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Méthexis ..IT (2007) p. 83-97 Artículos

COMPETING MODELS OF PAIDEIA IN 'S

JOHN J. CLEARY

INTRODUCTION

In this paper my specific and limited purpose is to examine the competing models of paideia that I find to be implicit in the explicit contrast between rhet­ oric and dialectic, which is drawn by Plato through the dialogical encounters be­ tween , Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles. In dramatic terms, Gorgias and Polus represent the rhetorical tradition with its own particular paideia, while Socrates represents an altemative paideia that is promoted through dialectical in­ quiry. Indeed, throughout the dialogue, Plato underlines many differences be­ tween rhetorical display (ETTL8Elc;LS),1 which involves a long speech on a set topic, and the Socratic elenchus which involves short questions and answers. For instance, in the opening se ene ofthe dialogue (447a-b), Socrates and Chaerophon have just missed a rhetorical display by Gorgias. Significantly, CallicIes promises that it will be repeated at their pleasure because Gorgias is his house-guest? Socrates, however, wants to know (447c) ifGorgias is willing to engage in dial­ ectical discussion (8LaAExe~vm) about specific questions (but not rhetorical themes) such as: what is the power ofhis craft (TLS ~ 8úvallLS T~S TÉXVTjS) and what is it (TL EaTLv) that he professes and teaches. CallicIes confidently responds (447 e) that Gorgias is always willing to answer questions, and urges Socrates to ask the man himself. Of course, it soon becomes apparent that Socrates and Gor­ gias have very different ideas about what is involved in asking a question. With reference to the historical context for this competition between two quite different kinds of paideia, we must distinguish between the dramatic date for the Gorgias dialogue, which hovers around the end of the Peloponnesian War (perhaps 405 BC), and the date of composition which may be located somewhere in the first quarter of the 4th century BC Despite the fuzziness of this temporal perspective, 1 think we may assume that Plato wants his audience to bear in mind the disastrous Sicilian expedition and its contribution to the eventual defeat of . The historical figure of Gorgias, as ambassador for Leontini, shared

I The tenn Err(&El~lS" is not being used in the technical Aristotelian sense but rather in a more general sense that covers many kinds of public perfonnance by a speaker; cf. R. Thomas (2003). There are sorne good reasons for believing that the historical Gorgias may have applied rhetorical Err(&El~lS" in many different contexts, including the Assembly and the lawcourts. 2 By contrast with Socratic discussions, each of which is unique and tailored to the discussion partner, a Gorgianic rhetorical display can be repeated at will and it is also like an item of merchan­ dise which is available to those with the means to payo 84 John J. Cleary sorne responsibility for this disaster because it was he who first seduced the Athenians by means of his to become involved in Sicilian . It is more difficult to establish any precise historical framework for the date of composition of the Gorgias dialogue but 1 find it plausible to assume that the figure of is lurking somewhere in the background. A native of Athens, Isocrates founded a school of rhetoric which continued the tradition of Gorgias and which enjoyed considerable success in Plato's lifetime. Furthermore, from his polemical work Against the Sophists, we gather that Isocrates was critical of eristic dialecticians, while also describing his own rhetorical activity and mode of paideia in terms of ',.3 Thus 1 claim that it is quite reasonable to treat Plato' s Gorgias as part of an ongoing debate in Athens about the best way to train young men for citizenship in the . Of course, Plato's explicit reference to and his speeches suggests that he may also be responding to , who claimed that Pericles was one ofthe greatest politicalleaders and civic educ­ ators of Athens.4 From a general philosophical perspective, however, 1 want to draw attention to the importance of paideia for ancient political debates, since this topic has been rather neglected by modem scholars ever since Jaeger's work in the middle of the last century. As soon as we realize that the ancient debate about constitu­ tions also involves the question about the best way to live, we cannot avoid the issue of competing models of paideia that underlies such constitutional debates. 1 maintain that this is a crucial perspective which contemporary scholarship needs to recover in order to deal with the civic dimensions of ancient political thought. For instance, 1 want to suggest that it is within such an educational perspective that we should understand Socrates' ironic remark (448d) that Polus seems to be fully equipped for speeches (AÓYOUS) but that he has not yet fulfilled his promise to Chaerophon. Gorgias seems puzzled by this remark presumably because he doesn't see the difference between answering a question and making a speech. Socrates remarks (448d-e) that Polus has had more practice in rhetoric than in discussion (OWAÉYE(J8m), with the result that he has failed to answer the question. Socrates explains that, instead of saying what is the art of Gorgias, Polus had praised it by saying that it is the finest. But this represents an answer to a question about the quality (nola) of the art rather than what name we ought to call it; i.e. what it is. 5

3 Significantly enough, Isocrates criticizes (Againsl Ihe Sophisls 12 fr.) those who apply the craft analogy to the art of speaking where it is inappropriate because a speech must be appropriate for dif­ ferent occasions, whereas an art like grammar is the same for aH occasions. Here the Platonic craft analogy could be the target of his criticismo

4 Yunis (1996) makes a very convincing case for regarding Thucydides as one of Plato's targets in the Gorgias, even though he is not mentioned by name (any more than is Isocrates). Plato did not often identify his contemporary ideological rivals. 5 Logical priority of 'what is it' question over 'what is it like' (ÓTTO'iÓV Tl); cf. Meno 71b; Prol. 360e, 361c: teachability ofvirtue.