Issue 2 (32), 2013

National identity as a necessity for democracy

In the whole context of the Belarusian issue, Belarusian identity: strong layer of Sovietism, the question of national identity is sometimes supported by the government and a huge cul- forgotten. Sociological researches show that 75 tural and political influence of Russia. Showing percent of Belarusians geopolitically gravitate the link between identity and democratization Andrei Kazakevich, PhD in po- towards Russia, 80 percent do not see Russia as the author shows that de-Sovietization and de- litical science, Director, Institute the foreign state and only one fifth of them in Russification of culture and politics are of Political Studies (Minsk, Be- cultural terms see Russia as “the other”. Thus, the necessary. larus) Senior Research Fellow, main question arises – what are the main rea- Vytautas Magnus University sons for this situation? Most experts argue that The second article by Vadim Vileita also links (Kaunas, Lithuania) Editor in this is the achievement of the regime because the process of democratization to the identity chief, Journal of Political Studies Lukashenka successfully managed to transform issue. However, the author argues that popular “Political Sphere”, Web: www. the quite weak Belarusian national identity into division between pro-European and pro-Russian palityka.org a constructed post-Soviet pseudo-identity sub- Belarusians does not show the whole picture. stitute. But is it really just so? He uses the concept of “threefold identity” and Vadim Vileita is a Lithuanian briefly describes all of them: ethno-centristic, and Belarusian political scien- In the first article Andrei Kazakevich tries to soviet and pragmatic Belarusians. The alliance of tist, journalist and interpreter/ show that the problem of identity in Belarus is the latter two has been ruling the country since translator. Born in Hrodna, not unique in the CEE region if one agreed that the beginning of the regime. So we may only Belarus, he moved to Lithuania the identity as such is not a constant. However, speculate if the current minority with a strong in the age of 15, studied in the the influence of the regime makes the Belarus national identity will grow or shrink in the near Institute of International Rela- case different from the others. Author states future and what will it mean to the future of Be- tions and Political Science of that there are two main factors in the issue of larus. Vilnius University and graduat- Vytautas Keršanskas, Editor ed cum laude, having defended his thesis on the Belarusian state identity. Mr Vileita is a founder of Belarus Watch, a Belarusian- Lithuanian NGO in Vilnius. The Belarusian identity and the problem of democracy

Andrei Kazakevich provide grounds for multiple interpretations, with often mutually exclusive conclusions. Rath- In discussions about the problems of democracy, er than an exception, the situation in Belarus is many theorists frequently refer to the concept actually a prominent illustration of how stereo- of identity and its influence on societal develop- types and short-term political goals influence CONTENTS ment, with considerable amount of approaches the identity problems. 1 and theories available in this field. Despite a National identity as a significant revaluation of the key terms and cat- Stereotypes are really abundant in this sphere. necessity for democracy egories during the last century, as nearly-racial Peculiarities of the Belarusian identity and its concepts of the “national spirit” and “mentality” implications for the political development are 1 have been replaced by flexible and construct- mentioned by a majority of authors; however, The Belarusian identity and ible ideas of “identity”, the issue of measuring they end up with antipodal explanations. To the problem of democracy impacts of cultural and historical factors on the complicate the situation even more, discussions 4 political development is persisting. are frequently dominated by a mixture of re- The Identity of the search findings, ideological writings, opinions Given the potential of identity discussions for of individuals and extravagancies of some intel- Belarusian State: a Never- rapid politicization and integration into politi- lectuals, something often resulting in comic situ- Ending Process? cal strategies, even examination of simple cases ations. 1 Issue 2 (32), 2013

E.g., it came into fashion in mid-2000s to dis- and even Lithuania (the integration of the Pol- cuss “the nonexistence of the Belarusian nation” ish minority), the heterogeneity of the Belaru- Any sociological research, in the Belarusian public space. This discussion sian case is neither unique, nor radical. including the population was used by different actors for different goals, census, has never proved with Belarusian intellectuals seeking to find a The core of the subject the idea of the “non-ex- new topic for theoretical provocation / contem- istent” Belarusian nation; plation, political forces trying to mobilize their Coming back to the issue of the link between the on the contrary, they doc- supporters or call for action, while pro-Russian identity and the political development in Belar- umented a sustainable players picked up the idea to prove the point- us, one cannot find strong arguments for a lack growth of the Belarusian lessness of the Belarusian statehood. However, it of a consolidated nation as a reason behind the was no-one’s objective to reflect the actual situ- dictatorship. It is true that some identity prob- identity. ation in the country. Any sociological research, lems exist. However, rather than a lack, com- including the population census, has never pleteness or consolidation of the identity, which proved the idea of the “non-existent” Belarusian is, in our opinion, not an issue since long ago, nation; on the contrary, they documented a sus- these are the problems of the identity content tainable growth of the Belarusian identity. and meanings. The problem is that, constantly re-vitalized, stimulated and promoted by the Ironically, some foreign researchers believed authorities, certain aspects of the identity are these extravagancies actually meant business, playing against the democratic and European took them seriously and reproduced in their trends. In most cases, it is done by the govern- publications. One should admit that Belarus is ment on purpose. not a well-known country for English-speaking scholars, leaving lots of unrestricted space for The history offers numerous ways to manipu- speculations and inventions. However, they are late identities. It is also true that the history of often groundless, especially if we approach Be- any nation contains both democratic and non- larus in the comparative perspective of the re- democratic elements. What are the elements of gion of the Central and (CEE). the identity that play against the democratiza- tion in Belarus? There are two major problems Discussions on the “incomplete”, “non-consol- behind it: first, a very strong layer of Sovietism idated” and “fragmentary” Belarusian national which is being supported and cultivated by the identity are taking the same track, with the Belarusian government since mid-90s (and also abovementioned reasons often used as an ex- by Russia, since 2000s); second, the factor of the planation of the authoritarian model and the cultural and political influence of Russia, some- rejection of democracy. Naturally, accuracy of thing that neutralizes the main motivation for concepts is crucial for the discussion. What is democratization in our region: the Eurointegra- “incomplete”? If by this we mean an ongoing tion and the geopolitical balancing. alteration of the concept of their history and national culture, then this is typical for all the These aspects are what really makes Belarus CEE nations. Almost all nations here have rein- very different from other countries; the above- terpreted their national identity during the last mentioned specific features can also serve a twenty years in a certain degree, as the political ground for a long-standing Belarusian authori- elements were strengthened and the ethnic ones tarianism. downplayed. The identity was re-articulated sig- nificantly in Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovakia, Contrary to the majority of the neighboring , , etc. Belarus is by far not an states, the historic and identity policies of the exception on this background. Moreover, it is Belarusian government were positive rather also common for the ‘old’ nations to readdress than critical about the heritage of the USSR/ their identities, especially as a result of changing BSSR. Significant funds and administrative ef- attitudes towards minorities and migrants, suf- forts have been and are still invested in it. fice it to recall the changing image of a ‘French- man” since the World War II. The main elements of the Soviet heritage that oppose the democratic trends are: 1) mistrust The heterogeneity of the Belarusian identity, in democratic procedures, elections and politi- e.g., in terms of the “Soviet” vs. “nation-cen- cal competition; 2) the justification of the state tered” understanding of the history and cul- domination in a range of spheres; 3) suspicious ture, is far from being exceptional. First, such / hostile attitude towards the West. a heterogeneity is, in a way, normal; the un- derstanding of the ‘U.S.’ by a white Republican Elections were a formality rather than a mecha- and an African American Democrat can differ nism of government change in Soviet times. The radically, too. Second, the distance between the concept is very much in line with the interests of competing identities is a way shorter in Belarus the existing authoritarian system which is doing than, e.g., in Ukraine. Given the difficulties of everything to uphold it. It goes together with a shaping the political nation in Latvia, Estonia, lack of transparency in politics, centralization 2 Issue 2 (32), 2013

and tough treatment of political rivals. It is also sia is maintaining control over the mainstream a persistent strategy of the authorities to outline mass culture and information flows in Belarus. There are two major prob- a need for a strong and active government. The The preservation of Russification in the Belaru- lems behind it: first, a very image of the Soviet government, as a certain sian identity is strengthening anti-Western as- strong layer of Sovietism ideal which has been destroyed by domestic and pirations. It also discourages Belarus from geo- which is being support- external enemies, is still an important compo- political balancing and a need to consistently ed and cultivated by the nent of the strategy. articulate its national interests. Belarusian government since mid-90s (and also by The foreign policy connotations of the Soviet Some conclusions Russia, since 2000s); sec- heritage serve as a basis for a persistent anti- ond, the factor of the cul- Western rhetoric of the government. Though Regardless of numerous speculations about the tural and political influ- the image of the West is non-uniform in Be- Belarusian national identity and their popular- ence of Russia, something larus, the government is consistent in stressing ity in the intellectual and analytical communi- the aspects of aggressiveness, interference in ty, there are no empirical data to claim for its that neutralizes the main domestic affairs, and potential military threat. motivation for democra- fragmented or non-consolidated nature. Natu- In general, it looks rather natural, given the po- rally, the national identity is heterogeneous and tization in our region: the litical isolation of Belarus after 1996. changing. However, the degree of its heteroge- Eurointegration and the neity and variability is hardly a factor for the geopolitical balancing. All the above-mentioned identity components population’s political preferences. It is not likely position. are quite strongly consolidated in minds of a that the heterogeneity in itself is a reason be- significant share of the country’s population hind the existence of the authoritarian regime, Regardless of numerous and backed by the state machinery. However, as in other countries, like Ukraine or Latvia, speculations about the all these mental structures are accompanied by such a heterogeneity results in a totally different Belarusian national iden- contradicting concepts. Skepticism about de- outcome. mocracy is combined with a wish to have “peo- tity and their popularity ple’s power’; the etatism goes hand in hand with The essence of the identity is much more impor- in the intellectual and an- a mistrust in state institutions, etc. alytical community, there tant, as a system of perceptions, images, values and understandings about the national history are no empirical data to Nonetheless, the problem stays there, because, and culture. During the last 18 years, the Be- claim for its fragmented with Soviet elements kept and even reinforced larusian authorities pursued their own politi- or non-consolidated na- as a part of the national identity by the informa- cal interests by stimulating anti-democratic and tional and cultural policies, it becomes harder ture. anti-European components of the Belarusian for the population to embrace democratic and identity. European values. Investing considerable funds and administra- Russification and the Russian influence tive resources into the promotion of a positive attitude towards the Soviet experience is an out- Quite a complicated and complex phenomenon, the Russian factor constitutes a structural prob- standing example. In particular, suspiciousness lem for democratization. on Western democracy and political competi- tion has been consistently stimulated, as well as It has been well described in many books that a decisive role of government in many spheres the main motive of democratization for the CEE of the society and mistrust in the Western com- countries (and also many other regions) was the munity and its requirements, often in a form of Westernization and Europeanization as well as persistent anti-Western rhetoric. geopolitical balancing, with an attempt to coun- terbalance Russia for our region. It was a deci- The above-noted effect is also enhanced by all sive motivation for nearly all countries of the re- forms of Russification. Along with the Russifi- gion, be it Turkey or Georgia, Serbia or Ukraine. cation of language, it applies to the dominance However, as a result of deep Russification and of the Russian mass culture, informational re- a foreign policy orientation of the government sources, political ideas etc., though this process towards Russia, this key motivation hardly was not unidirectional. As a whole, the Russifi- worked for Belarus. The situation in Russia is cation has contributed to the reinforcement of also an important factor in this regard, since it mistrust in the West and the loss of a need for has digressed from the democratic development geopolitical balancing or cooperation with the after the beginning of 2000s. West as a democratization stimulus.

Apart from the Russian domination in foreign Naturally, different scenarios are available for policies, given the isolation of Belarus, the the democratization and the Europeanization of Russification is overwhelming in culture and Belarus. What we find necessary to ensure the language spheres since 1995; only as late as in sustainability of this process is the cultural and the end of the last decade have some signs of political de-Sovietization and de-Russification changing policies appeared in this field. Rus- in a broad meaning. 3 Issue 2 (32), 2013

A popular model of “two Belaruses” - the one pro- The Identity of the Belarusian State: Western, pro-democratic and Belarusian-speaking, A Never-Ending Process? and another one, pro-Rus- sian, pro-autocratic and Vadim Vileita Russian-speaking - is an Since the beginning of Lukashenka’s rule, he oversimplification. To briefly define the range of problems of the has been constructing the identity of the new Belarusian identity is almost a mission im- Belarus on the old Soviet identity, whereas Since the beginning of possible. One can be interested in Belarus for Belarusians are “the (younger) brothers” of Lukashenka’s rule, he has years and decades, but still never find a com- Russians and their language is by far not cen- tral for the national self-perception. Accord- been constructing the mon language on Belarus with others, just be- cause they can hardly agree which Belarus they ing to this identity, Belarusians constitute a identity of the new Belar- actually bear in mind when discussing it. branch of an older Orthodox Russian nation. us on the old Soviet iden- The Soviet doctrine formally stresses Belaru- tity, whereas Belarusians A popular model of “two Belaruses” - the one sians are ‘equal’ to Russians, and this is what are “the (younger) broth- pro-Western, pro-democratic and Belaru- serves an argument for their claims for ‘equal- ers” of Russians and their sian-speaking, and another one, pro-Russian, ity’ in integration with Moscow. But Russia is language is by far not pro-autocratic and Russian-speaking - is an still essential for this kind of identity. Notably, central for the national oversimplification. Suitable for political mani- supporters of this theory tend to be people of self-perception. festos, it fails to explain lots of aspects of the older age. Many of them live in villages and Belarusian self-perception. towns, but even those living in cities are often not very good in Russian pronunciation, just The system of “threefold identity” looks like like many Belarusians of older generation, in- a more realistic alternative1. It is true that, cluding Lukashenka himself, originating from though being a state with a rather weak ethnic rural areas or having no higher education. So, identity, Belarus still has a considerable seg- this is a paradox of the “Soviet Belarusians”: ment of population which sticks to the ideas they do not respect their native tongue, but of the classical nation-state with Belarusian as their Russian is also quite poor. the only official language and the symbols of the old Grand Duchy of Lithuania as its state For a share of the population, arguably the symbols. These are ideas of predominantly largest one, the issues of language and identity well-educated people who, logically, live in are of no interest at all. They tend to live in a cities and use only pure Russian in public, just situation as it is, with Belarus being quasi-in- because Russian is the language of cities in Be- dependent on Russia, however, staying deeply larus. People who do not use Russian in Minsk integrated with the former imperial power or Hrodna risk becoming targets for perma- culturally, linguistically and economically. nent attention, either positive or negative one. This is how they see their identity: we are very These people are, as a rule, in the opposition similar to Russians, but we have our own state to the existing identity system of Belarus, but - so let’s get the best out of it. Pragmatic Be- they feel a marginal minority, so they opt for larusians treat the state as an opportunity for mimicry, knowing that minorities are not re- welfare rather than an identity-based entity. spected in this country. So, this is the “hid- Being pragmatic and free of ideologies, they ing ethno-centric Belarus”, or the “Russian- find no problem in being both pro-European speaking nationalism of Belarus”, described by and pro-Russian simultaneously. They might some authors. consider themselves Belarusians, but they hate the “nationalists”, so when they hear someone However, there is another (and bigger) share of speaking Belarusian, they might burst out: Belarusians not attracted by the dream about “Oh no, Belarusians again. So funny. I hate Belarus as a European nation-state. These can them” (rather than a personal remark, this is be divided in two groups - ‘pragmatic Belar- a famous quotation from Viktoryia Papova, us’ and Soviet-oriented, predominantly rural the editor of the “Culture” (sic!) section of the ‘Byelorussia’. The alliance of these two groups leading state newspaper “Belarus Segodnia/ has actually been ruling the state since 1994, Sovetskaya Belorussiya”, recorded on phone by effectively marginalizing the ethno-centrists. another journalist).

1 The model of ‘threefold’ Belarusian identity has Given the depth of the divisions and a lack of been in-depth described and justified at the author’s will to bridge the gaps, the Belarusian identity bachelor paper (2005), based on the polling data should be considered far from consolidated of the Independent Institute of Socioeconomic and and highly unlikely to reach the point of con- Political Studies (Belarus-Lithuania). solidation under the current regime, despite 4 Issue 2 (32), 2013

the dictator’s efforts. For this regime, the iden- statehood, should it be a nation-state or some tity issues proved irresolvable. However, they more sophisticated consensus models. So far, are crucial to invest in for Belarus to achieve Belarus is a terra incognita even for its own in- With the age of ethno- the status of a contemporary European nation. habitants who are lingering in a post-colonial centric nationalism over With the age of ethnocentric nationalism over limbo, with numerous conflicts in the society throughout Europe, to throughout Europe, to be a democracy Belar- glimmering on and never addressed. be a democracy Belarus us still needs a clear identity model of its own still needs a clear identity model of its own state- hood, should it be a na- tion-state or some more sophisticated consensus models.

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