U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Environmental Science Services Administration

HURRICANE CAMILLE

A Report to the Administrator

September 1969 HURRICANE CAMILLE r LIBRARY

DEC f 3 2&! Nation81 Qoeanjc b Atmospheric Admln~stratlon _ U.S. Dep. of Commerce )

A Report to the Administrator

September 1969

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Environmental Science Services Administration National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Weather Bureau Hurricane Series

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HOV Services Imaging Contractor 12200 Kiln Court Beltsville, MD 20704- 1387 November 6,2007 ESSAJPI 690034 September 1969 FOREWORD On August 22, 1969, I requested Donald C. House, Chief, Atmospheric Science Services Division, Office of Plans and Programs, to undertake, immediately, an extensive review of thg effectiveness of the natural haz- ards warning system during the period of hurricane CAMILLE. He was directed to review the performance of all elements of ESSA as well as those elements of the Department of Defense that participated in providing data for the warning service. The purpose of this survey was to establish where the warning system performed effectively and where deficiencies existed that required remedy.

The enclosed report by Mr. House and his group represents their find- ings on the warning service, its present capabilities, and its limitations. This report reveals clearly how effective community preparedness action strongly identified with and geared to the meteorological warning system can make possible significant savings in lives and greatly reduce the human suffering that follows disasters of this nature. I am impressed by the tre- mendous cooperation among Federal, State, and local authorities, the news media, and the public when the possibilities of disaster were identi- fied and time was still available to do something about it. The success of those actions is a tribute to the diligence and dedication of personnel involved.

Robert M. White Administrator Environmental Science Services Administration PREFACE The Survey Team included Dr. Harry P. Foltz, Chief, Public Weather and Warning Branch of the ESSA Weather Bureau's Office of Meteoro- logical Operations; Professor Frederick Sandersh, Department of Meteor- ology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Mr. G. A. Baker, ESSA Office of Public Information; Mr. Charles Carpenter, Regional Emergency Warning Meteorologist, ESSA Weather Bureau Southern Region; Mr. Robert Beck, Deputy Chief, Telecommunications and Space Services Di- vision, ESSA Office of Plans and Programs; Mr. Robert E. Hairston, Chief, Aerial Reconnaissance Coordination, Atlantic Hurricanes, National Hurricane Center, Miami, Florida ; and Commander L. J. Underwood, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer, Fleet Weather Facility, Jacksonville, Florida. The team was divided into two working groups. One team, consisting of Dr. Foltz, Mr. Baker, and Mr. Carpenter, proceeded on August 26, 1969 to the hurricane-stricken coastal area. The other group, consisting of Professor Sanders, Mr. Hairston, Commander Underwood, and the under- signed, assembled in the office of the National Hurricane Center on August 27, 1969.

The first group visited the coastal area and interviewed Weather Bureau officials, State and local Civil Defense officials, local government officials, and representatives of the news media to gather facts concerning the adequacy of the forecasts and warnings, the application of the warn- ings to local protection activities, and the state of community preparedness actions.

The second group visited the National Hurricane Center primarily for the purpose of gathering facts concerning the overall functioning and operations of this Center during Hurricane CAMILLE. The Director and staff of the National Hurricane Center were queried extensively concern- ing the problems associated with the prediction and warnings of this great hurricane. The Directors of the National Hurricane Research Laboratory, the Director of the Experimental Meteorological Laboratory and their staffs provided useful background information and facts concerning hurri- cane forecasting research. Finally, the Director of ESSA's Research Flight Facility provided the group with important insights into the hurricane reconnaissance problem.

It was agreed that this survey should concentrate upon the effective- ness of the meteorological service system in attacking the warning problem associated with CAMILLE. Once this was ascertained it then became possible to identify actions needed to strengthen the system.

*Professor Sanders chose not to participate in the discussion leading to the recom- mendations for additional research. This is because he is presently named as the prin- cipal investigator in a research grant to Massachusetts Institute of Technology for the conduct of research related to hurricane forecast problems. The survey team is indebted to numerous individuals within ESSA, other Federal agencies, State agencies, representatives of the news media, and the general public for their contribution to this report. It is impos- sible to enumerate all of them but particular credit should go to the Di- rectors of the National Hurricane Center, the Atlantic Oceanographic and Meteorological Laboratories, and the Associate Director, Meteorologi- cal Operations of the ESSA Weather Bureau and their staffs. The survey would not have been possible without their cooperation and assistance.

D. C. House Chief, Atmospheric Science Services Division Office of Plans and Programs EXECUTIVE SUMMARY On Thursday morning, August 14, 1969, a Navy reconnaissance flight requested by ESSA's National Hurricane Center intercepted a rapidly developing depression in the Caribbean about 400 miles south of Miami. This was the beginning of one of the worst in North Atlantic history: CAMILLE. By Sunday night, August 17, hurricane CAMILLE had struck across the Gulf coast between and the with winds of 190 miles per hour and tides 15 to 30 feet above normal near the . The hurricane was the most violent of record for the United States mainland. The hurricane warning cycle for CAMILLE began after aerial recon- naissance on August 14. Thereafter, the developing was kept under virtually continuous surveillance by aerial reconnaissance, environmental satellites, and, as it neared land, coastal weather radars, tide gages, and human observers. CAMILLE'S point of arrival along the coast was fore- cast about 15 hours before the storm struck, permitting a massive evacu- ation of the hurricane-conscious population of that area. This 15-hour warning, taken with the high level of individual and community prepared- ness for such emergencies, saved an estimated 50,000 lives. The purpose of the ESSA survey team reporting here was to evaluate the performance of the hurricane warning service and related activities during the CAMILLE emergency. To do this, the team focused on the actual warning and reconnaissance activities, and on the responses of municipal and emergency officials in the stricken area. The team's general conclusions were that : -The warning system performed in an outstanding manner. -The accuracy of hurricane prediction and warnings compares favorably with the present state of meteorological science and our present under- standing of hurricanes. -The strong cooperation between Federal, State, and local authorities, the news media, and the public, together with community preparedness, accounted in large part for the saving of lives along the Gulf coast. CAMILLE did reveal some defects in the hurricane warning system, and pointed up the need to advance the state of the science and supporting technology. Specifically, the survey team recommended that: -positive action be taken to ensure the maintenance of community action plans where they now exist, with the ESSA Weather Bureau taking the lead in helping coastal communities develop plans where no preparedness plan existed before. -the VHF-FM Weather Broadcasts, an extremely effective means, of communicating with the general public and responsible authority, be in- stalled on the Gulf and Atlantic coasts.

-the installation of urgently needed emergency power generators be a.ccelerated at all locations responsible for warning dissemination. -immediate action be taken to replace the facilities and equipment dam- aged or destroyed by CAMILLE, and that: observing equipment be installed on at least five additional ofshore oil platforms in the ; at least 14 new Cooperative Hurricane Reporting Network (CHURN) stations be established at Coast Guard stations and marinas along the Gulf and Atlantic coasts; the cooperating merchant ship observational program be expanded; the continuous-reading tide-gage program be expanded to imqrove real-time observation of tidal levels; and the worn out and obsolete equipment used in , St. Kitts, St. Lucia, and Dominica be replaced.

-immediate action be taken to restore the Boothville Weather Station and to provide assistance to the Caribbean and Latin American countries to update their upper-air facilities.

-the frequency of upper-air observations at Vera Crux, Mazatlan, Mexico City, St. Maarten, Trinidad, and Barbados be increased to two per day.

-the obsolete radar equipment at San Juan, Puerto Rico, which occupies a key location in the Tropics, be replaced by a modern radar as soon as possible.

-installation of remote readouts at nearby Weather Bureau ofices from existing Weather Radar ofices along the Gulf and Atlantic coasts proceed as planned.

-data from the existing Applications Technology Satellite series be made available to the hurricane warning service on a real-time basis until the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite system enters service.

-the Director of the National Hurricane Center specify the details of his requirements for altitudes of hurricane penetration and these be in- cluded in the Plan of the Day.

-action be undertaken leading to improvement in the aircraft and sen- sory equipment used in aerial reconnaissance. (A special analysis of hur- ricane reconnaissance is being undertaken by the Federal Coordinator for Meteorological Services and separate recommendations on this phase of the hurricane tracking problem will be made.) -the Department of Transportation's Federal Aviation Administration be apprised of the impact of any loss or delay of information used in issuing hurricane warnings.

--a comparative study be made of existing high-frequency radio, satellite microwave, and other communications systems to determine the best sys- tem for use in hurricane emergencies.

--a major research and development program be mounted with principal attention given to improvements in operational hurricane forecasting. Such an effort should include the development of improved tropical analysis technique using low-level winds derived from synchronous satellite data and the development of better numerical prediction models.

-ESSA set a goal of reducing the displacement error (between predicted and observed position) to the order of 75 miles in 24 hours by 1974.

In considering priorities of the actions recommended above the survey team further recommended that highest priority be given to the following:

1. Public education and community preparedness programs.

2. Improved aircraft reconnaissance.

3. Safe quarters and reliable power and communication facilities.

4. Forecasting research and technique development baaed upon new technologies, to be accelerated as toe approach a minimum standard of preparedness and public awareness of the consequences of a failure to respond to hurricane warnings. CONTENTS

Page Foreword ...... iii Preface ...... iv Executive Summary ...... vi Chapter I . Hurricane CAMILLE ...... 1 Chapter I1. Preparation and Warnings ...... 5 A . The Hurricane Warning 'Service ...... 5 B . Community Preparedness Plans ...... 5 C. Specific Action ...... 7 D . Findings and Recommendations ...... 8 Chapter 111. Data Collection and Communications ...... 11 A . Surface Observations ...... 11 B . Upper-Air Observations ...... 12 C. Radar Network ...... 13 D . Satellite Reconnaissance ...... 14 E . Aerial Reconnaissance ...... 16 F . Communications ...... 19 Chapter IV. The Forecasts of CAMILLE ...... 21 Chapter V . Economic Aspects and Priorities ...... 25 Attachment A-Summary of CAMILLE'S Forecasts and Warnings ...... 26

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Figure Page 1 Network of Observing Stations Reporting on CAMJLLE ...... 11 2 Upper-Air Coverage in Area of Hurricane CAMILLE ...... 13 3 Eye Positions Reported by New Orleans ...... 14 4 Satellite Reconnaissance of Hurricane CAMILLE Track. August 14.22. 1969 ...... Summary of Aircraft Reconnaissance ...... Official Forecast Displacement Error ...... Numerical Objective Forecast Displacement Error ...... NMC Forecast and Verification. OOOOZ August 18. 1969 ......

LIST OF TABLES Table Page I Summary of Operational Satellite Data-Handling for CAMILLE ..... 15 I1 "Best Track" Positions of Hurricane CAMILLE ...... 22 Hirrricr~nc CAMILIJE, photogrrcphecl 1174 ESSA 9 cumeras c~t,?:67 pm RIIT, Alrgust 17, 1969, rLs lhc violcnt storm approaclted tlte U.S. Gulf coast.

X Chapter I Hurricane CAMILLE

On Thursday morning, August 14, 1969, tides up to eight feet on the southwest coast. Navy 7, a reconnaissance plane out of Jackson- Cuban radar had the storm under surveillance, ville; was flying a weather mission over the and radar reports from were relayed Caribbean. The flight had been requested by as CAMILLE edged closer on a northwesterly the National Hurricane Center in Miami to track. investigate a suspicious low pressure tropical Although still maturing, winds at the storm's wave which had moved across the Atlantic from core had already reach 115 miles an hour on Africa and ranged across into the western the afternoon of the 15th) and the central pres- Caribbean. sure; had dropped to 29.40 inches. A bulletin Four hundred eight miles south of Miami issued at 3 pm on August 15 distinguished her and 60 miles west of Grand Cayman Island as the most intense hurricane since BEULAH Navy 7's flight pattern intercepted a rapidly de- of 1967. veloping depression which grew with amazing CAMILLE moved across western Cuba on speed and reached storm intensity even as the the evening of the 15th and was off the north- aircraft circled the area. Running low on fuel, ern coast before the day was through. In the Navy 7 reported data on the storm location vicinity of Guane and the Isle of Pines, 90- near Latitude 19.3 north and Longitude 82.3 mile-an-hour winds and 10-inch rains were west--maxihuh surface winds over 57 miles reported. an hour, sea-level pressure 29.49 inches-and Weakened only slightly by her trek overland, headed for home. Navy 7 had witnessed the CAMILLE began to regain her strength over birth of one of the most vicious storms ever the warm waters of the Gulf of Mexico. Radar recorded in North history : and plane surveillance placed her early Satur- CAMILLE. day at Latitude 23.2 north and Longitude 85.0 Advisory Number One on CAMILLE was west or about 220 miles west-southwest of Key issued by the National Hurricane Center at 1 West moving north-northwest at 10 miles an pm EDT that day. It reported the storm mov- hour with winds estimated at 100 miles an hour ing west-northwest at about 13 miles an hour near the center. with highest winds about 60 miles per hour in At 9 am CDT, Saturday, August 16, Special a small area near the center. It was predicted Advisory Number Nine set up a Hurricane to reach the extreme west tip of Cuba by early Watch from Biloxi, , to St. Marks, the following morning, raking the Isle of Pines Florida, and warned that CAMILLE was "po- with gale force winds in its passage. Signifi- tentially a very dangerous hurricane," with cantly, this first advisory on CAMILLE proph- winds expected to remain at not less than 100 esied: "conditions favor miles an hour, and a strong possibility of of this young storm." further intensification. At 11 am the same day Two advisories and two bulletins were to hurricane warnings were issued for the area follow that day, the beg-innings of a constant from Ft. Walton to St. Marks, Florida, and flow that were to report on CAMILLE'S every preparations were urged for tides of five to movement as her threat intensified. ten feet. Early on the morning of August 15 CA- The Southern Regional Office, Weather Bu- MILLE reached hurricane intensity about 60 reau, moved to assign a special crew to reopen miles south-southeast of Pinar del Rio. Cuba a Weather Bureau office at Pensacola, Florida, was warned by the National Hurricane Center and provide additional protection for that area to prepare for rapidly increasing winds reach- of the coastline. ing hurricane force by early afternoon with Late Saturday afternoon, Reconnaissance Group aircraft found the storm had slowed homes. Police and Civil Defense officials went but deepened rapidly. Maximum winds were through the areas of special hazard to contact estimated at 150 miles per hour near the center, individually those who thought they could "last which was located about 380 miles south of Ft. it out." Walton. At 1 pm Siinday a bulletin issued from the At 7 pm Saturday, August 16, a bulletin Weather Bureau Forecast Center in New Or- identified hurricane CAMILLE as a "very in- leans forecast the possibility of tornadoes as- tense and dangerous storm" and raised tide sociated with CAMILLE, but it was at 3 pm estimates to 12 feet. Later that evening CA- that the full extent of the danger was realized. MILLE resumed her north-northwest move- Air Force reconnaissance reports early Sunday ment at about 12 miles per hour. She was gen- afternoon indicated a central pressure in CA- erating winds of 160 miles per hour near her MILLE of 26.61 inches, the second lowest on center with hurricane-force winds extending 50 record, and maximum winds were estimated miles in all directions. at 190 miles per hour near the center. Tides On Sunday, August 17th, with "extremely up to 20 feet above normal were forecast from dangerous" CAMILLE 250 miles south of Mo- Gulfport to Pascagoula in the 3 pm Special bile, , Advisory Number Thirteen was Advisory, with 10-to-15-foot tides in the area issued at 5 am CDT extending hurricane warn- between Pascagoula and Mobile. ings westward to Biloxi, Mississippi, and a No hurricane as intense as this had ever hurricane watch was moved west to New Or- struck the mainland of the United States. The leans and Grand Isle, . need to remove everyone from the tidal beaches Weather Bureau staffs, maintaining an all- was urgent and, in at least one case, arrests night vigil, alerted their communities, now were made in a desperate move to save lives. affected by the watch and the warnings, and By official estimate 81,000 people moved to the tempo of preparation quickened. safety. The remainder were fully warned but Some residents along the Gulf Coast had some stubbornly remained: the curious, the un- already begun boarding up homes and busi- believers, the survivors of past storms, and nesses in the early hours of that Sunday morn- those few who could not bring themselves to ing, and a trickle of cars moved on the highways abandon all they owned. leading north as dawn approached. By 7 pm Sunday, the Weather Bureau Office Four hours later, at 9 am Sunday, with CA- at Boothville, Louisiana-about 60 miles south- MILLE about 200 miles southeast of New Or- east of New Orleans--was reporting wind gusts leans, Advisory Number Fourteen issued of 107 miles per hour. An offshore drilling rig warnings for all the Mississippi coast and the was raked by gusts estimated to be about 170 hurricane watch was changed to a warning as miles per hour. On the Mississippi shore as the far west as New Orleans and Grand Isle. The evening progressed the wind increased until advisory forecast hurricane-force winds from by 10 pm its sound was a continuous roar. In extreme northwest Florida to southeast Louisi- the unbelievable chaos of windblown debris, ana by late afternoon or early evening with the dreadful tide moved on the land. Sweeping tides up to 15 feet near the center. "Present inshore it was an irresistible force topped by indications are that the center of CAMILLE crashing waves that demolished everything in will pass close to the mouth of the Mississippi its path. Ocean-going vessels and small craft River late this afternoon and move inland on alike were swept inland and deposited among the Mississippi coast tonight." the remnants of buildings. Eyewitnesses re- Preparations for the storm reached a cre- ported that the deluge remained ashore very scendo. The stream of evacuees became a flood briefly--only for some 20-30 minutes-sucking as the threat to the low-lying coastline became back into the Gulf of Mexico with such speed evident. People hastily loaded what few be- that it carried much of its appalling burden longings they could carry with them and fled. with it. Local officials appeared on radio and television The eye of CAMILLE moved inland just east stations to point out the danger and plead of Bay St. Louis, Mississippi, about 11:30 pm with those who were reluctant to abandon their that night. It has been estimated that gusts of at least 190 miles per hour hit the city, while businesses, 32 boats destroyed or severely dam- winds of 150 miles per hour or more raked the aged; at least five trucking terminals completely area east of Biloxi. In Bay St. Louis and tiny destroyed, with damage to highways, bridges, Pass Christian electrical fires raged unchecked railways, and waterways running into millions during the storm. At a NASA site near Pic- of dollars; the Port of Gulfport almost com- ayune wind velocities up to 160 miles per hour pletely destroyed, at least 94 vessels sunk or were recorded. Tides ranged 15 to 30 feet above grounded in the ; oil rigs normal just east of the eye and up to five feet foundered, pipelines smashed, and land bases above normal as far east as Apalachicola, destroyed; enormous agricultural losses in Florida. crops, timberland, tung, pecan, and orange On Monday morning the sun was out hot and trees, with some 5,000 cattle drowned. The clear, a familiq Gulf coast summer day. Sur- dollar figure in damage could pass the $1 bil- vivors emerged from their shelters in shock lion mark ; no figure could measure the human and looked at the incredible desolation left by cost. the storm. CAMILLE weakened slowly as she moved In Louisiana's lower Plaquemines Parish a inland and moved on a curving path through massive tide surge over the Mississippi River Mississippi, , , and levees had removed almost all traces of civili- during the 18th, 19th' and 20th of August. She zation. returned to her birth place in the Atlantic on Six-thousand persons had made their homes the 20th, and still was able to summon up in the community of Buras along the Missis- enough strength to regain tropical storm wind sippi; only six structures remained standing. forces of 65-70 miles per hour. Then begun the task of counting the cost of the storm. The death toll at this writing stands Two days later she merged with a frontal at 140 in Mississippi and southeastern Louisi- system some 175 miles off Cape Race, New- ana with 76 persons missing. foundland, and lost her identity, but the man- Some statistics reported by the Red Cross gled coastline of Mississippi, Alabama, and the provide evidence of the destruction of the Louisiana delta will long bear evidence of the storm: 5,238 homes destroyed, 11,667 suffered passage of the most savage hurricane in re- major damage; 1,007 trailer homes, 569 small corded history. Tlte ESSA Weutlier Burercu's VHF-FM continuous wentl,er 0~oarlr:r~stscvuicc~ wr~sfound t,o hc "an c:zl~e?nel?/ effective rneuns of communicr~tingwitit, tiie gene~alpublic r~ndresponsi1)le uutltoritv" during lc7~rricnne errr.cr- gencierr. Chapter II Preparation and Warnings

A. The Hurricane Warning Service possible means of storm modification. The focal The objectives of the Hurricane Warning point for ESSA research and development ac- Service of ESSA Weather Bureau are to save tivities on hurricane research is the National lives and to minimize loss of property by timely Hurricane Research Laboratory at Miami, and effective alerting of the public of the loca- Florida. Also in Miami is the Research Flight tion and movement of hurricanes. The policy Facility. The Facility uses four ESSA-owned underlying this program is the provision by aircraft: two DC-G's, one B-57, and one DC-4. ESSA of a single national authoritative source The two DC-6 aircraft are specially instru- for the provision of forecasts and warnings of mented as flying laboratories to penetrate hur- extremely hazardous meteorological events. ricanes. In the Hurricane Warning Service, seven B. Community Preparedness Plans ESSA Weather Bureau offices maintain a close watch on the areas of potential or incipient Planning for effective community action in tropical cyclones and produce and issue advi- a hurricane emergency is a major concern of sories and bulletins for the public, disaster and ESSA Weather Bureau offices. rescue agencies, and salvage workers in threat- Before the commencement of the hurricane ened areas. These include the National Hurri- season (June 1 through November 30) the Offi- cane Center in Miami, forecast and warning cer in Charge of Weather Bureau Offices re- offices in ‘Sari Francisco and Honolulu, and sponsible for issuing forecasts and warnings warning offices in Boston, Washington, D.C., for cities and communities along the Gulf of New Orleans, and San Juan. Mexico and Atlantic Ocean Coasts vulnerable The National Hurricane Center provides a to hurricanes holds a Hurricane Preparedness single source for hurricane forecasts in the Conference. The objective is to alert people to Atlantic and Gulf Coast areas and is responsible the dangers of hurricanes and to help communi- for technical matters pertaining to the Atlantic ties develop community hurricane preparedness Hurricane Warning Service, including the su- plans or to check on plum already formulated. pervision of warnings prepared at Boston, Invited to the conference are the mayor, Civil Washington, D.C., New Orleans, and San Juan. Defense, American Red Cross, police, city engi- The hurricane advisories and bulletins pre- neer, superintendent of public works, superin- pared by the warning offices for the public con- tendent of street department, superintendent tain the position, intensity, direction and rate of schools, newspaper, radio and television rep- of movement, areas under watch and warnings, resentatives, power and gas company officials, and include a statement of the effects to be manager of transit system, harbor police, and experienced from the storm, including predic- port authorities. tion of wind-driven tides (storm tide), strength Preceding the hurricane season of 1969, 30 of winds expected on the coast, and amount of such conferences were held in Atlantic and rainfall. Gulf coast cities, ranging from Portland, The Weather Bureau is also directed to study Maine, to Brownsville, Texas. fully the internal structures of hurricanes. Re- Copies of an ESSA pamphlet, A Model Hur- search and development activities are con- ricane Plan for a Coastal Community, are pro- ducted on hurricanes and other tropical circula- vided to local authorities at the conferences. tions to acquire increased knowledge of these The plan offers suggestions as to planning and storms and to apply this knowledge to improve- organization to minimize hurricane losses. In ment of techniques of storm detection, fore- 1969, 2,800 copies of the plan were distributed. casting and warning, and to development of In many cities the pamphlet is used as the basis for a detailed local Civil Defense Emergency tributed every June. Plan with great effectiveness. Radio and television stations are requested In addition to the Model Plan the following to present in late May or early June of each informational brochures were distributed in year a series of at least five 15-minute broad- 1969, in the quantities shown: cast interviews with authorities on various Hurricane, a 40-page booklet giving informa- phases of hurricane preparedness. The superin- tion on hurricanes ; 18,000. tendent of schools is directed to instruct his Hurricane Znf ormation and Atlantic Track- teachers to inform their charges of these radio ing Chart, a fanfold explaining hurricanes ; and television broadcasts and to quiz them on 84,400. the information broadcast. Newspapers are en- Some Devmtating North Atlantic Hurri- couraged to publicize these broadcasts and pub- canes of the 20th Centuyl, a 10-page pamphlet lish summarizations of the interviews. The with tracks, damages, and casualties ; 10,000. broadcasts and newspaper articles include men- Hurricane/Storrn Surge Safety Rules, a tion of continua1 precautionary measures that poster with information on things to know tend to reduce danger and damage during an about hurricane and storm surges ; 72,500. emergency and give instructions on what should A public information campaign on hurri- be done when a hurricane is expected to strike canes, offering ad mats, was run in May 1969 the area. as well as a hurricane campaign to Bell System When a hurricane watch .is issued for the outlets offering copy, artwork, and photos for area, the local Weather Bureau office immedi- use in billing inserts. On June 5, 1969, the 30- ately notifies the chairman of the Hurricane minute color film HURRICANE! was released Preparedness Committee. The chairman calls for use on all coastal television stations for pub- an immediate meeting of his Committee to re- lic service programming, with a reported total view preparations for 'emergency procedures. to date of over 2 million viewers. The fire and police departments place all their Leadership in preparation for hurricane personnel on 24-hour on-call duty. American emergencies must come principally from local Red Cross calls for additional personnel and authorities. They direct municipal and com- equipment. State police set up check points on munity planning, control most of the facilities main highways leading into the threatened area which would be used in meeting an emergency, to control entry and re-entry. The county possess the necessary detailed knowledge of the sheriff sends his force out to alert all exposed local area, and have the immediate responsibil- settlements and trailer camps to maintain a ity for the welfare of their community and its constant radio watch for further instructions. residents. Also, they are informed where to go if they are A permanent Hurricane Preparedness Com- warned to evacuate. mittee is organized to provide the coastal city When a hurricane warning is issued for the and suburban communities with adequate pro- area, emergency procedures are initiated. Al- tection to minimize the deaths and property though the Weather Bureau has no authority losses usuaUy associated with hurricanes. The to order evacuation, it is the agency to which Committee directs a program designed to edu- the general public and responsible public offi- cate the public on the hazards of hurricanes cials must look for recommendations on evacua- and the protective measures to be effected. It tion. Since advisories and bulletins from hurri- makes recommendations regarding construc- cane warning offices must be reasonably short, tion projects and changes in building codes re- evacuation recommendations are included only quired to lessen danger and destruction from in broad terms. More specific information is hurricanes. The American Red Cross member contained in hurricane statements issued by of the Committee designates buildings to be local Weather Bureau offices. The final author- used as shelters. The City Engineer prepares ity for execution of evacuation plans in the city maps showing locations of shelters, emergency is the mayor and in the county it is the county bus loading points, and evacuation routes. director of Civil Defense. These maps are printed and distributed to all Local governments representing the larger residents of the area. Additional copies are dis- segments of population along the Gulf coast, Pascagoula, have prepared and printed emer- threat to the Florida coastline the former such as New Orleans, Mobile, Gulfport, and Weather Bureau Office at Pensacola was re- gency action plans containing the essentials of opened on August 15. This action was part of the "Model Hurricane Action Plan." These have the preparations made by the Weather Bureau been distributed to all people with particular to place all its facilities in a full state of readi- responsibilities in the plan and in some cases ness. were available to the news media as informa- As a backup to tracking of the hurricane by tion to broadcast. The focal point for commu- land based radar, the Weather Bureau assigned nity preparedness action in the Alabama, Mis- a man to use the military radar at Tyndall Air sissippi, Louisiana areas was generally the local Force Base, Panama City, Florida, on August Civil befense unit in the centers of larger 15. Also, on August 15 an electronic technician population or the police office in smaller com- was dispatched to help at Weather Bureau munities. Office Key West, Florida. Weather Bureau officials from New Orleans weather Bureau personnel were detailed and Mobile, the offices serving the Gulf coast from Weather Bureau headquarters in Wash- area most affected by hurricane CAMILLE, ington, D. C., the Southern Regional headquar- had attended biennial preparedness meetings ters in Fort Worth; Texas, or other duty sta- sponsored by four of the larger Civil Defense tions to provide specialized assistance at seven agencies. All smaller Civil Defense units and different Weather Bureau offices along the east police from surrounding areas also were invited and Gulf coasts between August 14th and 17th. to attend. Weather related problems and pre- As the warnings were moved westward person- paredness actions to combat them were dis- nel were shifted to cover the new area of con- cussed extensively. At least once annually the cern. officials in charge of local Civil Defense and At the suggestion of Weather Bureau Fore- community preparedness are visited individ- cast Office New Orleans, a statement was is- ually by ~eteorolo~ists-in-chargeof nearby sued by Weather Bureau Office Mobile, at about Weather Bureau offices. The New Orleans office 5 am on August 17, advising the evacuation of uses its VHF equipment effectively to broadcast the low-lying areas from Bay St. Louis, Missis- weather information, but the Mobile Weather sippi, to Mobile, Alabama. Bureau must place heavy dependence for pro- Telephone contact was made immediately by viding weather information for dissemination the Mobile Weather Bureau Airport Station to by radio and television stations in the Mobile WLOX-TV in Biloxi, and to Civil Defense Di- area on a direct wire Emergency Broadcast rectors in Pascagoula, Biloxi, and Gulfport, put- System (EBS) which is a land-line circuit with ting them on full alert. The warning was then two-way capability between Weather Bureau relayed by Civil Defense to all radio stations and Civil Defense offices and one-way to five in the area, and broadcasting of the Weather radio and TV stations. Of the four remaining Bureau advisories and bulletins and local emex- non-participating stations in the Mobile area, gency information became continuous. one-WALA-TV-depends on ESSA Weather Similar statements were issued almost simul- Wire service. Mobile newspapers are served by taneously from Weather Bureau Forecast Office national wire services or through telephone New Orleans covering the low-lying areas from contact. In the Mississippi coastal area of re- Bay St. Louis to Grand Isle, Louisiana. These sponsibility only two stations-WLOX-TV Bi- statements reached all Civil Defense and po- loxi and WGCM Gulfport-subscribe to the lice officials in the affected areas almost imme- ESSA Weather Wire service. All other mass diately. This was about 12 hours prior to winds media in the area obtain their weather infor- of any consequence being reported along the mation from UP1 and/or AP wire service. Di- coast. rect contact with the Weather Bureau in Mobile By 9 :30 am the Hurricane Emergency Infor- is made by telephone. mation Center in Mobile was staffed by an In- formation Officer from ESSA headquarters in C. Specific Action Washington, to assist in the flow of news be- tween the Weather Bureau and the media for Because of Hurricane CAMILLE'S earIy the duration of the emergency. VHF radio in New Orleans, the Emergency Bosworth, Head, Pascagoula Civil Defense; Broadcast System in Mobile and the ESSA Mrs. Julia Guice, Head, Biloxi Civil Defense; Weather Wire provided continuous service of and Wade Guice, Head, Harrison County, Mis- hurricane information. Press wire service was sissippi, Civil Defense---it was estimated that covered by UP1 in the Mobile Weather Bureau 2,000 people were evacuated in Mobile County, Office. The AP was represented in the Mobile Alabama; 26,000 in Jackson County, Missis- Press-Register office. sippi; 41,000 in Harrison County (including ,D~~~~~the morning hours of sunday, 25,000 moving to shelters at Keesler Air Force gust 17, officials briefed other local government in the area where damagewas the officials on the hurricane warnings. Evacuation fleatest. of areas below 20 feet elevation was begun im- Since it is almost a certainty that a majority mediately in some cases, but was delayed until of people remaining in the low-lying areas early afternoon in one case. Through contact ~ouldhave been lost, one can assume that at with the President of the Parish Council, least 50,000 people were probably saved by the evacuation of low areas in Plaquemines Parish combined efforts of the Weather Bureau, Civil was begun as early as Saturday since their ex- Defense, and police as well as news media. All perience with was still a Civil Defense officials conbcted firmly believe, vivid memory. Four persons, however, hid to without exception, that the timeliness and con- avoid evacuation. One was rescued, the other tent of Weather Ihreau warnings were excel- three perished. Fishing and boating camps lent and responsible for saving many, many along Lakes Pontchartrain, Catherine, and lives. Borgue were also alerted and emptied. Officials It can be said that the greatest problem in estimate that 12,000 persons were moved out warning of Great Hurricane CAMILLE was of Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana. disbelief. The people could not relate the awe- Along the , police and some Power of this storm to anything in their Civil Defense and volunteers made heroic ef- experience. Winds of 190 miles per hour or forts to warn and remove people. These efforts "Ore, and tides of 20 feet or more, were beyond continued until rising tides and wind made it the limits impossible to move about. Regardless of the careful planning and fore- Radio and television stations in Gulfport, sight which had gone into preparing the com- Biloxi, and Pascagoula remained on the air munities for action, regardless of the warnings broadcasting a steady flow of storm informa- which gave more than 12 hours in which to tion, urgent pleas from local officials for evac- reach safety, repeated visits by police and Civil uation from critical areas, and bulletins from Defense workers were needed to ~onvincethe local emergency sources until power was lost tardy or the stubborn of their danger. No one or the station was destroyed. with a true understanding of the situation would have chosen to remain, yet there are It has been estimated by Civil Defense offi- tragic instances of those who did. cials that 99 percent of the people living below 20 feet elevation along the Mississippi Gulf D. Findings and Recommendations coast Were evacuated and the remainder were The Task Group finds that the warnings were fully warned, but chose to "ride out the stmm'' timely and better than the average injaccuracy. for One reason or another. Some Were forcibly There is no question that greater advanced removed from their homes by police. In one warning would have been valuable. known case, a floup of 34 people who were Hurricane CAMILLE, probably the most definitely warned perished and in another a ,ioUs to strike the United states,was party of 23 were lost. Four people died in relatively small, with hurricane-force winds Jackson in ''aquemines Parish, and covering a circular area only about 175 miles the probably approach 200 in Harm in diameter. This allowed land-line communica- rison County. tions to function almost until the storm was In statements made by Captain Howard T. upon the area along the Gulf coast which was Black, Head, Mobile Civil Defense; Warren R. eventually severely damaged. All communication equipment except as noted areas are more expensive than some potential below operated without interruption before and subscribers can afford. This is particularly true during the storm at all ESSA facilities. Two in smaller communities. principal weather data distribution systems Public telephone was relied on for communi- were out from 9:20 pm CDT August 17 until cation between Weather Bureau Office Mobile 8 am CDT August 18 at Mobile, Alabama. and Civil Defense agencies and broadcasters There was a power outage at Mobile from 9: 35 in southern Mississippi. Circuit overloading am CDT August 18 until 10:20 am CDT Au- caused temporary outages, especially as the gust 18. Weather Bureau Meteorological Office storm approached the coast. Busy telephones Boothville, Louisiana, lost land-line communi- were frequently a problem. Telephone lines cations at 5 pm on August 17 and all other were lost entirely in southern Mississippi when communications were lost permanently at 7: 35 the storm was very near the coast. pm on August 17. Weather Bureau Office Mo- Amateur radio operators were on standby bile and all Civil Defense units in their area at Weather Bureau Forecabt Office New Or- of warning responsibility went on standby leans and Weather Bureau Office Mobile to op emergency power during the late evening hours erate on citizen and short wave bands to Civil of August 17, prior to the storm's passage in- Defense units in the event of the loss of tele- land. Commercial power and telephone service phone lines. This was not required during the was lost at 10:30 pm August 17 in southern hurricane. Mississippi for periods of up to four days. There is ample evidence of outstanding serv- Weather Bureau Forecast Office New Orleans ice to the coastal communities by the local radio and Weather Bureau Office Mobile have State and television stations during hurricane CA- National Warning Service (NAWAS) drops. MILLE. All stations stayed on the air with a New Orleans uses this means to contact Civil steady flow of weather information, and there Defense in New Orleans. Mobile uses this as was unanimous agreement by station officials backup to ESSA Weather Wire and Emergency that warnings were received in time to alert Broadcast System. Montgomery NAWAS Con- the communities. trol can patch through from Alabama NAWAS Mississippi stations, however, operating with- to Mississippi NAWAS Control in Jackson, out direct contact with the Mobile Weather Mississippi, for relay of information to Missis- Bureau Office, expressed the need of an "official sippi Civil Defense units in Mobile County voice" from the Weather Bureau to emphasize warning responsibility area. This was not the urgency of the warnings. People did not needed for this storm. Weather Bureau Office fully credit the authority of the warnings issued Jackson, Mississippi, did give weather infor- by their local staff and in many instances were mation over Mississippi NAWAS routinely. slow to respond. VHF radio was used by Weather Bureau This need for continuous news dissepination Forecast Office New Orleans very effectively between Weather Bureau offices and the mass during the storm to feed continuous flow of media-in both local and remote areas of re- weather information to people within a 25-mile sponsibility-is being met by the establishment radius of New Orleans city center. Many re- of the Hurricane Emergency Information Cen- broadcasts were made of this information by ter, employing the "pool" broadcast technique. other radio stations. Better VHF coverage is a Complete familiarity with the plan is necessary must in many Gulf coastal areas in order to for coordination between radio and television get warnings directly to the public as quickly stations and the Weather Bureau office in mak- as possible and in their original form. ing the relatively simple installation. The task ESSA Weather Wire was the principal means group urges that this service be kept fresh in of relaying weather information to Civil De- the minds of broadcasters, by recall and ex- fense, radio and TV, and police officials in Mo- planation at annual hurricane preparedness bile and in Louisiana. It was available as backup meetings. at one Civil Defense agency in Mississippi (by It is recommended that positive action be taken telephone relay from another subscriber). The to ensure the maintenance of community action ESSA Weather Wire tariff charges in some plans where they now exist, with the ESSA Weather Bureau taking the lead in helping lic and responsible authority, be installed as coastal communities develop plans where no planned on the Gulf and Atlantic coasts. At the preparedness plan existed before. same time, it is recommended that the installa- It is further recommended that VHF-FM tion of urgently needed emergency power gen- Weather Broadcasts, an extremely effective erators be accelerated at all locations respon- means of communicating with the general pub- sible for warning dissemination.

A Navy WC-121 Super Constellation of the type used for weather reconnaissance and "hurricane I~untinv," viewed from the coclcpit of a sister ship.

10 Chapter Ill Data Collection and Communications

A. Surface Observation Networks Network (CHURN) stations, which report data The surface observing networks provide basic for immediate use upon request. data for many uses and they include a variety The network of reporting stations (a) in the of data collection systems which are, to the southeastern United States is shown in Figure extent feasible, tailored to serve all appropriate 1. These stations are manned to provide com- uses. In general the networks are divided into plete surface observational data on assigned two classes: (a) the stations that provide data schedules. Observations taken at these stations for immediate use and for record purposes, and provide a data base for all weather analysis, (b) the substations that provide data primarily forecasting, warning, and weather service pro- for record purposes. Included in the substation grams of the Nation and a significant input to group, class (b), are stations which also report the climatology of the Nation. At the present rainfall amounts under certain conditions de- time the spacing between stations in the south- scribed below for immediate use, coastal sta- eastern United States averages about 65 to 70 tions, and Cooperative Hurricane Reporting miles inland from the coast and about 75 to 85

0 STATIONS TAKING OBSERVATIONS LESS THAN 24 HOURS PER DAY 310 STATIONS PROVIDING SYNOPTIC OBSERVATIONS OR ADDITIVE + DATA AT SYNOPTIC OBSERVATION TIME 383 384w

Fig. 1.-Network of Observing Stations Reporting on CAMILLE miles in the coastal areas. To describe ade- in the Bahamas, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, and Do- quately phenomena associated with hurricane minica be replaced. events the spacing between stations should be about 40 miles along and within 100 miles of B. Upper-Air Observations the coasts and about 65 to 70 miles inland from Upper-air observations include measure- the coasts. ments of pressure, temperature, water vapor, Off-shore weather reports are obtained for and wind direction and speed at various levels immediate use from a few platforms near the in the atmosphere from the surface up to about shore operated by the oil industry, an automatic 100,000 feet. The primary type of upper-air ob- buoy station operated by the Navy in the Gulf servation is the rawinsonde observation. These of Mexico, and cooperative ships sailing are taken at 94 ESSA ground stations and 38 through waters of the Gulf of Mexico, the other cooperative and special project station lo- Caribbean Sea, and the Atlantic Ocean. At the cations (financed by Department of Defense), present time reports from the cooperative ships and by 15 moving ships, including merchant, during daylight hours are such that if they Military Sea Transport Service, and ESSA were evenly distributed over the western At- Coast and Geodetic Survey vessels. lantic and Gulf of Mexico the spacing between In the southeastern United States land based reporting points would be about 110 miles. At upper-air stations in the path of hurricane night fewer reports are received from the co- CAMILLE are spaced at intervals of 180 to 300 operative ships and the average spacing be- miles (See Figure 2). The Gulf area south of comes about 360 miles. Merchant ships, how- the U.S. mainland is considered a data-sparse ever, tend to travel along a relatively few sea area insofar as upper-air observations are con- lanes, thus, weather reports from such sources cerned. Merida, Mexico, Grand Cayman Island, are not evenly spaced but are concentrated and Swan Island provide Gulf upper-air data along the main shipping routes. south and southeast of the point where CA- Except for worn-out and obsolete equipment MILLE struck the mainland. The nearest of problems in the islands of the Caribbean, the these stations, Merida, is located some 450 surface observation networks functioned ade- miles south of Boothville, Louisiana. The effi- quately until the time CAMILLE crossed the ciency of all of these stations is adversely af- United States coast line. At that time further fected by obsolete equipment badly in need of observational equipment was destroyed at the replacement. Weather Bureau facility at Gulfport and 16 The performance of strategic upper-air sta- cooperative hurricane reporting stations were tions during the hurricane was considered ex- destroyed. In addition, tide gages and related cellent. Except for Boothville, Louisiana, which equipment at Dauphin Island and Pensacola, was located in the direct path of the storm, no Florida, were destroyed. critical station missed any scheduled observa- It is recommended that immediate action be tions during the passage of the hurricane. Many taken to replace the facilities and equipment of these stations obtained special observations damaged or destroyed by CAMILLE, and that: on the request of the National Hurricane Cen- -observing equipment be installed on at least ter. Boothville obtained its last observation at five additional off-shore oil platforms in the 18 GMT* on August 17 (a special requested Gulf of Mexico; by NHC) but by the scheduled 00 GMT obser- -at least 14 new Cooperative Hurricane Re- vation on August 18 no further program was porting Network (CHURN) stations be estab- possible because of hurricane-force winds and lished at Coast Guard stations and marinas high water. The station was subsequently inun- along the Gulf and Atlantic coasts; dated by flood, resulting in heavy damage, and arrangements have been made to operate a tem- -the cooperating merchant ship observational porary upper-air program at the NASA Mis- program be expanded; -the continuous-reading tide-gage program be *The 24-hour clock and Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) is the time standard utilized in this chapter. expanded to improve real-time observation of Eastern Standard Time on the 24-hour clock can be tidal levels; and obtained by subtracting 5 hours from Greenwich Mean -the worn-out and obsolete equipment used Time. (200-KM. CIRCLES)

Fig. 2.-Upper-Air Coverage in Area of Hurricane CAMILLE sissippi Test Facility until the Boothville sta- when conditions indicate severe storms or rap- tion can be put back into operation. idly changing weather. Local use radar pro- It .is recommended that immediate action be vides information for short-period forecasts taken to restore the Boothvitle Weather Sta- and warnings in the immediate area. tion and to provide assistance to the Caribbean The radar network includes 92 ESSA sta- and Latin American countries to update their tions, of which 56 are equipped with World upper-air facilities; and that the frequencg of War I1 surplus radars with limited capability upper-air observations at Vera Crux, Maxatlan, (local use), and 36 are equipped with modern Mexico City, St. Maarten, Trinidad, and - radars (WSR-57) specifically designed for bados be increased to two per day. weather surveillance. These modern radars are located mainly in the tornado belt of the Mid- C. Radar Network west along the hurricane-vulnerable Gulf Radar observations include the detection and and Atlantic coasts. ESSA's radar network is measurement of precipitation, and identifica- supplemented by observations from Air Force tion and tracking of squall lines, hurricanes, and Navy installations which participate in an tornadoes, and other severe storms. These ob- interagency Federal network designed to pro- servations provide systematic measurements of vide 24-hour weather radar surveillance over location, height, and intensity of precipitation, all critical areas of the Nation. and are made hourly when precipitation is ob- WSR-57 radars are located at ApaJachicola, served within the area and more frequently Florida, New Orleans, Louisiana, Jackson, Mis- sissippi, and Lake Charles, Louisiana. There D. Satellite Reconnaissance of Hurricane are World War I1 local use radars at San Juan, CAMILLE Puerto Rico, Mobile, Alabama, Baton Rouge, ESSA's National Environmental Satellite Louisiana, and Meridian, Mississippi. Except Center (NESC) is responsible for acquiring, for brief power failures at Jackson and Mobile, processing, and analyzing satellite data as pro- the radars operated continuously throughout vided in the National Hurricane Operations the hurricane, transmitting reports on the eye Plan. The plan outlines specific support which position and extent of precipitation on a regu- NESC is to provide to hurricane forecasting lar hourly schedule. Special observations of the offices. eye positions were also transmitted regularly Table I summarizes the operational data-han- at half hour intervals. Excellent photographic dling of CAMILLE through August 20. The records were made at the four WSR-57 sta- time of observation is the time of the satellite tions. Eye positions were routinely reported to picture which viewed the stom. The positions ranges of 200 nautical miles. Figure 3 illus- from August 10 through 17 are those which trates the eye positions reported from the New were given in the Satellite Weather Bulletin Orleans radar. (SWB) . The positions from August 18 through It is recommended that the obsolete radar 20 are vortex center positions obtained from equipment at Sun Juan, Puerto Rico, which oc- post-analysis of the pictures. cupies a key location in the Tropics, should be The times for "bulletin sent" are the times replaced by a modern radar as soon as possible, that Satellite Weather Bulletins were filed at and that installation of remote readouts at the Weather Bureau Communications Center nearby Weather Bureau ofices from existing in Suitland for transmission. Telephone confer- Weather Radar Ofices along the Gulf and At- ences with Miami on bulletin content in each lantic coasts should proceed as planned. case preceded "bulletin sent'' time by 15 to 30 minutes. "Picture data transmittedJ' time indicates first transmission on the Forecast Office Fac- simile Network. ESSA-8 times are for APT picture relay; ESSA-9 times are for mapped digital data. Figure 4 contains a plot of ESSA-8 and -9 positions of CAMILLE and a preliminary plot of the storm track. A post-analysis of the actual ESSA-8 and -9 data, which was used to prepare the Satellite Weather Bulletins, was performed by the Ap- plications Group, NESC. This was compared with the operational interpretation. After Au- gust 14, when the storm was well organized, the average difference between the operation- ally arrived-at storm positions and the post- analysis positions was 18 miles. While there were some differences between the operational and post-analysis classifications and diameter measurements, the resulting differences in wind estimates were not more than ,+ 15 knots with an average difference of only f 1 knot. The op- erational interpretation of the pictures by op- erational personnel is therefore judged to be correct with the accuracy of the bulletin posi- Fig. 3.-Eye Positions Reported by New Orleans tions limited only by the gridding accuracy. TABLE I SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL SATELLITE DATA-HANDLING FOR CAMILLE

1969 August Time of Lat. & Long. Bulletin Picture Data Date observation Satellite Position Sent Transmitted 10 18472 E-9 16N-62W 21402 11/00302 11 17612 E-9 17N-66W 12/06002 --- 12 13362 E-8 17N-72W 16002 14202 18492 E-9 18N-72 W 23002 12/01632 (3) 13 03632 N-3 ------14272 E-8 18N-78W 16302 16222 19482 E-9 19N-77.6W 22102 Not Sent (4) 14 --- N-3 ------16182 E-8 19.6N-81W 16602 16302 18622 E-9 19.6N-82.6W 22402 (2) 16/0030Z 16 06692 N-3 ------14142 E-8 21N-84W 14602 16032 19602 E-9 21.6N-84.6W 22662 22362 (6) 16 06182 N-3 ------15002 E-8 24N-86W 16202 16222 18682 E-9 24.6N-87.6W 21602 22362 (6) 17 0616 N-3 ------16612 E-8 27.6N-88W 16862 16302 19632 E-9 28N-89W 22262 22362 (6) 18 06302 N-3 ------14472 E-8 32.6N-90W 16222 16222 19002 E-9 33N-90.6W --- 19/00302 19 04602 N-3 ------16382 E-8 37.6N-86W --- 1630Z 19462 E-9 37N-84W --- 20/00302 20 06632 N-3 ------14362 E-8 38N-78W --- 16222 18602 E-9 37N-76W --- 21/00302 Note: All times are Greenwich Mean Time. (1) Position and description given in Remarks Section of "Satellite Tropical Disturbance Summary," a daily scheduled transnlission at 06002. (2) Bulletin excessively delayed due to photo-processing equipment breakdown. (3) Delayed FAX transmission. Computer outage. (4) Line outage, Gilmore Creek to Suitland. (5) Special transmission 1:7,000,000 scale digitally mapped picture centered on CAMILLE. Fig. ,$.-Satellite Reconnaissance of Hurricane CAMILLE T~ack,August 14-22, 1969 The latter was within the established opera- have been useful in estimating the rate of tional limits. growth of the storm as well as estimates of the Satellite information was used by National environmental winds over the ocean and seas. Hurricane Center as an alternative means of It is recommended that data from the exist- tracking the storm. It was particularly valu- ing Applications Technology Satellite series be able in tracking CAMILLE in its incipient made available to the hurricane warning service stages across the tropical North Atlantic from on a real-time basis until the Geostationuw Africa. It was a valuable tool in directing the Operational Environmental Satellite system aerial reconnaissance flights into the right enters service. areas and provided good estimates of CA- MILLE'S position at times of doubtful aerial E. Aerial Reconnaissance* fixes. ATS-I11 pictures are acquired by NASA at In the National Hurricane Operations Plan Rosrnan, North Carolina. Pictures from this the policy is established that "The Air Force satellite were taken during the period of Au- and Navy will share the reconnaissance respon- gust 15 through 21, from approximately 4: 30 sibility on an equal basis for providing fixes am EST through 6 pm EST. Pictures were and investigative flights on tropical cyclones taken each day at 10-minute intervals. No com- and hurricanes in the Atlantic, Caribbean and munications were available to transmit these Gulf of Mexico areas in accordance with the pictures to NESC or Miami for interpretation. following; . . ." The Director of the National If these data had been available, they would Hurricane Center has the responsibility for identifying the operational requirements for 0045 GMT position on the 15th was off the "best hurricane reconnaissance. He is charged with track" by approximately 40 miles. the responsibility of advising the Chief, Aerial 2. While the hurricane was immediately Reconnaissance Coordinator, Atlantic Hurri- south of Cuba, the ESSA Research Flight Fa- canes, (CARCAH) of the aircraft reconnais- cility performed the reconnaissance because of sance requirements of the hurricane center. the restriction upon military overflight of Cuba. The CARCAH is responsible for the coordina- 3. On August 16 the Air Force aborted its tion and the final preparation of the reconnais- mission at 0000 GMT due to the loss of radar sance Plan of the Day and for the scheduling and radio. of aircraft required to meet the provisions of 4. The Navy accomplished four radar fixes the plan. Furthermore, the National Hurricane on the center of the storm at 0500, 0640, 0900, Operation Plan stipulates that plans for air- and 1200 GMT on the 16th. On the later fix craft reconnaissance shall be prepared by the the lowest sea-level pressure of the storm was CARCAH in consultation with the Director of reported to be 996 mb with a surface wind of the National Hurricane Center. When the 80 knots. flights by ESSA Research Flight Facility are 5. An Air Force penetration of the storm was to be made, the Chief of the Research Flight accomplished at 1835 GMT on the 16th at Facility will participate in the planning. In 24: 22N and 86: 04W when, at this time, a cen- practice and in accord with the agreement be- tral sea-level pressure of 908 mb was reported, tween the Air Force and Navy to share the which was a new record for lowest pressure of responsibility for hurricane reconnaissance, the any Atlantic hurricane. Six hours later at 0016 Research Flight Facility participates only in GMT August 17 the same Air Force crew re- hurricane reconnaissance whenever it is neces- entered the storm at 25 :15N and 87 :14W and sary in and over the territory of Cuba. This reported surface wind of 90 knots and a central is because the Cuban Government has given pressure of 905 mb. permission for only civilian aircraft of the United States to fly over Cuba in connection 6. On August 17 the Navy again provided with hurricane reconnaissance. The plan pro- five fixes by radar. Penetration was not 'at- ceeds to identify that requirements for opera- tempted because of the storm's intensity. An tional data are primary and suggests that every analysis of the reported positions and their com- possible effort should be made to meet the re- parison with the "best track" position indicate quirements for research data, implying that this there may have been some navigational difficul- should be done without affecting the fulfillment ties or radar positioning problems experienced of the needs for operational data. inasmuch as the first and second positions of A review of the aerial reconnaissance activity this group deviate significantly from the "best based upon the records retained by CARCAH, track." However, the other fixes were on "best reveals the following chronology : track." 1. CAMILLE was located by Navy reconnais- 7. Finally, the Air Force penetrated the sance at 1440 GMT on August 14, 1969, at storm at 1815 GMT on the 17th at 28: 12N and 19 :05N and 81.45W. Lowest sea-level pressure 88 :46W, established the central sea-level pres- was 999 mb with a maximum surface wind of sure at 901 mb and the surface wind at 180 50 knots. At 0045 GMT on August 15, Navy knots. A truly great hurricane. At this time reconnaissance fixed the position at 19 :57N and the hurricane was under the surveillance of 81: 10W. The lowest sea-level pressure was re- several shore-based radars and no further aerial corded as 991 mb with maximum surface wind reconnaissance was requested. of 50 knots. At 0600 GMT reconnaissance placed This chronology is shown in Figure 5. the position of the hurricane at 20:02N and The National Hurricane Center has estab- 83:19W. A subsequent analysis of these posi- lished requirements for the reconnaissance air- tions based upon a comparison with the "best craft to establish the position of the hurricane, track" of the hurricane derived from all in- the lowest sea-level pressure in the storm, and formation available, including satellite, radar, the maximum surface winds. These are speci- and surface weather reports, indicates that the fied in the National Hurricane Operations Plan. Fig. 5.-Summarg of Aircraft Reconnaissance They cannot be accomplished without the pene- ricane Center requirements can be met by pene- tration of the aircraft to the center of the trations at any level. storm. The Navy procedure for flying in hur- It is recommended that the Director of the ricanes specifies that the penetration will not National Hurricane Center specify the details be made in the event that the eye of the storm of his requirements for altitude of hurricane is less than 15 miles in diameter and/or the penetrations, and these be included in the Plan surface wind speeds higher than 120 knots. of the Day. These are safety of flight restrictions which It is further recommended that action be un- were a key factor in a storm of this magnitude. dertaken leading to improvement in the air- It seems that the Navy's capability to penetrate craft and sensory equipment used in aerial re- the storm and acquisition of the required data connaissance.* would be enhanced with more suitable aircraft. It is established that the Air Force radar is F. Communications not optimum for the job at hand although there Five major communications networks pro- is no assurance that installation of a different vide service for data collection from the array radar would not change the operating charac- of ESSA observation stations : teristics of the aircraft. a) Service C Teletypewriter Network com- The ESSA Research Flight Facility suffers prising six circuits operated by the FAA, col- from a number of the deficiencies currently lects and distributes most of the United States recognized in the Navy aircraft fleet. The ob- synoptic surface and upper-air data as well as servational equipment package aboard the Re- basic public forecasts. It also carries similar search Flight Facility is outdated. The aircraft data from parts of Canada and Mexico. platforms are roughly of the same vintage as b) Service A Teletypewriter Network has 60 those operated by the Navy and are overdue circuits operated by the FAA and collects and for replacement by modern aircraft. The Re- distributes hourly surface observations. It is search Flight Facility is not, however, opera- primarily an aviation system and carries prod- tionally restricted to flying into hurricanes. ucts of the Aviation weather Service. In addi- Because of aircraft and equipment limitations tion to U.S. civilian stations, this system also currently experienced by the Air Force and carries data from U. S. military stations and the Navy, the operational mission of the Re- reports from Canada, Mexico, and the Carib- search Flight Facility should continue to pro- bean. vide support to the hurricane reconnaissance c) Service 0 Teletypewriter Network has 23 program. This should cover at least the period long line, radio and cable circuits operated by of time required to modernize the Department the FAA, and exchanges meteorological infor- of Defense equipment currently in use. It would mation between the United States and foreign permit a larger choice of equipment at times countries. Most of the synoptic surface and when penetration might not otherwise be pos- upper-air data from the Caribbean, Mexico, and sible. Central America is carried on this system. A standardized instrument package for the d) RAWARC (Radar Report and Warning use of both the operational and R&D type re- Coordination) Teletypewriter Network em- connaissance should be developed. This would ploys five 75-word-per-minute circuits operated require considerable coordination among the by ESSA Weather Bureau. It collects and dis- three services both in the coordination and the tributes radar reports and stom warning in- development of requirements. It would enhance formation. Observations from the Cooperative the use of data for research purposes collected Hurricane Reporting Network (CHURN) may by different aircraft. be carried on this system. Finally, it is noted that the Navy reconnais- e) East Coast Circuit (7072), operated by sance operations are conducted at 1500 feet or *A special analysis of hurricane reconnaissance needs less above sea level. This stems from a Navy is being undertaken by the Federal Coordinator for requirement for data and it is noted that pen& Meteorological Services and separate recommendations trations at this level are not a requirement of on this phase of the hurricane tracking problem will the National Hurricane Center. National Hur- be made. ESSA Weather Bureau, collects and distributes in communicating to National Hurricane Cen- surface and upper-air data from land stations ter significant reconnaissance information con- and ships operating in the Atlantic Ocean, Car- cerning the position and intensities of hurri- ibbean Sea, and Gulf of Mexico. It also car- canes. The utilization of high-frequency radio ries forecasts and adminstrative traffic. communications facilities, in-flight, frequently No unusual problems were reported in the requires time-consuming relays because of collection of observational data essential to the propagation difficulties. The utilization of a preparation of forecasts and warnings appli- synchronous satellite for communications re- cable to hurricane CAMILLE. It should be lay might be a solution. noted, however, that as a consequence of auto- It is recommended that the Department of mation of the Aeronautical Fixed Telecom- Transportation's Federal Aviation Administm- munications Net (AFTN) there has been a big tion be apprised of the impact of ciny loss or turnover in FAA communications personnel at delay of information used in issuing hurricane Miami and San Juan. w arwings. Operating with staff vacancies and inexperi- enced personnel contributes to the delay and It is further recommended that a compara- sometimes loss of surface and upper-air ob- tive study be made of existli.ng highrfrequenc?j servations and aircraft reconnaissance reports radio, satellite microwave, and other communi- needed to support hurricane forecasting. cations systems, to determine the best system Considerable difficulty has been experienced for use in hurricane emergencies.

At the National Hurricane Center in M6r7t11,(L mclcorolo!lisl, si~tdirsrnosniccd satellite pholoqrcrpl~sof hurricane. (From motion picture HURRICANE!) Chapter IV The Forecasts of CAMILLE

It is clear that the warning was timely as displacement error in anticipating the future evidenced by the massive evacuation that was position of the storm. In the case of the first completed before the storm struck. A review error, the present ability to position the storm of Attachment A which details the chronology by the best method (aerial reconnaissance) is of the forecasts, warnings, and advisories con- probably no better than about +lo miles. Satel- cerning CAMILLE shows that a consistent bias lite reconnaissance can position the storm with existed in the early prediction of CAMILLE'S an accuracy of about +18 miles. The error in motions. These early forecasts consistently in- predicted displacement is a function of the dicated a more easterly movement than was forecasters' skill and meteorological knowledge. actually experienced. However, this was ad- It will vary from the one meteorological situa- justed at 5 am August 17 to provide 15 hours tion to another largely because of an imperfect of warning to the particular segment of the understanding and description of the atmos- coastline most affected. More time would have pheric process involved. Bearing this in mind been desirable. However, the team agrees that the average error in the official forecasts, com- the forecasts issued compare favorably with puted from the "best track" position, is ap- the capability of the state of the meteorological proximately 100 miles in 24 hours. This com- science and our present understanding of hur- pares with the long-term average error ricanes. experienced in the eastern Gulf of Mexico of The National Hurricane Center has devel- 115 miles in 24 hours. The average error in oped and uses special meteorological tools in- predictions using the NHC-67 objective fore- cluding climatological probability data designed cast was not significantly different. A com- for the specific job of forecasting hurricanes. parison of these forecasts is shown on Figures The forecaster varies his tools for the job to 6 and 7. be done. At this time there is no substitute for The ESSA Weather Bureau has assigned to experience, since much of the decision process its National Meteorological Center the respon- is based upon subjective evaluation of the rela- sibility for the preparation of broad-scale fore- tive significance of the several meteorological casts to be used as guidance by its forecast variables. offices. The individual forecast offices adapt It is standard practice to evaluate all official this material to the particular forecast prob- forecasts of hurricane motion with the best lem at hand. The National Hurricane Center estimate of the track of the storm. Table I1 is a prime user of these materials as basic provides the "best track" of hurricane CA- input to hurricane predictions. The following MILLE at the times indicated. Here the posi- illustrates how they can be used. tions predicted by the official forecast are also One of the problems faced by the hurricane compared with the positions predicted by the forecaster Saturday evening, August 16, was best objective statistical forecast. This statis- the influence on CAMILLE of a 500-millibar tical forecast is referred to as NHC-67 and it trough then over the Mississippi Valley. A is designed for use with 00 GMT and 12 GMT significant eastward movement of this trough input data only. When comparing the official would favor a recurvature of CAMILLE while, forecast with either the "best track" or the if the trough remained stationary or moved objective forecast, one must remember that the very slowly, continued north-northwest move- error in forecast position is made up of two ment of CAMILLE could be expected. Here the parts: the first is the error of the initial posi- National Hurricane Center is dependent upon tion; the second is the prediction error. These the National Meteorological Center for the pre- two errors define a vector which represents the diction of such large-scale mid-latitude fea- Fig. 6.--Oficial Forecast Displacement Eworor Table II "BEST TRACK" POSITIONS OF HURRICANE CAMILLE 24 hr. Omcia1 Fore- 24 hr. NHC 67 Fore- Best Track Advisory cast Position verify- cast Position verify- Position Position ing Date/time. ing Date/time. Date Time Lat. Long. Lat. Long. Lat. Long. Lat. Long. 8/15 OOZ 06Z 122 182 8/16 OOZ 06Z 122 182 8/17 OOZ 06Z 122 18Z 8/18 ooz 062 122 18Z 8/19 OOZ 06Z 122 Fig. 7.-Numel.ica1 Objective Forecast Displacement Er~or tures. Figure 8 shows the 24-hour 500-millibar stacle is vital. Fortunately, technology in the forecast prepared at the National Meteorolog- form of the Geostationary Environmental Sat- ical Center. It successfully predicted the be- ellite and ATS-I11 satellites will permit a havior of the important features over the south- breakthrough here by improving the observa- eastern United States. This guidance forecast tional system supporting forecast operations. is typical of such forecasts provided during Details on tropical wind circulations that are the period. not otherwise available and vital to successful An important operational objective of the predictions will become available within about warning service is to improve the diagnostic three years. techniques for the tropical regions. Advances Finally, the team believes that the perform- in technique development have not been as ance of existing prediction models indicates rapid as in the more northern latitudes and the that there is considerable potential for improv- team concurs that improvement is desirable. ing the accuracy of the prediction of hurricane The utilization of low-level winds derived from motion through the development of improved emerging satellite technologies offers consider- mathematical models. A reduction in the pre- able promise. diction error from the present average of 115 Increasing dependence is being placed upon miles in 24 hours to the order of 75 miles seems improved atmospheric prediction models. The possible. largest single deterrent to use of improved models is necessarily related to the input data. It is recommended that a major research Thus a solution or circumvention of this ob- and development program be mounted with Fig. 8.-NMC Forecast and Verification, oOOOZ August 18, 1969

principal attention given to improvements in operational hurricane forecasting. Such an ef- fort should include the development of im- proved tropical analysis technique using low level winds derived from synchronous satellite data and the development of better numerical prediction models. It is further recommended that ESSA set a goal of reducing the displace- ment error (between predicted and observed position) to the order of 7.5 miles in 24 h,ours by 1974.

Ocean-going ships beached by CAMILLE at Gulfport, Mississippi.

2 Chapter V Economic Aspects and Priorities

CAMILLE had the potential of becoming the Of nearly equal importance to public educa- greatest national disaster in the history of the tion and preparedness is the continuing produc- United States. It is estimated that the 15-hour tion of quality service by Weather Bureau warning given the people between New Orleans facilities during storms. The need for maintain- and the Florida panhandle on August 17 saved ing an "official voice" from the Weather Bureau 50,000 lives. Without putting a price on human seems paramount in disasters such as this. life, it is evident that the hurricane warning While much has been learned about hurri- service and community actions which keep the canes, skill in their forecasting has reached a the population prepared for such disasters are plateau. The principal obstacles are related to earning their way. Here the success was not the improvements of the acquisition of mete the result of an ability to predict with precision orological data and development of improved for long periods in advance the course of the atmospheric models whose rapid numerical storm. Rather, it was the utilization of the solution will result in better forecasts. The sur- warning in conjunction with an extensive pre- vey team feels that improved forecast tech- paredness action leading to a planned response niques can reduce the 24-hour prediction error to a specific warning. from the present 115 miles in 24 hours to the Because of the size of their investments, order of 75 miles. If accomplished this would large shipping and industrial activities can be reduce significantly the unnecessary costs re- expected to be responsive to hurricane warn- sulting from overwarning. In that regard ings. This is not the case with the general Sugg's study* suggests protective action re- public. It has been estimated* that normally duces losses by 50 percent; from this an esti- we may only expect that 20 percent of the pop- mate is made that the hurricane warning serv- ulation will take protective action in response ice saves in excess of $32 million while to hurricane warnings. If this estimate is ac- spending or causing to be spent an additional cepted, then it follows that increased use of $7 million during the average season. Gross existing services through the placing of more forecast errors could cause unnecessary costs emphasis on public education and community which might range up to $17 million. preparedness programs will pay large divi- The strengthening of the hurricane warning dends. Within the overall hurricane warning system requires all three actions indicated service system including the data acquisition, above. The establishment of priorities is funda- communications, processing, interpretation, dis- mental to their orderly accomplishment. It is semination, information, and preparedness sub- recommended that highest priority be given to systems, we are convinced that additional in- the following: cremental expenditures in public education and 1. Public education and community pre- community preparedness programs will provide paredness programs. the largest immediate benefits. This will be true 2. Improved aircraft reconnaissance. until the majority of the communities along the U. S. Gulf and Atlantic coastline are pre- 3. Safe quarters and reliable power and pared to respond as was the case in CAMILLE. communication facilities. We do not believe that such response is uni- 4. Forecasting research and technique devel- formly possible now. opment based upon new technologies, to be accelerated as we approach a minimum stand- *Arnold A. Sugg, "Economic Aspects of Hurricanes," ard of preparedness and public awareness of Monthly Weather Review, Vol. 95, No. 3, March 1967, the consequences of a failure to respond to pp. 143-146. hurricane warnings. Attachment A Summary of CAMILLE'S Forecasts and Warnings

On Thursday, Aug. 14, a Navy xeconnais- reconnaissance plane found Camille had highest sance plane reconnoitering a in winds estimated at 90 miles per hour. Advisory the Caribbean encountered a fast-developing Number Five, issued at noon Friday, Aug. 15, depression which reached storm intensity while indicated that hurricane Camille was centered the aircraft was still in the area. Advisory near latitude 21.2 north, longitude 83.9 west, Number One on the new storm, to be known as or about 400 miles southwest of Miami. It Camille, was issued at 1 p.m. EDT that day stated that Camille would reach western Cuba by the Weather Bureau's National Hurricane around noon or a little later and precautions Center in Miami. should be taken immediately for rapidly in- At that time, Camille was located near creasing winds reaching hurricane force by latitude 19.3 north and longitude 82.3 west early afternoon and tides up to eight feet on or about 60 miles west of Grand Cayman or Cuba's southwest coast. 408 miles south of Miami. Camille was moving It forecast a turn to a more northerly course, west-northwestward at about 13 miles per hour and an increase in forward speed which would with strongest winds about 60 miles per hour bring the. storm into the Gulf of Mexico by over a very small area near the center. A bul- evening. It pointed out that small craft around letin was issued at 3 p.m. Advisory Number the should not venture far from Two was issued at 6 p.m. on Aug. 14, saying shore and those around Western Cuba should indications were that the storm would pass be in safe harbor. A bulletin issued at 3 p.m. on near the western tip of Cuba that night or Friday, Aug. 15, said that an ESSA reconnais- early the next morning, moving northwestward sance plane reported steady intensification, and at 10-12 miles per hour. It was forecast that somewhat slower movement as it approached the storm would go into the Gulf of Mexico. southwest Cuba coast. The eye of the hurricane Another bulletin was issued at 9 p.m. EDT was clearly in view of the weather radar in on the 14th, indicating no important change. Havana, which was supplying regular reports At midnight Thursday, Aug. 14, Advisory to the National Hurricane Center. This bul- Number Three was issued. It stated that letin said Camille, while still an immature Camille took a more northerly course. This was young hurricane with a very small intense core, based on a Navy reconnaissance flight report. was nevertheless the most intense hurricane At that time, there was no significant change since Beulah of 1967. Maximum winds were at in intensity. least 115 miles per hour and over water areas A bulletin was issued on Friday, Aug. 15 gale force winds extended outward into the at 3 a.m. stating that Camille was "plodding" eastern Florida strait area. At 6 p.m. on Fri- toward the Isle of Pines. At 6 a.m., on Friday, day, Aug. 15, Advisory Number Six was issued, Aug. 15, Advisory Number Four was issued, stating that the storm was at latitude 21.5 stating that Camille was still heading toward north and longitude 84.4 west or about 270 extreme western Cuba with indications that miles southwest of Key West. This position was hurricane force would be reached that morning based upon Air Force reconnaissance, land- and hit extreme western Cuba around noon or based radar, ship, and island reports. It said a little later. It forecast a slight turn to more the hurricane was expected to enter the Gulf northerly movement after Camille passed Cuba of Mexico early Saturday morning, Aug. 16 and would enter the Gulf of Mexico later that and proceed north over the eastern Gulf at a day. At 9 a.m. that day, a bulletin said Camille slightly increased forward speed. It stressed had become a full-fledged hurricane. An ESSA that all interests along the eastern Gulf of Mexico should remain in close touch with all Orleans Weather Bureau office. It stated that future advisories and bulletins. A bulletin was hurricane warnings had been issued on the issued at 9 p.m. Friday, Aug. 15, stating the northwest Florida coast from Fort Walton to eye was over extreme western Cuba and was St. Marks and gale warnings elsewhere from under surveillance of the Key West and Havana Pensacola to Cedar Key, effective at 11 a.m. radars. Another bulletin, citing no change, was that day, CDT. It added that "preparations for issued at 11 p.m. hurricane force winds and five-to-ten-foot tides At midnight Friday, Aug. 15, Advisory Num- in the area from Fort Walton to St. Marks ber Seven was issued. It stated that small craft should be started immediately and completed around Florida should observe caution. It called tonight." At 11 a.m., she was centered near Camille "a dangerous hurricane" entering the latitude 24.5 and longitude 86.0, or about 380 east portion of the Gulf of Mexico and said it miles south of Panama City, Florida, moving "poses a great threat to the United States main- north-northwestward about 10 miles per hour. land." It urged all interests along the eastern It added the hurricane was expected to con- Gulf of Mexico to keep in close touch with tinue that movement that day, with a gradual advisories. It stated that a hurricane watch turn to the north that night. A slight increase probably would be issued for a portion of the in speed was said to be likely that night and coastal area of the northeast Gulf by or before the following day. Highest winds were esti- noon Saturday, Aug. 16. mated at 115 miles per hour near the center, A bulletin issued at 3 a.m. Saturday Aug. 16 with gales extending out about 150 miles from located Camille near latitude 23.2 north and the center. Conditions were said to be favorable longitude 85.0 west or about 220 miles west- for further increase in intensity that day. A southwest of Key West, moving north-north- bulletin was issued that day at 1 p.m., repeat- west at ten miles per hour, with winds esti- ing the information. Another bulletin was is- mated at 100 miles per hour near the center. At sued at 3 p.m., stating Camille had stalled 6 a.m. Saturday, Aug. 16, Advisory Number temporarily, but was expected to resume its Eight said the hurricane threatened northwest north-northwestward movement at about 10 Florida. It said that small craft along the miles per hour that night. At 5 p.m. CDT the northwest Florida coast and as far west as bulletin said the hurricane had become very Mobile, Alabama, should seek safe harbor that intense and repeated safety precautionary in- night. It added that a hurricane watch "un- formation, along with the area watch and doubtedly" would be needed over most of that warning. area later that morning, and warnings for a A 7 p.m. CDT bulletin repeated the informa- portion of the area that afternoon. tion and called Camille "a very intense and Advisory Number Nine, issued at 9 a.m. dangerous storm." At 9 p.m. CDT on Saturday, Saturday, Aug. 16, said "a hurricane watch is Aug. 16, Advisory Number Eleven was issued. in effect from Biloxi, Mississippi, to St. Marks, It gave the location as latitude 25.4 north and Florida, at 8 a.m. CDT. Specific hurricane longitude 87.3 west, or about 350 miles south of warnings will be issued for portions of this Pensacola, Florida, moving north-northwest- coastline at noon today following receipt of ward about twelve miles per hour, with highest further reconnaissance information from the winds estimated at 150 miles per hour near the center of hurricane Camille." It stated that the center. At 11 p.m. CDT that night, Advisory strongest winds were expected to remain not Number Twelve was issued, stating that less than 100 miles per hour, with further in- Camille was "extremely dangerous," repeating tensification expected. It said Camille was the watch and warning area and predicting "potentially a very dangerous hurricane. All little intensity change over the next twelve interests in the watch area and adjacent coast- hours. A bulletin at 1 a.m. CDT Sunday, Aug. lines should remain in close touch with later 17, continued to call the storm extremely dan- advices today and be prepared for fast protec- gerous, and repeated the watch and warning tive action when warnings are issued." areas. A 3 a.m. bulletin said that the hurricane At 11 a.m. CDT on Saturday, Aug. 16, Ad- was located by a Navy reconnaissance plane visory Number Ten was issued from the New near latitude 26.7 north and longitude 86.7 west or about 260 miles south of Pensacola, It stated: "Gale warnings have been ex- Florida, moving on a course a little west of tended westward to Morgan City, Louisiana. north at about twelve miles per hour. A slight Hurricane warnings are now in effect from change to a more northerly course was said to New Orleans and Grand Isle, Louisiana, east- be indicated with little change in forward ward across the Mississippi, Alabama, and speed. The plane found Camille still well or- northwest Florida coasts to St. Marks. Gale ganized, with a small compact eye. Highest warnings are now in effect elsewhere from winds were estimated at 160 miles per hour Morgan City to Cedar Keys, Florida. Prepara- near the center. tions against this extremely dangerous hurri- At 5 a.m. CDT Sunday, Aug 17, Advisory cane should be completed within the next few Number Thirteen was issued. It called Camille hours. "extremely dangerous" and said that she had "Winds are increasing and tides are rising shifted a little westward, threatening Missis- along the northern Gulf coast from Grand sippi, Alabama, and the northwest Florida Isle eastward. Gales have begun a short dis- coast. Hurricane warnings were extended west- tance offshore and will be spreading inland ward to Biloxi, including the Alabama coast over the warning area today and will reach and the Pensacola area of northwest Florida. hurricane force from southeast Louisiana Hurricane watch and gale warnings were ex- across coastal Mississippi, Alabama, and ex- tended westward to New Orleans and Grand treme northwest Florida by late this afternoon Isle, Louisiana. or early tonight. Tides up to 15 feet are ex- It said: "Hurricane warnings are now in ef- pected in the area where the center crosses the fect from Biloxi, Mississippi, to St. Marks, coast and tides of five to 12 feet elsewhere in Florida, and gale warnings elsewhere from New the hurricane warning area. Evacuation of the Orleans and Grand Isle to Cedar Keys, Flori- lowlying ,area that will be affected by these da." It said preparations should be completed tides should be done as early as possible today as early as possible that day in the area of before escape routes are closed. Present indica- hurricane warnings and persons in the area tions are that the center. of Camille will pass of hurricane watch should be prepared to take close to the mouth of the Mississippi River quick action if necessary. It called for winds late this afternoon and move inland on the to increase and tides to start to rise along the Mississippi coast tonight." At 9 a.m., the hur- northern Gulf coast from Grand Isle eastward. ricane was located near latitude 27.4 north It forecast tides up to 15 feet in the area where and longitude 88.4 west or about 200 miles the center was to cross the coast and up to southeast of New Orleans, moving north-north- five to twelve feet elsewhere in the hurricane west at about twelve miles per hour. ~i~hest warning area. "Evacuation of the low-lying winds were estimated at about 160 miles per area that would be affected by these tides hour near the center. Hurricane force winds should be done as early as possible today before extended outward 50 miles, gales 150 miles escape routes are closed. The center is expected from the center. Camille then was under the to move inland near Mobile tonight." A bulle- surveillance of radars at New Orleans, Pensa- tin issued at 7 a.m. CDT Sunday, Aug. 17, cola, and Apalachicsla. stated that the movement of hurricane Camille A bulletin issued at 1 p.m. CDT on Sunday, during the past few hours had been generally Aug. 17, repeated the fact that Camille was toward the mouth of the Mississippi River extremely dangerous and moving toward the and "unless the anticipated turn to a more mouth of the Mississippi River, repeated the northerly course occurs within the next few areas of watch and warning, and stated that hours, it will be necessary to extend hurricane "several tornadoes are likely over extreme warnings into the area of hurricane watch." southeast Louisiana eastward to Fort Walton, Advisory Number Fourteen issued at 9 a.m. Florida, and up to 100 miles inland this after- CDT on Sunday, Aug. 17, extended warnings noon and tonight." Advisory Number Sixteen, westward to include all of the Mississippi coast issued at 3 p.m. CDT Sunday, Aug. 17, dis- and southeastern Louisiana as far west as New continued warnings east of Apalachicola and Orleans and Grand Isle. continued warnings at New Orleans and Grand Isle, Louisiana, eastward across the Missis- southeast Mississippi, southwest Alabama, and sippi, Alabama, and northwest Florida coasts the Florida panhandle that night. At that time, to Apalachicola. It pointed out that winds were the center of hurricane Camille was located increasing and tides rising along the northern by New Orleans and other landbased radar Gulf coast from Grand Isle eastward. It near latitude 29.5 north, longitude 89.1 west, urged immediate evacuation of areas affected or about 70 miles east-southeast of New Or- by tides, and repeated the other warnings. An leans and 60 miles south of Guifport, Missis- Air Force reconnaissance flight into Camille sippi, moving north-northwest about 15 miles Sunday afternoon, the advisory stated, esti- per hour. Highest winds were estimated at 190 mated the winds at 190 miles per hour near miles per hour with hurricane force winds the center with hurricane force winds extend- extending outward 60 miles and gales 180 miles ing outward 60 miles and gales outward 180 from the center. miles from the center. Advisory Number 18 was issued at 11 p.m. On Sunday, Aug. 17 at 5 p.m. CDT, Advisory CDT on Sunday, Aug. 17. It reported Camille Number Seventeen was issued. It stated: moving inland near Gulfport, Mississippi. It "Hurricane warnings are in effect from New repeated the hurricane warnings and urged Orleans and Grand Isle, Louisiana, eastward precautions be continued. It stated that hur- across the Mississippi, Alabama, and north- ricane force winds were then occurring over west Florida coast to Apalachicola. Gale warn- most of the warning area. It again forecast ings are in effect from Morgan City to Grand heavy rains and the tides quoted earlier. Isle. Preparations against this extremely dan- It said that "those in the path of the eye gerous hurricane should be completed before are reminded that the winds will die down sud- dark. denly if the eye passes over your area but the "Winds are increasing and tides are rising winds will increase again rapidly and from the along the northern Gulf coast from Grand opposite direction as the eye moves away. The Isle eastward. Hurricane force winds are now lull with Camille will probably last from a few occurring at the mouth of the Mississippi minutes to one-half hour and persons should River. Gales in squalls are spreading inland not venture far from safe shelter. Hurricane over the warning area and winds will reach Camille has begun to fill and will weaken quite hurricane force over much of the area from rapidly as it continues northward through southeast Louisiana across coastal Mississippi, Mississippi at about 15 miles per hour tonight Alabama, and into extreme northwest Florida and Monday. Winds and seas will gradually later this afternoon or by early tonight. The diminish Monday as Camille moves away from following tides are expected tonight as Camille the coast. Warnings will be discontinued Mon- moves inland: Mississippi coast, Gulfport to day." Pascagoula, 15 to 20 feet. Pascagoula to Mobile, At 1 a.m. CDT on Monday, Aug. 18, a bulle- 10 to 15 feet. East of Mobile to Pensacola, six tin was issued at the time when Camille was to 10 feet. Elsewhere in the area of hurricane battering the Mississippi coast and heading warning east of the Mississippi River, five to inland. It reported that hurricane winds were eight feet. Immediate evacuation of areas that occurring from extreme southeast Louisiana will be affected by these tides is advised. eastward across the Mississippi coast with a "The center of Camille is expected to move few squalls to hurricane speed likely across inland on the Mississippi coast near Gulfport coastal Alabama into northwest Florida. Tides early tonight. Several tornadoes are likely over were running ten to 20 feet above normal on extreme southeast Louisiana eastward to Fort the Mississippi coast and five to ten feet else- Walton, Florida, and up to 100 miles inland where from southeast Louisiana to Northwest through tonight. Any flood statements needed Florida. It cautioned that several tornadoes will be issued by the local Weather Bureau were likely that night within 100 miles of the offices. . ." coast in the area of southeastern Mississippi A bulletin issued at 7 p.m. CDT on Sunday, eastward to Fort Walton Beach, Florida. Aug. 17, added that heavy rains with local At 1 a.m., the center of the hurricane was amounts eight to ten inches would spread into located by New Orleans and other landbased radars near latitude 30.6 north, longitude hour, tides were falling along the coast, and 89.5 west or 10 to 15 miles east of Picayune, many areas were still inundated. Winds and Mississippi. Highest winds were estimated at tides were forecast to continue diminishing 140 miles per hour near the center along the through the day. Heavy rains with local accu- Mississippi coast. at mulations of five to eight inches were expected Biloxi reported 20-foot tides and 125-to-150- in northern Mississippi that day and evening, mile per hour winds at 10:30 p.m. CDT the and heavy rain was predicted to spread into previous evening. A 3 a.m. bulletin substan- western Tennessee and western Kentucky that tially repeated the advisory. night and the following day. At 5 a.m. CDT, Monday, Aug. 18, Advisory Advisory Number Twenty was issued at 11 Number Nineteen was issued. It found the hur- a.m. Monday, August 18 CDT. It reported the ricane continuing to weaken, and predicted a storm continuing to weaken as she moved more rapid weakening as the storm moved northward through central Mississippi. northward through Mississippi at about 15 Warnings were discontinued along the north- miles per hour. An 8 a.m. bulletin said warn- ern Gulf Coast at 11 a.m. CDT. It reported ings along the northern Gulf coast would be tides falling along the coast, with many areas discontinued at 11 a.m. CDT. Highest winds still inundated. It stated that winds and tides at that time were estimated at 80 miles an would continue to diminish that day and night.