DOCSLIB.ORG

Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and U.S

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and U.S Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and U.S. Policy Updated September 19, 2019 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R45008 SUMMARY R45008 Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and September 19, 2019 U.S. Policy Cory Welt After Ukraine’s transition to a new government under President Volodymyr Zelensky and his Specialist in European Servant of the People party, the country continues to grapple with serious challenges. President Affairs Zelensky has expressed a commitment to implementing difficult economic and governance reforms, promoting Ukraine’s Western integration, rebuilding ties with residents of Russian- controlled areas of eastern Ukraine, and revitalizing talks with Russia on conflict resolution. The U.S. government has congratulated President Zelensky and all Ukrainians on their “vibrant democracy” and expressed “steadfast support” to Ukraine “as it undertakes essential reforms.” The United States supports Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders, while actively promoting the continuation and consolidation of domestic reforms. Since Ukraine’s independence, and especially after Russia’s 2014 invasion, Ukraine has been a leading recipient of U.S. foreign, humanitarian, and military aid in Europe and Eurasia. Nonmilitary, non-humanitarian assistance totaled an average of $320 million a year from FY2015 to FY2018. The United States provides substantial military assistance to Ukraine, including via the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, which provides “appropriate security assistance and intelligence support” to help Ukraine defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Since 2014, many Members of Congress have condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, promoted sanctions against Russia for its actions, and supported increased economic and security aid to Ukraine. Key legislation includes the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (SSIDES; P.L. 113-95; 22 U.S.C. 8901 et seq.), the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (UFSA; P.L. 113-272; 22 U.S.C. 8921 et seq.), and the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA; Title II of P.L. 115-44, Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act [CAATSA]; 22 U.S.C. 9501 et seq.). In November-December 2018, Members of the 115th Congress passed resolutions condemning a Russian attack on Ukrainian naval vessels (S.Res. 709, H.Res. 1162). The 115th Congress also passed a resolution calling for the cancellation of Nord Stream 2, a new Baltic Sea pipeline Russia is constructing, and the imposition of sanctions with respect to the project (H.Res. 1035). In July 2019, during the 116th Congress, the Senate passed S.Res. 74 to mark the fifth anniversary of Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity. Several pieces of Ukraine-related legislation are under consideration in the 116th Congress. In March 2019, the House of Representatives voted 427-1 to pass H.R. 596, the Crimea Annexation Non-recognition Act, which asserts that it is the policy of the United States not to recognize Russia’s claim of sovereignty over Crimea, its airspace, or its territorial waters. Several Members of Congress have sought to further respond to Russia’s November 2018 attack on Ukrainian naval vessels (S.Res. 27, H.Res. 116, S. 482), express continuing opposition to Nord Stream 2 (S.Res. 27, H.R. 2023, H.R. 3206, S. 1441, H.Res. 116, S. 1830), and enhance U.S.-Ukraine security cooperation (H.R. 3047). For related information, see CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions on Russia, and CRS In Focus IF11138, Nord Stream 2: A Fait Accompli? Congressional Research Service Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and U.S. Policy Contents Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Politics and Governance .................................................................................................................. 1 Ukraine’s New Government ..................................................................................................... 3 Reform Challenges .................................................................................................................... 5 Conflict with Russia ........................................................................................................................ 8 Crimea ....................................................................................................................................... 9 Eastern Ukraine ....................................................................................................................... 10 Internally Displaced Persons and Transit Across the Contact Line .................................. 12 Minsk Agreements ............................................................................................................ 13 Sea of Azov and Kerch Strait .................................................................................................. 19 Ukraine’s Church Becomes Independent of Moscow ............................................................. 21 Economy ........................................................................................................................................ 21 Trade ....................................................................................................................................... 22 Energy ..................................................................................................................................... 23 U.S.-Ukraine Relations .................................................................................................................. 25 Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity ....................................................................................... 25 Maritime and Energy Security ................................................................................................ 27 Domestic Reforms ................................................................................................................... 28 Foreign Aid ............................................................................................................................. 29 Military Aid ....................................................................................................................... 30 Trade ....................................................................................................................................... 33 Role of Congress ..................................................................................................................... 33 Congressional Response to Russia’s Invasion .................................................................. 34 Ukraine-Related Sanctions ...................................................................................................... 36 Relations with the EU and NATO ................................................................................................. 37 Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 39 Figures Figure 1. Ukraine ............................................................................................................................. 9 Figure 2. Southern Ukraine and the Sea of Azov .......................................................................... 20 Tables Table 1. July 2019 Parliamentary Elections .................................................................................... 4 Contacts Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 39 Congressional Research Service Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and U.S. Policy Introduction Ukraine has accomplished much in the five years since the country’s Revolution of Dignity (also known as the Euromaidan). Forced to confront a Russian invasion and occupation of the Crimea region, a Russian-instigated conflict in eastern Ukraine, and a tightening of Russian control in the nearby Sea of Azov and Black Sea, Ukraine has developed a military capable of territorial defense, halted a decline in economic growth, implemented reforms, maintained a democratic path, and gained formal independence for the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Ukraine continues to grapple with serious Ukraine at a Glance challenges. Earlier this year, the country Population: 42.2 million (January 2019 est., excluding transitioned to a new government. President about 2.2 million in Crimea) Volodymyr Zelensky and his Cabinet have Size: Slightly smaller than Texas pledged to implement difficult economic and Capital: Kyiv governance reforms, promote Ukraine’s Ethnicity: 78% Ukrainian, 17% Russian, 0.5% Crimean Western integration, rebuild ties with residents Tatar (2001 census) of Russian-controlled areas of eastern Languages: Ukrainian (official), 68%; Russian (regional Ukraine, and revitalize talks with Russia on status), 30% (2001 census) conflict resolution. Religion: About 75% Orthodox Christian (mostly Ukrainian Orthodox), 8%-10% Greek Catholic The United States has long supported GDP/GDP per capita: $125 billion/$2,963 (2018 Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and est.) democratic trajectory. Since 2014, many Top Exports: iron and steel, cereals, fats and oils, Members of Congress have condemned ores, electrical machinery,
Load more

Recommended publications
  • No Justice for Journalists in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia September 2011
    No Justice for Journalists in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia September 2011 ARTICLE 19 Free Word Centre 60 Farringdon Road London EC1R 3GA United Kingdom Tel: +44 20 7324 2500 Fax: +44 20 7490 0566 E-mail: [email protected] www.article19.org International Media Support (IMS) Nørregarde 18, 2nd floor 1165 Copenhagen K Denmark Tel: +45 88 32 7000 Fax: +45 33 12 0099 E-mail: [email protected] www.i-m-s.dk ISBN: 978-1-906586-27-0 © ARTICLE 19 and International Media Support (IMS), London and Copenhagen, August 2011 This work is provided under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-ShareAlike 2.5 licence. You are free to copy, distribute and display this work and to make derivative works, provided you: 1) give credit to ARTICLE 19 and International Media Support (IMS); 2) do not use this work for commercial purposes; 3) distribute any works derived from this publication under a licence identical to this one. To access the full legal text of this licence, please visit: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ legalcode. ARTICLE 19 and International Media Support (IMS) would appreciate receiving a copy of any materials in which information from this report is used. This report was written and published within the framework of a project supported by the International Media Support (IMS) Media and Democracy Programme for Central and Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. It was compiled and written by Nathalie Losekoot, Senior Programme Officer for Europe at ARTICLE 19 and reviewed by JUDr. Barbora Bukovskà, Senior Director for Law at ARTICLE 19 and Jane Møller Larsen, Programme Coordinator for the Media and Democracy Unit at International Media Support (IMS).
    [Show full text]
  • Launching an Effective Anti- Corruption Court: Lessons from Ukraine
    U4 Practice Insight 2021:1 Launching an effective anti- corruption court: Lessons from Ukraine By David Vaughn and Olha Nikolaieva Series editor: Sofie Arjon Schütte Disclaimer All views in this text are the author(s)’, and may differ from the U4 partner agencies’ policies. Partner agencies German Corporation for International Cooperation – GIZ German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development – BMZ Global Affairs Canada Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark / Danish International Development Assistance – Danida Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency – Sida Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation – SDC The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation – Norad UK Aid – Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office About U4 U4 is a team of anti-corruption advisers working to share research and evidence to help international development actors get sustainable results. The work involves dialogue, publications, online training, workshops, helpdesk, and innovation. U4 is a permanent centre at the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) in Norway. CMI is a non-profit, multi-disciplinary research institute with social scientists specialising in development studies. www.U4.no [email protected] Cover photo High Anti-Corruption Court (CC copyrighted) Keywords justice sector - anti-corruption courts - judges - vetting - Ukraine - Eastern Europe Publication type U4 Practice Insight Creative commons This work is licenced under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) Ukraine’s High Anti-Corruption Court was created in response to immense public demand to hold government officials and judges accountable for corruption. Making the court operational, however, required more than adopting legislation. It meant selecting and preparing judges, recruiting qualified court personnel, and setting up administrative and organisational structures, including courthouse facilities, security, IT infrastructure, and communications systems.
    [Show full text]
  • 'Traditional' Churches in Independent Ukraine
    Ukraine twenty years after independence ISBN 978-88-548-7765-8 DOI 10.4399/97888548776586 pag. 55–74 (febbraio 2015) ‘Traditional’ Churches In Independent Ukraine In Search of Common Identity F. Iwan Dacko, F. Oleh Turii It is general knowledge that the year 1989 marked a significant change in the public life of Eastern European countries. Ukraine was no exception. After the celebrations of the millennium of Baptism of Kyivan Rus’ (1988) one can even speak of a resurrection (Keleher 1993; 1997, Gudziak 1997, p. 49–72) of political, and particularly reli- gious life in Ukraine, which ultimately lead to the proclamation of its independence on 24 August 1991 and disintegration of Soviet Union. When we compare statistics they speak for themselves. In 1985 there were 16 religious confessions registered in the Ukrainian SSR, whereas in 2011 the number had risen to 120. In 1985, on the other hand, 6.2 thousand religious communities were oYcially recorded in Ukraine, whereas in 2011 they were 34.5 thousand, tendency increasing (Tserkva i suspil’stvo 2000–2001, p. 207)1. Objectively one has to admit that with such increase, there were tensions and conflict situations within these communities. This fact has been widely noted, especially among the Western mass media, frequently exaggerated and overestimated on all sides. Furthermore, there were and are tendencies to overemphasize these facts and politicize them. Today, however, after more than twenty years, we dare to express the opinion that basically it was, and still is the search towards self identification, or rather identity, of each religious community.
    [Show full text]
  • Minsk II a Fragile Ceasefire
    Briefing 16 July 2015 Ukraine: Follow-up of Minsk II A fragile ceasefire SUMMARY Four months after leaders from France, Germany, Ukraine and Russia reached a 13-point 'Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements' ('Minsk II') on 12 February 2015, the ceasefire is crumbling. The pressure on Kyiv to contribute to a de-escalation and comply with Minsk II continues to grow. While Moscow still denies accusations that there are Russian soldiers in eastern Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly admitted in March 2015 to having invaded Crimea. There is mounting evidence that Moscow continues to play an active military role in eastern Ukraine. The multidimensional conflict is eroding the country's stability on all fronts. While the situation on both the military and the economic front is acute, the country is under pressure to conduct wide-reaching reforms to meet its international obligations. In addition, Russia is challenging Ukraine's identity as a sovereign nation state with a wide range of disinformation tools. Against this backdrop, the international community and the EU are under increasing pressure to react. In the following pages, the current status of the Minsk II agreement is assessed and other recent key developments in Ukraine and beyond examined. This briefing brings up to date that of 16 March 2015, 'Ukraine after Minsk II: the next level – Hybrid responses to hybrid threats?'. In this briefing: • Minsk II – still standing on the ground? • Security-related implications of the crisis • Russian disinformation
    [Show full text]
  • STATEMENT by MR. ALEXANDER LUKASHEVICH, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE of the RUSSIAN FEDERATION, at the 1200Th MEETING of the OSCE PERMANENT COUNCIL
    PC.DEL/1350/18 8 November 2018 ENGLISH Original: RUSSIAN Delegation of the Russian Federation STATEMENT BY MR. ALEXANDER LUKASHEVICH, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, AT THE 1200th MEETING OF THE OSCE PERMANENT COUNCIL 8 November 2018 On the murder of Kateryna Handziuk in Ukraine Mr. Chairperson, We note the initiative by our Ukrainian colleagues to report on the progress in the investigation into the brutal murder of Kateryna Handziuk, assistant to the mayor of Kherson and activist. We hope that all of those responsible for this crime will be found and brought to justice. At the same time, we are obliged to note that this is far from the first and only attack on human rights defenders and public figures in Ukraine. The attacks, threats and violence towards activists undesired by the authorities have taken on massive proportions in the country in recent times. According to the International Society for Human Rights, 34 lawyers were attacked, five of them fatally, in Ukraine between 2016 and 2018. We may recall their names: Yuriy Grabovskiy, Viktor Loyko, Tetyana Popova, Valeriy Rybalchenko and Iryna Nozdrovska. According to human rights defenders, more often than not these acts of violence take place with the involvement of the police, the Ukrainian Security Service and the tax authorities. One further eloquent example of the lawlessness in Ukraine is the recent incident with the well-known Ukrainian public figure Elena Berezhnaya. In fact, she has participated on several occasions in the OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting in Warsaw and many colleagues have probably seen her in person.
    [Show full text]
  • Freedom on the Net, Ukraine
    Ukraine https://freedomhouse.org/country/ukraine/freedom-net/2020 The COVID-19 pandemic saw the authorities prosecute users for spreading rumors online and launch several initiatives aimed at stopping the spread of the disease, including an app that monitors individuals in mandatory isolation, that infringe upon users’ privacy rights. Online journalists continued to face extralegal retaliation for their work. Cyberattacks remain a regular occurrence, affecting government and nongovernment targets alike. C1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to 3.003 information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that 6.006 lacks independence? The right to free speech is granted to all citizens of Ukraine under Article 34 of the constitution, but the state may restrict this right in the interests of national security or public order, and it is sometimes restricted in practice. Article 15 of the constitution prohibits censorship.132 Ukrainian courts are hampered by corruption and political interference, and public trust in the judiciary remains low.133 Serious crimes against journalists often remain unresolved (see C7). President Zelenskyy’s administration has at times denied reporters access to information (see B5). The IMI recorded 21 COVID-19–related restrictions on the work of journalists from mid-March 2020 until the end of April 2020, including cases in which journalists were prohibited from attending government meetings or prevented from reporting.134 C2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities? 2.002 4.004 No dedicated law mandates criminal penalties or civil liability specifically for online activities.
    [Show full text]
  • UNIVERSITY of BELGRADE FACULTY of POLITICAL SCIENCE Regional Master's Program in Peace Studies MASTER's THESIS Revisiting T
    UNIVERSITY OF BELGRADE FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE Regional Master’s Program in Peace Studies MASTER’S THESIS Revisiting the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan: Pro-Democracy Civil Disobedience in Ukraine Academic supervisor: Student: Associate Professor Marko Simendić Olga Vasilevich 9/18 Belgrade, 2020 1 Content Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………………3 1. Theoretical section……………………………………………………………………………..9 1.1 Civil disobedience…………………………………………………………………………9 1.2 Civil society……………………………………………………………………………... 19 1.3 Nonviolence……………………………………………………………………………... 24 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………… 31 2. Analytical section……………………………………………………………………………..33 2.1 The framework for disobedience………………………………………………….…….. 33 2.2 Orange Revolution………………………………………………………………………. 40 2.3 Euromaidan……………………………………………………………………………… 47 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………… 59 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………… 62 References……………………………………………………………………………………….67 2 INTRODUCTION The Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity have precipitated the ongoing Ukraine crisis. According to the United Nations Rights Office, the latter has claimed the lives of 13,000 people, including those of unarmed civilian population, and entailed 30,000 wounded (Miller 2019). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees adds to that 1.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), 100,000 refugees and asylum-seekers (UNHCR 2014). The armed conflict is of continued relevance to Russia, Europe, as well as the United States. During the first 10 months,
    [Show full text]
  • Ukraine's Political Crisis and U.S. Policy Issues
    Order Code RL32691 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Ukraine’s Political Crisis and U.S. Policy Issues Updated February 1, 2005 Steven Woehrel Specialist in European Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress Ukraine’s Political Crisis and U.S. Policy Issues Summary In 2004, many observers believed that Ukraine was at a key period in its transition that could shape its geopolitical orientation for years to come, in part due to presidential elections held on October 31, November 21, and December 26, 2004. In their view, Ukraine could move closer to integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions, real democracy and the rule of law, and a genuine free market economy, or it could move toward a Russian sphere of influence with “managed democracy” and an oligarchic economy. For the past decade, Ukraine’s political scene had been dominated by President Leonid Kuchma and the oligarchic “clans” (regionally based groups of powerful politicians and businessmen) that have supported him. The oligarchs chose Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych as their candidate to succeed Kuchma as President. The chief opposition candidate, former Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko, was a pro-reform, pro-Western figure seen by many observers as a man of high personal integrity. International observers criticized the election campaign and the first and second rounds of the election as not free and fair, citing such factors as government-run media bias in favor of Yanukovych, abuse of absentee ballots, barring of opposition representatives from electoral commissions, and inaccurate voter lists. Nevertheless, Yushchenko topped the first round of the vote on October 31 by a razor-thin margin over Yanukovych.
    [Show full text]
  • LAW of UKRAINE on Civil Service
    LAW OF UKRAINE On Civil Service This Law defines legal and organizational principles of civil service, and conditions and procedures for the exercise of the right to civil service by citizens of Ukraine. SECTION І GENERAL PROVISIONS Article 1. Terms and definitions 1. The terms listed below shall have the following meanings herein: 1) civil service shall mean professional activities of civil servants including development of proposals on state policy making, ensuring its implementation, and provision of administrative services; 2) civil servant shall mean a citizen of Ukraine holding a civil service position in any public agency of Ukraine or the Autonomous Republic of Crimea or their secretariats (apparatus); earning a salary paid from the funds of the state budget unless otherwise specified by the law; and exercising the powers specified for that position and directly related to realization of tasks and performance of functions of the public agency of Ukraine or the Autonomous Republic of Crimea as regards: development of proposals on state policy making; drafting, examination, and/or editing of draft legal acts; provision of administrative services; public monitoring and supervision; management of state property of Ukraine or the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, including management of state corporate rights; human resource management in public agencies of Ukraine or the Autonomous Republic of Crimea or their secretariats; realization of other powers (or competence) of the respective public agency; 3) an order shall mean a form of exercise
    [Show full text]
  • Making Waves
    Making Waves Sea Blindness and Australia’s Second Sea Navy (RAN), HMAS Stirling, at Garden Island, off Fre- Brian K. Wentzell mantle, Western Australia. The base is now the home of all Collins-class submarines, five Anzac frigates and a It is interesting to examine countries with coasts on more single fleet tanker. There is also a heliport to support he- than one ocean. Which coast is emphasized illustrates licopters assigned to the ships. Other resources, includ- much about the country’s history. Thus in Canada, the ing the landing ships, air warfare destroyers, coastal pa- focus has historically been on the Atlantic Ocean. Only trol vessels and mine warfare forces would have to deploy recently has focus changed to the Pacific coast and even from the east coast and northern areas to counter a major more recently the Arctic coast. For Australia the focus has maritime threat in the eastern Indian Ocean. been on the Pacific Ocean, and not the Indian Ocean. The Royal Australian Air Force has three air bases, two of David Brewster, writing for the Australian Strategic Policy which are in a maintained but inactive status in the north Institute, has highlighted the importance of the Indian coast area of Western Australia, and the other is a training Ocean as a waterway to world markets from the west and airfield shared with the Republic of Singapore Air Force northwest of the Australian continent. His article, entitled near Perth, which is on the southwest coast. Aside from “Australia’s Second Sea: Facing Our Multipolar Future in two training squadrons, there are no dedicated combat, the Indian Ocean,” exposes Australia’s national blindness early warning, maritime patrol or cargo aircraft based in to the importance of this ocean to the economy and secur- the region.
    [Show full text]
  • Resilient Ukraine Resilient
    Resilient Ukraine: Safeguarding Society from Russian Aggression Russian from Society Ukraine: Safeguarding Resilient Research Paper Mathieu Boulègue and Orysia Lutsevych Ukraine Forum | June 2020 Resilient Ukraine Safeguarding Society from Russian Aggression Mathieu Boulègue and OrysiaLutsevych Chatham House Contents Summary 2 1 Introduction 3 2 The Impact of the Armed Conflict 13 3 Creating Resilience Dividends: Case Studies 27 4 Recommendations 33 5 Conclusion 37 About the Authors 38 Acknowledgments 39 1 | Chatham House Resilient Ukraine: Safeguarding Society from Russian Aggression Summary • Despite military conflict and an increasingly adversarial relationship with Russia, Ukraine has largely maintained its democratic reforms thanks to its resilience and determination to decide its own future. The country is gradually developing the capacity of its state institutions and civil society to address the political and social consequences of Russian aggression. • Russia’s three main levers of influence in Ukraine include the ongoing armed conflict, corruption, and the poor quality of the political sphere. The Kremlin seeks to exploit these vulnerabilities to promote polarization and encourage a clash between Ukraine’s citizens and its governing elite by taking military action, manipulating the corruption narrative, supporting pro-Russia parties, and fuelling religious tensions through the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). • The ramifications of the military operation in Donbas reverberate strongly across the country and domestic politics. The most prominent spillover effects include the circulation of firearms and the weakened capacity of authorities to reintegrate internally displaced people (IDPs) and war veterans. • With no clear way to end the armed conflict, there is a growing risk of societal polarization. This could have negative consequences for any prospective peace agreement.
    [Show full text]
  • Ukraine's Gontareva on One of the Toughest Jobs in Central Banking
    http://www.centralbanking.com/operational-risk/governance/3238311/ukraines-gontareva-on-one-of- the-toughest-jobs-in-central-banking Ukraine’s Gontareva on one of the toughest jobs in central banking Christopher Jeffery Dan Hardie 12 May 2017 The outgoing National Bank of Ukraine governor speaks about transforming the central bank while engaging in wartime deficit funding and overhauling the banking sector How did you end up as governor of the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU)? This is really a question for the president, Petro Poroshenko. But perhaps it was because I was a seasoned banker with more than 20 years of experience and the president knew me personally. The request came as big surprise and, initially, I refused it. But he convinced me. And it also came just after the ‘Revolution of Dignity’ [the Maidan Revolution in 2014, which overthrew then-president Viktor Yanukovych], at a very patriotic time when everybody wanted to implement real reform. After a few weeks of quite difficult discussions, the president convinced me to accept his proposal, and my nomination was put to Ukraine’s parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, where a majority of the deputies who voted supported the motion. Were there any terms you required from President Poroshenko in terms of support or otherwise before you took on your role? At the time, it was a very difficult macro situation. So we only discussed some general areas for reform – particularly the real need for reform in the banking sector – but nothing on specific details, of what should be done. What was the situation like when you took over as governor? It was the epicentre of a perfect storm.
    [Show full text]