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Bc's Referendum on Proportional BC’S REFERENDUM ON PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION: A PRIMER In this fall’s referendum on electoral reform, British Columbians will be asked whether they want to change from the current first-past-the-post (FPP) electoral system to proportional representation (PR), marking the third time in less than 20 years that British Columbians have been asked to vote on a switch to PR. WHAT IS PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION? WHAT IS FIRST-PAST-THE-POST? Proportional Representation is a voting system wherein the number of seats a Under our current FPP system, whichever candidate receives the most votes party holds in the legislature is directly correlated to the overall percentage of within a given riding wins a seat in the legislature. The winner does not need an votes the party received. absolute majority (i.e., more than 50 percent of the votes) to win. The party that wins the most ridings forms government. WHAT ARE THE THREE TYPES OF PR BEING PROPOSED? While the concept behind proportional representation is simple enough, execution of the system is complicated. Three different models of PR have been proposed by the government, two of which have never been implemented. MIXED MEMBER PROPORTIONAL DUAL MEMBER PROPORTIONAL RURAL URBAN PROPORTIONAL • Currently used in Germany, New Zealand, • Has never been implemented. • Has never been implemented. Scotland and Wales. • Would create two-member districts by combining • Combines aspects of the MMP model with the • Combines aspects of PR with our current FPP existing districts (excluding low-density areas). Single Transferable Vote model, which is in use in system. Ireland and Australia. • Parties nominate two candidates per district — a • Voters cast two votes: one for a candidate and primary and secondary candidate — and voters • Rural (less populated) regions of the province one for a party. The winner of the plurality of the cast a single vote for one party’s pair of candidates. would implement a Mixed Member system, vote in a given constituency wins the seat — the while urban areas would implement a Single • The first seat goes to the “primary candidate” same as our current system. The remaining seats Transferable Vote system. of the party that won the most votes while the are allocated based on the proportion of overall second seat is allocated to ensure proportionality • Under a Single Transferable Vote system, voters votes received by a given party. across the province. would rank candidates in order of preference and • One MLA represents each riding and several any candidate who receives a certain number of • Many ridings will be represented by two MLAs, MLAs represent a region. Details will be finalized votes (based on overall population) wins a seat. likely from different political parties. after the referendum. • Many ridings will be represented by two MLAs. WHAT ARE THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST PR AND FPP? PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION FIRST-PAST-THE-POST Arguments For Arguments For Advocates for proportional representation argue: Advocates for first-past-the-post system argue: • More accurate reflection of voter preferences and greater opportunities for • Clear accountability between constituencies and elected representatives representation of minority groups • Perception of greater stability as it tends to yield majority governments • Requires governments to compromise and build consensus as it seldom rather than minorities or coalitions results in one party holding an absolute majority • Relatively easy to understand voting process, with constituents only voting • Can yield higher voter turnout due to perception that every vote counts for a single MLA to represent their riding Arguments Against Arguments Against Critics of proportional representation argue: Critics of the first-past-the-post system argue: • Accountability can be blurred by candidates not being tied to particular • “Winner take all” model leads to unfair disparities between votes received constituencies and power-sharing arrangements between parties versus seats, e.g. candidates frequently win seats with only a third of the votes • Lower threshold to win seats can lead to more extremist politics and “single • Limits representation of minority groups and alternative views issue” parties • Perception that votes are discounted can lead to voter apathy, lower turnout rates • Greater sense of political uncertainty and less secure investment environment IMPACT OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION Regardless of the specific type of proportional representation implemented, Narrower Bases of Party Support there are three broad-ranging impacts of PR: Parties have less of an incentive to espouse broadly agreeable platforms under a PR system, where there is a lower threshold of voter support needed in order to Greater Likelihood of Minority and Coalition Governments win a seat. This can sometimes result in “single issue” parties winning seats. Studies of jurisdictions with PR systems show that they have a significantly greater likelihood of yielding minority or coalition governments. Greater Number of Parties Within the Legislature Because the threshold to secure seats is lower, a greater number of political In first-past-the-post systems, elections result in coalitions 23 per cent of the parties can gain representation in the legislature. While there are 18 registered time, while in PR systems, minority/coalition governments are formed 87 per political parties in B.C., for example, only three (Liberal, NDP and Green) hold cent ofthe time. seats in the legislature. Under a PR model (where the threshold for holding a seat is typically about five percent), this number could double. For a fulsome overview of the upcoming referendum, visit Elections BC (https://elections.bc.ca). To learn more about how this referendum could impact your business, contact Edelman Vancouver’s Public Affairs team. Bridgitte Anderson Hon. James Moore General Manager Special Advisor, Public Affairs 604.648.3403 | [email protected] 604.648.3401 | [email protected] Matt Gordon Alanna Smith Senior Associate, Public Affairs Senior Account Executive, Corporate & Public Affairs 250.896.4923 604.648.3422 | [email protected] Edelman Vancouver | October 2018 | 1400 – 1500 West Georgia St | Vancouver, BC V6G 2Z6 | 604 623 3007.
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