Unhappily Yoked? Hugh Scott and SCORDINGto John D. Ehrlichman, President Nixon's domestic

policy chief, "Hugh Scott and Richard Nixon were unhappily Ioked." That assessment contains some truth. Nixon and Senate Minority Leader Hugh D. Scott, Jr., Republican of Pennsylvania, sometimes disagreed, occasionally sparred, and could hardly be described as confidants. Relations between the White House and the GOP's top senator seemed strained, with Ehrlichman dismissing Scott as "a rotund, owlish Pennsylvania machine politician." "I saw more of this hack than I wanted to," he whined, overlooking Scott's aristocratic, cultivated background.' The antipathy was mutual. "They had basically, I think, a disrespect for Congress," Scott said of Nixon's staff in 1976 According to the senator, their treatment of Congress as "a necessary appendage" became pronounced following the president's reelection in 19723 There is more to this story than Ehrlichman and Scott let on. Watergate's shadow, darkened by self-serving accounts of participants such as Ehrlichman and on-lookers like Scott, has long obscured our understanding of Nixon's relations with Congress during the years that preceded it.4 Books

For their insightf-l commients, the author thanks de journal's anonymous referees as well as Charles C. Alexander, DeanJ. Fafouris, Gregory C. Ference, Alonzo L. Hamby, and Katherine Jllison. For grants-in-aid of research, he thanks the Caterpillar Foundation, Everett McKinley Dirksen Center, Lyndon Baines Johnson Foundation, and Gerald R. Ford Foundation. In preparing this article, he also received assistance from the interlibrary loan staffat Blackwell Library, Salisbury University, and from Kenneth Hafeli, of the Gerald R. Ford Library, who located the photographs. 'John Ehrlichman, Witness to Power The Nixon Years (New York, 1982), 198. 'Hugh Dorrt Scott, Jr., Oral History, Sept. 20,1976, 53, United States Capitol Historical Society Oral History Program, Association oftFormer Members of Congress Papers, Library of Congress (LC). 'Hugh Scott, interview by A. James Reichley, Dec_ 6, 1977.2, box 2, A. James Reichley Interview Transcripts, Gerald R. Ford Library (GRFL), Ann Arbor, Mich. SNixon's relationship with Congress has not yet received a sound, archivally-based, scholarly treatment, but helpful works include Rowland Evans, Jr.,and Robert D. Novak, Nixon in the W/hire

THE PENNSYLVANIA MAGAZINE OF HisTORY AND BIoGRAPHY CXXV, No. 3 (uly 2001) DEAN J. KOTLOWSKI written after the scandal portray an administration engaged in an undeclared war with the legislative branch. "The President won some of these skirmishes and lost others," the historian Stanley I. Kutler contended, "but by 1972, he and Congress viewed each other with mutual animosity."6 Recent studies show another Nixon, cooperating with a Democrat- controlled Congress to pass legislation in such areas as civil rights, Indian affairs, social welfare, occupational health and safety, revenue sharing, postal reform, consumer protection, cancer research, mass transit, dean air, and pubfic parks.7 Accordingly, the details of Nixon's relations with Congress, especially its leaders, have assumed greater importance. Relations between presidents and Senate leaders historically have involved a delicate balance. Presidents prefer to work with leaders of their own party, forgetting that such leaders must tend to constituent pressures and often resent executive-branch encroachments. Senate leaders pick their issues carefully, "usually siding with the[ir] president, but sometimes opposing his programs or seeking modifications."8 In 1944, Senator Alben W. Barkley, Democrat of Kentucky, briefly resigned as majority leader after President Franklin D. Roosevelt vetoed a tax bill that Barkley supported. Overall, the FDR-Barkley partnerstip ran smoothly, as did that of President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Senate Majority Leader Robert A. Taft, Republican of

House;-'7e Frusrarionof Power (New York, 1971), 103-32; A. James Retehley, Conscrvarvs in an Age of Change: The Niyon and Ford Administrations (Washington, 1982), 79-97; Stephen Hess, Organizsng the Presidency, (2d ed , Washingtion, 1981), 121-28; DeanJ. Kolowski, "Trial By Error: Nixon, the Senate, and the Haynawnrth Nomination,' PresidentidStudies Quarterly26 (1996), 71-91. 'Jonathan Schell, lie Time of Illusion (New York, 1975), 299-304; Peter N. Carro], IrSeemed Like Nothing Happened Americai in the 1970s (New Brunswick, N.J., 1990), 100-2; Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon: 'Fli Triumph of a Politician, 1962- 1972 (New York, 1989), 400-7. Stanley I Kuler, The War, ofWarigatre The Last Crisis of Riaaid Nixon (New York, 1990), 126. See Joan Hoff-Wilson, "Richard M. Nixon: The Corporate Presidency,' in Leadership in the Modem Presidency, ed Fred I. Greenstein (Cambridge, Mass., 1988), 164-98; Hugh Davis Graham, 77 Civ Rights Ea: Origins and Devlopment of Narional Polcy, 1960-1972 (New York, 1990), 301- 65; Tom Wicker, One of Us: Richird Nixon am the American Dream (New York, 1991); Herbert S. Parmtet, Richard Nixon and His America (Boston, 1990);John Robert Greene, The Limits of Power The Nixon and FordAdminisrranons (Bloomington, Ind.,1992); Joan Hoff, Nixon Reconsdered (New York, 1994); AenJ. Matusow, Nixon's Econons,.y Boums, Busts, Dollars and Votes (Lawrence, Kam, 1998); Dean J. Korlowski, "Nixon's Southern Strategy Revisited,"Jouia'al of Policy History 10 (1998), 207-38; Melvin Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon (Lawrence, Kant, 1999), 153; James T. Patterson, Grand £ixpectrions' Te United Staries, 1945-1974 (New York, 1996), 719. 'Norman J.Ornstein, Robert L. Peabody, and David W. Rohde, "The U.S. Senate: Toward the Twenty-Fir t Century," in Congress Reconsidered, ed. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer (Washington, 1997), 16. HUG H SCOTr AND RICHARD NIXON

Ohio. Minority Leader Everett McKinley Dirksen, Republican of Illinois, ironically enjoyed friendly relations with Democratic Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson while Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, Democrat of Montana, did not want senators "simply to become functionaries of the New Frontier."9 Give and take has been the rule in dealings between the White House and Senate leadership. The relationship between Nixon and Scott, in which a few high-profile disagreements masked large areas of agreement, proved no exception. The two men, occupying the center and left of the Republican Partys spectrum, cooperated and compromised on such issues as welfare reform and voting rights. Scott generally backed the president's foreign policy initiatives, including his handling of the Vietnam War. Yet they dashed over Supreme Court nominations, civil rights, and the GOP's political agenda. Nixon deemed Scott too independent, and the senator at times found the White House heavy-handed. Nevertheless, during the Watergate affair, Scott proved a good soldier, keeping his misgivings about Nixon's conduct private while defending the president in public. The Nixon-Scott relationship brought together two men of the same party, but with different public personas, political interests, and institutional duties. The result was both tension and dependency. Although Nixon and Scott were politically yoked, their stances on domestic and foreign issues showed that it was not always an unhappy tethering.

Nixon and Scott forged an uneasy partnership. Politically, Nixon's constituency, which included conservative white southerners as well as northern liberals, was national, requiring symbolic and policy gestures to both the right and left. Scott's base, in urban, industrialized Pennsylvania, proved narrower and more inclined to favor federal-inspired programs. The two men remained personally distant, a fact accentuated by Nixon's approach to congressional liaison and Scott's conception of his duties as minority leader. Nixon and Scott had similar backgrounds. They both served in the U.S. Navy during World War II, both men were cold warriors, and both took

'Ross K. Baker, "Mike Mansfield and the Birth of the Modern Senate," in FarstAmong Equaks OursridingSenatw Leadens of he Tw.nrieth Century,ed. Richard A. Baker and Roger H. Davidson (Washington, 1991), 276. This volume also contains hvaluable essays on such Senate lcadus as Barkley, Taft, and Daksen. DEAN J. KOTLOWSKI

hawkish positions on Vietnam. Both graduated from modest undergraduate colleges and went on to well-respected law schools (Nixon from Whittier College in California and the law school at Duke University; Scott from Randolph-Macon College in and the law school of the University of Virginia). Each man seemed well-read. Every year, Nixon consumed "a few good books" as "brain food.""0 The senator, a Sinophile, collected Asian art, a subject on which he wrote several books, and was familiar with both Greek history and modern philosophy." After a 1969 meeting, Patrick J. Buchanan, a conservative Nixon aide, described Scott as "impressive" and listed his attributes as "soft-spoken, eloquent, reasonable, persuasive." (One can almost picture the portly Scott, seated, pipe in mouth, with his trademark pencil mustache, thinning hair parted in the middle, and resistance to fashion, e.g. sideburns). Lastly, each man left politics under the cloud of scandal; Nixon endured Watergate while Scott faced charges of accepting illicit contributions from the Gulf Oil Company. Unlike Nixon, however, Scott received official exoneration when the Senate Ethics Committee cleared him of any wrongdoing. 3 Nixon and Scott wrestled with a divided Republican party. Eastern liberals, such as Scott and Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller of New York, clamored for federal action on such issues as civil rights, public housing, and urban renewal. On the other hand, the party's right wing, which stressed private initiative and diminished application of federal power, was gaining influence under the leadership of Senator Barry M. Goldwater of Arizona and Governor of California. 4 Throughout the GOP's fractious debates, Nixon preferred to play "the role of party unifier, centrist

" Richard M. Nixon to Raymond Moles'. Feb. 26, 1963, folder: Nixon, box 293, Raymond Moley Papers, Hoover Instirution Archives, Stanford University. "Holnes Alexander, 'Hugh Strt Offers Republians Mixture of Brains and Bonhomie,' Richmond News-Lrader, Oct. 8, 1969, 10; Hugh D. Scott to Norman Richardson, April 10, 1974, foldcr 1974 Jan.-May Nixon Resignation, box 1, Additional Papers, Hugh D. Scott, Jr., Papers, Department of Special Collections, Alderman Library, University of Virginia. " Patriekj. Buchanan, Memorandum to the President, Jan. 28, 1969, 9, in Papers ofthe Nixon White House (hereafter, PNVIH), ed. Joan Hoff-Wilson, Part 2: The President's Meeting File (Lanham, Md., 1989), fiche 69-1-26. "'Dean J. Kotlowski, 0Hugh Dcgtt , Jr.," in American National Biography(hreaftcer,ANG), ed. John Garraty and Mark C_ Caces, (New York, 1999), 19:492-93. "Dean J. Kotlowski, "Politics and Principle: The Nixon Administration and Civil Rights Policy" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1998), 43-47; Mary C. Brennan, Turning Right in the Sixties: The Conservaive Capture ofrthe GOP (Chapel Hill, 1995). HUGH SCOT AND RICHARD NIXON moderate, and 'needed voice of sanity.'"' S Nixon and Scott worried about the growing influence of the GOP's right wing. Nixon, if less likely than Scott to seek statist solutions, had endorsed federal aid to education and cost-of-living adjustments for Social Security recipients during the fifties and sixties. 6 "Remember John," Nixon lectured an aide in 1965, "the far right kooks are just like the nuts on the left, they're door bell ringers and balloon blowers but they turn out to vote. There is only one thing as bad as a far left liberal and that's a damn right wing conservative-"" There was room for cooperation between these two moderate Republicans. Both Nixon and Scott pursued multilayered agendas. In domestic affairs, the president's rhetoric tilted to the right more than his policies, making for a schizophrenic course that conservative and liberal purists found hard to follow. He courted southern and suburban whites by, among other things, denouncing "forced integration" of schools. But he also, in response to civil rights advocates, espoused economic gains for blacks via affirmative action and minority business set-asides. His programs fell within the tradition of moderate Republicanism, which saw the small producer as the bedrock of society and used state power--selectively-to enhance equal opportunity and social mobility. 8 Nixon also sought the middle ground knowing that his GOP could not become the nation's majority party "if either [its] liberal or conservative wings were sliced off." 9 If there were many Nixons, there were also many Scotts. The senator's liberalism was obvious; he endorsed federal efforts to improve the lives of working people and racial minorities, key constituencies in Pennsylvania. Scott had backed such Great Society measures as rent supplements and aid

"Hol, Nixon Reconsidered, 78. ' L, Arthur Minniek Notes of Legislative Leadership Meeting, July 23, 1957, box 4, Legislative Meeting Series, Staff Secretary Records, Dwight D. Ei enhower Library (DDEL), Abilene, Kants; To Protect Social Scurity:. Remarks of Richard K Nixon, Columbus, Indiana," Oct. 29, 1966, folder: Nixon, Richard M., Presidential Candidacy 1966, box 49, Political FVdes, Bourke B. Hickenlooper Papers, Herbert Hoover Library (H L), West Branch, Iowa. " Quoted in John C. Whitaker, "Nixon's Domestic Policy: Both Liberal ant Bold in Retrospect," Preaidenal Stdies Quarterly 26 (1996), 131. " Arthur Larson, A Republican Looks at His Party (New York, 1956), 202-3; Herbert Hoover, Am erican Individualism (Garden City, N.Y., 1922), 53; Erie Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men, The Ideology of the Republican ParryBeiore the Civil War (New York, 1970), 16-18, 191. "'Nixon off-the-record remarks to Republican congressional stafrs, attached to George Pavlik to Bourke B. Hickenlooper, March 3,1966, box 49, Political File, Hickenlooper Papers. DEAN J. KOTLOWSKI

to model cities and, during 1968, the American Federation of Labor- Congress of Industrial Organizations graded his support at 100 percent." Between 1948 and 1968, Scott consistently favored the most liberal aspirants to the GOP presidential nomination. Tepidly backing the 1964 standard- bearer, Goldwater, he later denounced "the radical rightists who attached themselves to our party" and cost the GOP "millions of potential 2 members." ' "Let's be honest, Hugh . . ." Goldwater protested, "amI the one you want to get out of the Republican Party? Am I an extremist?"' Scott had to weigh the demands of constituency and conscience against loyalty to the GOP's ever-changing leadership. Conservatives could appreciate another side of the Scott rubric, his acid- tongued partisanship. A life-long politician, who entitled his memoir I've Been to the Pair, Scott won a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives in 1940.' Pennsylvanians elevated him to the Senate in 1958, then narrowly reelected him in 1964 despite Lyndon Johnson's landslide margin in the state. "I hear that you wired my opponent after Election Day that you were 'praying for a miracle,'" a triumphant Scott wrote LBJ. "May I respectfully suggest that it has already occurred." As a member of the GOP's so-called Truth Squad he stumped for Nixon in 1960 and 1968 (fig. 1). In 1968, Scott blasted the segregationist presidential candidate George C. Wallace as "a menace to everyone," adding "If he bit himself, he'd die of blood poisoning."24 In 1976, he urged President Ford to peel Democrat Jimmy Carter "like an onion down to the garlicky inner core.' If less venomous and more witty than Nixon, Scott too was a political warrior. As party leader Scott was both ambitious and amiable. Aided by GOP liberals, who had gained strength in the Senate in 1968, he won the post of minority whip in 1969, defeating Roman L. Hruska of Nebraska. In so doing, Scott defied Minority Leader Dirksen, who preferred Hruska, a

"Mike Manatos to Lyndon B Johnson, Sept. 19,1967, White House Cetral File (WHCF), Name File: Hugh Scott (Sea.), Lyndon B. Johnson Library (LBJL), Austin, Tex.; -The New Party Whips in the Senate," New York lmcs,Jan. 4, 1969, 18. LUPI Wire Report, Feb. 23, 1965, WHCF, Name File: Hugh Scott (Sen), LBJL. "Barry M. Goldwat r to Scott, Dec. 14, 1965, folder: 1963-1976, Goldwater, Barry M., box 13, Additional Papers (#10,200), Scott Papers, " Kolowski, "Hugh Doggett Scott, Jr.," ANG, 9:492-93. 2'All preceding quotations come from 'The New Party Whips in the Senate," New York Tmeajan. 4, 1969, 18, " Scott to Robert T. Hartnann, Aug. 9, 1976, folder: Hugh Scott, box 50, Robert T. Hartmann Files, GRFL HUGH SCOTT AND RICHARD NIXON

Fig. 1. Hugh D. Scott and the GOP "Truth Squad" campaign for Richard Nixon, October 1960. From top, Sen. Roman F-uska, Nebraska, Sen. Styles Bridges, New Hampshire; Sen. Kenneth Keating, New York; Rep. , Michigan; Hugh Scott; and Rep. Charles Goodell, New York. (Photo, Courtesy Gerald R. Ford Library.) fellow conservative. Following Dirksen's death ten months later, GOP senators elected Scott minority leader over Howard H. Baker, Jr., of Tennessee, Dirksen's son-in-law. Then, in a gesture of unity, Scott accepted from Dirksen's family a portrait of his predecessor. 6 Over time, GOP

I Scott, handwritten comment (SHC) on "Bill1to Scott, Oct. 1, 1969, folder: Baker, Howard H., Jr.,box 12, Additional Papers. Scott Papers. DEAN J. KOTLOWSKI senators of all stripes grew to respect Scott as the "affable tiger."2' "Affable" was not a term applied to Nixon. There were limits to how amiable Scott and Nixon could be toward each other. Both were politically vulnerable and looked after their own interests first. The president, having received only forty-three percent of the popular vote in the election of 1968, hunted for votes in the white South, telling aides: "That's where the ducks are."' Nixon sought support in the Northeast, Midwest, and West as well Scott's political fate would of course be determined in Pennsylvania, where the unpopularity of Republican Governor Raymond P. Shafer jeopardized the senator's reelection in 1970. Yet at the same time in Washington Scott, aware of his slender triumphs in the Senate as minority whip and leader, by margins of 24 to 20 and 24 to 19, respectively, could not ignore the possibility of a tight-wing revolt.29 The president, moreover, wanted his programs passed. Scott needed to achieve an acrobatic political performance of Olympian dimensions, bending far enough to the left to appease his black and working-dass constituents, pulling close enough to the center to please Repubican senators, and demonstrating sufficient loyalty to satisfy Nixon. Since the president and senator were not confidants, each failed to understand the other's predicament. Nixon marked a 1955 letter to Scott "personal," but it read like boiler-plate, reminding the GOP faithful that "we all have to do our part." ° In 1968, Scott preferred liberal governors George W. Romney of Michigan and Nelson Rockefeller of New York to Nixon for the presidential nod.' The Pennsylvanian distrusted Nixon. "He has the knowledge," Scott told Martin G. Hamberger, an aide, in 1968. "The question is: does he have the wisdom?" 2 The accuracy of that comment, recaUed during the unfolding of Watergate, is open to dispute. Yet it helps

2 Jules Witcover, "Hugh Scott-Pussycat on a Hot Tin Roof," Washington Post, no date, folder: Scott, Hugh-General. box 11, Patrick O'Donnell and Joseph Jenckes Files, GRL. Quoted in Kotlowski, "Nixon's Southern Strategy Revisited," 209. S'Philadelphia Set to Get G.O.P. Slate," New York Times, Jan. 25, 1970,49; "Kennedy Ousted as Whip," New York rumes, Jan. 22, 1971, 12; "G.O.P. Names Scott as Senate Leader," New York Times, Sept. 25, 1969, 1. " Nnon to ScottJune 21, 1955, folder: 1955-1974 Richard M. Nixon (1), box 3, Additional Papers, Scott Papers. "IHolmes Alexander, "Hugh Scott Offers Republicans Mixture of Brains and Bonhomie," Richmond News-Leader, Oct. 8, 1969, 10. "Scott to Martin G. Hamberger, May 10, 1973. folder. 1973 Nixon Resignation, box 1. Additional Papers, Scott Papers HUGH SCOFF AND RICHARD NIXON explain the divide separating the two men. Nixon's approach to Congress widened that gulf Unlike Scott, he had spent just six years in the House and Senate and never became a legislative tactician. At the outset of his presidency Nixon invited Dirksen and House Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford of Michigan to select congressional participants for White House meetings and vowed not to "ride hard" on 33 Republican members to support every administration program. Preoccupied with ending the Vietnam War, Nixon hesitantly entered frays in 1969 over tax reform, the anti-ballistic missile (A.BM), and Supreme Court appointments. This laissez-faire stance tempted lawmakers to vote as they wished. In 1971 the president fumed that "we never have these people whom we suck around with all the time," meaning liberals of both parties.' Not eager to cajole lawmakers, Nixon told Haldeman that if substantive talks "will do the trick, let's have the substantive talks and to hell with the social events." 5 To enact the president's agenda of liberal and conservative initiatives, congressional liaison chief Bryce N. Harlow followed a "floating coalition" strategy, rallying either Democrats or Republicans according to the issue. But without firm leadership by Nixon those coalitions sometimes drifted away from his preferences.3 The president's tactics often proved counterproductive and contradictory. His disavowal of "arm-twisting' did not preclude enlisting White House staffers to press members of Congress.3 Ehrichman informed Scott that if a Republican senator refused to vote with the president, Scott should "hit him in the face." 8 Nixon considered fiscal issues to be tests of party loyalty"; Republicans who sided with the opposition too often became marked for punishment. In 1970, William E. Timmons, Harlow's successor, reported

" Robert T. HKarmann, Notes of Meeting with Congressional Leaders, Dec. 16, 1968, and Diary of White House Leadership Meetings-91st Congress, March 11, 1969. box 106, Robert T. Hartmann Papers, GRPL. " Nixon to H. I Haldeman, Nov. 12,1971, folder. P Memos 1971, box 231, H. R.Haldeman Ples, Whit House Special Ples (WHSF). Richard Nixon Presidential Materials (NPM), National Archives (NA), College Park, Md. " Nixon to Haldeman, Feb. 28, 1973, folder- P Memos 1973, box 16, Haldeman Files, Contested Document File (CDF), NPM. Reichily, Consertives in an Age of Change, 85-86; Grhamr, Civil Rights Era, 36065. Harlow to staff secretary, Oct. 29,1969, PNWH: 2, fiche 69-10-26. Scott Or-al History, Oct. 15,1976, 57, LC; Scott, interview by Reichley, Dec. 6, 1977, 2, GRFL. Diary of White House Leadership Meetingsr, 91st Congress June 24, 1969, box 106, Hartmann Papers, DEAN J, KOTLOWSKI

that liberal Senator Charles M. Mathias of Maryland had been receiving "deep freeze" treatment, including "no meetings, one line acknowledgment to letters, failure to return calls, etc. in an effort to show him we disapprove of his anti-RN votes."' These methods could not be used to the same degree against the minority leader. Scott's relations with the liaison office mirrored his dealings with the administration: periods of harmony punctured by fleeting complaints. Harlow, who learned the art of executive-legislative branch relations during Eisenhower's administration, met with GOP senators every Tuesday in Scott's office. 4 Correspondence between the two men seemed chatty, even chummy. 2 The minority leader considered Timmons a "friend" and described their relations as "pleasant."43 Scott's critique of White House- GOP leadership meetings and the White House personnel office involved minor matters. He reminded Nixon to keep his stated schedule of meeting with lawmakers every other Tuesday," and urged "increased dialogue" between the "personnel staff and Hill people" before the president announced his appointments. At the same time, Scott defended his own turf. He objected when the White House tapped other senators to intro- 47 duce legislation. In an unpublished paper on Senate leadership, Scott ranked voting his conscience as his highest priority. Serving the Keystone State came second, leading Republican senators third, and pushing administration programs last. "I cannot subordinate my own conscience nor the welfare of Pennsylvania for what some feel is the tradition of complete, unbending support for the executive department's viewpoints," Scott asserted.48 By trying to sound like

4"William E.Timmon toTed Hullin, Oct. 27, 1970, folden Eha-lichman Chronological Files [Oct. 5, 1970-Nov, 24, 1970] [3 of 4], box 54, John D. Ehrmichan Files, WHSF, NPM. Nargie to Scott, Scpl 30, 1969, foldcr 1969-1976 Republican Leadership, box 64, Scott Papers. Scott to Harlow, Dec. 19, 1973 and Harlow to Scott, Dec. 26, 1973, folder 1970-1976 White House, box 65, Scott Papers., " Scott to Timmons, Dec. 5,1974, folder: 1970--1976 White House, box 65, Scott Papers. 4Scott to Timnons, July 17, 1970, ibid. "Scott to Ttmmonm, Aug. 15, 1974, folder Scott. Hugh (1), box 24, Congresional Mail ile, GR,. He disliked Tranportation Secretary John A. Volpe's d(cision, in 1970, to oppose expansion of an interstate highway in Pennsylvania. "Dan" to "Roy," March 2,1970, and "Dan" to 'Sid," March 3, 1970, folder: 1970-1971 MisceUaneous Political Correspondence and Papers, box 32, Scott Papers. 47 Scott to Harlow, June 30, 1970, folder: 1970-1976 White House, box 65, Scott Papers. 4 "Unpublished Paper by U.S. Senator Hugh Scott," [late 1969], folder.1969 Paper by HS Re His Role as Minority Leader, box 64, Scott Papers HUGH SCOTT AND RICHARD NIXON

Edmund Burke, whom he admired, the minority leader exaggerated his own independence.49 Scott remembered times when he would vote against the administration on a bill, then vote the other way to sustain Nixon's veto of the same measure.' Overall, however, the senator seemed serious about his duties and realistic concerning his relations with the president. The president, also a realist, had to cooperate with his Senate leader. Nixon at first welcomed the change from Dirksen to Scott since the former had opposed some of his choices to head federal agencies. White House chief of staff H. R. Haldeman found an early meeting with Scott and Ford "productve." The president thought that the Pennsylvanian would make an "an effective leader" who "can bring the liberals along, where[as] Baker could not have, and we can hold the conservatives ourselves. "" Nixon wanted Scott to succeed. The president told Haldeman, in 1970, that the senator should have "a bundle [of bills] to cargo" to help him "protect" his leadership "spot" if Scott won reelection. 2 But Nixon grew dissatisfied with Scotts independent streak. The White House always felt that Hugh Scott should be its leader in the Senate," recalled Eugene Cowen, a one-time Scott aide who worked for Nixon's congressional liaison staff " In June 1970, H. R. Haldeman noted, Nixon dreamed of gaining three Senate seats "so we can win a vote without sweating it out to the last second" and then "overthrow Scott and maybe get some leadership." "The present situation really frustrates [Nixon]," he growled, "understandable." A year later, the president complained that he had received more support from House Minority Leader Ford than from Scott (fig. 2)." Nixon and Haldeman filed to understand that power among Senate Republicans was dispersed among several committees, hindering the 35 emergence of a powerful majority or minority leader. Given his weak leadership position and an uneasy relationship with the

Scott to Norman Richardson, April 10, 1974, folder 1974 Jan.-May Nixon Resignation, box 1, Additional Papers, Scott Papers. "' Scott, interview by Reichly. Dec. 6,1977, 3, GRFL. H.L RH laldcman Diary, Sept. 30 and 24, 1969, (first and second quotations) in The Haldeman Diaries: Inside die Nixon thite House,ed. H. I Haldeman (Santa Monica, Calif, 1994) (CD-ROM). See lso "Dirksen Death Unlikely to Alter Congrss's Course,' New York Trnes, Sept. 18, 1969,26. "1H. I. H ademan Meeting Notes, April 29, 1970, PNWH. Part 5: H. R, Haldcman Notes of White House Meetings, fiche 2. Eogew Cown,intaview by A. Jan= Reckhy, Oct 5,1977, 5, R&i lntrsiw Transcripts, GRFL Quotations come from Haldcman Diary, June 11 and May 18, 1971. s Ornstein et al., "The U.S. Senate," 13. DEAN J. KOTLOWSKI

Fig. 2. Hugh Scott and House Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford meet with President Richard Nixon in the Cabinet Room, 1971. (Photo, Courtesy Gerald R. Ford Library.) president, Scott pried few rewards for Pennsylvania from Nixon's White House. The senator's greatest success came in 1969, when the president named one of Scott's protgts, William H. Brown III, an African American lawyer from Philadelphia, to chair the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).6 Yet a year later, Transportation Secretary John A. Volpe "slammed the coffin lid" on a proposed expansion of Highway 219, the north-south artery that bisects central Pennsylvania, which sent the minority leader's staff reeling." The Johnson administration, they seethed,

" Dean)J. Kodowski, -The Knowles Affair. Nixon's Self-Inflicted Wound,* Presidentid Srtudies Quarterly 30 (2000), 453. "Dan" to"Roy," March 2, 1970, foldcr: 1970-1971 Miscellaneous Political Correspondence and Papers, box 32, Scott Papers. HUGH SCOIT AND RICHARD NIXON had spent little to upgrade the commonwealth's other roadways, making the Pennsylvania Turnpike "the most expensive and obsolete major highway in the country."" With Scott facing a tough reelection race in 1970, the White House might have been more sympathetic to Pennsylvania's needs. In a larger sense, Nixon and Scott were groping with the problems inherent in the separation of executive and legislative powers set out in the U.S. Constitution. The notion, associated with Woodrow Wilson, of the president as prime minister, using his party to lead Congress, proved the exception, not the rule. Harlow informed Scott that "despite our most cordial efforts" sporadic "discomfort" would develop between the two branches." Beginning in 1933, equipped with larger staffs, "modern" presidents acquired greater formal and informal powers, which they often exercised without reference to Congress. Facing a Democrat-controlled House and Senate, Nixon often made policy via administrative actionY' But as Hannah Arendt has argued, the presidency remains both the strongest and weakest office on earth; U.S. presidents enjoy leeway in foreign affairs, while the House controls fiscal matters and the Senate considers treaties and nominations.61 Nixon could not ignore Congress-and vice versa.

On policy questions, Nixon and Scott either jousted, compromised, or forged a united front. Their greatest differences occurred over the president's Supreme Court nominations. Regarding civil rights, the two men either found common ground or agreed to disagree. On foreign policy, Scott proved a staunch Nixonian. In general, discord over a few high profile issues clouded significant accord between the president and senator. The president's early choices for the Supreme Court troubled Scott. In line with the southern strategy, which centered around symbolic gestures, Nixon named Judge Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., of South Carolina to the high court in 1969. Senate liberals, upset over Haynsworth's conservative rulings on labor issues and school desegregation, accused the judge of conflict of interest, participating in cases where he stood to gain financially.

"' "Dan" to "Sid,* March 3,1970, ibid. " Harlow to Scott, July 14,1970, folder: 1970-1976 White House, box 65, Scott Papers. , Fred 1 Greenstein, "Nine Presidents in Search of a Modem Prcsidency," in Lcadcrship in the Modern Presidency,296-52, " Stephen E. Amnbrose, intrd., The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House, ad. H. FL Haldeman (New York, 1994), 5, DEAN). KOTLOWSKI

The charges, however thin, resonated among GOP moderates. "Ijust can't vote for him," Scott told Nixon. "His record indicates he will be a vote against civil rights positions on the court."6 The minority leader joined GOP Senators Margaret Chase Smith of Maine, Richard Schweiker of Pennsylvania, William Saxbe of Ohio, and Minority Whip Robert Griffin of Michigan in voting down the nomination.' "I have kept my counsel," he privately affirmed, "and voted my conscience."64 Although Scott recalled Wbite House pressure to back the judge, Nixon understood his "dilemma" and granted Scott "leave" to vote against Haynsworth.6" In nominating Haynsworth, Nixon appeared more attuned to the concerns of southern whites than those of blacks and Republican moderates. "Northern senators feel that the administration doesn't care much about them," Schweiker observed, adding that "there wasn't a Haynsworth vote north of D.C."' According to Cowen, Scott's one-time aide, GOP liberals such as Schweiker having run ahead of Nixon in 1968 "felt little sense of allegiance" to him and appealed to a "different constituency."67 Hamberger, another Scott aide, read a news clipping entitled "'Southern Strategy' Is Alive and Well" and lamented that it represented "2/3rds of the thinking within the White House. ""' Haldeman, in turn, considered independent- minded Republicans "a pretty despicable group," although Scott seemed "not so bad." During a December 1969 meeting, moderate Republican senators "made [the] point that they're worried mainly about 'Southern Strategy' and that we have to be concerned with the big states and big cities, where the people are." Nixon, in a foul mood, dubbed the whole encounter "useless" and Haldeman agreed. 9 Scott did not relish opposing Nixon's high court nominees. When Senator Phillip A. Hart, Democrat of Michigan, invited him to recommend

Scott Oral History, Oct. 16. 1976, 61, LC. "Kotlowski, *Trial By Error," 75-83. "Scott Handwritten Note, no date, folder Papers Re Clement Haynsworth's Nomination to the Supreme Court, box 32, Scott Papers. " Scott, interview by Reichley, Dec. 6, 1977, 3, GRLN; Harlow to staff secretary, Oct. 29, 1969, PNWIH: 2, fiche 69-10-26. ' Tom Lias to Kevin Phillips. Oct. 16, 1969, folder Haynswordl 3, box 6, Harry S. Dent, Jr., Files, WHSF, NPM. "Cowen, intmerw by Reichlcy, Ocr. 5, 1977, 5, GRFL. SI Martin G. Haibergr, Unaddressed Memnorandwn, Dec. 3, 1971, folder 1970-1971 Miscellantms Poltical Correspomnc and Papers, box 32, Scott Paprs. " Haldeman Diary. Dec. 10, 1969. HUGH SCOTT AND RICHARD NIXON a probe of Haynsworth's finances, the Pennsylvanian, like any loyal Republican, balked. But the White House never saw this side of Scott. After the Senate rejected the judge, Nixon excluded Scott and Griffin from a meeting on chemical weapons.70 "Problem with Congress, especially Republican senators, deepens daily," Haldeman wrote late in 1969. "Scott seems to go out of his way to take on the White House at every opportunity. P is determined to hold to his line of the cold shoulder for those who don't stick with us."7' The senator got the message. To "lock himself' into supporting the president, Scott quickly endorsed Nixon's next nominee, Judge G. Harrold Carswell of Florida." Attorney General John Mitchell assured the senator that Carswell was moderate and would garner wide support, for the Senate had voted three times to confirm him to lower offices." Although the judge's intellectual mediocrity and segregationist past ultimately sank his nomination, Scott swallowed hard and voted "yes" on Carswell.' Scott later described his vote for Carswell as his "worst mistake"; Nixon later admitted that he had nominated Carswell out of anger over the Senate's rejection of Haynsworth." On voting rights, both men showed greater flexibility. Nixon at first sought to appease southern conservatives who hated the Voting Rights Act of 1965 for singling out Dixie for federal oversight. Rather than renew the act, set to expire in 1970, Nixon and Mitchell proposed a substitute which abolished literacy tests nationwide and repealed pre-clearance, the section requiring southern states to clear their voting laws with the Justice Department. 6 But the president did not want to thwart minority voting rights and did not make the abolition of pre-clearance a priority. He had supported voting rights legislation as vice president and had endorsed the 1965 act. In 1969, Nixon jotted down his thoughts on that law: "(1) it has

'SHC on Hamberr to Scott, SepL 4, 1%9, foldcr. Judiciary Committee-Carsweil Nomination, box 68, Scott Papers; Haldernan Meeting Notes, Nov. 21,1969, PNWH: 5, fiche 12, "Haldeman Diary, Dec 5, 1969. n Cowen, interview by Reichlcy, Oct. 5.1977, 4, GRFL. "Scott Oral History, Oct. 16, 1976, 63, LC. "Cowen, intcrview by Reichley, Oct. 5, 1977,4, GRFL; Scott Oral History, Oct. 16,1976,64, LC. 7 Scott, interview by Reicley, Dec. 6, 1977,3, GRFL (quotation); Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered, 46. Steven F. Lawson, In Au t ofPover: Southr Blacks and ElectoralPolitics(New York, 1985), 121-57; Abigail M. Ternstrorn, WhMe Votes Count Affirmafive Action and Minority Voting Rights (Cambridge, Mass., 1987), 31-42; Graham, Ci Rights Era, 246-65; Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered, 94. DEAN J. KOTLOWSKI worked for South, (2) 1 want no retreat, (3) it should be national-uniform residence requirements. Any bill that accomplishes that will have my approval."' The president ordered his team to hang tough on the sections of Mitchell's bill that covered the "whole country," that is, ending all literacy tests and establishing uniform residence requirements for voting. As for the rest, including pre-clearance, he voiced "no obj. to compromise."' Civil rights liberals and GOP moderates, led by Scott, made compromise possible. Before the president's substitute bill passed the House late in 1969, Scott huddled with Phil Hart, the Michigan Democrat, to plot how to propel a revised voting rights measure through the Senate. 9 Scott and Hart took the toughest enforcement provisions of Mitchell's bill-a national ban on literacy tests and uniform residency requirements-and joined them to the existing law. Their version retained pre-clearance, as liberals wanted, and applied it to nonsouthern states where less than fifty percent of eligible minority citizens had voted in 1968, another "national" proviso for Nixon."0 In March 1970, Scott-Hart breezed through the upper chamber, 64 to 12, with eleven of the dissenters coming from Dixie.2 The president opposed only one part of Scott-Hart, an amendment attached by Senate liberals to lower the voting age to eighteen. Assuming that most young people voted Democratic, Nixon told aides they "must defeat" the eighteen-year-old vote. 2 But he also professed a belief in "ballots, not bullets," that dissenters should express themselves in voting booths rather than in the streets. After weighing the pluses and minuses of vetoing the revised Voting Rights Act, Nixon deemed the price of stifling the eighteen-year-old vote too costly. A veto would alienate minority groups

"Nixon Handwritten Comment (NHC)on Bradley H. Partrson, Jr., to Ehlichiman, Dec. 8, 1969, PNWH: Part 6, Series A, Documents Annotated by the Presidemt, fiche 49. 'John D. Ehrlichman, Meeting Notes, DCc. 9, 1969, PNWU. Prt 3:john D. Ehrlichman Notes of Meerings with the President, fiche 7. 7,David Johnson to Sid Bailey, Dee. I0,1969, folder: Jan. 1969-Jan. 1970 Voting Rights- Extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, box 156, Scott Papers. " This addition was the so-called Cooper nent sponsored by Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, a moderate Republican. See "Statement Explaining the Cooper Amendment," no date, ffoldc.Voting Rights Act-1969-70, box 510,John Sherman Cooper Papers, Margaret . King Library, University of Kentucky. ""5 -Year Extension of Voting Rights Passed By Senate," New York i, Match 14, 1970, 1. See also "Outlne forRevicw of Compromise Amendment to the Voting Rights Act of 1969," Feb. 18, 1970, folder 1970 Feb. Voting Rights-Extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, box 156, Scott Papers. Ehrlichman Meeting Notes, March 17, 1970, PNWH: 3,fiche 13. HUGH SCOTT AND RICHARD NIXON and divide the country at a time when citizens were protesting the president's military incursion into Cambodia and the shootings of anti-war demonstrators at Kent State University. In the end, Nixon signed the 1970 act to prevent the "goddamn country" from "blowing up."" In fashioning the compromise, Scott acted from two considerations. The first was his strong belief in civil rights. Throughout his career, Scott had supported nearly every bill or amendment to advance racial equality. He co- sponsored the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and proposed a holiday to honor the memory of Martin Luther King, Jr. 4 Clarence Mitchell, chief lobbyist for the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, called Scott "the opponent that Dixie segregationists wish to avoid.""5 Second, Scott's political compass led him to back voting rights, for both Philadelphia and Pittsburgh had sizeable African American populations. After the senator endorsed renewal of the Voting Rights Act in 1969, his staff asked Clarence Mitchell to spread the word among black voters." When the senator faced reelection in 1970, Scott's aides advised him to play down the president's support of the compromise bill, "It might be considered to dilute your role in the passage of the extension," they said. Scott, no less a politician than Nixon, backed civil rights more vigorously and, at times, in a more calculated way. Scott's independent streak set him against Nixon's other racial policies. The senator urged a presidential message on race "to allay the widespread fear that this administration does not hst this concern among its highest priorities. I know otherwise.' In 1972 he shelved a bill to outlaw busing to integrate schools. The measure, backed by Nixon and passed by the House,

" Ehrlichman Meeting Notes, June 19, 1970, box 1, Ehrlichman Files, CDF, NPM. "Statement by U.S. Senator Hugh Scott on Civil Rights Lgislation," March 10, 1960, folder: 1960-1962 Civil Rights Gcneral (2), box 74; News Release, 'Senator Scott Advocates Fight against All Discrimination,' Aug. 6, 1963, folder 1963-1964 Civil Rights, box 74; Fact Sheet, "Senator Scotts Record on Civil Rights Legislation," no date, folder 1959-1971 HS's Voting Record on Civil Rights, box 215, Scott Paers. " Clarence Mitchell, "From the Work Bench," The Afro-Amer can, Sept. 17, 1963, folder: 1963-1964 Civil Rights General, box 74, Scott Papers. " Cowen ro Scott, June 25, 1969, folder: Jan. 1969-Jan. 1970 Voting Rights--Extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, box 156, Scott Papers. "SHC on Bart-Jeffrey to Scott, no date, folder. Feb. 1970 Voting Rights--Extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, box 156, Scott Papers. " Scott to Nixon, March 4, 1970, folder. 1955-1974 Richard M. Nixon (1), box 3, Additional Papers, Scott Papers. DEANJ. KOTLOWSKI

called into question all court-ordered desegregation.89 Scott and Majority Leader Mansfield agreed to consider the anti-busing bill at the dose of the session. Scott then advised the Senate to await a ruling by the Supreme Court on the measure's constitutionality, even though it never passed the Senate. He also voted against ending a filibuster of the anti-busing bill." "This is not the time," Scott told Nixon, 'for the Senate to vote on an issue which affects the fundamental requirements of our Constitution and the future of millions of our citizens."92 Nixon and Scott were not always in disagreement over civil rights. The senator backed the president's Philadelphia Plan, to set minority hiring goals for construction trades, quietly "so as not to stir up" unrest among blue-collar white workers in his state. 2 Nixon, fbr his part, was no enemy of civil rights. To appease white southerners, he had amplified his opposition to busing while muffling his efforts to desegregate Dixie's schools.9 In 1972 the president privately remarked that "legally segregated education is inferior education" and rejected "any solution that would, in effect, 'turn back the clock."'94 Since opposing busing was not among Nixon's policy priorities, it did not cause a rift between him and the minority leader.95 During 1970, with Scott up for reelection, he could not afford to stray from the president. Sixty-two percent of Pennsylvanians approved of Nixon's job performance. Timmons observed that Scott was "constantly looking over his shoulder at the ambitions of Bob Griffin, Howard Baker, and Bob Dole" and was "particularly interested in having the image of the 'President's man . ' Scott's staff compiled figures in 1970 showing him ahead of Baker, Dole, and Hruska in supporting the president. He voted the administration's way 78 percent of the time in 1969, endorsing 72 percent of Nixon's

nGOP Leader Helps Scuttle Anti-Busing Sd]," Human Evens Oct. 21, 1972, folder. 1972 Busing (2), box 163, Scott Papers. "' 'Joint Menorandun of Understanding between Senator Mansfield and Senator Scott," Sept. 15, 1972, and New frm Senator Hugh Scott, Oct. 10. 1972, foder: 1972 Busing (2), box 163, Scott Papers. 'lScott to Nixon, draft !reer, no date, folder: 1972-1974 Busing, box 163, Scott Papers. Cowen to Scott,July 9,1969, folderJan. 1969-Jan. 1970 Voting Rights-Extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, box 156, Scott Papers. " Kotlowski, 'Nixon's Southern Strategy Revisited," 221-24 9 Edward L.Morgan, Memorandum for the President's Fde, March 10, 1972, folder Beginning March 5 11972J, box 4, President's Office Files(POI0, CDr, NPM, "' 'I don't think much of your position," Nixon told Scott, "but you have a right to hold it." Scott Oral History, Oct. 16, 1976, 60, LC. *Timmons to Nixon.July 15,1970, folder: Beginning July 12,1970, box 4, POP, CDP, NPM. HUGH SCOrr AND RICHARD NIXON domestic programs and 95 percent of his foreign policy initiatives." Scott told one White House staffer that he could recall "no major instance (except Supreme Court nomination Number One) where I have been at odds with Nixon Administration policy.' After the columnist Richard Wilson noted Scoffs independence on "critical" issues, the senator pointed to a record that "shows me third in the Nation in support for the President on domestic affairs and the highest on foreign affars."' Nixon campaigned for Scott who defeated William G. Sesler, a Democratic state senator from Erie, by a mere 200,000 votes to retain his U.S. Senate seat."° Several factors contributed to Scoffs narrow margin of victory. He had always faced stiff challenges in this Democratic-leaning state, and 1970 was a tough year for the GOP, since the party controlling the White House usually loses congressional seats in midterm elections.' Shafer, the out- going governor who had proposed an income tax to overcome the state's budget deficits, dragged down the Republican vote; for the first time since 1936, Democrats won control of Pennsylvania's executive and legislative branches)" Within this setting, the forty-two-year-old Sesler campaigned vigorously against the sixty-eight-year-old incumbent. To Scott's claim of being "the most powerful Senator Pennsylvania ever had," Sesler replied that Scott was not even powerful enough to guarantee his own reelection as minority leader in 1971. Sesler portrayed the senator as indecisive for voting in favor of Carswell and then denouncing the Floridian as a racist, and for backtracking on a 1968 gun-control law which Scott had supported.'" Since conservatives were upset with Scotts vote against Haynsworth, the senator's base of support within Pennsylvania already had shrunk. Nevertheless, Scott

' Bill to Scott, Jan. 20, 1970, fibder: 1970-1971 Miscellaneous Political Correspondence and Papers, box 32, Scott Papers. "" Scott to Peter N. Fanigan, Feb. 5, 1970, foldecr 1970-1976 White House, box 65, Scott Papers. Scott to Richard Wilson, Oct. 13, 1970, folder: Scott, Hugh 1970, box 8, Richard L. Wilson Papers, HHL. ''Wilson's rqly was rather defensive. See Wilson to Scott, Oct 19,1970, rolder Scott, Hugh 1970, box 8, Wilson Papers; Tmmons, Memorandum for the President's File, Nov. 6,1970, PNWH: 2, Fiche 70-11-1; Extent of Shapp's Victory Gives Democrats Legislative Control," New York Tnes, Nov. 5, 1970, 43. ," Kodowski, "Hugh Doggett Scott, Jr.," ANB, 19: 492-93. "'GO.P. Fears Loss in Pennsylvania," New York Times, May 11, 1969, 42; "Extent of Shapp's Victory Gives Democrats Legislative Control," New York Thnies Nov. 5, 1970, 43. "Shapp, Democrat, Elected Governor of Pennsylvania," New York T nes, Nov. 4, 1970, 26; "Seler s Beaten by Scott,* Phibdelphia Inquirer. Nov. 4,1970, 1, 7. DEAN J. KOTLOWSKI ran well in midstate, respectably in Philadelphia, and gained the largest majority of any Republican senator in the nation, fifty-two percent of the vote, becoming the first Pennsylvanian to win three consecutive terms in the U.S. Senate,">4 Following the midterm elections, Nixon became entangled in an effort to remove Scott as minority leader. Late in 1970 the president advised Baker not to seek the minority leader's post, fearing it would divide the GOP. 05 But Nixon escalated tensions when he named Dole, an up-and-coming conservative, to chair the Republican National Committee (RNC)." Scott lambasted Dole's appointment as "intolerable in my leadership position," and White House staffers found the senator "red hot" and "climbing the wall over Dole. " " A freshman senator, Dole had annoyed the minority leader by supporting the president vocally and solicitously.t " Scott's umbrage said a good deal about his tenuous hold on the leadership, for Dole could not have challenged him openly from the RNC post. After Scott urged GOP senators to oppose Dole, Nixon, in a clumsy fashion, encouraged a revolt. Vice President Agnew urged Senate Minority Whip Griffin to seek Scott's job, and Griffin expressed interest, if he did not have to lead the fight himself Haldeman cryptically jotted that Harlow was seeing Senator John J. Williams of Delaware "re overthrow [off Scott." ' Nixon, like Griffin, shied away from open warfare against the minority leader. According to Haldeman, the president had moved against Scott only to strengthen his own hand and force the Pennsylvanian to accept Dole."0 When Scott complained of White House officials campaigning against him, Nixon vowed to fire "by nightfall" any staffer found meddling in the leadership fight."' In 1971, Scott hung on to his leadership post, defeating

'" "GOP Strategy Fails," larrsburg(Pa.) Parrior, Nov 6, 1970, 30; "Scott Labels Balloting Tribute' to President," Harrisburg (PA.) Patriot, Nov. 5, 1970, 2; "Shapp Maps Fast Bid on Tax Reform, Pinrsborgh Post-Gazette, Nov. 5, 1970, 4; "Sesler is Beaten by Scott," Philadelphia Inquuier, Nov. 4, 1970, 1, 7 " Wiliam E.Tnmon, MeNmorancdun for the President's Fde, Nov. 6,1970, PNWJ: 2, fiche 70-11-1. ""Dooe Is Slcectcd to Direct GOP," New York Tracs,Jan. 6, 1970, 42. "' HIsldeinan Meeting Notes, fDe. 1970 and Dec, 11, 1970, PNW1-: 5, fiche 37; Haideman Diary, Dec. 11, 1969. " Nixon to F-aldeiman, Dcc. 4,1970, in From the Preside(c Richard Nixon's Secret Fsk , edLBruce Oudes (New York, 1989), 181. " Haldeman Meeting Notes, Dec. 11, 1970, PNWH: 5, fiche 37, 11 Haldcman Diary,Jan. 7, 1971. . Scott, interview by Reichlcy, Dec. 6, 1977, 5, GRFL. HUGH SCOTT AND RICHARD NIXON

Baker 24 to 19.' Nixon and Scott remained unhappily yoked. Or were they? Scott supported much of Nixon's domestic agenda. The senator, like the president, espoused aid to minority-owned businesses. " 3 He endorsed Nixon's extension of the tax surcharge, then "really raised hell" in a "highly partisan exchange" with Mansfield over the issue. Scott professed the "grtst admiration" for Treasury Secretary , a presidential favorite, and encouraged Nixon's use of wage and price controls to arrest inflation. " 4 He unsuccessfully fought to pass the president's welfare reform bill, the Family Assistance Plan.1 In assisting Nixon, Scott displayed guile. When Senate liberals pressed Scott to oppose the president on ABM, Cowen advised the senator, who favored ABM, to change the subject and discuss instead his stand on behalf of voting rights." 6 After Scott prodded labor unions to back the president's wage and price controls, Nixon scrawled: "Tell him RN appreciated his good statement." 7 After Scott helped sustain the president's veto of a dean water bill, Nixon commended him for 'a great job."" ' Scott applauded Nixon's conduct of foreign affairs from the sidelines. A Sinophile, he favored changing U.S. policy toward the People's Republic of China, likening improved relations to a pearl and China to an oyster in desperate need of opening. He called Nixon's visit to China an "important step in producing world peace."" 9 On arms control, he privately affirmed: "Mr. President, your course is right"" Yet neither Scott nor Nixon backed unilateral concessions to the Soviet Union. In 1972 the senator rejected both

"'"Kennedy Ousted as Whip as 92d Congress Meets," New York Tfmes, Jan. 22. 1971. 12. . News from Senator Hugh Scant, March 7, 1973, folder: Scott, Senator Hugh-News Releases 1973, box R30,Gerald R.Ford Congressional Papers, GRFL; quotations com from Haldeman Meeting Notes, July 18, 1969, PNWH: 5, fiche 6. "'"Scott Forecasts Extended Stsrax, New York Tunes, Feb. 5,1969,24; Haldeman Meeting Notes, Dec. 14, 1970, PNWH: 5, fiche 38; "Dugout Chatter," June 11, 1973, folder Scott, Hugh-Dugout Chatter 1973, box R30, Ford Congressional Papers, GRFL .. Scott. interview by Reichley, Dec. 6, 1977, 6, GREL ..Cowen to Scott, July 7, 1969, folde: Jan. 1969-Jan. 1970 Voting Rights-Extension of Voting Rights Act of 1965, box 156, Scott Papers, "' NHC on News Summary, Oct. 12,1971, PNWH, Par 6, Series B: Annotated News Summaries, fiche 60. "' Scott Notes on 'Call from the President," Oct. 18, 1972, folder 1955-1974 Richard M. Nixon (2), box 4, Additional Papers, Scott Papers ""Senator Scott, in Tokyo, Cites New Options for U.S, on China," New York Tunes, Feb. 16,1969, 7; *Congressman Voice Pleasure; Taiwan Sends Protest to U.S.," New York Tnegs July 16, 1971,2. 120Clark MacGreor, Memorandum for the Presidents Fkl,May 20,1971, 3, PNWH Z fiche 71-5-71. DEAN J. KOTLOWSKI the "folly of unilateral disarmament" and the Mansfield Amendment to reduce U.S. troop levels in Europe. Nixon agreed: "Why jeopardize what may be going on with [Soviet President] Podgomy or in China?" Perhaps indicative of his trust in Scott, the president deferred to his "good judgment" on how to thwart Mansfield's proposal. 2' More likely, Nixon's concern over the amendment, which Congress had rejected in 1969 and 1971, had diminished by 1972." Scott backed Nixon's Vietnam policy. By 1969 both men had soured on the Indochinese war and sought "peace with honor." The president's policy blended escalation, negotiation, and Vietnamization, in which indigenous troops replaced U.S. forces on the battlefield. Scott initially had backed LBJ's escalation of the war, then endorsed Johnson's decision in 1968 to begin peace talks.'23 After traveling to twenty Pennsylvania counties, Scott reported that "the people want to get out of Vietnam, but without disgrace." 24 At first the senator saw Vietnamization as a viable option. 2 ' Following the fall of Saigon in 1975, his views changed and he called the effort "a little ridiculous. ""2'6 In the interim, a familiar story unfolded with Scott balancing his conscience and loyalty to the president against the wishes of constituents and GOP moderates, who were turning against the war. Scott's own desire for peace flashed from time to time. In May 1969 he suggested that removing some U.S. troops might "flush out" North Vietnam's intentions at the bargaining table. 2 Five months later, Nixon ordered Harlow and National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger to "take Scott into the woodshed and make sure he stops his talk on [a unilateral] cease-fire. " " Scott, along with Mansfield, sponsored a resolution in November 1969 supporting a mutual cease-fire, free elections in South

" Notes from HS's Conversation with the President," June 20, 1972, folder; 1955-1974 Richard Nixon (2), box 4, Additional Papers, Scott Papers. 1uHoff, Nixon Reconsidered, 193. , Jeffrey Kimball, Nivon's Vietnam War (Lawrence, Kans., 1998), 63-102; Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered,208-10, Cowen to Mana, Feb. 8, 1967, and UPI Wire Rqot, April 3, 1967, WHCF, Name File: Hugh Scott (Sen), LBJL. " Diary of Whtite House Leadersip Meetings--91 st Congress, Sept. 16, 1969, box 106, Hartmann Papers - Vietnam 1: Critics Say Nixon Policy Is a Hoax,' New York Time Feb. 8, 1970, E4. Scott,o int eview by Reichly, Dec. 6, 1977, 5, GRFL. "'Scott Joins Aiken in Urging Pullout," New York Times, May 3, 1969, 1. nHa]deman to f arlow and I enry A. Kissinger, Oct. 22,1969, folder Memos/Bryce Harlow (Oct. 1969), box 4, Haldernan Files, CDF, NPM. HUGH SCOTT AND RICHARD NIXON

Vietnam, and the Paris Peace Talks-all in line with White House policy." The declining discipline among U.S. soldiers in Vietnam troubled the senator, who advised Kissinger that the problem might require "accelerating the rate of withdrawal."" In general, however, Scott backed administration policy. 3' In 1971 the senator privately praised "the president's splendid handling of the war in Vietnam."'32 Scott applauded the president's invasion of Cambodia as "courageous and remarkable," and voted against the Cooper-Church Amendment requiring the removal of U.S. forces from Cambodia by July 1, 1970." Not wanting to tie Nixon's hands, Scott opposed the McGovern-Hatfield Amendment setting a deadline for U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. He also accused Democratic critics of "crying the same line as Moscow, Peking and Hanoi" and goaded anti-war protestors to "demonstrate against Hanoi."" 4 Scott dubbed South Vietnam's incursion into Laos a success, which it was not, and he praised the president's decision to review the case of Lieutenant William L. Calley, Jr., the officer held responsible for the massacre of civilians at My Lai." 5 Scott defended Nixon's war with the gusto of a battle-scarred partisan, and, he later claimed, it hurt him politically." That recollection was gratuitous and self-serving; turning "dove" would have enhanced neither Scott's political position nor the effort to exit Vietnam. The withdrawal of most U.S. troops, the senator privately conceded, had removed Vietnam as a front-burner issue for the presidential election of 1972."' Public opinion, in fact, swung Nixon's way on sending bombers to halt North Vietnam's 1972 offensive; two-thirds of

' 0 "40 Senators Back Cease-Fire Plea," New York Tumes, Nov. 8, 1969, 10. ' Scott to Kissinger, Dec. 2, 1969, folder: 1970-1975 , box 3, Additional Papers, Scott Papers. "' 'Kennedy Decries U.S. Military Tactics in Vietnam,' New York Tunes, May 21, 1969, 4. 112Scott to Clark MacGregor, Sept. 14,1971, folden 1970-1976 Wlfike Howse, box 65, Scott Papers. ""Nixon Agrees to See Congress Groups,' New York Times, May 2, 1970, 5 (quotation); 'Senate Rol-Call on Cambodia Curb," New York Times, July 1, 1970, 13. "4 "War Curb Lases in Senate," New York Times, Sept. 2, 1970, 10; "Moves to Swat Nixon Leave Scott Out on a Limb," Baltimore Sun, April 12, 1971, folder: 1970-1971 White House, box 157, Scott Papers (first quotation); "Nixon Steps Up Efforts to Mute Criticism of His Vietnam Policy," New York Times, Oct. 1, 1969, 5 (second quotation). " "Admitaion Aide Portray the Incursion into Laos as a Success,' New York Times, Feb. 24, 1971; "Congress Divided over CalIcy Case," New York Tunes, April 6. 1971, 18. Scott, interview by Reichley, Dec. 6, 1977, 5. CRL. " Scott to MacGregor, Sept. 14,1971, folder 1970-1976 White House, box 65, Scott Papers. DEAN J. KOTLOWSKI

Pennsylvanians who wrote the White House endorsed the president's stand.'38 Scott offered no fresh ideas for ending the conflict. His suggestion that some U.S. troops remain in South Vietnam following a peace settlement, as in Korea, was "unrealistic," for Vietnam and Korea were not parallel cases.' 39 Had Scott advanced a plan to end the war, Nixon probably would have ignored it. The president did not consult the senator prior to the Cambodian operation, and Scott's advice that Nixon explain the Christmas 1972 bombing of North Vietnam in a televised address went unheeded." Locked into party loyalty, the minority leader lacked the leverage and vision to influence the presidents posture on Vietnam. Scott's support on Vietnam paid one dividend: the senator amassed sufficient political capital to defend Republican doves. In 1970, for example, James L. Buckley of the Conservative Party ran for the Senate seat held by Charles E. Goodell, Republican of New York. Nixon preferred Buckley to Goodell, the sponsor of an amendment to remove all U.S. troops from Vietnam by the end of 1970. Agnew, playing the part of attack dog, denounced Goodell as a turncoat, the "Christine Jorgensen of the Republican party," a reference to an early sex-change operation. 42 Scott campaigned for his Senate colleague and chided Agnew's campaigning: "When the president is away, there are those who like to play." 42 Yet the vice president distinguished Scott's sporadic independence from Goodell's habitual disloyalty. 3 Nixon privately conceded that Scott could not endorse Buckley.'44 In the end, of course, the president was the one celebrating, when Buckley overcame Goodell. By 1972, there was cause for Republican smiles. The Voting Rights Act had been renewed; the economy was about to boom; the battle over the Supreme Court, with four Nixon appointees, had subsided; the war in Vietnam was winding down; and the president prepared for historic journeys to China and Russia. Yet the best results did not always emerge from the

' MacGregor to Scott, May 18, 1972, ibid. " "Vietnam's Korean Solution," New York Times, Feb. 15, 1970, 12, "' Scott Notes on Telephone Conversation with Kissinger, Der- 30, 1972, folder: 1970-1975 Henry A. Kissinger, box 3, Additional Papers, Scott Papers. "' Greene, Limits ofPower, 59, IC "Rockefeller Calls on Nixon to Curb Agnew Stumping," New York Times, Oct. 7, 1970, 51. 141ibid. '" Scon haxlwrittea notes, "RN" to 'HS," July 25, 1970. folder: 1955-1974 Richard M. Nixon (1), box 3, Additional Papers, Scott Papers. HUGH SCOTT AND RICHARD NIXON decisions made by the president and the senator. Both had failed to overcome resistance to the Family Assistance Plan by Senate conservatives. The ill-effects of wage and price controls would be felt by 1973. Vietnamization prolonged the U.S. intervention in Indochina, killing an additional twenty thousand Americans over four years. 45 And less than two years after Nixon's 1972 electoral triumph, he would resign in disgrace.

The Watergate scandal represented the nadir of political judgment for both Nixon and Scott. By trying to thwart the disclosure of his reelection campaign's burglary at the Democratic National Committee's headquarters, Nixon provoked a constitutional crisis that shattered his administration. In contrast to his attitude toward Vietnam policy, Scott privately expressed doubt about the president's handling of Watergate. In public, however, he almost always defended Nixon's innocence. Why such sustained support? It was mostly an expression of Scott's sense of duty as a party leader. During the presidential campaign of 1972, the senator supported Nixon by attacking his dovish opponent. Scott voiced shock over the "callous indifference" toward the "destiny" of South Vietnam shown by Senator George S. McGovern of South Dakota, the Democratic standard-bearer."* He labeled McGovern a back-bencher and, in a bit of red-baiting, joked that if the Senate were a philatelic convention, "George would be selling Albanian stamps behind a pillar."47 Along with other Republicans, Scott even charged McGovern with waging a "defamatory campaign" against Nixon. 4 ' Scott's fealty stemmed in part from presidential bullying and cajoling. Following Nixon's landslide reelection, the White House became more confrontational in its dealings with Congress. After Scott and Ford had secured a White House meeting in March 1973 to discuss upcoming legislation, congressional liaison chief Timmons advised Nixon to demand party unity on budgetary matters and "strong leadership on early vetoes to 9 'sober up' Congress."" When Ford and Scott recommended additional

14%Scott, interview by Reichicy, Dec. 6, 1977, 6, GRFL; Small, Presidency of Richard Nixon, 210-12; Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered,209. '""GOP Leaders Criticize McGovern's Peace Plan," New York 7mcs, Oct. 12, 1972, 12. "'President's News Summary, Nov. 1,1972, PNWH, 6:B, fiche 185. "41"Smear Campaign Charged by GOP," New York Times, Oct. 8, 1972,52. " immons to Nixon, March 5, 1973, PNWH: 3, fiche 61. DEAN J. KOTLOWSKI

meetings to elevate the GOP's esprit de corps, Nixon reminded them that the House, more than the Senate, had sustained his vetoes. In a swat at Scott, Nixon described the Senate's morale as "universaly low" with ceaseless "bitching" and "whining," and he rebuked the chamber for "irresp. on spending." The president resolved to look to the House to uphold fiture vetoes because, he claimed, the "country thinks the Senate is a bunch of assholes anyway Hugh."50 "Everyone present," Haldeman recorded at the time, "felt that this is going to have quite a substantial effect and probably a very salutary one on Scott, as it shapes him up."1" In fact, the rebuke, if less stinging than Ehrlichman recalled later in his 1982 memoir, did have the 2 effect of making the minority leader more malleable.' A dose of presidential goodwill had as much impact, for Scott's tender ego welcomed a firm massage. In 1965 the senator had gushed when LBJ aide Jack Valenti telephoned to applaud Scott's statement of support on Vietnam; the Pennsylvanian remarked that no other White House had shown him such courtesy.5 3 Following the skirmish with Nixon in 1973, Scott worked to sustain a presidential veto. Nixon telephoned and the blarney flowed free and easy: "a great job"; "a marvelous job"; "you fooled us"; "this vote will help the country." "When you said at the last meeting, 'we can't count on the Senate,'" Scott responded, "that's when I decided to bust a gut."' Nixon agreed that he had done just that. The senator, who kept notes of all presidential telephone calls and words of praise, dearly relished the approval of powerful men. As Scott's support on Watergate showed, flattery can indeed get one somewhere. Two weeks after the senator's clash with the president, Nixon conferred with GOP congressional leaders denying White House participation in a cover-up of Watergate. When Scott volunteered, on his authority, to relay this denial to the press, Nixon replied: "Hell no. You can say it on my authority."' Over the next two months, the minority leader blamed Watergate on the president's campaign staff who, he observed, were

"" Ehrlichman Meeting Notes, Mar. 6, 1973, ibid. " Haldman Diary, March 6,1973. " Ebrlichman, Witnes to Power, 198-99. 1 D /iracArdurii tojack Vaicn, March 2, 1%5, WHCF, Name &leHugh Scott (Sen), LBJL Scott Notes on Telephone Call by Nixon, no date, folder 1955-1974 Richard M. Nixon (2), box 4, Additional Papers, Scott Papers. " Scott to Hamberger, May 10, 1973, folder: 1973 Nixon Resignation, box 1, Additional Papers, Scott Papers. HUGH SCOTT AND RICHARD NIXON neither party officials nor professional politicians. Scott commended Nixon for accepting the resignations of Haldeman and Ehrlichman, affirmed his "fill confidence" in the president's innocence, and denounced former White House Counsel John W. Dean III as a "little rat" who had sought to save his own hide by implicating Nixon in efforts to obstruct justice)56 The senator bristled at the disclosure of a hidden White House taping system, reckoning (correctly) that prior administrations had engaged in similar eaves- 1 7 dropping. Yet Scott harbored doubts. "Someone is not telling the truth," he wrote Hamberger, "is it H and E? Dean? Or, God forbid, higher up?" The senator alluded to "the dilemma I face" as "party leader" and promised not to "prejudge this horrible situation, until all the facts are out.""' Since no Senate leader could have broken with his president at this point, Scott implored Nixon to defend himself publicly. He even told Kissinger that the president must exhibit "moral indignation. ""9 Nixon replied with further denials of "wrongdoing" and vows to come out "fighting" in defense of his actions. 60 The events of autumn 1973-Agnew's resignation over bribery charges, Nixon's firing of the first special prosecutor, and news of a gap on one White House tape-reduced Scott to further pleading for full White House disclosure.' 6 Since his March 1973 showdown with Nixon, Scott had worked hard to show tough, effective leadership and loyalty to the president. In September, he reminded Nixon that "I don't run under fire." The president then congratulated "Hugh" ("or boy") on sustaining another veto. Scott responded with verbal bouquets of his own: "My hear goes out to you and the vice president. it's so tragic." "Well ..Well ...Thank you, Hugh,"

"II ugh Scott Speech, "Bad Day at Credibility Gap," no date, folder: Meetings with Senator Scott 1973, box R25, Robert T. Hartmann Files, GRFL,; "Republicans Give Nixon Standing Ovation,' New York Tuns, May 24, 1973.35; "Scott Calls Dean 'Little Rat," New York Times,July 18, 1973, 36. '"Some Are Shocked, Some Unconcerned by Report on Taping of Nixon's Conversations," New York Tunes. July 17, 1973, 27 "' Scott to Hamberger, May 10, 1973, folder 1973 Nixon Resignation, box 1, Additional Papers, Scott Papers. " Notes from Conversation with the President, July 29, 1973, folder: 1955-1974 Richard M. Nixon (2), box 4; Scott Handwritten Notes on Converution with Kissinger, Aug. 22, 1973, folder: 1970-1975 Henry A. Kissinger, box 3, Additional Papers, Scott Papers. " Notes from Conversation with the President, July 29,1973, folder. 1955-1974 Richard M. Nixon (2), box 4, Additional Papers, Scott Papers. " "Nixon Meets with 15 Senators; Watergate Doubts Remn," New York Truns Nov. 14,1973, L DEANJ, KOTLOWSKI

Nixon muttered.' Partisanship and praise tied, then cemented, the minority leader to the administration during this constitutional crisis. Scott's greatest leap of faith occurred early in 1974. In December 1973, White House chief of staff Alexander M. Haig, Jr., showed Scott transcripts of Nixon's still-secret conversation with Dean on March 21, 1973.13 A month later, during a private meeting, Scott listened to House Minority Leader John J. Rhodes of Arizona and RNC chair George Bush complain about "lacking enough facts" on Watergate."' The senator responded by informing the press that he had seen evidence that would exonerate the president. But to Scott's chagrin no such material existed; Haig had shown him misleading excerpts from the March conservation'6 Scott's misstep placed him on the defensive. The New York Times warned that the senator was heading toward a credibility gap as wide as Nixon's.'" "I'm afraid," one anonymous GOP senator remarked, "Hugh has gone out on a limb and ... he's going to be cut off."67 "Tell Hugh Scott to put up or shut up," fumed one Pennsylvanian. "Does he not realize that he is going down with the president?" asked another."8 The Philadelphia Bulletin agreed: "Loyal through Adversity: Scott Is Nixon Spokesman."16' Scott's comments provoked such revulsion within Pennsylvania that Earl L. Lentz, chair of the Clinton County Republican Committee, advised the senator not to tarnish hs reputation "carrying the banner for Richard "1 70 Nixon. Such words proved sobering. Scott promised Lentz that he would not "be a patsy to a situation where carrying the banner only results in my friends

"" Notes from Conversation bctween the President and Sen Scott," Sept. 25, 1973, folder: 1955-1974 Richard M Nixon (2), box 4, Additional Papers, Scott papers. "' 'Scott Shown Partial Data," Hanrsbnlrg (Pa.) Patriot, May 4, 1974, 1. 164 Scott to Harnberger, March 30, 1974, folder 1974 Jan.-May Nixon Resignation, box 1, Additional Papers, Scott Papers. '" "Scott Declares Watergate Data Can Clear Nixon," New York Times, Jan. 21, 1974, 1; "A Credibility Problem for Scott,' New York Times, Jan. 24, 1974, 28; "Scott Shown Partial Data," Harrisburg(Pa.) Parrior,May 4, 1974. 1. "'A Credibility Problem forScott," New York TimcsJan. 24, 1974,28. -''ScottWon't Yield an inch . ," New York Times, Feb. 2, 1974, 12. t Quoted in 'Kitty" to "Martin," Feb. 1, 1974, folder: July 1973-April 1974 Correspondence and Papers Re: Watergate, box 32, Scott Papers. "' News Clipping, no date, folder: July 1973-April 1974 Correspondence and Papers Re= Watergate, box 32, Scott Papers. "70 Earl L. Lentz, Jr., to Scott, Jan. 22, 1974, folder: 1974 Jan.-May Nixon Resignation, box 1, Additional Papers, Scott Papers. HUGH SCOTT' AND RICHARD NIXON

regarding me as an apologist for a sorry performance."1 ' "I hope I'm not being used," he confided to former Senator Margaret Chase Smith. "I don't think so, but, of course, I'll be more chary hereafter. After all the tapes have " the answer. 17 When Nixon ignored Scott's plea to release the remaining tapes, Hamberger warned of a "steadily declining situation"' 73 The senator

should have known that the president often lied. Regarding Agnew's74 successor, Nixon had assured Scott that it would "not be you or Jerry."" Then, he tapped Ford! Scott's public support of the president cannot be dismissed as naivet6. It was another phase in the Pennsylvanian's pendulum-like loyalty; having swung against the president on Haynsworth and civil rights, he oscillated back on Vietnam and Watergate. On another level, Scott felt a private anguish over the scandal separate from the pressures facing a Senate leader when his president stares at impeachment. In March 1974, Scott turned down an invitation to join Democratic Senators Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts and James 0. Eastland of Mississippi in proposing a study of impeachment procedures. His acceptance would have irked pro-Nixon Republicans, encouraged anti-Nixon lawmakers, and alarmed the White House.'" Partisan considerations prevailed over constitutional duty, and Scott's alternative, the shibboleth of "full disclosure," was an attempt to pass the buck- The tapes did indeed hold the answer. The contents of the tapes initially shocked Scott. In April he had warned one constituent against making "moral judgments" on Nixon's conduct without a "presumption of innocence."' 76 Then, on May 7, after reading an eight-hundred-page transcript released by the White House, Scott openly deplored the "disgusting, shabby, immoral performance" of the president and his teamY' The New York Times read his critique as evidence of the GOP "disengaging" from Nixon; the Chicago Tribune, a Republican organ, cited

,' Scott to Lenz, Jan. 22, 1974, ibid. '"SCott to Margaret Chase Smith, Feb. 5, 1974, ibid. '" "President's View Disputed in House," New York imes, Feb. 27, 1974, 19; , Memorandum for the Presidert's ile Re: Meeting with Senator Hugh Scot March 27,1974, PNWI 2, Fiche 74-3-24; Hamberger to Scott, March 27,1974, folder: 1974 Jan.-May Nixon Resignation, box 1, Addition'] Papers, Scott Papers (quotation). "' Earl L. Lentz, Jr., to Scott, Jan. 22, 1974, folder: 1974 Jan.-May Nixon Resignation, box 1, Additional Papers, Scott Papers. ...Ken Davis to Scott, March 21, 1974, ibid. "' Scott to Richardson, April 10, 1974, ibid. '"Sen. Scott Shocked," PhiadelphiaInquirer, May 8, 1974, 1. DEAN). KOTLOWSKI it in urging Nixon's resignation. m Yet the minority leader would not go that far and, on the advice of staffers, he declined to attack the president farther.' 7 Scott deleted all references to his May 7 remarks in a draft letter to Interior Secretary Rogers C. B. Morton.' "The President looks to me for support (I had a most friendly meeting with him today)," he wrote one Pennsylvanian."' On May 13, Scott told the Dauphin County Republican Party that he did not favor Nixon's resignation. He then reminded reporters that the due process clause of the Constitution applied to the president as well.' Party and personal loyalties had pulled the senator back to Nixon. Other Republicans had less difficulty breaking with the president. In February 1974, House Minority Leader Rhodes backed a Judiciary Committee resolution to begin impeachment proceedings against the president; following the release of the White House transcripts, Rhodes openly urged Nixon to consider resigning."3 In May, while Scott attended a White House leadership breakfast and found the president "cordial" despite his harsh stance on the transcripts, Rhodes, expressing his "great unhappiness," skipped the meeting altogether."' Only after RNC chair Bush pleaded for Scott to handle the "situation" in a way "best for the country" did the senator begin consulting with Mansfield on rules for a trial. 5 "Jerry," Scott told Ford, "there's a better than 50-50 chance you will be president before long."'8 Division among Pennsylvanians over whether the president should leave office fed Scott's caution. In May 1974, Senator Schweiker called on Nixon to resign and arrest the "now obvious moral corrosion destroying and debasing the presidency."" 7 Shortly thereafter, the Greensburg (Pa.)

"' 'Te G.O.P. Disengages," New York Doses, May 9,1974,42; "Chicago Tribun Calls on Nixon to uit for Well-Being of Nation," New York Tmes, May 9,1974,32. "V Davis to Scott, May 8, 1974 f(older. 1974 May-June Nixon Resignation, box 2, Additional Papers, Scott Papers, Scott to Rogers C. B. Morton,June 10, 1974, ibid. , Scott to Calvin G. Griffith IIl, June 20, 1974, ibid. '"'Scott seeks Support for GOP Candidates," Harrisburg(Pa.) Patriot,May 14, 1974, 1, 4. , 'G.O.P. House Chief Backs Full Inquiry on Watergate,' New York Tunes, Feb. 2, 1974, 12; "Rhodes Urges Nixon to Consider Resigning," New York Dznes, May 10, 1974, 17. TM Scott Notes, May 8 and 9, 1974, folder: 1974 May-June Nixon's Resignation, box 2, Additional Papers, Scott Papers. tS Scott Notes, May 10, 1974, ibid. 6 ' Scott Notes on Meetings vth Ford and Mans fiedand with Ford (quotavion), May 14,1974, ibid. "7 "Nixon Shouldn't Resign," Pirrsburgh Posr-Gazetre, May 18, 1974, 8. HUGH SCOTT AND RICHARD NIXON

Tribune-Review, owned by the Pittsburgh multimillionaire Richard M. Scaife, a contributor to the president's reelection campaign, exhorted the House to impeach Nixon."' At the same time, the PittsburghPost-Gazette, while critical of the president's conduct, dismissed Schweiker's motion and urged Nixon to see the impeachment process to its conclusion." 9 Other Pennsylvanians read their junior senator's call as political, an attempt to enhance his own reelection bid; constituent mail ran two to one against Schweiker's call for Nixon's resignation. Nationwide, not one of the GOP's state chairs favored the president's resignation."9 On the issue of Nixon's resignation, Scott was more follower than leader. In May the senator agreed with Representative John B. Anderson of Illinois, a Republican member of the Judiciary Committee, that sending a delegation to advise the president to resign was premature.9 Then, after the House had voted three articles of impeachment, Scott and Goldwater met on August 2 and predicted Nixon's removal by the Senate. "The president is gone," sighed Goldwater, a much fiercer Nixon critic; "The vice president is our only hope for unifying the country."92 Three days later, on August 5, Nixon surrendered to Congress additional tapes, including a recording of the June 23, 1972, conversation in which he first ordered subordinates to obstruct the Watergate inquiry. Among GOP senators, the president's support quickly dissolved. 93 Scott's low-key approach allowed Republicans to debate the merits of sending emissaries to encourage Nixon's resignation. As late as August 2, Goldwater had vetoed such a mission, saying: "Hell, he wouldn't see us." 94 Four days later, the Senate Republican Policy Committee, minus Scott, who was attending a funeral, reached a different judgment. "We can be lied to so

"' "Resignation Pressure on Nixon Grows," Harrisburg (Pa.) Patriat,May 11. 1974, 1; "Nixon Backer's Newspaper Asks impeaMcment-Now," May 15, 1974, 3. " 4"Nixon Shouldn't Resign," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, May 18, 1974, 8. "I"Schweiker's Move: The Mail Pours In," PhiladelphiaInquirer, May 21, 1974, 7-A; "Majority of'GOP's State Chairmen Still Supporting Nixon,* Pittsburgh Post-Giserrc, May 18, 1974, 4. "' Scott Notes on May 9' Meetings, folder 1974 May-Jne Nixon's Resignation, box 2, Additional Paptrs. Scott Papers. "' Notes on "Meeting between Senator Scott and Senator Goldwater," Aug. 2, 1974, folder- Aug. 1974 Nixon Resignation, box 2, Additional Papers, Scott Papers. "" "Nixon Admits Order to Halt Inquiry on Watergate 6 Days After Break-In," New York 7imes, Aug. 6, 1974, 1. I Notes on "Meeting between Senator Scott and Senator Goldwater," Aug. 2, 1974, folde Aug. 1974 Nixon Resignation, box 2, Additional Papers, Scott Papers. DEAN J. KOTLOWSKI many times," Goldwater barked, "best [thing] he can do is to get out of WH this afternoon." New Hampshire's Norris Cotton recommended going to the president "to convey the danger of his position," while Colorado's Peter J. Dominick found Nixon's case "unsupportable." John G. Tower of Texas then reminded the group that they had "not yet gone to WH." After returning to Washington, Scott called a second meeting to implement the committee's will. By that point, Nixon already had sent for Rhodes, Scott, and Goldwater.'" Nixon's final meetings with congressional leaders were among the most awkward in the history of the presidency. Rhodes, Scott, and Goldwater found Nixon with his feet propped upon a desk, an "old habit," Scott recalled, and an effort "to avoid showing any stress." Goldwater put the president's support in the Senate at eighteen votes; Scott estimated fifteen. Nixon, having decided to resign, acknowledged his lack of options.'" The next day, August 8, the president told a bipartisan delegation that he had one more speech to give," that Watergate had been hard on everyone, and that he would not serve as a part-time president with a part-time Congress. Nixon joked, dumsily, about his ill-fitting suit, then lauded the group as "my good friends," a wild exaggeration. "God bless you," they replied as strains of "God Bless America" emanated from on-lookers outside." Scotts support for Nixon, before August 1974, cuts against the popular view that "the system worked" during Watergate. When, in 1969, the minority leader ranked his responsibilities to state, party, and president, the constitution had not entered into the equation. As the journalist Jules Witcover observed, Watergate left Scott, who claimed the evidence would exonerate Nixon, with "egg on his face."2" The senator, in contrast to Rhodes and Goldwater, placed greater stress on his duty to the president. There was, to be certain, plenty of blame to go around. A Democratic Congress inched toward impeachment, and a bipartisan

" Handwritten Meeting Notes, Aug. 8, 1974, ibid. "Hugh Scott Interviewed on CBS's Face the Nation," Aug. 21, 1974, 5-6, folder: Scott, Hugh, box 98, James B. Schiunan Files, GRFL 11 SHC on Pat to Senator, Dec. 20,1974, folder: Aug. 1974 Nixon Resignation, box 2, Additional Papers, Scott Papers. "' Richard Nixon, RN: The Mnemoirs of Richird Nixon (New York, 1978), 1073.

1 Scott Notes on "'Tlmrsday Evening, August 8, 1974 Meeting in the President's Office," folder: Aug. 1974 Nixon Resignation, box 2, Additional Papers, Scott Papers. "' Witcover, "hugh Sco10-Pussycar on a Hot Tin Roof," Washington Post, no date, folder. Scott, Hugh--General, box 11, O'Donnell and Jenckes F'les. GRFL HUGH SCOT AND RICHARD NIXON

consensus favoring either removal or resignation emerged only after eighteen months of probes, disclosures, and popular outrag? Scott's statements of confidence in Nixon's innocence and his reluctance to consider rules for a trial did nothing to expedite matters. Yet the minority leader performed a few commendable tasks. His stinging critique of Nixon's private machinations heartened the president's foes. Scott conducted himself with dignity during the last months of Nixon's presidency, working with Goldwater, a one-time btte noir. And he dished out some choice advice, telling Ford to cease making speeches in support of the president which "would make it harder to unite the country.' "I urge that you conduct a completely open presidency," Scott counsled. "Hugh," Ford replied, "for me there can be no other way." 2 In Scott's opinion, the new president was true to his word Like Nixon, Ford would not twist congressional arms. In 1964, as House minority kader, Ford had vented against "LBJ pressure" over a foreign aid bill Unlike Nixon, the new president was a twenty-five-year veteran of Congress who enjoyed a friendly rapport with legislative leaders.' Ford consulted with Scott and even sent him on a goodwill mission to the People's Republic of China. ' On the matr of dispensing patronage through either Mayor Frank Rizzo of Philadelphia or Pennsylvania's senior senator, Fords preference was dear- "protect Scott." Scott endorsed Ford's presidential bid, and the president saluted his old friend when Scott retired from the Senate in 1976'6 Years later Scott recalled, "Ofall the presidents I have known, Ford had the best understanding of the legislative process"

' loff, Nixon ReconsideCrd, 333-34.

202 Scott Notes on Meeting with the Vice President, Aug. 2, 1974, folder Aug. 1974 Nixon Resignation, box 2, Additions Papers, Scott Papers. " Scott Notes on Meetings with Ford and Mansfield and with Ford, May 14, 1974, folder 1974 May-June Nixon's Resignation, box 2, Additional Papers, Scott Papers. 2"Gerald R. Ford Diary, June 23, 1964, Asassination Review Board Records, GRFL. 2"1 have never met an enemy ofjery Ford," Scott observed. "On Vice President Ford," no date, folder: Notes by HS re Gerald Ford as Vice President, box 32, Scott Papers. S"Mar, P "to "Bill," Nov. 6,1974, WIICF, Name File: Hugh Scott, GRFL; Ford to Scott, June 9, 1976, folder: Hugh Scott (3), box 105, John Marsh Files, GRFL. ," Ford hamdwrtten comment on Timmons to Scott, Aug. 14, 1974, folde. FG 31-1 Llgatie Ladashp Meetings Aug. 9-Aug. 18,1974, box 119, WHCF 31-1 islative Ltadrship Meetings, GRPL. Ford to Scott, May 13,1976 and Pord to Scott, Dc- 9,1975, WHCF, Nan Fti: Hugh Scott, GRFL "Edited Transcript of an Interview with Honorable Hugh Scott," June 3, 1985, box 1, William A. Sayer Papers, GRFL. DEAN J. KOTLOWSKJ

The back-hand slap at Nixon could not erase the senator's complicated relationship with the former president. Three weeks following his resig- nation, Nixon telephoned Scott to express regret "that so many difficulties had arisen" for the party. "I hope they won't harass the old man," he added, referring to himself 21 Nixon had no reason to fret, for Scott endorsed Ford's pardon of the former president."' Nixon, in search of emotional support, even telephoned the minority leader on New Year's Eve 1974. The former president admitted to having a "rough time," though he claimed his life was "better." "It's been hard for you," Scott empathized, after bidding his "love" 2 12 to "Pat." That curtain-closing scene, however poignant or pathetic, underscored the many-layered bond between Nixon and Scott. Brought together by circumstance, not choice, these two Republicans occupied separate spheres, charted different courses, and banded together throughout the twin traumas of Vietnam and Watergate. Their relationship, like that of other presidents and Senate leaders, defies clever catch-phrases. They were something less than friends but something more than "unhappily yoked." Otherwise, the Scott-Nixon association is notable for two reasons. It confirms what scholars have been saying about the president's hot and cold relations with Congress; the Nixon years saw the passage of progressive domestic legislation as well as acrimonious debates over the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal. Even so, sparring between moderate Republicans like Scott and Nixon was becoming a thing of the past. By the 1970s, the GOP's demographic base had shifted from the East and Midwest to the South and West, where many voters were skeptical of federal-inspired programs. As proponents of limited government, Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush steered the party away from the ideas of Scott and Nixon, down a more conservative path.

Salisbury University DEANJ. KOTLOWSKI

SHC on Pat to Senator, Dec. 20, 1974, folder Aug. 1974 Nixon Resignation, box 2, Additional Papers, Scott Papers. "Compassion and Justice," New York "inies, Aug 27, 1974, 32. Scott Note on Telephone Call from President Nixon, Dec. 31, 1974, folder 1955-1974 Richard M. Nixon (2), box 4, Additional Papers, Scott Papers.