Holding the High Ground: Interpreting the Civil War in National Parks Robert K. Sutton IN 2000, CONGRESS RECOGNIZED THAT THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE “does an outstanding job of ... describing the particular battle at any given site, but in the ... multi-media presen- tations, it does not always do a similarly good job of documenting and describing the histor- ical social, economic, legal, cultural and political forces and events that originally led to the [Civil War] which eventually manifested themselves in specific battles. In particular, the Civil War battlefields are often weak or missing vital information about the role that the institution of slavery played in causing the American Civil War.” Congress further directed “the Secre- tary of the Interior to encourage Civil War battle sites to recognize and include in all of their public displays and multimedia educational presentations the unique role that the institution of slavery played in causing the Civil War and its role, if any, at the individual battle sites.” National Park Service Civil War battlefield superintendents had already begun to expand interpretation in their parks starting with a meeting in Nashville, Tennessee,in 1998, in which they asked themselves the question, “How do we go about expanding the scope of interpretation on Civil War battlefields, giving visitors the opportunity to explore the funda- mental contexts and meanings of the resources that comprise Civil War battlefields?” In the ten years since, we have made great progress in meeting our charge from Congress, by inter- preting not only the issue of slavery, but other causational themes as well. As we approach the Sesquicentennial of the Civil War, our goal is to make our parks laboratories for explor- ing and understanding this critical period in our history. “After four years of arduous service the “lost cause” of the Civil War. Simply marked by unsurpassed courage and stated, the lost cause was a viewpoint of the fortitude, the Army of Northern war, perpetuated by Confederate veterans, Virginia has been compelled to yield that the Confederacy was engaged in a to overwhelming numbers and re- noble war, fought by honorable men, to sources.” defend the cause of states’ rights. The South lost, not because the cause was With this farewell address to his troops wrong—the proponents believed it was at Appomattox Courthouse in April 1865, just—nor because the officers and soldiers General Robert E. Lee started what we have were inferior—in their eyes, they were su- since called the conception, or the myth, of perior. They lost because they faced insur- Volume 25 • Number 3 (2008) 47 mountable odds of more manpower and Although the Confederate states had more industrial might—in fact, more of vir- the smaller population and army, they had tually everything. many advantages, such as fighting much of Lee’s Farewell Address and the body of the war on their home ground, with the crit- literature that ensued, beginning with ical advantage of internal supply lines. The Edward Pollard’s 1865 book The Lost South had some of the most fertile land in Cause: A New Southern History of the War the country, yet the government was never of the Confederates, followed by a second truly able to shift its cotton-growing econo- volume in 1866, The Lost Cause Regained, my to large-scale food production, with an perpetuated and engrained the lost cause in adequate distribution system from areas of the Southern and, later, Northern psyche. abundance to areas of need. Further, the Pollard and others influenced the content of Confederate government was a true confed- textbooks, and by adopting an activist eracy, in which each state was sovereign. approach to curricular planning these States were asked to contribute money, Confederate sympathizers were able to per- rather than there being a mandatory taxing petuate the lost cause for generations system, so money was scarce and highly beyond the end of the Civil War.1 inflated. In many ways, the idea of the lost cause For years, historians have debated why made perfect sense. Indeed, there were the North won. In a new book, This Mighty more Northerners than Southerners. There Scourge, leading Civil War historian, James were more factories in the North than in the M. McPherson, examines recent scholar- South. There were more railroads in the ship on why the North won. Multiple rea- North. Indeed, the North had more of most sons from social, economic, political, and everything. So, was General Lee correct in military perspectives contributed to the his assessment? Southern loss and the Northern victory.3 As Throughout history, there have been one example, recent scholarship suggests many instances in which the smaller army that the desertion rate, especially among defeated the larger army. In the American Confederates, drained the army and provid- Revolutionary War, the Americans defeated ed strong evidence that many Confederates Great Britain, which outnumbered and out- lost the will to fight. Tied to that, many produced them, and, in fact, had more of wives implored their husbands who were just about everything, but still lost the war. off fighting to come home. Many heard the In the 1860s, Paraguay fought a war with siren calls, and came home.4 Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil and nearly Another significant factor was the addi- won, but lost not only the war, but much of tion of African American troops on the Union its male population, and about half its entire side at the critical juncture late in the war. population. Americans are still trying to Toward the end of the war, over 200,000 come to grips with the fact that we lost the black troops swelled the numbers in the war in Vietnam, despite the fact that we Union army at a time when both armies were the richest nation in the world.2 were in desperate need of more soldiers. For Smaller armies certainly do not win all of these African American soldiers, the stakes the time, but often enough to be notewor- were high. Many were former slaves, and thy. nearly all saw their mission as bringing an 48 The George Wright Forum end to the institution of slavery. The risks Congress—Chickamauga–Chattanooga in were higher for these men than their white Georgia and Tennessee—were set aside colleagues. If they surrendered, they would with specific legislation that directed the face being sold into slavery, or, worse yet, War Department, which was the first man- massacred, such as what happened at Fort ager of this park, to commemorate the bat- Pillow in Tennessee, an incident in which tles fought there and the brave soldiers who 80% of the black soldiers were killed.5 Be- gave their lives on that sacred ground. cause the Confederates refused to consider Furthermore, these parks were to be used as blacks as prisoners of war, the prisoner laboratories to study the military actions exchange system that prevailed early in the that took place there.8 Thus, when this and war broke down, leading to the establish- other military parks were transferred to the ment of the infamous prisoner-of-war National Park Service, staff avoided both camps. As the war progressed, however, an the issue of why the North won, and a great important philosophical shift became evi- deal of controversy,by focusing on the mili- dent. White soldiers began to understand tary history of the Civil War. the risks black soldiers faced, and when “Chit-Chat,” as we call Chickamauga– they saw how they fought—like furies— Chattanooga National Military Park, is actu- many who were indifferent to slavery now ally a wonderful park for discussing military came to accept the cause of ending the insti- history. On the final day of the battle of tution.6 Chickamauga, General William S. Rose- For generations, National Park Service crans, the Union commander, moved a divi- interpreters and managers have deftly skirt- sion from his line to cover what one of his ed such issues as why the North won the aides thought was a hole in another part of Civil War. Some academic historians have the line. As it turned out, there really was criticized us for telling “symbolic history” not a gap; the aide simply could not see the or “institutional” history, rather than Union troops in the tree cover. But by mov- wrestling with substantive issues such as ing this division, Rosecrans created a real why the North won.7 Historians in the acad- hole in the line, which, under normal cir- emy and the Park Service present their cumstances, would have been plugged work to different audiences and for different within minutes. Commanders and their purposes. Academics disseminate their aides always checked to make sure that work primarily to their peers, while Park there were no gaps in the line, or, to use the Service historians present their work to mil- terminology of the day, to ensure that none lions of visitors with a wide variety of inter- of the regiments or divisions were “in the ests, knowledge, and educational back- air.” Yet, at that moment, at that very spot, grounds. Both academic and Park Service and by total coincidence, Confederate Gen- historians, however, seek to enlighten their eral James Longstreet unleashed an attack, audiences with the most accurate and not knowing that the point of attack was insightful information available. uncovered. In the ensuing melee, and in Park Service historians sometimes have what could have been a disastrous Union a further restraint on what they present to defeat, Union General George Thomas their audiences. Many of our military parks, held his strong defensive position behind starting with the first one created by the front lines, allowing most of the Union Volume 25 • Number 3 (2008) 49 army to retreat north to Chattanooga.