University of Baltimore Law Review Volume 19 Article 12 Issue 1 Number 1 – 2 — Fall 1989/Winter 1990 1989 Industrial Design Protection and Competition in Automobile Replacement Parts—Back to Monopoly Profits? James F. Fitzpatrick Georgetown University Law Center Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons Recommended Citation Fitzpatrick, James F. (1989) "Industrial Design Protection and Competition in Automobile Replacement Parts—Back to Monopoly Profits?," University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 19: Iss. 1, Article 12. Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol19/iss1/12 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. INDUSTRIAL DESIGN PROTECTION AND COMPETITION IN AUTOMOBILE REPLACEMENT PARTS-BACK TO MONOPOLY PROFITS? James E Fitzpatrickt I. INTRODUCTION The central confrontation in the current debate over the enactment of industrial design legislation I is between the auto manufacturers and the automobile insurance industry allied with the consumer movement. That intense disagreement is based, as often is the case in important legislative proposals, on an underlying, high-stakes economic battle. Quite simply, the auto manufacturers want to secure intellectual property protection for the manufacture and sale of automobile replacement parts and thereby raise parts prices back to the stratospheric levels which existed when auto compa nies enjoyed a de facto monopoly over parts manufacture and sale.