CLOSUP Student Working Paper Series Number 63
April 2020
Hurricane Sandy and Managed Retreat: Analyzing Natural Disasters’ Potential as Focusing Events
Emma Uebelhor, University of Michigan
This paper is available online at http://closup.umich.edu
Papers in the CLOSUP Student Working Paper Series are written by students at the University of Michigan. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the view of the Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy or any sponsoring agency
Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy University of Michigan Emma Uebelhor
Environ 302
Professor Sarah Mills
9 February 2020
Hurricane Sandy and Managed Retreat: Analyzing Natural Disasters’ Potential as
Focusing Events
ABSTRACT
Scientists estimate that by 2050 rising sea levels will place over 800 million people around the world at risk for regular flooding events, infrastructure damage and, in some extreme cases, complete submersion. As a result, many communities throughout the world are considering managed retreat policies that encourage coastal residents to relocate to higher and safer ground. However, these policies are notoriously controversial and difficult to implement without strong public support. This paper
conducts a case study using Kingdon’s multiple streams framework to compare two New York
City neighborhoods’ readiness for managed retreat following Hurricane Sandy in order to answer
the following question: how, and under what conditions, can natural disasters operate as windows of opportunity for managed retreat policy implementation? Through an in-depth analysis of the problem, proposed policy, and politics in both communities, this paper concludes that with prompt, collaborative action following novel flooding events, communities may be more receptive to and willing to participate in managed retreat programs.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past 150 years, humans have released trillions of pounds of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, prompting rapid temperature rise and unprecedented climate events (United States
Environmental Protection Agency, 2016). Rising sea levels are among the most dangerous and
widespread consequences of human emissions. By 2050, it is estimated that over 800 million people
across the world will be affected by sea level rise (“Staying Afloat”, 2019). The majority of the world’s major cities, historically built along coastlines, are at risk for flooding, infrastructure loss, and in some extreme cases, complete submersion. Experts estimate that, at current rates, sea level rise will cost over a trillion dollars in damages in the next 30 years (“Staying Afloat”, 2019). Beyond these economic losses, it is increasingly likely that millions of people will lose their homes and neighborhoods due to persistent flooding in the coming decades. At our current global temperature, it is inevitable that sea rise will continue to a certain degree for centuries to come (Jevrejeva, Jackson, Riva, Grinsted & Moore, 2016).
Therefore, strong policy implementation is essential to protect coastal communities from the worst-case scenarios.
In addition to efforts to limit carbon emissions, coastal cities are currently implementing three types of policies to mitigate the effects of sea level rise. First, governments are investing in large scale engineering projects such as sea walls, overflow barriers and coastal pumps to protect their citizens from the rising sea (Muggah, 2019). However, while these projects are expected to help coastal cities, they are not likely to withstand the worst projections of sea level rise (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development, 2019). Communities are also creating programs to reintroduce natural barriers to flooding such as marshes and coral reefs. These techniques can be less costly than synthetic efforts to hold back the rising sea (OECD, 2019). However, like the sea walls, these projects may help to reduce the frequency of flooding events, but ultimately, will not save the most vulnerable communities from inevitable losses.
Therefore, some cities are bracing for the worst-case scenario by implementing a third type of policy that encourages long-term relocation to higher ground (Muggah, 2019).
These policies, commonly called managed retreat or relocation policies, are inherently controversial and difficult to implement. People naturally want to exhaust all possible solutions before admitting that they have no choice but to leave their communities. Additionally, managed retreat policies often ask the public to consider leaving behind their homes before they begin to feel a substantial impact from sea level rise. However, despite these implementation challenges, scientific evidence suggests that ultimately, moving to higher ground will be the only option for millions across the world (“Staying
Afloat”, 2019). Therefore, implementation and public support of managed retreat policies is essential. While there is an abundance of research into the public’s overall perception of managed retreat policies in
the United States and abroad, studies have yet to fully consider the factors that push American
municipalities towards successful policy implementation. This paper seeks to evaluate how major
flooding events can impact United States coastal communities' readiness for managed retreat.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The current research on the enactment of managed retreat policy following flooding events falls
into two main categories. There is some existing literature about public perception and the overall process
of implementing managed retreat policies. Additionally, there are existing case studies, upon which this
paper’s methods and framework are based, that analyze the impacts on many types of natural disasters on
policy change.
Perceptions of Managed Retreat Policies
A 2011 study by Alexander, Ryan and Measham analyzed people's framework for considering
issues in relation to their perception of managed retreat policies as a solution for sea level rise. The study
considers varying public perspectives on managed retreat policies by conducting an open-ended online
survey about a theoretical relocation policy. The researchers examined the framework through which
people answered the survey’s questions and found that people who were skeptical about the sea level rise
were more likely to consider the plan through a theological perspective, meaning that they rejected any
facts presented to them that were inconsistent with their worldview. Since the managed retreat policies,
and sea level rise in general, conflicted with their beliefs, they chose not to acknowledge them as options.
The study concludes that an understanding of the thought process behind these different perspectives is
useful because consensus is essential in implementing managed retreat policies. Therefore, communities
must convince theological deniers that sea level rise is a pressing issue before they create effective relocation strategies.
Torabi, Dedekorkut, and Howes (2017) build upon this theory in their analysis of sea level rise
policies in two Australian towns. In order to understand why some local governments are more successful
than others in implementing sea level rise solutions, the researchers compared the sea level rise policies of two similar Australian municipalities using their established criterion. Additionally, the researchers
conducted interviews with key stakeholders about the process of sea level rise policy creation and
implementation in their town. The researchers found that the town with a more developed sea level rise
policy had higher levels of environmental activism in its community and had faced more frequent sea level rise related flooding. Additionally, their local government had a higher percentage of officials that believed in climate change and sea level rise. The study concludes that a strong consensus about the
dangers of sea level rise may positively impact the development of effective sea level rise policy and
suggests that frequent flooding could lead to this consensus.
While other studies focused on public perception, Yousef, Neill, St. John III, Ash and Mahar’s
2015 study surveyed Virginia lawmakers in order to understand the development of sea level rise policy
in the state. The study uses John Kingdon’s multiple streams framework to understand the factors that
limited sea level rise policy development in Virginia. In his 1984 book Agendas, Alternatives and Public
Policies, Kingdon theorizes that there are three streams of policy creation that must meet in order to
implement effective policy (Kingdon, 1984). Kingdon’s first stream is the problem, or the issue that needs
to be recognized and solved through policy (Kingdon, 1984). For example, in the Yousef et al. study, the
problem is impending flooding in Virginia’s coastal communities due to sea level rise (Yousef et al.,
2015). Through a survey distributed to members of the Virginia legislature, the researchers concluded that
the lawmakers lacked a strong recognition of the risks that coastal communities in their state could face in
the coming years (Yousef et al., 2015). Therefore, according to Kingdon’s theory, the problem stream for
Virginia managed retreat policy was not at the point of action at the time of the Yousef et al. study.
Kingdon’s second stream, which he calls the policy stream, focuses on the availability and recognition of
potential solutions to a problem (Kingdon, 1984). In the Yousef et al. (2015) study, the policy stream
would encompass all possible answers to address sea level rise related flooding. The Yousef et al. study’s
survey results indicated that many of the legislators were also unsure about possible solutions for sea level
rise related issues in their state, demonstrating that the policy stream for Virginia sea level rise also lacked
readiness for action. Kingdon’s final stream, politics, encompasses all of the factors that could hinder the implementation of a solution, such as partisanship or public opinion (Kingdon, 1984). In the Yousef et al. survey, lawmakers identified a perceived lack of public support as their main political hindrance for sea level rise policy implementation (Yousef et al., 2015). This perception discouraged the legislatures from taking action on sea level rise, or as Kingdon would say, prevented the politics stream from reaching a point of action. The Yousef et al. study concludes that, as Kingdon theorizes, sea level policy would not be implemented in Virginia until all three of these streams moved forward (Yousef et al., 2015). The researchers suggest that each stream could potentially progress if a major flooding event pushed the
Virginia public and government to focus on the dangers of sea level rise.
Case Studies on Post Disaster Policy Change
While there are not any case studies to test this theory that specifically focus on sea level rise policy following flooding disasters, there are several case studies on post-disaster policy change that utilize Kingdon’s multiple streams framework. In 2015, Scolobig, Linnerooth-Bayer and Pelling conducted a case study of Italian landslide policy that utilized Kingdon’s theory in order to better understand the connection between natural disasters and policy reform. The researchers note there is a consensus among experts that in order to combat climate change, communities across the globe should shift from reacting to disasters to implementing preemptive risk-management policies. However, previous research has shown that such policies are often pushed off for future generations to solve and therefore, are low priorities on political agendas. To study if a natural disaster could disrupt this phenomenon, the researchers studied changes in Italian landslide policy following two historic disasters. They created a timeline of 20th century Italian landslide policy using legislative documents and interviews with key experts. Through this research, they identified two major shifts in landslide policy that occurred following publicized and catastrophic landfalls. The researchers conclude that while natural disasters alone do not have the power to change policy, they often bring visibility to existing advocacy and risk management policy and therefore, lead to change. This finding fits with Kingdon’s theory that focusing events, or major crises that highlight lack of action on a problem, can push the three streams together and lead to meaningful policy change (Kingdon, 1984). Another case study in European disaster policy used Kingdon’s framework and his theory of
focusing events to analyze the relationship between major floods in the last 70 years and changes in flood
management policy in England and Wales (Johnson, Tunstall, & Penning-Rowsell, 2005). The authors
were interested in how and why particular ideas in flood policy emerged following disasters in order to
better understand and predict future flood policy developments. In order to understand the relationship
between floods and policy change, the researchers identified four key floods to use as case studies. The
authors found that major national floods drew attention to flood policy and acted as “windows of
opportunity” through which key actors could implement existing ideas (Johnson, Tunstall, & Penning-
Rowsell, 2005). The majority of the time, the policies that were implemented following floods were not
novel and likely would have still been implemented, but on a slower timeline, had the flood not occurred.
The authors concluded that major flooding events are likely to act as focusing events if the solutions to
mitigate their damage are already in existence.
In 2008, a similar study was conducted to build upon the findings of the research on flood policy in England and Wales. Sultana, Johnson and Thompson (2008) applied the method of the previous study to Bangladesh in order to understand flood policy evolution outside of the United Kingdom. Like in the previous study, the researchers identified four major catastrophic floods to use as case studies. Again, they used Kingdon’s framework in order to analyze the behavior of key stakeholders and any policy changes that occurred following these four major floods. Through their analysis, the researchers concluded that flood management policy evolution in Bangladesh was more complex than English flood management policy. In Bangladesh, there were additional funding constraints on policy development.
Also, while major floods did provide existing advocates with windows to promote their policy ideas, these events also made room for new advocates and viable new solutions in flood policy. This study demonstrates the complexity of the process of policy implementation. Throughout the world, there is no one clear way that a community will react following a major natural disaster.
Summary Across research on sea level rise policy implementation, experts agree that consensus among
community members is essential for the creation of effective mitigation policies (Alexander et al., 2011;
Torabi et al., 2017; Yousef et al., 2015). Additionally, multiple sea level rise policy studies suggest that a natural disaster could prompt increased concern for and agreement about the danger of sea level rise
(Torabi et al., 2017; Yousef et al., 2015). Using Kingdon’s multiple streams framework, traditional
disaster management policy research also finds that in conjunction with some existing ideas for solutions,
natural disasters can promote effective policy change (Scolobig et al., 2015; Johnson et al., 2005: Sultana
et al., 2008). While some research exists on international responses to flooding disasters, there has been
little investigation into sea level rise disasters and policy change in the United States (Johnson et al.,
2005; Sultana et al., 2008). Additionally, there is a lack of information about the implementation of
managed retreat policies following major events. Since managed retreat policies are particularly
controversial, it would be beneficial to know if the general theory of natural disaster policy applies to
implementation of managed retreat policies. This paper conducts a case study using Kingdon’s multiple
streams framework to compare two New York City neighborhoods’ readiness for managed retreat
following Hurricane Sandy in order to answer the following question: how, and under what conditions,
can natural disasters operate as windows of opportunity for managed retreat policy implementation?
METHODS
Sampling Plan
In October 2012, Hurricane Sandy brought unprecedented destruction to the northeastern coast of
the United States (“Hurricane Sandy Fast Facts”, 2019). New York City was particularly vulnerable to the
storm. The area’s rising sea levels, nearly a foot in the past 100 years, amplified the effect of a storm
surge that led to 53 deaths and over 19 billion dollars in economic damages within the city (Kahn, 2012;
“Impact of Hurricane Sandy,” n.d.). However, this devastation was not distributed evenly throughout the
city. Over half of the deaths in the city occurred in Staten Island neighborhoods that were inundated with
16-foot tall storm tides (Wilson, 2017). Following the storm, official city policy was centered around providing aid to affected communities, so they could rebuild their homes and businesses. However, unexpectedly, east Staten Island residents overwhelmingly opposed this potential solution and requested that the city instead implement a buyout program that would allow them to retreat from the area (Koslov,
2014). When the city rejected their request, the community members organized and appealed to the state.
Eventually, the state agreed to introduce a trial buyout program in the Oakwood Beach neighborhood through which they offered property owners the pre-storm value of their home or business plus a 10 percent incentive for leaving (“NY Rising”, 2014). Following nearly 100 percent participation in the original trial, the state expanded the program to two more neighborhoods, where resident interest was also near 100 percent (Rush, 2015). These three Staten Island neighborhoods are the first example of a successfully implemented managed retreat policy in any major United States city and are among a select group of retreated communities in the rest of the United States.
In 2015, three years after Hurricane Sandy, city officials began a planning initiative for another
New York City neighborhood (Figure 1). Edgemere, Queens, like the Staten Island neighborhoods, is especially vulnerable to sea level rise. Hurricane Sandy highlighted that without change, the community faced a future of regular flooding crises. To combat this, the city suggested a variety of urban planning solutions, including transitioning the most vulnerable areas of this neighborhood from residential spaces to open parks (Nonko, 2020). Residents in these identified areas of the community were offered relocation packages. While city officials emphasized that they were welcome to remain in their homes if they preferred, the homeowners were told that they would no longer be eligible for funding from the city’s flood rehabilitation and resilience programs (Kensinger, 2017). Contrary to the situation in Staten
Island, many homeowners in Edgemere’s identified areas expressed discomfort about the plan and the idea of leaving their homes (Kensinger, 2017). Despite their close proximity to the Staten Island neighborhoods, Edgemere’s residents reacted to managed retreat in a manner more similar to other vulnerable communities facing sea level rise.
Figure 1: Timeline of Key Events
At the surface level, the Staten Island and the Queens cases are similar. Both communities experienced the same storm under the same leadership only a few miles apart. However, the two communities had vastly different reactions to the idea of managed retreat. Edgemere, Queens represents
Seawright and Gerring’s definition of a typical case (Seawright & Gerring, 2008). As past literature and other cases would predict, when presented with a managed retreat policy, the Edgemere residents resisted the plan and expressed doubt about the need for relocation (Alexander, Ryan & Measham, 2011). In addition to being a typical case, the background of the Edgemere case shares many commonalities with the situation in Staten Island. However, in comparison to Edgemere, the response from the east Staten
Island neighborhoods was far from typical. Unlike most communities, not only were the residents overwhelmingly in favor of implementing managed retreat, but they organized to reject the city’s initial proposal to rebuild. Therefore, east Staten Island is a deviant case (Seawright & Gerring, 2008). Our overall understanding of the public’s perceptions of managed retreat will improve with an analysis of the differences between this case and typical cases, like Edgemere.
Framework In order to compare the two cases, this paper utilizes Kingdon's multiple streams framework from his book Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (1984). Kingdon theorizes that there are three streams to policy making that must meet in order to implement change (Figure 2). In Staten Island, Hurricane
Sandy seemed to act as a focusing event, leading to a novel and meaningful solution to sea level rise.
However, the storm did not function in the same way in Edgemere, Queens. Therefore, this paper compares each of the streams for both cases to understand why Hurricane Sandy had differing policy implications throughout New York City.
Figure 2 (Framework)
The Problem Stream and Hurricane Sandy as a Focusing Event
Kingdon defines the problem stream as the process of identifying an issue for the government to address through policy (Kingdon, 1984). To understand the problem recognition process in both Staten
Island and Edgemere, this paper analyzes New York City flood maps and reports of past flooding events in both neighborhoods. In addition to analyzing prior problem recognition, this paper will also consider how Hurricane Sandy acted as a focusing event to enhance public attention about the threats posed by sea level rise. In order to do so, this paper analyzes newspaper articles and government reports released after the storm in both boroughs to understand how public and government perceptions about sea level rise
changed as a result of Hurricane Sandy.
The Policy Stream
The policy stream is centered around the potential solutions to the identified problems. Kingdon
theorizes that for effective policy implementation, a practical solution must exist when the problem comes
to light (Kingdon, 1984). Often, as in this case, there are competing ideas about the best solution for an
issue. This paper analyzes the proposed structure and implementation process of the potential policy
solutions suggested to manage sea level rise in Staten Island and Edgemere, Queens. Also, in accordance
with Kingdon’s framework, this paper looks into the groups that advocated for each potential solution.
The Politics Stream
Finally, the politics stream addresses the feasibility of implementing solutions to address identified issues. It encompasses the effects of the political ideologies of the governing body, the influence of public opinion and interest groups, the relationship between different levels of government, and the impact of any recent leadership changes (Kingdon, 1985). In total, the politics stream is meant to include any aspect that might make a government more or less inclined to address an issue. This paper will again turn to newspaper articles to understand both Staten Island and Edgemere residents’ opinions on sea level rise solutions. This evidence will be supplemented with demographic data and voting records to better understand the makeup of these neighborhoods and the perspective of their residents. In addition to the residents, this research uses news articles and government information to study the relationship between the New York City and the New York state governments in managing the recovery process following Hurricane Sandy. Finally, this paper focuses directly on the city and state officials to analyze how their ideologies could affect the implementation of sea level rise policy in both neighborhoods.
A detailed analysis of all three streams will provide a stronger understanding of the reasons behind the vastly different reactions to managed retreat between Staten Island and Edgemere and advance our knowledge of managed retreat policy implementation as a whole.
RESULTS & ANALYSIS The Problem Stream and Hurricane Sandy as a Focusing Event
The Staten Island Neighborhoods
Because of its exposed geography, Staten Island has historically faced regular flooding, and its residents are accustomed to coping with storm surges when hurricanes or tropical storms near the borough
(Gammon, 2012). In 1950, east Staten Island residents, living in the same homes that would later face
Hurricane Sandy, were forced to evacuate due to extreme rainfall and flooding during the Great
Appalachian Storm (“Photo gallery: Staten Island is no stranger to dangerous storms”, 2012). Years later, two Category 2 storms, Hurricane Gloria and Hurricane Bob, caused panic throughout the borough and led to the evacuation of hundreds of the most vulnerable residents (McFadden, 1985). However, east
Staten Islanders persevered through these storms, and ultimately, faced little permanent infrastructure damage as a result (“Photo gallery”, 2012). For the next twenty years, Staten Island experienced a period of relative calm, until Hurricane Irene threatened to bring unprecedented damage to New York in August
2011. As a result of the forecasts, then New York City mayor Michael Bloomberg invoked mandatory evacuation orders for all of the city’s most vulnerable, low-lying Zone A neighborhoods for the first time
(Smalley, n.d.). At the time, Zone A encompassed 95 percent of the city’s coastline, including the three
Staten Island neighborhoods that would later be bought out by the state (Smalley, n.d.). However, Staten
Island and the rest of New York, felt comparatively little damage as a result of Hurricane Irene.
Ultimately, east Staten Island faced a five-foot storm surge in the storm, which long-time residents considered to be relatively normal.
Generally, in the years prior to Hurricane Sandy, there was relatively low recorded media or public concern about the potential danger sea level rise posed to Staten Island neighborhoods during major storms. Prior to Hurricane Sandy, there is no record in the New York City Planning Department archives that the city’s Hurricane Evacuation Zone maps had been updated to account for sea level changes since they began recording their released documents on their website in 2002 (NYC Planning, n.d.). Estimates suggest that New York City sea levels rose more than four inches between 2002 and 2012 when Hurricane Sandy reached New York, and while that number may seem insignificant, every inch can exacerbate flooding events, especially in low-lying communities (“New York’s Sea Level Has Risen 9”
Since 1950,” n.d.). Additionally, in the year leading up to Hurricane Sandy, according to the records of the NewsBank database, there were only six unique news stories published in the United States that mentioned Staten Island’s future in relation to sea level rise. In the year following, the same search for
“Staten Island” and “Sea Level Rise” yields more than ninety unique results. In addition to the increased media coverage, after Hurricane Sandy, city officials revisited New York City’s Hurricane Evacuation
Zone maps to “more accurately delineate areas most at risk of flooding due to storm surge” by incorporating updated sea level data (NYC Emergency Management, n.d.). Since 2014, the city planning department has released yearly, updated Hurricane Evacuation Zone maps (NYC Planning, n.d.).
All of this evidence indicates that Hurricane Sandy acted as a focusing event for sea level rise related flooding concerns in Staten Island. To understand why, this paper turns to the public reaction to
Hurricane Sandy in Staten Island. Hurricane Sandy caused more destruction and death on Staten Island than any of the previously mentioned storms (Baptiste, 2017). Nearly half of New York City’s 53 recorded deaths occurred in Staten Island, and the largest percentage of those deaths occurred in the three east Staten Island neighborhoods that were later bought out by the state. As opposed to Hurricane Irene’s manageable five-foot storm surge, the unique conditions of Hurricane Sandy led to a storm surge of over
16 feet in east Staten Island. Residents described being shocked by the severity of the storm after being passed over by Hurricane Irene just one year prior while others described Sandy as their “wake-up call”
(Gabbatt, 2012). Many residents, with noted ties to their community, questioned if it was worth continuing to live in an increasingly vulnerable area where so many of their neighbors had perished. In his
1984 book, Kingdon notes that not every disaster has the potential to become a focusing event, and often, when a community faces repeated crises, only a noticeably more severe event can spur change. In Staten
Island, it appears that residents were accustomed to regular flooding, but Hurricane Sandy changed perspectives about the threat that sea level rise posed to their neighborhoods.
Edgemere Like the east Staten Island neighborhoods, Edgemere is located in a particularly vulnerable
position on the New York City coastline. Edgemere sits on the north end of the Rockaways, a barrier
island that has historically protected the rest of Queens from extreme storm surges and flooding. On the
Rockaways, residents are accustomed to facing flooding events. In 1893, a Category 1 hurricane
completely destroyed a small resort island just off the main portion of the Rockaways (Hogwood, 2008).
Additionally, like the Staten Island residents, many individuals living in the Rockaways evacuated when
the city faced both Hurricane Gloria and Hurricane Ben but found relatively minimal property damage upon their return (Hogwood, 2008). And while much of the Rockaways are slightly more protected from storm surges, Edgemere was categorized as Zone A under the pre-Sandy Hurricane Evacuation Zone maps as well, so Edgemere residents were also ordered to leave their homes before Hurricane Irene in
2011 (Smalley, n.d.).
There is some evidence that Hurricane Sandy also acted as a focusing event and concentrated government and media attention upon the threat that sea level rise posed to Edgemere. The city planning department’s updates to the Hurricane Evacuation Zone were citywide, and under the new system,
Edgemere has always been categorized as a highest risk zone (NYC Planning, n.d.). Additionally, in the year leading up to Sandy, a search for news articles related to “Queens” and “sea level rise” on the
NewsBank database yields eight unique results while the same search returns more than sixty original articles on the same topic in the following year. However, there is a severe lack of evidence that
Hurricane Sandy led to significant changes in the mentality of the Edgemere public. It is possible that the
Edgemere public responded to the storm similarly to the residents of Staten Island, and there was a lack of media attention on their response because of other mitigating circumstances. Given time and financial constraints, this paper is unable to directly interview Edgemere residents who experienced the storm firsthand. However, it is worth noting that in addition to the lack of evidence that Hurricane Sandy acted as a focusing event in Edgemere, there is also copious evidence to suggest that Edgemere did not face the same level of destruction as east Staten Island. While 11 people perished throughout Queens, there were no recorded deaths within the Edgemere neighborhood (“Mapping Hurricane Sandy’s Death Toll”, 2012). Additionally, because of the nature of Hurricane Sandy and Staten Island’s geography, east Staten Island
absorbed the worst of the storm surge. By the time the surge reached the Rockaways, it had partially
diminished to 10 feet at its highest point (Bessen, 2018). While Hurricane Sandy still caused devastating
destruction in Edgemere, it was not as extensive as the damage in east Staten Island.
Comparison
Both east Staten Island and Edgemere have been historically at risk for flooding and storm surges,
and rising sea levels have only exacerbated this issue for both communities. Prior to Hurricane Sandy,
there was little attention focused on this problem in either community. While the city and the residents of
both neighborhoods recognized that flooding events were issues for the two communities, there is limited
evidence to suggest that there was substantial government, media or public attention on sea level rise’s
impact on flooding events in these communities prior to Hurricane Sandy. Following Hurricane Sandy,
the city government worked to consider sea level rise in their emergency plans for the entire city, and
media attention on the issue increased throughout New York. However, despite these similarities, there is
evidence that suggests that while Hurricane Sandy caused a substantial increase in public attention
towards sea level rise for Staten Island residents, it would be erroneous to make the same claim about
Edgemere’s public. The difference in severity of the damage that each community faced particularly with
respect to loss of life is one potential explanation for this disparity. As Kingdon suggests, every disaster is
not a focusing event, and in two communities that are accustomed to facing flooding events, one might
expect that it would take a particularly unusual and devastating flood to alert the public to a problem
(Kingdon, 1984).
The Policy Stream
The Staten Island Neighborhoods
Just three weeks after Hurricane Sandy, Oakwood Beach residents held a community meeting to discuss their needs following the storm (Rush, 2015). At the end of the meeting, one resident asked their gathered neighbors if they would be interested in selling their homes and leaving the neighborhood if they were offered a buyout for the pre-storm value of their home. Meeting attendants described being shocked as nearly all of the meeting’s 200 plus participants raised their hands (Rush, 2015). These Oakwood
Beach residents had faced years of flooding, but Hurricane Sandy’s severity pushed them to conclude that their neighborhood was no longer hospitable and would only become more dangerous in the years to come. Following the first November community meeting, a group of residents formed the Oakwood
Beach Buyout Committee and methodically worked their way through the damaged neighborhood, gaging the community’s overall interest in buyouts and speaking to residents about the type of buyout program they would be most likely to support (Rush, 2015).
During this time, the New York City government continued to emphasize that the city’s strategy was to rebuild, not retreat, following Hurricane Sandy. Then Mayor Michael Bloomberg encouraged
Staten Island residents to utilize available Federal Emergency Management Agency grant programs in order to rebuild their homes and businesses (Baptiste, 2017). So, sensing resistance at the city level, the
Oakwood Beach Buyout Committee bypassed Mayor Bloomberg and brought their proposed buyout plan to the state (Rush, 2015). By February 2013, New York state Governor Andrew Cuomo officially agreed to fund a trial managed retreat program in Oakwood Beach that would offer residents 110 percent of the pre-storm value of their home if they gave it up to the state (Staten Island Advance, 2013). At the time of the announcement, over 140 homeowners in the neighborhood had already expressed desire to participate in the program. Oakwood Beach buyouts officially began in April 2013, and a large portion of homeowners in the area immediately accepted the state’s offer for their homes (“NY Rising”, 2014). In addition to the base offer, the final program also provided former Oakwood beach residents with a five percent incentive to relocate to another neighborhood within Staten Island. Despite the high rates of neighborhood participation, the program was completely voluntary and residents who wished to stay retained access to federal rebuilding grants (New York State Governor's Office, 2013). Once the homes were bought out, the state demolished the structures and returned the properties to nature in the hopes that they would serve as a natural barrier to protect the rest of the borough from future storm surges (Rush,
2015). Two months later, Mayor Bloomberg officially announced the Build It Back program, which was
the city’s primary policy response to Hurricane Sandy’s destruction. In his announcement, Bloomberg
described the Build It Back program as a resource to help New Yorkers navigate the Federal Emergency
Management Agency’s funding system in order to rebuild New York to be “stronger and more resilient”
than ever before (Office of the Mayor, 2013). The program designated approximately 2.2 billion dollars in
funding to assist New York property owners in four main initiatives (“Homeowner Services”, n.d.). The majority of the funding went towards construction and material costs for home repair projects throughout the city (“Build It Back”, n.d.). A select group of homeowners who could prove that more than half of
their home was destroyed by Hurricane Sandy were allowed to use this funding to add elevation or stilts
to their home to comply with modern flooding standards (Tempus, 2016). Homeowners who completely
lost their homes as a result of Hurricane Sandy were given funding through the rebuild initiative for
complete construction of new homes that they could choose from city-approved designs (“Homeowner
Services”, n.d.). In addition to the repair and rebuild programs, a reimbursement program allowed residents who had already completed reconstruction projects using their own money in the months following Hurricane Sandy to apply for grants to cover costs they incurred. Finally, a small proportion of the city’s hardest hit homeowners were offered access to an acquisition, or buyout, program. Ultimately, this program accounted for less than three percent of Build It Back cases and the majority of these acquisition cases occurred in conjunction with the state-led buyout programs (“Build It Back”, n.d.).
In 2019, New York City reported that 99% of Build It Back projects had officially been completed (“Build It Back”, n.d.). However, since the initial application period for the program, more than half of its applicants dropped out due to long wait times and paperwork backlogs (Spivack, 2019).
Following the program’s announcement, many east Staten Islanders expressed desire to instead participate in a similar program to the buyouts that were occurring in Oakland Beach (Baptiste, 2017).
Residents continued to appeal to the state, and in November 2013, the state governor's office expanded the program to the nearby Ocean Breeze neighborhood (New York State Governor's Office, 2013). At the time of the expansion, over 74 percent of the original eligible homeowners in Oakwood Beach had been bought out by the state. As participation in both neighborhoods neared 100 percent, the state buyout
program expanded once more in April 2014 to a section of the Graham Beach neighborhood, located just
south of Ocean Breeze (“NY Rising”, 2014). The state’s buyout program was highly targeted and limited
to neighborhoods with the highest levels of interest and need. Other east Staten Island residents who lived
just beyond the boundaries of the three chosen neighborhoods expressed frustration that they could not
participate and had no option but to rebuild their homes and remain vulnerable to future storms (Rush,
2015).
Edgemere
Like in Staten Island, all Edgemere homeowners were allowed to apply for funding under the
city’s Build It Back program following Hurricane Sandy. According to city records, Queens had the
highest level of Build It Back program applicants, with over 2,000 reconstruction projects completed
since 2013 (“Build It Back”, n.d.). Unlike Staten Island residents, there is no evidence of community-led
organization against the Build It Back policy in Edgemere or Queens as a whole. Following Hurricane
Sandy, the vast majority of Edgemere residents decided to rebuild and remain in their neighborhoods
(Kensinger, 2017).
In 2015, New York City’s department of Housing Preservation and Development began planning
beyond recovery from Sandy to the city's future with combating sea level rise through a series of
development initiatives in Edgemere, Queens (Kensinger, 2017). The city wanted to use Edgemere as a model case for sea level rise resilience in coastal communities both in New York City and the rest of the nation. The planning initiative introduced several new policy initiatives, including plans to elevate
vulnerable infrastructure and to construct coastal barriers to protect against rising tides (“Resilient
Edgemere Community Plan”, 2017). However, most controversially, the new policy included a plan to
convert one of the most low-lying sections of the neighborhood from a residential space to a park that would also serve as a natural barrier for the rest of the community against future storm surges.
Homeowners within the space were not forced to relocate, but they were told that they would no longer have access to the city’s Build It Back program resources to cope with future flooding damages. Then, each homeowner was offered a relocation package in which they would give up their home to the city and
move to a designated home of equal value elsewhere in the community.
Unlike the Staten Island communities who fought for a managed retreat program, the residents
placed in Edgemere’s “de-densification” zone pushed against their relocation policy and lamented their loss of the city’s Built It Back program (Kensinger, 2017). Lifelong resident Amanda Paleaz expressed
frustration with the reversal of city policy, saying “My parents went to Build it Back on day one, to tell
them we want to stay here, we want to lift our home, we want to be a part of the community… and then,
after two years, all of a sudden, it’s ‘You are going to have to rethink where you have lived for the past 45
years” (Kensinger, 2017). Additionally, while this zone of residents was told that they would no longer
qualify for Build It Back, they watched frustrated as their neighbors a few blocks away received city-
funded elevation improvements. Some residents also questioned the city’s promise that they would be
compensated with an equally desirable home. In addition to the sentimental value of their current homes,
some of the residents’ proposed new homes had substantially less square footage or were on considerably
smaller lots than their original home. Overall, the “de-densification” zone homeowners felt excluded from
the planning process. One resident who had lived in the community for the majority of her life protested
that “this new plan really seems like we are on the verge of getting pushed out … [and] does not have us
on it at all” (Kensinger, 2017).
Comparison
Despite facing extreme flooding from the same storm, east Staten Island and Edgemere residents
took opposite points of view about the need for managed retreat in their neighborhood. While Staten
Island community members organized and lobbied the state to create a buyout program and avoid
participation in the city’s Build It Back program, Edgemere residents embraced Build It Back and rejected
the city’s proposed relocation policy. As seen in the problem stream, the difference in infrastructure
damage and lives lost between the two communities as a result of Hurricane Sandy could offer a potential
explanation for this disparity. However, it is important to note that despite being based upon the same
concept, the relocation policies in Staten Island and Edgemere were not equal. In Staten Island, the state offered residents more than the pre-storm value of their home to move further inland while Edgemere residents were offered a home, instead of money, that many did not find to be equivalent to their current residence. As suggested by Alexander, Ryan and Measham’s 2011 study, seemingly small policy differences can create vast disparities between community members' perception of and willingness to participate in managed retreat programs. It is possible that Staten Island residents were more eager to participate in their managed retreat program than Edgemere residents because they perceived the offer they received to be more fair and just.
The Politics Stream
The Staten Island Neighborhoods
After clashes with city leadership over their response to flooding events both after Hurricane
Sandy and in the years prior, east Staten Island residents were motivated to organize and appeal to the state. Even before Hurricane Sandy hit Staten Island, residents had been frustrated with the city’s lack of attention and resources on the repeated flooding events throughout the borough (Gabbatt, 2012). Then, immediately following Hurricane Sandy, Mayor Bloomberg angered Staten Island residents by insisting upon holding the New York City Marathon. The streets of Staten Island were still flooded, bodies were still being recovered, and many newly homeless residents were taking refuge in hotels that would have been forced to kick them out to accommodate reservations for marathon runners in the coming weekend
(Belson, 2012). While Bloomberg eventually called off the marathon, the controversy did not help the relationship between the residents of Staten Island and the city government. Support for Bloomberg in
Staten Island had already fallen between his 2005 and 2009 elections, with nearly 30 point decreases in his percentage of votes in some east Staten Island neighborhoods, and his response to Hurricane Sandy further solidified the community’s resentment (“The Vote for Mayor”, 2009).
In addition to confrontations with the Staten Island public, Bloomberg frequently deviated from the state government’s response to the crisis. After Sandy, state Governor Andrew Cuomo advocated for a
“rethinking” of the way New York coped with natural disasters and sea level rise (Nocera, 2012).
Bloomberg publicly dismissed Cuomo’s calls for innovation, saying “the fact that we are close to the water shouldn’t be a surprise to everybody” (Nocera, 2012). As opposed to Bloomberg, the state
government encouraged bottom-up activism following Hurricane Sandy to create innovative solutions to cope with rising sea levels. In fact, Cuomo founded the NY Rising program, a federally funded grant program that distributed over $600 million dollars to local communities to implement their original sea level rise policy solutions for their neighborhoods (“New York: Governor Cuomo Hosts Conference”,
2014). At the one year anniversary conference of the program, Cuomo stated, “the way to really build
New York back was to go to affected communities and ask them to come together and figure out a plan
for what their specific community needed, so that we could fund their vision. Every community felt the
storm, but they all felt it differently. The differences, though seemingly minor, can make all the difference
in the world” (“New York: Governor Cuomo Hosts Conference”, 2014). Devastated by the severity of
Hurricane Sandy and frustrated with Bloomberg’s response to their suffering and insistence upon the
status quo, the Staten Island public was highly motivated to embrace this perspective and organize for
new policy solutions to avoid facing another Sandy. As a result, east Staten Island residents created a
managed retreat program that they supported as a community and were eager to participate in.
Edgemere
On the surface level, Edgemere’s public shares many similarities to the people of east Staten
Island. They have shared storm experiences and have been historically overlooked by the city in terms of
disaster relief (Kensinger, 2017). However, while both neighborhoods were affected by Hurricane Sandy,
there is far less recorded outcry from Edgemere’s residents about the city's response to the crisis. There
could be several explanations for this disparity that require further research. For one, while both
neighborhoods are considered to be working class, Edgemere has a higher proportion of residents living
below the poverty line which could affect their available resources to speak out on their feelings about the
city's response (American Community Survey, 2013). However, it could also be argued that since
Edgemere felt less severe effects from the storm, its residents were less motivated to call for a change to
their flood response policies. There is evidence that following the 2017 unveiling of the Resilient Edgemere plan, residents were quick to reject the idea of managed retreat and expressed strong preferences for rebuilding policies.
Unlike in Staten Island, the idea for Edgemere’s relocation policy originated within the city government and did not involve any aspect of community collaboration. As noted in this paper’s analysis of the policy stream, this lack of involvement was deeply frustrating for many Edgemere residents who felt “pushed out” of their communities by a sudden policy shift (Kensinger, 2017). In 2017, at a conference that looked
very different from Governor Cuomo’s event for NY Rising, New York City Mayor Bill De Blasio was
internationally recognized for the innovative Resilient Edgemere plan. However, Mayor De Blasio’s plan
has yet to spur successful relocation from Edgemere's most vulnerable neighborhoods.
Comparison
In Staten Island, resentment towards Bloomberg and despair over the extent of Hurricane Sandy’s
damage led the public to embrace the state government’s message of innovation and community activism.
In the months following Hurricane Sandy, Staten Island residents created a grassroots movement to
advocate for the strategy they believed was best for their community and their livelihoods in the coming
years. In contrast, Edgemere’s residents in the specified zones were told by the city that their best path,
and therefore only true option, was to relocate. A multitude of experts would agree that the city was
correct in its assertion that sea level rise will soon make that targeted area in Edgemere uninhabitable.
However, as past literature notes, public consensus is essential for the implementation of successful
managed retreat policies (Alexander et al., 2011; Torabi et al., 2017; Yousef et al., 2015). Despite the fact
that voting records show the Edgemere community was relatively supportive of Mayor De Balsio,
resident testimonials suggest that many Edgemere locals felt ignored by the Resilient Edgemere plan, and
therefore, resisted its implementation (“Election 2013”, 2013). These findings suggest that, unlike a
neighborhood’s support of government officials, the level of community collaboration and consensus to
create a managed retreat policy can be correlated with the success of that policy.
Combining the Streams Through this paper’s in-depth analysis of each neighborhood's problem, policy and politics stream, there appears to be three possible explanations for the disparity between the two communities' reactions. First, despite the fact that both boroughs were vulnerable and faced the same storm, Hurricane
Sandy impacted Staten Island more severely than Queens. In addition to a stronger potential focusing event, the idea of buyout programs was introduced sooner in Staten Island. According to Kingdon, without constant reminders, focusing events and calls to action soon fade from public view and government agendas (Kingdon, 1984). In the years between Hurricane Sandy and the introduction of the
Edgemere Resilience plan, the pain of the storm, and calls for change, could have dissipated from public memory.
Next, it is important to note that despite their similar goals, the two managed retreat policies presented to the communities were not equivalent. In Staten Island, homeowners were offered a true buyout program in which they sold their homes above pre-storm value and were able to choose their own next steps. On the other hand, in Edgemere, residents were asked to relocate to a new home the city government had chosen, and many residents did not feel that the relocation property was equivalent to their current home. The Alexander, Ryan and Measham (2011) study suggests that these small policy differences could create vast disparities between community members' perception of, and willingness to participate in, their neighborhood’s program.
Finally, in Staten Island, residents advocated for a buyout option after they were not satisfied with the extent of the city’s response while Edgemere’s residents were assigned a relocation program from the city government. As past literature suggests, public consensus is crucial for implementation of any type of managed retreat plan (Alexander et al., 2011; Torabi et al., 2017; Yousef et al., 2015).
Therefore, one would expect that a grassroots movement, such as Staten Island’s buyout organization, would have more success than a top-down shift towards managed retreat.
CONCLUSION
By comparing two vulnerable New York City neighborhoods’ responses to Hurricane Sandy and
the idea of managed retreat, this paper identifies three potential factors that could promote support of managed retreat following a major flooding event. First, as Kingdon theorizes, in order for a flood to operate as a true focusing event, it must be perceived as unique and more threatening than other floods in a community's recent memory. Then, as past literature suggests, not every managed retreat policy is equal, and communities may be more ready to embrace policies that they perceive to be fair. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, community consensus and involvement appear to be essential aspects of successful managed retreat policy. As stated at the beginning of this paper, managed retreat is notoriously difficult to implement because it requires individuals to consider leaving their communities behind.
However, this paper suggests that when communities are involved in planning their retreat, individuals are far more prepared to accept proposed policies.
This paper has several limitations and offers many questions for future research. To begin, this paper focused on two working class, metropolitan communities. There is no way to be sure that the developments observed in this paper extend to all coastal communities, and it would be beneficial to conduct more research using a similar framework to compare rural or suburban communities with varying economic and social structures. Additionally, as noted in the Results and Analysis section of this paper, there is a general lack of information on Edgemere's residents’ response to Hurricane Sandy. With more resources, it would be beneficial to conduct direct interviews with both Edgemere and Staten Island residents who experienced the storm firsthand in order to gain a stronger understanding of the mood in both communities. Finally, despite efforts to eliminate mitigating circumstances by conducting a case study on two communities that faced the same storm, Staten Island and Edgemere still faced different levels of damage from Hurricane Sandy. In order to better separate the potential explanatory factors suggested by this paper, it would be ideal to conduct a study of two communities that faced identical damages.
In the future, if policymakers want to successfully implement some form of managed retreat policy following a flooding event in their community, they may have a higher likelihood of success if they attempt policy implementation following an event that their constituents perceive as particularly damaging or unusual in comparison to past floods. While policymakers cannot control the severity of the storm that their community faces, this paper finds that they can increase their chances of success if they act quickly to involve the public in the policy creation process to formulate a plan that both the public and the policymakers perceive as fair. In the decades to come, experts predict that society will face unprecedented levels of natural disasters due to rising global temperatures. However, the east Staten
Island residents’ response to Hurricane Sandy offers some hope that through community collaboration, some of these disasters could act as focusing events that prompt adaptation and mitigation of the worst effects of climate change.
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