JOURNAL of HISTORY and MILITARY STUDIES [JHMS] Copyright © the Author(S), 2019 Volume 5(1): ISSN (Print): 2536-6726 ISSN (Online): 2734-388X Page: 92-107

Reconsidering Issues of Post-Civil War Nigeria

*Enemchukwu, Nnaemeka Emmanuel & Chukwudebelu, Michael Ifeanyichukwu**

Abstract The thirty-month war between Nigeria and Biafra which wreaked havoc and brought Nigeria on the brink of division and non-existence of itself have been examined in the context of causes, course, major actors, violence, and outcome. Yet, the issue of post-civil war reconciliation remains one of the most heated debates about the civil war. The present-day Nigeria political mainstream has not addressed the issues of reintegration of the Igbo into the fabric of the nation, and it does not seem as though they would in the nearest possible future. How- ever, it has been argued that after the war, the Federal Military Government under Gowon did everything to rebuild the already severed relationship between the people of defunct Bi- afra and the rest of Nigeria. On the other side of the argument are scholars who contend that the Gowon’s 3Rs – Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation were mere caricature and were never carried out to the latter. It is in this light of contestations that this paper, using secondary sources, evaluates the post-civil war Nigeria in relation to the feeling of marginalisation among the Igbo. The paper finds that there were concerted efforts by the Gowon’s regime to rebuild the Igbo after the war but varying challenges, especially the ab- sence reintegration efforts, thwarted the move, defeated the aim and laid the foundation for the victimisation of the Igbo in Nigeria. Hence, it advances the argument that the seeds of Gowon’s policy of 3Rs are largely responsible for recent resurgence of agitation-groups in all parts of Nigeria especially in the south-eastern part.

Introduction The civil war of 1967–70 between Nigeria and Biafra was fought along ethnic lines. For the Igbo it was a systematic genocide perpetrated by the Federal Military Government of Ni- geria, of which over three million Biafrans were killed.1 The policy of economic blockade and starvation mounted by the government of Nigeria could be said to be an evidence of ______Corresponding Author: *&**Department of History and International Studies, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Enugu State, Nigeria. Reconsidering Issues of Post-Civil War Nigeria N.E. Enemchukwu & M.I. Chukwudebele planned genocide. But the Nigerian position was simple – that the secession of Biafra would trigger other secessions within the polity, thus throwing the sub region of West Africa into wanton chaos. After thirty months of war on the basis of irreconcilable differ- ences, in January, 1970, the Republic of Biafra ceased to exist after it was defeated by the Nigerian federal troops. Immediately after that, the question of reconstructing the war- ravaged Igboland became a new quest for the victorious side.

According to Obi-Ani, the defeated side in a war is often made to pay dearly through un- dergoing certain penalties like payment of reparations to the victor for undue past trans- gressions. It could be in form of time, effort, money or ceding of territories. This form of treatment is often viewed as a logical way to make the vanquished side pay for their actions. Nevertheless, these harsh penalties rarely discourage and deter aggrieved parties from putting up any form of rebellion in the future. Neither have harsh peace terms deterred a vanquished side from starting fresh wars in the future.2 This essay analyses how the Igbo survived the post-war measures implemented by the victorious Nigerian government. There have been suggestions that the Igbo were given the necessary prerequisites to survive the aftermath of the war, but, on the other hand, the Igbo believed that the post-war Nigeria did everything in her capacity to systematically punish them for being rebellious, in other words, they (the Igbo) were subjected to vendetta. Therefore, in the light of this argument, the present study is hinged on unearthing the intricacies surround- ing both arguments.

Earliest Ethnic Tension and the Nigerian Civil War The Igbo have suffered resentment even before the achievement of independence in 1960. This is why Chinua Achebe opines that the Igbo have been unanimously resented by the rest of the country. In his view, Nigerians, will always come to a consensus whenever it comes to the common resentment of the Igbo. He believes that the resentment is as old and as complicated as Nigeria itself.3 Citing an article published in Northern Nigeria, Achebe reveals the apprehensions of the northers against the Igbo for dominating in al- most all sectors of the country. However, he argues that the article failed to acknowledge that the Igbo were qualified for the positions they occupied due to their educational ex- cellence and their receptivity to British education in general. He further argues that in the article, attention was mainly drawn to the manpower distribution in the public service, in which the 45 per cent of the managers within the service were of Igbo origin and was already skyrocketing to 60 per cent by 1968. However, the North’s future contribution in the public service would amount to only 10 per cent of the total workforce in the public service.4

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To corroborate the above claim, it was on record that in colonial Nigeria, the Igbo ethnic group was stocked than most in the federal civil service, corporation, universities, and other sectors of private and public chain of labour, much to the chagrin of other ethnic groups in Nigeria.5 Nevertheless, it has been indicated that the British Colonial Administra- tion systematically played a policy of divide-and-rule that saw the Igbo groping behind in the political sector.6 The Igbo renowned statesman of the era, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe argued that the British played a role in the national resentment of the Igbo in Nigeria. In his book, Selected Speeches, Azikiwe observes that the British systematically disenfranchised four million Igbos and carried out economic policies that did not benefit the Eastern Region, of which most inhabitants were Igbo. He argues further, that the roads in the East were de- plorable compared to other regions, and the social amenities of telegraph, telephone and wireless service were totally lacking. Pipe-borne water and electricity supplies were epi- leptic when compared to other areas in the country. Hence, he concludes that despite being a tax-paying region, the Igbo ethnic group was a victim of studied official victimiza- tion.7

Despite this political setback, the Igbo developed themselves with bootstraps. Her culture of egalitarianism and her attitude of individualism gave her an edge over other ethnic groups of Nigeria. Unfortunately for the Igbo group, they were assaulted for being perceived as domineering and wanting to hijack all the affairs of the nation. The 1966 publica- tion, “The Nigerian Situation”, no doubt heated the polity. At the slightest national prov- ocation, the Igbo found themselves paying dearly as they suffered xenophobia and all manners of assaults in territories outside Igboland. They became soft targets for intimidation and injury. For instance, in 1953, there was a massacre of the Igbo people residing in Kano. Shortly after this, in 1966, a deadlier attack occurred again in several towns and cit- ies in Northern Nigeria in response to the January 15, 1966 coup. Later, another wave of attacks occurred in a counter-coup carried out in July of the same year, 1966. These killings have been dubbed as the Igbo Pogrom.

The first wave of killings in 1966 was facilitated by the peaceful protest held in May at the Ahmadu Bello University against the Unification Decree enacted by General Aguiyi Ironsi, who was Nigeria’s Military Head of State at that time. Since General Ironsi was of Igbo extraction, the peaceful protest escalated into a violent action against the easterners. At the end of the exercise, over 3,000 easterners were reportedly killed, injured or maimed.8 Two months after the May Killings, another killing spree began, this led to the deaths of 27 Igbo officers, 12 non-Igbo officers, 154 men of other ranks from Eastern Nigeria and 17 others from both Western and Mid-Western regions with many others injured.9 According to Abraham Nabhon Thomas, these killings carried out by the Northerners against the Southerners, especially against the Igbo ethnic group was responsible for triggering the civil war. This is because, during these killings, the military leader at the period, General

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Aguiyi Ironsi, an Igbo, was also murdered alongside other top military officers in the second coup of July 1966. However, despite these killings which saw to the deaths of many Igbo civilians and military officers up to the July of 1966, the killings still continued up to September, and the new Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon failed to bring the killings to an abrupt end.10

According to Gordon Wainman, who worked as a volunteer for the Canadian University at Kurra Falls in Northern Nigeria, over 30,000 Igbo were massacred in Northern Nigeria.11 The unabated killing of the Igbo saw the Igbo fleeing to their homelands in millions. Then, the Nigeria-Biafra War started on July 6, 1967 after the former Eastern Region of Nigeria seceded from Nigeria and declared its independence on May 30, 1967.12

There is a plethora of literature on civil wars which have studied how wars are likely to reoccur. Among scholars of civil war is Barbara Walter who argues that, costly wars which had inflicted some form of severe damages on the combatants and their supporters could likely inspire violent hatred and cause a strong desire for inflicting punishment in the spirit of moral outrage and vengeance even after the wars have ended. She further observes that divisions and grievances that emanate from such wars are likely to be severe and in- tense; thus, they do not settle down well into the future.13 In a similar study, Kalyvas opines that wars are bound to reoccur when personal or group vengeance form the basis for en- gaging in such wars.14 Hence, it could be argued that the continued agitation for separation by the Igbo is attributable to the brunt of the civil war and the continued resentment that continued in post-civil war Nigeria.

Having fought against to a stronger and more equipped military force of Nigeria’s Military Government, the events of the war led to the severe suffering of the Igbo. Since Igboland was the major theatre of war, the Igbo felt the devastation of the war more. In fact, the Igbo perceived the war as a systematic and well-orchestrated act of genocide against them.15 Some authors have argued that the actions of the Nigerian soldiers during the war, which included selected killings of Igbo males, rape, and other unconventional forms of warfare, best explain the deep-seated resentment the Nigerian people had for the Igbo ethnic group. For example over 700 men and boys were massacred by the Nigerian soldiers in Asasba.16 The famous Asaba Massacre of October 1967 has been well documented in several media reports, books, and articles.17 Aside the Asaba Massacre, there were other cases of civilian massacres in Aba, Onitsha, Calabar, Uyo, Okigwe and Oji River.18

Having suffered millions of deaths from starvation and heavy military action, Biafra an- nounced its unconditional surrender on January 12, 1970. Then, the question of rebuilding the war battered areas of Igboland, the reconciliation of the Igbo with the rest of Nigeria,

Journal of History and Military Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, Dec. 2019 and the rehabilitation of the war depressed peoples of Eastern region, became a task before the Gowon military regime.

Post-Civil War Nigeria: Reconciliation or Vendetta After the war ended on January 12, 1970, the Gowon regime began a mission of rebuilding and reuniting the embattled country. However, there have been arguments that the Igbo paid dearly for their rebellious act; an argument the Gowon regime have often disproved.19 The Gowon regime argued that it gave Ukpabi Asika, the Administrator of Eastern Region and a federal loyalist, sufficient funds to rebuild the war-torn region especially in the areas of economy, education, sports, and healthcare. The Administrator began in earnest to get the region working again. A radio broadcast was first made by the Administrator urging civil servants to report to their duty posts in Enugu. However, Asika made no provision for transportations that would convey the people to their respective workstations, neither did he demand for the removal of roadblocks mounted by the Federal troops, who were infamous for intimidation and harassment of innocent civilians on the roads leading to Enugu.20

This led to low turnout of civil servants at their workstations. Moreover, the people were afraid of the Federal troops who still hovered all around the places, armed to the teeth. With the help of Colonel Achuzia, an erstwhile Biafran military leader, the situation was addressed. He advised the Administrator on the necessary steps to take to get things kicked off. Some of these steps include: first, a fresh radio broadcast urging the return of all Permanent Secretaries for an emergency meeting in Enugu on January 20, 1970; and a subsequent broadcast that called for the emergency meeting of all university professors on January 21, 1970; Second, provision of 4,000 gallons of diesel and 4,000 gallons of petrol to be delivered to him, Colonel Achuzia, at Aguata police station, where it would be distributed to vehicles conveying all those that would be visiting the Administrator in Enugu; And, lastly, relaxation of the roadblocks along the roads leading to the Enugu. These demands were carried out by the Administrator the next day.21

With the tensed situation eased, the Asika Administration began to rebuild the war-torn zones. There were several sectors that were affected by the war. For instance, the educational sector suffered severe setback as several school buildings and facilities were destroyed during the civil war. Many schools were razed down due to air raids. There were cases of bombed libraries, laboratories, and other facilities. There were also, cases of looted school properties. Since schools were closed down for three academic sessions during the civil war, it was impossible for tuition to continue. Despite these challenges facing Ukpabi Asika’s government, schools were opened in March, 1970, barely three months after cessation of hostilities. It was a case of rebuilding destroyed school facilities alongside undertaking academic work. One of the schools that were rebuilt was Heerey

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High School, Onitisha, a Roman Catholic school founded in 1933. The school was not ex- empted in the wanton destruction of properties during the war. Among the facilities destroyed were twelve staff houses, three laboratories, two school blocks, a chapel, and a hall. An estimate of ₦102, 103 was spent in rebuilding the damaged buildings and facilities, while ₦13,720 was spent in acquisition of furniture.22

The Asika administration in January of 1970, also set up a committee for the reopening of the University of Nigeria and other higher institutions; but, there were hitches encoun- tered, which led to the delay. This delay was as a result of the difficulty experienced by the Eastern States Interim Assets and Liabilities Agency in the transfer of ownership of the University to East Central and the South Eastern States governments.23 That notwith- standing, the East Central State Government advanced with the sum of £200,000 to the University for its Initial Renovation Works. The Federal Government made a grant of £80,000 for staff salaries for the period, January to March 31, 1970.24 It gave an additional £500,000 grant for emergency reconstruction in the University besides shouldering the institution's recurrent expenditure. The assets and liabilities of the former Eastern Region of Nigeria were shared on the basis of population: 51 per cent to East Central State, 29 per cent to South Eastern State and 20 per cent to Rivers State.25

In the area of commerce and industry, the Ukpabi Asika administration made giant efforts in resuscitating the Igbo shattered economy. This took the joint effort of both the Admin- istration and the doggedness of the Igbo people to get the economy working again. The reconstruction of destroyed markets in South-eastern Nigeria was central to the economic reconstruction of the Asika government. There was availability of special grants provided by the Federal Government to the state. The sum of £656,000 was budgeted and given towards the rebuilding of old and new markets in Igboland. For example, the Onitsha Main market, the biggest and the most modern market in Old Eastern region, was reconstructed.26

The rebuilding of markets was not limited to those in urban areas. Between 1970 and 1971, an estimate of 230 markets with 29,791 stalls and lock-up shops were reconstructed in Ig- boland. Furthermore, 600 lock-up shops and 800 stalls were either reconstructed or newly built between 1971 and 1972. Despite the efforts of the administration, indigenes of several host communities rebuilt and built new markets through communal efforts. For example, the Obeledu community in Njikoka Local Government Area, built a new market with lock- up shops after the civil war, and hired them out to traders at rent ranging from ₦20 to ₦30 monthly. Another example is the building of Eke and Oye markets at an estimated amount of ₦27,000 by the Obinofia-Ndiuno community in Ezeagu Local Government Area in present-day Enugu State. Also, in Orlu Local Government Area, the community of Mgbidi built

Journal of History and Military Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, Dec. 2019 a market costing the sum of ₦60,000 in 1975. Between 1977 and 1978, a total of forty-nine markets were built by several communities in Anambra State through self-help efforts at the sum of ₦505,000. Within the same period, communities in Imo State built ninety-four markets at an estimated cost of ₦2,403,000.27

Despite the giant strides witnessed in the reconstruction of Igboland, the process of rec- onciling the Igbo with the rest of the country suffered. The issue of 3Rs might have been put in place, but the Ukpabi Asika Administration and the Gowon regime failed to articu- late properly, through practical means, the re-integration of the Igbo into the fabric of Nigeria. Obi-Ani argues that the Reconstruction, Reconciliation and Rehabilitation were merely cynical since they failed include the Reintegration of the Igbo which is most pivotal. For instance, it was expected that at the end of the war, the Gowon regime would re- course to history, and show in practice, magnanimity to the vanquished side – the Igbo, but this was far from the case. Apart from Gowon's initial speeches that raised the hopes of the Igbo, subsequent measures of the government negated such promises.

The marginalisation of the Igbo in the scheme of things in the country progressively became evident. There were several policies executed by the Gowon government that further shrunk the possibilities of reconciliation between the vanquished Igbo side and the victorious Nigeria. Among these policies include: I) Decree No.46 of 1970, The Public Offic- ers (Special Provisions), which side lined the Igbo from being fully reintegrated into the public service after the war. II) Arrest and detainment of the revolutionaries of the January 15, 1966 coup. III) The changing of Bight of Biafra to Bight of Bonny. IV) The relegation of justice over the Abandoned Property Saga. V) The unjust Banking Decree which saw the Igbo receiving only 20 pounds from their pre-war bank accounts, regardless of how much was in deposit. V) The ban on the importation of second-hand clothing, a business pre- dominately engaged in by the Igbo. VII) Revenue allocation formula. VIII) Lack of Federal presence in the Eastern Region and IX) States creation to further balkanise the region. These policies seem to have been skewed against the Igbo.28

All these were against the recommendations of the international community. At the an- nouncement of Biafra’s surrender, the entire world became sympathetic towards the vanquished side and sent pleas the Gen. Gowon’s government not to embark on vendetta against the defeated Biafrans; rather, he was urged to take the path of reconciliation, rehabilitation and reintegration. As such was the Roman Catholic Pope at the period, who advised against any possible genocide against the defeated people, and the French Presi- dent Pompidou, who offered a hand of humanitarian support,29 of which the Gowon Gov- ernment rejected out rightly.

Also, the U.S. President Richard Nixon reached out to the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, to discuss the post-civil war situation in Nigeria, especially in the aspect of relief

98 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY) Reconsidering Issues of Post-Civil War Nigeria N.E. Enemchukwu & M.I. Chukwudebele situation in the vanquished Biafran Republic. On the side of the British Parliament, they expressed doubt that the Nigerian authorities had the capacity to ameliorate the food crisis that ravaged Igboland. Furthermore, the positions expressed by the international community helped in discouraging any form of hostility towards the defeated side. In fact, Richard Nixon likened the Nigerian-Biafran War to the American Civil War of 1861, and Gowon as Abraham Lincoln, the leader of the Union during the American Civil War. He suggested that Gowon emulated Abraham Lincoln and carry out an assignment of recon- ciling the defeated Igbo with the rest of the country. However, there were hints that hawk- ish members of the Gowon cabinet suggested oppressive policies against the vanquished side.30

This is why the London Daily Telegraph in its editorial, urged Gen. Gowon to emulate the virtuous example of General Ulysses Steve Grant, the commander who led the Union to victory against the Confederates in 1865. The Telegraph reminded the world, in their advice to Gowon, about the humane approach of Gen. Ulysses towards the vanquished Confed- erates. Gen. Ulysses rebuked the victorious Union army for celebrating the defeat of their fellow country-men. It was stated that Gen Grant also allowed the Confederates to keep their properties of houses and mules which were going to be needed during the spring, a period of ploughing. The Telegraph argued that if oppression becomes commonplace in a post-civil war Nigeria, then it would be an unbearable place to live for both the oppressed and the oppressor.31

The lacklustre on the part of Gowon's regime found the goodwill becoming a monumental embarrassment of his 3Rs policy. This is because, despite the international goodwill, the Igbo still found themselves socially and economically handicapped. Regardless of the 3Rs policy adopted by Gowon, the Igbo still struggled to gain acceptance and re-integration into the fabric of the nation. According to A. E. Afigbo, the Igbo were treated as social outcasts, such that their fellow countrymen wanted nothing to do with them. One of such events was the denial of Igbo identity by the inhabitants of Rivers State, the Ikwerre Igbo, who affixed the letter “R” to the names of their towns. This saw towns such as Umuigbo becoming Rumuigbo and Umukurushi metamorphosing into Rumukurushi, and so on. This was an attempt by the Rivers people to erase their Igbo identity so as to tell the rest of the country to forget that they are or were ever Igbo.32

According to Prince Rob Iweka, the abandoned property which the Igbo left in Rivers State and elsewhere while fleeing to their homeland at the wake of the war never got rehabili- tated. Unfortunately, many Igbo people lost their investments as they were sold at give- away prices. This resulted to the deaths of many Igbo businessmen and women who died of hypertension and heart attack. The Igbo were treated as aliens in their own country. In

Journal of History and Military Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, Dec. 2019 fact, the Gowon government failed to live up to their words on treating the vanquished side with clemency. As sad as it sounds for the Igbo, the Federal Government looked away as this wrongful acquisition and sale of properties went on unabated. Some scholars sug- gest that this was due to the fact that the Rivers’ government sided with the Federal Gov- ernment of Nigeria during the civil war.33 Iweka argues that the Federal Government supported the people of Rivers State so as to sponsor a politics of divide-and-rule among the Igbo and the Ikwerre.34

It was estimated that the Igbo lost properties worth £56 million during the 1970s period in Rivers State alone. Among these lost properties were 5,600 buildings worth over £28,253,000, underdeveloped land worth more than £28,253,000, plantations which were valued at £19 96 million, several plants and machineries of industries worth £2 million, ho- tels worth £218,000, petrol stations valued at £132,000 and other valuables worth £915,000. These properties were sited in Eleme, Umuamasi, Obia, Bonny, Port-Harcourt and Elele.35

The issue of abandoned property in Rivers State and elsewhere could be seen as eroding justice on the part of Nigerian government. It has been termed as one of the measures carried out by the victors to impoverish the Igbo and demote them to becoming second class citizens. There were also, high-handed conditions which were to be met before the Igbo house owners could reclaim their houses. Such conditions to be met were, the presentation of relevant building documents which otherwise, would lead to loss of property to the state. As depressing as these demands were, there was no provision made for those who may have lost their building documents in the course of the crisis. It was on this note that J.S. Nwokolo observed that, regardless of one abandoning his or her properties, he or she still retains the rights to ownership. During the civil war, house owners were forced to flee from one part of the country to the other. Hence, he argues that, Flights due to danger of conflict still meant that house owners were still entitled to the residency and property rights, as well as other legal attachments to the abandoned property.36 How- ever, the Igbo lost most of their abandoned property in Rivers State due to harsh conditions.

The pressures of the outbreak of war following succession of cataclysmic attacks on the Igbo in all parts of Nigeria saw the Igbo scrambling back to their homelands like the Jews fleeing the Holocaust. One must note that the tension felt by the Igbo was responsible for their abandonment of their properties. With such harsh treatment in the issue of abandoned property in Rivers State, it may not be wrong to argue that the confiscation of properties and investments which ran into billions of naira, without remorse, is a pointer to the resentment of the Igbo and the envy of their enterprise.

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Reacting to these injustices meted out to the Igbo, Chinua Achebe insists that instead of borrowing a leaf from the American Marshal Plan that followed the Second World War which led to the rebuilding of war-torn Europe, the Gowon administration introduced the 3Rs policy. The 3Rs stood for Reconstruction, Reconciliation and Rehabilitation. Despite how elaborate the scheme sounded and how it had set out to emulate the Marshal Plan, the Gowon administration failed woefully in delivering the goodwill the policy held. Mr. Ukpabi Asika, the Administrator of East Central State who was in charge of reconstructing the war-torn Igboland, requested for half a billion pounds to carry out the reconstruction project. It was on record that Asika did not receive close to a fraction of the demanded amount.37 In fact, what was given to Ukpabi Asika could not have amounted to 200 million dollars.38

To compound the agonies of the Igbo in the post-civil war era, the Finance Minister of the period, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, initiated the twenty pounds’ policy. This was a policy to offer the Igbo, who had huge sums of money in their bank accounts before and during the civil war, a paltry sum of twenty pounds. This was regardless of the amount formerly in their bank accounts, whether it ran into millions of pounds or not. Several Igbo people lost millions and thousands of pounds after the war due to this policy. This situation handicapped many of them economically. Hence, many could not restart or start-off their busi- nesses or even buy into any investments due to lack of capital.39

In an instance, Pini Jason, an eminent writer and journalist questioned Gowon on the in- discriminate thoughts towards the Igbo due to the civil war. While citing the Indigenisation Decree as one of the numerous examples, he put it to the General that the Indigenisation Decree which was a policy of transference of foreign controlled industries in Nigeria to Nigerian buyers to administer full control; was a policy to perpetually keep the Igbo im- poverished. The General’s reply showed contempt and lacked the needed sympathy to ameliorate the situation, when he stated, that the Indigenisation Policy was fair to all, because, indigenous industries in one’s place of residence were taken over by the inhabitants of that given area. To put succinctly, he justified the policy as being fair to all because the industries located in war ravaged east were taken up by the Igbo. As dismaying as it may be, the Indigenisation Decree was just barely two years after the civil war and two-third of Igboland was in ruins. The journalist, Pini Jason expressed shock at Gowon’s reply when he reminded the lacklustre General that the Igbo had just come out of a civil war barely two years ago, brutalised and financially handicapped with only twenty pounds in their possession. They were yet to find their feet and were in no position to buy into any company.40

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The implication of this economic frustration is the resurgence of Biafra, manifesting in groups such as the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MAS- SOB) and the Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB). Decades after these economic policies implemented by the Gowon administration, the Igbo still feel marginalised and cheated. The continuous clamour for Biafra by Igbo youths indicates their resentment of their ma- terial condition, a condition hinged on the contradicting Nigerian political economy, but which they perceive as emanating from ethnic seclusion.

In fact, the emergence and continuity of the agitation for Biafra is anchored on resource control and failure to access a better percentage of the nation’s economic rewards. The diminishing economic opportunities in Igboland, which had led to the increased rate of unemployment among highly educated youths, have contributed to the area being predis- posed to separatist movements and insecurity. Although, the issue of unemployment is a national problem, however, the rate of unemployment in the face of political marginalisation of south-eastern Nigeria gives separationist movements, the needed ingredients to thrive. It is argued that state violence occurs when certain groups feel disadvantaged in comparison to other groups in the society. Furthermore, some studies are of the opinion, that state insecurity arises when the state do not meet up to the expectations of its citi- zenry right in the presence of a buoyant economy. Hence, this state of insecurity has facilitated a vicious cycle of fragile security and underdevelopment.41

More so, another post-civil war development that could be said to be a form of vendetta against the Igbo, is the matter of political marginalisation and exclusion. Prior to the civil war, the Igbo were dominant in the Nigerian political space and even enjoyed political suc- cess outside Igboland. They were at the frontline of nationalistic movement from the 1940s to 1960, when Nigeria gained Independence. After the war, the political terrain became severe for the Igbo. After the war, the Gowon regime, made a promise to offer clemency to the defeated Igbo people, especially in seeing that they were reinstated into the civil service and the military. Sadly for the Igbo, the Gowon regime made a reversal of this promise despite its public pronouncement to grant general amnesty to the Igbo people. The government’s reason for this reversal to unconditionally restore the Igbo people to their previous posts in the military, civil service and public corporations, was to show that it did not want to lightly handle secession by reinstating the Igbo in their previously held posts.42 Another reason was that Gowon did not want to force out those who served the government by occupying the vacated positions previously held by the Igbo, simply because the Igbo returned to take back their spaces. However, Gowon failed to take cognisance of the fact that the Igbo vacated their positions in various work stations across the country, because they fled for their lives during the 1966 pogrom (and not to wage war), seeking safety in their homelands.43

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Furthermore, the Gowon regime put in place stringent policies that further deterred the peaceful reconciliation between the Igbo and the rest of the country. One of such policies was the Decree No. 46 of 1970 also known as Public Officers Decree. This Decree was to see to the re-engagement of the returning Igbo civil servants in the public service, provided that the appropriate authorities were satisfied that they did not engage in any act of hostility, sedition or any rebellious act between the period of January 15, 1966 and Jan- uary 15, 1970. The Decree also stated that any public officer who had been seen or heard to have engaged in any form of hostile, insubordinate or rebellious act during the period of war should be retrenched, or compulsorily retired from service.44

Furthermore, individuals found to have engaged in aiding and abetting or counselling any other person in similar act of hostility and rebellion should also, face similar consequences of forced retirement, removal or retrenchment. The Decree also stated that any individual whose reinstatement or continuous service would serve as a threat to the public service or his or her continuous working will not be in the interest of the nation should be compulsorily dismissed, removed or retrenched. This policy led to the dismissal of several Igbo civil servants without pension benefits, simply because, they had supported their nation when it mattered most, in time of war, or, maybe they were suspected to have engaged in acts seen as seditious. This policy was not challenged through any civil proceedings in any court of law because it was a military decree. This policy was a systematic way of pre- venting top Igbo civil servants and corporate leaders from being reinstated or re-engaged in any Federal or State public services or corporate services established under any Federal or State law, or any company that had substantial Federal government interests.45

The “directive” issued by Gen. Gowon that civil servants and public corporation officers should be immediately reinstated was merely a façade. This was because, most Igbo could not be reinstated in their previous positions due to the discriminatory politics that per- vaded the Nigerian civil service. This situation was why Cyprian Ekwensi, a renowned author and a former Director of the Federal Information Service, resorted to petty trading, dealing in glass tumblers, water jugs and plastic dolls.46 He was not reinstated neither did he receive his benefits. Jim Nwobodo could not be re-engaged by his old employers at Shell-BP due to the discriminatory effect of Decree 34, since it was difficult to employ those who had fought against the Federal Government, directly or indirectly.47

Finally, the case of political marginalisation at the federal level has been perceived by the Igbo as one of Nigeria’s deliberate vendetta against them. It has been argued by scholars of Nigerian politics and history, that the prevalence of ethnic rivalry and inter-ethnic com- petition for federal power has been largely responsible for the continued agitation for Bi- afra. According to Jibrin Ibrahim, the current agitation for Biafra is carried out by the Igbo

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Journal of History and Military Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, Dec. 2019 masses, especially her youths, who are embittered over the failure of their political elites to seize power at the federal level, thus, disenchanted with the unity of Nigeria. With the failure to capture power at the federal level, the Igbo masses have resorted to following the path separation.48

Conclusion

This essay attempted an investigation into the post-civil war Nigeria in order to understand whether it was a situation of reconciliation or vendetta, especially in dealing with the vanquished Igbo population. It briefly looked at the causes and impact of the civil war, and arrived at the notion that the deep seated resentment and ethnic rivalry among ethnic groups in Nigeria fuelled the war that rocked the nation between 1967 and 1970. However, findings indicated that the coup of January 15, 1966 and the ensuing massacres of the Igbo people that occurred between May and September of the same year was the last straw that broke the camel’s back. In general, the paper argued that post-civil war Nigeria might have made attempt in reconstructing the war-torn Igboland, however, it did not reconcile, rehabilitate nor reintegrate the Igbo into the fabric of the country. With systematic impov- erishment of the Igbo through certain national punishments passed off as policies, the Gowon regime failed to take cognisance that failure to adequately tackle root problems that led to civil war, the war would likely resurface again and threaten the unity of Nigeria.

104 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY) Reconsidering Issues of Post-Civil War Nigeria N.E. Enemchukwu & M.I. Chukwudebele

Endnotes

1 Adaobi Tricia Nwaubani, “Remembering Nigeria’s Biafra war that many prefer to forget,” BBC News, accessed 26 May 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51094093 2Paul Obi-Ani, Post-Civil War Political and Economic Reconstruction of Igboland, 1970 – 1983 (Second Edition) (Nsukka: Great AP Express Publishers Ltd, 2000), 73. 3Chinua Achebe, There Was a Country: A Personal History of Biafra (New York: Penguin Group Ltd, 2013), 76. 4Achebe, There Was a Country, …, 77. 5Achebe, There Was a Country, …, 77. 6 Nnamdi Azikiwe, ZIK: Selected Speeches of Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), 242-245. 7Azikiwe, ZIK: Selected Speeches, …, 245. 8 Robin Luckham, The Nigerian Military (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 76-77. 9 Luckham, The Nigerian Military, …, 77. 10 Abraham Nabhon Thomas, “Beyond The Platitude of Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, And Reconcilia- tion in Nigeria: Revolutionary Pressures in The Niger Delta,” Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 12, no. 1 (2010): 63. 11 Gordon Wainman, “I had a Ringside Seat at a Nigerian Massacre,” Toronto Daily Star, December 14, 1968. 12 Arua Oko Omaka, “The Forgotten Victims: Ethnic Minorities in the Nigeria-Biafra War, 1967-1970”. 13 Barbara F. Walter, “Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War,” Journal of Peace Re- search, 41, no. 3 (2004): 371-388. 14Stathis N. Kalyvas, “The Logic of Violence in Civil War: Theory and Preliminary Results,” (Estu- dio/Working Paper 2000/151, Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, Madrid, 2000). 15Okechukwu Ibeanu, Nkwachukwu Orji and Chijioke K. Iwuamadi, Biafra Separatism: Causes, Consequences and Remedies, (Enugu: Institute for Innovations in Development, 2016), 11. 16 Elizabeth Bird and Fraser Ottanelli, “The History and Legacy of Asaba, Nigeria, Massacres,” African Studies Review 54, no. 3 (2011), 1-26. 17 Emma Okocha, Blood on the Niger (New York: TriAtlantic Books, 2006). 18 J. C. Aneke, The Untold Story of the Nigeria-Biafra War (New York: Triumph Publishing, 2007); Chima J. Korieh, “Biafra and the Discourse on the Igbo Genocide,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 48, no. 6 (2013): 727–740. 19 Obi-Ani, Post-Civil War, …, 15. 20 Obi-Ani, Post-Civil War, …, 15. 21 Obi-Ani, Post-Civil War, …, 15. 22 Obi-Ani, Post-Civil War, …, 38. 23 “East Shares Assets, Liabilities - Rivers 20%, ECS 51 %; SES 29%,” Lagos Daily Times, August 15, 1970, 1 cited in Obi-Ani, Post-Civil War, …, 43. 24 Obi-Ani, Post-Civil War, …, 43. 25 "Reconstruction Goes Ahead, but the Odds are Formidable", Lagos Daily Times, January 15, 1971, 13. 26 Obi-Ani, Post-Civil War, …, 48. 27 Obi-Ani, Post-Civil War, …, 49. 28 Obi-Ani, Post-Civil War, …, 73. 29 Obi-Ani, Post-Civil War, …, 73.

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30 Ugo P. Onumonu and Precious O. Anutanwa “Rethinking the Impact of Nigerian Civil War: Commerce in the Post-Civil War Nnewi and its Challenges, 1970-2000,” Mgbakoigba, Journal of African Studies 6 no. 2 (February 2017): 158. 31 “A Letter to Lagos,” The Daily Telegraph, London, January 13, 1970 cited in Obi-Ani, Post-Civil War, …, 75. 32 Obi-Ani, Post-Civil War, 93; Afigbo, The Age of Innocence: The Igbo and Their Neighbours In Pre-Colonial Times, 1981 Ahiajoku Lecture, (Published by Culture, Youth and Sports and Printed by the' Government Printer, Owerri), 10. 33Obi-Ani, Post-Civil War, …, 93; cited interview with Prince Rob Iweka, legal practitioner and former At- torney General of Anambra State, Obosi, 30 July, 1995. 34 Obi-Ani, Post-Civil War, …, 93; 35 “56m Properties 'Lying Waste' In Rivers, Report Published in Enugu”, Lagos Daily Times, January 3, 1971, 32. 36 Obi-Ani, Post-Civil War, 95 citing “Rivers State Edict on Abandoned Properties,” Lagos Daily Times, Sep- tember 15, 1970, 17. 37Achebe, There Was a Country, …, 235-36. 38 Obi-Ani, Post-Civil War, 21; Achebe, There Was a Country, 236-40. 39 Onumonu and Anutanwa “Rethinking the Impact of Nigerian Civil War,” …, 158. 40Achebe, There Was a Country, 236-37. 41 Walter, “Does Conflict Beget Conflict?” 380. 42 Obi-Ani, Post-Civil War, 77; “The Public Officers (Special Provision) Decree 1970, No. 46”, Annual Vol- ume of the Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Containing Decrees and Subsidiary Legislation made in the Year 1970 (Federal Ministry of Information, Printing Division, Lagos, 1971), A205. 43 Obi-Ani, Post-Civil War, 77. 44 Obi-Ani, Post-Civil War, 77. 45 Obi-Ani, Post-Civil War, 79; Tekena N. Tamuno and Samson C. Ukpabi, Nigeria since Independence: The First 25 Years Vol. VI: The Civil War Years (Ibadan, Heinemann, 1989), 78. 46 "Petty Trade Boom in E-Central State -Ekwensi Sells Tumblers", Lagos Daily Times, July 16, 1970, 3 cited in Obi-Ani, Post-Civil War, 79 47Dillibe Onyeama, Modern Messiah: The Jim Nwobodo Story, (Enugu: Delta Publications, 1983), 56 cited in Obi-Ani, Post-Civil War, 79 48Jibrin Ibrahim, “Resolving the Igbo Question,” Premium Times, November 30, 2015, http:// blogs.premiumtimesng.com/?p=169859.

106 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY) Reconsidering Issues of Post-Civil War Nigeria N.E. Enemchukwu & M.I. Chukwudebele

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