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The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain a Study of the Balance of Power Within the Ruling Family 16 DEC 2012

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The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain a Study of the Balance of Power Within the Ruling Family 16 DEC 2012 www.bcsl.org.uk The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain A study of the Balance of power within the ruling family 16 DEC 2012 Abbas Busafwan (Bahraini Journalist and Writer) www.bcsl.org.uk The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain A study of the Balance of power within the ruling family 16 DEC 2012 Index Introducon 4 Chapter 1: HYPOTHESIS: the king is the core of the crisis 9 1- A study of the moves calling for the fall of the monarchy 10 Chapter 2: The Prime Minister, the cortex of dictatorship 29 2- The king sfles the Prime Minister in his “constuonal” den 30 3- The King and the Prime Minister: the public clash 49 4- Sunni groups are not loyal to the Prime Minister 58 5- Consensus on removing the Prime Minister 64 Chapter 3: The Crown Prince, the advocate of his father’s approach 71 6- What is said about the exclusion of the Crown Prince 72 7- The king’s fears about the crown prince 77 Chapter 4: The Rule of militancy… A review of King’s speeches 84 8- Power parity produces inera 85 9- It is not the me yet for democracy 90 10- King Hamad and the people ‘face to face’ 97 Chapter 5: Bassiouni’s Report and the Dismantling of the infrastructure of tyranny 101 11- Bassiouni ‘s recommendaons: the recipe to bring down the regime 102 Conclusion 115 Appendix 119 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain Introducon The internaonal media usually holds the Prime Minister Khalifa bin Sal- man Al Khalifa (1935, ...) accountable for the corrupon and dictatorship dominang Bahrain. He is perceived as an impediment to the assumed democrac development adopted by the King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa (1950, ...), and his eldest son the Crown Prince Salman (1969, ...). The main discourse of the opposion (Al Wefaq and other polical socie- es) usually focuses on the slogan “step down Khalifa”. This senment is also welcomed in the West as King Hamad, has insgated a number of constuonal and polical procedures, including the restructuring of the ruling elite, in order to limit the powers of his uncle, Shaikh Khalifa. In recent years the non-licensed polical groups (Al Wafa, Haq and Al Ahrar) or what is known in Bahrain as the forces of “objecon”, along- side acve youth groups, who started the uprising of February 14, 2011, adopted the slogan “Down with Hamad” bypassing the slogan “step down Khalifa”. The polical sociees preferred working within the project of King Hamad that was promising, according to the various jusficaons for engaging in it. The chapters of this book compare the acons of King Hamad, and those of his uncle, in an aempt to test the following hypothesis: King Hamad bears complete responsibility for the ongoing deterioraon in Bahrain, and not the Prime Minister, who is a dictator. As a journalist and observer of the polical scene during the past ten years, who closely witnessed the course of events, I can state that the notorious Prime Minister is not responsible for the path taken by Bah- rain in the last ten years when King Hamad took over the reins of power and the iniave(1) in the country. 4 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family This may not be known to the public, the diplomac corps and those concerned about the Bahraini case during the early years of the reign of the new king. Over the years I encountered a lot of opposion when I advanced the hypothesis that the prime minister has no power what- soever. It seems likely that some pares in the opposion are aware that the Prime Minister has been outside the circle of decision making since the king first became ensconced in the royal palace. The minister of his office became Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, the strong man in the country. However, the understanding of the opposion sociees in the balance of power in government circles, and the nature of their understanding of the regional and internaonal vision of Bahrain, in addion to the usual thinking of the official opposion which is characterized by cauon(2), prompts the opposion to demand the stepping down of the Prime Min- ister, rejecng the slogan of “Down with Hamad”, to avoid open confron- taon with the regime. The reader will find in the following chapters observaons and analysis of the overall steps and projects carried out by the king, which he sought to implement in the first decade of his reign, ( what writers call the strategy of Hamad). It is believed that this strategy produced a massive popular revoluon, essenally rejecng this monopolisc, exclusionary, Bandari strategy (relave to Al Bandar report). The reign of Sheikh Khalifa of Bahrain was based on an iron fist between the years of 1971 and 1999.(3) During this me he skillfully manipulated the different interests of groups and strata of the people. This enabled him to neutralize the technocrats, the middle class, the traders, and the tradional families and prevent them from firmly engaging against his tyranny. 5 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain However, the “cleansing” pracces of King Hamad towards the opposi- on and large secons society, issuing a constuon without consul- taon, perming wide scale naturalizaon of foreigners, and targeng anyone with a different point of view, because he believed that the Shias constute a strategic threat to the regime, contributed to a shi in pub- lic opinion from venerang the king in 2001(4) to calling for his overthrow in 2011. The King has chosen the doctrine of “walking on the edge of the abyss,” and adopng a policy of “either me or the opposion.” He succeeded at the beginning of his reign in paralyzing his opponents when he stunned them in 2001, adopng a series of affirmave historic acons(5), as they were described at the me. The opposion was confused as it felt it had to keep pace with the rapidly introduced concessions. But the king’s strategy was exposed when he stopped the ball he set in moon and re- versed the security and polical situaon to that of the 1950s when the naonal movement called for a full democrac system(6). In contrast to what is believed, the slogan of “Down with Hamad” has been raised on the first day of the events of 14 February (2011). These were the words of the mother of Ali Mushaima(7), near the Salmaniya Medical Complex SMC gate(8), where this slogan was connually chant- ed. The coming chapters will analyze the visions of the king regarding him- self and the army, what he thinks of his kingdom, and the convergence of some of his speeches during the crisis, showing that he refused de- mocracy, moderaon and popular parcipaon in the decision making process. In the light of these complexies, the Crown Prince played different roles(9) but he always remained faithful to his father’s approach. In the 6 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family first stage of his reign his father used him to undermine his uncle, the Prime Minister, and entrusted him with managing the economic file, as well as using him during the months of February and March 2011 to ab- sorb the anger of the protesters and explore their intenons, under the guise of dialogue. Since the demolion of the Pearl Roundabout on 18 March 2011, the Crown Prince, , has played a role described as the “Senior Director of the Public Relaons” of the ruling family, and a strong defender of the dictatorship-based approach in a liberal way due to his failure during the past ten years to establish deep and broad relaonships with the tribes and traders. He only has good relaons with an isolated elite. The displacement of Sheikh Khalifa, which is imminent either by a royal process (probably in 2014) or by God’s will, will connue to be a re- minder that the polical system in Bahrain is hard to reform, and that the Prime Minister is its cortex. However, the King’s goal of the declaraon of the “reform project” as a ploy for re-concentrang power in his hand, away from the Prime Min- ister, and not for the creaon of a popular partnership and a democrac life, has become clear. Given his strategy which harmed the historical experience of Bahrain in a way that no other Khalifi ruler did before, and aer his failure to contain the movement of 14 February, the scenario of overthrowing King Hamad cannot be excluded. This is verified by the ex- perience of history when the first Hamad(10) (1872-1942) replaced his fa- ther Sheikh Isa bin Ali(11) (1847-1932) in the twenes of the last century, by a Brish decision, aer popular and bier complaints of corrupon and human rights violaons, while the Saudi family -the main obstacle to a real change in Bahrain- isolated the second king of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Saud bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (1902-1969), in 1969. 7 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain Introducon footnotes 1- To be a governor does not mean to be in control of the polical decision, as in the case of the Amir Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa, who was a “ceremonial” prince while his brother, Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman was the actual decision maker. In the case of King Hamad -and the group that obeys his orders- he has the power to make a decision already.
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