aid for population; it consisted of “prominent citizens who are generally trusted, politically are beyond reproach and assessed as reli- able”. The committee started forming its subcommittees in the interior at- tached to the county commands.56 Of course, these bodies were under strict control of the occupation authorities. Attached to the Belgrade Committee were a civilian commissary and a military advisor; the same went for the Re- lief Committee. The members of the committee were elected on the basis of their personal activities rather than party affiliation.57 They were restricted to the bounds of their competencies. In January 1916, the former Serbian prime minister, Liberal Jovan Avakumović, suggested to Count Salis-See- wis a joint proclamation to the population. The Governor was so angry with Avakumović because of his impertinent idea of attaching his signature next

55 Ibid. Berichte des MGG/S, März 1916. 56 Dr. Vojislav Veljković, the chairmen of the committee, tried in May 1915 through the agency of the journalist Lončarević, who was assisting the representative of the Foreign Ministry, to initiate a general discussion between the Austro-Hungarian occupation au- thorities and the representatives of Serbian political parties who remained in the coun- try. He reminded of the example of the Russian Legation in Belgrade that had gathered together the Serbian opposition at the time of the last rulers of the Obrenović dynasty and proposed a similar action of the occupiers in gathering the opponents of the Kara­ djordjević dynasty and Radicals. According to Veljković and Lončarević, it was up to the Austro-Hungarian Legation in Belgrade to attract those parties which had not been ill-disposed to the Monarchy in the past. This discussion would have resulted in an agreement concerning the future political relations softening at the same time the un- necessary strictness of military authorities. (HHSTAW, P. A. I, K. 977, Krieg 32k Auf- zeichnung eines Privatgespräches des Endesgefertigten, Belgrad 13. Mai 1916). Živojin Perić expounded similar ideas at the end of September 1916 reproaching military ad- ministration for neglecting the supporters of the Serbian Conservative Party founded in 1914 with an anti-Russian and pro-Austrian political programme. Perić complained that the authorities were interning Austrophiles as much as Radicals. (Ibid., Krieg 32- k-o, Note by Živojin Perić and Professor Jovanović, Belgrade, late September 1916). In spring 1918, Perić proposed the formation of a “constituent [assembly]” in Serbia which would explicitly separate the Serbian cause from the Entente Powers (ibid. Report by Major Safranek, Belgrade, 11 March 1918). It is interesting to note that the renowned Austrophile Vukašin Petrović did not play a major role under the Austro-Hungarian occupation, although he did offer his services to Vienna (K. 952, Krieg 25, Burián to Thurn, private, 17 December 1915). The Military Governorate entrusted Petrović with collecting harvest and cattle from the Bulgarian occupation zone (ibid., K. 977, Krieg 32 k-o, Kuhn to Czernin, Belgrade, 23 March 1918). 57 HHSTAW, K. 973, Krieg 32a, Generalkonsul Györgyey an Ministar Burián, Streng Vertraulich, Belgrad am 18. Jänner 1916. 122 Balcanica XLVI (2015) to that of Salis-Seewis himself that he ordered his arrest and internment.58 The affair reached even the Emperor’s office which required further infor- mation.59 A statement of Vojislav Veljković to the effect that the “Belgrade Committee, supported [emphasis mine] by military authorities, will do a useful job” also gave cause for grievance. Szechenyi complained that this statement suggested that the Committee had priority over military authori- ties.60 When, at a meeting, Milivoje Spasojević, a member of the Relief Committee, started to criticise the occupation authorities the civilian com- missary interrupted him and asked the Governor to have him interned.61 Recruiting local people to committees, the public celebration of “County Day” (Kreistag) in Gornji Milanovac, propaganda conducted by the Beogradske novine (Belgrade Newspaper) to the effect that the Serbian people would have a better future within the framework of the new state, public opening of schools made Hungarian ruling circles suspect that the army not just carried out an annexationist policy in Serbia but also pre- pared political actions with the view to establishing some kind of domestic authorities under occupation. It was the fear of the Yugoslav question that accounted for such Hungarian attitude. The administration of Governor- ate recruited mostly clerks of Yugoslav origin due to their language skills. Szechenyi went so far as to accuse Count Salis-Seewis of having special sympathies for the “Yugoslav race” because of his mother’s Croat origin. A breeze starting from the top, from the Governor, Szechenyi complained, was turning into a storm among clerks at the bottom causing frictions and awakening unjustified hopes among the Serbs contrary to ambitions of the occupation authorities.62 Tisza saw the Yugoslav civil servants and the Ser- bian Belgrade Committee as an embryo of something of a Serbo-Croat authority that smacked of Yugoslavism and trialism.63 “All this indicates the formation of a permanent authority,” Tisza wrote to the Supreme Com- mand on 3 March 1916, “in a finally conquered country, with a specific [political] programme.”64

58 Ibid. Copia pro actis ad Einsichtsstück der Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät vom 25. Jänner 1916. (betreffend den gewesenen serbischen Ministerpräsidenten Avakumović). 59 Ibid. K. 977, Krieg32a, Graf Szechenyi an Baron Burián, Belgrad den 18. März 1918. 60 Ibid. K. 973, Graf Szechenyi an Baron Burián, Belgrad 4. IV. 1916. 61 Ibid, same as note 59. 62 Ibid. Tisza an Erherzog Friedrich, Budapest 26. V. 1916. 63 Ibid. K. 974, Krieg 32e, Kön. ung. Ministerpräsident an das k. u k. Armeeoberkom- mando, Budapest 3. III. 1916. 64 Ibid. K. 973, Krieg 32a, Abschrift eines Str. Vertr. Erlasses 1. an den Vertreter des k. u k. Ministerium des Äussern bei dem Armeeoberkommando, Wien 18. III. 1916. D. Djordjević, The Austro-Hungarian Occupation Regime in Serbia 123

In mid-March 1916, the Foreign Ministry in Vienna and the Hun- garian government filed their protests with the Supreme Command and Governorate pointing to the stepping over the bounds of powers and to the political consequences of such actions. Count Szechenyi was instructed from Vienna to personally inform Count Salis-Seewis65 but, as the rep- resentative of the Foreign Ministry expected, the Governor took shelter behind the Supreme Command referring to specific orders he had received and which he had to carry out as a soldier.66 The Supreme Command was also uncompromising: Conrad von Hötzendorf defended himself that the writing of the occupation press could not be taken as a proof because that press was read abroad as well and “we have no interest in provoking foreign public opinion or presenting ourselves in an unfavourable light by describ- ing our draconic repressive measures in Serbia”.67 In order to find out what the real state of affairs was, Tisza himself -un dertook an inspection tour in north-west Serbia in early May 1916 includ- ing a visit to the General Governor in Belgrade. On that occasion he visited Šabac, Koviljača, Zabrežje, Valjevo and Lazarevac.68 Upon his return, Tisza decided to finally settle the question. First in a written communication,69 then in a conversation with Erzherzog Friedrich and Conrad von Höt- zendorf at the end of May in Teschen, the seat of the Supreme Command, he requested a thorough reorganisation of the Military Governorate, the removal of Governor and condemnation of annexationist policy in Serbia. Since Hötzendorf again refused to accept Tisza’s reasons defending the army, the Hungarian Prime Minister addressed Baron Burián on 3 June with the plea to have the Emperor’s verdict in this dispute invoking the decisions of the joint Ministerial Council of 19 July 1914 and 7 January 1916. “The Hungarian government will not assume responsibility for events on the southern frontier and their impact on the hinterland,” Tisza con- cluded, “if the Military Governorate continues with its activities that run contrary to vital interests of the Hungarian state.”70 That was an ultimatum on the part of Hungary and Burián understood it as such. In his note to the

65 Ibid. Graf Szechenyi an den Herrn Minister des k. u k. Hauses und des Äussern Baron Burián, Belgrad 24. III. 1916. – Governor Salis-Seewis complained that Burián was ill-informed openly alluding to his interlocutor Szechenyi as a source of inaccurate information. 66 Ibid. K. 974, Krieg 32 b, d, e, Conrad von Hötzendorf an Grafen Tisza, Standort des AOK, 15. III. 1916. 67 Ibid. K. 973, Krieg 32a, Szechenyi an Baron Burián, Belgrad 17. Mai 1916. 68 Ibid. Graf Tisza an Erzherzog Friedrich, Budapest 26. V. 1916. 69 Ibid. Graf Tisza an Baron Burián, Budapest 3. Juni 1916. 70 Ibid. Abschrift eines alleruntertänigsten Immediatvortrages ddto Wien, 9. Juni 1916. 124 Balcanica XLVI (2015)

Emperor on 9 June he reminded of the decisions of the joint Ministerial Council in respect of Serbia, repeated all the accusations against the policy of Military Governorate and used the opportunity to demand extension of authority given to the representative of civilian authorities.71 Both propos- als were accepted: by the Emperor’s decision of 6 July 1916 Count Salis- Seewis and his chief of staff, Colonel Gelinek, were recalled and replaced by General Adolf von Rhemen and Colonel Hugo Kerchnawe.72 The removal of Salis-Seewis was received in Belgrade, in the words of Szechenyi, as a “thunder from a clear sky”. The Governor was angry and he instantly left Belgrade in a car. A protest addressed to the Supreme Command failed. Ironically referring to certain parts of Salis-Seewis’s farewell order men- tioning a “peaceful and content population”, Szechenyi pointed out that a plot had just been discovered in Serbia involving 50 persons of which 12 had been hanged.73 The Emperor’s decision of 6 July authorised Baron Burián to submit the necessary proposals to the Supreme Command for the purpose of ex- tending authority of a civilian commissary. He did it promptly on 10 July disputing the qualifications, previous knowledge and practical experience of military men in the matters of a political-administrative nature. The Statute of the General Military Governorate in Serbia considerably extended the power of civilian authorities. Civilian commissary was, just like Governor, appointed by the Emperor; he was charged with all matters of civilian ad- ministration, appointing, replacing and rewarding clerks; the entire politi- cal, economic, financial, and legal service of the Governorate, completely separated from military functions, was under him. Civilian officials headed all non-military departments.74 The entry of Romania into war in August 1916 temporarily postponed coming into force of these changes – that fi- nally took place on 15 October 1916.75 The conflict of military and civilian authorities in occupied Serbia ended in the defeat of the Supreme Command’s conceptions in summer 1916. In keeping with the interests of Hungarian ruling circles her fate

71 Ibid. Emperor’s decision of 8 July 1916. 72 Ibid. Streng vertrauliches Privatschreiben des Grafen Szechenyi ddto Belgrad, 12. Juli 1916. 73 Ibid. Abschrift eines geheimen Erlasses an Grafen Thurn, Armeeoberkommando, ddto Wien. 10. VII. 1916 – The suggested changes were attached. 74 Ibid. Telegramm an Grafen Thurn 20. IX. 1916; F. Kinsky an Baron Burián, Teschen 10. X. 1916. 75 Kriegsarchiv, Operationsabteilung AOK, No 28818/I, Armeeoberkommando an das Militergeneralgouvernment in Serbien 29. VIII. 1916; ibid. No 30219, 15. IX. 1916; ibid. No 30473, 13. IX. 1916 and No 30185, 9. IX. 1916. D. Djordjević, The Austro-Hungarian Occupation Regime in Serbia 125 remained uncertain in anticipation of the outcome of the war that was still in full swing. In the meantime, Serbia was going to be ruled with the iron fist of military occupation.

V The occupation authorities in Serbia in 1915–1918 had three basic tasks: to secure peace and order, to conduct economic exploitation of the country and to create the necessary conditions for the life of population. 1) The shifting of the war theatre towards the south (the Salonica front), military operations on the Italian front, the increasing demands from the main theatres of war in the west and east of Europe constantly di- minished military effectives stationed in Serbia. In mid-October 1915, the Command of the Belgrade Bridgehead (Brückenkopfkommando) was formed for the purpose of fortifying a defence line towards the south. The Com- mand of the City of Belgrade was added to it later, but technical works of the Belgrade Bridgehead Command were ceased as early as spring 1916, a large number of men was withdrawn and the command itself was dissolved in August 1917. Romania’s entry into war against the Central Powers in August 1916 brought the Serbian land to the vicinity of battlefield for a brief time. A strategic reserve was then formed in the Kragujevac-Palanka- Arandjlovac area which was also prepared to suppress hostile movements of the population. Mines were laid in the river. However, a rapid success on the Romanian front pushed again the Serbian land deeper into the background of military operations. The occupation forces adhered to the ratio of keep- ing 30,000 soldiers to control 50,000 civilians of military age.76 However, this ratio could not be maintained: in summer 1917, the General Military Governorate had just 16,000 troops at its disposal many of whom were not of particular fighting capabilities.77 Their duty was mostly reduced to securing the railway, harvest, occasional searching for guerrilla groups, par- ticularly guarding against the crossing of such groups from the Bulgarian occupation zone during and after the well-known Toplica insurgency in spring 1917.78 The stationed troops were increasingly ill-fed and ill-kept in

76 HHSTAW, P. A. I, K. 977, Krieg 32a, Materieller Monatsbericht des MGG/S pro Monat August 1917. 77 Kriegsarchiv, Operationsabteilung AOK, No 51692, Chef des Ersatzwesens für die gesamte bewafnete Macht, Wien 1. Juni 1917; HHSTAW, P. A. I, K. 977, Krieg 32k, Halbmonatsbericht für die Zeit vom 1. bis 15. Juli 1917. 78 According to a table of food rationing, Austro-Hungarian soldiers daily received 280g of bread as opposed to 750g allotted to German soldiers. – HHSTAW, P. A. I, Krieg 32k, Monatsbericht MGG/S pro Jänner 1918. 126 Balcanica XLVI (2015) comparison to German units.79 Prolongation of war, military defeats, news of the revolution in Russia diminished the morale of the occupation troops, especially common soldiers and NCOs. At the beginning of June 1918 the Ersatzbataillon of the 71st infantry regiment in Kragujevac with 700 sol- diers revolted. They were quelled with the use of artillery.80 In order to keep subdued 1,375,000 people estimated to populate the Austro-Hungarian occupation zone in Serbia with the relatively small and weak contingent of occupation troops, severe preventive measures were undertaken against civilians: deportation (internment), disarmament and hostage-taking. Deportations were carried out on several occasions: in late 1915, during the advancing of the Central Powers’ armies in Serbia, then upon Romania’s entry into war in 1916 and finally, during the Toplica uprising in spring 1917, and in late 1918.81 The largest-scale deportations were those undertaken from mid-August to the end of October 1916 in connection with Romania’s dec- laration of war. On 31 August, the Governorate issued the following order to the county commands: “Die Ruhe und Sicherheit sind, wenn nötig, mit den schärfsten Massnahmen (Geiseln, Dezimieren, Niederbrennung etc.) unbedingt aufrechtzuerhalten” [Peace and security must be maintained if nec- essary with the most severe measures (deportations, annihilations, burning down, etc.)].82 On that occasion 16,500 people were interned in Serbia and then deported to camps in Hungary and Austria (Vacz, Czegled, Nezsider, Naymeguer, Arad, Aschach, Heinrichsbrün, Braunau). This action was sys- tematically executed: the remnants of the Serbian army (soldiers, NCOs, of- ficers) that had remained in the country and avoided being taken to prisoner camps were first interned; then intelligentsia was arrested, especially those which had been hostile to the Monarchy before the war or participated in the work of political, national, cultural and even sport societies;83 then other

79 Ibid. K. 977, Krieg 32 k-o, Berichte Kuhn, Belgrad 5. VI. 1918. – According to Kuhn, 4 soldiers were killed and 12 wounded on that occasion. 80 J. A. Pisarev, “Okkupatsiia Serbii Avstro-Vengrii i bor’ba serbskogo naroda za svoe osvobozhdenie v 1916–1918 gg”, Sovetskoe slavianovedenie 4 (1965), 33. 81 Kriegsarchiv, Operationsabteilung AOK No 30185, MGG/S an das Kreiskommando, Belgrad 31. VIII. 1916. 82 The Serbian societies were listed: the Black Hand [sic], National Defence, Yugoslav Club, League of Volunteers, Marksmen Society, Dušan the Mighty, Obilić, Kolo jahača, Pobratimstvo Football Club [sic], Kolo srpske braće, members of masonic lodges, male members of Kolo srpskih sestara, members of the editorial boards of all Serbian journals including the humoristic ones (Brka, Spadalo, Djavo). 83 HHSTAW, P. A. I, K. 975, Krieg 32g, Telegramm in Ziffern an Baron Kuhn, Wien 15. IV. 1917. D. Djordjević, The Austro-Hungarian Occupation Regime in Serbia 127 people between 17 and 50 years of age who were capable of military service. The remaining peasants were organised inInternierten-Arbeiterabteilungen to work in the fields. Elderly persons with material resources were allowed to be confined in Austria-Hungary rather than interned.84 In May 1917, around 40,000 Serb civilians were in the camps of Austria-Hungary.85 These mass de- portations caused alarm beyond Serbia’s borders: even the Vatican intervened in April 1917 through the papal nuncio in Vienna against the internment of children.86 Imprisonment in camps cut both ways and it considerably ham- pered agricultural production. That is why some of the interned peasants were sent back in 1917.87 Disarmament of population was undertaken for the purpose of paci- fication. It took place on several occasions under threat of death penalty for hiding arms.88 There were a lot of weapons remaining among the people: in March 1917, thirty persons were executed and 288 indicted for hiding arms in the Kragujevac County alone.89 Upon the proclamation of amnesty, on 28 June 1917, 1230 rifles, 474 pistols, 54 hand grenades and other military material were turned in.90 That large quantities of arms remained hidden despite all this would become obvious at the end of the war. Taking of hostages was a similar security measure and it was increas- ingly applied as the war was drawing to an end and the resistance of the population was turning into armed struggle. Hostages were taken to secure harvest, threshers and railway or in the case of anonymous threats to senior officials of the occupation apparatus.91 The intelligence department, state police and gendarmerie, as well as financial organs within the General Gov- ernorate did their best to establish a wide intelligence network for gauging public opinion, espionage and counterespionage. The instructions prepared

84 Pisarev, “Okkupatsiia Serbii ”, 33. 85 HHSTAW, P. A. I, K. 975, Krieg 32g, Telegramm in Ziffern an Baron Kuhn, Wien 15. IV. 1917. 86 Ibid. K. 977, Krieg 32k, Halbmonatsbericht für die Zeit vom 15. bis 31. Mai 1917. Af- ter this protest some 10,000 people were returned to Serbia to join working battalions. 87 Ibid. Verordnung des AOK und des MGG/S betreffend den Besitz von Waffen, -Mu nitionsgegenständen und Sprengstoffen im hiesigen Okkupationsgebeite, Belgrad 21. Oktober 1916. 88 Ibid. Situationsbericht pro Monat März 1917. 89 Ibid. Halbmonatsbericht für die Zeit vom 1. bis 15. Juli 1917, Belgrad 16. VII. 1917. 90 E.g., an anonymous threat of an Austro-Hungarian intelligence officer was sent to the General-Governor in June 1917: ibid. Gesandte Kuhn an Grafen Burián, Str. Vertr. Belgrad 24. VI. 1917. 91 AS, MGG/S, Intelligence Department, box 1/3/42/45, Circular from the Intelligence Department and practical instructions. 128 Balcanica XLVI (2015) by the intelligence service in Serbia emphasised the need for creating a network of trusted persons among the people for the purpose of gather- ing information on the general mood, deportations, intelligentsia’s activities – especially that which was anti-Habsburg – anti-occupation movements, spreading of alarming news and texts, smuggling, arms hiding, abuse by officials etc.92 Monthly reports preserved in the archives of the Intelligence Department of Military Governorate reflect the vigilance with which the occupation authorities kept tabs on what was going on in Serbia. Denuncia- tions demonstrate a specific psychological pressure exerted on population by means of accusations that were largely based on statements given in a state of agitation and anger. 2) Economic exploitation of Serbia was based on confiscations, req- uisitions, use of economic resources and labour. In June 1916, the property belonging to all persons considered associated with the Sarajevo assassina- tion was confiscated.93 In the wake of the entry of occupation troops in Serbia in 1915, large-scale requisitions of wool, copper, brass, nickel, zinc and its alloys, foodstuff and leather ensued. Special units for conducting searches, the so-called Suchdetaschement, were formed; each consisted of an NCO, corporal, scribe, locksmith (for breaking in) and four or five soldiers. The requisitioned material was sent to Materialsammelstelle in Belgrade and then transported to Austria-Hungary.94 At the end of 1915, a central administrative body was formed in Vi- enna for exporting raw materials from Serbia, Montenegro, Serbian Mace- donia, Albania and Poland. In summer 1916, the K. u k. Wahren-Verkehrs Zentrale was established in Belgrade as an agency of Governorate with the view to “mediating and furthering trading traffic between the occupation area in Serbia and Montenegro, on the one side, and Austria-Hungary, on the other”.95 Under this new scheme, all companies abandoned by Serbian owners when retreating from the country became receivership. An artificial exchange rate of Serbian dinar to ruble was imposed and Serbian paper money was stamped over. It is interesting to note that this currency re- form dismally failed: out of 150 million dinars estimated to circulate in the Austro-Hungarian occupation zone only 38 million were stamped over

92 HHSTAW, K. 975, Krieg 32g, Szechenyi an Baron Burián, Belgrad 9. VII. 1916. 93 Ibid. K. 973, Krieg 32g, An das k. u k. Armee-Etappenkommando – Expositur Bel- grad, Feldpost 211, 10. XII. 1915; ibid. Bestimmungen für die Suchdetachements; ibid. Organische Bestimmungen und Dienstvorsichiften für die Materialsammelstelle. 94 Kriegsarchiv, Operationsabteilung AOK, No 28418, Provisorische Bestimungen für k. u k. Waren-Verkehrs Zentrale in Belgrad, Standort des AOK, 2. VIII. 1916. 95 HHSTAW, K. 975, Krieg 32g, Vertrauliche Privatschreiben des Grafen Szechenyi ddto Belgrad an Baron Mussulin, 16. VIII. 1916. D. Djordjević, The Austro-Hungarian Occupation Regime in Serbia 129 and the old dinar retained in Serbia greater value that the Austrian krone (100:102).96 The occupiers opened branches of their banks, particularly from Budapest (Andrejević & Co). Fortnightly and monthly reports from Military Governorate preserved in Serbian and Austrian archives are rife with information on economic exploitation of the country, export of agri- cultural raw materials, use of forests and mines and penetration of Austro- Hungarian companies in Serbia. The wealth and diversity of this source material requires a special study on the economic policy of the occupation power in Serbia in 1915–1918. 3) All Austro-Hungarian reports on the conquest of Serbia in 1915 noted a desperate state of population and famine threatening the occupa- tion zone. The return of refugees exacerbated shortage of food: the popula- tion of Belgrade rose from 15,000 in January 1916 to 50,000 in July 1917. Such situation created a twofold danger for the occupation power: local resources could not satisfy the needs of the occupation troops; destitution and desperation were not conducive to a peaceful rear.97 Foreign propagan- da caused much damage with its claims that Serbian population was dying of hunger.98 Reports from Serbia in late 1915 spoke of the necessity of re- ceiving urgent relief from Austria-Hungary to avoid disaster. The Austrian Prime Minister, Baron Stürgkh, was willing to respond to such appeals, but Conrad von Hötzendorf and Tisza were opposed. The Supreme Command suggested organising an international aid, but such action would take too long.99 Indeed, it did not start to function, in limited conditions, before spring 1916; The International Red Cross, Swiss and Swedish humanitar- ian organisations embarked on transferring Romanian wheat to Serbia.100 Meanwhile, the Governorate had to make do with the rational use of the existing supplies; some 1,000 wagonloads of crops were imported for the spring sowing in 1916 and then 600 wagonloads of flour and grains. Pen- sions of clerks were recognised in early February 1916.101 Foodstuff was

96 Ibid. K. 974, Krieg 32 a-f, K. u k. Armeeoberkommando an das Ministerium des Äus- sern, Standort des AOK, 7. XII. 1915; ibid. Krieg 32 b, d, e, Militärgeneralgouvernment in Serbien Präs 576, an das Armeeoberkommando, 16. Jänner 1916. 97 Ibid. K. 974, Krieg 32a-f, Baron Wiesner an Baron Burián 4. I. 1916. 98 Ibid. Der Vertreter des k. u k. Ministeriums des Äussern beim k. u k. Armeeober- kommando, Teschen 20. XI. 1915; ibid. Conrad von Hötzendorf an das Ministerium des Äussern, Standort des AOK am 18. XI. 1915; ibid. Krieg 32b, Der Vertreter des Ministeriums des Äussern beim AOK, Teschen 6. I. 1916. 99 Ibid. Krieg 32 a-f, Berichte des schweizerischen Gesandten in Wien, 11. II. 1916, 8. II. 1916. 100 Ibid. Krieg 32b, Draft for feeding civilian population in the occupied parts of Serbia. 101 AS, MGG/S, Military Department, box 1, Belgrade, 28 January 1918, Table of food. 130 Balcanica XLVI (2015) rationed and increasingly reduced: in January 1918, children from five to thirteen years received 320 g of meat and 120 g of lard a week; adults were entitled to a weekly ration of 480 g of meat and 240 g of lard. In July 1918, the amount of meat was cut down to 200 g and 300 g respectively.102 In order to fully control the youth and re-educate it in “the spirit of discipline and order”, the Governorate continued with its educational policy. During the last school year under occupation (1917/18) eight gram- mar schools with 4,000 in- and 3,000 out-school pupils, and 135 elemen- tary schools (1916–17) with 24,000 pupils were operating in Serbia. Some 105,000 children could not attend school due to the lack of space.103 Be- cause of the ban on the use of Cyrillic alphabet there was not enough text- books – even Serbian textbooks from Vojvodina which were printed in Cy- rillic and approved in the Habsburg Monarchy were not allowed in Serbia. The University of Belgrade was closed down throughout the occupation.104 The religion question also caused difficulties for the occupation regime as the highest-ranking clergy of the Serbian Orthodox Church had left the country with the Serbian army. The bishops of Niš and Šabac were interned in Bulgaria and some 200 priests were incarcerated in camps in Austria- Hungary. Illegitimate marriages were growing in number. Court Spiritual did not function and the Church as an organised institution did not ex- ist. The canon law of the Serbian Church did not allow bringing bishops from Austria-Hungary to elect the new metropolitan.105 In October 1918, the Bulgarians were requested to release the imprisoned bishops and return them in their dioceses, but this was a belated measure as the occupation was fast approaching its end.106

VI Despite physical and psychological pressure exerted on the population dur- ing the occupation in 1915–1918, the spirit of the Serbian people was not broken. Numerous reports of military and civilian occupation authorities are a testament to that. In one of those reports written in March 1917 it is

102 Out of 125 elementary schools, 95 were Serbian, the rest were Albanian and Muslim – HHSTAW, K. 977, Krieg 32k, Halbmonatsbericht für die Zeit vom 1. bis 15. Juli 1917; Ibid. Situationsbericht pro Monat März 1917; Ibid. Der Vertreter des Ministeri- ums des Äussern, Belgrad 13. III. 1918 and 13. II. 1918. 103 Ibid. Krieg 32e, Militärgeneralgouvernment in Serbien, Einfürung der cyrillischen Schulbücher in die Mittelschulen des MGG/S Bereiches, Belgrad 24. VIII. 1918. 104 Sto godina Filozofskog fakulteta (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1963), 88–89. 105 HHSTAW, K. 977, Krieg 32 k-o, MGG/S an das AOK, Ibid. Kuhn an Burián, Belgrad 28. VII. 1918. 106 Ibid. Weisung an Otto Czernin in Sofia, Wien 1. X. 1918. D. Djordjević, The Austro-Hungarian Occupation Regime in Serbia 131 said: “Im grössten Teile der Bevölkerung lebt noch immer die fantastische Hoffnung auf ein selbständiges Serbien” [Most of the population still main- tains the fantastic hope of an independent Serbia].107 News from the fronts and development of military operations received special attention; there was talk of the impending end of the war. “The Serbs hope for a better future and all that is displeasing to us is pleasing to them”, an intelligence report read.108 Although there was armed resistance in the Austro-Hungarian occupation zone, it did not reflect the true intensity of popular feeling. Much of the male population had left the country when the Serbian army had broken through Albania to the sea; part of the army ended as POWs; large-scale deportations and interments, particularly in 1916, thwarted, to a large extent, the growth of the resistance movement. According to the Austro-Hungarians, these deportations were the main reason that pre- vented the spread of the Toplica uprising (Toplički ustanak) from the Bul- garian occupation zone to Šumadija. From fall 1916 onwards, reports of the occupation authorities more frequently mentioned “bands” operating in Serbia.109 Three attempts at organising wider resistance in the country were discovered in 1916; in spring and fall 1917, similar attempts were suppressed in Brus, then in the vicinity of Kragujevac and Kruševac.110 The Toplica uprising encompassed the area around the Zapadna (West) Morava river spreading across Mali Jastrebac and Mt Kopaonik.111 In the part of Serbia under Austro-Hungarian occupation, however, there were no mass movements like those in the Bulgarian zone. Units operating in this area and relying on a wide network of local people consisted of four to twenty men; they avoided fighting against occupation forces and were concerned with eliminating traitors (mostly the heads of rural mu- nicipalities). Regular fortnightly and monthly reports of the occupation authorities abounded with details about the activities of such groups. They emerged all across Serbia but operated locally.112 Sabotages, particularly

107 Ibid. Krieg 32k, Situationsberichte pro Monat März 1917. 108 Ibid. Major Safranek an das AOK, Belgrad 28. I. 1918; see also: Kriegsarchiv, Ope- rationsabteilung AOK No 37388, Nachrichtenabteilung des MGG/S, Belgrad 15. XII. 1916; HHSTAW, P. A. I. K. 977, Kreig 32 k-o, Kuhn an Czernin, Belgrad 25. IV. 1917; ibid. Nachrichtenabteilung des AOK und Evidenzbureau des Generalstabes, Belgrad 1. VI. 1917; ibid. Monatsbericht vom 1. bis 31. März 1918, Belgrad 1. IV. 1918. 109 Ibid. Der Vertreter des Ministeriums des Äussern, Belgrad 17. I. 1917. 110 Ibid. K. 975, Krieg 32g, General von Rhemen an den Vertreter des Ministeriums des Äussern, Belgrad 10. VI. 1917. 111 M. Perović, Toplički ustanak (Belgrade, 1959), 148. 112 HHSTAW, K. 977, Krieg 32 k-o, Kuhn an Czernin, Belgrad 9. XI. 1917. 132 Balcanica XLVI (2015) burning of harvest, also took place. The authorities did not have enough troops to undertake wider and stronger measures against the bands and thus reacted with repression against civilian population in an attempt to isolate the bands from the masses. Any person caught in an act of sabo- tage was shot on the spot. Municipalities to which a perpetrator belonged were also punished: grain and cattle was confiscated, pecuniary penal- ties were imposed, men between 16 and 60 years of age were occasion- ally interned, houses were set on fire etc.113 The Russian Revolution, the revolt of Austro-Hungarian troops in Kragujevac in June 1918 and the increasing devastation of land as the war drew closer to an end facilitated armed resistance. In July 1918, 32 attacks were recorded in the Kragu- jevac County alone; 105 took place in August 1918 in Serbia.114 Along with local population, deserters from military units and fugitives from camps also committed such attacks. The authorities suspected the exis- tence of an organised network which operated in coordination with the operations of the Serbian army on the Salonica front.115 From September to mid-October the occupation forces tried to cleanse the ground from guerrilla groups. Not much was accomplished: 100 deserters and only one komita were captured. It was reported on 22 October that unrest among the people reached such proportions as to make access to the frontline ex- tremely difficult.116 B. Hrabak’s study amply documented the participation of Serbian population in driving the occupation forces out of the country in October 1918.117 Under the pressure from outside and inside the occupation system in Serbia was in full demise in October 1918. An attempt to take out food and material resources from the country and transport them to Austria- Hungary was the last spasm of the occupation regime. After the capitula- tion of Bulgaria on 29 September, the Serbian army and Allied forces were liberating the country with great rapidity. The last report of Baron Kuhn, the representative of the Foreign Ministry, was sent from Belgrade on 27 October. The next day he left Belgrade, along with General-Governor von Rhemen and his staff, and went to Subotica.118 Three days later, on 1 No-

113 Ibid. Kuhn an Czernin, Belgrad 31. VII. 1918, declaration is attached. 114 Ibid. MGG/S – Monatsbericht für Monat Juni 1918; Ibid. General-Oberst Rhemen an den Vertreter des Ministeriums des Äussern in Belgrad, 2. VIII. 1918 and 23. IX. 1918. 115 Ibid. Kuhn an Czernin, Belgrad 7. VIII. 1918. and 25. IX. 1918. Kuhn considered these movements “a general uprising”. 116 Ibid. Kuhn an Czernin 22. X. 1918. 117 B. Hrabak, “Učešće stanovništva Srbije u proterivanju okupatora oktobra 1918”, Isto- rijski glasnik 3–4 (1958), 25–50. 118 HHSTAW, K. 973, Krieg 32a, Baron Kuhn – Berichte, Belgrad 27. X. 1918. D. Djordjević, The Austro-Hungarian Occupation Regime in Serbia 133 vember, Belgrade was liberated. This brought to an end the tragic history of Serbia under the Austro-Hungarian occupation regime from 1915 to 1918. UDC 94(497.11:436/439)”1914/1918” 341.324

Archives

Arhiv Srbije [Archives of Serbia], Belgrade Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv Wien [HHSTAW], Vienna Kriegsarchiv, Vienna

Bibliography

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