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The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain A study of the Balance of power within the ruling family 16 DEC 2012

Abbas Busafwan (Bahraini Journalist and Writer) www.bcsl.org.uk

The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain A study of the Balance of power within the ruling family 16 DEC 2012 Index

Introducon 4

Chapter 1: HYPOTHESIS: the king is the core of the crisis 9 1- A study of the moves calling for the fall of the monarchy 10

Chapter 2: The Prime Minister, the cortex of dictatorship 29 2- The king sfles the Prime Minister in his “constuonal” den 30 3- The King and the Prime Minister: the public clash 49 4- Sunni groups are not loyal to the Prime Minister 58 5- Consensus on removing the Prime Minister 64

Chapter 3: The Crown Prince, the advocate of his father’s approach 71 6- What is said about the exclusion of the Crown Prince 72 7- The king’s fears about the crown prince 77

Chapter 4: The Rule of militancy… A review of King’s speeches 84 8- Power parity produces inera 85 9- It is not the me yet for democracy 90 10- King Hamad and the people ‘face to face’ 97

Chapter 5: Bassiouni’s Report and the Dismantling of the infrastructure of tyranny 101 11- Bassiouni ‘s recommendaons: the recipe to bring down the regime 102

Conclusion 115 Appendix 119 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

Introducon

The internaonal media usually holds the Prime Minister Khalifa bin Sal- man Al Khalifa (1935, ...) accountable for the corrupon and dictatorship dominang Bahrain. He is perceived as an impediment to the assumed democrac development adopted by the King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa (1950, ...), and his eldest son the Crown Prince Salman (1969, ...).

The main discourse of the opposion (Al Wefaq and other polical socie- es) usually focuses on the slogan “step down Khalifa”. This senment is also welcomed in the West as King Hamad, has insgated a number of constuonal and polical procedures, including the restructuring of the ruling elite, in order to limit the powers of his uncle, Shaikh Khalifa.

In recent years the non-licensed polical groups (Al Wafa, Haq and Al Ahrar) or what is known in Bahrain as the forces of “objecon”, along- side acve youth groups, who started the uprising of February 14, 2011, adopted the slogan “Down with Hamad” bypassing the slogan “step down Khalifa”. The polical sociees preferred working within the project of King Hamad that was promising, according to the various jusficaons for engaging in it.

The chapters of this book compare the acons of King Hamad, and those of his uncle, in an aempt to test the following hypothesis: King Hamad bears complete responsibility for the ongoing deterioraon in Bahrain, and not the Prime Minister, who is a dictator.

As a journalist and observer of the polical scene during the past ten years, who closely witnessed the course of events, I can state that the notorious Prime Minister is not responsible for the path taken by Bah- rain in the last ten years when King Hamad took over the reins of power and the iniave(1) in the country. 4 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

This may not be known to the public, the diplomac corps and those concerned about the Bahraini case during the early years of the reign of the new king. Over the years I encountered a lot of opposion when I advanced the hypothesis that the prime minister has no power what- soever.

It seems likely that some pares in the opposion are aware that the Prime Minister has been outside the circle of decision making since the king first became ensconced in the royal palace. The minister of his office became Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, the strong man in the country.

However, the understanding of the opposion sociees in the balance of power in government circles, and the nature of their understanding of the regional and internaonal vision of Bahrain, in addion to the usual thinking of the official opposion which is characterized by cauon(2), prompts the opposion to demand the stepping down of the Prime Min- ister, rejecng the slogan of “Down with Hamad”, to avoid open confron- taon with the regime.

The reader will find in the following chapters observaons and analysis of the overall steps and projects carried out by the king, which he sought to implement in the first decade of his reign, ( what writers call the strategy of Hamad). It is believed that this strategy produced a massive popular revoluon, essenally rejecng this monopolisc, exclusionary, Bandari strategy (relave to Al Bandar report).

The reign of Sheikh Khalifa of Bahrain was based on an iron fist between the years of 1971 and 1999.(3) During this me he skillfully manipulated the different interests of groups and strata of the people. This enabled him to neutralize the technocrats, the middle class, the traders, and the tradional families and prevent them from firmly engaging against his tyranny. 5 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

However, the “cleansing” pracces of King Hamad towards the opposi- on and large secons society, issuing a constuon without consul- taon, perming wide scale naturalizaon of foreigners, and targeng anyone with a different point of view, because he believed that the Shias constute a strategic threat to the regime, contributed to a shi in pub- lic opinion from venerang the king in 2001(4) to calling for his overthrow in 2011.

The King has chosen the doctrine of “walking on the edge of the abyss,” and adopng a policy of “either me or the opposion.” He succeeded at the beginning of his reign in paralyzing his opponents when he stunned them in 2001, adopng a series of affirmave historic acons(5), as they were described at the me. The opposion was confused as it felt it had to keep pace with the rapidly introduced concessions. But the king’s strategy was exposed when he stopped the ball he set in moon and re- versed the security and polical situaon to that of the 1950s when the naonal movement called for a full democrac system(6).

In contrast to what is believed, the slogan of “Down with Hamad” has been raised on the first day of the events of 14 February (2011). These were the words of the mother of Ali Mushaima(7), near the Salmaniya Medical Complex SMC gate(8), where this slogan was connually chant- ed.

The coming chapters will analyze the visions of the king regarding him- self and the army, what he thinks of his kingdom, and the convergence of some of his speeches during the crisis, showing that he refused de- mocracy, moderaon and popular parcipaon in the decision making process.

In the light of these complexies, the Crown Prince played different roles(9) but he always remained faithful to his father’s approach. In the 6 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

first stage of his reign his father used him to undermine his uncle, the Prime Minister, and entrusted him with managing the economic file, as well as using him during the months of February and March 2011 to ab- sorb the anger of the protesters and explore their intenons, under the guise of dialogue.

Since the demolion of the Pearl Roundabout on 18 March 2011, the Crown Prince, , has played a role described as the “Senior Director of the Public Relaons” of the ruling family, and a strong defender of the dictatorship-based approach in a liberal way due to his failure during the past ten years to establish deep and broad relaonships with the tribes and traders. He only has good relaons with an isolated elite.

The displacement of Sheikh Khalifa, which is imminent either by a royal process (probably in 2014) or by God’s will, will connue to be a re- minder that the polical system in Bahrain is hard to reform, and that the Prime Minister is its cortex.

However, the King’s goal of the declaraon of the “reform project” as a ploy for re-concentrang power in his hand, away from the Prime Min- ister, and not for the creaon of a popular partnership and a democrac life, has become clear. Given his strategy which harmed the historical experience of Bahrain in a way that no other Khalifi ruler did before, and aer his failure to contain the movement of 14 February, the scenario of overthrowing King Hamad cannot be excluded. This is verified by the ex- perience of history when the first Hamad(10) (1872-1942) replaced his fa- ther Sheikh Isa bin Ali(11) (1847-1932) in the twenes of the last century, by a Brish decision, aer popular and bier complaints of corrupon and human rights violaons, while the Saudi family -the main obstacle to a real change in Bahrain- isolated the second king of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Saud bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (1902-1969), in 1969.

7 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

Introducon footnotes 1- To be a governor does not mean to be in control of the polical decision, as in the case of the Amir Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa, who was a “ceremonial” prince while his brother, Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman was the actual decision maker. In the case of King Hamad -and the group that obeys his orders- he has the power to make a decision already. 2- In its expression of the public posion and polical demands, the official opposion led by Al Wefaq make sure to avoid an open war with the regime, and to maintain a good relaonship with the West, unlike the “radical/objecon” groups who focus their energies on the polical demand, and rarely take into account the local and internaonal contexts. 3- Sheikh Khalifa was appointed as prime minister in August 15, 1971, and officially ruled the country unl King Hamad held his posion as the prince of Bahrain in March 1999. 4- The (Prince) Hamad visited Sitra Island -which is a major stronghold of the opposion- in February 2001, as part of a campaign to promote his new policies then, and he was warmly welcomed by the residents there, and aempts were recorded to hold up his car as an expression of welcoming the visions of the new ruler. 5- Emptying the prisons, allowing those displaced from the country to return, abolishing the law and courts of the security state, allowing parsan polical acon, and promising of the return of the democrac life. 6- For more details on the events of the fiies of the last century, see: Abdul Rahman Al Baker, from Bahrain to exile. 7- Shot and killed by shotgun in February 14, 2011, and is seen as the first vicm of regime’s violence in the last uprising. 8- It is not surprising that the workers in this hospital have been punished, because it has embraced the first polical slogans against the king in this public manner. 9- Sheikh Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa was appointed as the crown prince in March 9, 1999. 10- Sheikh Hamad bin Isa bin Ali Al Khalifa ruled Bahrain between 1923 1942. 11- Shaikh Isa bin Ali bin Khalifa bin Salman bin Ahmed Al Fateh, the first ruler of the tribe of Al-Khalifa in Bahrain). He ruled Bahrain between 1869-1923. 8 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

Chapter 1

HYPOTHESIS: the king is the core of the crisis

1- A study of the moves calling for the fall of the monarchy

9 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

(1) A study of the moves calling for the fall of the monarchy

As the King seems to be at the center of the exclusionary policies, the most common and popular slogan has become: “Down with Hamad,” instead of “Step down Khalifa”.

In this chapter, I would like to answer a significant queson: Why did large and varied elements of society mobilize and go out and protest in an unprecedented way on February 14, 2011, while the middle class, traders and the elite did not engage in a similar way in the events of the ninees (1994-1998), during which a demand was made to return to the constuon of 1973(1)?

(2)I think the biggest catalyst for vast protests is related to the funda- mental difference between the rule of the late Amir Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa(3) (1933-1999), and his son the present King Hamad (62 years).

The premise upon which this chapter is built is that the reign of King Hamad, who took power in March 1999, was based on the total exclu- sion of large and popular sectors, the opposion, parliament, the poli- cal sociees, civil sociees and labor unions, and the tradional/family/ tribal and religious gatherings. These elements have reacted by seeking the exclusion of King Hamad and the Al-Khalifa family from the poli- cal scene. The popular will was reflected by the two main slogans of the uprising: “Down with Hamad,” and “the people want to overthrow the regime.

There was also a demand for a Republic raised by youth groups, and by what is known in Bahrain as the forces of “objecon”, which include the non-licensed wings of the Alliance of the Republic: the Al Wafa move- ment chaired by of Abdul Wahab Hussein, the Haq movement led by 10 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

Hassan Mushaima, and the London-based Bahrain Freedom Movement led by Saeed Al-Shihabi(4), as well as the human rights acvist Abdul Hadi Al Khawaja(5).

The second slogan is the call for a constuonal monarchy, under which the Royal Instuon turns to the margins of polical acon, and exec- uve powers are withdrawn from the hand of the king. This demand is adopted by the licensed official opposion, especially the Al Wefaq Society(6), and its five partners: Waad, Naonalist Democrac Assembly, the Unitary Naonal Democrac Assemblage, Al Ekha Naonal Society, as well as the Democrac Progressive Tribune.

Both slogans reduce or eliminate the powers of the ruling family. This is the very essence of the movement’s demand for change and democracy. The uprisings of the ninees called for polics to be modeled on the basis of the 1973 Constuon, which can be considered a replica of the Constuon of Kuwait (1962). In the cases of Kuwait and Bahrain the Constuon gives wide powers to the head of state (the Prince), who is “ The head of the state, whose self shall not be touched” and “the prince could appoint by an Amiri Order, the Chairman of the tradional Con- sultave Board, and remove him from office”(7), in contrast to legislave and regulatory powers of parliament(8) that is able to paralyze the work of the government, even if it is not determining its starng course.

The events of the ninees came in response to what I call the marginali- zaon (not exclusion) of the popular sectors and pares in the 70s, 80s and 90s. Perhaps that is why they called to break the monopoly of the ruling family on polical decision making on the basis of a return to the Constuon of 1973, but the events of 2011 called for the an exclusion.

The difference may be noted between the polical marginalizaon adopted by the Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, who

11 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain was the real ruler during the reign of his brother Sheikh Isa, and the policy of exclusion and “cleansing” followed by King Hamad, as follows:

1- The Constuon

The Constuon of 1973 was wrien by a half elected and half appoint- ed team. It was perceived as an acceptable Constuon, sll remaining posive to the late Amir and his brother Sheikh Khalifa. Unfortunately, the most important arcles of the constuon were suspended, and parliament was dissolved in August 1975, aer about a year and a half aer its elecon. This praccally ended the partnership in governance(9). Yet, the brothers, Isa and Khalifa have “maintained” the Constuon of 1973, as the country’s ruling constuon, with laws issued in its name, and country ran in accordance with its provisions.

Of course Sheikh Khalifa was not applying the Constuon, but he did not dare to overturn it. Even when the appointed Shura Council was formed in the mid-ninees of last century, in the wake of the war to liberate Ku- wait from Saddam Hussein’s army, and in response to protests demand- ing the return of the lumpy Constuon, the legal outcomes were not to abolish the constuonal provisions that established the parliament with effecve legislave and control powers. The Shura Council was es- tablished without constuonal provisions. The opposion’s response was that the government can form Shura councils or advisory bodies but they are not a substute for an elected representave instuon.

However, the constuonal changes made solely by King Hamad, when he issued the Constuon of the Kingdom of Bahrain on 14 February 2002, without consulng the opposion and all polical groups, and without a referendum of the people, seriously undermined the polical process. It certainly appeared that the king wanted a formula in which the people’s opinion counted for nothing. The provisions of the Con- 12 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

stuon of 2002, transformed the head of the state into an absolute ruler(10). There was a transion from the stage of marginalizaon that violated the wrien Constuon (1975-2001), to the stage of approved exclusion in the 2002 constuon!

The difference seems clear between an authority that violates the Con- stuon and does not apply its provisions making decisions by itself, as the Prime Minister did during the reign of his brother Isa, and a mo- nopolisc authority in accordance with the constuon!

2- The cabinet

The composion of government reflects, in general, the vision of the state’s head of the government of the country and the balance of power. The Council of Ministers was not important in the government in the period from 1975 to 1999, as the Prime Minister was the decision maker. One third of the ministers were from the Al-Khalifa family , one-third were Sunnis, and one-third were Shiites(11). (See table)

It is true that a quota system was in place but the quotas did not alter the equaon of power which was monopolized by the ruling family. The quota system, as a polical idea, is close to the democrac equaon of democracy and is like vong.

Quotas, among other controls, may maintain the country’s stability. There was a deviaon from the quota system on the eve of the uprising of February 14, 2011: The Council of Ministers had 25 members: eight Sunnis, five Shias and the rest from the Al-Khalifa family who filled key government posions(12).

This was an intelligent way of excluding the elite, the technocrats, the tribes, and powerful families and traders, who also engaged in the events 13 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain of February 14, in favor of the desire to bring about real reforms within the ruling establishment, as long as they could not benefit from them.

Table (1): The cabinet when Prince Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, chaired the country March 1999

# Person Posion Al Khalifa Sunni Shiite 1 Khalifa bin Salman Prime Minister * Al Khalifa 2 Abdullah bin Khalid Deputy Prime * Al Khalifa Minister and Minister of Jusce and Islamic Affairs 3 Mohammed bin Deputy Prime * Mubarak Al Khalifa Minister and Foreign Minister 4 Mohammed bin Minister of the * Khalifa Al Khalifa Interior 5 Ali bin Khalifa Al Minister of * Khalifa Transportaon 6 Jawad Salem Al Minister of State * Orayedh 7 Khalid bin Abdulla Minister of Housing * Al Khalifa 8 Khalifa bin Ahmed Minister of Defense * Al Khalifa 9 Mohammed Minister of * Ebrahim Al- Cabinet Affairs and Mutawa Informaon 10 Isa bin Ali Al Khalifa Minister of Oil and * Industry 11 Ali Saleh Al Saleh Minister of Commerce * 14 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

12 Abdulla Juma’a Minister of * Electricity and Water 13 Abdulaziz Minister of * Mohammed Al Educaon Fadhel

Table (2): The cabinet on the eve of February 14, 2011(13)

# Person Posion AlKhalifa Sunni Shiite 1 Khalifa bin Salman Al Prime Minister * Khalifa 2 Mohammed bin Deputy Prime Minister * Mubarak Al Khalifa 3 Khalid bin Abdulla Al Deputy Prime Minister * Khalifa 4 Jawad bin Salem Al Deputy Prime Minister * Orayedh 5 Ali bin Khalifa Al Deputy Prime Minister * Khalifa 6 Mohammed bin Minister of State for * Ibrahim Al-Mutawa Follow Up Affairs 7 Mohammed bin Minister of State for * Abdullah Al Khalifa Defense 8 Abdulaziz bin Minister of Shura * Mohammed Al Fadhel and Representaves Affairs 9 Rashid bin Abdulla Al Minister of the * Khalifa Interior 10 Khalid bin Ahmed bin Minister of Foreign * Mohammed Al Khalifa Affairs

15 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

11 Hassan bin Abdullah Minister of Industry * Fakhro and Commerce 12 Fahmi bin Ali Al Minister of Electricity * Jowder and Water Affairs 13 Ibrahim bin Khalifa Al Minister of Housing * Khalifa 14 Ahmed bin Minister of Finance * Mohammed Al Khalifa 15 Majed bin Ali Al-Naimi Minister of Educaon * 16 Majid bin Mohsin Al Minister of Labor * Alawi 17 Abdulhussain bin Ali Minister of Oil and * Mirza Gas Affairs 18 Fama Mohammad Al Minister of Social * Balooshi Development 19 Ahmed bin Aallah Al Minister for Cabinet * Khalifa Affairs

3- The “cleansing”

The “Bandar report”(14) prepared by the former adviser for strategic af- fairs at the Royal Brish Sudanese court Dr. Salah Al Bandar, did not leave a space for doubt about the exclusionary “strategies” of King Hamad of large segments of the populaon who were deprived of self-realizaon, based on consideraons of opinion and religious differences.

The writer received a copy of the report about six weeks prior to the ex- pulsion of the adviser Salah Al Bandar from Bahrain. It was a very scary moment. The inability of the polical forces to invest that serious report was quickly clear, at the moment preceding the parliamentary elecons 16 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

in 2006(15). Therefore, the writer decided, as a journalist, to leak the re- port to an enty to ensure it was widely distributed.

That was history being made so I will comment on the report with refer- ence to my meengs with the writer at his residence in Bahrain during the summer of 2006(16).

The “Bandar report” was wrien aer studying the Shiite experience in Bahrain. It concluded that the current strength of the opposion, and its backbone Al Wefaq and the Shiite public, can be aributed to:

1- A powerful religious reference (Ayatollah Sheikh Isa Qassem), in con- trast to the dispersion of the Sunni religious leaders, who are pro-gov- ernment.

2- A semi-total control by the opposion of the instuons of civil so- ciety (human rights associaons, trade unions, lawyers and doctors as- sociaons etc ), and thousands of religious instuons (mosques, and matams). This made it easier for the opposion to mobilize cizens against the authories.

3- The influence of Shiite cizenship (automacally seen by the govern- ment as opposion) in some vital sectors in the country, such as health, the media and small and medium enterprises.

The existence of a social safety network, founded on acve charitable funds in every Shiite village . They were considered a danger because in addion to their welfare role they:

A- Help students complete their undergraduate and graduate stud- ies, which is seen as an “ambious” program for the formaon of a Shi- ite elite (= opposion). 17 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

B- Organize collecve weddings for young people who get married late due to financial difficules. This leads to an increase in the number of Shiite cizens (opponents from the regime’s perspecve).

4- The control by many Shiite commercial dealers of the grocery market which is viewed as an impending danger by the regime as it strength- ens Shia traders and individuals from whom Sunni loyalists are forced to buy.

I can enumerate other plausible points. The Hamad strategy, as exposed by the Bandar report , was to regard every normal act of development of the Shiite community, as an aempt to strengthen the opposion. This included the seng up of kindergartens, universies, hospitals, medical clinics, a newspaper, or a large or small investment business. Therefore, the regime felt it had to oppose these development acvies following a policy of “drying up the water springs”, “shrinking resources” and “re- ducing opportunies.”

This jaundiced view of community acvies led to a hidden war iniated by the authories and led by Sheikh Ahmed Aallah Al Khalifa(17), to stop the perceived “Shiite expansion.” This necessitated the monitoring of normal social acvies and re- classifying them as acts which damage the security and safety of the state. The response to the Bandar report was an acon plan which called for:

(1) Containing the growing “advancement of the Shiite” (= opposion) within a broader policy to crack down on freedom, contain Parliament, penetrate the instuons of acve civil society, reduce job opportuni- es, promoon and commercial acvies of the Shiite cizens (auto- macally perceived as opponents by the regime)(18).

(2) Working on the advancement of the Sunni sectors of society which

18 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

are perceived as pro-regime through imitang some of the Shiite acvi- es and structures, by adopng certain measures including:

1- Working on the formaon of a pro-Sunni religious reference in oppo- sion to the Shiite religious reference. The “Al Bandar report” suggests the name of Dr. Abdullaf Al Mahmood to lead this reference. In order to make this happen a controversy has been created about the division of the Sunni groups, and the necessity for creang a solitary reference.

2- Establishing of government-funded NGOs and civil sociees, such as the “the Bahraini Jurists Society” and “Bahrain Human Rights Watch So- ciety,” while efforts connued to contain the acve independent asso- ciaons and adopt measures against them. These included the dissolu- on of the Teachers Society, doctors and lawyers associaons, and the Bahrain Society for Human Rights as well as impeding the acvies of charitable funds, and issuing laws for the division of labour unions. The government was correct in assuming they would be supporve of any democrac movements, as the uprising of February 14 (2011) revealed.

3- Encouraging the voices of the loyal groups(19): Establishing the pro- government Al-Watan newspaper (in opposion to Al Wasat Independ- ent newspaper), seng up electronic forums (such as the pro-Bahrain Forum(20) in opposion to Bahrain online(21)), in order to spread sectari- anism, and encourage loyal groups to express their views. The main dif- ference between Al Wasat and Al Watan newspapers for example, is that the first was founded due to the iniave of Sunni and Shiite inves- tors and policians, in 2002, and the second was launched and adopted, in 2005, by the Royal Court, which funds and runs it, through Sheikh Ahmed Aallah Al Khalifa. This also applies to electronic forums and civil society organisaons.

4- Increasing scholarships for Sunnis who are seen as pro-regime in the 19 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

Defence, Interior and Service ministries, in addion to the Ministry of Educaon(22).

5- Supporng collecve marriages for pro-regime Sunnis in imitaon of Shia pracces adopted for economic reasons.

6- Increasing the number of pro-regime Sunnis is the civil service, corpo- raons, trade and economic sectors.

The Al Bandar report documented the franc quest of the Royal Court to control the public space, over and above the control of the execu- ve, judicial and legislave powers, as was prevalent during the reign of Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman. The report also documented the official “plan” to contain Shiite acvity which the regime viewed as opposion to its rule.

Among the documents published by the “Al Bandar report”, was a study by the Iraqi researcher and former professor at the University of Bahrain Dr. Nizar al-Ani who was commissioned by the Royal Court. Al-Ani made the following recommendaons(23):

1- “Favour the influenal religious leaders among the Sunnis and give them weight in decision-making. 2- “Seek to control the funcons of the police, military, and the Naonal Guard. They have to strongly support the Royal Court. 3- “Establish a special center to study and monitor the acvies carried out by the Shiites”. 4- “Alter the demographic balance of the Shias so that they will not in- crease to more than 20 – 30% of the populaon and submerge them in a “Sunni sea.” 20 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

5- “Empower the Arab Sunnis, increasing their share of senior and sensi- ve posions and improve their economic posion encouraging them to have larger families and not to migrate to neighbouring countries.”

6- “The Royal Court should support the Sunnis so the demographic bal- ance is altered in their favour.

7- “Re-write the history of Bahrain and highlight the polical, cultural and religious role of Sunni leaders, sciensts and thinkers”.

8- “Reward and offer incenves to those who have switched from the Shiite sect, and take advantage of informaon they may be willing to provide.

During the sevenes, eighes and ninees the cizens did not feel that their current posion or future was threatened. Their revolt was there- fore limited to demanding the restoraon of the constuon of 1973, which allowed the Al-Khalifa family to remain as the rulers.

But during the reign of King Hamad they became terrified that this strat- egy did not envisage a beer future for them or their children. Hence the slogan: “The people want to overthrow the regime”, which was not previously demanded.

4- The Naturalizaon:

The naturalizaon of Pakistanis, Jordanians, Syrians, Yemenis, and Suda- nese to work in the military sector, is a not new policy. It was vigorously pursued during the reign of Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman and his brother, Sheikh Isa.

Nevertheless, King Hamad considered the demographic change as part of the priories of his “strategy”, which classifies the Shiite cizens as “a

21 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

strategic threat” to the regime, that should be eliminated from the civil- ian and military instuons. He put the theory of “drying up the water springs,” into pracce through neglect, impoverishment and the with- drawal of influenal posions.

According to available figures about 80 thousand people were naturalized(24). The feelings of a cizen can never be described when a foreigner is favored when it comes to services, housing, and employ- ment in the military and non-military sector. Second generaon natural- ized cizens are also favoured over the indigenous inhabitants.

With the entry of the “global war” pillars against the cizens, the popu- lar feelings of exclusion reached an unprecedented level and produced an extraordinary uprising against the “Hamad Strategy”. The people crossed red lines in calling for the ousng of the regime.

While the King seems to be at the center of this unwise policy, the most widely used popular slogan has become: “Down with Hamad,” instead of “step down Khalifa” which is favored by official polical opposion groups. And there is a difference between the opposion discourses in the ninees of last century, which did not direct any cricism at the head of state, Emir Isa bin Salman. Most of the me the cricism focused on the prime minister. Even though the opposion tried not to cricize King Hamad(25), the feeling is growing day aer day that he is responsible for the crisis.

This increases the challenges faced by the country and it limits the abil- ity of the Al Khalifa family, the region and the West to respond to the legimate aspiraons of those seeking change. The king himself could solve the crisis which he caused.

This problem is not facing King Abdullah II and the movement in Jordan, 22 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

King Mohammed VI in Morocco, or Emir Sabah Al-Ahmed in Kuwait. Slo- gans have not been directed at the heads of the state in those countries but they are directed directly at King Hamad and he needs to ask himself why this is the case.

In 2002, when the opposion Naonal Movement rejected the new con- stuon, many thought that the controversial constuonal document could be imposed by security, polical, regional, and internaonal force. This was also the senment of the opposion forces. It was very strong when Al Wefaq and Waad(26) opposionist sociees parcipated in the parliamentary elecons in 2006.

In 2002 the balance of power shied to the disadvantage of the opposi- on, especially if it wanted to wage open bales. It had just emerged ex- hausted from a polical conflict which lasted 30 years(27) and intensified in 1995 and beyond when the polical and security situaon worsened with the launch of a popular uprising, demanding the reinstatement of the Constuon of 1973.

Taking into account the mood of the people, the state celebrated the coming of a new king who pledged that “the most beauful days, are those that we did not live yet”. The naonal powers thought they were being given a new opportunity aer the unexpected blow in 2002 when one party issued the constuon. The opposion parcipated in the elecons of 2006, and 2010, only to discover that the parliamentary sys- tem and the project itself was sterile.

The parcipaon in parliament highlighted the nature of the problem: the constuon was not popularly accepted and was unable to develop polical life. Aer ten years of actual work based on the constuon and aer two parliamentary experiences (2002-2010), and the third (2010 2011), the Constuon of 2002 failed. The ten years spent markeng a 23 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

reform polical project also amounted to nothing. The historical sele- ment of 2001 may also have been a failure.

No one disputed the eligibility of the Al Khalifa family to rule, unl the 1973 Constuon was formally dropped. King Hamad issued a new con- stuon unilaterally destroying all precedents and historical understand- ings between the Al Khalifa family and the people and between the king personally and the naonal movement who signed the 2001 Charter. This project of Prince Hamad was widely supported and the naonal movement expressed great confidence in his declared and undeclared promises, even before they were submied to the text of the controver- sial Charter.

Moreover, the naonal movement has paid a big price because of the problems associated with returning to the 1973 constuon. King Ha- mad paid an even bigger price as there is now a lack of confidence in his program. It became clear that King Hamad through the two legislave councils (the appointed Shura and elected Representaves), and dual- elected municipal councils and the assigned provinces was not actually aiming to provide a balance to ensure the connuity of the democrac experiment; rather he wanted to impose a liberal monopoly of power, or what is somemes referred to in contemporary literature as “the Liberal Dictatorship.”

Therefore, the opposion and its audience are frustrated and dissasfied with the current king(28), who has dealt a severe blow to his credibility especially when the army which he leads targeted the protesng cizens at Pearl Roundabout on the morning of February 17, 2011, under his di- rect orders. Before and aer the bloody scene in Pearl Roundabout the king visited the headquarters of the military command. He did not take any acon to deter the military but emphasized the role of the regime’s armed forces in protecng security. 24 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

In my esmaon, the human rights violaons aer the imposion of the state of emergency in mid-March 2011, showed that the “Hamad strategy” endorses the security soluon if the polical opon is unable to rein in the ambions of the opposion to run the country.

The Constuon of the State of Kuwait (1962) provided great protecon to the ruling Sabah family during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and also during the Arab Spring revoluons. When voices appear to be calling for a constuonal monarchy in Kuwait to remove the Sabah family from the polical scene, the voices of the main opposion adhered to the Constuon of 1962, which gives broad powers to the head of state. This was also the case in the 1973 constuon of Bahrain.

The 1973 Bahraini Constuon does not exist, thanks to King Hamad, who chose to remove the popular legimacy from the Constuon, and select a “strategy” depending on the balance of powers, which is neces- sarily subject to change. To the Al Khalifa family the following statement is sacrosanct: “Access to the islands of Bahrain was accomplished by the sword”. The Al Khalifas were not welcomed with flowers.

King Hamad made a strategic mistake in missing an exceponal oppor- tunity to issue a compable constuon, which granted the family an honorable posion, and the people sovereign decision-making powers. It is not guaranteed that the balance of power will always favor the Al Khalifa family, as the consensual Constuon guarantees a polical life with known inputs and outputs. If the regime chooses to rely on military force and regional support, it exempts the popular majority from any obligaons towards it.

25 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

Item (1) footnotes

1- A constuon of the State of Bahrain was put by the “Constuent Assembly”, and issued by the late Amir Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa, and Bahrain has seen it as the compable and commied Constuon. 2- several reasons can be pointed out, related to the media and communicaons revoluon, and the that the Bahrainis were inspired by the Arab Spring revoluons, in addion to the presence of the official opposion on the ground, and its deep experience with the regime. As well as the youth formaon, that was surprising to everyone, and the women and the middle class exceponal role, and most importantly, the influenal engagement of the technocrats who I call them “the mind of the revoluon”. All of these and other inputs played a remarkable role in the uprising, while the violent security opon imposed an expansion of the an- regime posions. 3- The first governor of the State of Bahrain aer its independence in August 15, 1971. He ruled the country between the years 1961-1999. 4- Abdul Wahab Hussein, Mushaima and Al Khawaja are sentenced to life of imprisonment, while Al-Shihabi was sentenced in absena to 15 years of imprisonment. They were arrested on March 17, 2011, for the charge of changing the regime; where Amnesty Internaonal considers them as prisoners of conscience. 5- Al Khawaja resigned from his posion being in charge of the Middle East in “Frontline” human rights or- ganizaon, to engage in the “Revoluon” he was awaing for many years. 6- Al Wefaq Islamic Naonal society was established in 2001, and is considered the mainstream for Shiite groups in Bahrain, and is led by Sheikh Ali Salman, who owes allegiance to Ayatollah Sheikh Isa Qassem, is sees him as the spiritual father for Al Wefaq. 7- To review the powers of the Amir of Bahrain, see Arcle (33) of the Constuon of 1973. 8- Consists of two thirds elected and one third appointed (the Minister). 9- The immediate cause to solve the elected Council is the refusal of the laer the Law of the State Security, but it is believed that there are economic reasons as well, given the outbreak of the Lebanese war (April 1975), and the decision to transfer the financial sector from Beirut to Manama, that it is no coincidence that the parliament is dissolved (August 1975) aer four months of the start of the outbreak of the war in Lebanon, and this means that the regional situaon plays a role in the course of events, and the struggle for wealth is part of the intense rivalry between the leaders of the ruling family. 10- According to arcles (33-43) of the Constuon of the Kingdom of Bahrain for the year 2002, the King is the Supreme Commander of the Defense Force, and the President of the Supreme Judicial Council, and ap- points the prime minister, ministers, and members of the Shura, and “his self shall not be touched”.

26 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

11- This formula was not maintained all the me, especially aer 1995. 12- According to a report issued by the Bahrain Center for Human Rights BCHR in 2003, under the tle of: “Discriminaon, the unwrien law”, that of 572 senior post the Shiite cizens are running 18%, see page 10 of the report, and it can be said that this rao has came down now to less than 10%. 13- The formaon of this cabinet was announced in November 2, 2010. 14- To view the report: hp://www.bcsl.org.uk/ar/documents/472-albander-report. 15- The polical opposion forces thought that raising the issue may lead to damage the electoral process, which was the opposion sociees’ brigade then. And perhaps some of the pares believed that leaking the report was an official conspiracy. 16- Al Bandar had predicted an acon to be taken against him, therefore forwarded his report to a number of foreign embassies, and requested advice from the author for a good lawyer, and he suggested to him Abdullah Al Shamlawi. 17- Appointed in April 2011 as an Advisor to follow-up Affairs in Royal Court, “and is responsible to follow up the implementaon of the royal instrucons and direcves, as stated in the decree of his appointment (see: Al Wasat, April 8, 2011). He was the minister for the Council of Ministers since 2005, was dismissed from the cabinet on 26 February 2011, aer about ten days from the start of the uprising in February 14 (2011), in a shy aempt to calm down the situaon, as being one of the “aggravaon” ministers in the opposion eyes. He was the managing director of “Al Bandar report”. Re-appoinng to be the consultant of the Royal Court aer the demolion of the pearl Roundabout, reflected the official’s opposite course of militancy in dealing with the protest movement. 18- Ghassan Al-Shihabi, the legality of the demand of a Sunni religious reference, Al Waqt newspaper, Sep- tember 24, 2006. 19- Such as Sheikh Mohammed Khalid, and MP Jassim Al Saeedi. 20- hps://bahrainforums.com. 21- hp://bahrainonline.org. 22- On the issues of discriminaon in scholarships, see for example: Al Wasat newspaper, June 12, 2008. 23- Bahrain Center for Human Rights, a summary of recommendaons of the secret study prepared by Dr. Ani and implemented by the Bahraini authority in order to exclude the Shiite sect hp://www.bahrainrights. org/node/652. 24- Naturalizaon threatening Bahrain, Al-Akhbar Lebanese newspaper, January 14 2010. 25- Usually Al Wefaq leader, Sheikh Ali Salman asks the public not to raise the slogan of “Down with Hamad”, Ayatollah Isa Qassem also called in April 2011 not to raise the slogan of overthrowing as well. 26- The Naonal Democrac Acon Society (waad) was founded in 2001, as the first recognized polical organizaon in Bahrain and the Gulf, chaired by the late Abdul Rahman Al-Naimi, the historical leader of the Popular Front, which waad inherited. Waad’s Secretary General Ebrahim Sharif is imprisoned since March 17, 2011. 27- And possibly more, if we take into account that the country is in crisis since the twenes of the last century at least, and may be the period of the Constuent Assembly elecon (1972) and later the dissolved Naonal Assembly in 1975, is one of the relavely calm periods, which has lasted only for three years, and the arrests against opponents connued. 28- See (1) a study of the moves calling for the fall of the monarchy in this book.

27 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

Chapter 2

The Prime Minister, the cortex of dictatorship 2- The king sfles the Prime Minister in his “constuonal” den 3- The King and the Prime Minister: the public clash 4- Sunni groups are not loyal to the Prime Minister 5- Consensus on removing the Prime Minister

28 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

(2) The king sfle the Prime Minister in his «constuonal» den

Aer January 2005, and before that at all, the queson whether the Minister was on one side or another was no longer asked, since all of them have to implement the instrucons issued by the Minister of Royal Court otherwise dismissed, and perhaps the «Sultan» became angry.

Aer January 2005, the queson whether the Minister was on one side or the other was no longer asked, as everyone had to implement the instrucons issued by the Minister of the Royal Court or face dismissal and risk making the sultan angry.

This chapter will focus on the “quiet” and perhaps “slow”, yet, succes- sive and intensive steps of King Hamad to sfle the Prime Minister in his “constuonal” den(1) (Council of Ministers), through the appointment of persons loyal to the Royal Palace as council members. This happened in successive steps which were completed in 2005.

Prior to that, I would point out that King Hamad has taken a number of important decisions, in order to control the provisions of the decision making process, including:

First: the announcement of the reform project, parcularly the Naonal Acon Charter, which earned him:

Massive popular support (98.4%), aimed at winning over:

1. The wing of the prime minister from inside and outside the ruling family, to advance his “strategy”, of monopoly which became evident over me. 29 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

2. The wing of the opposion, which appeared confused in front of the king presenng himself as a reformer, through posive projects, while pursuing a controversial policy in 2002. The King used the void, confu- sion, hesitaon, and bewilderment that characterized the performance of the opposion, to advance his Bandari faith/ideology and strategy (relave to Al Bandar report).

However, it has become clear, even since 2002, and the texts of the King- dom’s new Constuon, that the goal of “the reform project” was not the establishment of democrac life, but inter family rivalry clinched by the King in his personal favor, somemes by geng rid of opponents outright and somemes by phasing them out in stages. In all cases that hoslity was redirected towards the king by the opposion, and some pares within the ruling family.

The King made unprecedented global publicity regarding the situaon in Bahrain which has been plagued by instability for a long me. Due to its fragile domesc legimacy the royal family sees itself in need of regional support and the support of the internaonal community. The interna- onal community may not have been convinced about the dictatorship in Bahrain unl aer the polical outcry of February 14th,2011.

Second: The King made constuonal changes (2002) to:

5. Install him as an absolute ruler, in contrast to the opposion, the po- lical forces, and other pares in the ruling family, taking away the con- stuonal powers of the Council of Ministers’ (Sheikh Khalifa bin Sal- man’s clique)(2).

Third: Restructuring the mechanism of decision-making:

6. Transferring the polical and constuonal file to the palace. 30 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

7. Transferring the economical file to the Economic Development Board(3).

8. Tightening the king’s grip on the Council of Ministers, through the replacement of members of the Council, in stages, with figures loyal to the royal palace rather than to the Prime Minister.

Changes in the Council of Ministers: the beginning of courtesy(4)

The King has worked hard at the beginning of his reign to talk posively about his uncle, the Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa. He was always ac- knowledging him, in his public speeches, as his late father (Isa bin Sal- man), glorifying him and extensively commending his efforts, using the words “our dear uncle”. With the passage of me, this form of praise ceased almost completely and the King imitated the style of the Egyp- an President Anwar Al Sadat. During his first term in office Sadat glori- fied his predecessor, Jamal Abdel Nasser echoing the commitment to his approach. Once his posion became secure he adopted a hosle stance towards his predecessor.

Despite the tyranny of Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman on the polical scene for three decades (the 70s, 80s and 90s), the succession of Prince(5) Ha- mad was very smooth aer the death of his father Sheikh Isa. Under the leadership of Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman himself, is a proud person to maintain the “tradions” of the tribes and their habits in the inheritance of reign.

In contrast to the shock taccs used to paralyze the opposion (2001), the King chose the style of courtesy, reverence and the policy of con- tainment with regard to the Prime Minister, in order to marginalize him in a more quiet way than that of President Al Sadat in dealing with the “power centers”. 31 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

While Al Sadat resolved the bale aer nearly two years of his reign in the wake of Abdel Nasser’s death, the Bahraini King gave himself un- l 2005, to get a grip on the Cabinet, but before that, he deprived the Council of Ministers of its powers and strength.

The Cabinet at the me when the King came to rule

The King ruled on 6 March 1999, and the execuve authority/Govern- ment/Council of Ministers was composed of 17 members/ministers (including the Prime Minister). With the excepon of the Minister of Defense Marshal Khalifa bin Ahmed, the other 15 members from the Al Khalifa family were:

- Abdullah bin Khalid Al Khalifa, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Jusce and Islamic Affairs. - Mohammed bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, Deputy Prime Minister and Minis- ter of Foreign Affairs. - Mohammed bin Khalifa Al Khalifa, Minister of Interior. - Ali bin Khalifa Al Khalifa, Minister of Transport. - Jawad Salem Al Orayedh, Minister of state. - Khalid bin Abdulla Al Khalifa, Minister of Housing. - Mohammed Ebrahim Al Mutawa, Minister of Cabinet Affairs and Min- ister of Informaon. - Isa bin Ali Al Khalifa, Minister of Oil and Industry. - Ali Saleh Al Saleh, Minister of Commerce. - Abdullah Juma’a, Minister of Electricity and Water. - Abdulaziz Mohammed Al Fadhel, Minister of Educaon. - Ebrahim Abdelkarim, Minister of Finance and Naonal Economy - Abdulnabi Abdulla Al Shoala, Minister of Labour and Social Affairs. - Majed Jawad Al Jishi, Minister of Works and Agriculture. - Faisal Radhi Al Mosawi, Minister of Health.

32 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

The first ministerial change: a pulse check

The King procrasnated unl May 1999, and made a very limited cabinet reshuffle, through the appointment of three new ministers. Only one, the Minister of Electricity and Water the late Duaij bin Khalifa Al Khalifa was affiliated to the king. He succeeded Abdullah Juma’a, who was ac- cused of major corrupon in establishing Al Hid staon.

The other two new ministers affiliated with the Prime Minister were Ab- dullah Saif, who headed the finance and the naonal economy ministry, and Ali Al Mahroos, who was appointed as Minister of Works and Agri- culture. He was quickly ousted due to allegaons of corrupon.

This pulse check was a sign that Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman was sll exert- ing his influence, but it is also true that the King had chosen to keep up with him.

During the first cabinet reshuffle, two persons were affiliated to the king in the government: the Minister of Defense Khalifa bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, and the Minister of Electricity and Water Duaij bin Khalifa Al Khalifa. Six- teen ministers were affiliated to the Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa.

33 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

Table (3): The ministerial cabinet aer the first change conducted by the (Prince) Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, in May 1999

# Person Posion Affiliated Affiliated Affiliated with the with the with the King Prime Crown Minister Prince 1 Khalifa bin Salman Prime Minister Al Khalifa 2 Abdullah bin Deputy Prime * Khalid Al Khalifa Minister and Minister of Jusce and Islamic Affairs 3 Mohammed Deputy Prime * bin Mubarak Al Minister and Khalifa Foreign Minister 4 Mohammed bin Minister of the * Khalifa Al Khalifa Interior 5 Ali bin Khalifa Al Minister of * Khalifa Transportaon 6 Jawad Salem Al Minister of State * Orayedh 7 Khalid bin Abdulla Minister of Housing * Al Khalifa 8 Khalifa bin Ahmed Minister of Defense * Al Khalifa 9 Mohammed Minister of * Ebrahim Al- Cabinet Affairs and Mutawa Informaon 10 Isa bin Ali Al Minister of Oil and * Khalifa Industry

34 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

12 Abdulla Juma’a Minister of * Electricity and Water 13 Abdullah Hasan Minister of Finance * Saif and Naonal Economy 14 Abdulnabi Abdulla Minister of Labor * Al Shoala and Social Affairs 15 Ali Al Mahroos Minister of Works * 16 Abdulaziz Minister of * Mohammed Al Educaon Fadhel 17 Faisal Radhi Al Minister of Health * Mosawi Total 2 15 0 Number of ministers affiliated to the King: 2 Number of ministers affiliated to the Prime Minister: 15 Number of ministers affiliated to the Crown Prince: 0

The second ministerial change: an increase in the share of the King’s af- filiates without decreasing the share of the Prime Minister

(Prince) Hamad bin Isa conducted a second ministerial change in April 2001, where the change seemed mid. It directed the King towards in- creasing his affiliates in the Council of Ministers, without decreasing the number of ministers affiliated to the Prime Minister.

The most significant observaons on this change:

1- The Prime Minister could keep the 15 ministers affiliated to him, namely: 35 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

Abdullah bin Khalid Al Khalifa - Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Jusce and Islamic Affairs Mohammed bin Mubarak Al Khalifa - Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Khalifa Al Khalifa - Minister of the Interior Ali bin Khalifa Al Khalifa - Minister of Transport (the eldest son of the prime Minister) Jawad Salem Al Orayedh - Minister of State of Municipalies and Envi- ronmental Affairs Khalid bin Abdulla Al Khalifa - Minister of Housing Mohammed Ebrahim Al-Mutawa - Minister of Cabinet Affairs and Infor- maon Isa bin Ali Al Khalifa - Minister of Oil Ali Saleh Al Saleh - Minister of Commerce Abdulaziz Mohammed Al Fadhel - Minister of Shura and Representaves Affairs Abdullah Hasan Saif - Minister of Finance and Naonal Economy Abdulnabi Abdulla Al Shoala - Minister of Labor and Social Affairs Mohamed Jassim Al Ghatam – Minister of Educaon Faisal Radhi Al Mosawi - Minister of Health Mohamed Hasan Kamalladin - Minister of State

2- The King increased the number of ministers affiliated to him, namely: Khalifa bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, Minister of Defense. Duaij bin Khalifa Al Khalifa, Minister of Electricity and Water. Nabil Yaqoob Al Hamar, Minister of Informaon. Mohamed Abdul Ghaffar Abdullah, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.

3- The Informaon Ministry was withdrawn from Mohammad Al Mu- tawa; instead Nabil Al Hamar the media advisor of the king was commis- sioned. Al Mutawa is described as the “strong man”, and the right arm of the Prime Minister, especially during the ninees uprising (1994-1999), 36 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family where decisions were made by the Prime Minister and his assistants.

Perhaps Mohammed Al Mutawa had to pay the price of his close contact with the Prime Minister reducing his powers before anyone else. That has been a bigger pulse check, and perhaps a more visible challenge to the Prime Minister. However, Al Mutawa has retained his posion as Minister for Cabinet Affairs, which gives Sheikh Khalifa reassurance that the goal, as far as possible, is power-sharing.

Mohamed Abdul Ghaffar was appointed a Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, in an aempt by the King perhaps to intervene in foreign policy, which was long dominated by the “old” man Mohammed bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, who later became “a solver of all problems”, and all important commiees are referred to him. This may have constuted a rapproache- ment between the conservave ruling poles, luring bin Mubarak to be a substute for the Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa. Bin Mubarak would be willing to take up that posion if it was offered to him.

4- Ali Fahmi Al Jowder entered the ministry for the first me as Minister of Works; a figure affiliated with the Crown Prince Sheikh Salman, who at that me was a model of efficiency and an example of the new blood, which heralded the new era, without necessarily forsaking discrimina- tory tendencies.

The third ministerial change: Enhancing the presence of the King

The King chose to increase the number of supporters expressing his as- piraons through the cabinet change, aer the holding of the parlia- mentary elecons in 2002. His share increased to ten ministers, and the Prime Minister’s share decreased to 13. The Crown Prince retained one minister affiliated to him.

37 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

But the king also reduced the powers of the ministers affiliated to the Prime Minister. He:

1- Withdrew the Ministry of Jusce from the old man Abdullah bin Khalid Al Khalifa, and assigned it to another old man Jawad Salem Al Orayedh.

2- Removed the businessman Abdulnabi Al Shoala from his post as Min- ister of Labor and Social Affairs, and assigned it to the former opposi- onist Dr. Majeed Al Alawi, who entered the ministry for the first me.

3- Withdrew the Ministry of Industry from Sheikh Al Khalifa, and as- signed it to Dr. Hasan Fakhro, who was affiliated to the reformers and has close contacts with the king and his advisor for economic affairs(6). But Isa bin Ali retained the Ministry of Oil, and was subsequently the Minister of Oil and Industry. But, perhaps the most important point in this change was the removal of the powerful person Khalid bin Abdullah from his post as Minister of Housing, forcing him into virtual rerement. He was appointed Minister of the Court of Sheikh Khalifa due to the prime minister’s intercession. It is interesng that the young Fahmi Al Jowder was assigned Minister of Housing, who was given a cabinet post nearly a year and a half ago.

4- The number of ministers increased with lack of controls determining the number, under the absolute power of the king in the formaon of the ministry.

38 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

Table (4): the cabinet aer the third ministerial change conducted by King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, on November 11, 2002

# Person Posion Affiliated Affiliated Affiliated with the with the with the King Prime Crown Minister Prince 1 Khalifa bin Prime Minister Salman Al Khalifa 2 Abdullah bin Deputy Prime * Khalid Al Khalifa Minister and Minister of Jusce and Islamic Affairs 3 Mohammed Deputy Prime * bin Mubarak Al Minister and Foreign Khalifa Minister 4 Mohammed bin Minister of the * Khalifa Al Khalifa Interior 5 Ali bin Khalifa Al Minister of * Khalifa Transportaon 6 Jawad Salem Al Minister of Jusce * Orayedh 7 Khalid bin Minister of the Court * Abdulla Al Khalifa of Prime Minister 8 Khalifa bin Minister of Defense * Ahmed Al Khalifa 9 Mohammed Minister of * Ebrahim Al- Cabinet Affairs and Mutawa Informaon 10 Isa bin Ali Al Minister of Oil * Khalifa 11 Ali Saleh Al Saleh Minister of Commerce *

39 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

12 Duaij bin Khalifa Minister of * Al Khalifa Electricity and Water 13 Abdulaziz Minister of Shura * Mohammed Al and Representave Fadhel Affairs 14 Abdullah Hasan Minister of Finance * Saif and Naonal Economy 15 Abdelnabi Minister of State * Abdullah Al Shoala 16 Nabil Yaqoob Al Minister of * Hamar Informaon 17 Fahmi Ali Al Minister of Works * Jowder and Housing 18 Mohamed Abdel Minister of State for * Ghaffar Abdullah Foreign Affairs 19 Majed Al Naimi Minister of * Educaon 20 Khalil Hasan Minister of Health * 21 Hasan Fakhro Minister of Industry * 22 Mohamed Ali Al Minister of * Shaikh Mansoor Municipalies and Al Sitri Agriculture 23 Majid Al Alawi Minister of Labor * and Social Affairs 24 Abdulhussain Ali Minister of State * Mirza Total 10 12 1 Number of Ministers affiliated to the King: 10 Number of Ministers affiliated to the Prime Minister: 12 Number of Ministers affiliated to the Crown Prince: 1 40 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

May 2004: the control of the Ministry of the Interior

On 22 May 2004, a popular massive rally was held in Manama led by Ayatollah Sheikh Isa Qassim denouncing the bombings that targeted Shiite shrines in Iraq. The public was disgusted that the security forces targeted the licensed march using tear gas and shotguns(7).

It is interesng and surprising that on the same day King Hamad issued a decree appoinng Rashid bin Abdulla Al Khalifa, Minister of the Interior, in place of his predecessor, Khalifa bin Mohammed Al Khalifa.

Much can be said about this but in this chapter it is important to note the displacement of the Minister of the Interior affiliated to the Prime Minister with another affiliated to the king in a manner showing the King as a reformer who stands against the use of violence against protesters. The Prime Minister’s wing was portrayed as targeng defenseless peo- ple simply for expressing their opinion.

And it is even more excing as the minister, Khalifa bin Mohammed was part of the main crew -led by Sheikh Khalifa- in the suppression of the ninees protests, who in the eyes of the opposion is accused of human rights violaons, and is a hero in the eyes of the royal family. Neverthe- less, that did not deter the King from overthrowing him in an “offensive” way, as long as he severed his control over the security forces. Khalifa bin Mohamed was believed to be loyal to the Prime Minister unl he lost control due to the advent of the Chief of Staff Defense Force (since 2001) Rashid bin Abdulla Al Khalifa, Minister of the Interior.

The fourth ministerial change: the king pounces

The ministerial change on January 14, 2005 can be described as the mo- ment of the King’s aack on the Prime Minister, not only in terms of 41 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain increasing his share to 12 ministers in contrast to 7 affiliated with the Prime Minister (see Table ...). but also in terms of the faces emerging from the ministry, who are the fundamental pillars of Sheikh Khalifa’s approach.

This me the king took the decision to remove the four characters seen as the striking arms of the Prime Minister:

- The removal of Mohamed Al Mutawa from his post as Minister of Cabi- net Affairs, and his replacement by Abdul Hussain Mirza, who is a calm and professional person affiliated to the King. This has very significant implicaons and shows that the king can appoint and dismiss whoever he wants. It also meant that appoinng Mirza as Minister of the Cabi- net Affairs was the realizaon that his agenda is now under the eyes and control of the palace. Without a doubt, the appointment of Sheikh Ahmed Aallah to this post later (September 2005), meant more than just the appointment of a “professional” person like Mirza, taking into account the important posion occupied by Aallah (the nephew of the Minister of the Royal Court) in making and implemenng royal deci- sions.

- The removal of the second important person in the eyes of Sheikh Khal- ifa, the Minister of Finance and Naonal Economy, Abdullah Hassan Saif, and appoinng in his place, Sheikh Ahmed bin Mohammed Al Khalifa, who is affiliated to the Crown Prince, assigning to him the Ministry of Finance only. This is supposed to mean that the responsibility for for- mulang the policy on the naonal economy had been confirmed to be transmied to the Economic Development Board, chaired by the Crown Prince.

- The removal of Jawad Al Orayedh who has close contact with the Prime Minister from the cabinet. 42 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

- The removal of the minister Abdulnabi Al Shoala, in a rebuking way. The Bahrain News Agency pointed out his exempon(8), despite a state- ment released two days later denying the issue of exempon and paid tribute to the man for what he has achieved on naonal levels(9). Inter- esngly, Mohammed Al Mutawa, Abdullah Saif and Jawad Al Orayedh were appointed as the Prime Minister’s advisors, but not Al Shoala. It is not known whether this reflects royal resentment, given that appoint- ments to the status of minister must be issued by the king.

- A remarkable reducon in the powers of the minister Dr. Majeed Al Alawi. Aer he was the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, he became the Minister of Labour only, while the Social Affairs Ministry was as- signed to Dr. Fama Al Balooshi affiliated to the militants in the Royal Court. Preferably, this is to be discussed in another context rather than the conflict between the king and prime minister to control the compo- sion of the government.

We can talk in another context about other issues related to increasing the number of ministers from the ruling family, reducing the presence of the Shiite ministers, and the lack of efficiency in appointments.

43 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

Table (5): the cabinet aer the fourth ministerial change conducted by King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, in January 2004 # Person Posion Affiliated Affiliated Affiliated with the with the with the King Prime Crown Minister Prince 1 Khalifa bin Salman Prime Minister Al Khalifa 2 Abdullah bin Deputy Prime * Khalid Al Khalifa Minister and Minister of Jusce and Islamic Affairs 3 Mohammed bin Deputy Prime * Mubarak Al Khalifa Minister and Foreign Minister 4 Rashid bin Minister of the * Abdullah Al Khalifa Interior 5 Ali bin Khalifa Al Minister of * Khalifa Transportaon 6 Khalid bin Abdulla Minister of the * Al Khalifa Court of Prime Minister 7 Khalifa bin Ahmed Minister of * Al Khalifa Defense 8 Isa bin Ali Al Minister of Oil * Khalifa 9 Ali Saleh Al Saleh Minister of * Municipalies and Agriculture 10 Abdullah bin Minister of * Salman Al Khalifa Electricity and Water

44 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

11 Abdulaziz Minister of Shura * Mohammed Al and Representave Fadhel Affairs 12 Ahmed bin Minister of Finance * Mohamed Al and Naonal Khalifa Economy 13 Fama Al Balooshi Minister of Social * Affairs 14 Fahmi Ali Al Minister of Works * Jowder and Housing 15 Mohamed Abdel Minister of * Ghaffar Abdullah Informaon and Minister of state for Foreign Affairs 16 Majed Al Naimi Minister of * Educaon 17 Nada Haffadh Minister of Health * 18 Hasan Fakhro Minister of * Industry and Commerce 19 Mohamed Ali Al Minister of Jusce * Shaikh Mansoor Al Sitri 20 Majid Al Alawi Minister of Labor * 21 Abdulhussain Ali Minister of Cabinet * Mirza Affairs Total 11 6 2 Number of ministers affiliated to the King: 11 Number of ministers affiliated to the Prime Minister: 6 Number of ministers affiliated to the Crown Prince: 2

45 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

The boom line is that the King publicly started a bale against the prime minister, who gave up in the face of the storm. Yet, he did not resign as the Egypan centers of power did during the period of Al Sadat, and he also did not accept any alternave posion even if the Viceroy that was not menoned in the Constuon, was seen as a consultant.

The connuous cabinet change dictated the presence of ministers, who were affiliated with the king, while the ministers affiliated with the Prime Minister have become aware of the balance of power, and the Prime Minister himself has become convinced that the authority and power had shied in form and content, to the new king. Aer January 2005, and before the queson whether the Minister was on one side or the other was no longer asked, since they all had to implement the instruc- ons issued by the Minister of the Royal Court otherwise they could be dismissed and the sultan could become very angry.

Bahrain is usually referenced to the model of the king of Jordan, who “plays with the ministers like dolls.” This is the model that the king of Bahrain wanted to apply. Somemes he changed ministers in a libelous way - for example, the dismissal of the former Minister of Informaon Jihad Bukamal aer about 14 months from the date of his appointment. Bukamal was sacked in November 2008, through news carried by the Bah- rain News Agency, and internaonal agencies. The news was confirmed by the King’s media adviser Nabil Al Hamar, when the king was on a busi- ness trip to New York(10). It was as if a catastrophe happened that neces- sitated sacking Bukamal quickly, and reprimanding him in public(11).

Regardless of whether the dismissal of Bukamal came aer Bahrain TV broadcasted an interview with Waad’s Secretary General Ebrahim Sharif in which he spoke of what he called the secret budget of the Royal Court and the arms deals(12) or against the background of complaints by work- ers in Bahrain TV(13) on the acons carried out by the former Chief Ex-

46 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family ecuve of Bahrain Radio and Television, Ahmed Najem (appointed by Bukamal), or for other reasons, the sacking of Bukamal could have been carried out in a more convenonal way(14).

We can also refer to the dismissal of the former Minister of Municipali- es Mansoor bin Rajab, in March 2010, as a model for the controversial dismissals, where bin Rajab was accused of money laundering with the Iranian Revoluonary Guard(15). He was defamed in the local media for weeks, in a country not used to raising corrupon issues, suggesng that other targets were behind the whole process.

Item (2) footnotes 1- I say constuonal, given that the Council of Ministers is a constuonal body logically was not solved for example, and this is well understood by the Prime Minister. 2- See, item number (<<), The Sunni groups are not loyal to Sheikh Khalifa, in this book. 3- See, item number (<<), The king and the prime minister, a Public clash, in this book. 4- This chapter does not discuss ministerial changes to the point of efficiency, or sectarian dimension, and these problems are present. But the chapter discusses the formaon of Ministers taking sides of either the Prime Minister or the King. 5- Sheikh Hamad declared himself as a king in February 14, 2002, and gave himself the tle of “His Great- ness”, but the media pressure made it replaces it with “His Majesty”. 6- Perhaps assigning Fakhro as a Minister also aims to keep him out of the palace, a policy followed by the Minister of the Royal Court Khalid bin Ahmed for the persons close to the King, as happened with the former Minister Mansoor bin Rajab. 7- Al Wasat newspaper, May 23,2004. 8- See Bahrain News Agency link: hp://www.bna.bh/portal/news/43631. 9- Al Wasat newspaper, January 17, 2005. 10- See Bahrain News Agency link: hp://www.bna.bh/portal/news/135720. 11- ?????? 12- To see the interview of Ebrahim Sharif, see the following link: hp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4GW ZVBpBuPA&feature=related. 13- For background on the protests, see Al Wasat newspaper, 6 August, 2008. The protests of the television staff coincided with a visit carried out by King Hamad to Turkey, and newspapers in Ankara broadcasted it, which caused the upset of the king. 14- According to other sources the dismissal in this way came due to the refusal of the minister Bukamal the instruc- ons of the Minister of the Royal Court to dismiss Ahmed Najam from his post as chief execuve for Bahrain’s radio and television. Bukamal said then to the Minister of the Court that he was receiving instrucons from the king. 15- Al Wasat Newspaper, March 23, 2010.

47 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

(3) The King and the Prime Minister: the public clash

The King publicly rebuked the Prime Minister, and invited him to “obey” the orders of the Crown Prince, who is mandated by the eco- nomic policy-making of the country. Ministers were also threatened with dismissal if they disrupted the decisions of the Crown Prince, and the monopolisc economic decisions.

In the face of the insistence of the opposion on the dismissal of the government (its president and members), the Bahraini authories find themselves facing a challenging demand as the ruling mentality is com- mied to keeping the dean of the tribe Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa (77 years) in office as prime minister, out of respect for the tribal tra- dions. The main powers of the Prime Minister were withdrawn and polical, constuonal, and parliamentary affairs were referred to the royal palace, while issues with economic dimensions were referred to the Economic Development Board(1), chaired by Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa (43 years).

This situaon has created dispersion in decisions, the emergence of more than one council of ministers, and perhaps the creaon of centers of power, necessitated in some cases by interference from the top of the hierarchy to set its pace, as was the case when the King of Bahrain publicly rebuked his uncle, the Prime Minister, due to a complaint made by Crown Prince Salman of lack of cooperaon by some ministers and government agencies with the Economic Development Board.

Here is a complaint of the Crown Prince, which was broadcasted via the Bahrain News Agency in January 14, 2008. The king responded to this complaint.

48 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

The context of the Crown Prince’s complaint of the Prime Minister: His Majesty my dear father, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, the beloved King of the country, may God protect him.

Peace, mercy and blessings of Allah

His Majesty my dear father, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, the beloved King of the country, may God protect him. Peace, mercy and blessings of Allah

I am pleased your Majesty to extend my sincere greengs and best wishes for good health and happiness to you, expressing at the same me my pride and my gratude to your Majesty for the support and assistance in various tasks and responsibil- ies that were precluded to us in the Economic Development Board, which is always trying to implement your kind guidance for the further development, progress and prosperity of the Kingdom of Bahrain and its people in your blessed reign.

This message comes in the context of our permanent need of wise guidance and the valuable advice of Your Majesty as well as our desire to inform you on the ongoing progress made by the Board of responsibilies and tasks that are assigned to us. Besides, the constraints and difficules facing the Board’s work, we have decided to present to Your Majesty, God bless you, with the following issues about which we need your wise guidance as well as to your indispensable support.

Your Majesty, Your naonal vision and comprehensive reform project of the Kingdom of Bahrain have raised a lot of hopes with your peo- ple, and movated the faithful ones to achieve the noble vi- sions and aspiraons of Your Majesty. It was also honoring us

49 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

to take part in this integrated reform project, I mean the eco- nomic reform project that we sought in the Economic Develop- ment Board in order to develop the foundaon, and economic plans based on study and research as well as learning from the experiences of those who preceded us, bearing always in mind the noble aspiraons of Your Majesty’s, which aims to achieve progress and prosperity for our country, wealth and well-being of our honorable people. In spite of the sincere efforts and those good intenons our work in the Economic Development Board did not find an interest among some gov- ernment officials and that has led to great difficules in imple- menng the project which is an essenal part of Your Majesty reformist project, God bless you.

Your Majesty, The efforts of your fellow cizens in the Economic Develop- ment Board, and the efforts of everyone involved in the na- onal dialogue have resulted in a lot of achievements which we are proud of. And it was possible for these achievements to expand and grow, if harmony was found between your vision, and the policies pursued by some of our government officials. As we are presenng the maer to your Majesty in order for you to decide what you see as suitable, we would like to ex- press our readiness to implement all your guidance, which has become for us very necessary and important.

In conclusion, please accept our sincere wishes and lasng pride in your connuing support to us, and asking God to bless you and grant you good health and wellness.

Your sincere son Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander

50 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

The king’s leer in response to the complaint of the Crown Prince about the lack of cooperaon by the prime minister:

Dear son, your Highness Sheikh Salman bin Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, Crown Prince, Deputy Supreme Commander of the Bahrain Defense Force, and the President of the Economic Development Board, May God bless and protect you.

Peace is upon you and God’s mercy and blessings be upon you.

We have examined your sincere and candid leer, about your desire to remove any obstacles from the aspiraons of the administraon and the resoluons of the Economic Development Board under your leadership, and your will- ingness to overcome the absence of cooperaon between the Council and some government agencies.

As we emphasize trust in your competence and your integ- rity that you have become known and even known at the naonal and internaonal level, and cherished by everyone in this beloved country, we see that it is incumbent on the government agencies concerned to exceed the delay and slowdown in implementaon, and comply with the guid- ance in implementaon as stated in the decree establish- ing and organizing the Council, and the decrees amending some provisions, as stated in the text to be «the Council’s decisions are binding on ministries, instuons and admin- istrave bodies in the State and shall take the necessary measures for its implementaon», as well as loyal and com- mied to the aspiraons of the Economic Development Board, which is already the aspiraons of our loyal people to the progress and prosperity for a decent life.

51 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

As stated in the decree amended No. 5 of 2002, as you are free to choose members of ministers and experts, and see in this situaon that anyone who is not playing a signifi- cant role and doing their work in the Council, then it would negavely affect their posion in the cabinet or even in the reshuffle, and at the same me if they prove an efficiency and provide quality work, then they could be considered in assigning greater responsibilies. Since our comprehensive reform may ensure that, thanks to God, the various dimen- sions of polical, economic and social development, then we want to have an input to the administrave reform of the state, to be the economic decision of the Council of Economic Development, where it became the policies of the naonal economy of competence, and no longer in the custody of any ministry, We are determined to find a tool to consider the appropriate legal and necessary means to achieve this goal, namely, the unity of the country’s eco- nomic decision to proceed with the projects aimed to achieve the prosperity of the cizens, without any delay. We wish you to connue success, and appreciate your sin- cere efforts to serve the naon.

God bless you and, and help you to serve people, be safe. Hamad bin Isa, king of Bahrain.

This was the first me that the Prime Minister got publicly reprimanded, and his call explicitly to “obey” the orders of the Crown Prince, which is mandated by the policy-making not related to the economy of the coun- try, as he was threatened in the event of Minister of being firing if the decisions of the Crown Prince were not followed. 52 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

It is likely that this issue arose as the King was terminally ill in the second half of 2007, and his departure for medical treatment brought to the fore the prime minister’s aempts to regain some influence, but they have been met harshly by the King, who interfered by:

1. The appointment of the Crown Prince “ His Highness Sheikh Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa, Deputy Supreme Commander, to oversee the im- plementaon of public policy and military plans, administrave, eco- nomic and financial, Bahrain Defense Force and Naonal Guard, and ex- ercise any other powers conferred upon it by the Supreme Commander.” This was in early January 2008(2).

2. Expanding the powers of the Economic Development Board which is headed by the Crown Prince, at the same me as marginalizing the larg- est of the Council of Ministers. The Crown Prince has appointed ten min- isters as members of the EDB on January 30. The EDB has become the actual alternave to the Council of Ministers in the resoluon service and the country’s economic development.It is made up of “the Deputy Prime Minister Jawad Al Salem, the Minister of Educaon, the Minister of Works, the Minister of Labor, the Minister of Social Development, the Minister of Cabinet Affairs, the Minister of Jusce and Islamic Affairs, the Minister of Municipalies and Agricultural Affairs, the Minister of Infor- maon, the Minister of Health and the Minister of Housing”(3).

3. Taking more stringent steps to remove the prime minister’s son Ali bin Khalifa Al Khalifa from the civil aviaon sector, which was supervised by him. The Crown Prince was to be responsible for taking the necessary legal and administrave procedures to transform Bahrain Internaonal Airport from a subsidiary to a company property, to be part of the pri- vate sector, in accordance with the laws adopted in the Kingdom under the direct supervision of the civil aviaon authority and a maximum of transparency and disclosure(4). 53 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

On 17 January 2008, it was announced that Bahrain Holdings(5) (the in- vestment arm of the government in the non-oil sectors) announced the appointment of Sheikh Duaij bin Salman Al Khalifa, as the chairman of the Board of Directors of Bahrain Internaonal Airport.

It could be argued with regard to the status of Ali bin Khalifa, the eld- est son of his father, the Prime Minister, that the expression is evident from the place of the marginalized of Sheikh Khalifa, who was unable to secure the porolio of the Ministry of Interior for his son Ali, who is running for the post of Deputy Prime Minister, without any real power. He was the Minister of Transport for 18 years (since 1993), unl the last change. He then became deputy prime minister without porolio of the transport ministry, which has been assigned in March 2011 to Kamal Ahmed, a very close associate of the Crown Prince.

The status of Ali bin Khalifa Ali is just like his father, and remained in the last ten years without any authority aer that was removed from the presidency of the telecommunicaons company named Batelco (the government owns the majority of its shares), and the withdrawal of the telecommunicaons sector from under his hand aer it was opened for private investment, and removed from the Department of Gulf Air, The Bahrain Internaonal Airport. It is clear that the process of restructuring power lasted several years, to make the King axis up (power) instead of the Prime Minister, and will not allow for any changes.

Despite the friendliness lost between the king and prime minister, the issue of the dismissal of Sheikh Khalifa from his post had grave implica- ons and may have been the straw that broke the camel’s back given the atude of the authories to reject his dismissal and the insistence of the opposion on the appointment as a step to forward in the term of a government that reflects the popular will.

54 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

The change of the prime minister will not solve all the problems, but it could remove the biggest obstacle to the launch of a formal dialogue between the opposion and the regime. But the difference might be deeper in the authories’ refusal to give wrien guarantees to establish a constuonal monarchy.

The agreement to dismiss the prime minister will remain the biggest problem. The other is the insistence of the opposion on the elecon of a constuent assembly to write a new constuon, and determine the paern of the next government, or resort to a referendum on the constuon.

However, the central dimension in the opposion’s insistence on re- moving Sheikh Khalifa, is the appreciaon that such a move could have profound consequences on the structure of the formal decision. If this happened one of the scenarios could be something like what happened in Egypt and Tunisia, when Zine El Abidine and Hosni Mubarak were re- moved. Subsequent events led to a remarkable change in the structure of the two systems. But there is a difference worth nong here: Sheikh Khalifa is not the first man, nor even the second or third in Bahrain.

The structure of the constuonal order in Bahrain, combines broad powers in the hands of the king(6), who can keep a grip on the situaon without dramac consequences, as happened in Tunis and Cairo.

This is perhaps why the opposion wants to redraw the powers of the head of state in an aempt to shrink them. This is part of a wider at- tempt to reduce the powers of the royal family. The opposion wants to change the royal family into a constuonal rather than a governing monarchy. If this does not happen the situaon will become complicat- ed and blood will be shed.

55 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

Item (3) footnotes 1- Crown Prince Sheikh Salman bin Hamad was appointed as the Chairman of the Economic Development Board in March 3, 2002. The Council was responsible for formulang and overseeing the economic develop- ment strategy of Bahrain, and aracng foreign investment to it. in fact, the pluralist instuons that was established, especially those led by the Crown Prince , such as “Mumtalakat” aimed to pull more power from the prime minister, with the laer retaining his formal posion. 2- Al Wasat newspaper, 7 January 2008. 3- Al Wasat newspaper, 31 January 2008. 4- Al Wasat newspaper, 18 January 2008. 5- “Mumtalakat is the investment company for the Kingdom of Bahrain, and was established in June 2006 by Royal Decree as an independent holding company for the government of Bahrain’s strategic non-oil and gas related assets. Mumtalakat was created to align and implement the execuon of the government’s iniaves to pursue value-enhancing opportunies, improve transparency and help achieve operaonal excellence for its state-owned non-oil and gas related assets. Mumtalakat holds stakes in over 35 commercial enterprises, represenng a porolio value of approximately BD 3.3 billion (U.S.$8.8 billion) as of June 30, 2011 and span- ning a variety of sectors, including aluminum producon, financial services, telecommunicaons, real estate, tourism, transportaon, and food producon”. hp://www.bmhc.bh/en/4/media-centre.aspx. 6- See arcles (33-43) of the Constuon of the Kingdom of Bahrain 14 February 2002. 56 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

(4) Sunni groups are not loyal to the Prime Minister

The Prime minister was not able to penetrate the Sunni polical groups, and sociees: (Muslim Brotherhood) and “Salafists” who are faithful to the Palace and the strong man Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed, and his nephew Shaikh Ahmed.

Considered “Hamad Strategies” in the polical system of Bahrain in- clude the “presidenal strategy”, similar to the system in America: The King, or President makes a decision, and departments of the Execuve Council of Ministers apply it, unlike in the exisng system in the 1973 Constuon, which can be considered “mixed”, and gives the Council of Ministers wide powers.

The 1973 constuon allowed the Council of Ministers to dominate the affairs of state, according to Arcle 85/A, which states that “ the Council of Ministers and the Ministers dominate in maers related to the inter- ests of the state, and formulate the general policy of the government to pursue its execuon, and oversee the funconing of the government.” In the Constuon of 2002 promulgated by King Hamad the word ‘domi- nate’ was replaced with the word ‘sponsor’ (Arcle 47/A), and referred all powers to the king, who is exercising his powers directly, and through his ministers, while the head of state in the 1973 Constuon handles his powers through his Ministers.

In light of the “Hamad Strategies”(1), this was the point of turning Sheikh Khalifa Bahrain’s Prime Minister into the Minister for the affairs of Mu- harraq city(2), or the Minister of cizens’ affairs. It became clear since the parliamentary elecons in 2002, when Sheikh Khalifa began his sub- sequent visits to Al Muharraq, that decision making powers had been taken away from the Prime Minister who is the chairman of the Gov- 57 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

ernment of His Majesty the King, and is commied to the instrucons of the head of state. The decision-making mechanism was transferred from the Council of Ministers to the palace. The council of ministers was relegated to implemenng policies drawn up by oversees consultants the implementaon of those who works in the palace(3), and in contrast to the previous prince or ruler of Bahrain, Sheikh Khalifa authority was unlimited during the rule of his brother Sheikh Isa (from 1963 to 1999).

Since 2001 the Prime Minister appeared aware of the concerns of the Sunnis. It was well known among Sunni groups that the King was creat- ing a broad alliance with Shiite groups(4) and the opposion, which was endorsed in the Charter (2001), as it was not for the Sunni groups loyal to the role in his release (the Charter).

What got more aenon back then was that some Sunni groups could play the role of the opposion to Al-Khalifa. The Sunnis felt they should vote on the charter as the king made the Shiite partners to govern: he released prisoners, deportees returned and the laws of the State Secu- rity were negated. There was an agreement to open a newspaper, and a civil project for homes in the North (where the vast majority are Shiite). There was also an agreement to establish a polical society (Al Wefaq), heralding the elecon of parliament, and the acvaon of the 1973 con- stuon was not insisted on.

It is “the next catastrophe,” in the eyes of some Sunni groups who are loyal to the royal family, which was and sll is the biggest beneficiary for the governance, since the emergence of the modern state. This was more pronounced in the last ten years. Discriminaon was not part of the official policy. The abuse of the Shia cizens occurred behind closed doors.

Despite the shortness of some pares in the palace of Sheikh Khalifa’s 58 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

acvies in Muharraq, the palace looks at these acvies as the space allowed to the Prime Minister who is inacvated, and which are in a proper space. They are in the acvaon and strengthening of the Sunni sectors which is a crical objecve of the palace. The palace was also aware of the modest size of the capital built by Sheikh Khalifa in this sensive area.

When endowed with the events of February 14, 2011, the reacon of Sheikh Khalifa was offensive, and moved in a manner that recognizes the complexies of the situaon, trying to reap what he has sown ten years ago, in Qalali and Muharraq city(5).

Sheikh Khalifa was not the one who issued any strategic decision on how to deal with sit-ins at the Pearl Roundabout (February and March 2011). It is true that he was in favor of curbing the demonstrators, but he was never a decision-maker in the use of violence, and the decision-maker in a call to the Saudi forces. He did not mind being portrayed as “the bad guy”, and he presented himself as the one who ordered the army to fire on unarmed demonstrators, declared a state of emergency in mid- March 2011, and was behind the demolion of the rotor, and the occu- paon by the military of Salmaniya hospital. He gave the impression he was behind the formaon of naonal unity headed by Dr. Abdullaf Al Mahmood. The truth of the maer was that King Hamad and his crew led by the Minister of the Royal Court Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa was the main contributor in the formulaon of a “Hamad strategy” or Ha- mad policies” and their applicaon.

Sheikh Khalifa was not behind any of the important decisions in the proc- ess of suppression of advocates of reform, but he wanted to appear like a “bad” man who was against the demands of the opposion, in favor of punishment and restraint, as he did not have anything to lose and the signs that he would be overthrown kept increasing. 59 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

However, Sheikh Khalifa faced a man of decision, not just guidance and words: the commander of the army, Field Marshal Khalifa bin Ahmed (brother of the Minister of the Royal council)(6), who pulled the rug out from the Prime Minister. He was proud of memories of “conquest and invasion”(7) against the Bahraini people and wanted to ingraate the loy- alists to the King and his crew, not the Prime Minister.

However, aer ten years of King Hamad taking over, it became clear that he lost the support of the Shiites. They were opposed to his promises of reform, and may have destroyed much of what is posive in relaons be- tween the ruling family and Shiite groups. He didn’t even get the loyalty of the Sunnis who saw his treatment of the Shiites as hypocrical and the amnesty for prisoners of conscience as derisory(8). One of the students at the sit-ins said we do not want King Hamad, we want Sheikh Khalifa.

Nevertheless, Sheikh Khalifa was not able to penetrate the Sunni po- lical groups, and Sociees (Muslim Brotherhood) and “Salafists” who have been faithful to the Palace and the strong man Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed, and his nephew Ahmed bin Ayat Allah.

The message of Dr. Abdullaf Al Mahmood published in the “Washing- ton Times”(9) was clear; to approve the removal of Sheikh Khalifa and put forward a theory saying that the crisis is over, thanks to Sheikh Khalifa and his extraordinary work and achievements. And this does not change the probability of Sheikh among Sunni masses in Muharraq, which can be tuned, by adjusng some of the popular representaves.

Sheikh Khalifa has failed in the formaon of a polical rally which gives him allegiance despite desperate aempts. The palace stopped his ear- ly aempts to iniate a polical movement. The prime minister knows that the decision was taken in the palace, not in Government House. The army and security forces are under the command of the palace, which

60 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

means the presence of the actual Sheikh Khalifa is fragile indeed.

So, the displacement of Sheikh Khalifa only needs a decision by the King, to automacally find in favor of the “Coalion of the Conqueror” and other polical groupings. The palace and its official media and local press will portray the decision as inevitable as will The Country, and Gulf News – newspapers which are close to the Prime Minister.

Opons are narrow for the King, as he chooses to throw the load of his office onto the Minister Khalid bin Ahmed and his brother, the com- mander of the army. This group is sll awaing the right opportunity to keep Sheikh Khalifa away from the scene.

The situaon is quiet and contrary to what is believed there is a local iniave to remove the prime minister. Sheikh Khalifa has already been given the message that the game is over. It is true that Saudi Arabia will remain an obstacle. But it should be remembered that the Al-Saud fami- ly made a decision to sack King Saud bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud (1902 1969), in 1963(10), and that King Hamad passed a package of reform measures that were disturbing to Riyadh in 2001. But Saudi Arabia’s desire to fight any aspiraons for the advancement of the Bahraini people may again be soened if King Hamad forces the resignaon of Sheikh Khalifa and starts a new era in Bahrain.

The dilemma faced by the King here is not Saudi Arabia, or the pro-re- gime groups but the preoccupaon with what happens next. What is the benefit of offseng Sheikh Khalifa? The opposion adheres to the restructuring of power, and demands that the powers of Parliament and the Government fully reflect the opinion of the people.

The displacement of Sheikh Khalifa is imminent and will ensure that the polical system in Bahrain scks to reform; Sheikh Khalifa is only a shell.

61 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

Item (4) footnotes 1- See also number (3) of this book: The king sfle the Prime Minister in his “constuonal” den. 2- The second city aer the capital Manama, Bahrain, and it was the place of the governor in the first half of the tweneth century. 3- Most notably the Royal Court Minister Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa. 4- Abbas Busafwan, Bahrain Mirror: the dialogue is embraced in Al Fateh, 28 June 2012. 5- A village located north of the city of Muharraq, and inhabited by the families of the Sunni sect. 6- Born in 1946, professional soldier, he was promoted to the rank of Marshal on 9 February 2011, a few days before the start of the uprising of February 14. He was appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of Bahrain Defense in January (January) 1974, and he served as Commander in Chief of the Bahrain Defense Force in March / March 1988. 7- Perhaps one of the major challenges facing the ruling family is to forget that it has by force entered Bah- rain in 1783, and the Baharna/Shiite (indigenous people of the island) usually hates the word “conquest” used by the official date of entry of the first rulers of Al-Khalifa of Bahrain, also do not like the name of Al Fateh Mosque, the main mosque/official in the capital, Manama. Bahrain being a Muslim country the word conquest is an Islamic term used to express the takeover of the Muslim army on a foreign State. 8- The king issued an amnesty for about 12 prisoners of conscience. 9- Ben Birnbaum, The Washington Times, Top Sunni: P.M. should mull quing aer crisis, 18 August 2011. 10- see: hp://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/_____. 62 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

(5) Consensus on removing the Prime Minister

The opon of an unstable state or a historic selement by instung a real constuonal monarchy may not be acceptable to the king. But the decision to displace his uncle is affordable, to provide an accepted selement, claiming that the obstacle to reform (Sheikh Khalifa) has been eliminated.

The Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman was not at all comfortable with the formaon of the Bassiouni Commission of Inquiry on violaons of human rights, as he was afraid he would be forced to resign.

Sheikh Khalifa is geng his revenge by employing a global company, called Mackenzie(1), for the preparaon of reports on the economic situ- aon, and status of Bahrain, if Sheikh Khalifa remains in his posion, as Bahrain faces huge challenges in terms of unemployment and poor abil- ity to aract investment, because of corrupon and mismanagement which are his legacy(2). This file has been managed since 2002, by the Economic Development Board, chaired by Crown Prince, as part of the campaign waged by King Hamad against his uncle.

So, in pracce, Sheikh Khalifa is no longer a target for the opposion, announcing only that he was and sll is the target of powerful forces in the Royal Council. This is clear as he has been marginalized by the forces in the system such as the Crown Council. Sheikh Khalifa has been removed from the scene, an indispensable condion, to restructuring the course of selement in Bahrain, from the standpoint of its strategic ally (the USA), and the patrons of the historic ruling family Al-Khalifa (Britain), and some countries of the Gulf Cooperaon Council (Oman, and Qatar).

63 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

In fact, the complexies of compleon of a historic compromise between the people and the family of Al-Khalifa, led to increasing pressure to bear on Sheikh Khalifa as a scapegoat. The opposion does not object to this but supports his departure in an honourable way. This is less ambious than the goals of the opposion, which is now in the posion of having to conform to the system to gain legimacy and polical stability.

If a historic selement is intended it must be based on consensus for a real constuonal monarchy, where the role of the king is marginal and polical decisions have to be made by the elected parliament and gov- ernment. This is very difficult. It is a challenge not faced 60 years ago, during the demands of the Naonal Union of the mid-fiies. This was the me when Jamal Abdel Nasser overthrew King Farouk of Egypt.

In fact, the Al Khalifa family does not comprehend that a constuonal monarchy is one where the people have the final say in the rule set. The Al Khalifa have faced the movements that demand the rights of people and responded by the use of excessive force which caused the loss of blood and the murder of innocent people.

When confronng the opposion groups, even when they are consider- ing reducing the losses, the system was le with no choice but to con- nue using excessive force. Great sacrifices were made and now there is no trust at all between the people the royal family, and the king himself. This is considered a disaster.

History will record later that King Hamad was the most aggressive king who caused the most damage to Bahrain, and its people. The confronta- on between the Al Khalifa family and opposion groups during the last ten years resulted in an uprising on February 14. The 30-year, undemo- crac rule of Sheikh Isa / Sheikh Khalifa did not do as much damage as that of King Hamad. 64 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

It is true that the Arab Spring was the spark that ignited protests in Pearl Roundabout in a peaceful explosion, but it is also true that the situaon in Bahrain has been waing for a shot of gunpowder to explode.

In September 2001, when terrorists aacked the World Trade Center in New York, and le the U.S. President George W. Bush, stressing the Arab rulers that need to adopt the opon of democracy, King Hamad was in a comfortable posion, because he had already taken some steps towards democracy. About seven months prior to the terrorist aack of 11 Sep- tember, a number of bold decisions, were taken which showed that the king favored democarcy(3).

The King followed policies which are unprecedented in the history of the state: discriminaon and naturalizaon. The tenth anniversary of the Charter, like all fesve occasions, was transformed from a happy me to an occasion which revealed the tragedy of the system. This was also the case with Naonal Holiday celebraons. Naonal Day (16 December) coincides with the start of the ninees uprising. Due to the history of fallen martyrs the official day is greeted with mixed feelings and is usu- ally accompanied by demonstraons and casuales(4).

The king himself suspended the Constuon of the State of Bahrain (1973), a consensus between the people and the ruling family, which came from abroad (Zubara in Qatar). The king bears a great responsibil- ity for the damages suffered by the country, and for the damage to the reputaon of the ruling family which should be in a beer situaon.

The policies of King Hamad have tarnished the image of the Al Khali- fa family abroad, even among their allies in the Gulf. The procedures the family developed whether to hand over more powers to the Sunni groups who are loyal to the family, or influenced by Saudi Arabia, or to give Parliament wider powers, are less effecve. 65 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

Most likely, the West will stand in support of the family and try to play a role in the succession if an offered selement refers to parliament and the government to be more representave of the people, so that The Americans and the Brish are interested in the selement as long as their interests are secured and these interests cannot be secured if the ruling family monopolises decision-making. But the West also believes that its interests may be superseded or reduced if the rule of Bahrain is transferred to a naonal, independent movement as decided by the people.

So the West is interested in a comprehensive selement and has de- clared its interest in a deal which secures stability to ensure the conn- ued flow of oil. Bahrain is surrounded by Iran, and faced with the military superiority of Israel. The West thinks that its interests will be assured by the present king and it will not find beer patrons than the ruling tribes in all of the Gulf States.

The posion of the Sunni supporters(5) of the connuaon of the symbol of Sheikh Khalifa and his plan is more than its connuaon by him in person. It is likely that the system can accommodate their reacon in one way or another, by ministering some people from the sociees of “Islamic Menbar” and “Al Asalah” and “the Coalion of Naonal Unity” or through persuading Sheikh Khalifa to rere honorably.

The West also believes that the challenges of the regional balance of power do not permit one of the cizens to be in charge of polical de- cision-making i.e the prime minister. Current informaon suggests that the Saudis will be an obstacle to radical changes in the way Bahrain is governed.

However, the biggest dilemma is that the overthrow of Sheikh Khalifa will not turn into a fragile historic selement, even if the opposion con- 66 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

sidered it as an important victory. This is what makes King Hamad more reluctant to dispense with Sheikh Khalifa and the king will be haunted by a reducon of his powers.

So, the risk to civil peace will remain along with the excessive use of violence by the military which has ruled the country, under the direcon of the king and not Sheikh Khalifa. Some hardliners in the ruling family could destroy the foundaons of coexistence, as they did during the pe- riod of the emergency between mid-March and the end of May 2011, if they see that their interests are threatened.

The opposion know that, and are also aware that the forces of compro- mise in the system remain fragile. However King Hamad himself, even as he adopts the security policies to manage the challenges of the uprising of February 14, 2011, and takes decisions contrary to internaonal law, knows beer than anyone else what to do to protect “the secretariat of the chair.”

In this case the king may chose the “military decision” to impose incom- pable constuonal amendments(6). He may repeat the policies which have been followed since 2002, and applied in a terrible manner aer the uprising of February 14, 2011. Undoubtedly this threatens to turn Bahrain into an unstable state and the royal family without legimacy, using force illegally.

Between the unstable state opon, and the historic selement, ( submis- sion to a real constuonal monarchy), King Hamad may find that the dis- placement of his uncle to safe guard the selement is acceptable and claim that the obstacle to reform is (Sheikh Khalifa) who has been ousted.

The king will have to honour many commitments whether he announces the sacking of the prime minister or whenever he announces new re-

67 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain forms. The king has lost the confidence of the Shiites and Sunnis as well. The Sunnis prefer the prime minister ‘Khalifa bin Salman’. The king has missed many chances and opportunies which caused him to lose the confidence of the Bahraini people. This is an obstacle which cannot be easily overcome.

The king will have to ensure the safety of his family and his people. That can be achieved if the people were in the posion of decision-making, which is not the case at present, where the ruling family thinks that peo- ple are a strategic threat. Everyone involved: the ruling family and the people of Bahrain, are the losers in this no win situaon.

Item (5) footnotes 1- A global consulng firm, formed an alliance with the Crown Prince, and has put the overall economic plans adopted by the Economic Development Board. 2- A study published by McKinsey at a large conference sponsored by the Crown Prince, on December 22 (December 2003), that unemployment in Bahrain will be 100,000 in 2013, if it connues the current admin- istraon of the economy (under the authority of the Prime Minister). 3- The charter was voted on to the king who united the Bahrainis, in the February 14, 2011, about seven months before the aack on the Twin Towers in New York, the King highlighted as a model for the ruler seeking democracy. 4- Hani Al Was and Hani Khamis died due to bullets shots by Security on December 16, and that was seen as a spark to start an uprising ninees. 5- To understand the posion of the “Al Fateh Gathering” of rejecng the demands of the reform, see Abbas Busafwan, Bahrain Mirror: the dialogue is embraced in Al Fateh, June 28 2011. 6- See: Abbas Busafwan, Bahrain: “fragile” constuonal amendments, boosng up the crisis and not reso- nate locally and internaonally, May 29, 2012.

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Chapter 3

The Crown Prince, the advocate of his father’s approach

6- What is said about the exclusion of the Crown Prince 7- The king’s fears about the crown prince

69 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

(6) What is said about the exclusion of the Crown Prince

What is said about the exclusion of the Crown Prince “In the Kingdom of Bahrain, my role as Crown Prince is to support his majesty the King my father and I am proud to be in that role. The King appointed me as head of the Economic Development Board, and as his deputy of the armed forces. These are my most important roles(1) . The term “Crown Prince” is menoned in the 2002 constuon of Bahrain three mes, in arcle 74, which gives the King the right to appoint the Crown Prince or an alternave to open the session of the Naonal Council ( Parliament).

As for the subject of the Crown Prince, Item B from Arcle 1 of the con- stuon states that the rule will “pass to his [the King’s] eldest son, one generaon aer another, unless the King in his lifeme appoints a son other than his eldest son as successor, in accordance with the provisions of the Decree on inheritance stated in the following clause.”

With the excepon of being deputy to the King in the King’s absence and being appointed as the delegate to open Parliament, the constuon does not give the Crown Prince any authority outside what is ordered by the King.

Currently, the Crown Prince is not involved in the daily general affairs of Bahrain. He is not the King’s accomplice, and this is in line with the role that King Hamad played when he was Crown Prince.

When King Hamad was Crown Prince (1964 – 1999), he was appointed as head of the Ministry of Defense, which remains under his command to this day. He built the Ministry of Defense on a basis that completely excluded any Shiite cizens, or potenal opposion figures(2). Within the armed forces, he imbedded the culture of “protecng the Royal Fam- 70 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family ily”, from external threats and especially internal threats. From what we know about the King, he always thought, and to this day thinks, that “the Shiite are a strategic threat to the regime”. The King views the revo- luon of 14 February 2011 as an event that vindicates his beliefs in rela- on to the Shiite, despite the fact that the revoluon is proving to be a complete failure of the strategy Hamad has pursed during the past ten years.

A central principles of the king’s policy was the exclusion of the Shiite from the regime. The cizens reacted by excluding the royal family from the polical field.

When the current King was Crown Prince, he acvely wanted to engage in polical roles. However, his father would repeatedly tell him to “wait your turn”.

At the me, Sheikh Khalifa Bin Salman Al Khalifa was the strongman of the naon. This may have been the reason why the current King, upon his ascension, reduced the execuve role of his uncle. In other words, the limitaon of the role of Sheikh Khalifa was an act of revenge by the current King in response to being excluded from the polical process for nearly three decades during Sheikh Khalifa’s rule.

Despite the conflict, the King is adamant to retain his uncle in the role of Prime Minister, even as a token gesture. The King even offered him the posion of Deputy to the King. However, Sheikh Khalifa refused to accept the offer knowing that the Prime Ministership remains a central role in ruling and in the constuon, and it is difficult to be ignored, whereas the constuon does not refer to the posion of the Deputy to the King.

Despite the aempts made by the King that the crown prince should 71 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain not be out of the equaon of governance, as he was during his term of the Covenant, such aempts were not successful and the Crown Prince is not in a beer posion now than his father when he was the crown prince.

In fact, Sheikh Salman does not exercise a key role in the Ministry of Defence. To a large extent it can be said that in his posion as Depu- ty Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces he is not authorized to take military or administrave decisions in this sector: his commission is clearly from the supreme commander of these forces (the king).

The Commander in Chief of the Defense Force, Field Marshal, Sheikh Khalifa bin Ahmed (brother of the Minister of the Royal Council) remains as the strong man in the military sector, who was with the king from the beginning during the formaon of the army. Al-Khalifa, found it neces- sary to defend the army and if necessary even use force against the people, as was evident during the declaraon of a state of emergency (March 15, May 30, 2011). This is in line with the belief of the ruling fam- ily of Bahrain, that it took over by force as the official discourse in 1783 revealed.

Before that (2005), the McKinsey company for the Advancement of studies confirmed that the country is in a disasterous state with regard to unemployment and impeding business growth due to the corrupt policy of Sheikh Khalifa. The establishment of the Labor Market Regula- tory Authority(3) and the Labor Fund (Tamkeen)(4), expanded the pow- ers of the Economic Development Board (2008), and the formaon of company property, in order to marginalize the Council of Ministers, and its president, Sheikh Salman and enable the implementaon of his eco- nomic program.

Those who work in the Royal council led by the Minister of the Royal 72 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

Court, Sheikh Salman, don’t trust the crown prince and see him as a “Western fancy, who would prefer to speak English, and not write po- etry. He likes to watch cars races (such as Formula One), and does pro- mote horses races “ as the tribes usually do. He has been besieged on some of his instuons run by the staff close to those influenal in the royal palace(5).

Although he did not show his disagreement , Sheikh Salman didn’t play the rule as an opposion figure in a public manner to remove him from polical decision-making and his commitment to help his father to fo- cus on the economic file (within the instrucons of minors, of course). Although it is impossible to separate the two files, the senior officials of the royal palace sll look at the crown prince as a rival, and the rival is always deprived of the polical file, and thrown into a war of wills with Sheikh Khalifa, who is an expert in the management of the bales(6).

Sheikh Salman, did not win over the business sectors(7), or the opposion where he is seen as the best of the worst aer his experience which was characterized by weakness and unilaterality in the management of the Economic Development Board, which is not subject to the accountability of parliament. He is also likely to be involved in corrupon with regard to land (such as the land of the island), and the priories of the Formula One, project. The building of a track for the Bahrain Formula One, at a cost of $150 million, has come under scruny and quesons were asked whether this project was selected only because it was favoured by the crown prince who wanted to see his dream come true.

King Hamad managed to establish the nucleus of his mission, which was built by the army and not by expanding es to Sheikh Salman who is not connected to certain pares. He is also isolated from the new business elite. None of the advocacy groups were pro Sheikh Salman. They cri- cized his economic and polical acvies in public. I was a witness dur- 73 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain ing his file management dialogue between mid-February and mid March (March 2011), when it was said that “the commander of the march had to make concessions to the opposion.”

And records show the failure of Sheikh Salman in the formaon of a network of relaons with tradional families, whether Shiites or Sunnis. He failed like his father. Under Sheikh Khalifa the administraon of the country was less turbulent, the opposite of what is believed. But he was removed from decision making during the new millennium.

So, it was not strange the king did not assign the Crown prince to be the chairman of the naonal dialogue(8). The mission was assigned instead to the head of parliament, led by Mr. Khalifa Dhahran. Assigning the mission to the crown prince while preparing to aack the pearl rounda- bout and the protestors there would show the crown prince as a failure who cannot lead the country and carry on his job. As crown prince he has a famous history of failure, such as his failure in the labor market and the management of the properes of Bahrain, Gulf Air, which has lost 500 million Bahraini dinars in the year while the accumulated losses since 2001 to 2009 are esmated at pme billion and 240 million Bahraini dinars(9).

74 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

Item (6) footnotes 1- The Crown Prince discourse of Bahrain in a meeng with Al Arabiya channel, April 10, 2010. 2- The King oversaw the construcon of the army without the employment of Shiite cizens, even in small ranks, except in the narrow posions. 3- The Authority takes on all necessary dues and powers to regulate the labor market in the Kingdom and the organizaon of work permits of foreign workers and licensing agencies supplying workers and the employment offices and pracce permits foreign employers to work in Bahrain “, see: hp://portal.lmra.bh/ arabic/page/show/56. 4- Tamkeen was established in August of 2006 as one of the iniaves of the naonal reform project and the Bahrain Economic Vision 2030. And was entrusted with the task to develop the private sector in the Kingdom of Bahrain and make it the primary engine of economic growth. “See: hp://www.lf.bh/ar/about/?p=Profile. 5- Sheikh Khalifa bin Duaij Al Khalifa, is heading the Crown Prince’s Court, and is a nephew of the chairman of the Royal Court, Ahmed Ayat Allah Al-Khalifa, and the laer is the nephew of the Minister of the Royal Court, Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, 6- See Item No. 3), the king and the prime minister... the public clash, in this book. 7- The traders protest on a permanent basis, for example, for fees have been imposed on employers for foreign labor, as part of the “labor market reform” led by the Crown Prince, and found support from the op- posion. For more informaon about the project see the labor market: hp://portal.lmra.bh/arabic/faq/category/2. 8- The state organized a consensus of a naonal dialogue in July 2011, but the opposion boycoed (Union- ist), or pulled out of it (Al Wefaq), or did not accept its findings (the naonal assembly, Waad, the Progressive plaorm). 9- See the remarks of the parliamentary commission of inquiry in Gulf Air Halim Murad, Al-Wasat, May 5 (May 2010).

75 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

(7) The king’s fears about the crown prince

There is concern about the Crown Prince from the extremist groups, which are within the government, and look to Sheikh Salman bin Ha- mad as an open-minded liberal.

Usually, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa wakes up at midday and begins his meengs which will last unl the evening surrounded by officials from the department. The first meengs are usually with the head of the Na- onal Security Service (Minister of Intelligence), which reviews two re- ports with the king:

The first Report is on developments of local affairs and the Arab and internaonal levels, followed by the second report about the Royal Fam- ily.

In one of the meengs, the King focused as he usually did since the up- rising began on Feb. 14 (2011) on the second report: the development of the situaon of the royal family, threats to them since the revoluon started, focusing on unprecedented local and regional challenges.

The king confided his concerns about his own security to his eldest son Sheikh Salman. He did not menon the word murder or aempted mur- der, but said he was concerned about this life and his crown(1).

The Minister of Intelligence told the king that the crown prince was a priority for the security apparatus, the Ministry of the Interior and Army Naonal Guard. The king was concerned about Sheikh Salman, because he is his son and that is the natural senment of a father towards his children which is no different to the king’s concern for the general pub- lic. However, the fear of the King also comes from the fact that Sheikh 76 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

Salman served as the crown prince, who is supposed to carry the banner of the ruling family.

One of the reasons for the risk to the Crown Prince is that on 18 Febru- ary 2011, he appeared on the TV screen in Bahrain, perhaps as a friend of the opposion calling for calm and dialogue and the withdrawal of the army from the vicinity of Pearl roundabout aer the bloody aack on the peaceful protesters in the rotor.

At that me the king was prepared to deliver a fatal blow to the oppo- sion, and dispense with dialogue. It was a preparaon for a scenario which could plunge the country into civil violence. This coincided with a decision in the militant circles in the Royal council to form the “Coalion of Naonal Unity,” the pro-government grouping headed by Dr. Abdul- laf Al Mahmood.

While the King and loyal groups were talking about governance and se- curity between mid-February and mid March 2011, the Crown Prince was contemplang peace.

So, the concern for the safety of the Crown Prince does not come from the opposion be it the legal or the illegal opposion. The opposion finds the Crown Prince mild compared to other hard-liners in the ruling family. This makes the King and the Minister of Intelligence more aware that the fear of aempts on the life of Sheikh Salman comes from some- where else.

And without equivocaon, concern comes for the Crown Prince from the extremist groups, and pro-government forces, which view him as a liberal open-minded person who presented ideas to the opposion, on 13 March 2011, which may change the structure of power, if they suc- ceed. 77 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

For these extremists, the Crown Prince, as the opposion, is a poten- al danger to their interests, and may be violated if the opposion was able to reach an understandings with the government; it shall transform the seven points announced by the Crown Prince to reality. Under the iniave is the establishment of a naonal dialogue that discusses the seven major points: parliament with full powers, a government repre- senng the will of the people, fair constuencies, naturalizaon, the fight against financial and administrave corrupon, misappropriaon of state property, and dealing with sectarian tensions.

These themes were agreed on aer the Saudi intervenon aer long discussion of the seven points with the associaons, led by the Secretary General of “Al Wefaq” Sheikh Ali Salman(2). An announcement that he is dealing with the aspiraons of the opposion in a democrac transi- on leading to a constuonal monarchy which will reduce the powers of the ruling family and have access to the king and the people govern through elected instuons, was made.

The ruling family and the loyalists were alarmed at the prospect of the Crown prince ascending to power suddenly before his father, who is sur- rounded by the military and could end the popular movement through the use of the security forces or through polical rallying.

The Intelligence Minister informed King Hamad about those suspected of a possible aack against Sheikh Salman. King Hamad grabbed the list and read the names, including well-known personalies who are close to him. He sighed, shook his head, as if showing approval for the con- tents of the list. He was then given a new list classified according to the degree of seriousness of each character, which should include acons to be taken by the intelligence services for the protecon of the Crown Prince.

78 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

The King oen asked for clarificaon on certain maers and the Minister of Intelligence provided him with a daily report, usually in the presence of the Minister of the Royal Court, Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, and a secretary who took the minutes.

It seemed that the Intelligence Minister was hoping that the king would not be talking about these sensive points during this meeng, but the King might have wanted to show his concern to those who are close to him.

The last special meeng was to discuss opportunies for a coup within the ruling family. The conclusion of the King, the Minister of intelligence and the Crown Prince, who aended this meeng, was that the poten- al of the Naonal Guard or the Department of the Interior to carry out the coup did not seem possible.

The king is aware of that, but the scenarios must be on the table in ex- ceponal circumstances and the unexpected has to be expected. In such a situaon maers would be referred to the Supreme Defence Council, the Council of the ruling family, including any decision concerning the dislodging of the potenal Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, from the posion he has held for forty years to balance the com- peng wings of the ruling family.

Rumor says that a change of the Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa may be postponed unl 2014, as a compromise between the opposion who would record a decisive victory. Alternavely the prime minister could remain for life with the conservaves around him.

The Minister of Intelligence expects that the king is considered to reduce his powers (to offset the major decisions of the Boards of the family and the Supreme Defense). This is understandable in the light of exceponal 79 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

circumstances, and the expectaon that King expresses sasfacon that alternaves within the ruling family are limited and complex when the prospect for his overthrow is considered. He always remembers that the Brish, replaced Sheikh Isa Bin Ali Hamad with his son in the twenes of the last century, when there were complaints about the way the King- dom treated its cizens(3).

The King has advised his son Salman, to be closer to Riyadh, and related groups in Muharraq, and demonstrate great flexibility with the militant wing of the family and loyalists, and abide by the instrucons of the con- servaves in the Cabinet and the military, intelligence and security serv- ices, and even dismiss those who are involved in the protests and sup- port violent acons to be taken against those involved in the protests.

About a thousand workers who were involved in the February and March 2011 protests from the property company (the investment arm of Bahrain in the non-oil sector which is supervised by the Crown),(4) were dismissed.

The Crown Prince is under pressure from loyalist rich traders who usu- ally echo the views of the conservaves in the ruling family, because of the abandonment of many of the objecves of the dra reform of the labor market. This revealed the real conflict between the Crown Prince and Prime Minister and the disagreement was aired in public. The Prime Minister kept to his method of governance, while the Council adopted the economic development study prepared by McKinsey published in a major conference sponsored by the Crown Prince, in December 2003. The study suggests that unemployment in Bahrain will reach 100 thou- sand in 2013, if the current management of the economy connues un- der the chairmanship of Sheikh Khalifa(5).

The labor market is freezing fees between April 2011 and April 2012. This may have an economic movaon, because of the repercussions of

80 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family the protest movement, but the policy moves are evident in light of the consideraon for the project as a challenge between the Prime Minister and the Crown, who withdrew from the bulk of economic projects.

The CEO of the Market Regulatory Authority Ali Radhi (April 2011) has been changed, heeding the request of Sheikh Khalifa.

The king pied his son more than anyone else. Without doubt, the King was not expected to implicate his son and crown prince but portray him in the official and internaonal media as a liberal man in front of his op- ponents in the ruling family. He could be seen as a loyal ally for “enemies and traitors” (the opposion from their point of view), and that puts him on the “wanted” list of the Saudi-backed militants.

The king had hoped the seven-points would be the base line and the security soluon could not abort his growing popularity if the march of events went towards regional projecon systems.

This would be required as a soluon to what happened since (May 2011) and the months following the re-markeng of the Crown Prince as part of the system, and to show that he is allied with Saudi Arabia, and is keen on the priority of the relaonship with their loyalists. However, it mis- erably wounded him, and re-drew the picture of Sheikh Salman in the mind of loyalists. The king is sll concerned about the crown prince.

Item (7) footnotes 1- See Crown Prince replaces the guards in his palace, Bahrain Mirror, 13 December 2011. 2- Born in 1969, and is one of the most prominent polical leaders in Bahrain, leaders of the protest move- ment in the ninees, was deported from the country, in 1995, to the United Arab Emirates, and moved then directly to the Brish capital (London), and returned to Bahrain in 2001, shortly aer the vote on the naonal Acon Charter, and contributed to the establishment of Al Wefaq Society, and headed it since then. 3- Saeed Al-Shihabi, Bahrain 1920 1971, a study in the Brish documents, 1996. 4- Al Wasat newspaper, July 26, 2011. 5- Al Wasat newspaper, 23 December 2003. 81 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

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Chapter 4

Chapter 4: The Rule of militancy… A review of King’s speeches

8- Power parity produces inera 9- It is not the me yet for democracy 10- King Hamad and the people ‘face to face’

83 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

(8) Power parity produces inera

In his speech on the occasion of the last ten days of Ramadan (August 28, 2011)(1) , Bahrain’s King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa appeared to be direct and outspoken in his rejecon of the demands of the protest movement, which started on 14 February 2011.

Objecvely, regardless of the assessment of the king’s speech, in my opinion, it was different from all the previous speeches he made. He rejected democracy and showed himself to be a supporter of the use of violence against his opponents.

In the past royal speeches were used to inject public opinion with doses of hopes. The king does not want a polical prisoner in his judgment, he is against the jailing of journalists, he will review the policies of natu- ralizaon, every cizen would be given land, the pockets of the cizens would be filled with money and the northern city building and three other cies and so on.

It is true that most of the promises menoned and many others have not and probably will not be kept. The king never said he would not keep his promises but confidence in the official discourse from opposion groups and those royal to the king is almost non existent.

The speech was clear and honest and there were no promises of reform. The king even declared that the claims brought by the opposion for reform “will not do or help”, and were rejected. Demands included the rejecon of the opposion filed by the legal (Al Wefaq, and its partner associaons to set a metable for the transion to democracy.

It was the first me that he explicitly talked about punishment for involve-

84 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family ment in the protest movement, but it was not punishment in the strict sense of the term. And we can talk a lot about the concept of “extremism,” which he referred to in the speech, and enter into a debate about the de- gree of tolerance. He seemed to be in favor of the arbitrary procedures taken against the workers, students and medical staff, but he did not be- lieve that such measures were taken against everyone in these sectors.

He used the word “accelerate” in taking steps to return to work for those who have been dismissed because of their polical posions. This word opens the door for interpretaon to more delays.

Aer analyzing speeches about governance for years I believe , that the last Ramadan speech may be more of an expression of how the king sees himself. He sees himself as an absolute ruler, and sees his loyal people as a congregaon. The opposion (the Shiite intellectual judgment) should be punished, and the land should be cleansed of them. This cleansing process also applies to the Council of Ministers, department heads and an-market traders(2) who are opposed to the king’s policies.

For the regime the real problem is to stop behaving in a manner which is condemned internaonally. Despite the steps taken against it the pro- test movement is sll acve and is expected to grow.

The regime is rejecng internaonal demands. This is coupled with a green light for the punishment of protesters. It is as if the government is repeang the argument commander of the army that there is no turn- ing back. But the regime threatens to use violence again, if it is faces real challenges. It is a difficult choice and has led to the current situaon, where the regime is semi-rigid.

The system wants “to resolve” the bale militarily, but it has failed to do so. It has lost the confidence of the internaonal community as the

85 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain system does not hesitate to suppress its opponents - even murder them - arrest women and demolish mosques. Contrary to what its supporters believe it is difficult to connue on this path because violaons of hu- man rights are unacceptable internaonally under any pretext.

The strategy focused on isolang the demonstrators who looked con- fused when faced with an unprecedented show of strength even though violence was restricted.

The authories again asked the queson: How can the regime face the demands of peaceful reforms, as its image is tarnished in the eyes of the world.

As I first menoned the situaon in Bahrain did not reach its peak yet, and may exhibit unexpected escalaons, including the move towards a kind of domesc violence, especially in view of the recorded successes of the popular movement.

However, it is important to recognize that the system sll has the army and the Interior and the intelligence and thugs ‘armed milia groups’, and sectors of significant groups, which are pro the government. And more importantly, it receives support from the region and the West. There is a formal polical opposion but it is reluctant to take a step forward against the system, and this reservaon leads to the restricon in the violence of the security apparatus.

So far the people have been unable to transform the polical vision and popular mobilisaon in a peaceful manner.

Item (8) footnotes 1- See Appendix (1) for the full text of the leer of the monarchy. 2- Shops of the businessman Faisal Jawad were subjected to more than 50 aacks during the outbreak of protests. 86 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

(9) It is not the me yet for democracy

Any revision of the official discourse since 14 February 2011, including the king’s speech will clearly show references linking democracy and a civil war.

King Hamad spoke about the maer of democracy and that it is not the me for it in more than one of his speeches. When he opened Parlia- ment on October 9, 2011(1), King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa of Bahrain stated that it’s not the me for democracy yet in Bahrain.

He jusfied his rejecon of democracy, with a number of arguments:

1- Democracy is against Bahraini privacy

King Hamad considered that “The system stemming from the civil state and the nature of the configuraon of cultural, polical, social and reli- gious factors is the suitable system or regime for our country, which is more suited to the situaon in Bahrain.”

One of the royal announcements stated that the current system, with the monopoly of the ruling family regarding decisions about the naonal wealth is “suitable for our country”, and democracy, including the circu- laon of power, do not fit Bahrain and is against Bahraini privacy.

King Hamad did not use the word ‘privacy’ itself. He is referring to it in what he sees as a differenated configuraon of Bahrain which places the formaon of an elected government, imparal judiciary and the se- curity establishment to represent the people and protect them outside the framework of Bahrain’s cultural, social and religious system.

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Indeed, the privacy argument has failed globally, and the concepts of equality and human rights and the right of people to govern themselves is seen as a human constant. It is an underlying principle of the United Naons and the internaonal convenons rafied by the Kingdom of Bahrain, many of which are rafied by the King himself.

The word privacy may be used in different countries, without prejudice to the foundaons of democracy, the legal frameworks and the actual applicaons, including the explicit rule of the people governing their country by themselves.

The culture of people and naons will connue to inform the human experience, where each model is unique and special. We see a clear dif- ference in the American model in comparison with the Brish, or the Danish, Turkish or Brazilian model.

The framework that those models have in common is periodic elecons to ensure a fair, transparent and peaceful transfer of power.

2- Democracy threatens naonal unity

The King said in his speech on October 9 (October 2011) the current state system “is the best that suits our country and enhances Bahrain’s naonal cohesion.” It’s just like saying that the mono system and dicta- torship is preserving naonal unity.

In this sense the applicaon of the foundaons of the constuonal monarchy including pares according to parliamentary majority control, will harm naonal unity, deepen the naonal aspect, and promote sec- tarianism, which may later lead to a civil war.

In fact, any review of the official discourse since 14 February 2011, in- 88 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family cluding the king’s speech, will clearly illustrate the linkage between de- mocracy and a civil war.

In light of the above the ruling family is asking the opposion to choose between dictatorship or a civil war. The authories in Bahrain have held a rehearsal of the civil conflict in February and March of 2011, when they moved the civilian milias to aack the areas inhabited by the sec- tors of the popular majority demanding democracy.

The dictatorship or civil war opon will always be presented by the Au- thority whenever the people move and demand democracy. The degree to which the people manage to succeed and show other naons that their demands are very fair will determine the degree to which the au- thority will try to lead the country and take it into a civil conflict. It is hard to avoid it without understanding and consensus to complete the transion to democracy.

But what has not been menoned in the royal speech is the idea of de- mocracy has been built in Europe. It was built to avoid any civil strife, and not vice versa.

If a society has a group of disparate visions that are keen to prevail and control a country, then people have the right to choose from disparate visions. This moves the conflict from the street, the sword and the tank, into the arena of Parliament: the word and the law.

The most important aspect of the democrac peaceful transfer of power is that it enables the people to remove any polical facon that holds power through a fair elecon.

This is contrary to what was menoned in the royal speech: that democ- racy leads to the conflict. It codifies conflicts in a peaceful framework. 89 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

There are procedures for compeng to win the trust of the people by a parliamentary instuon.

Instead of using weapons, there are tools of conflict management in democracies in the data, speeches, sit-ins, periodic elecons and par- liamentary quesons and interpellaons of ministers and a vote of con- fidence in them, in addion to the pivotal role of the media and civil society instuons.

4- YES to development, but NO for democracy!

The royal speech’s last expression, indicates the rejecon of King Hamad of the transion to democracy. He says “we will support those who work on consistently developing as it’s a must for our country.”

This means that the pro-democracy argument, the prevailing concept of the world, does not enjoy the support of the king, who supports devel- opment and not democracy.

Although the King refers to the years of historical development, he does not specify the meaning behind those words. Does he mean more ef- ficient government, and the Advisory Council as more competent? Or does he mean more advanced formats? That does not seem obvious at all.

If the analogy is based on the actual experiment, the King himself signed a constuon in 2002, referred by an absolute ruler, that causes us to be- lieve that development in the eyes of the king is a formula, which makes people marginal in polical decision-making - at best “parcipants”, as in successive models of the councils and the Constuon of 2002.

Although the formula of “partnership in the decision,” pales, and bypass-

90 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family es the requirement of democracy, it has not been applied in the last ten years. There is no confidence in its applicaon.

The Arab spring has eliminated the uncertainty and the resoluon calls for a total or majority decision by the people themselves, ending the whole concept of development used in the ambiguous royal speech.

5- The transion to democracy means burning stages

King Hamad menoned in one of his speeches that he supports the de- velopment “without jumping on the stage.”

The problem here is that the ruling family wants to determine the stages on its own without the involvement of the Bahraini people. For instance, if King Hamad equates development with democracy then the ruling family will decide the stages that Bahrain needs to move through with- out the approval or the involvement of the Bahraini people.

Since more than ten years, the opposion talked about the leader of “Waad party” a ‘detainee Ibrahim Sharif’ as “delaying” reform. The na- onal forces or the opposion are not saying that a new prime minister should be elected tomorrow. It recognizes the difficulty and the cost of the blood that they want to reduce, talking about the importance of a dialogue to agree on a smooth transion, within a specified period of me, from a single to a mul party system.

The authority prefers to work on development as it is today, with no involvement of the people in decision making because the ruling family wants to maintain power within the family itself. Bahrain remains back- ward even aer forty years of the emergence of the modern state.

In the last ten years which have been called reformist the state was in

91 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain breach of the constuon and the law. This culminated on 14 February 2011 in an unprecedented popular uprising in the history of Bahrain.

If Bahrain follows this mode of “development”, it may take a century to arrive at a parliamentary democracy that truly represents the will of the people.

These categories of ownership are no longer acceptable or even palat- able. The privacy argument no longer convinces anyone: it is non sensi- cal and no one wants to hear this old argument.

It is possible for the authority to drag the country into civil conflicts, but this is neither in the benefit of Bahrain or the ruling family itself. Past experience of civil wars in the region and other areas tesfies to this.

On the issue of burning stages, it became clear aer forty years of the emergence of the modern state that this is not the right way to resolve problems in Bahrain. The burning states are just an excuse not to make the transion to democracy.

I am aware there is a crisis in Bahrain and realize how limited the op- ons are but it seems the best opon is the transion to a democrac system.

Item (9) footnotes 1- See Appendix (2) for the full text of the leer of the monarchy.

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(10) King Hamad and the people ‘face to face’

King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa already talked to people with the “sword in his hand”, (August 28, 2011 speech)(1) He has previously said that the me is not yet right for democracy in Bahrain (the opening of parliament speech: October 9, 2011)(2). There is a valuable leer dated January 15, 2012(3), from the King about his assessment of the poli- cal situaon in the country. He believes that the protest movement is not in a posion to engage in the dispute for power, as in February and March 2011, it was forced to make meaningful concessions.

The king has a tendency towards dictatorship but as a polician as well, he could make a gi of a thousand dinars to the cizens (February 2011), or go to the stronghold of protest movements on the island of Sitra (Feb- ruary 2001), in order to get the support of the cizens living there to vote on the Charter. He would not hesitate to publicly apologize for killing the innocent protestors who have been murdered (February 15, 2011), or to apologise for the Crown Prince’s iniave. (March 13, 2011).

By nature the King is not a reformer or a consensual person. He is in- clined to adopt a policy of “cleansing”, as can be seen clearly from the composion of the military establishment.

The King may have ignored in his speech the demands of the naonal forces of the opposion but it is clear that the protest movement has not subsided and is sll troublesome, causes harm polically, militarily and economically, and embarrasses the ruling family and its government at the internaonal level. But the King managed to successfully abort the uprising of Pearl Square in March and February, 2011.

In his view at the end of May 2011, the uprising was unable to shake the

93 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain authority, which may in me act as it did in the ninees of last century. The protesters may be trapped in the villages and the outskirts of residenal ar- eas, disturbing power and causing harm to the economy and to the presge of government but they will not be able to take down the government.

The protesters may make their demands known to Western countries and regional organizaons, which can contribute to the pressure on the government to correct certain situaons. But this may not be done as a maer of urgency.

It seems that the idea of easing the demonstraons may have crept into the media sector, including news agencies such as Reuters and the French and German agencies whose reports are usually neutral. They reported that the mass sit-ins and protests at Pearl Roundabout in the middle of March 2011 were suppressed through the use of force.

Returning to the analysis of the king’s speech it is clear that he sets out to anatgonise.

In the mentalies of raonality, the authories try to correct as far as possible the negave aspects in order to avoid aggravaon. But the be- havior of King Hamad in the past ten years, has been more abusive to the people of Bahrain than that of any other member of the royal family. That is why the unprecedented uprising started a year ago and is sll connuing.

Many advised the king not to act in this way but he believe he could con- tain the situaon inside the country. Without real reform the King will not be able to control large areas. If the King himself or his crown or his prime minister, were to pass away, more difficules would ensue. This would also be the case if Prince Nayef Al-Saud, or Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah passed away.

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The events of February (2011) were not expected several weeks aer the fall of Presidents Ben Ali of Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt.

Perhaps the King was deluding himself in view of the sit-ins. He aended the pro-regime Al-faith gathering on February 21, 2011 travelling in his own airplane and witnessed by those who also aended the gathering and saw him.

So, according to the reading of the King’s speeches, the whole situa- on is under the iron grip of violence and this requires further security opons including repressive measures, “purges” and collecve punish- ment. It is hoped the problems will be resolved in 2012 when the protest movement has been depleted and new elecons held without the ap- pointment of the current Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman.

Even if the state had to go to the table of dialogue, it has the seven points of the crown prince. Dialogue will be preceded and followed by threats and proofs of violence and bully taccs especially in the points of contact (Bani Jamra / Budaiya, Dar klaib / Hamad Town, Muharraq, Samaheej and Al Dair, Qalali and Al Busaiteen).

It seems that the situaon will escalate, because nothing will force peo- ple to return to their homes. The King is being challenged to deal with the reality of the situaon.

Item (10) footnotes 1- See Appendix (1), and look at item No. (9) of this book. 2- See Appendix (2), and look at item No. (9): It’s not the me yet for democracy, in this book. 3- See Appendix (3) for the full text of the leer of the monarchy.

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Chapter 5

Bassiouni’s Report and the Dismantling of the infrastruc- ture of tyranny

11- Bassiouni ‘s recommendaons: the recipe to bring down the regime

96 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

(11) Bassiouni ‘s recommendaons: the recipe to bring down the regime

Bassiouni and the recommendaons of the recipe to bring down the system, include a bold bid to rebuild the state according to the guide- lines of the public interest - not the benefit of the tribe.

The Report of Bassiouni”(1) held the King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa re- sponsible for implemenng the recommendaons made on November 23, 2011, in a public ceremony.

The report states that “the King of Bahrain and the Government will develop a mechanism to implement the recommendaons of the Com- miee”, within a period of me(2).

In a speech before a large gathering at his palace in Sakhir, the king pledged his commitment to the terms of the report and its recommen- daons, even though the King cricized some of the conclusions espe- cially the lack of evidence of Tehran’s relaons with the protest move- ment which overthrew the most important pillars of the revoluon led an-militant wing in the system.

To accept the results of the invesgaon is a done deal. The Bahraini independent fact-finding commiee was formed aer nearly three months of the official campaign of violence against the calls for democ- racy. It was formed as the King said in a June 29, 2011, “ aer doing a lot of consultaon, including the United Naons Office of the High Commissioner(3).

This forces the head of the state’s obligaons to not only the people of Bahrain, but to the internaonal community and the United Naons, to be implemented. 97 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

Peaceful Spring of Bahrain:

The Commiee’s report lists the Bahraini independent fact-finding ac- counts of the government at face value in the “Current Events”, and lists the point of view of the opposion(4).

Bassiouni may argue that he cites the allegaons of each party, but more important in the report is the conclusion and findings and recommen- daons which are contained at the end of each chapter. The conclusion contains the words of the opposion and internaonal human rights groups.

The report concludes in Chapter II that “Bahrain impressed by what be- came known as a general Arab, spring although each state and Arab so- ciety was affected differently by these events and developments. The Arab spring encouraged the people of the Arab world, including Bah- rain, to express their grievances and demands for reform which were repressed for long periods”(5).

The report records that the rallies and large marches in the rotor Pearl, between February and March 2011, despite the high ceiling of the de- mands of the demonstrators showed that the protesters were good natured(6)- they used to carry flowers.

Much of the narrave is not reliable in the report, which is based on the account of the government which is fabricated and inaccurate, and does not necessarily reflect the view of members of the Commiee. Not all of what is contained in the report reflects the opinion of the Commit- tee, although it bears responsibility for the report.

The report documents the situaon according to internaonal law where the issue of Bahrain is raised. It assumes that the government has taken 98 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family some acon and concludes with a summary and recommendaons. The recommendaons reflect the viewpoint of the commiee more than other secons of the report.

In many cases I disagree with the commission’s conclusions, but my disa- greement increases in the provision of recommendaons, which seemed the most conservave of cauous abstracts.

The dismantling of the state structure of dictatorship

I will try to read the recommendaons of the report, in light of the fun- damental premise that the real implementaon of the recommenda- ons of the Bassiouni report necessarily lead to the collapse of the pil- lars of the single state which is monopolized the by Al Khalifa family in terms of polics and naonal wealth.

I see that the recommendaons of the Fact-Finding Commission call for the restructuring of the legislave structure, and security and intelli- gence system, the judiciary and the media.

It carries with it the recommendaons of the dimensions of humanity and a deep commitment to polical and human rights, including, in es- sence, I think, a bold call for rebuilding the state according to the guide- lines of the public interest, not for the benefit of the tribe. In their en- rety the recommendaons call for the dismantling of the police state that protects the current rule and the establishment of an alternave system which adopts the deeper concepts of human rights.

Restructuring of the security system

Bassiouni’s report makes it clear that the security services violate the security of Bahrain and internaonal law through the: 99 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

- Use of excessive force leading to killing. - Use of shotguns against civilians, although there is no need for that, and without cauon to minimize serious injury. - Use of tear gas in a way that is appropriate to disperse the protesters, and to target homes at random. - Use of excessive force at checkpoints. - Breaking into cars and private property without authorizaon.

The recommendaons call for an end to the above-menoned acts be- cause they are criminal. There is a need for legislave and instuonal changes to ensure no recurrence of these offences. The report condemns the arbitrary arrests by the security forces and the military, intelligence and the Naonal Guard.

The recommendaons call on the interior minister, intelligence chief, officers, and security personnel to account for the above-menoned violaons and others. The Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry Mah- mood Bassiouni says that responsibility for the systemac torture of de- tainees lies with the Minister of the Interior Sheikh Rashid bin Abdulla Al Khalifa(7), who is sll in office, in addion to the President of the Naonal Security Service (NSA)(8), which was appointed, shortly aer the release of the report.

The report recommends that “the security forces receive training on the dimensions of human rights, and in parcular the need to refuse to parcipate in any acons that may be marred by torture or any form of ill-treatment”(9).

Accounng for these acts to the Minister of the Interior will not neces- sarily lead to “destabilizing” the Ministry of the Interior. Neither will it confuse the security establishment-based abuse, especially if we take into consideraon the other recommendaons adopted by the com- 100 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family mission which include making the security establishment incorporate all denominaons. The current security system is based on foreigners, designated in scienfic literature as “mercenaries.”

Feasibly, and without exaggeraon, it seems to me that these recom- mendaons respond in part to the opposion’s demand for security for all. Bassiouni recommends that all secons of society are involved in ensuring security , and that this instuon is a defender of human rights and refuses arbitrary arrest and torture. Those arrested should be treated kindly and criminal law must be properly applied. Security personnel must be held accountable, in the event of infringement of the law. These recommendaons mean cung off the right hand of the state of dictatorship, which has been responsible for many violaons over the past years.

The report is theorecal and it is difficult to see how its recommenda- ons will be applied. Even aer the Bassiouni report it will be a surprise to see a selement in Bahrain”(10). Reading the report is one thing and applying its recommendaons is quite another.

The fall of intelligence

Bassiouni calls in the report to prosecute the former head of the Naonal Security Service Khalifa bin Abdulla Al Khalifa, and all officers in the intel- ligence and those involved in arbitrary arrests and tortures, coupled with the restructuring of the intelligence service to be involved in gathering informaon without law enforcement. It has to be ensured that this work shall be compable with the demands of internaonal law(11).

Although the king issued a decree liming the work of the device in the collecon of informaon(12), it does not change the fact that intelligence with sharp teeth and long claws is taken out of context.

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The applicaon of the recommendaon of a “humanized” the intelli- gence service, means the fall of the other arm of the arms of the system of dictatorship, which was built 40 years ago. It violated the aempts of the legimate reformer during the past ten years to build democrac frameworks (parliament and municipal councils) which represent the will of the people.

The presence of the former officer Fleifel(13) in the polical arena and its celebraon of the Prime Minister, is sufficient to say that the ruling fam- ily is not honest when it claims it is applying these recommendaons.

A severe blow to the judicial system

Bassiouni report directs a mortal blow at the judiciary, while wondering “whether the judicial system may carry more of its energy during the events of February and March 2011, or that it failed as a result of weak- ness in dealing with the challenges imposed by the situaon”(14).

The report finds that violaons occurred already in pre-trials and during the trial, which deprived the accused of the most basic guarantees for fair trials(15). Other parts of the report are scathing about the failure of prosecutors and judges in their roles in the invesgaon of complaints of torture(16). The report calls for accountability for the perpetrators of the torture. It is also assumed that army commander, Field Marshal Kha- lifa bin Ahmed Al Khalifa (brother of the Minister of the Royal council), will not be brought to trial for his applicaon of measures of naonal safety (emergency), and the notorious conduct of emergency courts.

Military jusce was applied during the period of naonal safety (emer- gency) and beyond, so “that the decree applied by the Naonal Safety military prosecutor has exceeded the naonal judicial system.”

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The military jusce law controls must be contained as well as restructur- ing of the public civil jusce, to provide guarantees for the accused. The judiciary has to be independent from the execuve branch, and the rul- ing family and narrow objecves. This means separate courts for pros- ecuon. The independence of the judiciary must be maintained and the judges must not receive instrucons from leaders or commanders of the army. Civilians have to determine trends in governance, and ensure fair, independent and transparent trials for the defendants. Again, the im- parality of the judiciary and its independence, is a means of protecng people from the oppression of power.

The case of the illegality of the state of Naonal Safety (Emergency)

Bassiouni’s report says that there is a gap in the legislave declaraon of a state of naonal safety, and in its implementaon, so that “the con- stuon did not clarify the circumstances in which the government may resort to in the declaraon(17).

It is believed by the report that many of the acons that took place dur- ing that me have a lack of a legal legimacy, or are in a hazy legal area. Indeed, the report finds that some applicaons of Naonal Safety were arbitrary to a certain degree.

It calls to pass legislaon that regulates the status of naonal pacifism restricted by the internaonal obligaons of Bahrain. This provision is sufficient if it contributes to the reducon of infringements in various fields of human rights that have been violated a few months ago, under the pretext of naonal safety (emergency). The status of the military

The Bassiouni report may conclude there is a major effort by those who wrote it, and by the State, to keep the army away from the Department 103 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

of Accountability, in the hope that remains protected from the throne and that it keeps the royal family away from the legal framework.

However, these aempts did not succeed completely; the army is sll accountable according to the report for the use of lethal force against Abdulredha Buhumaid, who fell dead on February 18 (February 2011) shot directly by the army.

The responsibility for the killing of cizens, such as Bahia Al Aradi and two others was not placed on the army. The report concluded that there is no evidence that the military used excessive force to kill them, with proof that the bullets that killed them were fired by military personnel. This may mean that the killing of these three is “killed by mistake,” but this word is not contained in the report.

In addion to involvement in the killings, the military was involved in the arrest of more than 100 people(18) and the demolion or parcipaon in the demolion of nine of the mosques of the Shiite community(19). Without a doubt, there has to be a call for the army to assume legal and polical accountability.

There also must be some accountability of the army officials for serious violaons and physical and psychological torture suffered by detainees in the prison of the peer-run Bahraini Defense Force; the report says that the violaons stopped in June 10, 2011; i.e. they lasted from March 17, 2011 for a period of three months.

Given what was menoned in the report that torture is systemac be- hind bars, the army leadership is a party to any accountability. The of- ficials of the army and the military prosecutor, prosecutors and judges in the courts of naonal safety (emergency) are responsible for gross violaons and the absence of jusce in the these courts. 104 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

It seems the army commander responsible for legal and polical viola- ons during the validity of naonal safety (emergency), is responsible for the implementaon of its measures(20).

This requires a team of lawyers to decide on, and I find myself in line with the Bassiouni Commission that the army did not use live ammuni- on on a large scale. The allegaon that the hands of the army were ed and that F-16 planes were used to wipe out villages and regions engaged in the rebellion are nonsense.

Atrophy of the official media

Bassiouni condemns the official media and accuses them of “humiliat- ing” the opponents. He says this should not happen again and calls for open television and radio broadcasng for the opposion, and for the naonal media as a whole.

Despite the promises of the authories to open the media for all, this provision was not enforced. State television connued unchanged in its distasteful mode. One of the arms of the police state will be cut off if the naon ceases to be fed biased informaon.

Inadmissibility of the punishment of protesters

Those dismissed from their jobs must be allowed to return to work. Stu- dents have to go back to their universies, and prisoners, including the leaders of the opposion have to be released because these groups did not break the law, as the report acknowledges, making the authories lose the popular equaon.

As and when they return to the posions from which they were expelled, the morale of those who are calling for change will be raised as they will 105 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain be able to demonstrate without being dismissed from their jobs.

The recommendaons explicitly state that thousands can join rallies such as those during the months of February and March 2011. They can raise slogans demanding the state of democracy, including the slogans calling for the fall of the regime, and can strike and address the media. The vast majority of the measures taken by the Authority are considered illegal by the Bassiouni commission and those responsible must be held accountable.

The system will be thrown into confusion because the advocates of re- form are protected from abuse, because the system is commied to the security of internaonal law, and cannot spread terror, as it did during the past months.

The workers were reinstated aer a long me, and aer internaonal in- tervenon by the Internaonal Labor Organizaon. Hundreds have not been redeployed and opportunies of new employment for people who are against the regime (the Shiites from the view point of the regime) have been withdrawn.

Summary

The implementaon of the recommendaons of the Secretary Bassiouni will not take place. They are almost the same as the recommendaons that have repeatedly been made by the Human Rights Council, Amnesty Internaonal, Human Rights Watch, and the report of the U.S. State De- partment. They are the same as those in the Constuon of Bahrain, issued by the King without consulng the people but these recommen- daons are not implemented.

It is worth nong that if the recommendaons are not implemented the 106 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family credibility of King Hamad will be lost. He lost the trust of the people; Sunnis and Shiite for various reasons, and he lost the confidence of the region (Kuwait, Qatar, Oman), and of the Americans and the EU because, during the past ten years, he failed to keep his promises to the people, and to the West.

Following this approach to the recommendaons of Bassiouni I see that its implementaon will change the course of Bahrain. It would be sur- prising if the recommendaons of this report became a reality to over- throw the dictatorship of the system.

Item (11) footnotes 1- See hp://www.bcsl.org.uk/en/documents/471-bassiouni-report. 2- Report of the Bahraini independent Commission of Inquiry, paragraph 1643. 3- Al Wasat newspaper, June 30, 2011. 4- Report of the Bahraini independent Commission of Inquiry, paragraphs: 186 and 639. 5- Report of the Bahraini independent Commission of Inquiry, paragraph 641. 6- Report of the Bahraini independent Commission of Inquiry, paragraph 650. 7- Bassiouni said that the officials involved in torture are the interior minister and head of naonal security, see Al-Wasat, November 25, 2012. 8- Headed by the King, the Supreme Commander of the Bahrain Defense Force, and includes the leaders of the ruling family, and security officials and the military. Khalifa bin Abdullah was appointed in two menoned posions on November 28, 2011, aer nearly four days of the issuance of Bassiouni report. 9- Report of the Bahraini independent Commission of Inquiry, paragraph 1254. 10- Bahrain Mirror, November 15, 2011. 11- Report of the Bahraini independent Commission of Inquiry, paragraph 1718. 12- Al Wasat newspaper, Nove 29, 2011. 13- Charges against him of violang human rights during the validity of the security of the state, especially during the uprising ninees. 14- Report of the Bahraini independent Commission of Inquiry, paragraph 1702. 15- Report of the Bahraini independent Commission of Inquiry, paragraph 1702. 16- Report of the Bahraini independent Commission of Inquiry, paragraph 1241. 17- Report of the Bahraini independent Commission of Inquiry, paragraph 164. 18- Report of the Bahraini independent Commission of Inquiry, paragraph 1125. 19- Report of the Bahraini independent Commission of Inquiry, paragraph (A) 1317. 20- Abbas Busafwan, Bahrain Mirror, Marshal may be charged twice in the human rights violaons, July 13, 2011.

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Conclusion:

With regard to the polical situaon in Bahrain, the report is a rich model to study the structure of tribal government in the Gulf, which has been away from the absorpon of the principle of sovereignty of the peo- ple. In addion, for historical reasons and geopolics(1), the condions in Bahrain appear set to connue with instability and heightened tensions for the same reasons. The report can provide a model of democracy, co- existence and economic prosperity.

With the bier memory of the experiences of tyranny it is difficult to say whether the demand for democrac transformaon, in the form of a “constuonal monarchy”, reflects the wishes of the people.

The royal families management has oen exacerbated the polical situ- aon. There was an elected parliament in 1975, passing through a con- stuonal change in 2002. There was a negave experience of co-exist- ence with the royal family during the past ten years. This was followed by the transformaon of the country into a Kingdom, as per the ‘strategy of King Hamad’ and the government is responsible for it.

So, the biggest dilemma facing Bahrain is the failure to avoid a direct conflict between the head of the State (the King) and the popular sec- tors. They see one another as opponents who should be excluded from the polical process.

The main opposion strives to direct its violence against the Prime Min- ister instead of the king, to avoid an open war with the system, and to open a space (system) to search for a selement. This will be more com- plicated if the target is the king himself.

Whether King Hamad calls for change or not, he seems very angry at the 108 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family protest movement, which he considers his personal challenge. It appears that the man may be convinced that the chances of popular consensus, without him making concessions are limited. That is why his policies are coercive and violent, instead of bending to the storm, or making a wise call and looking for a selement.

In parcular, the King has adopted very enthusiascally, and amazingly, the suggeson of integraon in the confederaon with Saudi Arabia, with all this entails. This will be a negave development for the Shiite majority, and for the other Gulf states.

The authoritarian structure of the system has limited ability to deal with these issues. A different response is required for a new era. Frankly, the selement in Bahrain is awaing a royal concession to the people, partners in decision-making, which can be reached through producve dialogue. Any unclear formulas or those imposed by the government, even if accepted by the pares in opposion, can hardly be expected to ensure success in a sustainable manner.

Constuonal amendments cannot be approved by the King on 3 May 2012(2), to be a gateway for reform. Some form of unity with Saudi Ara- bia could be an escape route but fears of a deepening desire for power of ruling without the involvement of the people is likely.

The understanding locally (with the support of regional and internaon- al actors) is to hand over decision-making to the people. That means a reducon of the absolute powers of the royal family, which seems the most effecve soluon to the issue of Bahrain. If the bloodshed conn- ues regional tensions will escalate. The proposed the idea of a constu- onal monarchy means that there is no abolion of the monarchy, or the absolute ruling paern which seems to be able to maintain stability in the country. 109 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

The King issued the 2002 constuon unilaterally as his mind was fo- cused on the interests of Bahrain and he did not want the monarchy to be prejudiced.

It should be impossible to overthrow the king which seems unrealisc and contrary to historical experience(3). A scapegoat is required to ease tensions.

I’m not sure that the displacement of Sheikh Khalifa would solve the problem unless the king provides iniaves such as reshaping the struc- ture of governance and its mechanisms towards greater democraza- on. The success of any selement will be subject to a decision of King Hamad. It would be a mistake from him to remain hosle to his oppo- nents and large secons of the people. The connuaon of the current ruling elite, especially the Minister of his bureau Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, will not be easy even if the main polical groups avoid conflict with him. He seems more dangerous to the country than the King’s un- cle Khalifa bin Salman.

In my esmaon a change in Bahrain must mean a change in the leader- ship necessitang the overthrow of the king and/or the Prime Minister and/or the Minister of the royal council (or both together: Sheikh Khalifa and Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmad), and to seek to address the imbalances in the power structure, through restructuring in the interest of people. It is a soluon between the tradional form of government and those who are marginalized.

The methods of “cleansing”, “dry springs,” excluding the opposion, and “Walking on the edge of the abyss, led to regime to monopolizing full power all the wealth of the country. The King lost the support of the people within ten years.

110 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

Without doubt, adhering to the same “policies” is the worst opon. It signals a return to the “Hamad policies” prevailing in an aempt to en- sure the safety of Bahrain, but these policies have failed in the past.

Conclusion footnotes 1 Abbas Busafwan, geopolics and democracy in Bahrain, Al-Akhbar Lebanese newspaper, December 20, 2011. 2- See: Abbas Busafwan, Bahrain: “fragile” constuonal amendments, boosng up the crisis and not reso- nate locally and internaonally, May 29, 2012. 3- the Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh was removed and his posion was taken over by the Vice Presi- dent Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, and such scenario may take place in the Syrian case by creang an alterna- ve compable to replace President Bashar al-Assad. 111 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

Appendix

(1) Summary of the royal speech on the occasion of the last ten days of Ramadan dated August 29, 2011.

Unity, jusce and forgiveness were pledged last night by His Majesty King Hamad. In a major speech to the naon, the King said his government’s aspiraon is “for tolerance and shunning violence, and not for excessive punishment that affects our unity, cohesion and naonal co-existence”.

In the address broadcast on Bahrain Television, and relayed on other television and radio staons, His Majesty spoke of reconciliaon.

“When we see workers at their places of work and students at their learn- ing instuons, while some other workers are not working and some other students are not studying, we are prompted to look into their situ- aon in order to help them join their colleagues and classmates.

“Such an accomplishment will benefit the workers, the students, their families and the whole naon,” he said. “These are our orders to the concerned instuons and they should implement them more quickly.”

The King’s remarks on the occasion of the last 10 days of Ramadan, came as more than 400 Bahraini students, who were suspended during the unrest earlier this year, were this week reinstated.

Referring to those who were charged with crimes in the past, His Maj- esty said that “even though we do not wish to interfere in the process of jusce and the applicaon of the law, we stress that all civil cases will have their final ruling issued in civil courts”.

112 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

“We would like to emphasise that we do not ancipate pung everyone on trial,” the King said. “There are those who were charged with abusing us and senior officials in Bahrain, and we today announce that we for- give them as we hope that they understand that abusing us and others in fact offends everyone and achieves nothing.”

The King also noted that the Supreme Judicial Council will oversee com- pensaon for those killed or injured during the unrest.

His Majesty stressed that the past months of this year have been painful for all Bahrainis, but he said Ramadan has contributed to the restoraon of cohesion and “made us all recall our tradional interacons, compas- sion and fraternity.”

The King said the decision to set up the Bahrain Independent Com- mission of Inquiry was “the best indicaon of our full commitments to knowing the whole truth and to giving people their rights”.

He also commended on the outcome of the Naonal Dialogue. “Your agreements on further reforms are highly appreciated, deeply welcomed and greatly supported.”

Congratulang Bahrainis on Eid Al Fitr, His Majesty said he hoped Bah- rain now “will witness a new stage of outstanding producvity, cohesion and stability as our reforms move forward.”

113 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

(2) The text of the royal speech at the opening of Parliament, 9 October (October) 2011

IIn the name of God, the Most Compassionate, Most merciful

Dear brothers and sisters, members of the August Naonal Assembly

Peace and God’s mercy and blessings be upon you

We would like first to congratulate the new representaves on their vic- tory in the parliamentary by-elecons and to congratulate all of you on the start of the second session of the third legislave term.

We were, like the rest of the naon, very pleased with the naonal spirit that prevailed in the Naonal Dialogue and our happiness was increased thanks to the success of the parliamentary by-elecons and the full membership of the Council of Representaves. The successes were a powerful indicaon that Bahrain, a strong country by the will of God, is well capable, thanks to the collecve consciousness of its people, of protecng its gains and record and of overcoming all challenges.

On this auspicious occasion, we wish to congratulate the Bahraini wom- en who have proven their aptudes to compete for, and win, the honour of serving this naon and parcipang in the naon building process and in the reforms.

We praise God for His great blessings. Bahrain has always been a good and blessed country and its history tells the story of the hard-working and tenacious Bahraini who adores his country and loves his wider fam- ily, the people of Bahrain.

114 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

Brothers and Sisters, Our gathering today is held in the Isa Cultural Centre, the same place that hosted the naonal dialogue under the leadership of the Speaker of the Council of Representaves and under the care of the legislave branch in cooperaon with the government. It was a consolidaon of our firm and unlimited commitment to supporng the state of laws and to reinforcing the role of constuonal instuons and the principle of cooperaon between the branches.

The outcome was the visions of the Naonal Dialogue, which we sup- ported and endorsed. They reflect and embody the depth of the civilized affiliaon of the naon and its generous people. Dialogue is the lan- guage of civilizaons and the means for success and goodness.

Brothers and Sisters, Economic growth and job creaon are currently the main challenges in several regions in the world. We are proud of our policy of economic openness that has been Bahrain’s choice over me. Preserving posive growth rates and connuing to create adequate job opportunies will remain the main challenges. Our economic policy should also remain all-inclusive and integrate everybody as the Government focuses on en- couraging investments and on providing all facilies to investors.

In this regard, we commend, with great pride and appreciaon, His Roy- al Highness Prince Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, the Prime Minister, in leading the government and in relessly serving naonal interests.

We also laud His Royal Highness Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa, the Crown Prince, for his determinaon in boosng achievements and preparing for a brighter future for future generaons.

Brothers and Sisters, 115 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

The Bahrain Defence Force is the shield that protects the homeland and protects its gains. That is the only priority for the personnel of the BDF, officers and soldiers. They are the impregnable fortress of the naon.

On this occasion, we praise their honourable training, equipment and organizaonal standards.

We also thank the personnel of the Ministry of the Interior and the Na- onal Guard for their loyal services. They assumed their responsibilies fully in preserving law and order and in ensuring the security, tranquillity and serenity of the cizens and residents.

We are also pleased to express our appreciaon to the units of the Pe- ninsula Shield as a force of goodness, security and peace. They were a model of the full cooperaon between the countries and peoples of the Gulf Cooperaon Council and a natural extension and an integral part of the forces of each of the GCC member countries.

In this regard, the Kingdom of Bahrain is proud of the polical and de- fensive support from our brothers in the GCC countries which reflects the status of the countries within the Council.

We stress that the Kingdom of Bahrain will exert all its efforts to de- velop and reinforce the outstanding fraternal relaons between the GCC countries. The premise is that in the world of force, there is room only for the strong.

The strength of the GCC stems from the faith of its leaders and the stress of its peoples on the need for cohesion, unity and the development of its instuons. We will strive towards further coordinaon, integraon and interdependence among the GCC countries in all areas in order to achieve unity. 116 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

Based on our pride in the standing that Bahrain enjoys within the inter- naonal community and in its full support to the goals and principles of the Charter of the United Naons, we have personally parcipated in the 66th General Assembly of the United Naons in New York City. We talked in our address to the heads of states about the progress of our na- on and conveyed the aspiraons and ambions of our people as well as their democrac progress. We stressed that the civil state system stem- ming from our cultural, polical, social and religious nature is the most suitable for our country and enhances naonal cohesion.

In conclusion, I wish you all success. Do move forward under God’s blessings, filled with faith and determinaon to deepen the culture of dialogue and democracy and promote its pracce. Our eyes, minds and hearts will remain open to all those who wish to join the united naon with its Arab identy and Arab and Gulf dimensions. We will support all those who endeavour to boost steady and posive progress without jumping stages or reversing course or stalling advances.

May God protect Bahrain and all its people and grant them health, wealth and happiness.

Peace and God’s mercy and blessing be upon you

117 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain

(3) Leer from the Monarchy, January 15, 2012.

In the name of the Almighty God the most Merciful the most Gracious Dear cizens, Peace and God’s mercy and blessings be upon you. We are pleased to address you today, as we move forward on the path of development to enable Bahrain to build further gains. This will be for the benefit of our beloved country, and in the interests of its honorable children, with the aid of Almighty God, in adherence to the values of tolerance and coexistence in the light of God’s law, and Arab tradions. These are the values upon which we have all been brought up; and they have protected us against the dangers of intolerance and sectarianism.

Our loyal people have demonstrated that their will, despite all events, is devoted to connuing the reform project, to preserving the achieve- ments of the Charter and the Constuon, and to accelerang progress and momentum through constuonal instuons. Today, we will con- nue this march with anyone who has genuine patrioc desire for fur- ther progress and reform in all its forms, whether it is polical, economic or social, on the basis of our common convicons that reflect the spirit of the mes and meet the legimate aspiraons of all cizens to achieve further development consistent with the principles of a peaceful de- mocracy.

Brothers and sisters, It is beyond doubt that the Naonal Consensus Dia- logue recommendaons have outlined the shape of the reform that we are aiming to achieve, and emanate from the solid base of our naonal experience, laid down by the historical consensus on the Naonal Ac- on Charter. We have instructed the Execuve and Legislave Branches to implement without precondions these recommendaons, for which many parts of society resolutely parcipated so as to move forward through comprehension and belief in the principle of naonal acon en- 118 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family compassing everyone.

Accordingly, and in line with our mandate to propose constuonal amendments and to honor our promise, we will later issue a Royal De- cree to refer to the Council of Representaves and the Shura Council, requesng the constuonal amendments as stated in the recommen- daons of the Naonal Consensus Dialogue. The philosophy and mo- vaon behind this request is to open new horizons for our democracy, based on the Naonal Consensus Dialogue recommendaons, and to reflect our commitment to the stability of the naon, the unity of its people, and the realizaon of their aspiraons, taking into consideraon the best interests of the homeland, and the interests of present and fu- ture generaons of cizens to develop our democracy and our polical programs.

Brothers and sisters, These proposed amendments bring greater harmo- ny in the relaonship between the Execuve and Legislave Branches in order to achieve greater balance among them.

The amendments add new guarantees to be applied when exercising the right to dissolve the Council of Representaves. They require and entail consultaon with the Chairman of the Shura Council, the Chairman of the Council of Representaves, and the President of the Constuonal Court, while previously it required only the consent of the King and the Prime Minister. Further, in respect of the appointment of members of the Shura Council, the amendments call for a Royal Decree to be issued by the King prior to the order of appointment seng out the method, procedures, and guidance that govern the selecon process.

To empower the Councils concerning preparaon of the state budget and legislaon, the proposed amendments extend the scheduled ses- sions of the Naonal Council in its both Chambers, the Shura Council 119 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain and the Council of Representaves, when necessary to pass dra laws regulang economic issues urgently requested by the government.

In addion, the amendments set out the competent authority for dra- ing bills, raising constuonal amendment proposals, proposing laws or dra Constuonal amendments, and determining the necessary pe- riod of me to refer such bills to the Council where the proposal was originated. These amendments allow both Councils to more easily set the state budget, in a way that helps to effectuate the new budget at the beginning of the fiscal year, and preclude the announcement of a budget of more than two fiscal years.

In line with the conclusions of the Naonal Consensus Dialogue, these constuonal amendments aim to reflect the popular will in the for- maon of the government based on its program. The Council of Rep- resentaves will discuss the government program aer it swears the constuonal oath. Moreover, it has the right to approve or reject the government program, and if the program is approved, the government has secured the confidence of the Council.

In addion, the proposed recommendaon consolidates the oversight role of the Council of Representaves as a sole monitoring Power. Thus, the recommendaons grant the Council the right to end cooperaon with government, and to iniate discussions on any public theme. The amendments add addional guarantees to ensure the parcipaon of the Council of Representaves collecvely during the discussions of the quesons addressed to Ministers, and to set a meframe for the govern- ment to jusfy any rejecon of the demands of the Council.

Alongside this, the Council has been vested with the constuonal right to queson and withdraw confidence from Ministers, as well as to set up Commiees to conduct such quesoning. 120 16 DEC 2012 A study in the power balances in the ruling family

While the Constuon had previously given jurisdicon to the Chairman of the Shura Council to refer the bills approved by the two Chambers to the Prime Minister to pass them, and given him priority to preside over the meengs of the Naonal Council, the amendments have vested these jurisdicons and this priority to the Chairman of the Council of Representaves.

Brothers and sisters, We are confident that the Legislave Power will resume its constu- onal responsibilies to make these amendments, responsive to the recommendaons of the Naonal Consensus Dialogue. However, the historic step we make today will open doors wide to democracy and develop its exercise, enabling future generaons to build on it to reach new heights.

We cannot fail at this point to emphasize that democracy is not just liter- ature, or constuonal and legislave provisions. Democracy is a culture and pracce, commitment to the rule of law, respect for the interna- onal principles of human rights, coupled with serious naonal poli- cal acon that represents all spectrums of society without exclusion or quotas. In parallel with this crucial step that we take today, we call for other important steps to be made to reinforce the democrac culture and pracce on the land of our beloved country. Furthermore, we call upon all segments of society – the community and the family – to work together to ensure that our young people respect the law. This is a re- sponsibility that must be shouldered by all, especially when respect for the law is linked to the principles of coexistence, tolerance, harmony and love.

Today, we are passing an important era in the history of Bahrain. Con- stuonal and polical reform cannot be aained, or connue to exist, in a vacuum, but it is in parallel and closely related to economic reform, 121 16 DEC 2012 The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain development efforts and to the social reform that takes into account the interests of all cizens of this country.

We will march together at this period of me to aain all these achieve- ments with determinaon and resolve, praying to Almighty Allah to pro- tect our country, our security, our stability and to bless our steps and sustain the unity of our voice, as he who listens to our supplicaon.

God save Bahrain and its cizens and give us His help, support and guid- ance, for He is the Lord and the Patron.

May peace and God’s mercy and blessings be upon you.

122 Abbas Busafwan is a Bahraini -based in London- journalist and writer who specialize in polical and parliamentary affairs. He was the former Chief Editor of Aswaq Economical Newspaper, the former Deputy Chief Editor in Al-Ayam Newspaper, and former Head of local news in Al-Wasat Newspaper. He has parcipated in dozens of meengs and seminars, and has published several working papers and studies on the situaon in Bahrain. The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain A study of the Balance of power within the ruling family 16 DEC 2012 Copyright ©

Bahrain Centre For Studies in London (BCSL) [email protected] www.bcsl.org.uk Facebook.com/BHCSL @BHCSL www.bcsl.org.uk

About BCSL There has been an increasing talk about the Kingdom of Bahrain and the polical trends and challenges the country is facing since the increase of the polical crisis started on February 14th 2011 when Bahrain emerged as a part of the so called “Arab Spring Revolts” that roiled Arab world in 2011.

This has raised fundamental quesons about Bahrain’s sophiscated ever polical issues, despite, that Bahrain is located and surrounded by, as described as, conservave and stabilized countries.

The internaonal interest about Bahrain, and at the same me the lack of insighul readily available informaon, are behind the drive to estab- lish, on the 3rd of May 2012, “The Bahrain Center for Studies in London (BCSL)”, as an independent research centre, aims to, study the case and status of the uprising in Bahrain, its influenal factors and expected fu- ture affairs.

BCSL will prepare and publish researches and studies and will also organ- ize debang sessions evolving around the domesc affairs of the King- dom of Bahrain and its strategic aspects related to polical, economic and security policies and including its relaon at regional and interna- onal levels.

BCSL encourages discussions and dialogues in respect of Bahrain, and seeks to increase the interest of researchers, decision-makers, and ac- tors in public opinion and movate them to address the different as- pects of the issues of Bahrain. www.bcsl.org.uk

BCSL wishes that this will contribute to a sound understanding and in- sighul of Bahrain case.

BCSL interests: BCSL is mainly concerned with all issues related to Bahrain within the context of its regional and the internaonal relaons and polics in par- cular that relates to the Gulf Corporaon Council (GCC) states.

Research interests programs include, but not limited to, the followings: 1. Polical Issues. 2. Polical Associaon & Pares, Trade Unions and Civil Society Instuons. 3. Human Rights Issues. 4. Legal and Constuonal Affairs. 5. The issues of Security, Defense and armed equipment 6. Media 7. The links and entanglements between Bahrain issues and other GCC States, in a regional and internaonal context. 8. Economic and Oil

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