Master thesis

The Fading of the

Rainbow Nation? A Study about Democratic Consolidation in Post- .

Author: Oskar Malmgren Supervisor: Daniel Silander Examiner: Emil Uddhammar Term: HT20 Subject: Political Science

Level: Advanced

Course code: 5SK30E

Abstract This thesis addresses the level of democratic consolidation in South Africa. The study aimed to provide a deeper understanding of the current political situation and the general state of democracy. As a method, a single case study was used where the political situation in post-apartheid South Africa was applied upon the concept of democratic consolidation by using five distinctive consolidation arenas: civil society, political society, judiciary, bureaucratic society and economic society. The results of the analysis show a variance in the degree of democratic consolidation in the country. The judiciary is very much well-functioning and independent and can therefore be classified as consolidated. The civil society and some elements of the political society are mostly functioning and can be classified as mostly consolidated with some reservations, while the bureaucratic and economic societies are deemed to be not consolidated. However, South Africa also possesses several obstacles for genuine consolidation that applies to all arenas, namely high degrees of violence, low social trust, and institutional weakness. The democratic system in South Africa is not currently considered to be under serious existential threat and has proven itself capable of withstanding high degrees of pressure. Nevertheless, it is found to be suffering from a type of democratic fatigue and transformation stagnation, which could have the potential to result in more serious implications in the future. South Africa can therefore be classified as a partly consolidated democracy.

Keywords: South Africa, post-apartheid, democracy, democratic consolidation, civil society, political society, judiciary, bureaucratic society, economic society.

Table of Contents 1. Introduction ...... 1 1.1. Research problem………………………………………………………….4 1.2. Aim and research questions………………………………………………..5 1.3. Disposition…………………………………………………………………5 2. Methodology & Material…………………………………………………..…7 2.1. Case selection……………………………………………………………...6 2.2. Research design……………………………………………………………8 2.2.1. Case study…………………………………………………………………..8 2.2.2. Interviews………………………………………………………………….10 2.3. The material of the study…………………………………………………11 2.4. Validity and reliability………………………………………………..…..13 3. Theoretical framework……………………………………………...... 13 3.1. Democratisation………………………………....………………………..13 3.2. The third wave and the century of democratisation….....……………...... 15 3.3. Liberalisation……………………………………………………………..18 3.4. Transition…………………………………………………………………19 3.5. Perspectives on consolidation - the idea of democratic consolidation…...21 3.5.1. Democracy - "the only game in town"…………………………………….23 3.5.2. Consolidation - a versatile concept?...... 25 3.5.3. The five arenas of consolidated democracy……………………………….29 1.1. Table - the five arenas of consolidated democracy………………...…….36 4. Analysis……………………………………………………………………….37 4.1. The South African civil society…………………………………………..37 4.1.1. Strenghts of the civil society………………………………………………37 4.1.2. Weaknesses of the civil society……………………………………………41 1.2. Table - Civil Society……………………………………………………..44 4.2. The South African political society………………………………………45 4.2.1. Strenghts of the political society………………………………….……….46 4.2.2. Weaknesses of the political society………………………………………..48 1.3. Table - Political Society………………………………………………….52 4.3. The South African judiciary……………………………………………...52 4.3.1. Strenghts of the judiciary………………………………………………….53 4.3.2. Weaknesses of the judiciary…………………………………………...…..58 1.4. Table - Judiciary………………………………………………….………62 4.4. The South African bureaucratic society………………………...………..62 4.4.1. Strenghts of the bureaucracy………………………………………………63 4.4.2. Weaknesses of the bureaucracy……………………………………………65 1.5. Table - Bureaucratic society……………………………………………..70 4.5. The South African Economic Society……………………………………71 4.5.1. Strenghts of the economic society…………………………….…………..72 4.5.2. Weaknesses of the economic society……………………….……………..74 1.6. Table - Economic society………………………………………………..79 5. Concluding remarks………………………………………………………...79 6. References…………………………………………………………………....86

1. Introduction For over three centuries, the governance of the South African state was vested in the hands of a white minority while the majority population was excluded from any decision-making, including suffrage. By the time of 1948, the white population of South Africa went to the polls in a general election which stood between the ruling pro-British United Party (UP) led by Prime Minister Jan Smuts and a coalition of opposition parties dominated by the National Party (NP) under the leadership of Daniel Malan. The UP, although not in favour of the total racial integration, was nevertheless considered more moderate and pragmatic in its stance on racial relations and believed that eventual racial integration in South Africa was inevitable. The NP, on the other hand, had campaigned on a radical promise of the introduction of a racially-instituted system based de jure separation of the country’s ethnic groups to safeguard the continuing domination of white South Africans in the society. The election resulted in a narrow victory for the NP along with its coalition partners, leading to the formal adoption of the Apartheid-system in 1950 (Meredith, 1988).

During the years of Apartheid, the political arena of South Africa was dominated by the NP and until 1974, only one member of the South African parliament was officially opposed to Apartheid. Opposition to the system was often violently suppressed with political opponents being prosecuted and imprisoned. Opposition parties such as the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) and the Communist Party (SACP) were outlawed with its leaders forced into exile or incardinated for treason, including prominent ANC member and future leader , a lawyer who had been a member of the ANC since the 1940s and also co-founded the armed wing of the party. The system was seemingly left unchallengeable until the 1980s when more militant opposition towards the Apartheid-system started to erupt in South Africa, which at this time had

1(105)

become increasingly internationally isolated. The NP-government, now lead by State President Pieter Willem Botha, proclaimed a nationwide state of emergency in 1986 in an attempt to quell the increasingly violent unrest in the country, leading to censorship of the press, suspension of many civil liberties and the detainment of thousands of people. Although some of the most draconic Apartheid-laws were repealed during the 1980s, the government refused to officially negotiate with the ANC and other outlawed opposition parties, or as State President Botha stated in his own words:

“…I am prepared to talk with people who want constitutional changes, but not prepared to talk with people who want revolutionary changes…”, referring to the imprisoned ANC-leader Nelson Mandela (South African History Online, 2018; Kino Library – Youtube, 2013).

In 1989, State President Botha resigned due to health reason and was succeeded by F.W. de Klerk, a former government minister who for most of his career had been known as a conservative “hardliner” and forceful proponent of continuing racial segregation as well as the preservation of white minority interests (de Klerk, 1991). He immediately announced the start of formal negotiations with the ANC as well as the lifting of bans against several opposition parties. Nelson Mandela was also released in 1990 after spending nearly 30 years in prison and was subsequently elected president of the ANC the same year, replacing the ailing Oliver Tambo. The aim of the negotiations was meant to eventually result in a constitutional arrangement which would include the official abolishment of Apartheid and the transition to majority rule. De Klerk later stated that the purpose of the negotiations was to avoid that South Africa descended into a civil war and the continuing international isolation of the country (Roherty, 1992; de Klerk, 1991).

2(105)

By the beginning of the 1990s, the situation in South Africa further deteriorated into a violent spiral with staggering homicide rates and the rise of extreme right-wing groups as well as more radical political parties such as the Conservative Party (CP) lead by former cabinet minister Andries Treurnicht which opposed all negotiations with the ANC and instead wanted to preserve white minority rule at all cost. At the same time, violence also increased between rival parties within the black majority population, most notably between supporters of the ANC and the Zulu-dominated (IFP). The IFP and its leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi had earlier been a close ally of the ANC and had supported each other in the struggle against Apartheid. However, the relation between the two parties broke down during the 1980s due to the increased focus of IFP on tribal loyalty and Zulu ethnic interests as well as Buthelezi's position as a leader and collaboration with the South African Defence Forces (SADF) (Southall, 1981; Busch, 2013). Inkatha members were also involved in several massacres of ANC-members during the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, leading to the fear of the outbreak of a potential civil war (Busch, 2013).

To consolidate the support for further negotiations for the dismantlement of Apartheid, a referendum among the white population was called in 1992 by State President de Klerk which resulted in a large majority voting for continuing negotiations. Although many white voters were motivated to vote yes a sign of good-will towards the black majority population, many also saw the negotiations and transition and essential for the future of South Africa, such as the lifting of international sanctions and to prevent the outbreak of a civil war as well as the rise of radical political powers (BBC, 1992; NY Times, 1992).

The negotiations between the government and the ANC were concluded in 1993 and resulted in the adoption of an interim constitution before a new

3(105)

constitution could be drafted and a general election in 1994 which was to be conducted under the principle of universal suffrage for the first time in the history of South Africa (Thomas, 1995; BBC, 1990). The election resulted in a sweeping victory for the ANC, taking close to two-thirds of the vote, and Nelson Mandela, who had been the leader of the ANC since 1990, was sworn in as the country’s first black and democratically elected president. A new constitution was promulgated in 1996 which is still considered to contain some of the most far-reaching human and civil liberties in the world (Goemede, 2018).

During his time in office, Nelson Mandela proclaimed the creation of the Rainbow Nation with the words:

“…Each of us is as intimately attached to the soil of this beautiful country as are the famous jacaranda trees of and the mimosa trees of the bushveld – a rainbow nation at peace with itself and the world…” (Manzo, 1996)

The term was intended to encapsulate the diverse character of South Africa with its many different nations and the strive to include all these into a unity of a multi-cultural and democratic country which for most of its history had been identified by a strict division along racial lines. Nevertheless, the country has continued to face significant problems with increasing crime rates, ethnic tensions and inequality (Gachago & Ngoasheng, 2017).

Since the first elections of 1994 conducted under universal suffrage, South Africa has held five democratic elections which all have resulted in majority victories for the ANC. During recent years, however, South Africa has been marred by a poor economic state, continuing high crime rates, allegations of corruption on the highest political levels and lukewarm respect for the rule of law while the country at the same time possesses some of the highest levels of inequality and sexually related violence in the world (World Bank, 2018;

4(105)

Statistics SA, 2018). At the same time, the ANC has been characterised by increased internal tensions and fighting between factions and shrinking electoral support with the vote falling beneath 60 per cent in the 2019 general election for the first time in modern South African history. Issues such as potential land reforms to redistribute the land from the white minority, which still is in the possession of a big majority of the land in the country, has resulted to further tensions between the different population groups. Meanwhile, while the electoral support for the dominating ANC has been shrinking, South Africa has also seen the rise of more radical political parties such as the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and the (FF+) and a political culture characterised by inflammatory statements and tensions within the country (Southall, 2019).

So how could the state of the South African democracy be described today, 26 years after the first democratic elections? Have Nelson Mandela’s vision of a harmonic Rainbow Nation built on the principle of reconciliation as its lodestar brought happiness and prosperity to South Africa or has this lodestar begin to fade?

1.1. Research problem While it is hard to deny the fact that South Africa seemingly went through a relatively successful and peaceful transition from a racialist authoritarian rule to multi-party democracy, there are serious questions whether this transition brought a satisfactory result. While South Africa remains a democratic state with frequent free and fair elections, it is unclear whether this fact alone can determine if the country is a consolidated democracy. This raises serious questions about the state of democracy in today’s South Africa and how safeguarded the democratic system could be considered to be.

Although South Africa is struggling with both political and economic problems, the country remains a notable power force on the international

5(105)

arena but in particular as a regional power on the African continent. The fact that South Africa is one of the few countries in Africa that never have experienced a coup d’état or unconstitutional change in government while at the same time having conducted free and competitive elections since 1994 statues an example of stability on a continent which historically has been marred by political instability (African Development Bank, 2012).

1.2. Aim and research questions This study aims to investigate and conclude whether South Africa could be classified to be a consolidated democracy. To achieve the aim of this study the following research question will be addressed:

Could South Africa today be considered to be a consolidated democracy in terms of the five consolidating arenas civil society, political society, judiciary, bureaucratic society and economic society?

1.3. Disposition of the study This study commences with an introduction in which a background, research problem, as well as the aim of the study and the research questions, are presented. The background contains a general description of the subject, finally leading to an explanation of why the study is important. The second part, which concerns the method and material of the study, presents the case selection and its limitation along with the choice of research design and material collection. These parts are discussed critically and also contain arguments in favour of the chosen research problem.

The method selected for this conductment of this study is qualitative in the form of a case study since there is a clear case, post-Apartheid South Africa, and the issue of the level of democratic consolidation in this state, along with elements of qualitative interview methods. Furthermore, the third section contains the theoretical framework of the study which includes previous

6(105)

research on democratic consolidation which is aimed to support the empirical framework which will later be presented in the analysis.

Because democratic consolidation is a theoretical concept with a wide scope of definitions, this part contains earlier research on the subject as well as a critical discussion about the best-suited definition which is used concerning the analysis. The next part contains the main analysis of the study where the case, South Africa, is being applicated upon the chosen theoretical framework as defined in the earlier part. The last and final section of this study presents the conclusion which can be drawn from the analysis.

2. Methodology and Material This section of the study will concern the selected research design, a case study conducted with the assistance of the collection of material which includes written material such as books, articles and interviews. Furthermore, an explanation is being given to why this is the most preferable design for the conductment of this study. The importance of the validity and reliability of the material will also be addressed along with a presentation of the theories used in the study.

2.1. Case selection and delimitations The main purpose of this study is to investigate the democratic situation in South Africa and conclude whether the state is a consolidated democracy according to the five arenas as mentioned. As previously stated in the first chapter of this study, the reason for choosing this case is due to the significant transition that occurred in South Africa during the 1990s with the transformation from a largely authoritarian racial-based regime into a multi- party democracy with universal rights. Furthermore, South Africa faces an uncertain future when it comes to her democratic system of government for several different reasons which include political mismanagement, corruption,

7(105)

lack of trust in the political system, declining levels of participation in the democratic process as well a general violent state of the country. The importance of the country both regionally and in Africa should not be underestimated which means that future developments in South Africa could potentially affect the entire African continent (Diamond, 2008).

Due to the limited scope of this study, the analysis will not involve an analysis of how South Africa functioned before 1994, other than the background history and potential connections between this and the present- day situation of the country. Whereas democratisation is a very broad area with many different theories and concepts, a delimitation has been drawn to uniquely include the concept of democratic consolidation which is a theory regarding how safeguarded and well-established a democratic system of government is by using the five arenas of civil society, political society, rule of law, bureaucratic society and economic society. (Linz & Stepan, 1996).

When it comes to the character of the study itself, it will be of a theory consuming character since the purpose is to use existing theories and factors to explain the case in question; namely the degree of democratic consolidation in South Africa after 1994 (Esaiasson & others, 2017).

2.2. Research design As with the research design of this study, it is essential that this design is also being properly connected to the research problem of the study. In this case, a descriptive study method will be used since the intention of this study is to identify and explore the current situation regarding democratic consolidation in South Africa which will later be used to conclude the study (Esaissson & others, 2017).

2.2.1. Case study The main research design which is going to be used for the analysis is a single case study method. A case study is used when one wants to investigate

8(105)

a specific case in which one delimits the area of that specific case. This study method is suitable when one wants to make a more in-depth investigation and description of the case in question and contribute with potential explanations to the different phenomena with this case. The theory of democratic consolidation is a well-established concept within the scope of political science even though some scholars tend to be critical towards the theory due to its alleged vagueness. However, this is not a reason not to use the theory in this study because it vests the researcher with a virtue of authority to investigate different aspects of the democratic system in a state. This does not automatically mean that the theory is unflawed but likewise, it allows the researcher to conclude whether the theory itself is usable in addition to the main result (George & Bennett, 2005; Ejvegård, 2009).

Case studies are a very popular research method within the scope of social science (Yin, 2014). However, it is important to mention the fact that case studies have received certain forms of criticism which potentially could have a weakening effect on the result. Case studies have frequently been criticised for causal determinism, non-replicability, subjective conclusions, absence of generalisable conclusions, biased case selection and lack of empirical clout (Creswell, 2014). If a case study is going to be conducted, it is therefore essential with a clear structure as well as the application of an operational and systematic approach to providing a clear result (Yin, 1981). As earlier mentioned, this study will be conducted from the dimension of democratic consolidation. The concept is a rather broad one with many different definitions, the concept will be discussed in the next part about the theoretical framework, whereafter it will be narrowed down to five main ideas: civil society, political society, rule of law, bureaucratic society, and economic society. The case of post-Apartheid South Africa will, therefore, be analysed according to these terms. The reason for the selecting of these

9(105)

ideas will be further described in the next chapter about the theoretical framework.

As mentioned above, case studies are often criticised for the lack of generalised conclusions about the investigated case. This could constitute a potential weakness with regards to the method of this study but since this study possesses a clear and defined case which itself is narrowed down into some subcases, this allows for a much greater chance of answering the research question due to the more close and detailed investigation of the case. Furthermore, a case study allows the researcher to categorise and measure the indicators which best signify the theoretical concepts that the researcher aims to investigate (George & Bennett, 2005). Given the fact that this study aims to examine how or why a phenomenon is or has occurred along with extensive research on a specific subject for different angles, a case study is very suitable since this also allows an increasing possibility to reach the aim of understanding how or why something has occurred (Thomas, 2011).

2.2.2. Interviews The research design of this study also contains a number of qualitative interviews as a method of study. This interview method is characterised by a certain level of flexibility and lack of structure. This method stands in contrast with quantitative interviews which are used for surveys and similar. The two major forms within the scope of the qualitative interview method are the semi-structured interviews and unstructured interviews. As for this study, the semi-structured interview method has been deemed the most appropriate. In this method, the researcher has a clear aim and topic of the study, but the importance is also to allow the interview subject to talk from their perspective by using their own experiences along with a frame of reference, ideas and meanings which are familiar to them. Flexibility is the core aspect of this interview method which means that there is no need for a clear

10(105)

structure other than the main case. The researcher can start with the main question involving the main case while the interview subject has a large degree of freedom to stir the conversation. The possible upcoming of unexpected themes and adjustment of the content is not negative as such since this also allows for a wide spectrum of opinions. Concerning this study, interviews have been conducted with persons that have specialised knowledge about the themes of the five consolidation arenas (Edwards & Holland, 2013).

As the aim of this study is to investigate the level of democratic consolidation in South Africa after 1994, the case will be deeply analysed and thus this method is, therefore, the most suitable. The interviews have been conducted and defined as a method on its own but the answers, and thereby the results, will be presented and included in the case and thus analysed as a part of the case study.

2.3. The material of the study As with the material of this study, the theoretical material is collected from both primary and secondary sources, depending on the part of the study. Since the theory of this study, democratic consolidation, is a broad concept, the definitions of this are collected from a large scope of scholars. The five core aspects of the study themselves are retrieved from the book Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, which is also one of the most valuable sources concerning the theoretical part (Linz & Stepan, 1996). The consolidation concept is also further upheld by referring to some other scholars that have also written about the subject such as Larry Diamond, Samuel Huntington, etc. Whereas the consolidation theory is not a universally accepted concept among scholars, other materials have been collected from different scholars (e.g. O’Donnell & Schedler) which often

11(105)

have different views on democratic consolidation to provide an alternative viewpoint on this.

The material used for the analytical part of this study was omitted by scientific articles and books that were mostly retrieved from internet sources such as Google Scholar, Linnaeus University OneSearch and judicial judgments of South African courts as well as directly from South African scholars. Websites such as the Institute for Security Studies, Statistics SA, Independent Electoral Commission, etc. were also used and provided a wide range of valuable sources to support the aim of the study. Some newspaper articles and videotaped interviews have been used as part of the material with most of these being of international and South African origin. It is important to highlight that these sources are meant to provide the study with concrete examples with regards to each of the five arenas, such as happenings, announcements and statements by individuals connected to specific actions. Hence, these popular sources have mainly been used to provide the analysis with proof.

Furthermore, a total number of seven individuals (see appendix) have been interviewed for this study. The conduct of the interviews all began with personal email contact between the author and each of the scholars where the purpose and the theme of interviews were presented. The interviews were then conducted in an open manner where some decided opening questions were asked but with a focus on letting the interviewees speak as freely as they wanted as long as it was within the area. The interviews were all recorded as well as notes being taken to preserve its original content. All of these individuals are scholars based in South Africa with deemed special knowledge of the five consolidation arenas. The contact with the scholars was established by the author of this study after consultations with lecturers at the North-West University in Potchefstroom, South Africa. The possibility to interview some experts on the South African political system provided the

12(105)

study with a very valuable set of information since it was possible to ask direct questions in addition to exploring the articles and books that they had written. By interviewing scholars, it was also possible to retrieve new and actual information about the current situation in South Africa which was of great value for the analysis and conclusion.

2.4. Validity and reliability The consideration regarding the validity and reliability of the material is essential for the study. According to Esaisasson et al. (2017), four requirements are deemed to be important for the reliability of the material: authenticity, independence, contemporariness and tendency. The authenticity of the material was always taken into consideration since it was collected after being closely analysed. This included the control of reliable sources to make sure that everything was trustworthy. A majority of the material used in this study was produced in the 21st century which reduced the risk of information being outdated or incorrect. Nevertheless, it is important to mention that some of the material that was used as sources originates from earlier years but this material is mostly used to illustrate historical examples rather than the current situation. The fact that the material consists of many kinds of sources created the possibility to correlate different opinions and thereby ensure the objectiveness of the information retrieved.

3. Theoretical framework When it comes to the theoretical framework of this study, it is important to highlight the fact that the concept of democratic consolidation is not scientifically unambiguous. A wide range of different definitions and opinions exists among scholars. This part of the study will, therefore, contain a presentation and discussion about the concept and why the chosen definition has been selected and why this one is the most appropriate one to apply upon the case.

13(105)

3.1. Democratisation Whereas the concept of democratic consolidation is the core aspect of this study, it is also vital to understand and explain this concept in an appropriate way. Peradventure the best of understanding the concept is to take a closer look at the term itself. According to the Cambridge Dictionary, the verb “consolidate” could be defined as something that “to become, or cause something to become, stronger, and more certain” (Cambridge Dictonary, 2020). In other words, the term democratic consolidation indicates a process in which the democratic system is, or is becoming, stronger and more certain. The term also indicates that consolidation is part of a bigger and wider concept. To be able to classify a democracy as “consolidated”, it is also necessary to have a system of government with a commitment to democracy. But as described by the definition of consolidation, it is furthermore clear that the concept is also part of a process, a process where democracy gradually becomes more stable and established. This also indicates that the democratic system itself has also developed from something that earlier not could be considered to be defined as democracy, a process of democratisation.

How can then democratisation be defined? A well-known approach defines the period of democratisation as the period between the beginning of the breakdown of an authoritarian regime and the conclusion of free and democratic elections. This could also be called a minimalist perspective on democracy where the mere existence of elections is the most vital part (Schumpeter, 1942). Others scholars argue that the minimalist perspective is far to narrow and means instead that a democratisation process begins already with liberalisation reforms conducted by an authoritarian regime, while the regime itself still may hold the final power. These reforms may after some time weaken the regime to such degree that it can no longer stop the emerging of opposition groups which could continue to push for further

14(105)

democratic reforms. Critics of the minimalist perspective also argue that the democratisation process is something that continues far after the first democratic elections, which itself does not ensure a full-functioning democracy. According to this definition, all countries, even democratic ones, could potentially be defined as not fully democratic (Schedler, 2001).

3.2. The third wave and the century of democratisation At the beginning of the 1970s, the future of the democratic system of government had been put into serious question by many scholars. There were several non-democratic countries in Western Europe, the Eastern part of Europe, including non-aligned Yugoslavia, was ruled by communist parties. At the same time, most of Latin America was under military or other forms of authoritarian rule, large parts of Asia were undemocratically ruled, and in Africa, the previous colonial rule had mostly been replaced by authoritarian regimes. The pessimism regarding democracy was mostly rooted in the fact that the hope for a brighter and more democratic future of the world after the fall of totalitarian Nazi Germany and its European and Asian allies had not come true. Although the some of the most prominent former Axis powers, most notably West Germany, Austria, Italy, and Japan, had managed to establish stable democratic systems, much of the world was still under undemocratic rule (Markoff & Burridge, 2009).

After the end of the Second World War, most of the political scholars had turned to the theory that economic development or appropriate cultural values were the keys to democratisation (Lipset, 1959). As economic development spread, so would democracy; as modern Western values spread, so would democracy. This meant that the US and her Western allies could actively help these processes through economic development programmes and the spread of values. However, a few decades later, it was clear that this theory did not have the impact as it was initially anticipated. By the mid- 1970s, practically entire Eastern Europe remained firmly under Soviet-

15(105)

dominated rule while also several western European countries such as Portugal, Spain and Greece were all authoritarian states. As an even more dismaying fact, economically developed countries in Latin America underwent democratic backslidings, most notably in Uruguay, Chile and Argentina which ushered a period of outright scepticism among scholars on whether democracy stood any hope of spreading outside the already established and stable democratic countries. Although the situation for democracy looked grim in many parts of the world by the 1970s, it was also during this time when some signs of the beginning of what would later be called The Third Wave began to rise (Huntington, 1991; Markoff & Burridge, 2009).

In 1974, the authoritarian Estado Novo-regime in Portugal was overthrown in a military coup, known as the Carnation Revolution, which resulted in the rapid democratisation of the nation and the subsequent withdrawal by Portugal from her remaining colonies. In neighbouring Spain, longtime authoritarian leader Francisco Franco died in 1975, which eventually resulted in the dismantlement of the four-decade-long Falangist dictatorship and transition to democracy with parliamentary elections in 1977 which were the first ones in Spain conducted in a free manner since the 1930s. At the same time, the military junta which had ruled Greece since 1967, resigned. During the 1980s, authoritarian regimes also fell in Latin America and Asia and subsequently, in 1989, practically the entire Eastern Bloc fell apart at the same time as many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa started to democratise. Weakened by the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and worsening political and economic conditions, the Soviet Union was dissolved in December 1991, which left the world with the United States as the only remaining superpower and the independence of a great number of earlier satellite states. The expansion of democracy was in some parts of the world stunning. For example, by 1978, only a couple of countries in Latin America were

16(105)

considered to be democratic, and in 1995, only Cuba and Haiti remained authoritarian states (Schenoni, Luis & Mainwaring, 2019).

The dramatic increase in the numbers of democracies around the world came to be specified as The Third Wave of Democratisation by Samuel P. Huntington in 1991. He argued that this wave of democratisation occurred due to five main causative factors:

“… 1. The legitimacy of authoritarian regimes decreased due to increased popular demands and expectations of free elections and/or a poor economic state as well as military failure.

2. Economic modernisation, which included structural societal changes and education.

3. Changes in the Catholic Church during the 1960s which emphasised individual rights and opposition to dictatorship. This shift in world view was especially important for the Catholic countries of Southern Europe and Latin America, as well as the Philippines, Poland and Hungary.

4. Regional contingency factor (also known as the Snowball effect) also known as demonstration effects which means that the success of democracy in one country will likely cause other countries to democratise as well.

5. External factors, most notably the efforts to spread democracy by the EU and the US…” (Huntington, 1991).

Huntington highlighted that international structural factors during the 1970s greatly contributed to the beginning of the third wave. Most notably, this was the case with Spain, Portugal and Greece where economic benefits of being a member of the European Community (EC) were seen as essential to the countries’ development, and then a transition to democracy was necessary.

17(105)

This was also an inspiration for some of the countries in the Eastern Bloc (Kopstein & Reilly, 2000).

During the 1970s, the definition and politicisation of issues such as human and civil rights on an international level also occurred. During the Cold War, the conditions of economic and political support had largely been based on the premises of loyalty to the west rather than the safeguarding of civil and democratic rights which for example was characterised by the support for authoritarian anti-communist regimes by the US. But during the latter half of the 1970s, this began to change and more focus were laid on premises of civil liberties and political rights (Huntington, 1991).

The third wave of democratisation is significant in the sense that it did not only resulted in a completely new way of studying democratisation. Many countries in the world had abolished their authoritarian system in favour of democratic ones which meant that they had positioned themselves as transitional democracies. This created a big interest concerning the meaning and process of the democratisation which seemed to include a number of different stages – liberalisation, transition and consolidation of democracy.

3.3. Liberalisation The process of liberalisation was a core aspect in the third wave of democratisation and is generally seen as the first step towards an eventual democratic system. A process of liberalisation may include the softening of draconic laws and certain types of political and civil reforms. This could eventually lead to a democratic transition but at the same time, it is important to mention the fact that far from all liberalisation-processes that occurred in authoritarian states during the third wave resulted in democracy. The liberalisation process may provide citizens with higher degrees of freedoms but the authoritarian state may still be in firm control. Among the examples of this are China and Cuba. China went through a period of market

18(105)

liberalisation under paramount leader Deng Xiaoping during the 1970s and 80s while the country remained a tightly controlled one-party state under the Communist Party of China (CPC). Protests and demands for democratic and political reforms at the end of the 1980s resulted in a military crackdown and the retainment of the authority of the CPC. Cuba has also gone through a series of economical and judicial reforms with the recognition of private ownership and some strengthening of the rule law through the formal reintroduction of presumption of innocence. At the same time, Cuba also remains a one-party state under the rule of the Communist Party which is also the only permitted party in the country. Thus, liberalisation does not necessarily mean political liberalisation. With regards to democratisation, the liberalisation process could eventually result in the resignation and diminishment of the ruling authoritarian power and a democratic system of government is introduced and adopted. The once dictatorial state had thereby gone through a process of transition (Welzel, 2009; World Finance, 2018).

3.4. Transition As mentioned in the previous chapter, a process of liberalisation does not necessarily mean that a state becomes fully democratised but merely a certain degree of political reforms which often result that the lives of the citizens are more open. When it comes to the understanding of the democratisation concept, a common approach is to differ between two main phases: the transition from a semi-authoritarian or authoritarian regime to electoral democracy and the subsequent consolidation of this democracy. The transition and consolidation process of democracies could be viewed as fairly distinct processes driven by different actors under a different set of conditions. The transition process often starts with the breakdown of this authoritarian regime and a subsequent and often gradual adoption of a democratic system of government. Such a transition period in a state is often characterised by the initial overthrow or collapse of the authoritarian regime

19(105)

which often results in the subsequent installation of an interim government, sweeping reforms, elation among the public and different kinds of decrees. This is often a critical moment in the transition itself since the earlier structures of the state has often collapsed or left in disarray, potentially leaving a breeding ground for reversal. Although this transition process often results in democratic elections and change of power, this does not necessarily mean that the state is democratised in such a way that the risk of democratic backsliding, the potential reversal back into authoritarianism, could be completely ruled out (Gunther & others, 1995; Linz & Stepan, 1996).

When it comes to transition, three main modes of the concept have been identified which includes pacted transitions, bottom-up transitions, and top- up transitions. In pacted transitions, more moderate and reform-friendly elements of an authoritarian regime often take the initiative of negotiating certain terms of transitions along with moderate members of opposition groups. A transition of this kind tends to occur relatively quickly and eventually result in a power-sharing agreement and democratic elections while the state often retains some of the elements of the old authoritarian regime. Examples of this kind of democratic transition during the third wave include the Spanish transition to democracy during the latter half of the 1970s and the reintroduction of democracy in Chile in 1990 after nearly two decades of military rule (Kauffman, 2018). A bottom-up transition, on the other hand, is best defined by a big amount of pressure upon the authoritarian regime, often through the form of grass-root driven mass-protests which eventually forces the regime to relinquish their power. Transitions of this type often result in a radical and dramatic break with the old regime which not seldom brings certain difficulties in the form of remaining authoritarian elements within the state institutions. This kind of transition became very evident and crucial during the latter half of the third wave which included most countries in Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War, along with

20(105)

Taiwan and South Korea. The top-up transition is a process where the authoritarian regime begins to implement certain types of democratic reforms because it may think that it is the only possible way of securing its survival. A recent example of this includes Ethiopia but also protracted transitions in which the new democratic regime does not break with the old regime in a dramatic way, such as Mexico under the Institutional Revolutionary Party. This transition process may also lead to a more dramatic shift, but then it is more usual that this occurs unintentionally, such as with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 which was largely a result of failed attempt to liberalise the Soviet society while retaining the state itself (Kauffman, 2018; Hearpfer & others, 2019; Gunthers & others, 1995).

It is naturally a question of debate of which type of transition may have the best chance of leading to consolidation. Scholars who tend to favour the strategic-choice approach argue that the transition process itself has a little or non-existing effect on consolidation. Instead, they tend to regard the actors as forward-looking and only marginally affected by historical legacies. Other scholars argue that the prospects for a good transition are vested in the balance of power between democratic and authoritarian forces when they are equal. This does provide for the pressure of compromise and moderation. A third argument is dismissive that there is such a thing as the best mode of transition. Instead, it is the unique compensation of each state with its own historical and contextual factors that provide for the opportunities and obstacles during the transition period. These factors may include previous democratic experiences, civilian control over the military, mass mobilisation and external factors (Kauffman, 2018).

3.5. Perspectives on Consolidation The idea of democratic consolidation While it is important to mention that the democratic transition process is not a specifically defined theory, but rather a process that can be explained by a

21(105)

scope of different factors, it is nevertheless seemingly more easily described as a transformation from a dictatorship to a democracy. The final part of democratisation, consolidation, is a more complicated notion since it is contested among scholars. Even with the presence of this contestation, one could nevertheless still argue that there is a generally accepted definition of what democratic consolidation is. Consolidation may be defined as the deepening of democracy during a large scope of time or the sustainability of the democratic system. These different understandings of consolidation reflect the different opinions on what democracy is. According to the minimalist definition, such as defined by Joseph Schumpeter (1942), democracy is a dichotomous notion (a regime is either democratic or not) and consolidation is merely a concept of the survival of electoral democracy. For a broader definition, democracy is seen as a continuous variable (a state can be less or more democratic) which means that consolidation can go beyond the electoral democracy and also include other characteristics such as fundamental liberties. Consolidation is still hard to define even depending on whether a scholar has a minimalist or broader view of the concept.

Democratic consolidation has been defined in different ways ever since the concept was launched. Haggard & Kaufman (1994) defined consolidation as a process where constitutional rules and procedures become more routine and respected. Larry Diamond (1994) argued that democratic consolidation is a notion where democracy as a way of ruling a state is so well-established and respected by its citizens that a reversal back into a dictatorship is unlikely.

A well established written definition of what consolidation could mean was further launched by scholars such as Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996). The authors defined consolidation as:

“…a state in which the actors of a society accept the legitimacy of the nation’s democratic system of government and do not seeks to act outside the democratic institutions for both normative and self-interested reasons…”.

22(105)

In other words, the democratic system in a state has matured in such a way that it is highly unlikely that it is going to revert into an authoritarian system without an external shock. Conceptually, the democracy of a country is consolidated when the chance of it reverting into authoritarianism is unlikely. This is not easy to know because only failures can be measured directly, and these only in hindsight. A common indicator is two consecutive turnovers of power as defined by Samuel Huntington and another is when one political group agrees to give up power to the former opposition. This would indicate a willingness by incumbents to settle disputes through the democratic process and to spend periods of time out of office. However, these measures are somewhat tautological, because the processes that define democracy are also used to measure its persistence. An alternative strategy is to measure the legitimacy of the democratic regime among citizens under the theory that democracy is consolidated when all political actors recognise democracy as the best system for their society. Consolidation represents a shift in political culture as democratic behaviours become routine and taken for granted. This happens over time through the institutionalisation of democratic procedures and the ability of the system to perform effectively (Gorokhovskaia, 2017; Linz & Stepan, 1996; Huntington, 1991).

3.5.1. Democracy – “The only game in town” The description democratic consolidation as “the only game in town” was launched by Giuseppe Di Palma (1990) and has since been used as an explanation and definition of what democratic consolidation constitute.

The phrase was then essentially used by scholars as Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan in their book Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, published in 1996. These authors argued that democratisation, and thereby consolidation, was fulfilled when a state’s democratic system had become “the only game in town”. More specifically, democracy becomes the only game in town when no serious attempts or risk of attempts from groups to

23(105)

overthrow the democratic regime exist. The behaviour of the elected government that has emerged as a result of the democratic transition is no longer dominated by the problem of how to avoid a reversion back into an authoritarian state. In other words, the political system in the state has matured. This could be argued as an institutionalised maturation of the democratic system and is in many ways vital but as important is the attitudinal maturation, as described by Linz and Stepan (Linz & Stepan, 1996)

The democratic system could only be considered to be the only game in town if it has the overwhelming majority support of the population itself. The state’s democracy must be able to withstand pressure from situations such as political, economic, and even constitutional crises, the actors of the state must still think that any further political changes have to emerge within the parameters of the democratic system. Furthermore, any political conflicts ought to be resolved within the framework of the constitution and the established norms and that violation of these principles are in general unthinkable for great masses. A consolidated democracy could, therefore, be defined as a state where democracy has become so routinised and deeply internalised in the institutional, social, and even psychological life of the state, that it is seen as essential for achieving success (Linz & Stepan, 1996).

Notwithstanding, it is important to mention that even a democracy consolidated in the way described above is always going to contain certain actors within the society that do not accept the democratic system och seeks to depose it, but the state is then always the strongest actor concerning the containment of such elements. As an example, few scholars would probably argue that there is a real potential chance of a military coup d’état in Greece even if the country in recent years has gone through a deep economic and political crisis with the threat of state bankruptcy and frequent snap elections. This could be described as an example of a democratic system withstanding

24(105)

the pressure of a potential democratic breakdown or deconsolidation (Linz & Stepan, 1996; Przeworski, 1991).

3.5.2. Consolidation - a versatile concept? Although the definition of consolidation presented by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan is one of the most accepted ones within modern political science, this does not mean that the concept itself is unchallenged. A wide range of ideas and what the notion constitutes exist, with some scholars even argue that the concept should be outright rejected due to its vagueness. One of the most foremost critical arguments is that there is no substantive evidence that a democratic state possesses something specific that safeguard its continuation as a democracy, other than the fact that it is “more likely” that such a state will continue to be a democracy in the future (O’Donnell, 1996).

Arguments such as the one mentioned above do not question the concept of consolidation as such but rather raises questions on how and when a democracy could be defined as consolidated. How do we know that a state with a seemingly robust democratic system is not going to be rocked by a future democratic breakdown? The term “consolidated” democracy implies that a form of a linear development with an “end” at which democracy is finally fully established. Thomas Carothers has criticised this linear development and argues that it is not possible to discern when democracy is consolidated since practically every state is going to have some kind of democratic flaws (Carothers, 2002).

Peradventure, it is exactly this type of question that one needs to pose to safeguard the consolidation process. A state with a democratic system of government may seem fairly robust and consolidated on the surface and even institutionally with both competing politicians and common citizens showing a deep commitment to democracy. However, some scholars argue that such a commitment could also have the potential to be rather treacherous. To focus too much on the aspect of institutional consolidation does not mean that

25(105)

democracy as such is consolidated. In other words, democracy could never be considered to be consolidated unless a behavioural commitment to the system exists. The democratic forces need to show themselves capable of strike back against potential threats by non-democratic forces who wants to overthrow the system. In some cases, the argument of “saving democracy” from supposed “enemies” has even been used as an excuse to overthrow a democratic system. An important argument based on the above-mentioned notions is that consolidation could be likened to the universe, it has no end. The democratic system could never be considered to be fully consolidated unless democrats always are guarding the fundaments of the democratic system. To sit back and relax in the convincement that democracy is secure and stable could result in the weakening of the democratic system. A democracy is as most consolidated if one also believe that one could never take democracy for granted (Schedler, 2001).

The issue of more sophisticated threats against the consolidation of democracies is also a notion that has become more evident during recent years, especially with the so-called “third wave” of democratisation which swept over large parts of the world at the end of the Cold War at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. Samuel Huntington argues that the biggest threats against democracy and consolidation in modern time may come from within the democratic system itself or even be a result of it. While full-scale unconstitutional overthrows of democratic regimes, such as in Latin America during the Cold War, are less likely to take place today due to increased civilian control of the military, democratic backsliding is nowadays more likely to occur within the democratic system. This could include the democratical elections of parties and actors which are committed to authoritarian and even undemocratic measures. An even more evident risk is when a democratically elected executive begins to concentrate the power in his own hands which could result in authoritarian measures being

26(105)

undertaken. And the fact that more repressive means have been undertaken by democratically elected governments to infringe upon civil liberties, freedom of the press etc. is also a warning sign (Huntington, 1996).

The so-called two-turnover test has historically also raised several problematic questions. One could, for example, argue that Chile could have been considered to have consolidated as a democracy in 1970 with the democratic election Salvador Allende. However, this “consolidated” democracy collapsed merely three years later as a result of a military coup d’etat which marked the beginning of nearly two decades of authoritarian military rule in Chile. As mentioned, democratic consolidation does often depends that the system is also accepted in a broad sense within the military and the richer elite (Schneider, 1995).

However, there is also a question about the democratic commitment of non- state actors. A flourishing and well-functioning civil society is an essential ingredient of a healthy democracy. That is a statement which one could find among many different essays and scholars about the democratic system of government, especially according to Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan as mentioned in their five arenas. Some scholars even argue that civil society could play a crucial role in the opposition against an authoritarian system and then in the building of new consolidated democracy. But some scholars argue that the concept of civil society is far more complicated than what is usually described and also that one should be cautious about it. Could civil society even be a threat to democracy? The civil society is often consisting of different kinds of interest organisations or other association which are functioning outside the scope of the state itself. As such, civil society has often been credited with successful opposition towards authoritarian regimes and even contributing to their subsequent falls. This society is often functioning outside the state institutions and most claims to be apolitical but what says that a civil society organisation not could be authoritarian? Thus it

27(105)

is argued that one should act cautiously when it comes to the civil society which in the end may not be the idealised factor that it is usually portrayed as but may even constitute a threat against democracy due to its often strong influence of political leaders and decision-making. An influence which is often enforced with their interest in mind, an interest that may not have broad public support but becomes a part of the society nevertheless. The threat of a more radicalised civil society is also mentioned. Civil society has often been hailed as the crusader of a free society but it is also clear that these non-state actors do not always have good intentions (Foley & Edwards, 1996).

The many different opinions on how to define and include in the concept of democratic consolidation do naturally raises questions of how reliable the concept is. Guillermo O’Donnell goes as far as arguing that the notion of democratic consolidation could be dismissed as a mere illusion. In his article Illusions of Consolidation, published in 1996, O’Donnell argues that the idea of formalised consolidation of a democratic system with democracy becoming “the only game in town” is highly flawed since this idea almost exclusively focuses on the formalised rules of democracy. In other words, there is no guarantee that another game is played within these formalised institutions, which as such could be harmful to the democratic system. Political leaders could thereby use the formalised institutions to undermine democracy, meaning that consolidation has not taken place. O’Donnell prefers instead to use the expression institutionalisation to describe a democracy which could be described as well-established with the special focus on two crucial institutions. The first one is one which is highly formalised: elections. The second one is more informal and is referred to as particularism, or more properly clientelism, the asymmetric relationship between political actors. As such, democracies can never be said to be fully consolidated while they are more likely to endure as long as they possess the mentioned institutions. Thus, the potentiality of democratic breakdown

28(105)

cannot be avoided even in a seemingly established democracy (O’Donnell, 1996; O’Donnell, 1996).

3.5.3. The five arenas of a consolidated democracy Although Linz and Stepan argued that a consolidated democracy requires details such as frequent elections and a general acceptance of the democratic system, they further argued that consolidated democracies also need to possess five interaction arenas to reinforce one another for the very existence of such consolidation in a state.

These five arenas could be described as types of interconnected and mutually reinforcing conditions which must exist for a democracy to be consolidated. Firstly, a free and lively civil society must be able to flourish and exist without the risk of state reprimands. Secondly, an autonomous and valued political society must be present. Thirdly, the state in question must embrace the principle of rule of law which includes an independent judiciary to ensure legal guarantees for the freedom of the citizens and the upholding of the constitution and laws. Fourthly, well-functioning state bureaucracy is vital for the country, both for the use by the democratically elected government, but also to safeguard and ensure smooth transitions of power. Fifthly, the state must have an economic society which is also institutionalised. These five areans will be described in detail hereunder (Linz & Stepan, 1996).

The arena of civil society refers to a polity of different kinds of self- organising groups, movements, and individuals who are relatively autonomous from the state. This does not mean that the civil society at such is not affected by the state but it is not created by as a tool of the state but is rather representative for the people that lives within the state. These groups, movements, or individuals exist to articulate values, create associations, and advance their specific interests within the state. The civil society is a diverse concept and can include a broad variety of things such as women’s groups, religious associations, student movements, motorcycle clubs, etc. and also

29(105)

civic associations such as trade unions, journalists, intellectuals, and lawyers Linz & Stepan, 1996). As mentioned in earlier chapters, the civil society has historically been proven to possess a great deal of capacity to mobilise opposition against authoritarian regimes, most notably in Latin America, and was crucial to the fall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s (Linz & Stepan, 1996; Diamond, 1994).

Although the organised part of the civil society is an essential part of the arena itself, it is also important not to diminish the ordinary citizen who is not part of any organisation or movement. Trust among the population is very important for a healthy democracy. Such citizens have played a significant and often crucial role in the fall of authoritarian regimes through means of protest marches and a general demand for change. These citizens movements often start in relatively small numbers but tend to grow in size over time. This could be linked to the “snowball-effect” were citizens in an authoritarian state start to realize that they are stronger together in the sense that the state is not possibly capably of imprisoning hundreds of thousands of protesters. Characteristic of these movements is that they often tend to lack a formal centralised leadership but they have nevertheless been proven effective by overwhelming the leadership, forcing them to consider liberalisations and ultimately a regime change. Movements of this kind have historically resulted in the downfall of authoritarian regimes. However, it is important to mention that such unorganised, although heroic, movements may not necessarily be able to overthrow or even liberalise an authoritarian regime since the regime, at the specific moment, could still be far too strong and institutionalised (Linz & Stepan, 1996; Putnam, 1993).

So the civil society may be able to overthrow and destroy an authoritarian regime but a full democratic transition, and in particular, consolidation must also include the political society. This polity refers to the different actors who arrange themselves to contest the legitimacy to exercise control over the

30(105)

public and state apparatus. An overthrow of an authoritarian state involving the civil society is not seldom conducted in a revolutionary manner with a sense of euphoria. However, to return to a sense of normality and development of the healthy state, the introduction of stable democratic institutions such as political parties, free and fair elections, electoral rules, political leadership, legislatures, etc. are essential to consolidate democracy and so that the society can constitute itself politically and chose its political leadership and monitor its democratic government (Linz & Stepan, 1996).

To define the distinctiveness of civil society and political society is certainly important but with regards to democratic consolidation, it is even more vital to clearly distinguish how these two arenas complement each other. While civil society is often hailed as the core actor in bringing about change, certain problems tend to arise a the moment of democratic transition. It is not seldom that political leaders demand that civil society take a step back or even disperse for the newly elected politicians to take charge of the country and develop a more normal democratic society. Arguments like this could be considered to be authoritarian in the sense that lively and independent civil society is invaluable and essential for democracy to consolidate. A conflict between civil society and political society is not a bad thing as such because it is also a sign of democratic awareness. But this conflict can only be considered to be democratically correct of both these arenas adhere to the third arena, the judicial.

To achieve a consolidated democracy, it is crucial with certain constitutional procedures and the adherent to the rule of law. All the actors, whether they be political or civil, must accept that the judicial system is independent of all kinds of political involvement and accepts its verdicts. A lively political debate and conflict between different political factions, civil society etc. is not a negative thing as long as all these actors respect the constitutional democratic institutions of the state. The principle of majority rule means that

31(105)

the party or the person with the most votes or seats wins but this can never be an excuse to suppress the minority. The opposition must always be allowed to freely exercise their democratic rights and criticise the ruling power without the fear of reprimands. This constitutional system has to be able to withstand even a challenge to its very existence, such a constitutional crisis (Linz & Stepan, 1996).

Stable political leadership and a free civil society which operates within the principles of rule of law are essential for consolidated democracy. But for these conditions to be satisfied, a well-functioning bureaucracy and an institutionalised economic society are also necessary.

Democracy is a form of government where all the citizens are endured with certain guaranteed rights and protections. Therefore, the democratic government also needs to be able to exercise its claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of force in its territory. The state would also have to be able to tax its citizens to pay for police, judiciary and other state services. A functioning democracy needs the capacity to command, regulate, and extract which means a functioning state and a state bureaucracy. Although this bureaucracy may be ruled by a certain political power, it also needs to be nominally independent for the state to be upheld even if it can be rocked by serious challenges. For example, a turbulent general election which may not result in any clear winner and eventually result in a political vacuum must not affect the capability to collect taxes, healthcare or policing. No matter what is happening politically, there always has to exist stable institutions that are capable of carrying out essential functions of the state. According to Larry Diamond, it is the aspect of an unstable of even non-existent bureaucracy that may constitute the most serious challenge to democratic consolidation (Diamond, 1994).

A country such as Brazil tend to possess a democratic system with frequent and fair elections, including peaceful changes of power, an active civil

32(105)

society, and democratic rights that are respected, but the state bureaucracy is nevertheless very weak which affect the democratically elected government’s possibility to exercise its power effectively. This can be even more obvious with countries that are democratised in a very fast and unorderly manner where the leader may be democratically elected but is hindered from exercising his or her duty because the state bureaucracy is still filled with representatives from the old authoritarian regime (Linz & Stepan, 1996).

According to Linz and Stepan, the fifth and final condition for a consolidated democracy is the economic society. According to the authors, there has never been and cannot be a non-wartime consolidated democracy in a state- commanded planned economy. Likewise, there has never been and almost certainly never be a consolidated democracy with a pure market economy. Therefore, a consolidated democracy requires a set of accepted norms, institutions and regulations, called the economic society, which mediates between market and state. A free economy where the citizens can choose freely between different companies, merchandises, etc. is necessary for consolidated but it is also argued that certain types of state regulations are even more important to safeguard the rights of the citizens when they are participating the economic society. While there certainly can be ideological differences when it comes to the handling of the economy, the economic society could be considered to be apolitical. Historically, the market has proven to be unstable and therefore the safety of the participants have to be guaranteed. The market must therefore adhere to the basic rules that are set by the ruling power elected by the people in democratic elections (Linz & Stepan, 1996).

The case of a stable economic society and economic growth and its positive contribution on the continuing existence of democracy is also a classic argument within the research area of democratisation with Seymour Martin Lipset arguing in his article Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic

33(105)

Development and Political Legitimacy in 1959 that economic development would also bring democracy – the modernisation theory (Lipset, 1959). This theory has since been criticised for being too narrow and focused on western perspectives because of the continuing existence of economically prosperous states with authoritarian political tendencies, such as Singapore, Turkey and India (Banerjee, 2012). But the original thesis of Lipset has continued to gather a significant amount of support. In the article What Makes Democracy Endure (1996), Adam Przeworski & others argue that a country’s economic development plays a very important role in the continuing existence of the democratic system of government. While economic growth is not seen as essential to the survival of democracy, it is nevertheless seen as conducive for it. Furthermore, Przeworski et al also state that a low or decreasing level of income inequality contributes positively to the survival of democracy (Przeworski & others, 1996).

Conversely, widespread poverty constitutes a significant obstacle to democratic consolidation because of the often very limited possibilities of economic and political competition and the enormous advantages of the ruling power which tend to vest the permanent control of a state in the hands of dominant party or person. This does not, however, mean that a democratic system of government is completely unable to survive in a poor and underdeveloped country but it is more unstable and even more unlikely to survive if the economy stagnates or contract (Leftwich, 2000). Thus, a stable economic society is an essential part of the consolidation process.

To summarise, a consolidated democracy can be conceived of as being composed of five inter-relating arenas with its primary organising principle. Democracy should therefore not only be defined as a regime but also an interacting system of arenas. And for the arenas to functioning properly and uphold the consolidated democracy, they all need some support from one another as demonstrated earlier in the chapter. I view Linz and Stepan’s

34(105)

definition of consolidation as the most ideal one for the study of consolidation in South Africa due to two main factors. First, it is possible to apply the case of this study, South Africa, onto the five arenas and thus draw a conclusion on whether the country’s democracy is consolidated or not. To some extent, I agree that democratic consolidation could be perceived as a vague concept in the sense that it is hard to point out an absolute end to a democratic transformation process but it is still my foremost opinion that consolidation is very valuable when it comes to studying the details of a regime. If one is using the five arenas, one is also able to distinguish the different strengths and weaknesses in the South African democratic system and thereby be able to estimate to what degree the country could be classified as democratic.

In the following table, the five arenas of consolidated democracy are defined in respective order. While it is certainly very hard for a state to fully adhere to all the principles in each arena, the state must nevertheless be proven to follow them to a high degree for it to be defined as consolidated democracy. A state with a partial and politicised judiciary, for example, can impossibly be defined as a consolidated democracy since each arena is important in its own right. In this case, we shall therefore investigate the actual situation in South Africa with regards to each of these five arenas and their definitions. This is done by dividing each arena into two parts, strengths and weaknesses so that consolidation in South Africa more clearly can be distinguished.

35(105)

Table. 1.1. The five arenas of consolidated democracy

Civil society A part of society that refers to a polity of different kinds of self-organising groups, religious groupings, social movements, and individuals who are relatively autonomous from the state. Political Political actors compete with each other for the power of society the state apparatus and public policies through free and fair elections conducted under the principle of universal suffrage. The people participated and supports democracy with the democratic institutions are stable and transparent with existing checks and balances under a constitutional arrangement. Judiciary Sub-society based on the rule of law with independent judicial institutions with sworn allegiance to the state and the law rather than the ruling party. Also exists to safeguard the rights and liberties of the citizens from abuse of state power. Bureaucracy A set of stable and efficient state institutions and agencies with the task of implementing democratic governance and the rule of law. Plays a vital part in the safeguarding and upholding of the state institutions and basic services for the citizens even in a time of crisis and political instability. Economic Economic institutions that operate under certain rules society and procedures. Safeguarding against the potential risk of an uncontrolled market economy, but also against a complete state-controlled planned economy.

36(105)

4. Analysis The following section will present the analytical part of the study. The analysis will systematically examine the selected part of each of the theories of this study. Whereas the theory of this study is based on the five arenas by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, the case of South Africa will be divided and examined from the perspective of each arena. The analysis will begin by applying the arena of civil society, and thereafter political society, judiciary, bureaucratic and economic society.

4.1. The South African Civil Society As previously stated in the theoretical part of this study, the official, or more precisely the “legal” opposition to the Apartheid-system during its existence between 1950 and 1994, was very limited or non-existent. When it came to the opposition to Apartheid, it was instead the civil society that played a significant and important role that eventually resulted in its abolishment and the transformation of South Africa from an authoritarian state to a multi- party democracy. Although the ANC and other political groups opposed to Apartheid were officially banned they nevertheless managed to mobilise a large number of the population to resist the political system and the repressive state. Other groups as religious associations, women’s groups etc. also played an important role in advocating for democratic rights and civil liberties (Habib, 2005). In a country marred by poor governance, tensions, political instability, and corruption, the civil society in South Africa possess a significant role when it comes to the safeguarding of democracy and the upholding of human and civil liberties. But the continuing dominance of the ANC combined with low levels of social and public trust may also have resulted in the weakening and even suppression of the civil society (Mafunisa 2004).

37(105)

The question is then if the arena of civil society in today’s South Africa upfills the consolidation criteria? This is going to be investigated in this chapter.

4.1.1. Strengths of the South African civil society During the years of Apartheid, the governance of South Africa was based on a British-styled Westminister system of parliamentary sovereignty which meant that the governance of the country was vested in the Parliament of South Africa, then controlled by the NP. This meant that power to rule South Africa was dominated by the NP-government which also had de jure-right to make laws without consideration which infringed and decimated the legal possibilities to oppose the Apartheid-system, whether it was through political or civil channels (Venter, 2017; The Constitution Act, 1961).

When Apartheid was dismantled at the beginning of the 1990s, one of the most essential parts in the transition to a democratic form of governance was the institutional transformation of South Africa into a system of constitutional supremacy with the adoption of the Constitution of South Africa in 1996. Due to its significant role in the abolition of the Apartheid- system, the role of the civil society was given a special place and protection in the Constitution where the preamble states:

“…We, the people of South Africa, recognise the injustice of our past, . . . adopt this Constitution as a supreme law of the Republic of South Africa . . . to . . . heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights…”

Furthermore, sections 9, 16, 18, 19 and 32 of the Constitution provide for a Bill of Rights, which contains several essential values that specifically address fundamental issues of good governance and civil society. These include equality, freedom of expression/association and information and political rights (Mafunisa, 2004; Constitution of South Africa, 1996).

38(105)

Section 181 of the Constitution also provides for a series of independent state institutions which are specially created to safeguard the influence of the civil society on good governance. These institutions include several ombudsmen and commissions such as are the ; the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities; the Commission for Gender Equality; the Auditor-General and the Electoral Commission. Members of civil society, as whistle-blowers, have the right to send their complaints or grievances to these institutions for investigation without the fear of being reprimanded (Mafunisa, 2004; Constitution of South Africa, 1996).

The power and importance of these independent state institutions have been demonstrated several times, most notably the those of the Public Protector, an office specifically created to protect the public from governmental maladministration (Public Protector Act, 1994). One of the most significant cases investigated by the Public Protector concerned the alleged misuse of state resources by President when his homestead Nkandla in KwaZulu-Natal was extensively renovated in 2009, a case brought forward by representatives of the civil society and political parties. Jacob Zuma, who became president in 2009, had already from the beginning been involved in accusations of corruption and other criminal activities. During his decade- long term as president, between 2009 and 2018, there were continuing allegations of corruption, manipulations of state institutions and collapsing public services. The Public Protector, appointed by Zuma himself, opened an investigation into the apparent mismanagement of state resources and released the so-called Nkandla report in 2014 which some of the upgrades were unlawful and recommended the immediate repayment of the money (Public Protector, 2014). Even though Zuma and the ANC dismissed the report and questioned its legitimacy while also stating the recommendations were not legally binding, several civil organisations and political parties filed

39(105)

a lawsuit against the Presidency, arguing that the report of the Public Protector was indeed legally binding (Basson & Du Toit, 2017). The case eventually reached the Constitutional Court of South Africa which ruled that the Public Protector’s report was indeed binding and that President Zuma had violated the constitution by failing to implement its finding (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2016).

While critics of the Zuma administration were often attacked by its supporters of being “agents” of the “white monopoly capital”, “imperialists” or puppets of foreign states, it is still clear that they were crucial by filing repeated lawsuits against Zuma on charges of corruption and manipulations of state institutions for personal gain which proved that the independent institutions and the civil society did indeed had the profound impact on South African democracy as it was stated in the constitution (Vavi 2012; Heywood 2017).

In the end, these mobilisations also lead to public protests and the subsequent erosion of the position of Jacob Zuma and his supporters within the ANC which eventually lead to the defeat of his hand-picked successor at the ANC- congress in 2017 and his subsequent resignation as president in 2018 (Gumede, 2018).

But it is also notable that the above-mentioned series of happenings which led to the subsequent downfall and resignation of Jacob Zuma is not the only time a president has been forced out of office due to pressure from the South African civil society. The disposition of , president between 1999 and 2008, occurred largely due to actions by different actors within the civil society. Although Thabo Mbeki possessed strong support among ANC- members and especially businesses for his neo-liberal policies, his long- standing opposition to the acknowledgement of the AIDS/HIV-epidemic in South Africa and the distributions of medications thereof, made him very unpopular in some parts of the society which eventually led to the failure of

40(105)

his reelection as party leader at the ANC-congress in Polokwane in 2008. This occurred mainly due to pressure from different kinds of NGO:s which themselves gathered support from many parliamentarians of the ANC (Gumede, 2018; Lehman, 2008; Habib, 2005).

Due to the continuing dominance of the ANC, it has also been argued that many people in South Africa view the civil society as the only true mean of voicing their opposition in the country which has lead to a wide diversity of non-governmental-associations and organisations with different agendas and ideas (Runciman, 2017).

4.1.2. Weaknesses of the South African civil society As seen from a legal point of view, the civil society in South Africa is placed in very high regard according to the country’s post-Apartheid constitution from 1996 which is considered to contain some of the most far-reaching civil and political rights in the world. But even if the civil society may be formally protected and free to pursue its ideas throughout South Africa, this does not necessarily mean that this also is the case in reality. At some occasions, there are even signs that defending democracy may also come with a price.

While a wide range of civil society organisations exists today in South Africa, their existence is not without complications. In a country which has been politically dominated by one party for more than two decades, the role of civil society could be considered to be even more important. It is therefore natural that criticism for political mismanagement in South Africa is directed at the ruling ANC-government. Certain elements within the ANC has been hostile to any type of critical opinions directed against the government and leaders and has not seldom accused some groups and organisations within the civil society by alleging them of being fronts for Apartheid-era groups, foreign enemies, or traitors to the nation. Calls have also been made to proscribe certain groups because of these accusations. (IOL, 2017; Guemede, 2018).

41(105)

A recent example of this is the Right2Know Campaign which is a non-profit organisation established in 2010 to reduce state secrecy in the drafting of laws, increase access to information, and protect freedom of expression, especially on the internet. The organisation has been directly involved in calls for investigations into corruption, protection of whistle-blowers and government accountability. In October 2015, officials of the South African State Security Agency distributed a letter to the members of the South African Parliament in which the Right2Know Campaign was accused of being an agent of foreign powers to destabilise South Africa, an accusation vehemently denied by the organisation themselves (Right2Know, 2015; Runciman, 2020).

Under President Jacob Zuma, the ANC also expressed open opposition to freedom of the press and certain types of speech. Some proposed laws, while not enacted, have been accused to place a de facto-limitation on these freedoms. There have also been several reports of serious intimidation of journalists. Articles that have been deemed critical towards the ANC has not seldom resulted in fierce reactions and threats, including inflammatory calls for newspaper offices to be burned down or journalists to be shot (de Waal, 2011 & 2012; Mail & Guardian, 2011).

Some political and civil activists have also been assassinated while fighting for democratic rights, including anti-mining activist Sikhosiphi Rhadebe, the chairman of the Amadiba Crisis Committee (ACC), an organisation opposed to mining activities in the environmentally sensitive coast of the Eastern Cape. Some organisations have also seen their state financial support and contracts being withdrawn for being critical of the ANC-government (Gumede, 2018; Habib, 2013).

As earlier mentioned, the phenomenon of popular protests, and the ability of the civil society to organise these, is a very important aspect regarding this arena. Popular protests against the Apartheid-system were not seldom met

42(105)

with violent suppression by the state but were nevertheless crucial to the democratic transition in the long-term perspective. But protests have not disappeared in South Africa. On the contrary, the number of popular protests, especially violent and with xenophobic characteristics, have increased significantly in South Africa during the 2000s (De Juan & Wegner, 2019). Although public gatherings and protests are fundamental rights guaranteed by the South African Constitution, there have also been signs that these rights have not been lawfully honoured by the state. In several different cases, authorities in South Africa has “banned” protests from occurring, even though there are no legal possibilities to do so. In later years, it has also been argued that the state itself has started to take a more authoritarian stance with regards to popular protests and uses the police forces to assert its power over the national territory. A notable example of this is when 34 miners were shot and killed by the South African Police Service (SAPS) during a strike at a mining complex in Marikana outside Rustenburg on the 16 August 2012, which constituted the most lethal use of force by South African security forces against civilians since the Soweto uproar in 1976 (The Washington Post, 2012; McMichael, 2014).

Some scholars have argued that South Africa still possesses many of the authoritarian and violent features of the Apartheid-regime and even suggested that violence or the threat of violence is so well-established and fairly “accepted” in the South African society that it is encoded into the very form of the country’s political and democratic system, a fairly unique characteristic called violent democracy by Karl Von Holdt. This has also lead to a gradual shift in public opinion regarding protests where more people tend to favour more repressive methods to stop protests perceived as violent, reinstatement of the death penalty, etc. at the same time as the social trust among the population is very low (McMichael, 2014; Von Holdt, 2013).

43(105)

It ought to be mentioned that the current civil society in South Africa is not considered to be as organised as it was until 1994. Many of the big organisations have been dissolved or absorbed into the ANC which means that the civil society today is more fragmented and unorganised, and mostly based on local community activism, for example, the Right2Know-campaign in the Eastern Cape (Runciman, 2020).

While it is clear that the civil society in South Africa could be considered to exist under a certain type of external pressure, it is also important to mention that the civil society itself has been noted for the inability to mobilise people to bring about real change like political parties and trade unions which has to lead to questions about its effectiveness. Especially since South Africa remains one of the world’s most unequal societies (Heywood, 2020).

The South African civil society compared to the consolidation arena:

Table. 1.2. The Civil Society

Civil society Civil society - South Africa A part of society that refers to a * The civil society of South Africa is polity of different kinds of self- vibrant, diverse and open and protected. organising groups, religious * Violent nature. groupings, social movements, and * Powerful mobilisation force individuals who are relatively * Not well-organised. autonomous from the state. * Some signs of repression, for example by the state, have been identified. * The independence of certain organisations is also questionable. * Potential implications and obstacles often limited to verbal threats or threats of actions rather than actual acts.

44(105)

4.2. The South African Political Society When multi-party democracy was introduced in South Africa in 1994, the country had virtually no previous experience of free and competitive elections. Suffrage was only extended to white people and while political opposition to Apartheid was not forbidden as such, this legal opposition was limited to only a few political parties and members of parliament. The fall of the NP from power after nearly five decades of unbroken rule and the subsequent electoral victory of ANC in the first multi-party elections in 1994 constituted both a dramatic and significant change in the South African political society. The settlement that forged the modern South African democratic state was a sophisticated process conducted primarily by elites within the ANC and NP that eventually resulted in the adoption of the 1996 Constitution (Corder & others, 2014).

The negotiation process is notable because it was largely based on forging an elite transition rather than a revolutionary liberation which originally had been the goal for some factions of the ANC. These negotiations and their eventual conclusion were the consequence of certain terms that were deemed as necessary. Although the ANC possessed a significant strength in mobilising people against the Apartheid-system, the party also realised that it was not possible to overthrow the ruling power by force, while at the same time, the NP realised that it was impossible to suppress the ANC and other movements without the outbreak of a potential civil war (De Jager, 2020).

Although the daily realities of racial separation remained, it laid the groundwork for newly created political institutions which resulted in the joyful first democratic election of Nelson Mandela, the first black president of South Africa. However, this joyfulness and promises of a bright future have proven to be challenged by the political dominance of the ANC, reelected with sustainable majorities in every general election since 1994, which has allowed the party to erode some of the constraints formally

45(105)

imposed upon its authority by the 1996 Constitution. (Southall, 2013; Southall, 2019).

4.2.1. Strengths of the South African political society In 2019, South Africa held its sixth democratic election since the introduction of democracy which was also the 25th anniversary of the transition to democracy. The elections resulted in the sixth consecutive victory for the ANC and the retainment of its majority in parliament. But even if the political dominance of the ANC continued, it was also the third consecutive election in which the party suffered a drop in electoral support which also fell below 60 per cent for the first time since 1994. At the same time, the voter turnout dropped to a historic all-time-low with merely 66 per cent of registered voters participating, meaning that the “actual” public support for the ANC among South Africans was hovering somewhere around 25 to 30 per cent. (IEC, 2019).

If one is to look at the formal conditions of the political society in South Africa, it is pretty clear that the country operates under a system of a robust representative democratic system with free and competitive elections conducted every fifth year under the principle of universal suffrage. The 1996 constitution especially mandates the existence of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) which is an independent institution with the formal responsibility of elections. During the years of Apartheid, elections in South Africa was instead under the jurisdiction of the Department of Home Affairs, meaning that the impartiality of the elections could be questioned (Constitution of South Africa, 1996; Heydenrych, 2020).

The 2019 general elections were arguably the most competitive in the history of South Africa with almost 50 political parties that fought for the seats in the National Assembly. The pre-election context was also conducted in the aftermath of the resignation of President Jacob Zuma and the 2016 municipal elections were the ANC suffered several bad results around the country

46(105)

which resulted in several local turnovers. Election observers concluded that the 2019 elections were mainly conducted according to democratic principles, although some concerns about violence and protests were mentioned (EISA, 2019).

What is interesting to notice is that while the electoral support for the ANC has consistently been shrinking since the 2009 general elections, the support for other, often more radical parties have been growing. One of these parties is the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) which was launched in 2013 by the former President of the ANC Youth League , and a group of allies, after he was expelled from the ANC (Dispatch Online, 2013). The party has been characterised by the adherent to far-left ideas and repeated accusations of inflammatory statements towards the white and Indian minorities of South Africa which has resulted that some scholars had identified the party as a threat against democracy (Buccus, 2020; Habib, 2020). But what is interesting to notice, especially with regards to the rise of the EFF, is that some scholars have also argued that the mere existence of the party also seems to have resulted, at some occasions, in the upholding of the democratic institutions of South Africa. This is especially notable with regards to accountability of the dominant ANC through court cases (Piper, 2020).

The 1996 Constitution provides for a series of independent institutions, most of them created with the outspoken purpose of safeguarding the democratic system in South Africa. As mentioned in the earlier chapter, these institutions have not seldom demonstrated their independent power in the face of the dominating ANC government. The Office of the Public Protector has consistently conducted investigations and issued recommendations which on many occasions has been deemed as harshly critical of actions taken by the government or even the president (Public Protector, 2016; De Jager, 2020).

47(105)

While the ANC continues to possess a high level of dominance on the South African political arena it is clear that the country seems to have a democratic system of government that can be deemed well-functioning and democratic when it comes to the conductment of elections and also the turnover of political power. This signals that a system of free and fair competition of the state apparatus by different political actors do exist in South Africa. But due to the dominance of the ANC, it is even more vital to investigate how democracy works within the democratic institutions.

4.2.2. Weaknesses of the South African political society After the abolishment of Apartheid and the subsequent election of Nelson Mandela as president, a period of joy and bright believe in the future erupted in South Africa. This even though the country remained highly unequal with continuing high levels of crimes, political violence and few actual signs of transition. The government of Nelson Mandela highlighted the need for reconciliation between the many ethnic groups of South Africa and was largely adherent to the democratic principles. These principles continued also during the initial years of the presidency of Thabo Mbeki but it was also during these years that an apparent shift in attitudes began to rise where the boundaries between the state and the ANC seems to have diminished (De Jager, 2020; Southall, 2019).

The earlier commitment to democracy and the especially to the principle of “serving the people” came into serious questioning at the beginning of the 2000s when South Africa was rocked by an accelerating HIV/AIDS- epidemic. The South African government, including President Mbeki and then Minister of Health Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, officially denied the fact that HIV caused AIDS and invited several denialists to advise the government. Several controversial treatments against the disease were recommended which lead to the estimated death of more than 300 000 infected people in South Africa. It was only after non-governmental

48(105)

organisation Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) began suing the government in court that the antiretroviral drugs were made available to South Africans. This was also a contributing factor in the deposition of Thabo Mbeki as leader of the ANC in 2008 (Heywood, 2009).

After a brief interim period, Thabo Mbeki was replaced by Jacob Zuma as leader of the ANC and thereby President of South Africa. Zuma possessed a significant amount of support from the left-wing faction of the ANC, especially the South Party and the ANC Youth League. At the time of his election, Zuma was implicated in a series of legal disputes and trials which involved accusations of corruption and rape, charges which were later dropped by a court in 2009 (Habib, 2013).

During the near decade-long presidency of Jacob Zuma (2009-2018), there has been a series of allegations of poor governance, undermining of constitutional arrangements, and even jeopardise of the state itself (Basson & Du Toit, 2017). Respect for the constitutional procedures of the state is one of the core aspects of the arena of political society. According to section 89 of the 1996 Constitution, a violation of the constitution is clear criteria for the removal of the president by the National Assembly. The question is then how such a potential violation would be handled in real life? A very clear example of this is the aftermath of the 2016 judicial case Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly, in which the Constitutional Court of South Africa unanimously ruled that President Jacob Zuma had breached the Constitution by failing to implement the recommendations in a report made by the Public Protector about the use of state funds for the renovations of his private homestead Nkandla. Although the Court clearly stated that the President had indeed violated the Constitution, no action concerning the removal of the President was taken by the ANC-majority in the National Assembly. On the contrary, most of the ANC and its affiliate organisations expressed their “full” and “unshaken” support for Jacob Zuma.

49(105)

While opposition parties called for the removal of Jacob Zuma, members of ANC instead argued that the violation was not “serious enough” and refused to consider a removal even if the National Assembly was seemingly constitutionally obliged to do so according to the provisions of the Constitution (Constitutional Court, 2016; ENCA, 2016; ENCA, 2016).

During recent years, the allegations of systematic political corruption and enrichment of private business interests have become very prevalent in South Africa, a phenomenon which has come be known as “”. In 2016, a series of accusations and allegations about a potentially corrupt relationship between the South African-based wealthy Indian and President Jacob Zuma began to erupt. Oppositions parties began making accusations that the Gupta family had insinuated themselves into a position where they could offer cabinet posts to people and also possessed a large deal of influence over the governance of South Africa (News24, 2016; Basson & Du Toit, 2017). These allegations came further into light when some member of the ANC alleged that they had been offered cabinet posts by the Gupta family in the exchange for lucrative business arrangements (The Sowetan, 2016; News24, 2016). It has also been alleged that several cabinet reshuffles and dismissal of cabinet ministers by Jacob Zuma also had links to the Gupta family (Biznews, 2016). Although Jacob Zuma and the Guptas have repeatedly denied any wrongdoing or involvement in corruption, the allegations have been hard to deny (Chipkin, I and Swilling, M et al, 2018; Wall Street Journal, 2019; Basson & Du Toit, 2017).

In 2018, the of Inquiry was set up as recommended by the Public Protector to investigate the allegations of state capture (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2018). Jacob Zuma has continued to deny all allegations of corruption or criminal activities and has instead argued that the allegations are a result of a foreign conspiracy and that the commission is

50(105)

a tool of intelligence agents from the Apartheid-era to destroy his reputation and political career (News24, 2020).

While the ANC continues to be the dominant party of South African politics, the issue of internal divisions and factions have become even more evident during the latter years of the 2010s. At the ANC-congress in in 2017, the fierce opposition towards Zuma from elements within the party resulted in the narrow defeat of his hand-picked successor and ex-wife Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in favour of Deputy President , an outspoken critic of Zuma and his faction. This later also resulted in the resignation of Jacob Zuma from the presidency. But even if many people have put their hope in the reformist agenda launched by Ramaphosa, the Zuma-faction could still be argued to hold a large amount of power within the ANC, especially on a local and provincial level, which has not seldom resulted in more or less open internal fighting (Southall, 2019).

Continuing poor governance and the seeming unableness of the ANC to effectively rule South Africa has resulted in a big public disillusionment with politics in general which is characterised by shrinking election support for the ANC, low turnouts, violent protests, and a general lack of legitimacy of democracy. It is also argued that there is a lack of political will in the country effectively attack the problems (De Jager, 2020; Runciman, 2017; Runciman, 2020).

The fact that the disillusionment with the ANC has not resulted in any significant improvement of the results of the liberal opposition parties such as the Democratic Alliance (DA) but rather a rise in the support of more radical parties such as the EFF, currently South Africa’s third-largest party could be seen a future potential threat against democracy in South Africa due to its alleged militarism and repeated inflammatory statements and acts which has been directed towards minorities, women and journalists by leading figures of the party.

51(105)

The South African political society compared to the consolidation arena:

Political society Political society - South Africa Political actors compete with each * Political actors in South Africa do other for the power of the state compete with each for the power of the apparatus and public policies through state apparatus and public policies. free and fair elections conducted * A robust set of operating institutions under the principle of universal supports the competition. suffrage. The people participate and * The people participate in elections but support democracy with the to a limited degree. democratic institutions are stable and * Lack of legitimacy and trust in the transparent with existing checks and state institutions. balances under a constitutional * Checks and balances exist to a high arrangement. level of degree but their authority is often violated and judgments not respected.

4.3. The South African Judiciary The principle of the independence of the judiciary is considered to be fundamental to democracy. As a result of this, this principle is quite frequently featured in many international legal documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights.

The abolishment of Apartheid and the subsequent transition to democracy in South Africa in 1994 did not only constitute a political transition from a previously authoritarian dominant-party system to multi-party democracy but also a fundamental transition of the legal framework on which the country was operating on. Until the adoption of the Constitution of South Africa in 1996, the country had been operating under the principle of parliamentary sovereignty which meant that the Parliament of South Africa was the

52(105)

supreme authority with regards to the making and unmaking of laws in the country. This meant that the court system did not possess the legal right to override decisions of the parliament, an aspect that constituted the possibility of the very existence of Apartheid (van Themaat, 1954; Endoh, 2015).

In 1993, the South African Parliament adopted the Interim Constitution which was a provisional legal meant to replace the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty to that of constitutional supremacy, a process which was finalised with the adopted of the 1996 Constitution, promulgated by President Nelson Mandela on the 18th December 1996. The adoption of the constitution thereby cemented the doctrine of constitutional supremacy in South Africa and provided for legal review of any laws that were inconsistent with the constitution through a system of checks and balances where the Constitutional Court is the final court of appeal for all legal cases (Endoh, 2015; Ackermann, 2006).

Due to the unstable political situation and the dominant-party system in South Africa, it would be appropriate to argue that the independence of the judiciary shall be considered to be of utmost importance and to post the question what judicial independence means? A nominal independent court system is naturally an important aspect but it should be even more important to observe how the judiciary works in practice. A truly independent judiciary should not only be independent in a legal and constitutional perspective but should also not hesitate to make the right judgements which also could be uncomfortable with regards to the ruling power.

4.3.1. Strengths of the South African judiciary The independence of the judiciary is explicitly guaranteed by chapter 8 of the 1996 Constitution which states that the court system is subject only to laws of the land and contains the following sections:

53(105)

“…The courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, which they must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice...”

“…No person or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of the court…”

“…Organs of state, through legislative and other measures, must assist and protect the courts to ensure the independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the courts…” (Constitution of South Africa, chapter 8, 1996, amended 2012).

During the transition to democracy in the early 1990s and with the adoption of the 1993 Interim Constitution, a Constitutional Court was created which is the ultimate court of appeals for all constitutional and legal matters in South Africa. The Court is also vested with the power to try if laws are complying with the Consitution and also holds the power to strike down laws that are found to be unconstitutional. When interpreting the Constitution, the Constitutional Court is also required to study international human rights laws and may also look at laws and judgements of other countries (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2020; Erskine, 2008).

The National Prosecution Authority (NPA), which is a constitutionally required state agency with the sole power to institute criminal proceedings on behalf of the State, also has its independence guaranteed as per section 179(4) of the Constitution which states:

“…National legislation must ensure that the prosecuting authority exercises its functions without fear, favour or prejudice….” (Constitution of South Africa, chapter 8, 1996).

An article that also has been interpreted by the Constitutional Court in a judgement in 2011 with the following words:

54(105)

“…there is a constitutional guarantee of independence and any legislative or executive action inconsistent therewith would be subject to constitutional control…” (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2011).

Furthermore, chapter 2 of the Constitution guarantees every person in South Africa the right to have a dispute or trial heard by a fair, impartial and independent court (Constitution of South Africa, 1996).

The importance of judicial independence in South Africa has long been considered a core aspect of the nation’s democracy as defined by the former Chief Justice of South Africa, , in an address to the Cape Law Society in 2012:

“…Judicial independence is a requirement demanded by the Constitution, not in the personal interests of the judiciary, but in the public interest, for without that protection judges may not be, or be seen by the public to be, able to perform their duties without fear or favour…” (Chaskalson, 2014).

During his term in office, President Nelson Mandela, himself a lawyer, also highlighted that an independent judiciary was one of the core principles upon which the South African democracy was founded, even when the courts ruled against actions taken by him as president:

"…The independence of the judiciary is one of the pillars of our democracy & equally fundamental is the commitment to abide by the decisions of the courts, whether they are in one’s favour or not…" (Mandela, 1998).

Seen from a legal and constitutional point of view, it would be hard to argue with the fact that South Africa possesses all the principles that are needed for a guaranteed independent judicial system and thereby for its arena to be considered to be a consolidated one. But could this also apply to how the judicial system works de facto? To have the power to make bold and just decisions which may not be in line with public opinion is often characteristic

55(105)

of an independent judiciary and there have been several examples of this in South Africa ever since the transition to democracy in 1994.

According to section 277(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, the death penalty was a legal punishment in South Africa and although a moratorium had been in place since 1989 as a part of the democratic transition process, there were about 400 prisoners awaiting execution in 1995. In what has been referred to as the then newly established Constitutional Court’s first politically and controversial holding, the Court handed down a unanimous judgement in the case that the death penalty was inconsistent with the human rights enrichment in the 1993 Interim Consitution, effectively abolishing the death penalty as a source of criminal punishment in South Africa. Although the retention of the death penalty was supported by a significant majority of the South African population, a fact also acknowledged in the judgement, the Court affirmed its ultimate commitment to the principle of constitutional supremacy:

“…The question before us, however, is not what the majority of South Africans believe a proper sentence for murder should be. It is whether the Constitution allows the sentence…”

Or more precisely expressed by then Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson:

"…in itself, it is no substitute for the duty vested in the Courts to interpret the Constitution and to uphold its provisions without fear or favour…" (Constitutional Court, S v Makwanyane, 1995).

In a further judgement in 2001, the Constitutional Court also ruled that suspects may not be extradited to a country where they may face the death penalty (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2001).

The above-mentioned judgements are all pretty clear examples that the court system sees itself as an independent interpreter of the law which has also resulted in many significant judgements that have strengthened the human

56(105)

rights in South Africa. The question is then how the judiciary function concerning the ruling power?

The 2016 Constitutional Court judgement Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly, previously mentioned in this study as the Nklandla-judgment, is considered to be one of the most important judgements ever handed down by the South African court system (Cameron, 2016). In a unanimous decision authored by Chief Justice , the Constitutional Court held that then-President Jacob Zuma and the ANC-controlled National Assembly had violated the Constitution of South Africa by failing to implement a report by the Public Protector. Chief Justice Mogoeng, appointed by Jacob Zuma in 2011, had earlier been subject to harsh criticism due to his alleged lack of qualification, lukewarm respect for minority rights and his supposed close links to Zuma, something that also continued after his appointment (Calland, 2013). But with the Nkandla-case, Mogoeng handed down a judgement which was considered both profound and powerful and contained several harshly critical words directed towards President Zuma:

“…The President failed to uphold‚ defend and respect the Constitution as the supreme law of the land...”

“…[Zuma] was duty-bound to‚ but did not‚ assist and protect the Public Protector so as to ensure her independence‚ impartiality‚ dignity and effectiveness by complying with her remedial action….“

“…The President is expected to endure graciously and admirably and fulfil all obligations imposed on him‚ however unpleasant..."

“…Any failure to fulfil shared constitutional obligations by any member of the Executive would… be attributable to the President as his own failure. After all, he appoints them and they are answerable to him....” (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2016).

57(105)

The judgment was not only a considered devastating to the already embattled Zuma but also a clear sign that the judiciary was able to operate independently, did not hesitate from rebutting the ruling power and also signalled that all rule in South Africa was subject to the Constitution (Spector, 2016).

Although the Nkandla-case is considered to be the most significant court case concerning the ruling power versus the rule of law in South Africa, the judiciary has continued to rule on similar cases.

In December 2017, the High Court of South Africa rejected President Jacob Zuma’s efforts to block an independent state inquiry into the allegations of state capture. The court argued that allegations were extremely serious and that the efforts by President Zuma to block the inquiry could well be a sign of serious implications of the Presidency. Furthermore, the High Court had also ruled that the appointment of a new Chief and head of the NPA was invalid due to his alleged closed links with Zuma and instead ordering then-Vice President Cyril Ramaphosa to make the appointment, arguing that Zuma himself was “conflicted” (High Court of South Africa, 2017).

From the mentioned examples, it is fair to assume that the South African judiciary is not only formally independent but is also able to fully able to operate as such.

4.3.2. Weaknesses of the South African Judiciary If one is reading about all the profound and independent judgment of South African courts, as mentioned in the part above, it could be quite easy to conclude that the potential implications or political involvements in the judiciary are very small or non-existent. And one could surely draw that conclusion based on how the judiciary operates but does this mean that it is also independent of political involvement? Perhaps it is instead the control of

58(105)

the judiciary, rather than how it is operating, where one could find these answers.

During years of Apartheid, judges in South Africa were appointed by the State President, usually on the recommendation by the Minister of Justice, and behind closed doors without any outside interference or hearings. During the constitutional negotiations between the NP-government and the ANC, it was therefore decided that the President’s power to appoint judges should be complimented and moderated by a special impartial body mandated by the Constitution – the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), which is required to be composed by representatives from both the ruling party and the opposition, as well as some jurists and judges (Judicial Service Commission, 2020; Consitution of South Africa, 1996).

According to article 178 of the 1996 Constitution, the main task of the JSC is to conduct interviews with potential judges and conduct a screening process. When it comes to the appointment of judges of lower High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal, the President is obliged to choose the candidate recommended by the JSC. But in the case of justices of the Constitutional Court, the JSC instead makes a shortlist of four candidates of which the President picks one. In the case of the Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice, the role of the JSC is instead purely ceremonial as the President has the power to appoint whomever he wants. The JSC also has a role of deciding complaints against sitting judges and justices (Constitution of South Africa, 1996).

And why is it so important to mention the process of appointing judges in South Africa? While the country’s judiciary is constitutionally independent, it also seems to suffer from a series of contradictory elements that seemingly leave the judiciary under strong control of the national executive, which have been argued to constitute an insidious erosion of the separation of powers and the judiciary itself (Siyo, 2012).

59(105)

Ever since the beginning of the 2000s, there have been serious allegations and controversies surrounding the Judge President of the Western Cape branch of the High Court of South Africa, , who has repeatedly been accused of gross misconduct. The allegations have involved deliberate delaying of judgments, corruption, inflammatory statements, assaults, etc. In 2008, the justices of the Constitutional Court stated that they had referred Hlophe to the JSC due to allegations that he had tried to influence judgments of the Court, something he fiercely denied. And as late as January 2020, judge Hlophe was again accused of misconduct by having tried to influence the appointments of judges loyal to former President Jacob Zuma. The JSC, however, has repeatedly failed to act with regards to the allegations which has put the body’s supposed impartial image into serious questioning (Malan, 2017; Siyo & Mubangizi, 2015).

During the presidency of Jacob Zuma, political attacks against the judiciary also intense to a very disturbing degree. These attacks came to a sharp relief by late 2015 at the summit of the African Union (AU) and the visit of the President of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, to South Africa. In 2009, the International Criminal Court (ICC) had issued an arrest warrant for al-Bashir over alleged genocide and war crimes committed in the Darfur-region in 2003. As South Africa is a signatory of the Rome Treaty, a unanimous district court in the province ruled that that al-Bashir should be arrested and not be permitted to leave the country, pending extradition to the ICC in the Hauge. The government, which had previously promised al- Bashir diplomatic immunity, rejected the ruling and stated that arresting al- Bashir was not an option and argued that such action would constitute an unofficial declaration of war against Sudan and damage South Africa’s reputation on the continent. It also argued that such action would be to legitimise the ICC and its alleged bias against African leaders. As a result, al- Bashir attended the summit as planned and left South Africa with being

60(105)

touched. After the ruling, the South African judiciary came under fierce attacks from politicians from the ruling ANC which accused the judiciary of “trying to create chaos” and “contradicting the interest of the state”. Statements which eventually lead to an intervention by Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng by defending the independence of the judiciary (Siyo & Mubangizi, 2015).

The above-mentioned judicial conflict between the political and judicial powers of South Africa tend to stir into another implication which has been facing the country’s judiciary in recent years, namely the respect for the rule of law and especially the expectations of the judiciary. Some scholars, such as professor Koos Malan, have argued that the seemed excellence and independence of the South African judiciary is a flawed interpretation. The courts may be able to act independently and impartiality but its strong position within the South African constitutional frameworks also makes the judiciary itself a powerful political actor, especially concerning the dominant-party system that exists in the country. This is notably characterised by criminal investigations or verdicts against senior members of the ANC while still being supported by the party (Malan, 2017).

And while the judiciary is a seemingly strong and independent institution in South Africa, it is also clear that itself have been the victim of increasing political interpretation, especially during the presidency of Jacob Zuma. The previously mentioned Nklandla-case from 2016 where Zuma was found to have violated the Constitution by a unanimous Constitutional Court, senior ANC-members such as parliamentary chief whip Jackson Mthembu, argued that the violation was not “serious” (Malan, 2019; ENCA, 2016).

61(105)

The South African Judiciary in comparison with the consolidation arena:

Judiciary Judiciary - South Africa Sub-society based on the rule of law * Constitutionally and legal framework with independent judicial institutions which guarantees the independence of with sworn allegiance to the state the country’s judicial institutions. and the law rather than the ruling * The judiciary answers only to the party. Also exists to safeguard the Consitution and the laws of South rights and liberties of the citizens Africa. from abuse of state power. * The court system is robust and has repeatedly ruled on issues which have strengthened the human and civil liberties and held the ruling power accountable at many occasions. * Some concerns with judicial independence, especially regarding the appointment and accountability of judges. * Some tendencies to political attacks on the judiciary and questionable respect for certain rulings from political actors.

4.4. The South African Bureaucratic Society In 1986, the same year as then-State President P.W. Botha proclaimed a nationwide state of emergency in an attempt to quell the unrest in South Africa, the composition of the senior levels of the South African public service corresponded completely with the ruling elite. Approximately 95 per cent of all the senior officials within government departments were white and

62(105)

more than 75 per cent of these were also Afrikaans-speaking. It was then argued that a pure political transition of South Africa was not enough to bring about democracy in the country since the Apartheid-system was so institutionalised in the bureaucracy that a fundamental reorganisation of the state institutions was needed (Schrire, 1986).

A well-functioning state apparatus is fundamental for the upholding of a democratic system. Its mere existence has to be able to withstand both political instabilities and crisis. No matter what happens, the fundamental responsibilities of the state have to stay functioning. So the question is then how this development has looked like in South Africa ever since the transition to democracy in 1994?

4.4.1. The strengths of the South African Bureaucratic Society Ever since the decolonisation of Africa, many countries on the continent have marred by conflicts and institutional weakness. From a regional perspective, the African continent is home to the largest number of fragile or failed states anywhere in the world. This is characterised by the fact that the state has a weak capacity to carry out basic governance functions and to effectively control its territory (ISS, 2013).

Although the state apparatuses in South Africa during Apartheid were seemingly well-functioning and stable, they also played an essential role in upholding the authoritarian state under the NP and were dominated by people loyal to the NP-government and racially instituted political system (Schrire, 1986). A transformation of the bureaucracy and the establishment of strong independent state institutions and the separation of powers were therefore seen as a vital part of the democratic transition in South Africa (Langa, 2006).

The 1996 Constitution promotes the principle of separation of powers even though it does not refer to it explicitly. However, the Constitutional Court, in

63(105)

its judgement South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath, stated that:

“…there can be no doubt that our Constitution provides for such a separation [of powers] and that laws inconsistent with what the Constitution requires in that regard, are invalid…” (Langa, 2006).

Furthermore, the Constitution also mandates the existence of a series of state institutions, explicitly created to safeguard the democratic system of governance in South Africa. These are often referred to as the “Chapter Nine Institutions” (after the chapter of the Constitution of which they are a part). It is stated that these institutions must act independent and impartial and that other branches of the state have a responsibility to support and uphold the existence of these institutions so that they can perform their duties. Furthermore, it is also stated that these institutions answer only to the National Assembly and not to any specific branch of government or minister (Consitution of South Africa, 1996; Langa, 2006).

Several examples of efficiency among state institutions supporting democracy have been noted, especially among the Chapter Nine Institutions. The Electoral Commission (IEC) is the agency with the responsibility to arrange and secure free and fair elections in South Africa. Every general election in the country since 1994 have been deemed free and fair by both domestic and international observers which do indicate that the IEC is capable of safeguarding on the most important principles of representative democracy (Freedom House, 2019).

An even more prominent example is the Office of Public Protector that holds its mandate by the Public Protector Act of 1994, which preamble states:

“…The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa ... provides for the establishment of the office of Public Protector to investigate matters and to protect the public against matters such as maladministration in connection

64(105)

with the affairs of government, improper conduct by a person performing a public function, improper acts with respect to public money, improper or unlawful enrichment of a person performing a public function and an act or omission by a person performing a public function resulting in improper prejudice to another person…” (Public Protector Act, 1994).

The importance of the Office of the Public Protector was especially highlighted during the term of President Jacob Zuma when a series of reports concerning serious allegations of mismanagement and corruption were published by then-Public Protector Thuli Madonsela, which also recommended the creation of a state inquiry in the allegation of state capture (Public Protector, 2013; 2016). Although the reports were bluntly dismissed by Zuma as “political propaganda”, an inquiry was subsequently set up after a court decision (News24, 2017).

The efficiency of the national tax authority of South Africa, The South African Revenue Service (SARS), and the Department of the Treasury have also been lauded for its ability to lay and collect taxes with regards to the South African public (Von Holdt, 2010; Ndlovu, 2016).

Ever since the decolonisation of Africa, many African countries have been struggling with one of the most essential parts of a functioning state apparatus, namely the ability to effectively exercise control over the national territory. In South Africa, however, it can be well-argued that the state still “reaches everywhere”. It does not necessarily mean that institutional public services are equal all across South Africa but rather that the state has an effective capability to control the national territory, something that is otherwise a very characteristic feature of weak bureaucracy on the African continent. This ability was recently demonstrated during the Covid-19 pandemic when the government ordered a nationwide lockdown and stay-at- home order all across South Africa. Although a few incidents occurred with people breaking the quarantine rules, the state was largely able to effectively

65(105)

enforce the lockdown of the tens of millions of inhabitants across South Africa (Heydenrych, 2020; Croucamp, 2020).

4.4.2. Weaknesses of the South African Bureaucratic Society Even if it seems like the state apparatuses of South Africa possesses some amount of strength when it comes to bureaucratic society, the weaknesses and the implications of this arena nevertheless seems to be far greater.

One of the foremost implications of the South African state bureaucracy which has become prevalent in after the abolishment of Apartheid is the apparent failure of transition or more exactly the transformation of state institutions. The entire ground on which the South African bureaucracy is built could be said to be based on Weberian bureaucracy which is one of the core aspects of western modernity. This modernity was adopted in South Africa through the establishment of a western-based white-minority regime which, according to some scholars, also internalised the colonist state and thus exemplifying the so-called “imperialism of the universal”. Although a transition of the people operating the state apparatus occurred after the abolishment of Apartheid, few changes were made to the state apparatus themselves (Bourdieu, 2000).

According to Karl Von Holdt (2010), the historical shifts from the repressive authoritarian state apparatuses to a tool for the liberated black-majority population of South Africa could be defined in the following way:

“Apartheid South Africa “Post-Apartheid South Africa 1. The suppression of black class 1. Support of black class formation. formation. 2. Modern Western and European 2. Ambivalence towards and knowledge and skills to safeguard contestation of Western and European and advance the interest of whites skills. and dominate blacks.

66(105)

3. Instrument of continuing colonial 3. Instrument of African sovereignty and white domination” 4. Hierarchical, authoritarian and 4. Hierarchical, with a focus on status racist. and deference. 5. Violent, repressive and 5. Ambivalence towards authority with authoritarian. high levels of contestation and low levels of discipline. 6. Sufficient budget for the white 6. Low levels of budget discipline which minority population.” signals that public service is secondary.”

By studying the chart above, one could say that three different patterns can be noted:

1. The South African state apparatuses during the Apartheid-era was firmly in the hand of the ruling NP-government and existed to support the institutionalised segregation, the continuing dominance of the white minority and the suppression of opposition towards the state. 2. After the abolishment of Apartheid and the subsequent political transition to democracy in 1994, a bureaucratic transition of the state apparatuses also took place which largely constituted that the earlier marginalised black majority population being evaluated to higher positions. 3. Although it is hard to deny the fact that a transition of the state apparatuses took place after 1994, the transition was more of the transformation of the bureaucracy itself to include the majority population and stop being an instrument of oppression, but also more an elite-based internal transition into the hands of a privileged part of the majority population rather than an overall transition.

67(105)

It could be argued that the bureaucracy in post-Apartheid South Africa is characterised by irregularities with continuing tensions the appropriation and rejection of modernity concerning the new “African” South African where experienced white state officials were degraded or surrendered their position in favour of representatives of the black majority population which did not seldom lack any previous experience (Von Holdt, 2010; Heydenrych, 2020).

And the transformation of state institutions did not generally result in increased public service for the all-population of South Africa but rather a dramatic enlargement of the state bureaucracy in the name of transformation. This had also occurred during Apartheid when the bureaucracy of the South African state was dramatically enlarged due to the affirmative action policies of the NP-government which favoured Afrikaans-speaking people, leading to the degradation of more educated English-speaking civil servants which left the state in dysfunctional state for years to come. But this problem did not stop with the democratic transition, it rather became worse but in different shapes (Von Holdt, 2010; Posel, 1999).

Other scholars, such as Professor Adam Habib, have identified the weakness and incompetence of the South African state institutions as the single biggest threat to political and economic stability in South Africa today. As the institutions were enlarged and earlier employees degraded or dismissed, new people with lacking experience of competence were instead hired. This has resulted in a range of dysfunctional governmental agencies which has been accused of being run by people with virtually no experience or even will of ruling the institutions effectively. Some state institutions, such as the Department of Home Affairs, the Health Department and the SAPS, have been characterised as “dysfunctional” with extremely poor services with waiting times lasting for years and improper training and morals. Widespread corruption with state officials taking bribes has also been mentioned as widely common where people does not see any other alternative than to bribe

68(105)

officials to get the work done (Von Holdt, 2010; EyeWitness News, 2011; The Sowetan, 2011; Habib, 2020).

The effectiveness of the Chapter Nine Institutions, although sometimes proven effective, has also been put in question due to alleged incompetence and failure to uphold their original mission (Habib, 2020).

It has also been argued that recent alleged state repressions, such as the shooting of the 34 mineworkers by the SAPS in Marikana outside of Rustenburg in 2012, was not a result of increased authoritarianism but rather an extremely worrying sign of incompetence and improper training among the ranks of the police service (Croucamp, 2020; Habib, 2020).

The situation on local government level has been identified as worrying with widespread corruption on the highest political level and several forms nepotism and complete dysfunctionality where the bureaucracy does not seem to work at all due to the lack of interest from the ruling parties to address the problems. These problems do not seldom have their roots in the lack of accountability in local governance which is considered to be very limited (Piper, 2020).

The ability of the South African state to lay and collect taxes is also an issue of concern despite the good reputation of the SARS. This because only a small minority of wealthy South Africans along with companies are paying all of the taxes in the country, meaning that the system is suffering for a massive institutionalised inequality (Rolling Alpha, 2017).

And perhaps the most serious phenomena that have arisen in South Africa during the recent years is the issue of tenderpreneurism which means that an individual enriches themselves through corrupting the awarding of government tender contracts, mostly based on personal connections and corrupt relationships, although outright bribery might also take place and often involves an elected or politically appointed official (or his or her family

69(105)

members) holding simultaneous business interests This is often accomplished by overpricing and/or shoddy workmanship and/or excessive 'under the table' advances termed "commissions". The previously mentioned case involving the Gupta family and their close ties to Jacob Zuma can be classified as tenderpreneurism and has also been mentioned as state capture where it has been alleged that several levels of the South African bureaucracy have been “captured” through a network of nepotism and corruption with connection to the prominent ANC-faction of Jacob Zuma and the Indian financial family of Gupta. This has created a form of institutionalised oligarchy where the mentioned family has used state institutions for their wealth (Labuschagne, 2017; De Jager, 2020; Croucamp, 2020).

The incapacity and dysfunctionality of the state apparatuses in South Africa have resulted in a widespread distrust among the South African public in the country’s institutions which has to lead to some beginning to talk about a “failure of the regime type” where the state has abdicated from its basic responsibilities and people instead have to rely on corrupted officials or private companies (Habib, 2020; De Jager, 2020).

The South African Bureaucratic Society in comparison with the consolidation arena:

Table 1.5. Bureaucratic Society

Bureaucratic Society Bureaucratic Society - South Africa A set of stable and efficient state * A set of stable and independent institutions and agencies with the institutions exists that has been proven task of implementing democratic able to safeguard and uphold the governance and the rule of law. Plays democratic system. a vital part in the safeguarding and * The state is largely able to control its upholding of the state institutions territory. and basic services for the citizens * Badly managed transformation

70(105)

even in a time of crisis and political process. instability. * Dysfunctional state institutions that are not always able to offer basic

services for the citizens. * Efficient state bureaucracy exists but they are merely pockets of excellence in bureaucratic disarray.

4.5. The South African Economic Society With the formal introduction of the Apartheid-system in 1950, South Africa did not only became a divided country by political means but also economically. Throughout the 1960s, South Africa was defined as the only developed country on the African continent according to United Nations- standards and for a time enjoyed some the highest rates of economic growth in the world. The economy was, however, tightly controlled through the state-owned Industrial Development Corporation and benefited the white minority while much of the economic growth and success was made possible due to black labour and migrant workers, a fact that was also recognised by the NP-government. Due to the economic sanctions placed on South Africa by many foreign countries, the economy was very closed with very limited trade with the outside world and strict rules regarding the flow of money out of the country. This lead to the development of a very strong banking system in South Africa during the years of Apartheid (Bunting, 1964).

However, during the 1970s, the South African economy began to suffer from instability because of more severe trade sanctions being imposed which lead to the withholding of foreign investment, something that became even more apparent during the increasing turmoil in the 1980s. Some market liberalisations, such as the privatisations of the country’s largest steel and oil

71(105)

companies, took place during the 1980s. With the first democratic elections in 1994, the ANC-government inherited the most advanced physical infrastructure on the continent but also one of the world’s most unequal economic systems (Habib, 2013).

An economic society, which for over 300 years had been dominated and ruled by a privileged minority, would have to be adjusted to include the previously excluded black majority. How did this go and perhaps more importantly, what has the results been?

4.5.1. Strengths of the South African Economic Society South Africa had for a long period an economic system which by some has been defined as a form of state-capitalism that benefited a minority of the country’s population. This itself had created a massive inequality and poverty among racial lines and eradication, or at least reduction, of this, was seen as essential by some scholars by the time of the democratic transition during the 1990s:

“…successful economic reform holds the key to the survival of democracy in South Africa…” (Dreijmanis, 2000).

The ANC was long committed to a socialist planned economy as stated in the (1955). Shortly after his release from prison in 1990, Nelson Mandela repeated that both he and the ANC were still committed to the basic economic principles of the Freedom Charter;

“…The nationalisations of the mines, banks and monopoly industry is the policy of the ANC and a change or modification of our views in this regard is inconceivable…” (Nattrass, 1992).

But after negotiations with the NP-government and the subsequent electoral victory of Nelson Mandela and the ANC in 1994, this view gradually changed and resulted in the adoption of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RPD) where the ANC and its partners within the Tripartite

72(105)

Alliance, the COSATU and the SACP, moved to accept a social market economy:

“…democracy, participation and development. We are convinced that neither a communist central planning system nor an unfettered free market system can provide and adequate solutions to the problems confronting us. Reconstruction and development will be achieved through the leading and enabling role of the state, a thriving private sector, and active involvement by all sectors of civil society which in combination will lead to sustainable growth…” (ANC, 1994).

The RDP also made references to “basic welfare rights” which embraced the right to basic needs such as shelter, food, health care, equal working opportunities, income security and general well-being of the people (ANC, 1994). This programme was the first major political programme in South Africa which directly addressed the socio-economic problems of the country as well as the adjustment of towards a high income och productive economy.

In the immediate years after the abolishment of Apartheid, the Mandela administration did few dramatic changes to the economy with regards to the racial transition and instead focused on keeping down inflation and promote foreign investment while the growth largely stagnated (Dreijmanis, 2000).

At the beginning of the 2000s, then-President Thabo Mbeki vowed to further pursue neo-liberal policies to promote economic growth and foreign investment by relaxing restrictive labour laws, stepping up privatisation of governmental companies and property, raising government spending and cutting interest rates. Although these policies were met with fierce oppositions by COSATU and the left-wing of the ANC, economic growth picked up significantly from 2004 and onwards with increased employment, reduced inflation and capital formation which also resulted in an increased value of the (ZAR) (Breytenbach, 2006; Habib, 2013).

73(105)

The market liberalisation and the opening of the economy have not come without advantages. Scholars like Adam Habib (2020) have argued that much of the continuing functioning of South Africa with regards to development, security, social issues, etc. is because of the thriving private sector. Due to the dysfunctional situation of the South African state institutions, which mainly are unable to operate effectively, many have instead turned to private investment and employment. This is something that also applies to the rise of private security companies, hospitals, schools, etc. Although this could be classified as disturbing with regards to the state’s capability, it could nevertheless be considered a good sign that the liberalised economy has benefited South Africa.

In 2019, it was also estimated that the private sector in South Africa made up more than 70 per cent of the country’s economy, meaning that the level of the market economy in South Africa had risen dramatically since 1994 (City Press News24, 2019).

While it should be fair to assume that South Africa has indeed moved in the direction of a market-based economy with certain state restrictions after 1994, the question then remains how this implementation affected the country?

4.5.2. Weaknesses of the South African Economic Society However, the outcomes of the neo-liberal policies have been mixed. Although it brought macroeconomic stability and financial discipline to South Africa but failed to deliver in key areas. Formal employment continued to decline, and although signs of a fledgling middle class and social mobility and the ongoing effects of the black empowerment programmes, the country’s wealth remained much divided along racial lines (The Economist, 2007).

74(105)

After the election victory of the ANC in 1994, the RDP was never really implemented and in 1996, the Mandela administration launched the so-called Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) to stimulate the economy through privatisations of state assets and the removal of exchange controls. These neoliberal policies were deepened during the presidency of Thabo Mbeki which also led to the marginalisation of the two other partners within the , COSATU and the SACP due to their fierce opposition (Habib, 2013). A series of other programmes, one being called Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) was introduced in 2005 which is a point-based system that shall encourage the integration of black people into the still unequal economy. The main goal of the black empowerment policies was largely meant to contribute to the redistribution of wealth from whites to blacks but there have been little signs of success. Instead, the policies have been accused of even exacerbating the income inequality of South Africa by unintentionally favouring wealthy members of the black ruling elite over poorer black South Africans (BBC, 2003; Breytenbach, 2006; Seekings & Nattrass, 2005). The former leader of the Inkatha Freedom Party, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, has been one of the fiercest critics of the BEE and have likened it to a “brain drain” where educated white South Africans are being degraded or emigrate from the country due to the affirmative action while the programme has also failed at delivering for the black majority population (Mail & Guardian, 2007).

The marked-friendly reforms launched by the ANC-government has primarily been aimed at creating a business-friendly environment which has indeed contributed to increased efficiency and productivity of the economy. However, economic growth itself has rarely meant success with regards to reducing inequality and poverty (May and Meth, 2007).

South Africa still lives under the heritage of the Apartheid-era which had a deep and enduring influence on today’s inequality in the country. Apartheid

75(105)

legislation such as the Group Areas Act institutionalised policies of job reservation and influx control of black people in the white minority community (Seekings & Nattrass, 2005; Mubangizi & Mubangizi, 2005). This ensured a very limited degree of competition by blacks on the labour market and the economy as well as the unequal distribution of land and natural resources. The restrictive policies resulted in the relegation of large numbers of the black majority population to poorly paid jobs, leading to high degrees of income and wealth inequality, which was further reinforced by an unequal distribution of training and higher education (Aliber & others, 2006).

This unequal distribution of resources within South Africa was addressed as early as 1998 in an address to the Parliament by then-Deputy President Thabo Mbeki where he argued that South Africa compromised of “two nations – one black and one white”:

“…One of these nations is white, relatively prosperous… with ready access to developed economic, physical, educational, communication and other infrastructure. The second and largest nation of South Africa is black and poor… with grossly underdeveloped economic, physical, educational, communication and other infrastructure…” (Mbeki, 1998).

But since this speech was given over 20 years ago as of now, it would be interesting to see how these inequalities look like today. What is even more striking that these differences are very much illustrated also in modern-day South Africa which continues to suffer from extreme levels of income inequality and is considered to be not only one of the most unequal but the most unequal society in the entire world. According to figures from Statistics South Africa and the World Inequality Database published in 2019, it is estimated that the top 1 per cent of South African earners take home close to 20 per cent of all the income in the country, while the top 10 per cent take 65 per cent. The remaining 90 per cent of South Africans only get 35 per cent of the total income. These unequal incomes, according to the Inequality

76(105)

Trends report, remain stubbornly racialised, gendered and spatialised. White people in South Africa are more likely to find a job than blacks. And once they do, they also earn better. Female workers earned around 30% less than male workers during the same period, and workers in the countryside earned less than half of what urban workers did (Stats SA, 2019; World Inequality Database, 2019).

And it is not just with the incomes that South Africa possesses a high degree of inequality but also with regards to the distribution of wealth among the population, something that is even more staggering. A report from 2016, authored by economist Anna Orthofer found that the wealthiest 1 per cent of South Africans owns 67 per cent of the country’s wealth. The top 10 per cent owns 93 per cent and the remaining 93 per cent owns merely 7 per cent of the wealth (Orthofer, 2016).

Although the unemployment rates in South Africa dropped significantly from a top notation of 33,5 per cent in 2002 to 22,5 per cent in 2008, the country is still struggling with significantly high levels of unemployment, with rates started to go up again at the 2008 financial crisis and has since not decreased but rather increased and currently (2020) stands on almost 30 per cent (Statista, 2020).

While it is clear that the economic policies of the ANC have largely failed to increase the wealth and well-being of the vast majority of South Africans in post-apartheid South Africa, the neoliberal direction after 1994 has also resulted in political implications. The GEAR-policies were, as previously mentioned, fiercely opposed by representatives of the COSATU and the SACP, as well as civil society representatives along with more left-oriented factions of the ANC such as the Youth League and the regional faction in KwaZulu-Natal, lead by Jacob Zuma. Partly due to objections to the Mbeki administration’s handling of the HIV/Aids-crisis and foreign policy towards the increasingly authoritarian , but mainly because of the

77(105)

economic policies, the left-wing faction of the ANC staged a palace coup at the ANC National Conference in Polokwane in 2007 where Thabo Mbeki was recalled from office and Jacob Zuma elected as the leader of the ANC (Habib, 2013).

Mbeki had previously admitted that his government had not done enough to reduce poverty and reduce the inequalities in South Africa and promised more state intervention in the economy but as a matter of fact, the GEAR- policies remained largely in place (Habib, 2013).

During the presidency of Jacob Zuma, the economic policies moved further to a more state interventionist neo-Keynesian direction with a focus on investments in infrastructure, promoting tourism and small businesses, mining, industrialisation and the broadening of black empowerment. However, these policies did not result in any significant improvements in the lives of the general population. Instead, it has been marred by high levels of corruption on the highest level of government with allegations of state capture as well as a continuing economic recession and political and social instability while extreme levels of inequality remain (Habib, 2013; Habib, 2020). Furthermore, the management of state-owned companies such as Eskom, the electricity public utility, has been described as dysfunctional and in constant crisis with repeated breakdowns and planned rolling blackouts due to inefficiency and poor management (Mail & Guardian, 2018).

78(105)

The South African Economic Society compared to the arena:

Table 1.6. The South African Economic Society

Economic Society Economic Society - South Africa Economic institutions that operate * A market-based economic system under certain rules and procedures. with certain rules of state regulations Safeguarding against the potential being in place. risk of an uncontrolled market * Focus on economic growth. economy, but also against a complete * Failure to deliver prosperity and state-controlled planned economy. wealth to the majority of the South African population.

* The most unequal society in the world.

5. Concluding remarks The dismantlement of the Apartheid-system and the largely peaceful transition of South Africa from a near three-century-old racialist authoritarian state into a multi-party democracy is arguably one the most notable political transitions in modern time. In 2018, the country celebrated her 25th anniversary as a democratic state which was followed by the sixth consecutive election the following year. The South African population, regardless of colour, background, etc. was able to freely choose their representatives in an election conducted in a free and fair manner. Therefore, it is safe to refer to South Africa as a stable and established democracy, or is it? Democracy is a complex system of government that includes more than just free and fair election whereas South Africa is a very complex case. Every young and newly transformed democracy tend to suffer from different factors of weaknesses which could demonstrate themselves in way that could

79(105)

stretch far away from that specific ballot box in the high school gymnasium in Durban. It is about the maturation, the consolidation of the democratic system that constitutes the real factor from which one can discern the real face of the political system.

This study aimed to provide an answer to the question of whether today’s post-apartheid South Africa is a consolidated democracy by using the five consolidation areans as defined by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan; civil society, political society, judiciary, bureaucratic society and economic society.

The study was conducted in the manners of a case study in which different theories of democratic consolidation were used. By applying the five consolidation arenas onto the case of South Africa and present her respective strengths and weaknesses within these areas, the analysis was conducted to reach the aim.

First, the analysis shows that civil society has played a significant role in the history of South Africa, especially regarding the struggle against the Apartheid-system when many formal opposition parties and movements were officially banned. There can be no doubt that civil society has continued and continues to play a very important role also in the post-apartheid era of South Africa. It is quite clear that this arena possesses a significant amount of strength as seen from a legal and constitutional point of view. The civil society has also, on repeated occasions, been able to show its strength towards the ruling power in a way which could undoubtedly be described as the safeguarding of its arena, something which was especially demonstrated in connection with the HIV/Aids-crisis in the country as well as fighting corruption.

However, it is also important to highlight the fact that the civil society in South Africa does not function completely without obstacles. The trust among South African remains on a low-level which is a worrying sign the

80(105)

functioning of civil society. There have been some examples of increased scrutiny and pressure from state authorities upon the civil society, as well as from political parties, organisations and other individuals. This is something that has become more evident during the latter half of the 2000s. But in the end, the most important observation about this arena is that it could still be argued to stand strong in the face of state repression, considering that the external pressure often seems to halt at threats or proposed actions rather than real action itself. This supposed repression cannot be compared with the Apartheid-era either. This is even more evident when one is investigating the significance of what actors of the civil society have achieved and continues to achieve in post-Apartheid South Africa.

Secondly, there can be no doubt that South Africa is a country with a strong system of institutionalised democracy which includes regular and competitive elections that could be defined as free and fair. The ANC remains a very dominant political force and has ruled South Africa in its own right since the first democratic elections in 1994. Generally speaking, the party still seems to mostly act within the principles of parliamentary democracy and institutional arrangements. This does also applies to other political parties and individuals with the South African Parliament containing a diverse number of political forces, many of them sharply critical towards the ANC. Although a political transition is yet to take place on a national level, democratic transitions following elections are not unheard of and have taken place on several occasions on a local and provincial level where the ANC has peacefully surrendered the power. South Africa should also be commended for her independent institutions that exist to safeguard democracy that has repeatedly demonstrated their abilities to act independently, which has not seldom resulted in holding the ruling power to account.

81(105)

But at the same time, there can also be no doubts that there are serious challenges to the arena of political society in South Africa. The occasional lukewarm respect for the rule of law and the apparent undermining of constitutional arrangements by dominant political actors are findings that only can be classified as serious. Although the judiciary has demonstrated itself as a guardian of the constitutional procedures in South Africa, especially through several legal challenges brought forward by opposition parties, this itself also constitutes a very disturbing finding in its own right, namely that it seemingly has become a task of the judicial system to make sure that opposition voices can be heard and thereby becoming a form of a forced political actor. Checks and balances do exist but tend to have been undermined due to the lack of respect for their decisions.

There are also serious questions regarding the public trust in the entire democratic system due to the high levels of societal disillusion which may be classified as form a failure of the regime type. Inflammatory statements and threats of violence also tend to occur quite frequently from across the political spectrum in South Africa. Therefore, it could well be argued that parts of this arena are consolidated but due to the disturbing findings of the undermining of constitutional arrangements and poor governance.

Third, speaking about the judicial arena, it is possible to conclude that South Africa could well be considered as a state where the rule of law is generally practised and respected. Through its legal and constitutional frameworks, South Africa has established a robust court system which largely seems to ensure the independence of the judiciary. The judicial system has on frequent occasions ruled against the ruling party and also safeguarded human rights and civil liberties of the people. The main concern when it comes to judicial independence in South Africa seems to find at the JSC which has been accused of political bias while not fulfilling its constitutional obligations. The fact that the body is also under significant influence of the national

82(105)

executive should be considered as a source of concern along with the fact that the President himself has the exclusive right to appoint the highest judicial posts in the country without consideration. Political attacks directed at the judiciary for a variance of reasons are also subjects of great concern. It is also a worrying sign that it has been argued that the judiciary itself is considered, although unwittingly, a political actor due to the dominant-party system in South Africa and that it does not seems to be a natural law that decisions by the courts are always well-respected in practice. But I would nevertheless conclude with the finding that the threats against the independence and impartialness of the South African judiciary, to this date, seems to be mostly limited to words and allegations rather than real direct and concrete threats since the judiciary nonetheless has demonstrated its absolute ability to act both impartially and independently.

Fourth, the state of the South African bureaucratic society could perhaps fairly be described as a situation where “pockets of excellence” exists within a largely dysfunctional state. The efficiency of certain Chapter Nine Institutions, such as the Public Protector, and their role in upholding democracy in South Africa should not be underestimated, nor should the effectiveness of the Treasury and the SARS, but they mainly seem to be limited to the mentioned “pockets”. The South African state seems to instead suffer from a form of “institutionalised weakness” with several large, dysfunctional state institutions, often occupied by unqualified people and marred by corruption where a small elite tend to be enriched. This is not, per definition, very different from Apartheid when it was the case with the white minority. One positive aspect is notwithstanding that the problems with corruption and dysfunctionality are recognised by the government and certain state institutions which has resulted in improvements and accountability such as criminal charges and resignations. It is also important to mention that the South African government has proved itself to be able to

83(105)

use the full power of the state apparatuses to control its territory but this does not take away the fact that the state itself does not function accordingly.

Fifth, the South African economic society is arguably the most complex of all the five arenas of this study. If one is to look at the formal criteria of this arena, South Africa does indeed have a functioning economic society and the policies of the ANC-governments since 1994 have all been characterised by a modern market-based economy. In 1994, the South African economy was in disarray and desperate need of rebuilding which resulted in the main focus on economic growth and the reduction of inflation. A series of economic programmes, which all could be defined as neoliberal, were launched and contributed to the fact that the South African economy experienced rapid growth during the 2000s with shrinking unemployment rates. Some policies, such as the BEE, has also been introduced to increase the empowerment of the black majority population on the earlier white-dominated economic arena. What is then an extremely disturbing pattern is that these economic policies have mainly failed to create a more prosperous and wealthy society for the majority of the South African population. While the economy has grown, the policies have been more or less focused only on economic growth rather the reduction of poverty within the country. The economic policies have instead seemingly lead to the enrichment of a small top-elite while the majority of the population has not benefitted anywhere near as much. During the recent decade, the South African economy has performed badly with little or no growth, consistently rising unemployment rates, corruption and dysfunctional state enterprises. But what is perhaps the most worrying fact, in this case, is that South Africa is considered to be the world’s most unequal society with an extremely unequal distribution of national wealth and resources. Since the presence of widespread poverty and a poor economic state have proven to be risk factors for the continuing existence and

84(105)

consolidation of democracy, this cannot be seen as any other than a source of great concern.

South Africa seems to be stuck in a situation where the transformation that began in the 1990s never really consolidated itself and instead continues to suffer from structural problems of stagnation and a form of democratic fatigue among the population that seems to be hard to overcome.

So is it fair to say that today’s South Africa is a consolidated democracy or has the Rainbow Nation faded? Based on the findings in this study, it is undoubtedly true that the judiciary is consolidated due to its efficiency and independence. The civil society and the political society can indeed be defined as consolidated with some reservations, while the bureaucratic society and economic society only possess a few aspects of consolidation. This means that South Africa best can be described as a partly consolidated democracy.

The country faces some serious challenges, especially through the continuing existence of a dominant party in combination with lack of societal trust, enormous inequality and the presence of violence across society, but also when it comes to the interaction and respect of the consolidation arenas. At the same time, any signs of serious threatening challenges to the democratic system itself have yet to be identified, meaning that democracy can be said to be “the only game in town” in South Africa. Future challenges to this fact cannot be ruled out, however.

Thus, the question about the fading of the Rainbow Nation is perhaps better posed as: did the rainbow ever shine at all?

85(105)

6. Reference list: Literature: * Basson, Adriaan & Du Toit, Pierre (2017). Enemy of the People: How Jacob Zuma stole South Africa and how the people fought back. Jonathan Ball Publishers, Johannesburg & , South Africa.

* Bourdieu, P (2000). Pascalian Meditations. Cambridge, Polity Press.

* Bunting, Brian (1964). The Rise of the South African Reich. Penguin Books.

* Calland, Richard (2013). The Zuma Years: South Africa’s Changing Face of Power. Zebra Press, Cape Town, South Africa.

* Chipkin, Ivor & Swilling, Mark (2018). Shadow State: The Politics of State Capture. Wits University Press, Johannesburg.

* Creswell, J. W. (2014). Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

* Corder, Hugh, Frederico, Veronica & Orrù, Romano (2014). The Quest for Constitutionalism – South Africa since 1994. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, London, United Kingdom.

* de Klerk, Willem (1991). F. W. de Klerk: The Man in his Time. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers.

* Di Palma, Giuseppe (1990). To Craft Democracies. An Essay on Democratic Transitions. Oxford: University of California Press Ltd.

* Diamond, Larry (2008). The Spirit of Democracy – The Struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout the World. Holt Paperbacks, New York City.

* Ejvegård, Rolf. 2009 Vetenskaplig Metod. 4. ed. Lund: Studentlitteratur, Print.

86(105)

* Esaiasson, Peter, Gilljam, Mikael, Oscarsson, Henrik, E. Towns, Ann & Wängnerud, Lena. (2017). Metodpraktikan: konsten att studera samhälle, individ och marknad. Femte Upplagan. ed. Stockholm: Wolters Kluwer, Print.

* Edwards, Rosalind & Holland, Janet (2013). What is Qualitative Interviewing? London, GB. Bloomsbury Academic.

* George, Alexander L., Bennett, Andrew (2005) Center for Science International Affairs. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. Cambridge. Mass; London: MIT, Print. BCSIA Studies in International Security.

* Gunther. R.P., Diamandouros. N. and Puhle. H.J. (Eds.). (1995). The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective. Baltimore, the Johns Hopkins University Press.

* Habib, Adam (2013). South Africa's Suspended Revolution. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, United States.

* Hearpfer, Christian & Kizilova, Ksenyia (2019). Chapter 21: Post- Communist Central and Eastern Europe & Chapter 22: Post-Soviet Eurasia. In Democratization, Oxford University Press.

* Huntington, Samuel P. (1991). The Third Wave - Democratization in the late twentieth century. University of Oklahoma Press, United States.

* Linz, Juan & Stepan, Alfred (1996). Problems of Democratic Consolidation – Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland, United States.

* Leftwich, Adrian (2000). States of Development: On the Primacy of Politics in Development. Polity Press, United States.

87(105)

* Malan, Koos (2019). There is no supreme constitution: a critique of statist- individualist constitutionalism. African Sun Press, Cape Town, South Africa.

* Manzo, K. A. (1996). Creating Boundaries: The Politics of Race and Nation. London, Lynne Reiner Publishers.

* Markoff, John & Burridge, Daniel (2009). The Global Wave of Democratization. Chapter 6 in Democratization, 2009. Oxford University Press, United Kingdom.

* Meredith, M. (1988). In the Name of Apartheid. London: Hamish Hamilton.

* Nattrass, Nicoli (1992). The ANC's Economic Policy: A Critical Perspective. Robert Schrire (eds.) Wealth or Poverty? Critical Choices for South Africa, pp. 623-634, Cape Town and London: Oxford University Press.

* Putnam, Robert (1993). Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, United States.

* Przeworski, A., 1991. Democracy and the market: political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

* Roherty, James Michael (1992). State security in South Africa: civil- military relations under P.W. Botha. M.E. Sharpe.

* Seekings, Jeremy & Nattrass, Nicoli (2005). Class, Race, and Inequality in South Africa. New Haven: Yale University Press, United States.

* Schmupeter, Joseph (1942). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Routledge; 1st edition, 2006.

88(105)

* Thomas, Scott (1995). The Diplomacy of Liberation: The Foreign Relations of the ANC Since 1960. London: Tauris Academic Studies. pp. 202–210.

* Southall, Roger (2013). Liberation Movements in Power: Party and State in Southern Africa. Scottsville, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, South Africa.

* Thomas, Gary (2011). How to Do Your Case Study: A Guide for Students and Researchers. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, Print.

Venter, Roxan, 2017. Chapter 4: The Legal System and the Judiciary in Government and Politics in South Africa. Editors: Landsberg, Chris & Graham, Suzanne. Published by Van Schaik Publishers, Pretoria, South Africa.

* Welzel, Christian (2009). Theories of Democratization. Chapter 2 in Democratization, 2009. Oxford University Press, United Kingdom.

* Yin, Robert K. (2014). Case Study Research Design and Methods (5th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

* Yin, Robert, K. (1981). The Case Study Crisis: Some Answers. Administrative Science Quarterly, 26(1), pp.58–65. Available at: [https://www.jstor.org/stable/2392599?seq=1]

Scientific articles: * Ackermann, L. W. (2006). Constitutional Comparativism in South Africa. South African Law Journal, 123(3), p-497.

* Aliber, Michael, Kirsten, Marié, Maharajh, Rasigan, Nhlapo-Hlope, Josephilda & Nkoane, Oupa (2006). Overcoming Underdevelopment in South Africa's Second Economy. Development Southern Africa (Sandton, South Africa) 23.1 (2006): 45-61.

89(105)

Banerjee, A. (2012). Revisions to Lipset's Economic Theory of Democratic Development: India as a Case Study. Cornell International Affairs Review, 6. Available: http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/a?id=1210 Accessed: 2020-12-19.

* Breytenbach, W.J. (2006). The Presidencies of Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki Compared: Implications for the Consolidation of Democracy in South Africa. Africa Insight, 36(3&4): 173-185.

* Carothers, Thomas (2002). The end of the transition paradigm. Journal of Democracy, vol. 13, no. 1, s. 5-21. Accessed: 2020-10-01.

* De Juan, Alexander, Wegner, Eva (2019). Social Inequality, State-centered Grievances, and Protest: Evidence from South Africa. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 2019;63(1):31-58.

* Diamond, Larry. (1994). Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation. Journal of Democracy 5(3), 4-17.

* Dreijmanis, John (2000). Is South Africa a Consolidated or a Defective Democracy? Il Politico 65, no. 2 (193) (2000): 209-28. Accessed: 2020-11- 20. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/24005477.

* Endoh, Fabrice Tambe (2015). Democratic constitutionalism in post- apartheid South Africa: the interim constitution revisited. Africa Review, 7:1, 67-79.

* Erskine, Daniel H. (2008). Judgments of the United States Supreme Court and the South African Constitutional Court as a Basis for a Universal Method to Resolve Conflicts Between Fundamental Rights. Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development, Volume 22, Issue 3, Winter 2008. Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://en.wi

90(105)

kipedia.org/&httpsredir=1&article=1071&context=jcred. Accessed: 2020- 10-19.

* Foley, Michael W. & Edwards, Bob (1996) The Paradox of Civil Society. Journal of Democracy 7, no. 3 (1996): 38–52.

* Gashago, Daniela & Ngoasheng, Asanda (2017). South Africa’s ‘rainbow nation’ is a myth that students need to unlearn. The Conversation, 2016.

* Habib, Adam (2005). State-Civil Society Relations in Post-Apartheid South Africa. Social Research, FALL 2005, Vol. 72, No. 3, South Africa: The Second Decade (FALL 2005), pp. 671-692.

* Haggard, S., & Kaufman, R.R. (1994). The Challenges of Consolidation. Journal of Democracy 5(4), 5-16.

* Heywood, Mark (Editor) (2020) The transformative power of civil society in South Africa: an activist’s perspective on innovative forms of organizing and rights-based practices. Globalizations, 17:2, 294-316.

* Heywood, Mark (2009). South Africa's Treatment Action Campaign: Combining Law and Social Mobilization to Realize the Right to Health. Journal of human rights practice, 1(1), pp.14–36.

* Huntington, Samuel P (1996). Democracy for the Long Haul. Journal of Democracy 7, no. 2: 3–13.

* Kopstein, J., & Reilly, D. (2000). Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the Postcommunist World. World Politics, 53(1), 1-37.

* Labuschagne, Pieter (2017). Patronage, State Capture and Oligopolistic Monopoly in South Africa: The Slide from a Weak to a Dysfunctional State? Acta Academica (Bloemfontein, South Africa) 49.2 (2017): Acta Academica (Bloemfontein, South Africa), 2017, Vol.49 (2).

91(105)

* Lehman, H.P. (2008). The emergence of civil society organizations in South Africa. Journal of public affairs, 8(1‐2), pp.115–127.

* Lipset, Seymour Martin (1959). Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. American Political Science Review. 53 (March): 69-105.

* Malan, Koos (2017). Reassessing Judicial Independence and Impartiality against the Backdrop of Judicial Appointments in South Africa. Potchefstroom electronic law journal, 17(5), p.2040.

* McMichael, Christopher (2016). Police wars and state repression in South Africa. Journal of Asian and African Studies. 2016;51(1):3-16.

* Mafunisa, Mutuwafhethu John (2004). The role of civil society in promoting good governance in the Republic of South Africa. International Review of Administrative Sciences, SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi) Vol 70(3):489–496.

* May, Julian & Meth, Charles (2007). Dualism or Underdevelopment in South Africa: What Does a Quantitative Assessment of Poverty, Inequality and Employment Reveal? Development Southern Africa (Sandton, South Africa) 24.2 (2007): 271-87.

* Mubangizi, J.C. & Mubangizi, B.C. (2005). Poverty, Human Rights Law and Socio-Economic Realities in South Africa. Development South Africa, 22(2): 277-289.

* O’Donnell, Guillermo (1996). Illusions About Consolidation. Journal of Democracy 7, no. 2: 34–51.

* O’Donnell, Guillermo. Democratic Consolidation–Debate: Illusions and Conceptual Flaws. Journal of Democracy 7, no. 4 (1996): 160–68.

92(105)

* Posel, Deborah (1999). Whiteness and Power in the South African Civil Service: Paradoxes of the Apartheid State. Journal of Southern African Studies, 25(1), pp.99–119.

* Przeworski, Adam, Alvarez, Michael, Antonio Cheibub, José & Limongi, Fernando. What Makes Democracies Endure? Journal of Democracy 7, no. 1 (1996): 39–55.

* Runciman, Carin (2017). The 'ballot and the brick': protest, voting and non-voting in post-apartheid South Africa. Journal of contemporary African studies, 34(4), pp.419–436.

* Schedler, Andreas (2001) Measuring Democratic Consolidation. St Comp Int Dev 36, 66–92.

* Schenoni, Luis L. & Mainwaring, Scott (2019) US hegemony and regime change in Latin America, Democratization, 26:2, 269-287.

* Schneider, Ben Ross (1995). Democratic Consolidations: Some Broad Comparisons and Sweeping Arguments. Latin American Research Review, 30(2), pp.215–234.

* Schrire, Robert (1986) South Africa: Bureaucracy and the process of reform. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 5:1-2, 145-164.

* Siyo, L & Mubangizi, J.C (2015). The independence of South African judges: a constitutional and legislative perspective. Potchefstroom electronic law journal, 18(4), pp.816–846.

* Southall, Roger (October 1981). "African Affairs". 321. 80 (321): 453–481.

* Southall Roger (2019). Polarization in South Africa: Toward Democratic Deepening or Democratic Decay? The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 2019;681(1):194-208.

93(105)

* van Themaat, H. ver Loren (1954). Legislative Supremacy in the . UWALawRw 6; (1954) 3(1) University of Western Australia Law Review 59. Available at: http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UWALawRw/1954/6.html. Accessed: 2020-12-10.

* von Holdt, Karl (2010) Nationalism, Bureaucracy and the Developmental State: The South African Case. South African Review of Sociology, 41:1, 4- 27.

* von Holdt, Karl (2013). South Africa: the transition to violent democracy. Review of African Political Economy, 40:138, 589-604

Newspaper articles: * British Broadcasting Cooperation (1990). De Klerk dismantles apartheid in South Africa. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/2/newsid_2524000/ 2524997.stm Accessed: 2020-09-20.

* British Broadcasting Cooperation (1992). South Africa votes for change. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/18/newsid_2524000/2 524695.stm Accessed: 2020-09-20.

* British Broadcasting Cooperation (2003). Is black economic empowerment working? Article by Richard Hamilton. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3262123.stm. Accessed: 2020-12-10.

* Buccus, Imraan (2020). The EFF is a direct threat to our democracy. Opinion article in the Daily Maverick, 14th September 2020. Available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2020-09-14-the-eff-is-a-direct- threat-to-our-democracy/. Accessed: 2020-11-20.

94(105)

* City Press, News24 (2019). The private sector must come to SA’s growth party. Article by Hlengani Mathebula. Available at: https://www.news24.com/citypress/Business/the-private-sector-must-come- to-sas-growth-party-20191206. Accessed: 2020-12-15.

* De Waal, Mandy (2012). Jacob Zuma and the second transition: The print media. Daily Maverick, 18th June 2012. Available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-06-18-jacob-zuma-and-the- second-transition-the-print-media/. Access date: 2020-09-29.

* The Economist (2007). The Long Journey of a Young Democracy. 382(8518): pp. 32-33. Available: https://www.economist.com/briefing/2007/03/01/the-long-journey-of-a- young-democracy. Accessed: 2020-12-10.

* ECNA, 6 April 2016. Zuma's violation of the constitution was not serious – Mthembu. The article can be found at https://www.enca.com/south- africa/zumas-violation-constitution-was-not-serious-mthembu. Accessed: 2020-11-10.

* ENCA, 31 March 2016. Our support for Zuma remains unshaken, says ANC Women's League. The article can be found at https://www.enca.com/south-africa/our-support-zuma-remains-unshaken- anc-womens-league Accessed: 2020-12-02.

* Heywood, Mark (2017) Fighting for truth, fighting against lies: civil society, media and public activism. Daily Maverick, 15th August 2017.

* Mail & Guardian (2007). Buthelezi slams affirmative action. Article published on 1st February 2007. Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20070927215102/http://www.mg.co.za/articlepa ge.aspx?area=%2Fbreaking_news%2Fbreaking_news__national%2F&article id=297671 Accessed: 2020-12-14.

95(105)

* Mail & Guardian (2011). Burn down Mandela Bay newspaper, cries ex-PE mayor. Article published on 20th May 2011. Available at: https://mg.co.za/article/2011-05-20-burn-down-mandela-bay-newspaper- cries-expe-mayor/. Accessed: 2020-09-19.

* Mail & Guardian (2018). Eskom has a problem, a R20-billion problem. Article by Tshwane, Tebogo. Published: 12th January 2018. Available at: https://mg.co.za/article/2018-01-12-00-eskom-has-a-problem-a-r20-billion- problem/. Accessed: 2020-11-15.

* Maughan, Karyn (2020). Zuma says state capture inquiry is a 'political project' against him. Article in News24, 17th December 2020. Available at: https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/zuma-says-state-capture- inquiry-is-a-political-project-against-him-20201217. Accessed: 2020-12-22.

* New York Times (1992). SOUTH AFRICAN WHITES RATIFY DE KLERK'S MOVE TO NEGOTIATE WITH BLACKS ON A NEW ORDER, article by S. Wren, Christopher. Accessed: 2020-10-10.

* Quintal, Genevieve (2016). Parliament must deal with 'state capture' – DA. Article in News24, 27th March 2016. Available at: https://www.news24.com/news24/SouthAfrica/Politics/parliament-must- deal-with-state-capture-da-20160327. Accessed: 2020-11-28.

* Rice, Catherine (2011). Zimbabwe applications will take 2 years to process. Article in EyeWitness News, 3rd January 2011. Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20111008203500/http://www.eyewitnessnews.c o.za/articleprog.aspx?id=56145. Accessed: 2020-12-01.

* Saville, Meggan (2013). Malema launches his Economic Freedom Fighters. Article in Dispatch Online, 12th July 2013. Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20130725200305/http://www.dispatch.co.za/mal ema-launches-his-economic-freedom-fighters/#comments. Accessed: 2020-11-30.

96(105)

* Sakuneka, Michael (2011). Getting an ID book a struggle. Article in The Sowetan, 5th January 2011. Available at: https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2011-01-05-getting-an-id-book-a- struggle/. Accessed: 2020-12-10.

* The Sowetan (2016). Full statement by Deputy Finance Minister Mcebisi Jonas on Gupta job offer. Available at: https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2016-03-16-full-statement-by-deputy- finance-minister-mcebisi-jonas-on-gupta-job-offer/. Accessed: 2020-10-15.

* Steinhauser, Gabriele (2019). South Africa’s Former President Offers Fiery Defense In Corruption Probe. Article in the Wall Street Journal, 15th July 2019. Available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/south-africas-former- president-offers-fiery-defense-in-corruption-probe-11563201685. Accessed: 2020-11-03.

* Spector, J. Brooks (2016). When Judges make history: Earl Warren and Mogoeng Mogoeng. Daily Maverick, 4th April 2016. Available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-04-04-when-judges-make- history-earl-warren-and-mogoeng-mogoeng/. Accessed: 2020-11-25.

* The Washington Post (2012). South African police open fire as striking miners charge, killing and wounding workers. Available at https://web.archive.org/web/20120817062827/http://www.washingtonpost.co m/business/south-african-police-open-fire-on-striking-mine-workers-several- injured/2012/08/16/c9c99e3c-e7ad-11e1-9739-eef99c5fb285_story.html. Accessed: 2020-11-11.

* Mkhwanazi, Siyabonga (2017). Mahlobo reignites debate on party funding. IOL, 16th May 2017. Available: https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/mahlobo-reignites-debate-on-party- funding-9174678. Accessed: 2020-10-01.

97(105)

Video sources: * Kino Library Archive (2013). 1980s South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha on Nelson Mandela. Available via: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=89tvzIU0BCY Accessed: 2020-09-20.

* South African Broadcasting Cooperation News (2020). SA’s Future | What will save the country from the political and economic abyss: Prof. Adam Habib. Available via: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aV9eIgympls Accessed: 2020-12-01.

Websites: * Cambridge Dictionary, 2020. Consolidation. Available at https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/consolidation. Accessed: 2020-03-02.

* Judicial Service Commission (2020). About the JSC. Available at https://www.judiciary.org.za/index.php/judicial-service-commission/about- the-jsc. Accessed: 2020-11-30.

* The Nelson Mandela Foundation – Nelson Mandela: The Presidential Years (2020). 6.3 Relationship between the executive and the judiciary. Quote by Mandela, 1998. Available at: https://tpy.nelsonmandela.org/pages/part-ii-governing/theme-6-the-president- and-the-constitution/6-3-relationship-between-the-executive-and-the- judiciary. Accessed: 2020-11-20.

* Right2Know-campaign (2015). Spy report laughable – R2K. Public comment by Busi Mtabane, published on October 19th 2015. Available at https://www.r2k.org.za/2015/10/19/spy-report-laughable-r2k/ Accessed: 2020-11-09.

98(105)

* Parliamentary Monitoring Group (2018). Judicial Commission of Inquiry Into Allegations of State Capture. Available at: https://pmg.org.za/call-for- comment/694/ Accessed: 2020-12-02.

* Rolling Alpha (2017). Who Pays South Africa’s tax? The 2017 edition. Available at: http://www.rollingalpha.com/2017/10/26/who-pays-south- africas-tax-the-2017-edition/. Accessed: 2020-11-30.

* South African History Online, 2020. A History of Apartheid in South Africa. Available at https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid- south-africa. Accessed: 2020-09-29.

* World Inequality Database (2020). Wealth Inequality, South Africa, 1993- 2017. Available at https://wid.world/country/south-africa/ Accessed: 2020-11-20.

Publications: * African National Congress (1994), The Reconstruction and Development Programme: A Policy Framework, Johannesburg: Umanyano Publications.

* Busch, Gary K. (2013). Zuma and Zulu nationalism: A response to Gumede. Article in Pambazuka News, 16th January 2013. Available at: https://www.pambazuka.org/pan-africanism/zuma-and-zulu-nationalism- response-gumede. Accessed: 2020-11-20.

* Ben Barka, Habiba & Ncube, Mthuli (2012). African Development Bank. Political Fragility in Africa: Are Military Coups d’Etat a Never-Ending Phenomenon? Available at: https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Econo mic%20Brief%20- %20Political%20Fragility%20in%20Africa%20Are%20Military%20Coups %20d%E2%80%99Etat%20a%20Never%20Ending%20Phenomenon.pdf Accessed: 2020-10-27.

99(105)

* The Constitutional Court of South Africa (2016). Cases CCT 143/15 and CCT 171/15. Judgement in case of Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others; Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others [2016]. The full judgement can be accessed via http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2016/11.pdf. Accessed: 2020-10-28.

* The Constitutional Court of South Africa (1995). Case No. CCT/3/94. In the matter of THE STATE versus T MAKWANYANE AND M MCHUNU. Full judgment: http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/1995/3.pdf. Accessed: 2020-11-28.

* Consitution of the Republic of South Africa (promulgated in 1996). Full legal text available at https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/images/a108- 96.pdf. Accessed: 2020-11-02.

* Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (2019). The South African 2019 National and Provincial Elections: A Post-Election Review. Available at https://eisa.org/pdf/sou2019erc0.pdf. Accessed: 2020-10-20.

* Gorokhovskaia, Yana (2017). Democratic consolidation. In Oxford bibliographies in political science, ed. L. Sandy Maisel. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/OBO/9780199756223-0224. Accessed: 2020-09-20.

* Guemede, William (2018). 19. 25 years later, South African civil society still battling the government in people’s interests. Full article at Civicus: https://www.civicus.org/index.php/media-resources/news/civicus-at- 25/3531-25-years-later-south-african-civil-society-still-battling-government- in-people-s-interests. Accessed: 2020-10-10.

* Independent Electoral Commission (2019). 2019 National and Provincial Election Report. Available at: http://www.elections.org.za/content/default.aspx. Accessed: 2020-11-20.

100(105)

* Institute for Security Studies (2013). Prospects for Africa’s 26 fragile countries. By Jakkie Cilliers & Timothy D. Sisk. Published: 14th October 2013. Available: https://issafrica.org/research/papers/prospects-for-africas- 26-fragile-countries. Accessed: 2020-11-20.

* Kauffman, Craig M. (2018). Britannica. Democratization. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/democratization. Accessed: 2020-11-01.

* Langa, D.P. (2000). Judgement in Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others In re: Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others v Smit NO and Others (CCT1/00) [2000] ZACC 12; 2000 (10) BCLR 1079; 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) (25 August 2000). Constitutional Court of South Africa. Full judgement: http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2000/12.pdf. Accessed: 2020-12-02.

* Law Society of South Africa (2012). Address by Justice Arthur Chaskalson to the Cape Law Society on 9 November 2012. Available at: http://www.derebus.org.za/address-by-justice-arthur-chaskalson-to-the-cape- law-society-on-9-november-2012/. Access date: 2020-10-20.

* Mbeki, Thabo (1998). Statement of Deputy President Thabo Mbeki at the Opening of the Debate in the National Assembly, on “Reconciliation and Nation Building”, National Assembly Cape Town, 29 May 1998. Full speech available via http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/1998/mbek0529.htm Accessed: 2020-11-15.

* North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria (2017). Case No: 91139/2016 - President of the Republic of South Africa v Office of the Public Protector and Others. Full judgment available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2017/747.pdf. Accessed: 2020-12-02.

101(105)

* Orthofer, Anna (2016). Wealth Inequality in South Africa: Evidence from Survey and Tax Data. From the Research Project on Employment, Income Distribution & Inclusive Growth – REDI3x3. & National Treasury. Available at http://www.redi3x3.org/sites/default/files/Orthofer%202016%20REDI3x3% 20Working%20Paper%2015%20-%20Wealth%20inequality.pdf Accessed: 2020-12-20.

* Pelcher, H (2020). South Africa: Unemployment rate from 1999 to 2020. In Statista, release date: October 2020. Available at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/370516/unemployment-rate-in-south- africa/ Accessed: 2020-12-20.

* Public Protector Act 23 (1994). Government Gazette, No. 16107. Full law can be accessed via https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/act23of1994.p df. Accessed: 2020-12-20.

* Public Protector (2013). Report No: 25 of 2013/14 – Secure in comfort. Full report: https://dc.sourceafrica.net/documents/8074-final-report- 21h00.html. Accessed: 2020-12-01.

* Public Protector (2016). Report No: 6 of 2016/17 – State of capture. Full report: https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/2019-05/329756252- state-of-capture-14-october-2016.pdf. Accessed: 2020-12-01.

* Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, 1961. Full legal text available at https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Republic_of_South_Africa_Constitution_Act, _1961. Accessed: 2020-10-10.

* Rivera, Fernando Moncada (2018). World Finance. Cuba’s economic liberalisation remains a distant prospect. Available at https://www.worldfinance.com/strategy/government-policy/leadership-

102(105)

change-will-not-bring-immediate-economic-liberalisation-to-cuba Accessed: 2020-10-10.

* Siyo, Lunga Khanya (2012). Judicial Independence in South Africa: A Constitutional Perspective. Master thesis conducted at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Available at: https://researchspace.ukzn.ac.za/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10413/9769/Siyo_L unga_Khanya_2012.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. Accessed: 2020-12-01.

* Statistics South Africa (2019). Inequality Trends in South Africa: A Multidimensional Diagnostic of Inequality, 2017. Full publication available via http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-03-10-19/Report-03-10- 192017.pdf. Accessed: 2020-11-02.

* Vavi, Zwelinzima (2012). The indispensable role of progressive civil society. COSATU General Secretary, Zwelinzima Vavi’s, opening address to the National Congress in Tembisa on 8 July 2012. Publication available: https://www.groundup.org.za/article/indispensable- role-progressive-civil-society/. Accessed: 2020-09-20.

Interview appendix: * Prof. Runciman, Carin. Associate professor, Centre for Social Change; Department of Sociology, University of Johannesburg, South Africa. Interview conducted and recorded via Zoom on October 30th 2020.

* Dr De Jager, Nicola. Senior lecturer at the Department of Political Science, Stellenbosch University, South Africa. Interview conducted and recorded via Zoom on 10th November 2020.

* Prof. Piper, Laurence. Professor and Head of the Department of Political Studies at the University of the Western Cape, South Africa. Interview conducted and recorded via Zoom on 12th November 2020.

103(105)

* Dr Croucamp, Piet. Senior Lecturer, Political Studies and International Relations, Vanderbijlpark Campus, North-West University, South Africa. Interview conducted and recorded via Zoom on 26th November 2020.

* Dr Heydenrych, Pieter. Lecturer, Political Studies and International Relations, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa. Interview conducted and recorded via Zoom on 2nd December 2020 (first interview)

* Prof. Habib, Adam. Professor of Political Science. Professor of political geography. Director of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London as of 1 January 2021. Former Vice-Chancellor and Principal, University of Witwatersrand, South Africa. Interview conducted and recorded via Zoom on 8th December 2020.

* Dr Heydenrych, Pieter. Lecturer, Political Studies and International Relations, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa. Interview conducted and recorded via Zoom on 8th December 2020 (second interview)

* Prof. J. van der Elst, Herman. Associate Professor, Political Studies and International Relations, Vanderbijlpark Campus, North-West University, South Africa. Interview conducted and recorded via Zoom on 9th January 2021.

104(105)

105(105)

1(1)