DOCSLIB.ORG

Durham E-Theses

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Durham E-Theses Durham E-Theses Political economy of contemporary Lebanon : a study of the reconstruction. Najem, Tom Pierre How to cite: Najem, Tom Pierre (1997) Political economy of contemporary Lebanon : a study of the reconstruction., Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/1638/ Use policy The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that: • a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details. Academic Support Oce, Durham University, University Oce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP e-mail: [email protected] Tel: +44 0191 334 6107 http://etheses.dur.ac.uk THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONTEMPORARY LE!BANON: A STUDY OF THE RECONSTRUCTION by: Tom Pierre Najem A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Middle East Politics The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without the written consent of the author and information derived from it should be acknowledged. Supervisor: Professor Tim Niblock PhD Thesis 1997 The Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies University of Durham Autumn 1997 0 23 JAN 1998 ii ABS TRACT The general purpose of this study is to look at the post- war economic reconstruction of Lebanon. More specifically, our primary aim is to examine, within the context of development theory, the institutional arrangement for implementing the various reconstruction programmes. In order to address these points, we will need to examine several important issues: How the economic leadership of post-war Lebanon has developed; what the institutions providing economic leadership have been; what plans have been developed for Lebanon's reconstruction; what groups have participated in the reconstruction; and what the principal obstacles to the economic reconstruction of the country have been. We will argue that the institutional arrangement is inappropriate for implementing the recovery programme. In part, because of the institutional arrangement, the recovery programme has suffered, and it is conceivable that the programme may fail to strengthen the Lebanese economy. The information collected for this study originated from three main sources including: material obtained from library research in the U.K.,; material collected in Lebanon from organisations, institutions, and individuals involved in the recovery programme; and material acquired from a series of unstructured interviews conducted in Lebanon in the winter of 1997 with individuals intimately associated with the reconstruction, prominent opponents of the system, and general observers of the Lebanese scene. iii Declaration I, Tom Pierre Najem, the author of this research declare that the content of this thesis is my original work. None of the material contained in this study has previously been submitted by me for a degree in this or any other University. All the material in this study, which is not my own work, has been appropriately cited. Tom Najem September 1997 Copyright The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without his prior written consent, and information derived from it should be acknowledged. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ii---bstract ill--Declaration iv---Table of Contents xiv--Abbreviations xv---Note on use of Arabic words xvi --Acknowledgements xvii--Dedication Main Text 1---Chapter One: Introduction 1----1. Objective of Study 2----2. The Historical Context 3---------2.1 The Lebanese Political System: 1943-1975 9---------2.2 The Lebanese Economic System : 1943-1975 12--------2.3 The Collapse of the Lebanese Political System 18--------2.4 The Lebanese Civil War: 1975-1990 19-------------2.4.1 The Political System: 1975-88 21-------------2.4.2 The Economic Situation: 1975-1990 25-------------2.4.3 A Violent Prelude to the 1989 Ta'if Accord 29---3. The Political Economy of Contemporary Lebanon: A Study of the Reconstruction 39--------3.1 The Literature on Lebanon To Date 32--------3.2 Development Economics and the Importance of Institutions: Theoretical Considerations 32-------------3.2.1 Dominant Theories in Development Economics 35-------------3.2.2 The Role of Domestic Institutional Arrangements 37-------------3.2.3 A Theoretical Understanding of Domestic Institutional Arrangements 39-------------3.2.4 The Economic Development of Lebanon: The Institutional Arrangement 41---4. Methodology of the Study V 44---5. Outline of the Study 45---Chapter Two: The Rise of Rafig Hariri 47---1. Problems with the Post-Ta'if Political System & the Failures of the Karami and Solh Government 47--------1.1 Problems with the Post-Ta'if System 50--------1.2 The Karami Government 50-------------1.2.1 Developments in PostTa!if Lebanon 50-------------1.2.2 "The Government of National Reconciliation" 52-------------1.2.3 The Return of State Control: The Dissolution of the Militias 55-------------1.2.4 The Increase in Syrian Dominance of the Lebanese Political System 58-------------1.2.5 The Economic Reconstruction of Lebanon 63-------------1.2.6 The Economic Crisis: 1990 - October 1992 72--------1.3 The Government of Rashid Solh 72-------------1.3.1 The Formation of a New Government 75-------------1.3.2 The Parliamentary Elections of 1992 80-------------1.3.3 The Election Results: The New Parliament 82---2. The Rise of Rafiq Hariri 82--------2.1 Questions for Syria 83--------2.2 The Post-Election Process: International Reaction 86--------2.3 The Post-Election Process: Domestic Reaction 88--------2.4 Hariri T s Background 94--------2.5 The Decision to Appoint Hariri 95--------2.6 Reaction to Hariris Appointment 96--------2.7 The Hariri Government 98--------2.8 Hariri's Mandate 99---3. The Hariri Government: A Capitalist Developmental State? vi 101--Chapter Three: The Plan for the Reconstruction and Development of Lebanon - "Horizon 2000" 103--i. "Horizon 2000": The Government's Stated Objective For Reviving Lebanon's Economic Fortunes 106--2. The Origins of the Horizon 2000 Plan 112--3. The Contents of the Horizon 2000 Plan 139--4. The Hariri Government: A Capitalist Developmental State? 141--Chapter Four: The Institutions Managing and Implementing the Horizon 2000 Plan 143--i. The C.D.R. 143-------1.1 The Origins of the C.D.R. 145-------1.2 The Structure of the C.D.R. 146-------1.3 The Stated Role of the C.D.R. 147-------1.4 Actual Role of the C.D.R - From 1977-1990 149-------1.5 The Failure of Past Reconstruction Plans: Problems with the C.D.R. 153-------1.6 Recommendation for Reforms to the C.D.R. 154--2. The Lebanese Public Sector 156-------2.1 The Weaknesses of the Lebanese Public Sector 159-------2.2 A Brief Examination of Some of the Ministries & Agencies 162-------2.3 Recommendations for Improving the Ministries & Agencies 163--3. The Institutional Arrangement for the Implementation of the Horizon 2000 Programme 163-------3.1 Origins of the Institutional Arrangement 164-------3.2 The C.D.R. and the P.M.U. 169-------3.3 The Ministries, Agencies, and the S.I.U.s 171-------3.4 The Technical Coordination Committee vil 171-------3.5 The Actual Workings of the Institutional Arrangement 173--4. Hariri's Dominance over the Recovery Programme 176--5. The Hariri Government: A Capitalist Developmental State? 179--Chapter Five: The Progress of the Reconstruction Programme 180--i. The Implementation of the Horizon 2000 Programme 182-------1.1 The Rehabilitation of Lebanon's Physical Infrastructure 183------------1.1.1 The Electricity Sector 184-----------------1.1.1.1 The Consultancy Contracts 185-----------------1. 1. 1.2 Repairs to the Electricity Network 188-----------------1. 1. 1.3 The Rehabilitation of the Janthour & Bsalim Substations 188-----------------1.1.1.4 The Construction of Two New Power Plants at Zahrani and Beddawi 189-----------------1.1.1.5 The Installation of New Gas Turbines in Baalbeck and Tyre 190------------1.1.2 The Posts & Telecommunications Sector 192-----------------1.1.2.1 The Consultancy Contracts 193-----------------1.1.2.2 The Supply of Spare Parts and Equipment & the Rehabilitation of Buildings 194-----------------1.1.2.3 Repairs to Exchanges (Upgrading Telephone exchanges) 194-----------------1.1.2.4 The Rehabilitation and Expansion of the Telephone Network 195-----------------1.1.2.5 Contracts for the Rein.statement And Improvement of International Telephone Connections 196-----------------1.1.2.6 GSM Network (Global System for Mobiles) 197-----------------1.1.2.7 The Postal Service 198------------1.1.3 The Transportation Sector 199-----------------1.1.3.1 The Rehabilitation of Beirut International Airport 199----------------------1.1.3.1.1 The Consultancy Contract 200----------------------1.1.3.1.2 The Rehabilitation and Expansion of the Airport 20J.----------------------1.1.3.1.3 The Operation of Facilities at Beirut International Airport 202-----------------1.1.3.2 The Rehabilitation and Extension Of Beirut Port 202----------------------1.1.3.2.1 The Consultancy Contracts 203----------------------1.1.3.2.2 The Physical Rehabilitation of Beirut Port viii 204-----------------1.1.3.3 The Rehabilitation
Load more

Recommended publications
  • World Bank Document
    INTEGRATED SAFEGUARDS DATA SHEET APPRAISAL STAGE Report No.: ISDSA10332 Public Disclosure Authorized Date ISDS Prepared/Updated: 15-Sep-2014 Date ISDS Approved/Disclosed: 13-Jun-2014, 17-Sep-2014 I. BASIC INFORMATION Public Disclosure Copy 1. Basic Project Data Country: Lebanon Project ID: P125184 Project Name: Lebanon-Water Supply Augmentation Project (P125184) Task Team Claire Kfouri Leader: Estimated 16-Jun-2014 Estimated 30-Sep-2014 Public Disclosure Authorized Appraisal Date: Board Date: Managing Unit: GWADR Lending Specific Investment Loan Instrument: Sector(s): General water, sanitation and flood protection sector (100%) Theme(s): Water resource management (80%), Other public sector governance (20%) Is this project processed under OP 8.50 (Emergency Recovery) or OP No 8.00 (Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies)? Financing (In USD Million) Total Project Cost: 617.00 Total Bank Financing: 474.00 Financing Gap: 0.00 Public Disclosure Authorized Financing Source Amount Borrower 15.00 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 474.00 Islamic Development Bank 128.00 Public Disclosure Copy Total 617.00 Environmental A - Full Assessment Category: Is this a No Repeater project? 2. Project Development Objective(s) Public Disclosure Authorized The project development objective is to increase the volume of water available to the Greater Beirut and Mount Lebanon area. 3. Project Description Page 1 of 14 Despite its relatively abundant water resources, Lebanon is significantly water-stressed. Groundwater is over-extracted by 200 million cubic meters (MCM) per year and water supply reaches as low as three hours per day in the summer season across many regions. Lebanon further only stores six percent of its total water resources, rendering it the country with the lowest dam capacity across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.
    [Show full text]
  • Request for an Inspection on the Impacts of the Bisri Dam Project in Lebanon
    June 24th, 2019 To: Executive Secretary, the Inspection Panel 1818 H Street NW, MSN 10 - 1007, Washington, DC 20433, USA REQUEST FOR AN INSPECTION ON THE IMPACTS OF THE BISRI DAM PROJECT IN LEBANON We, the Lebanon Eco Movement (LEM), are a network of 60 environmental NGOs advocating for sustainable development and the protection of the environment in Lebanon. The movement co- founded the Save the Bisri Valley Campaign in collaboration with the affected communities and a group of experts. LEM is also a member in the Arab Watch Coalition. In this request, we represent a group of residents and landowners whose addresses and signatures are enclosed below. We are also attaching a copy of a new petition that gathered more than 30,000 signatures (Annex Z.b). Our network submitted an earlier request for inspection on June 6th, 2018, and the Panel did not recommend investigation. While we acknowledge the Panel’s previous efforts to address our concerns, we believe that the first complaint was not satisfactorily answered. The Recommendation Report given by the Panel focused more on ensuring a checklist of studies is filled rather than evaluating the validity of the studies and, most importantly, the grave social, environmental and economic harms the project poses to Lebanon. Consequently, the Panel accepted inaccurate information and factual discrepancies provided by the Bank Management. Additionally, given the emergence of new evidence and circumstances, we are submitting a new request for inspection. Our concerns have been already conveyed to the relevant authorities and to the World Bank Management in Beirut. However, the concerns were either disregarded, or addressed with neglect and delay.
    [Show full text]
  • Republic of Lebanon Council for Development and Reconstruction Lebanon Water Supply Augmentation Project
    Republic of Lebanon Council for Development and Reconstruction Lebanon Water Supply Augmentation Project Environmental and Social Panel (ESP) of Experts First Mission (March 7th–11th, 2016) Jean-Roger Mercier & Anna M. Kotarba-Morley Table of Contents Acronyms ............................................................................................................................................................................... 2 1. Background ....................................................................................................................................................................... 3 2. Terms of Reference (ToR) of the Environmental and Social Panel (ESP) of Experts ........................................ 4 3. First mission narrative ..................................................................................................................................................... 4 4. Supporting documentation ............................................................................................................................................. 5 5. Mission findings ............................................................................................................................................................... 5 5.1. Application of Lebanese rules and regulations and of Donors’ Environmental and Social Safeguard Policy requirements ......................................................................................................................................................... 5 5.2.
    [Show full text]
  • Political Sectarianism in Lebanon Loulwa Murtada
    Claremont Colleges Scholarship @ Claremont CMC Senior Theses CMC Student Scholarship 2018 Aversive Visions of Unanimity: Political Sectarianism in Lebanon Loulwa Murtada Recommended Citation Murtada, Loulwa, "Aversive Visions of Unanimity: Political Sectarianism in Lebanon" (2018). CMC Senior Theses. 1941. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1941 This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you by Scholarship@Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in this collection by an authorized administrator. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Claremont McKenna College Aversive Visions of Unanimity: Political Sectarianism in Lebanon Submitted to Professor Roderic Camp By Loulwa Murtada For Senior Thesis Fall 2017/ Spring 2018 23 April 2018 Abstract Sectarianism has shaped Lebanese culture since the establishment of the National Pact in 1943, and continues to be a pervasive roadblock to Lebanon’s path to development. This thesis explores the role of religion, politics, and Lebanon’s illegitimate government institutions in accentuating identity-based divisions, and fostering an environment for sectarianism to emerge. In order to do this, I begin by providing an analysis of Lebanon’s history and the rise and fall of major religious confessions as a means to explore the relationship between power-sharing arrangements and sectarianism, and to portray that sectarian identities are subject to change based on shifting power dynamics and political reforms. Next, I present different contexts in which sectarianism has amplified the country’s underdevelopment and fostered an environment for political instability, foreign and domestic intervention, lack of government accountability, and clientelism, among other factors, to occur. A case study into Iraq is then utilized to showcase the implications of implementing a Lebanese-style power-sharing arrangement elsewhere, and further evaluate its impact in constructing sectarian identities.
    [Show full text]
  • Lebanon's Versatile Nationalism
    EUI Working Papers RSCAS 2008/13 MEDITERRANEAN PROGRAMME SERIES Lebanon’s Versatile Nationalism Tamirace Fakhoury Muehlbacher EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES MEDITERRANEAN PROGRAMME Lebanon’s Versatile Nationalism TAMIRACE FAKHOURY MUEHLBACHER EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2008/13 This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Additional reproduction for other purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s). Requests should be addressed directly to the author(s). If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the working paper, or other series, the year and the publisher. The author(s)/editor(s) should inform the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the EUI if the paper will be published elsewhere and also take responsibility for any consequential obligation(s). ISSN 1028-3625 © 2008 Tamirace Fakhoury Muehlbacher Printed in Italy in May 2008 European University Institute Badia Fiesolana I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) Italy http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ http://cadmus.eui.eu Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), directed by Stefano Bartolini since September 2006, is home to a large post-doctoral programme. Created in 1992, it aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research and to promote work on the major issues facing the process of integration and European society. The Centre hosts major research programmes and projects, and a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European integration and the expanding membership of the European Union.
    [Show full text]
  • Presidential Elections in Lebanon: Consensus Or Conflagration? by David Schenker
    MENU Policy Analysis / PolicyWatch 1299 Presidential Elections in Lebanon: Consensus or Conflagration? by David Schenker Nov 1, 2007 ABOUT THE AUTHORS David Schenker David Schenker is the Taube Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute and former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs. Brief Analysis n October 31, Saad Hariri, leader of the "March 14" majority bloc in the Lebanese parliament, met with O opposition leader Michel Aoun, head of the Hizballah-allied Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), the largest Maronite Christian party in Lebanon. Discussions focused on the September 25-November 25 presidential elections, which will decide whether Lebanon's next chief executive will align with the pro-Western, reform-minded March 14 coalition or follow the path of current president Emile Lahoud and align with Syria. Despite increasing pressures on the March 14 forces -- including an apparent Syrian-orchestrated assassination campaign -- a breakthrough agreement between the majority and the opposition remains unlikely. Meanwhile, Hizballah has warned the March 14 bloc that if it does not compromise on the choice of president, the opposition will adopt a "more direct" approach. Background In the aftermath of the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese premier Rafiq Hariri, Syria was forced to withdraw its forces, and the March 14 bloc won the parliamentary elections and formed a government. The government coalition included Hizballah ministers, but differences quickly emerged, primarily over the prospective international tribunal to prosecute Hariri's killers. In November 2006, Hizballah's ministers essentially quit after Prime Minister Fouad Siniora requested UN assistance to establish the tribunal, and tensions have been high ever since.
    [Show full text]
  • Working for the People in Mashreq- Brochure
    Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized IN MASHREQ THE FOR PEOPLE WORKING IRAQ, LEBANON, JORDAN, IRAN AND SYRIA IRAN JORDAN, LEBANON, IRAQ, FOR MORE INFO, PLEASE CONTACT: Mona Ziade, [email protected] Zeina El Khalil, [email protected] The World Bank Group PHOTO CREDITS Front Cover-Left: Gerhard Jörén/World Bank Front Cover-Center: Mohamad Azakir/World Bank WORKING FOR THE PEOPLE Front Cover-Right: Mohamad Azakir/World Bank Page 8: World Bank Photo Collection Page 12: World Bank Photo Collection Page 13: Mohamad Azakir/World Bank IN MASHREQ Page 16: World Bank Photo Collection Page 17: Arne Hoel/World Bank Page 19: Mohamad Azakir/World Bank IRAQ, LEBANON, JORDAN, IRAN AND SYRIA Page 20: World Bank Photo Collection Page 22: Mohamad Azakir/World Bank Page 23: Mohamad Azakir/World Bank Page 25: World Bank Photo Collection Page 26: Dominic Chavez/World Bank Page 28: World Bank Photo Collection Page 29: Bulent Kilic/AFP/Getty Images Page 31: Ahmad Al Hayali Page 32: Dominic Chavez/World Bank Page 34: Dominic Chavez/World Bank Page 35: Dominic Chavez/World Bank Page 37: Dominic Chavez/World Bank Page 38: World Bank Photo Collection Page 40: Mohamad Azakir/World Bank Working for the People in Mashreq HIGHLIGHTED PROJECTS Economic Opportunities for Jordanians and Syrian Refugees (Jordan) 16 Emergency Social Stabilization and Resilience Project (Iraq) 16 Table of Contents 18 Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Development for Inclusive Growth Project (Jordan) Supporting
    [Show full text]
  • Management Has Reviewed the Request for Inspection of The
    MAN AGEME NT RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR INSPECTION PANE L REVIEW OF THE LEBANON: WATER SUPPLY AUGMENTATION PROJECT (P125184); GREATER BEIRUT WATER SUPPLY (P103063) AND ITS ADDITIONAL FINANCING (P165711) Management has reviewed the Request for Inspection of the Lebanon: Water Supply Augmentation Project (Pl25184); Greater Beirut Water Supply (Pl 03063) and its Additional Financing (P16571 l), received by the Inspection Panel on August 6, 2018 and registered on September 12, 2018 (RQ 18/05). Management has prepared the following response. October 12, 2018 CONTENTS Abbreviations and Acronyms iv EXECUTIVE SUMMARY V I. INTRODUCTION 1 II. THE REQUEST 1 III. PROJECT BACKGROUND 3 IV. SPECIAL ISSUES 6 V. MANAGEMENT'S RESPONSE 7 Map Map 1. IBRD No. 43987 Annexes Annex 1. Claims and Responses Annex 2. Location of Environment Sensitive Areas and Large Water Infrastructure in Lebanon Annex 3. Lebanese Law No. 3 7 for Cultural Properties Annex 4. Summary of Potential Dam and Non-Dam Alternative Sources Annex 5. Extract from 2014 "Assessment of Groundwater Resources of Lebanon" Annex 6. Consultations Carried out for the Lebanon Water Projects Annex 7. Information Booklet on the Grievance Redress Mechanism Annex 8. Communication with Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) iii ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AFGBWSP Additional Financing Greater Beirut Water Supply AC Appeal Committee BAP Biodiversity Action Plan BMLWE Beirut Mount Lebanon Water Establishment CDR Council for Development and Reconstruction CESMP Construction Environmental and Social Management Plan
    [Show full text]
  • Approving a President: Hezbollah and the Lebanese Political System
    Approving a President: Hezbollah and the Lebanese Political System Maddie Jurden Research Assistant, ICT Summer 2015 This article examines the current presidential deadlock in Lebanon, and the important role Hezbollah has played. The ties between Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah influence the outcome of the election and have the potential of deep repercussions for stability in Lebanon and the region as a whole. In light of the growing instability attributed to the Syrian civil war, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, and the deterioration of political stability, it is vital that the Lebanese deadlock situation be rectified as soon as possible. This article outlines the possible economic, political and security effects of the ongoing presidential deadlock, and analyzes Hezbollah’s role. * The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT). 2 Table of Contents INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 4 BRIEF HISTORY OF LEBANON..................................................................... 5 Current Governmental Power Distribution ..................................................... 9 BRIEF HISTORY OF HEZBOLLAH ................................................................ 9 Lebanon's Historical ties to Syria and Iran .................................................... 12 Modern Day Hezbollah ................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Political Party Mapping in Lebanon Ahead of the 2018 Elections
    Political Party Mapping in Lebanon Ahead of the 2018 Elections Foreword This study on the political party mapping in Lebanon ahead of the 2018 elections includes a survey of most Lebanese political parties; especially those that currently have or previously had parliamentary or government representation, with the exception of Lebanese Communist Party, Islamic Unification Movement, Union of Working People’s Forces, since they either have candidates for elections or had previously had candidates for elections before the final list was out from the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities. The first part includes a systematic presentation of 27 political parties, organizations or movements, showing their official name, logo, establishment, leader, leading committee, regional and local alliances and relations, their stance on the electoral law and their most prominent candidates for the upcoming parliamentary elections. The second part provides the distribution of partisan and political powers over the 15 electoral districts set in the law governing the elections of May 6, 2018. It also offers basic information related to each district: the number of voters, the expected participation rate, the electoral quotient, the candidate’s ceiling on election expenditure, in addition to an analytical overview of the 2005 and 2009 elections, their results and alliances. The distribution of parties for 2018 is based on the research team’s analysis and estimates from different sources. 2 Table of Contents Page Introduction .......................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Lebanon This Week
    In memory of the victims of the Beirut Port explosion Economic Research & Analysis Department Issue 643 | July 27- August 11, 2020 LEBANON THIS WEEK In This Issue Charts of the Week Economic Indicators...........................1 Beirut Port Explosion in Numbers* Capital Markets..................................1 Lebanon in the News..........................2 Economic activity in Lebanon to contract by 24% in 2020, outlook depends on reforms International community pledges $300m to Lebanon for immediate humanitarian relief Port of Beirut explosion exposes dysfunc- tional public sector Multilateral institutions reiterate commit- ment to support Lebanon, call for structural reforms Banque du Liban takes measures to support individuals and businesses affected by Beirut Port explosion Global investment banks react to Port of 0LVVLQJ 'HDG ,QMXUHG +RPHOHVV 'DPDJHG 'DPDJHG 'DPDJHG Beirut explosion PHGLFDO VFKRROV UHVLGHQFHV IDFLOLWLHV Banque du Liban asks money transfer oper- ators to settle incoming transfers in US dol- Preliminary Estimates of Damages from Beirut Port Explosion lars EQEQ Gross public debt at $93bn at end-May 2020 EQ Revenues through Port of Beirut down 46% to $50m in first five months of 2020 Moody's downgrades Lebanon's sovereign ratings World Bank extends government deadline to EQEQ meet Bisri Dam loan requirements Fiscal deficit at 35% of expenditures in first five months of 2020 Banque du Liban's foreign assets at $30.7bn, gold reserves at $18bn at end-July 2020 Banque du Liban announces launch of Cedar
    [Show full text]
  • European Union Election Observation Mission to the Republic of Lebanon 2018 EU Election Observation Mission – Lebanon 2018 FINAL REPORT
    Parliamentary Elections 2018 European Union Election Observation Mission to the Republic of Lebanon 2018 EU Election Observation Mission – Lebanon 2018 FINAL REPORT LEBANON FINAL REPORT Parliamentary elections 2018 EUROPEAN UNION ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION www.eueom-lebanon2018.eu This report has been produced by the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) to Lebanon 2018 and contains the conclusions of its observation of the parliamentary elections on 6 May. The contents of this report do not necessarily reflect the official position of the European Union. 1 EU Election Observation Mission – Lebanon 2018 FINAL REPORT Table of Contents I. Executive summary ................................................................................................. 3 II. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 8 III. Political background ............................................................................................... 9 IV. Implementation of previous EOM recommendations ............................................ 10 V. Legal framework ................................................................................................... 11 VI. Election Administration ........................................................................................ 14 VII. Voter registration ................................................................................................. 17 VIII. Registration of candidates and political parties ....................................................
    [Show full text]