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Pen Register Trap and Trace Template

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Pen Register Trap and Trace Template 1 2 3 SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR SNOHOMISH COUNTY 4 IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR AN ) ORDER AUTHORIZING INSTALLATION AND ) 5 USE OF A PEN REGISTER AND TRAP AND ) No. TRACE; AUTHORIZING DISCLOSURE OF ) 6 NON-CONTENT STORED AND ) TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS; AND ) APPLICATION 7 ACQUISITION OF HISTORIC RECORDS AND ) DEVICE LOCATION INFORMATION ) 8 ) ) 9 STATE OF WASHINGTON ) 10 ) ss. COUNTY OF SNOHOMISH ) 11 12 being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 13 (1) I am a fully-commissioned, sworn Police Officer with 14 I am currently assigned to: 15 16 17 18 19 (2) I am involved in an ongoing criminal investigation (as detailed in paragraph (4) 20 below) and believe that the information likely to be obtained through the installation and use of a 21 pen register/trap and trace device is relevant to that investigation. 22 (3) This application is based on information I have gained from my own investigation, 23 personal observations, training and experience, as well as information related to me by other APPLICATION – 1 Revised 08.23.12 1 detectives, police officers, and/or federal agents through oral and written reports. Further, I have 2 reviewed and am familiar with the investigative file in this matter. 3 (4) 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 (5) The suspect's whereabouts are presently unknown. From my training and experience 19 I know that service providers for: 20 21 retain information pertaining to their subscribers and account-holders. That information 22 typically includes the subscriber’s name, telephone number, email address, billing address, 23 APPLICATION – 2 Revised 08.23.12 1 billing/payment information, account initiation date, account features, and information pertaining 2 to any other accounts linked to the primary account. 3 (6) Service Provider Specific Facts (Check all that apply): 4 For Mobile/Cellular Telephone: 5 Service for the above-listed target telephone number is provided by the above-identified 6 service provider. The service provider identity was obtained through a query of a publicly- 7 available database that has proven reliable by routinely yielding verifiably accurate information 8 in previously investigations. 9 For Social Media Site/Email Account: 10 Service for the above-listed 11 is provided by the above-identified service provider. 12 13 14 15 16 17 (7) Electronic Communications Service Specific Facts (Check all that apply): 18 Cellular network and phone communications: 19 From my training and experience, I know the following: 20 A cellular telephone (cell phone) is a mobile device that transmits and receives wire and 21 electronic communications. These communications can include traditional telephone calls, two- 22 way radio communications, Voice over Internet conversations (VoIP), text, email, peer-to-peer 23 communicati ons, communications using social networking websites, and other communications APPLICATION – 3 Revised 08.23.12 1 using the Internet. Individuals using cell phones contract with service providers, which maintain 2 antenna towers (also known as "cell towers") and/or satellites covering specific geographic areas. 3 In order to transmit or receive calls and data, a cell phone must send a radio signal to an antenna 4 tower or satellite that, in turn, is connected to a cellular service provider’s network. 5 In addition to a unique telephone number (known in telecom parlance as the Mobile 6 Directory Number, or MDN), each cell phone has one or more unique network or hardware 7 identifiers associated with it. Depending on the particular network and device protocol, the 8 embedded or associated unique identifiers for any given cell phone could take several different 9 forms, such as Electronic Serial Number (ESN) (including 8-digit hex format); Mobile 10 Electronic Identity (MEID), Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) or International Mobile 11 Equipment Identity (IMEI), for hardware; and Mobile Identification Number (MIN); Mobile 12 Station Identity (MSID); Mobile Subscriber Integrated Services Digital Network number 13 (MSISDN). The unique identifiers – as transmitted from a cell phone to a cellular antenna or 14 tower or satellite – are like the telephone numbers. They are unique, can frequently be recorded 15 by pen register or trap and trace or similar devices, and indicate the identity of the cell phone 16 making the communication without revealing the communication’s content. In many cases, 17 users have the autonomous ability to change or “swap” the original, provider-approved 18 network/hardware combinations, such as removing the hardware SIM card (which contains the 19 network IMSI that is slaved to the network MSISDN) and placing it inside another phone 20 (bearing a different hardware IMEI). In other cases, such as for a device without a SIM, or to 21 change the MSISDN associated with an IMSI on a SIM, a user must submit a request to the 22 service provider (in person, by phone or on the Internet) to change the network identity (MDN, 23 MSISDN, MIN/MSID) and hardware (ESN/MEID) assignments. APPLICATION – 4 Revised 08.23.12 1 Providers of electronic communications services, such as the above-listed service 2 provider, have technical capabilities that allow the provider to collect data for a particular target 3 address and for usage at specific cellular towers/satellites. This data includes the date, time, 4 duration, initiating and destination numbers and addresses with which the cell phone or device 5 communicates, as well as location information that identifies the cell towers and/or GPS 6 satellites that receive radio signals from particular cell phones or devices (this is known as cell- 7 site location information, or CSLI) and is included in what service providers commonly refer to 8 as "call detail data." Service providers also maintain engineering maps that show cell site tower 9 locations, their sectors, and their orientations. Many cell towers divide their coverage up into 10 multiple sectors (most often three 120º sectors). Where this is the case, the provider can usually 11 identify the sector of the tower that transmitted the communication. Some companies can further 12 narrow the device location within a particular sector. 13 When a cellular telephone or other electronic device is turned on to register its 14 availability to receive communications on the network, or when the device actually sends or 15 receives communications, it will communicate with a cell tower or satellite within its radio 16 frequency range. While cell phones frequently do not communicate with the closest 17 tower/antenna, their approximate location can often be estimated by mapping the geographic 18 distribution of towers/antennas in the specific “switch” (market) where the phone is registered. 19 As a cellular telephone moves through geographic space, one cell tower or satellite will "hand 20 off" the cell phone's (or other device's) signal to another cell tower or satellite with greater ability 21 to maintain the connection. Some cell phones or other electronic communication devices 22 additionally communicate their physical location, in precise terms (such as longitude and 23 latitude), to the provider via global positioning system (“GPS”) satellite or multilateration (e.g. APPLICATION – 5 Revised 08.23.12 1 triangulated signals off three or more towers) measurements that are shared with or accessible to 2 the provider owing to software settings and terms of service (TOS) agreements. 3 Depending on tower/satellite location, a cell phone or other electronic communication 4 device may communicate with a tower/satellite owned or operated by a service provider other 5 than the provider with which the phone or device is contracted. When this occurs, the second 6 service provider will have records pertaining to that particular cell phone or device. 7 Additionally, cell phone calling numbers can be "ported," which means that a customer can 8 transfer - to a different service provider - his or her service contract for the device, the device 9 address, phone number, and/or other identifiers unique to the particular device. If this occurs, 10 the first service provider, as well as the new service provider, will have usage and location 11 records for the cell phone. 12 Service providers retain information about cellular telephone signals and transactions at 13 each tower or satellite, whether or not a particular device sent or received any communication. 14 Some of these stored records are retained to substantiate billing (e.g. toll) charges while others 15 are used for fraud detection and prevention. Many are used for systems monitoring, diagnostic 16 and maintenance reasons, such as balancing the network’s traffic load and identifying 17 requirements for additional capacity. 18 Because of this, and the fact that cell phone owners typically have their phones either 19 with or very near them, cell tower and GPS location information for a particular cell phone 20 typically leads to locating the person using that device. This information can be used to assist 21 and corroborate surveillance officers' observations and anticipate future movements and 22 locations of the suspect by establishing his or her habit pattern over time. For example, if the 23 telephone consistently signals the same tower both late at night and in the early morning hours, it APPLICATION – 6 Revised 08.23.12 1 is reasonable to conclude that the suspect is living, sleeping, hiding or working at a night job in 2 that vicinity. 3 Internet Communications (Social media/Email): 4 From my training and experience I know the following: 5 Whether the target address is a phone number, email address, internet service connection, 6 or social networking site, or something similar, it is becoming increasingly common that 7 communications of all types transit the "world wide web" through the Internet. These can 8 include calls using mobile cellular telephones; calls using Voice over Internet Protocol1 (VoIP); 9 peer-to-peer conversations, with or without a video component, email, text messages, 10 communications in which photos, videos or other data are sent and received, social networking, 11 and the like.
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