Nsuworks Seabrook: a Profile of Anti-Nuclear Activists, June 1978

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4-1981

Seabrook: A Profile of Anti‐Nuclear Activists, June 1978*

Neil H. Katz Nova Southeastern University, [email protected]

David C. List

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NSUWorks Citation Katz, N. H., & List, D. C. (1981). Seabrook: A Profile of Anti‐Nuclear Activists, June 1978*. Peace & Change, 7 (3), 59-69. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0130.1981.tb00441.x

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Seabrook: A Profile of Anti-Nuclear Activists, June 1978* by Neil H. Kalz and David C. Lid

THE SEABROOK DEMONSTRATIONS

In April 1977, slightly over 1,400 opponents of nuclear power pitched camp on a dirt parking lot of a nuclear power plant under construction in Seabrook, New Hampshire. Within two weeks, this group of people catapulted the American anti-nuclear movement into national and world prominence and demonstrated, once again, the efficacy of nonviolent action.' Their main tactic was refusal to leave the parking lot, an act of civil disobedience that resulted in their arrest, and acts of non-cooperation in the armories where they were held for up to two weeks.* The non-cooperation with bail procedures, sex segregation, etc., drew the attention of the New England press for over fifteen days. The event was a public relations victory for the anti-nuclear movement and an embarass- ment to New Hampshire's Governor Meldrim Thomson, an ardent nuclear power proponent. In addition, the bail refusal tactics of many of the protestors cost the tiny state of New Hampshire $50,000 a day during their incarceration. The exasperated governor unsuc- cessfully so ght federal funds and pleaded for contributions from the public to cover these costs. 4

Hoping to build on the success of the April 1977 protest, the organizers of the action, the Clamshell Alliance, announced an Occupation/Restoration for June 1978 at the site of the partially-built plant. The Clamshell Alliance, a coalition of anti- nuclear power groups in the New England area formed in 1976 (hereafter referred to as Clamshell or "Clams" for individual members), vowed to Ihnobilize the citizenry to return to the site to blockade or occupy it until construction has ceased and the project is totally and irrevocably canceled" and to "restore or return the land to its former condition.

The 1978 protest ultimately drew more than 6,000 protesters and over 10,000 spec- tators and gained considerable media coverage. This the, however, the planned civil disobedience and mass arrests never occurred because, after some hesitation, the Clamshell accepted a proposal by New Hampshire Attorney General Thomas Rath for a three-day legal rally on the site of the power plant construction. This pact came to be called the "Rath Agreement.

The 1978 action generated considerable controversy in the media and within the Clamshell Alliance. In the months preceding the June 1978 action, opponents of the Clamshell Alliance, led by Governor Thomson and William Loeb, editor of the staunchly conservative newspaper, the Manchester Union Leader, repeated claims that Clamshell was planning "essentially a military maneuver" that "might seek the unlawful destruction of lives or property." The organizers of the protest were characterized as "terrorists" and as "associates of Russian agents." Other supporters of nuclear power repeated 1977 claims that the protesters were "no-growth muggers" or said the protest was "just an excuse for another Woodstock." Anti-nuclear activists denied these allegations, of course, insisting that they were loyal, sincere Americans, dedicated to nonviolence and alternative forms of energy.5 Controversy within the Clamshell was intense. Differences over the proposal to forego civil disobedience centered not only on the Rath Agreement itself but, also, on

*The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the ReseaPch and Equipment Fund of Syracuse University which provided financial assistance for this research (Grant #RE-78-B6). Copyright 1981 PEACE AND CHANGE 60

the process by which the pact was approved by Clamshell. The Agreement permitted Clams to occupy a portion of the plant site on the condition that demonstrators not interfere with construction and leave after three days. Prepared in advance with the help of a private consulting firm, Rath's proposal was presented withou warning to Clamshell representatives only six weeks before the planned occupation. ' Clamshell representatives concluded that this was done in hopes of splitting their group and alienating public sympathy through anticipated rejection of the offer. Primarily due to the urging of Seabrook area Clams, however, the Alliance did in fact accept the proposal two weeks prior to the action, after short-circuiting its own decision-making process by not consulting the entire membership.7 The agreement immediately became the focal point of dissension, ambivalence, and confusion In the organization. Before and during the 1978 protest, there was extensive discussion and debate in the organization over strategy and tactics. Arguments about process centered around the fact that the Clamshell Coor- dinating Committee ratified the decision without seeking a consensus agreement from all local affiliates.

Despite the considerable controversy within the Clamshell Alliance and p edictions of Clamshell chaos and violence made by some state and media representatives,ti the weekend demonstration was well-organized and followed a strict nonviolent discipline. After the weekend rally and alternative energy fair, all members of the Clamshell Alliance left the demonstration area peacably at the agreed time. State and county inspectors announced that demonstrators had left the site much cleaner than when they had arrived, and Governor Thomson changed his characterization of Clamshell from a "lawless mob" to a "well-disciplined group . . . who cooperated and kept their word."9 Furthermore, Clams' upholding of the agreement gained them favorable me a coverage and increased sympathy from residents of Seabrook and surrounding towns. B

In order to examine some of the characteristics, beliefs, and strategies of the protesters, and to explore issues posed by the acceptance of the Rath Agreement, a Syracuse University research team travelled to Seabrook in June and July 1978. The nine-member research team conducted a survey among participants in the June demonstration that sought to discover: (1) the backgrounds and Ideologies that typified the people who came to Seabrook, (2) the protesters' perceptions about the effectiveness of various types of tactics for stopping construction of the plant, and (3) the protesters' perceptions of and attitudes toward the Clamshell Alliance. The data obtained by the research gained more importance and urgency because of the external and internal controversies related to the Rath Agreement.

THE RESEARCH DESIGN

After reviewing the relevant literature on anti-nuclear protests," the research team constructed a survey instrument which included both closed-and open-ended questions. Self-definitions and open-ended questions were employed to minimize the likelihood that participants would be forced to choose responses that were not meaningful to them. The closed-ended questions provided a supply of readily-codable data and comparable responses. The survey was administered by interviewers who read questiomto subjects and recorded verbatim responses. The instrument included an introduction In which the researcher identified himself/herself as a member of the Syracuse University research affinity group12 and asked permission to conduct the Interview. Researchers were allowed to be on site at all times during the three-day protest since they had undergone the required nonviolent training and constituted themselves as an affinity gr0up.~3 This made it possible for researchers not only to administer the survey throughout the entire weekend, but also to talk informally with protesters and observe meetings and briefings. l4 After observing the protesters at a staging area near the rally site on the first day of the demonstration, the research team estimated the relative distrlbution of respondents on the basis of sex, age, and place of residence. The team members were 61

instructed to adhere as closely as possible to this distribution in selecting subjects.15 One hundred thirteen surveys were administered and completed.

PROFILE OF THE DEMONSTRATORS

I. Backgrounds and Ideology

The backgrounds and ideologies of the participants in the 1978 Seabrook action were distinctive and showed that those who came were educated, youthful, and experienced in political protest (see Table One). Eighty-four percent reported having attended college. The median age was 25, with 65 percent falling in the 20-29 age group. A particularly striking discovery was the high number who had been involved in other demonstrations. Almost three quarters (73 percent) had taken part in one or more "political protest activities" other than protests against nuclear power. This was considerably more than the 48 percent who had been involved in previous anti-nuclear protests. The people who came to Seabrook in 1978 were neither inexperienced nor "single-issue" oriented. Their political commitment level was apparently rather high as well, if the percentage who had been a rested in previous protests (21 percent) is treated as an indicator of commitment .Ig

Not surprisingly, the ideology of participants was overwhelmingly left of center, and considerable sympathy for radical perspectives was evident. A mere 15 percent rated their own views as conservative or moderate, while the remainder split between radical left (36 percent) and liberal (29 percent). Not one of the 113 respondents chose the label "ultraconservative." Worth noting was the fact that 20 percent of those questioned declined to rate themselves on this scale, w ch may suggest that to many respondents left-right distinctions were not meaningful. 1p3

Another indicator of ideology was a list of eight categories of political perspectives that was read to the subjects. The list was preceded by the question, "Which, if any, of the following viewpoints would you say you generally agree with?" Respondents were allowed to select more than one answer, and disagreement was not solicited. Agree- ment ran as follows: feminist 50 percent, pacifist 44 percent, socialist 42 percent, anarchist 24 percent, Democratic Party 20 percent, Marxist 18 percent, libertarian 15 percent, Republican Party 2 percent. Clearly, the persons who came to Seabrook were generally unsympathetic to traditional two-party politics, and they were receptive to a variety of political views outside of the mainstream of the national political scene.18

11. Perceived Effectiveness of Tactics

In order to get a comparative view of how demonstrators viewed different tactics, a series of questions was asked about the perceived effectiveness of six different tactics that might be used for stopping the construction of the nuclear power plant at Seabrook. Respondents were asked to rate each tactic "highly effective," "somewhat effective," or "not at all effective" in stopping the Seabrook plant (see Table Two).

Not surprisingly, since Clamshell had attempted obstruction in the April 1977 demonstration, "nonviolent obstruction of the site" emerged as the clear favorite in perceived effectiveness. The perceived ineffectiveness of violence is consistent with both the stated strategy of Clamshell and the organization's "Guidelines" for the 1978 action which prohibited property destruction, breaking through police lines, etc. l9

The remaining four tactics yielded intermediate approval ratings but with a few interesting differences. Marches/picketing was clearly favored over the other three. Symbolic sit-ins were viewed as "highly effective" by only 22 percent, which seems surprising in light of the fact that this essentially described the protest in which the participants were engaged. 62

Other than violent confrontation, the only tactical approach thought to be ineffective by a significant number of persons (19 percent) was electoral campaigns. This is consistent with the finding that few persons identified with either major party (22 percent altogether), and, of course, it was also consistent with Clamshell's pre- ference for direct action tactics.

111. Perceptions of and Attitudes Toward Clamshell The data on attitudes and perceptions fall into two categories: (1) views about the Clamshell and its procedures in general, and (2) views about the controversial Rath Agreement. These data were gathered through open-ended questions. Responses were coded as indicative of lrpositivellor "negative" feelings (see Tables Three and Four).

The views on the Alliance in general indicated that individuals perceived that they had influence in the organization, held positive attitudes toward Clamshell procedures, and overwhelmingly supported future Clamshell actions in principle. (1 Respondents were asked if they felt they "had an opportunity to take part in making Clamshell policy." By a two to one plurality, respondents said "yes" (46 percent to 23 percent). An additional 6 percent had a mixed response (e.g., "most of the time, but not always," etc.), and just over one-fifth (21 percent) volunteered that they had not tried to influence Alliance policy. These data suggest that the Alliance organizers were accurate in claim- ing that their decision-making approa h helps avoid "unsatisfied minorities" and encour- ages "an even distribution of power.

The procedures through which individuals influence the group's policies received far more decisive support. The question What do you think of the affinity group set-up and the way it works in the Clamshell Alliance?" drew 64 percent positive response and an inconsequential 4 percent negative response (intermediate responses indicating mixed feelings, etc., totalled 25 percent) .*I

A question on willingness to participate in future activities of the group was designed to test the depth of dissatisfaction with Clamshell. Presumably, those most dissatisfied would answer lTnollwhen asked, "Do you think you will likely take part in future Clamshell activities?" Fully 81 percent said "yes, however, and only 1 percent said This straightforward indicator of attitudes suggests that demonstrators viewed Clamshell very favorably. These findings are considerably more striking when considered in the context of the controversy surrounding $pRath Agreement, which might have led to significant disenchantment with the Alliance. The survey findings showed divided attitudes toward the Rath Agreement -- strong dissatisfaction with the process by which it was reached, but, nonetheless, a strong willingness to abide by the agreement. The situation was summed up well by an observer who noted, "Although almost everyone connected with the Clamshell condemned the process by which the agreement was reached . . . in retrospect most seemed to agree that the decision not to occupy was the right 0ne."~3

When asked, "How do you feel about the decision to accept the state government's offer and conduct an entirely legal three-day occupation?", a distinct plurality re- sponded positively (35 percent positive to 16 percent negative). However, a majority of respondents fell somewhere in between the two views (18 percent mentioned mixed feelings, and 27 percent indicated the agreement was the best that could be achieved under the circumstances). Obviously, no clear consensus emerged and considerable ambivalence was apparent. The question, "How do you feel about the way that decision was reached?", drew a mixed response. Again, only about half those responding expressed either a distinctly positive or negative attitude. Among those with clearly defined attitudes, views were basically reversed from the previous question, with 38 percent expressing negative feelings and 12 percent positive feelings. A related question concerned participants' willingness to abide by the agreement not to engage in civil disobedience during the action. The question elicited a 91 percent "yes" response and 6 percent lldon'thow," with not a single respondent saying rrno.ll This finding was surprising, as the research team had expected that dissatisfaction with the Rath Agreement would lead at least a small number of participants to violate the agreement by overstaying the deadline and courting arrest. One other attempt was made to measure dissatisfaction with the cancellation of civil disobedience. Interviewers asked, !!Did any members of your affinity group not come to Seabrook?I1 and "If so, why did they not come?11 No responses mentioning dissatisfaction with the decision to forego civil disobedience were recorded. A small number (just under 10 percent) indicated that one or more members of their group had failed to come as a result of illness, family or work obligations, etc. The absence of any responses indicating displeasure with the Rath Agreement was a surprise. Dissension prior to June 24 had been intense, as written reports from members of two affinity groups suggest. "On hearing the news, we were shaken and confused, saddened and angry," reported a New York occupier of his affinity group. "The immediate reaction of our af i nity group . . . was disappointment and anger," explained a Wisconsin denonstrator.26 - Both pups came to Seabrook, however, suggesting a high level of commitment to the Clamshell Alliance among its supporters. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS I. Beliefs and Backgrounds Based on press accounts and photographs of the 1977 Seabrook demonstration, it was anticipated that participants at the 1978 action would be young adults, well-educated, and politically left-of-center. It was predicted that a substantial minority would have been involved in previous anti-nuclear demonstrations, and that similar, but probably relatively smaller numbers, would be veterans of Vietnam protests and demonstration arrests. All these predictions were confirmed, but several figures were startling. The 84 percent with some college education was a high figure (if the 7 percent aged 17 or under are excluded from the sample, the proportion is 90 percent). This suggested that the Alliance's ideology and/or tactics appealed to only a relatively well-educated sampling of the general population, a conclusion worth noting for social change activists concerned with recruiting members to their actions.25 Almost half the respondents had been in previous anti-nuclear protests, about what had been anticipated. The 21 percent who had been arrested at a demonstration was also consistent with expectations. A total of 41 percent had been involved in Vietnam protests, a figure which suggests a possible basis for the strong support for pacifism that appeared in the survey findings. The widespread sympathy for pacifism (44 percent) and feminism (50 percent) regis- tered among Seabmok demonstrators is consistent with ideology prevalent in Clamshell since its founding in 1976. From that time to the present, the Alliance has taken increasingly explicit anti-militarist positions, including a 1977 revision of the group's manifesto, "Declaration of Nuclear Resistance," to include a demand for an end to nuclear weapons spending and the endorsement of a series of disarmament protests in 1978. Feminism has been an important influence on the ideology and decision-making style of numerous 64 activist groups over the past decade, among them the Clamshell Alliance. Many feminists have promoted decision-making styles which seek to overcome hierarchy and male domina- tion in political groups. This has been particularly evident in Clamshell.

11. Perceptions of Tactics It was expected that most protesters would consider violent confrontations to be not at all effective. This expectation was based on the belief that pacifists consider violence ineffective, and that the strong influence of pacifist ideology among Clamshell supporters would encourage a belief in the futility of violence. This expectation was generally SuDuorted by the data (see Table Two). However, the 32 percent who rated violent confrontation as either highly or somewhat effective was marginally greater than anticipated. If the 32 percent represented persons who had individual scruples against violence, but nonetheless perceived violence as sometimes effective, the view t t pacifism implies a belief in the ineffectiveness of violence S called into question. $8

The substantial number of respondents who perceived elections as an ineffective way of stopping the Seabrook plant (19 percent) may be partly explained by the failure of electoral efforts to stoD nuclear Dlant construction urior to 1978. The fact that a majority vote against nuciear plant'construction was cast by the town of Seabrook in 1976 may have encouraged the view that elections are a futile method for stopping the plant (construction began six months after this vote). Indeed, the birth and development of Clamshell has been closely associated with the very limited success that has met in- stitutional approaches to halt nuclear construction. Taken together, electoral politics and lobbying/lawsuits may have been perceived by participants as llworking within the systemt1 as contrasted with the non-routine direct action tactics of demonstrations, sit-ins, and picketing. Clamshell literature implies that "working within the system" is a weak approach, but that nonviolent direct action gives additional leverage to otherwise futile attempts to use elections and hearings to stop nuclear plants. Thus, an early 1978 leaflet observed that anti-nuclear iqftervenors at hearings "face a stacked regulatory deck. Direct action was needed. . . .It 111. Perceptions and Attitudes Toward Clamshell

It was anticipated that there would be considerable opposition to the Rath agreement and somewhat more dissatisfaction with the means by which it was ratified. These results were expected on the basis of oral reports from affinity groups prior to the June 24 action and discussion of the proposal in the Clamshell Newsletter.

These views were confirmed (35 percent positive to 16 percent negative feelings about the agreement, 12 percent positive to 38 percent negative about the process of the decision). The research team concluded that opposition to and uncertainty about the agreement may have followed partly from the psychological jolt that the abrupt change in plans may have had on persons who had made the often difficult decision to take part in civil disobedience. Also, some persons clearly believed that the Alliance had given too much ground to its opponents in accepting the Attorney General's proposal. Further, Clamshell had chosen to abandon a tactic its supporters believed very powerful (nonviolent obstruction) in favor of marches and symbolic occupation, thought to be much weaker weapons. All of these factors undoubtedly contributed to some dubious feelings about the agreement.

There was little question that the process surrounding the pact with Mr. Rath was perceived as a violation of usual Clamshell decision-making styles. Thus, the substantial opposition to the agreement's procedure was, in effect, an affirmation of 65

Clamshell's perceived customary decision-making style rather than a protest against it. This, combined with the fact that the agreement itself aroused far less opposition than did the process, may help explain why no one chose to violate the prohibition on civil disobedience. CONCLUSION

The survey results not only predicted correctly that the protesters would uphold the terms of the negotiated settlement but also provided evidence of the ways in which an organization's structure and decision-making process can encourage loyalty and support from its members. The overwhelming approval of the affinity group structure and consen- sual decision-making procedure, and the perceptions of members that they had influence within the group, provided motivation to maintain loyalty to the organization and Comply with the Rath Agreement, despite misgivings about the settlement and, especially, the way it was ratified. Clamshell's distinctive decision-making style prevented important differences over strategy from seriously rupturing the organization at that time, and allowed the Alliance to gain third party support while disproving opponents' predictions of chaos and violence. However, although Clamshell's structural and procedural strengths allowed members' loyalty to overcome immediate controversy, tactical differences did not disappear and divisions within the New England anti-nuclear power movement have intensified. NOTES

1. Nonviolent action is defined by Sharp as a set of methods for waging struggle which involves protest, noncooperation, or intervention: The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Boston: Porter Sargent, 19731, p. 64. For a discussion of nonviolent action in the nuclear movement see Irwin and Faison, Why Nonviolence? Nonviolence Theory and Strategy for the Anti-nuclear Movement," Dandelion (April 1978).

2. Details of these tactics and the internal debate over their use appear in S. Barkan, "Strategic, Tactical and 0,rganizational Dilemmas of the Protest Movement Against Nuclear Power," Social Problems, 27, 1 (October 19791, pp. 19-37.

3. Articles in Boston Globe, Boston Herald-American and Manchester Union Leader (May 4-19, 1977). 4. Handbook '78: A Handbook for the OCCUPATION/RESTORATION beginning June 24 (Portsmouth, N.H.: Clamshell Alliance, 19781, p. 8. Arthur C. Eagan, Jr., "Will Protest Be Peaceful?' Manchester Union Leader (April 29, 1977), p. 1. John Chamberlain, Who Directs the Anti-Nuclear Power Activity in U.S.?", gL& (April 18, 1977), p. 32; Nuclear Infcnrmation (Washington, D.C.: Atomic Industrial Forum), p. 32. A group called Operations Service Inc. was hired to help with strategy and public relations. This information was confirmed through interviews with State Attorney General Thomas Rath, Concord, N.H., June 23, 1978, and Frank Shants, Manager of Special Projects, Public Information Department, Public Service Co. of N.H., Manchester, N.H., June 23, 1978. For more information on negotiations on the Rath proposal see Katz, "Put on Your Marching Shoes: Direct Action and Negotiations at Seabrook, N.H." (April l981), n.p. (mimeograph). There were also other reasons for Clamshell's acceptance of the Rath agreement after they initially refused the offer. For details see Xatz, "Put on Your Marching Shoes,11 (April 1981). 66

8. The Manchester Union Leader announced during the weekend "Clamshell Cracks, Threat of Violence Growsf1 in a banner headline (June 25, 1978)' p. 1. Other state and media representatives were far more cautious about the prospects for violence but did suggest that dissidents might overstay the 3 p.m. June 26 deadline for leaving the site (e.g., see Boston Globe (June 24-26, 1978)).

9. Jonathan Prestage, "Covernor Sees Defeat for Clams, If Manchester Union Leader (June 27, 19781, P. 1.

10. David List, Neil Katz and John Hunt, "Lessons from Seabrook: How Local Residents Viewed the Action," Fellowship (Nyack, N.Y., March, 1979), pp. 13-14. For more details on third party reaction to the protest see Hunt and Katz, "Nonviolent Protest and Third Party Opinion: A Case Study of the June, 1978 Seabrook, New Hampshire Anti-Nuclear Power Protest," to be published in Journal of Voluntary Action Scholars (Fall 1981).

11. Unfortunately, scholarly studies of nuclear power protests were not directly appli- cable to our study. Of only limited help were Alan Mazur, "Opposition to Techno- logical Innovation,11Minerva, 13 (19751, pp. 58-81; Robert Cameron Mitchell, "The Public Speaks Again: A New Environmental Survey," Resources (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, Sept. - Nov., 1978), pp. 1-6; and Dorothy Nelkin, Nuclear Power and Its Critics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1971). Most relevant were two studies that were published after our surveys were completed: Ladd, Hood and'Van Liere dealt with the background and political beliefs of protest participants in the May 1979 Washington, D.C. rally in "Ideological Strandsin the Anti-Nuclear Movement: Consensus and Diversity,fl (Spring 1979), n.p. (mbeograph); and Barkan examined the tactical issues confronting the movement in "Strategic, Tactical and Organizational Dilemmas.11

12. Affinity groups were groups of about 10-20 persons who knew and trusted one another, and who were responsible for one another's behavior and safety. These groups also acted as governing bodies, with each group entitled to one representative at decision- making meetings, and each group having veto power over all decisions reached.

13. The Clamshell Alliance required all persons planning to participate in civil disobedience to form affinity groups and undergo training. After civil disobedience was canceled, membership in an affinity group was still required for admission to staging areas where protesters camped on the day prior to the on-site demonstration, and in order to be admitted to the on-site action on June 24 (the following day the event was opened to the general public). Thus, membership in an affinity group was useful in giving our team access to participants over a longer period of time. 14. Participants displayed a nearly universal friendliness and willingness to talk. The fact that researchers wore affinity group armbands probably helped establish confidence among subjects who might have been suspicious of researchers. The casual dress and youthfulness of our team (all were under 35 years, most under 26) may also have en- hanced rapport. 15. We sought to achieve a representative sample of the crowd rather than a random sampling because of the overwhelming difficulty of attempting the latter approach. Sex, age, and place of residence (demonstrators wore armbands color-coded by geographic region) were chosen as selection factors because each factor permitted instant visual selection by researchers. 16. Almost identical findings on the age and education of anti-nuclear protesters were obtained by Ladd, Hood and Van Liere in their study of participants In the May 6, 1979 demonstration in Washington, D.C., "Ideological Strands." Their study also 67

uncovered a large proportion of persons with experience in Vietnam and anti- nuclear weapons movements.

17. Mazur and others have found that persons opposed to nuclear power tend to describe themselves as liberal: "Opposition to Technological Innovation." Ladd, Hood and Van Liere also found a near absence of conservatives and Republicans in their sample in "Ideological Strands." The relationship between radical ideology and degree of activity was demonstrated by Pinard, Kirk and Von Eschen in a study of participants in a series of 1961 civil rights sit-ins: llProcesses of Recruitment in the Sit-In Movement,11 Public Opinion Quarterly, 33 (1969), pp. 355-69. If the relationship between radical ideology and degree of participation is similar in the anti-nuclear movement, one would expect that persons taking part in demonstrations (especially ones planned as civil disobedience) would be more radical than persons merely holding anti-nuclear attitudes.

18. The influence of radical ideology stems partly from the tactical leadership provided the anti-nuclear movement by radical pacifist groups (such as the War Resisters League and the Movement for a New Society), and the links such groups have drawn between nuclear power and other issues such as nuclear weapons, patriarckv, etc. 19. "Guidelines for 1978 Action,'! Second Supplement to the O/R Handbook 1978 (Portsmouth, N.H. : Clamshell Alliance), n.d. (distributed at June, 1978 demonstration).

20. "What is the Clamshell Alliance?,ll(Clamshell Alliance), p. 3 (distributed Spring, 1978). The approval of the affinity group structure and the feeling of participants that they could influence Clamshell policy suggests a major strength of the group's decentralized organizational style. Similarly, Gerlach found that "segmented, polycentric, networkedIt groups resisting powerline and fossil fuel electrical sta- tions also tended to encourage individual participation. "Citizen resistance to Energy Development in the Upper Midwest and Northern Tier States," (August 19761, n.p. (mimeograph). Gerlach defined his terms as follows: 1Y3egmented, composed of many groups; polycentric, led by many people. . . ; networked, integrated through the many-stranded interaction of participants. . .I1 This description aptly describes Clamshell, and provides further evidence that the group's structure encouraged the maintenance of the loyalty of its supporters. Interestingly, Gerlach was observing groups that lacked the youthful, counter-cultural background common to many persons at Clamshell protests.

21. For an informative discussion of how affinity groups and consensus procedure function within Clamshell, see Barkan, "Strategic, Tactical and Organizational Dilemmas."

22. These figures are more impressive when one considers that fully 28 percent of the subjects reside outside the New England-New York-New Jersey area that constitute Clamshell's domain. Hence, a number of persons who were neither "official" members of Clamshell nor residents of the area thought they would be taking part in future Clam actions.

23. Scott Schneider, "Beyond Seabrook," Science for the People, 10, 5 (September/October 19781, P. 34.

24. Gary Weinstein, "Seabrook: No Longer an Occupation," Peace Newsletter (Syracuse, N.Y. : Syracuse Peace Council, July, 1978) ; Michael Shanklin, CCR Newsletter (Madison, Wis. : Center for Conflict Resolution, Summer, 1978).

25. A partial explanation of the high representation of youthful and highly-educated persons is suggested by Olsen and Baden's study on the perceived legitimacy of various types of protest activity: "Legitimacy of Social Protest Actions in the United States 68

and Sweden," Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 11 (Fall l974), pp. 173-89. They found that younmr and better-educated uersons were far more likely to grant legitimacy to ali types of protest. They also found that approval of civil disobedience was far stronger (although much less than a majority) among students than it was among the general population of three Midwestern cities. For other views on the limited appeal of civil disobedience actions see Jeeer, Who's On First: What's On Second" A Grass Roots Perspective on the Anti-nuclear Movement," (New York, October 12, 1978). 26. For another view see Barkan, IIStrategic, Tactical and Organizational Dilemmas, Social Problems. He points out that proponents of nonviolent tactics in the movement include both persons who see nonviolence as a philosophical principle and those who view nonviolence as the most effective strategy for the movement. The latter group would include many non-pacifists who perceive violence as ineffective (or at least less effective than nonviolence). 27. "What Is the Clamshell Alliance?". TABLE I. BELIEFS AND BACKGROUNDS

Table 1A: Age 4s Percent (Number) 14-19 12 (14)

20-29 65 (73) 30-39 18 (20)

over 40 5 (6) TOTAL 100 (113)

Table 1B: Educational Background

Education Percent (Number)

High school or less 16 (18)

Some college 39 (44)

College degree 35 (40) Graduate degree TOTAL

Table 1C: Sex Percent (Number)

Male 55 (62)

Female 45 (51) 69 TABLE 11. EFFECTIVENESS OF POSSIBLE ANTI-NUCLEAR TACTICS AS PERCEIVED BY PARTICIPANTS Tactics Rating Highly Somewhat Not At All Don't Know TOTAL

Nonviolent obstruction of the site 59 (67) 38 (43) 3 (3) 0 100 (113) Marches and picketing 35 (40) 64 (72) 1 (1) 0 100 (113) Lobbying and conducting lawsuits 25 (28) 68 (77) 5 (6) 2 (2) 100 (113) Symbolic sit-ins 22 (25) 65 (73) 12 (14) 1 (1) 100 (113) Participation in election campaigns 22 (25) 57 (64) 19 (21) 3 (3) 100 (113) Direct confrontation using violence 12 (13) 20 (22) 64 (72) 4 (5) 100 (113)

TABLE 111. ATTITUDES TOWARD THE RATH AGREEMENT AND TOWARD "THE WAY THAT DECISION WAS REACHED" Issue Examined Attitude Best Under Positive Negative Circumstances Don't Know Missing TOTAL Rath agreement 35 (39) 16 (18) 27 (30) 18 (20) 3 (3) 3 (3) 102 (113) Way agreement was reached 12 (14) 38 (43) 17 (20) 15 (17) 10 (12) 6 (7) 98 (113)

TABLE IV: SELECTED ATTITUDES TOWARD CLAMSHELL AND ITS ACTIONS Issue Examined Attitude Positive Negative Mixed Don't Know Missing TOTAL Affinity group set-up 64 (72) 4 (5) 25 (28) 4 (4) 4 (4) 101 (113) Participation in future clam actions (positive, "yes, negative, "no") 81 (92) 1 (1) (0) 13 (15) 4 (5) 99 (113) Abide by Rath Agreement (positive "yes, negative, "no") 91 (103) 0 (0) 6 (8) 2 (2) 99 (113)