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Home , Armenian dram, Black Garden, OSCE Minsk Group

No. 71 April 2016

Armenia, and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: why the ‘black garden’ will not blossom any time soon

Tobias Schumacher

After the recent escalation of fighting to a complete termination of the fighting or between Azerbaijan and -backed contribute even to a resolution of the years- separatist forces of the self-proclaimed long conflict. At least three major factors can Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh – the explain this sobering prospect. bloodiest and most wide-ranging for the last 22 years – the South Caucasus has re-emerged in the international spotlight. THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT What are the prospects of the recently AS A SOURCE OF IDENTITY AND concluded ceasefire agreement mediated LEGITIMACY by , asks Tobias Schumacher. First, neither the authoritarian regime of So it finally happened. The conflict between Azerbaijani President Ilham Alijev nor the Armenia and Azerbaijan over the separatist Armenian Republican Party, dominating the and internationally isolated mountainous state apparatus and led by President Serzh region of Nagorno-Karabakh in the South Sargsyan, have a real interest in resolving the Caucasus, which erupted in 1988 and escalated conflict. To both sides, Nagorno-Karabakh is during 1991-1994 into a full-blown military too important from an identity-generating conflict, flared up again. From 2 to 5 April perspective, and too strong weigh the 2016 Azerbaijani forces on the one side and legitimacy deficits that both regimes are faced separatist forces of the self-proclaimed with. What does this mean? Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (NKAO) on The ‘black garden in the mountains’, as the the other side, supported by the Armenian wild mountainous region is translated literally, military, found themselves in major military is, according to Azerbaijani reading, the clashes which, in terms of scale and casualties, birthplace of Azerbaijani identity and the exceeded all previous skirmishes since the cradle of its national culture. Conversely, the ceasefire of 12 May 1994. This time, the internationally unrecognized republic, drawing conflict parties agreed on a renewed ceasefire, from the military and financial support of mediated by Russia, after just four days. Yet, as Armenia, and boasting just some 150.000 the recent past demonstrated, this will not lead inhabitants, stands in the Armenian collective

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memory for the continuation and incessancy economic advancement and improvements of of the Armenian nation and identity, given its living conditions were only possible in roots as a province in Greater Armenia at the exchange for non-interference in domestic turn of the second century BC. Any territorial political affairs, has increasingly come under concession by either side would not only result threat. Consequently, in such a tense and even in a de facto and de jure loss of territory. More hostile climate it seems natural from the importantly, for a considerable part of the two regime’s angle to utilize the Nagorno- populations it would correspond to a betrayal Karabakh conflict and elevate it to a higher of the national self-conception. This is escalation level, hoping that the decreased something that both regimes cannot afford to legitimacy qua performance can be ignore, as much as the fact that the conflict is a compensated and ideally turned around by viable instrument in their autocratic tool-kit revitalizing, and rallying support for, the fight that can be used and adjusted anytime for what is framed as the ‘national cause’. depending on the domestic political and economic situation. In this regard, the parallels to Armenia are obvious. While the country until not long ago As far as Azerbaijan is concerned, Alijev’s was euphemistically considered by some as a apparatus of power, and thus its power ‘Caucasian tiger’1, which drew quite some monopoly, has recently come under growing international attention due to its success in pressure as a result of its decreasing attracting foreign direct investment and its ‘performance legitimacy’. The country, whose temporary fight against poverty, this has been exports are comprised of 95% hydrocarbon reversed into its opposite since 2008.2 The goods, suffers considerably from the recent global financial crisis, western sanctions against fall in the price of oil. Since the end of 2015 Russia – Armenia’s most important trading this has led to a decline of capital reserves by partner – and Russian pressure to become a approx. 50% and to a depreciation of the part of the still dysfunctional Eurasian national – the manat – by 48%, both Economic Union have forced the hand of the of which, in turn, contributed to a complete Republican Party and President Sargsyan and melting of the once impressive balance of exposed the regime to popular discontent. payments surplus. As the hitherto financially Growing poverty – every third Armenian lives self-sufficient, oil-rent-based regime suddenly currently below the poverty line –, the decline finds itself in discussions with international of Armenian-Russian trade in 2015, the financial institutions such as the IMF, the depreciation of the Armenian dram and of the World Bank and the European Bank for Russian , the decline in remittances of Reconstruction over emergency loans and foreign Armenian workers, a record-high assistance packages to the private sector, it has government debt, and the resulting increase of come under intense domestic pressure. During living costs and electricity prices have sparked the last months, rising food prices, widespread protests in the summer of 2015, unemployment and inflation sparked though – unlike in Azerbaijan – these were numerous demonstrations across the country mainly confined to the national capital which even led to violent clashes between . Societal discontent is aggravated by protesters and the security forces. In other the recent adoption of a new constitution. As a words, the social pact that was concluded by consequence of a successful referendum, the undemocratic and human rights violating which de facto was characterized by ballot- regime of Alijev, whereby opportunities for stuffing, vote buying, pressure, and even

EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 2 violence, the new constitution foresees the US$3,2 billion. Notwithstanding, also Armenia transformation of the hitherto presidential has been in relative terms one of the biggest system into a parliamentary one. Yet, as a military spenders in the recent years. In 2015, matter of fact, it is destined to mainly serve the its military expenditure was approx. US$500 purpose of securing the power monopoly of million, which corresponded to more than 21% President Sargsyan and the Republican Party, of its total expenditure and an increase of 8% thus satisfying the elites whose support is vital compared to 2014. Back then, the military for their political survival. Therefore, in light of spending-GDP ratio was 4.3% and thus just the rampant discontent with the stagnating slightly below Azerbaijan’s ratio. Though these political and economic situation, any territorial figures seem to speak for themselves and concession in the framework of the conflict supposedly indicate Azerbaijan’s military over Artsakh – the historic Armenian name of supremacy, they cannot disguise the true Nagorno-Karabakh – would, from the balance of power. So far at least, Armenia perspective of the ruling elite, be equivalent to always found ways and means to establish and political suicide. Moreover, taking into account maintain a military balance. As a member of that the conflict has been the most important the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty foreign policy issue throughout the last almost Organisation (CSTO)3, and as a result of three decades, offering a most useful source to bilateral defence agreements with Russia, it has increase regime legitimacy and foster the image been benefiting from weapons’ deliveries, of a national enemy, it becomes providing it with arms and equipment below understandable why, in turn, occasionally market value or even at no cost. violent skirmishes with Azerbaijan do play into the hands of the regime. Another aspect is indivisibly linked with the military build-up in the South Caucasus in ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN AND recent years that is major cause for concern. EXCESSIVE MILITARY SPENDING Instead of ‘just’ enlarging their defence capacities, a worrying trend can be discerned This leads directly to the second reason why lately as both parties have been heavily the prospects of a lasting ceasefire, or even of a investing in offensive weapons and – as the peace agreement, are extremely poor. Both most recent clashes and the downing of an Azerbaijan and Armenia have in recent years Armenian helicopter by Azerbaijani forces in increased their military spending considerably November 2014 clearly demonstrated – and made every effort to enlarge their military lowered their inhibition threshold to use them. arsenal and to modernize it. Azerbaijan’s For example, already last year Russia promised military expenditure in relation to its total Yerevan the delivery of Iskander-M missiles, spending increased during the period from which would theoretically enable Armenia to 1994 to 2012 by 95%, while the defence target Azerbaijan’s oil and gas installations. In budget, for example in 2015, grew by 27% in turn, Azerbaijan’s military is nowadays using – comparison to 2014, amounting nowadays to as was demonstrated in the recent clashes – the US$4,8 billion. This corresponds to a share of ultra-modern Russian TOS-1 ‘Solntsepyok’ approx. 5% of Azerbaijan’s GDP as well as system as well as weaponized Orbiter-2 drones, approx. 18% of the state’s total expenditure. In and it nowadays possesses – as could be seen relative terms, these figures exceed even those during the Azerbaijan International Defence of the United States, as well as Armenia, the Exhibition and Conference in September 2014 total state budget of which amounts to just – more than 900, locally manufactured, yet

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highly competitive arms and material. some of the latest state-of-the-art Buyan-M missile corvettes. On the other hand through THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT AS the illegal annexation of Georgian territory in A POWERFUL INSTRUMENT IN RUSSIA’S and , which enables FOREIGN POLICY TOOL-KIT Russia to potentially interrupt Azerbaijani hydrocarbon exports to Europe, thereby The third reason why the recent ceasefire will berefting the regime of vital revenues. not be sustainable and thus not conducive to a potential resolution of the conflict is the role of In other words, the conflict in Nagorno- Russia. Regarding politics as a zero-sum game Karabakh joins the ranks of other unresolved and through the prism of power calculations, the conflicts in Russia’s neighbourhood, notably in Kremlin leadership, at least thus far, does not eastern Ukraine, in Crimea, South Ossetia, see any reason why it should engage itself in Abkhazia and Transnistria, as the Kremlin pushing the conflict parties towards a peace regards their preservation and occasional settlement. In particular in recent years, Putin incitement as a viable tool to preserve its benefited from the conflict in so far as it enabled supposedly hegemonic influence in the post- him to leave the opposing sides in a constant Soviet space more generally and over domestic state of insecurity, to fuel the conflict through political developments in its neighbourhood weapons deliveries to either side depending on countries in particular. Though this calculus is his liking and the evolving dynamics on the connected with enormous risks, which could ground (or through the threat of refraining from generate, both domestically and geo- such supplies), and to even profit financially strategically, unpredictable political and from these deliveries. By means of Russia’s material costs, no regional actor has hitherto troops’ presence in the Armenian city of managed to escape from Russia’s power and Armenia’s military dependency on Russia, projections or to even delink itself from Putin has a mechanism at its disposal that allows Moscow’s neo-imperial efforts. him at any time to limit the Armenian regime’s room for manoeuvre, to commit it to Moscow CONCLUSIONS: THE DARK FUTURE OF and to preclude it from drifting closer towards THE ‘BLACK GARDEN’ western structures – as was the case in Whether this remains to be the case also in the September 2013 when Sargsyan was ‘requested’ mid-term in what regards the Nagorno- to abandon the country’s path towards partial Karabakh conflict seems to be rather less integration into EU-European structures. predictable than it was one year ago, given the Though Russia’s leverage vis-à-vis Azerbaijan is changing geopolitical developments in Russia’s less developed, also , at least until the wider neighbourhood. In light of the massive establishment of a more self-sufficient national deterioration of Russian-Turkish relations after weapons industry, has been dependent on solid the downing of a Russian fighter jet in relations with Moscow, most of all in order to November 2015 and the corresponding expand its pre-emptive strike capacity and to rhetoric muscle flexing of the rather benefit from corresponding technology uncompromising Mr. Putin and Mr. Erdogan, transfers. Moreover, Russia continues to remain it is to be feared that the South Caucasus in a position to project its military power: on the might even become the venue of a proxy war one hand through its well-equipped North of sorts. In how far the recently uttered and Caucasus contingent and the presence of its rather explicit declarations of support on the Caspian flotilla, which nowadays features also

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part of Erdogan and the existence of a strategic democracy-averse thinking and practices, partnership and mutual assistance pact between continue to dominate in Yerevan and Baku and Azerbaijan motivated the pressured alike, an externally mediated or even imposed regime of Alijev to turn its aggressive war rhetoric peace process is unthinkable. In fact, the as regards the separatist region of Nagorno- friendly and in many cases even close relations Karabakh and its patron Armenia into military of some western countries with both Armenia action is subject of speculation. This applies also and Azerbaijan are often rather complicating to the question of whether Armenia feels than facilitating any process towards a lasting encouraged by the perspective of Russian settlement. In this sense, US military aid to weapons deliveries and the prospect of close Armenia, Paris’ Treaty on Concord and economic relations with Iran, which is determined Cooperation with Yerevan, Armenia’s and to re-enter the regional and international stage, to Azerbaijan’s participation in NATO’s militarily confront Baku. However, three Partnership for Peace initiative, or the observations are incontestable. intensification of EU energy relations with Azerbaijan, supposedly leading to the country’s Firstly, the observation of, and adherence to, the inclusion into the EU Energy Community, Basic Principles of the Process – which have provided the Armenian and the since 1994 and under the leadership of the OSCE Azerbaijani regime respectively with valuable Minsk Group is supposed to lead to a lasting external legitimacy, thus indirectly feeding into solution of the conflict – that German chancellor their respective conflict-specific approaches Angela Merkel, in the presence of Armenian and narratives. President Sargsyan, demanded on 6 April 2016 in Berlin are incompatible with one another.4 Thirdly, the recent developments have Armenia’s insistence on Nagorno-Karabakh’s demonstrated once more that it is misleading right to self-determination and Azerbaijan’s and in fact irresponsible to speak of Nagorno- insistence on the principle of territorial integrity Karabakh as a ‘frozen conflict’ as there have continue to be diametrically opposed to one always been smaller or larger skirmishes along another also 22 years after the initiation of the the line of contact and beyond throughout the Minsk Process. This is aggravated by the fact that last 22 years, regularly causing casualties on Azerbaijan was never sympathetic to the Minsk both sides. Furthermore, both conflict parties format and that both sides throughout the years succeeded in using these skirmishes never demonstrated any determination to grab systematically to implant the alleged chances – as for example in Kazan in 2011 – to unsolvability of the conflict in the minds of end the conflict. large parts of their respective societies instead of sensitizing them gradually for a potential Secondly, even in the event that the recent peace process. In light of the recent territorial ceasefire will be observed, the outlined mélange gains by Azerbaijan there is every indication of intervening variables render any short- to mid- that the next military confrontation is just term conflict resolution settlement impossible. As around the corner as Armenia is unlikely to long as Russia considers to treat its tolerate them for long. Also, it is rather likely neighbourhood as its exclusive sphere of that the international community continues to influence, and remains determined to domesticate be condemned to its role of a background it by lawful and unlawful means, and as long as actor that on the one hand has been hard security-oriented world views, rooted in demanding peace and stability for 22 years,

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while on the other hand – Sargsyan’s state visit Prof. Tobias Schumacher is the Chairholder of the European in Berlin on 6 April 2016 demonstrated this visibly – has regularly been held to ransom by Neighbourhood Policy Chair at the the conflicting sides. College of Europe, Natolin campus (Warsaw) and currently a John F. Kennedy Memorial Fellow at the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies at

Harvard University. competition in and around Europe evolves

further, the importance of SOF therefore continues to increase.

In contemporary NATO doctrine, special operations forces serve three principal tasks. First, they can be used for special reconnaissance. Across the full range of operations, SOF provide military commanders and political decision- Endnotesmakers with discreet or covert situational 1 Seeawareness Saumya Mitra,within Douglas any given Andrew, theatre. Gohar Second, Gyulumyan, they Paul Holden, Bart Kaminski, Yevgeny Kuznetsov, Ekaterine Vashakmadze,can be used The for Caucasian executing Tiger. direct Sustaining action Economic against Growth in Armenia, Washington, D.C.: World Bank Press, 2007.specific targets or for achieving specific

2 objectives. Such missions can range from While foreign direct investment in Armenia reached an all time high of US$425,89 million in the fourth quarter of 2008,hostage it recorded rescue a net andoutflow evacuation of US$7,5 million missions in the last to quarter of 2015. sabotage and counterterrorism raids. Thirdly, 3 Azerbaijanthey can has be left used the forCSTO a in wide 1999 rangeafter refusal of military to sign an extension to the treaty. The CSTO has no obligation to defend the NKAO as its members have never recognized it. assistance duties. This includes the training and 4 Thementoring OSCE Minsk of Group local is composed security forces.of Russia, Asthe United such, States of America and , all of which since 1997 act as co-militarychairs, and assistance of , constitutes , , a continuum , , that Armenia and Azerbaijan. On a rotating basis, also the OSCE Troikaranges is a permanentfrom the specialmember. to the conventional. All

three tasks are executed by small teams of highly trained operators. These are often supported by extensive intelligence links, civil affairs specialists and commando units, all tailored to meet what the specific mission requires. Also, they rely on state-of-the-art equipment, especially with regards to secure communication links.

In recent years, the Belgian Special Forces Group and paracommando battalions have engaged in all three of these tasks. While open- source operational details are scarce, a few examples help illustrate their use. In 2008, Belgium deployed its special forces to eastern Chad to ensure a proper intelligence picture for the EUFOR Tchad/RCA operation. For several months, it provided the combined joint special operations component command within the mission (Clerix 2009). In 2010, a team of special forces was sent to the Ivory Coast with the task of protecting the Belgian embassy (Knack 2010). 6 At the time, heavy fighting was taking place in Abidjan and all borders and airspace were officially closed, thus requiring a covert insertion