Judith and Sidney Swartz Director and Professor of Politics ISIS in : What We Get Wrong and Shai Feldman

Associate Director Why 2015 Is Not 2007 Redux Kristina Cherniahivsky

Charles (Corky) Goodman Professor David Siddhartha Patel of History and Associate Director for Research Naghmeh Sohrabi

Senior Fellow n September 10, 2014, President Barack Obama outlined Abdel Monem Said Aly, PhD Othe inchoate U.S. strategy to “degrade and ultimately Goldman Senior Fellow destroy the terrorist group known as ISIL [the Islamic State Khalil Shikaki, PhD in Iraq and the Levant, also known as ISIS or the Islamic Myra and Robert Kraft Professor 1 of Arab Politics State].” At the core of that strategy, in both Iraq and , is Eva Bellin a systematic campaign of air strikes against ISIS, coupled with Henry J. Leir Professor of the support for local “partner forces” fighting ISIS on the ground. Economics of the Middle East Nader Habibi Subsequent analysis and policy attention have focused largely on the campaign in Syria. This is partly due to the challenge Sylvia K. Hassenfeld Professor of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies of identifying effective local partner forces in the midst of the Kanan Makiya complex Syrian civil war. But it is also because U.S. policy Neubauer Junior Research Fellow Sarah El-Kazaz, PhD makers tend to believe that they understand Iraq, after having occupied the country for more than eight years. Junior Research Fellows Hikmet Kocamaner, PhD Asher Orkaby, PhD I argue that several assumptions or conventional understandings that are David Siddhartha Patel, PhD guiding U.S. intervention in Iraq are incorrect or, at best, incomplete, in ways Jean-Louis Romanet Perroux that make the emerging strategy against ISIS unlikely to be successful. These include assumptions about the nature of the insurgency, the conditions under which Iraqi tribes might turn against ISIS, and the relationship between Sunni and the Iraqi government. These assumptions are reinforced in Washington by people with experience in Iraq during the occupation. But successfully countering ISIS in Iraq requires understanding its complex relationship with the Sunni Arab community and recognizing that strategies that worked to reduce violence in 2007–8 might not succeed today. January 2015 No. 87 This Brief explores three assumptions about ISIS in Iraq that are common in the media and in Washington policy circles and undergird the developing American-led strategy. They are: 1. ISIS is foreign to Iraq, and ideological fissures will splinter the current alliance of convenience between Islamists and secular Baathist insurgents; 2. ISIS is so extreme that it will inevitably alienate Sunni Arabs living under its rule; and 3. Iraq has formed a more inclusive government in order to reach out to Sunni Arabs.

The Brief examines the origin of each assumption in the American experience of occupation and considers why each is no longer correct, if it ever was. It concludes with a discussion of how these problematic assumptions have shaped American strategy for identifying additional local partner forces who might, with air support, take and hold territory from ISIS.

Assumption #1: ISIS is foreign to Iraq, and ideological fissures will splinter the current alliance of convenience between Islamists and secular Baathist insurgents.

ISIS developed out of a string of predecessor insurgent organizations that operated in Iraq between 2003 and 2013, most notably “al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers,” commonly known as AQI.2 Although Iraqis over time increasingly filled the cadres of AQI, the organization’s leadership and early fighters were largely non-Iraqi Arabs, including its most well-known leaders, the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (d. 2006) and the Egyptian Abu Ayyub al- Masri (d. 2010), as well as the leaders of the wider al-Qaeda network.

During the occupation, counterinsurgent analysts typically distinguished between violent Islamist groups in Iraq, including AQI, and what they David Siddhartha Patel is considered to be secular Iraqi nationalist insurgent groups. This latter category a Junior Research Fellow included Baath Party loyalists hoping to return to power, as well as what were at the Crown Center and a often informally described by occupation officials as POIs, or “pissed-off Iraqis”: former public sector employees and soldiers who had lost their jobs, families former Assistant Professor who felt disrespected by counterinsurgent activities, and Iraqi nationalists in the Department of motivated to resist foreign occupation. Islamist and nationalist insurgents often Government at Cornell engaged in pragmatic alliances of convenience; but as in most civil wars, “red- University. on-red” violence between insurgents ostensibly on the same side was common. After ISIS rapidly seized and much of Northern Iraq in June 2014, analysts and the media largely portrayed this advance as resulting from a pragmatic alliance of convenience between ISIS and secular Baath Party loyalists, most notably the Men of the Army of the Naqshbandia Order (widely known as JRTN, an acronym of the Romanization of the group’s name) and former officers from Saddam’s . The JRTN is reportedly led by Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, the most prominent member of the former Baath The opinions and findings expressed in this regime to have evaded being captured or killed. A New York Times headline Brief belong to the author exclusively and dubbed the alliance “uneasy” and said “the two sides are unlikely to coexist do not reflect those of the Crown Center or if they should attain power in some areas” because “the Baathists, being more Brandeis University. secular and more nationalist, have no interest in living under the harsh Islamic law that ISIS has already started to put in place in Mosul.”3 Indeed, Baathism 2 is often described as a secular, pan-Arab movement of the generational cohort of Baathist officers who have historically hostile to . In subsequent weeks, joined ISIS. When analyzing Baathist insurgents, many the media and policy makers paid close attention to the analysts continue to focus on Saddam’s senior military situation in Iraq, watching for any evidence of an expected leaders and the organizations they formed in the early falling-out between ISIS and its allies, owing either to days of the occupation, such as al-Douri’s JRTN or Younis ideological fissures or to fears that their ally was becoming al-Ahmed’s underground movement al-Awda (“The too powerful. This expectation, however, was based on an Return”).8 These were prominent insurgent organizations incorrect understanding of this so-called alliance. during the occupation but are now led by men in their late sixties or seventies, such as the seventy-two-year-old ISIS is different from its predecessor organizations in al-Douri. Yet, many of the ex-officers joining ISIS seem to several important ways. First, it is led by Iraqis and be much younger. ISIS’s former Baathists were born in the these Iraqis are almost all former Baathists. The most late 1960s or early 1970s. Although they are forty to fifty thorough publicly available information on the leadership years old today and seasoned insurgents, some were only in structure of ISIS comes from flash drives taken from the their thirties when Saddam’s army was disbanded in 2003. home of the organization’s military chief of staff for Iraq, These are military officers whose careers were cut short who was killed in a raid by the Iraqi military in Mosul and interrupted just when they were expected to have in early June 2014.4 Nineteen of the twenty known top accelerated. They are not seeking, like al-Douri, to return ISIS leaders at that time—including the entire cabinet, to power; they were never in power. Their formative years those serving in the war office, and the governors of were spent fighting, and being imprisoned by, Americans. Iraqi territory5—were from Iraq; the only exception was a Syrian in charge of ISIS’s media relations unit.6 Saddam’s Faith Campaign played an important role in Approximately one-third of those nineteen leaders laying a foundation for this younger generation of military were officers in ’s military; several and intelligence officers to smoothly integrate into ISIS others were officers in Iraqi intelligence agencies. years later. Descriptions of Iraq and the Baath Party as “secular” ignore the effects that the Faith Campaign had on The self-proclaimed Caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, has Iraqi society. Launched in 1993, the Campaign dramatically two deputies. The first, Abu Muslim al-Turkmani, oversees expanded religious studies throughout the education the Iraqi provinces and was either a lieutenant colonel or system and injected aspects of Islamic law into Iraqi a general in Saddam’s military intelligence (the istikhbarat, society. Amatzia Baram writes that after 1993, “Islam was or Directorate of General Military Intelligence), and suddenly omnipresent: in the schools, in the university, in also spent time as a Special Forces officer in the Special the media, in the legal system, even in Ba’th Party branch Republican Guard. The second deputy, Abu Ali al-Anbari, meetings.”9 who oversees Syrian provinces, was a major general in the Iraqi military. Most, if not all, of the nineteen were Saddam’s final generation of officers entered the military members of the Baath party. and intelligence agencies in a decade when religious education and piety were spreading, and the state and ISIS’s stunning battlefield success is not the result of an Party were actively encouraging its spread among Sunni unstable alliance of convenience between ideologically Arabs. Young Baathists were no longer steeped in secular incompatible predispositions, one Islamist and one secular. ideology; all levels of the Baath Party were now required to It is a result of ISIS fully incorporating former Baathists study the .10 The AQI/ISIS-Baath nexus might have into its organizational structure without diluting its begun in the prison cells of Camp Bucca after 2005, but the ideological commitments. ISIS’s leadership ranks include integration of young Baath officers into ISIS was facilitated experts in traditional military command and control and by the spread of Salafi clerics and ideas in Iraq in the 1990s. logistics as well as seasoned Islamist insurgents. Two Although ISIS may eventually have a falling out with al- months after it called the ISIS-Baath alliance “uneasy,” the Douri’s JRTN and older Baathists, a younger generation of New York Times recognized that ISIS “is in effect a hybrid military and intelligence officers have fully integrated into of terrorists and an army.”7 ISIS and have come to play leading roles within it. They are committed to the Caliphate, and splits are unlikely. How did these supposedly secular Baathist officers end up as leaders in a radical Islamist organization like ISIS? Several were imprisoned by U.S. forces during the occupation; Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s closest deputies, it is said, were imprisoned with him at Camp Bucca in Southern Iraq. But often overlooked is the consistency

3 fuel, engage in racketeering and smuggling without Assumption #2: ISIS is so extreme that it will competition, and control the flow of some jobs and inevitably alienate Sunni Arabs living under reconstruction spending in “his” territory, the boundaries of which the U.S. military demarcated and helped enforce.15 its rule. Thus, although some tribes rose up against AQI because of its brutality, most “flipped” when they saw how other This assumption is based on a particular interpretation tribes or clans benefited from openly allying with coalition of the anti-AQI Awakening movements that emerged in forces. Because many of the benefits distributed by the U.S. al-Anbar and spread through Sunni Arab–majority areas involved authority within a fixed geographical territory, from 2006 to 2008. The dominant narrative among U.S. sheikhs feared being left out if nearby or rival groups policy makers and military officials who served in Iraq signed on before them. It was preferable to “flip” early during this time is that AQI’s brutal tactics alienated Sunni and be the U.S.-appointed Don in an area, rather than Arabs living under its control. Thomas Ricks, for example, live under another’s authority or settle for a much smaller interviewed a U.S. army commander from al-Anbar territory later. who suggested that by late 2006, “al-Qaeda might have overplayed its hand: They drove some fence-sitters into the These tribal “leaders,”cooperating with the U.S. military, 11 American camp.” AQI’s rhetoric, its strict interpretation were often sheikhs from secondary or minor clans within of Islamic law, and its extreme tactics are seen to have the tribe. The military’s tribal engagement officers spent led tribal sheikhs to rise up and take control of their areas considerable time trying to distinguish “real” sheikhs from foreign terrorists. In this account, the U.S. merely from “fake” ones, often failing to realize that their supported these indigenous uprisings, to which they gave recommendations of whom to support elevated some a variety of civic-minded names, such as “Concerned Local sheikhs and families relative to others. A sheikh’s authority Citizens” (CLCs) and “Sons of Iraq” (SOIs). This supposed largely derives from his ability to deliver goods and services “flip” of the tribes is understood to have been one of the to his kinsmen. The U.S. supported sheikhs who it thought critical reasons for the success of the counterinsurgency had authority—but that authority was, in many respects, a strategy—described by Linda Robinson as “a pragmatic function of that support: Labeling a sheikh “real” effectively 12 approach of flipping all those who could be flipped” — made him so. As with the earlier British occupation of Iraq, implemented by commander of coalition forces General outsiders’ perceptions of Iraqi society had a major influence in 2007. on how the state interacted with tribes, and on both intra- and inter-tribal dynamics.16 But a counter-interpretation of the rising up of the tribes against AQI understands the reasons for their flipping as In 2007, then, sheikhs stood up against AQI because they more prosaic. In this account, U.S. military commanders— expected coalition authorities to guarantee a flow of locally at first, but then in a more systematic and resources to them—and this trend spread quickly because institutionalized fashion, beginning in 2007—effectively those resources were tied to authority within a fixed allowed a traditional tribal authority, or sheikh, to be geographical territory, and they feared missing out. At the the Don Corleone, as it were, of a fixed geographical area time, it appeared as though the U.S. was increasing its in exchange for keeping AQI out. This was an excellent commitment to Iraq, even as the costs of the continued arrangement for local U.S. commanders seeking to reduce occupation to the were going up. Although coalition casualties. Ricks quotes an Army commander the number of additional troops deployed to Iraq in as saying, “Whenever a tribe flipped and joined the the so-called Surge seemed small, the number of troops Awakening, all the attacks on coalition forces in that area on the street in restive areas doubled, and Petraeus’s would stop, and all the caches of ammunition would come counterinsurgency strategy led U.S. troops to be based up out of the ground. If there was ever an attack on us, the amidst the population in an attempt to “win hearts and sheikh would basically take responsibility for it and find minds.” whoever was responsible.”13 Tribal leaders expected the U.S. to institutionalize their Because U.S. forces were present on the ground, it was also access to patronage, thereby guaranteeing its continuation an excellent arrangement for the tribal leader who struck into the future. But Shiite politicians in feared the deal: Typically, the U.S. authorized him to establish that, if that happened, the Awakening militias might checkpoints and conduct patrols, as well as relying on him develop into military forces that could threaten their to provide intelligence. Tribesmen were trained and paid control, while Sunni Arab politicians feared that newly to participate, with selection and payroll going through empowered Sunni sheikhs could become political 14 the designated sheikh. This allowed the sheikh and his rivals and displace them. Indeed, several electoral lists supporters to dominate the delivery of oil and cooking emerged out of the Awakening movements to challenge 4 established Sunni parties in the 2009 governate and 2010 Finally, the leaders of ISIS learned from mistakes that they parliamentary elections. U.S. military officials pressured and their predecessors made in 2006–8 and took steps to the Iraqi government to integrate Sunni Arab militiamen deter tribes from rising up against it. ISIS has reached a into the security services,17 but the ministries of Defense series of understandings with tribes operating in territory and Interior both dithered and used extended vetting it claims.22 In August 2014, ISIS made a deliberate example processes so as to wait out the U.S. pressure. Although of the al-Sheitat tribe in Syria’s Deir ez-Zur province. A some militiamen were absorbed into local police forces segment of the Sheitat reneged and rose up after a kinsman and others were paid to continue to man checkpoints, the was publicly executed.23 In retaliation, ISIS shelled Sheitat patronage flows to sheikhs dried up after the U.S. handed villages and then rounded up and executed all surviving responsibility over to the central Iraqi government in 2009. men and boys they could find older than fifteen. ISIS After U.S. forces withdrew from their areas and in the posted on one of its blogs photos and videos of Sheitat men absence of state resources, many of the sheikhs who had being beheaded, crucified, and executed in mass shootings. participated in Awakening movements were either killed The videos are shocking: ISIS fighters mock the tribesmen or fled. Many today live in Amman or Erbil. before savagely decapitating them one after another like sheep. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights A similar tribal uprising today is unlikely, because neither estimated that 700 tribesmen were killed, including 100 the Iraqi government nor distant U.S. authorities can fighters and 600 civilians.24 credibly commit to providing a future flow of resources to groups that stand up to ISIS, and any sheikh considering The photos and videos, which circulated widely in Syria doing so can reasonably expect any support that is and Iraq, served their deterrent purpose: Tribesmen know extended to be only temporary. The earlier tribal uprisings how ISIS would respond if they confronted them. ISIS has spread quickly because many benefits were tied to being also made an example of Iraqi tribes allied with the Iraqi designated as the authority within a designated territory. government, such as the Albu Nimr clan of the al-Dulaim Green and Mullen’s detailed account of the fight against tribe, which saw several hundred of its members executed AQI in al-Anbar in 2006–8 emphasizes how critical it was in late October. The Albu Nimr had previously fought AQI; for coalition forces to build a security environment on the and as with the massacre of the Sheitat, ISIS recorded and ground before tribes would rise up.18 Without U.S. or shared humiliating and gruesome executions on social capable Iraqi government boots on the ground in Sunni media. The inability of the U.S. or Iraqi governments to Arab majority areas, such conferring of authority today protect tribes who fight ISIS is readily apparent. would be meaningless. And sheikhs fear that the central Iraqi government will renege in the future on any promises made today. Assumption #3: Iraq has formed a more inclusive government in order to reach out to Iraqi and U.S. policy makers recognize this challenge and are trying to reassure tribes and localities that they will Sunni Arabs. not be abandoned in the future if they rise up now against ISIS. Their principal strategy is to form an Iraqi National In his speech on countering ISIS, delivered two days after Guard to organize militias under an official umbrella, the the Iraqi parliament approved Haider al-Abadi as the idea being that a National Guard will help tribal militias country’s new prime minister, President Obama stated coordinate with the in the short term that “additional U.S. action depended upon Iraqis forming 25 and ease their integration into the police and security an inclusive government, which they have now done.” forces in the medium to long term.19 The details of how The final years of Nouri al-Maliki’s premiership had been this will occur, however, have not been worked out.20 Most marked by the arrest of several prominent Sunni Arab critically, the proposed National Guard plan does not in parliamentarians and the emergence of a sustained Sunni any way tie the hands of future Iraqi governments; it does Arab protest movement. The perception in Washington not provide a credible commitment to the tribes of ongoing was that a new prime minister was needed who would be access to largesse and employment if they stand up to ISIS willing and able to reach out to Sunni Arabs, particularly now. How can National Guard members today trust that the secular nationalist insurgents and tribes who, it was they will not be dismissed—or, more simply, not paid— hoped, could be flipped against ISIS. in the future? This is especially of concern because many politicians in Baghdad, including former prime minister But the new Iraqi government, sworn in on September 8, and current vice-president Nouri al-Maliki, openly oppose 2014, is not significantly different from the previous one; the National Guard plan.21 The interior and defense there are few, if any, new faces. The new president, Fuad ministers in Iraq’s new “unity” government will be critical Masum, was a confidant of the outgoing and incapacitated in easing these fears. (See Assumption #3 below.) president, Jalal Talabani; they were two of the four co- 5 founders of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. The new How does this affect the likelihood of Sunni Arabs prime minister shares a background with the outgoing turning on ISIS? In an October 2014 report, Amnesty one: Both were long-time members of the banned and International named the as one of the persecuted Islamic Da’wa Party, and both spent decades in Shiite militias involved in the abduction and killing of exile before returning to Iraq in 2003. Maliki is now one of Sunni Arab civilian men.28 According to Amnesty, Shiite Iraq’s vice-presidents and retains considerable influence in militias tend to consider Sunni men from areas where ISIS the prime minister’s party and coalition. The new speaker operates as terrorists or terrorist supporters and, with the of parliament, Salim al-Jabouri, was allied with the party of consent or, at times, cooperation of government forces, the former speaker, Osama al-Nujaifi. In other words, even kill civilians “seemingly in revenge for IS attacks and at within the constraints of Iraq’s confessional power-sharing times also to extort money from the families of those they conventions (Muhassasah), the same parties and coalitions have abducted.”29 The Badr Organization, as we have remain in key positions. The vast majority of cabinet seen, now control the Interior Ministry, which will be the appointments are long-time politicians from Baghdad’s state institution tasked with vetting recruits to the Iraqi isolated “Green Zone.” The new government, then, is not National Guards. As a consequence, Sunni Arab tribesmen a significant departure from the old one; years earlier, can reasonably expect a highly politicized process of President Masum had even supervised Maliki’s master’s security checks. thesis in Arabic language and literature in Erbil.26 A fundamental problem in Iraq since 2003 has been the But might Abadi be able to reach out to Sunni Arabs in lack of unifying national-level Sunni Arab leaders. While ways Maliki would or could not? In particular, did he Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani successfully coordinated appoint individuals to head the key security ministries Shiite politicians and voters with respect to several key who would be committed to integrating new National issues and ballots, Sunni Arabs remained fractured and Guard units in the future? In truth, Abadi tried to make unable to present a unified front.30 This remains a core such appointments, but he failed. On September 16, 2014, challenge for Abadi or any leader seeking to form a more Abadi nominated Riad Abdul Razak Gharib, a former labor inclusive government. Shiite and Kurdish politicians do minister from the Shiite State of Law bloc, for minister of not feel pressure from a unified Sunni Arab bloc to make the interior and Jaber al-Jaberi, a Sunni Arab Islamist close concessions regarding key issues or posts, and any new to several dissident politicians, to head the Ministry of Sunni Arab leaders brought into the government threaten Defense. That same day, the Iraqi parliament rejected both those Sunni Arabs who have served in Parliament for nominations. several years, such as those involved in Saleh al-Mutlaq’s National Dialogue Front, the Iraqi Islamic Party, or Ayad The opposition to Abadi’s nominations for the security Allawi’s Iraqi National Accord party. The Iraqi government ministries was led by his supposed Shiite allies in the has not significantly changed, and there is little prospect Badr Organization, a political party that was formerly of a cohesive Sunni Arab front demanding to have a greater the military wing of the Islamic Supreme Council of say. Iraq (ISCI). It took over a month for the Interior and Defense posts to be filled, and when they were, the new ministers were not Abadi’s preferred candidates. The Badr Conclusion Organization demanded the Interior Ministry, and they got it. It was a position they had previously held and to which The assumptions guiding U.S. policy toward ISIS they felt increasingly entitled, since Badr militias had imply that the Islamic State is inherently a self-limiting reinforced the in the fight against ISIS. The head organization. Ideological fissures, it is thought, will of the Badr Organization was unacceptable to both Sunni shatter the alliance of convenience between ISIS and Arab parties and the Americans, but another member of secular nationalist insurgents. Sunni Arab tribes will tire Badr was appointed.27 The new defense minister, Khaled of ISIS’s brutality and its strict interpretation of Islamic al-Obeidi, is a Sunni Arab from Mosul and is close to the law and will rise up against it. Iraq’s new government al-Nujaifi family, but he has little sway back in ISIS- will successfully reach out to long-disenchanted Sunni controlled Nineveh province. He represents established Arabs, and the new Iraqi National Guard will smooth the Sunni Arab politicians already present in the government integration of nationalist insurgents and tribesmen, who in Baghdad. Instead of bringing in (or back in) Sunni Arab will “flip” and join the fight against ISIS. leaders alienated by Maliki, positions in the new Iraqi government rewarded Kurdish and Shiite groups who were From this perspective, U.S. strategy in Iraq is partly a already on the front lines fighting ISIS. waiting game: Prevent further ISIS gains and wait for Sunni Arabs to turn against it. Attention can focus, rather,

6 on countering ISIS in Syria. But if these assumptions primarily on the United States. Whether America can and are incorrect, as I have argued, ISIS will instead be should assume this enormous task, however, is beyond the consolidating its hold over large swaths of Iraqi territory scope of this Brief. and deepening its ties to the Sunni Arab community.

In fact, ISIS’s military success in Iraq has more to do with its integration of ideologically like-minded young Baathists into its ranks and leadership than with dependence on Endnotes an unstable alliance of convenience with older, secular Baathists. Additionally, ISIS’s leaders learned from 1 The White House, “Statement by the President on ISIL,” mistakes its predecessor organizations made during the September 10, 2014.* U.S.-led occupation. When ISIS took Mosul—with the 2 The group was never named “al-Qaeda in Iraq,” despite the help of other organizations—it rounded up dozens of coalition’s and media’s widespread use of the acronym AQI. former military, intelligence, and Baath officers in the city, It later changed its name to the . 3 See, for example, Tim Arango, “Uneasy Alliance Gives thereby eliminating potential rivals who might strike a deal Insurgents an Edge in Iraq,” New York Times, June 18, 2014.* with the central Iraqi government and lead a resistance. 4 See Ruth Sherlock, “Inside the Leadership of Islamic State: This included at least one released Baath leader from How the New ‘Caliphate’ Is Run,” The Telegraph, July 9, 2014,* the U.S. Army’s infamous “Most Wanted” deck of cards: and “Video: Who Are ISIS’s Top 20 Leaders?” Al Arabiya Saifeddin al-Mashhadani (the three of clubs). Haider al- News, September 19, 2014.* Abadi, a parliamentarian when Mosul fell and now prime 5 The twenty comprise the Caliph (Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi), his minister, recognized ISIS’s logic in taking preemptive two deputies, seven members of his cabinet, six governors action in the city. He told Reuters, “ISIL knows very well of Iraqi provinces, three members of the war office, and one they can’t stay if these groups move against them. They spokesman. Other reports claim that ISIS has twenty-four are not giving them the opportunity.”31 At the same time, governors—twelve in Iraq, twelve in Syria—of which we have the names of six from Iraq. Note that several of the ISIS installed former Baathists as governors in Mosul and individuals on the initial list have been killed. elsewhere. Instead of replacing a local administration, ISIS 6 ISIS is much more likely to use non-Iraqis in media and co-opts key parts of it. public relations roles, perhaps seeking to appeal to potential recruits. Sunni Arab tribesmen will not rise up against ISIS unless 7 Ben Hubbard and Eric Schmitt, “Military Skill and Terrorist the Iraqi government can credibly commit to support Technique Fuel Success of ISIS,” New York Times, August 27, and reward in the future those who pay the high costs of 2014.* fighting ISIS today. The tribal uprising in 2007–8 spread 8 See, for example, Shane Harris, “The Re-Baathification of rapidly because the presence of U.S. troops allowed Iraq,” Foreign Policy, August 21, 2014.* sheikhs to have authority in geographically demarcated 9 Amatzia Baram, Saddam Husayn and Islam, 1968-2003: Ba’thi Iraq from Secularism to Faith (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins areas, which is unlikely to be an option against ISIS now. University Press, 2014), p. 314. The formation of the Iraqi National Guard is an attempt 10 Ibid., pp. 254–58. to make a credible commitment to integrate tribesmen 11 Thomas E. Ricks, The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the and former insurgents into the security services, but the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006–2008 (New York: inability of Abadi to wrest control of the Interior Ministry Penguin, 2009), p. 66. from the Iranian-backed Badr Organization makes it 12 Linda Robinson, Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus unlikely that Sunnis will trust that the vetting process will and the Search for a Way out of Iraq (New York: Public Affairs, be fair or that the National Guard will be properly funded 2008), p. 252. and adequately supported in the future. 13 Ricks, The Gamble, p. 67. 14 A former U.S. military tribal engagement officer describes this strategy in Daniel Green and William Mullen, Given the successful integration of Baath-era military Redux: The Anbar Awakening and the Struggle with al-Qaeda and intelligence troops and officers into the ranks and (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2014), pp. 28–31. command structure of ISIS, which has made it an effective 15 It is not a coincidence that one of the early leaders and the fighting force, the battle against it will be long and most prominent figurehead of the Awakening movement, difficult. And as Iraqi Sunni tribes are unlikely to turn Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, was widely considered to be an against ISIS, and Iraq’s new government is incapable of oil smuggler. AQI’s interruption of cross-border smuggling pursuing an “inclusive” policy that might persuade the routes, or its efforts to compete with established smugglers, tribes to do so, it will be very difficult for the U.S. to find probably played an important role in some early tribes’ turn effective Iraqi allies for the war against the Caliphate. This against them. means that the burden of fighting in Iraq will again fall 16 Toby Dodge. Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003). 7 17 Robinson, Tell Me How This Ends, pp. 254–61. 18 Green and Mullen, Fallujah Redux. 19 The Iraqi Prime Minister and U.S. President both highlighted the National Guard idea as part of their outreach efforts to Sunni Arab communities. On the Iraqi government’s plan, see Osama Mahdi, “Abadi Government: Reconstruction of the army, reconciliation, pardons, and easing extraction,” Elaph, September 9, 2014 [in Arabic].* In his speech on ISIS, Obama said, “We’ll also support Iraq’s efforts to stand up National Guard Units to help Sunni communities to secure their own freedom from ISIL’s control.” The White House, “Statement by the President on ISIL”.* 20 “Iraq’s Unified ‘National Guard’ May Be Impossible,” Al-Monitor, September 16, 2014.* 21 “Maliki: The Establishment of the National Guard Beginning to Divide Iraq,” Erem News, September 14, 2014 [in Arabic].* 22 Ryan Lucas, “With Incentives and Brute Force, IS Subdues Tribes,” , November 27, 2014.* 23 Liz Sly, “Syria Tribal Revolt against Islamic State Ignored, Fueling Resentment,” Washington Post, October 20, 2014.* 24 “Islamic State Group ‘Executes 700’ in Syria,” English, August 17, 2014.* 25 The White House, “Statement by the President on ISIL”.* 26 “Iraq and the Islamic State: Engaging the Enemy,” The Economist, August 16, 2014.* 27 Hadi al-Amiri, the leader of Badr, had recently been quoted in a New Yorker magazine article expressing his feelings for the commander of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force. “I love Qassem Suleimani!” he says. “He is my dearest friend.” Dexter Filkins, “The Shadow Commander,” The New Yorker, September 30, 2013.* A good case can be made that Amiri never intended to take the Interior Ministry position, but that proposing him and then replacing him with another Badr official helped make it look like Abadi stood up to his coalition allies and got “his” nominee approved. 28 Absolute Impunity: Militia Rule in Iraq (Amnesty International, October 2014).* 29 Ibid., p. 5. 30 David Siddhartha Patel, Islam, Information, and the Rise and Fall of Social Orders in Iraq (unpublished book manuscript, 2014). 31 “Islamic State Rounds Up Ex-Baathists to Eliminate Potential Rivals in Iraq’s Mosul,” Reuters, July 8, 2014.*

*Weblinks are available in the online version at www.brandeis.edu/crown

8 ISIS in Iraq: What We Get Wrong and Why 2015 Is Not 2007 Redux

David Siddhartha Patel

Recent Middle East Briefs: Available on the Crown Center website: www.brandeis.edu/crown

Abdel Monem Said Aly, “Post-Revolution Egyptian Foreign Policy,” No. 86

Seyedamir Hossein Mahdavi, “A Comprehensive Nuclear Deal with : Not Mission Impossible,” No. 85

Eva Bellin, “The Road to Rule of Law in the Arab World: Comparative Insights,” No. 84

Shai Feldman and Khalil Shikaki, “Stabilizing Gaza-Israel Relations: What Would It Take?” No. 83

Abdel Monem Said Aly, “Deciphering Abdel Fattah el-Sisi: Presidnet of ’s Third Republic,” No. 82