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Software Testing, Data Security and GDPR

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Software Testing, Data Security and GDPR www.usn.no FMH606 master’s Thesis MT-31-19 Process Technology Software Testing, Data Security and GDPR May 14, 2019 Michael Ogechi Agbamoro Faculty of Technology, Natural sciences and Maritime Sciences Campus Porsgrunn www.usn.no Course: FMH606 master’s Thesis MT-31-19 Title: < Software Testing, Data Security and GDPR Number of pages: <61> Keywords: Data security, security testing, GPDR, threats, trends, Edemso, test tools, test software. Student: Michael Ogechi Agbamoro Supervisor: Hans-Petter Halvorsen External partner: Cevia Solutions Availability: Open Summary: Software and data security are an important part of a modern-day business strategy of any organization as it forms the basis for guaranteed security of information, data, and assets of any organization. This project is principally focused on performing security test on the Edemso software to find vulnerabilities, based on the security test results determine the security level of the Edemso software and propose improvements regarding the general security of the Edemso software. In this project, extensive and detailed analyses of common security threats, various software security testing tools, security testing method, and GDPR were performed. Based on the analysis a preferred security testing method was determined and the Edemso software was properly examined and tested and the findings meticulously documented and analyzed. After proper and extensive examination of the Edemso software, about 36 vulnerabilities or loopholes were discovered, 75% of which are low risk, 25% are critical risk level vulnerabilities and there was zero severe high-risk level vulnerability. Attempts to exploits the discovered vulnerabilities were unsuccessful and proposed solutions to eliminating these critical vulnerabilities found in the project are; an update of the OpenSHH on port 22tcp and reconfigurations in the internet information service manager of the Edemso software. Based on the project results the security level of the Edemso software was determined to be in good shape and if documented recommendations for improvements are implemented there will be a significant improvement of the security level of the Edemso software. The University of South-Eastern Norway takes no responsibility for the results and conclusions in this student report. Preface Preface Protection of network systems and platforms from cyber-attack and unauthorized access is an important issue facing all organizations and businesses in this era of internet of things. This project work focuses on the overall and complete protection strategy of a cloud-based startup company. Special thanks to my Supervisor Hans-Petter Halvorsen for the great supervision and encouragement during this project Special thanks to Erling Ekrene the Founder of Cevia Solutions for his quick response to all my inquiries To my wife Gift and son Nathan, thanks for the many midnights of staying awake with me. Porsgrunn, 14th of May 2019 Michael Agbamoro 3 Contents Contents 1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 8 1.1 Background ............................................................................................................................. 8 1.2 Cloud-Based Software: Edemso ......................................................................................... 10 1.2.1 Structure & Architecture of Edemso ........................................................................... 10 1.2.2 How Edemso Works ...................................................................................................... 11 2 Data Security ...................................................................................................... 14 2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 14 2.2 Trends and Threats ............................................................................................................... 14 2.2.1 Malware .......................................................................................................................... 14 2.2.2 Spyware .......................................................................................................................... 15 2.2.3 Ransomware .................................................................................................................. 15 2.2.4 Trojans Horse ................................................................................................................ 16 2.2.5 Viruses ........................................................................................................................... 16 2.2.6 Worms ............................................................................................................................ 16 2.2.7 Rootkits .......................................................................................................................... 16 2.2.8 Adware ........................................................................................................................... 16 2.3 Data Security Platforms ....................................................................................................... 17 2.4 GDPR ...................................................................................................................................... 17 2.5 ISO/IEC 27001 ........................................................................................................................ 18 3 Overview of Software Security Testing ................................................................. 19 3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 19 3.2 Trends and Threats ............................................................................................................... 19 3.2.1 Computer Crime ............................................................................................................ 19 3.2.2 Vulnerability ................................................................................................................... 20 3.2.3 Eavesdropping .............................................................................................................. 20 3.2.4 Keyloggers ..................................................................................................................... 20 3.2.5 Exploits .......................................................................................................................... 21 3.2.6 Backdoors ...................................................................................................................... 21 3.2.7 Logic Bombs.................................................................................................................. 21 3.2.8 Payloads ......................................................................................................................... 21 3.2.9 Denial of Service ........................................................................................................... 21 3.3 Common Vulnerabilities ....................................................................................................... 22 3.3.1 Injections ........................................................................................................................ 24 3.3.2 Broken Authentication .................................................................................................. 24 3.3.3 Sensitive Data Exposure .............................................................................................. 24 3.3.4 XML External Entities (XXE) ......................................................................................... 24 3.3.5 Broken Access Control ................................................................................................ 24 3.3.6 Security Misconfiguration ............................................................................................ 25 3.3.7 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) ........................................................................................... 25 3.3.8 Insecure Deserialization ............................................................................................... 25 3.3.9 Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities ........................................................ 25 3.3.10 Insufficient Logging & Monitoring ...................................................................... 25 3.4 OWASP Projects ................................................................................................................... 26 3.4.1 Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP) ................................................................................................ 26 3.4.2 Web Testing Environment (WTE) ................................................................................ 26 3.4.3 OWTF .............................................................................................................................. 26 3.4.4 Dependency Check ....................................................................................................... 26 3.4.5 Security Shepherd ........................................................................................................ 26 3.4.6 DefectDojo ..................................................................................................................... 27 3.4.7 Juice Shop ....................................................................................................................
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