Between the Wall and the Mall: Geographies of Encounter between Israelis and Palestinians in Jerusalem

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of “DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY”

by

Marik Shtern

Submitted to the Senate of Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

July 19, 2018

Beer-Sheva Between the Wall and the Mall: Geographies of Encounter between Israelis and Palestinians in Jerusalem

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of “DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY”

by

Marik Shtern

Submitted to the Senate of Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Approved by the advisor Approved by the Dean of the Kreitman School of Advanced Graduate Studies

July 19, 2018

Beer-Sheva This work was carried out under the supervision of Proffesor Haim Yacobi

In the Department: Politics and Government

Faculty: Humanities and Social Sciences Research-Student's Affidavit when Submitting the Doctoral Thesis for Judgment

I Marik Shtern whose signature appears below, hereby declare that (Please mark the appropriate statements):

___ I have written this Thesis by myself, except for the help and guidance offered by my Thesis Advisors.

___ The scientific materials included in this Thesis are products of my own research, culled from the period during which I was a research student.

___ This Thesis incorporates research materials produced in cooperation with others, excluding the technical help commonly received during experimental work. Therefore, I am attaching another affidavit stating the contributions made by myself and the other participants in this research, which has been approved by them and submitted with their approval.

Date: July 19, 2018 Student's name: Marik Shtern Signature:______To my beloved Chaya, Michael, Avshalom and Jerusalem Acknowledgments I would like to thank those without whom this research project would not have been possible. First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my doctoral supervisor Professor Haim Yacobi for the continuous support of my PhD. study, for his immense knowledge, wisdom, rich experience and motivation. I appreciate all his contributions of time and ideas to make my PhD. experience productive and stimulating. I am also thankful for the excellent example he has provided as a successful researcher and professor. It has been an honor to be his PhD. student.

Special thanks go to the members of my doctoral supervisory committee: Professor Avinoam Meir and Professor Nurit Alfasi for their initial comments and guidance and for the willingness to help at all times.

The Department of Politics and Government at the Ben Gurion University has become my academic home during my PhD studies. I would like to thank all faculty members in the Department. I thank also the dedicated office staff and my doctoral colleagues whose insights and willingness to share their knowledge have been priceless.

My doctoral research has been supported over the years by a number of institutions and funds. I would like to thank the following institutions:

The Kreitman School of Advanced Graduate Studies; The Department of Politics and Government at the Ben Gurion University in the Negev; Steinmatz Center for Peace Research and the Walter Lebach Institute for Advanced Studies Education. It is the financial contribution of these institutes that has made my studies possible.

Special acknowledgment goes to the Israel Institute for Policy Research which has hosted me as a fellow Researcher throughout my doctoral studies. The institute served not only as a source of financial support but also me as a vital platform of research, data, collegial brainstorming and inspiration.

1 Lastly, I would like to thank my family for all their love and encouragement. To my mother who supported me in all my pursuits. And most of all to my loving, supportive, encouraging, inspiring and beautiful wife and partner Chaya whose faithful support during my Ph.D. was eminent. I could not do this without her.

Thank you.

2 Abstract This dissertation focuses on inter-group encounters between Israelis and Palestinians in post-Oslo Jerusalem (2005 onwards). It explores the role of urban neoliberalism in the construction of the political, economic and spatial relations between two communities. Based on a mixed-method analysis of three case studies— a commercial space, the labor market and a residential neighborhood, this research comprises a multidimensional analysis of geographies of encounter and the ethno- national and neoliberal forces that inform them.

The dissertation illustrates the role of economic and cultural neoliberalism in inter-group spatial mixing and the blurring of ethno-national segregation in daily activities. In most cases, transformations did not entail the creation of equitably shared spaces, nor dissolve existing macro social and political structures. However, in some cases, prevailing ethno-national divisions have foremost become class-based encounters. In such instances, obscured cores of conditioned multiculturalism are revealed. In theoretical terms, this dissertation explores the intersection—integration and contradiction—between the ethno-national production of urban spaces and neoliberal market forces in post-Oslo Jerusalem. As reflected in the opening quotations, this dissertation employs a multidimensional conceptual exploration. Through a range of structural prisms, including the ethno-national contestation of space; colonial space; and neoliberal space, I outline local spatial dynamics at play between ethno-national and neoliberal logics and demonstrate the ways in which patterns of inter-group interaction between the city’s Israeli and Palestinian residents serve to represent and reproduce these logics.

This dissertation includes five sections. The first section presents an introduction, which elaborates on the theoretical background and methods of the research. Following are three chapters, each presents an article that has been accepted to a peer-reviewed journal. The three chapters are arranged according to the following logical structure:

Chapter 1 presents the article: Shtern, M. (2018). Towards ‘ethno-national peripheralisation’? Economic dependency amidst political resistance in Palestinian

3 East Jerusalem. Urban Studies, 0042098018763289. This study combines extant literature on the geopolitics and economy of Jerusalem with the Center-Periphery theoretical framework (Shils, 1975) in order to analyze the development and decline of East Jerusalem’s socio-economic status and political environment from 1967 to 2016. As I illustrate, since the beginning of the 1990s, Israeli national security policies have transformed East Jerusalem from a Palestinian metropolitan center into a region on the socio-economic periphery of Israel. I term this particular type of marginalization ‘ethno-national peripheralization,’ a process of socio-economic decline that is an output of ethno-national policies of division and annexation. The radical shift in East Jerusalem’s regional socio-economic status, from a center of one national realm to the periphery of another, transforms urban life and political spatial strategies in East Jerusalem. This chapter provides the geopolitical and historical context of contemporary processes of inter-group spatial mixing in Jerusalem. The peripheralization of East Jerusalem catalyzes the increased ‘functional Israelization’ of Palestinians, which strengthens their incorporation within Israeli spaces of West Jerusalem. As I demonstrate, transforming modes of spatial integration are signaled, inter alia, by evolving patterns of Palestinian participation within the labor market of West Jerusalem.

Chapter 2 presents the article: Shtern, M. (2016). Urban neoliberalism vs. ethno-national division: The case of West Jerusalem's shopping malls. Cities, 52, 132- 139. This study examines patterns of inter-group encounter in two shopping malls in West Jerusalem: Mammilla quarter and Malha mall. Despite periodic waves of political violence in post-Oslo Jerusalem, the city has seen the emergence of neoliberal spaces of consumption that serve as resilient spaces of inter-group encounter between populations. Based on a field survey and in-depth interviews, I demonstrate how these malls provide a sense of security sufficient for non-violent co- habitation. The case studies indicate that privatized urban spaces can undermine processes of ethno-national segregation. I argue that patterns of spatial division between members of the two groups are challenged and reshaped by neoliberal spaces and that the relocation of ethno-national inter-group encounters from public streets to privatized spaces of consumption may represent a temporal shift to a class-based encounters.

4 Chapter 3 presents the article: Shtern, M., & Yacobi, H. (2018). The urban geopolitics of neighboring: Conflict, encounter and class in Jerusalem's settlement/neighborhood. Urban Geography, in press. This paper examines a unique yet paradigmatic case study of a colonial neighborhood in East Jerusalem. The French Hill neighborhood, built in 1971, was one of the first Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem. Initially populated by upper-middle class secular-Jewish residents, an ongoing demographic transformation has rendered the French Hill the most ethno- nationally mixed neighborhood in the city. Two distinct new groups—middle class Ultra-Orthodox Jews and Palestinians—are increasingly moving into the neighborhood. This volatile social mix has yielded intense inter and intra-ethnic collisions. Based on a mixed-method analysis, I argue that the juxtaposition of colonial and neoliberal logics of space informing political relations in the neighborhood reveals a shared, if fragile, middle-class identity. My co-author and I suggest that this new geopolitical space of neighboring calls for a discussion of political conflict, housing and current colonial conditions to restore notions of class within analyses of the production of contested space.

Finally, the concluding section of the dissertation proposes an integrative discussion that seeks to connect the various aspects of the picture that emerges from the findings presented in Chapters 1,2,3 and to outline the dynamics and attributes of the spatial relations between Israelis and Palestinians in post-Oslo Jerusalem. Finally, I propose a conceptual model defining the inter-relations between ethnonationalism, neoliberalism and multiculturalism, as manifested through the study of inter-group encounters in Jerusalem.

5 Table of Contents

Acknowledgments5T 5T ...... 1

Abstract5T 5T ...... 3

Introduction5T 5T ...... 8

Theoretical5T Trajectories 5T ...... 11

Urba5T n Segregation 5T ...... 11

What5T is Jerusalem? Divided, contested or colonial? 5T ...... 14

Urban5T neoliberalism in nationally contested cities 5T ...... 18

Neoliberalism,5T colonialism and space in Israel/Palestine 5T ...... 20

Urban5T neoliberalism and contested Jerusalem 5T...... 22

Towards5T geographies of encounter 5T ...... 24

5TInter-group encounter in contested Jerusalem 5T ...... 27

Research5T Questions 5T ...... 30

Methodology5T 5T ...... 30

Research5T Ethics 5T ...... 33

The5T Articles 5T ...... 35

Chapter5T 1: Towards 'ethno-national peripheralisation'? Economic dependency amidst

Political resistance in Palestinian East Jerusalem...... 5T 39

Abst5T ract 5T ...... 39

5TIntroduction 5T ...... 40

Ethno-national5T peripheralisation: Theoretical background 5T ...... 42

Palestinian5T Peripheries in Israel 5T ...... 43

Urban5T neoliberalism and Jerusalem 5T ...... 44

East5T Jerusalem peripheralisation: Historical preview 5T ...... 44

Period5T 1: Partial Incorporation (1967–1987) 5T ...... 45

Period5T 2: Contestation (1987–2004) 5T ...... 46

Period5T 3: Peripheralisation (2004–2016) 5T ...... 47

Functional5T integration in neoliberal Jerusalem 5T ...... 48

Discussion5T 5T ...... 50

Conclusions5T 5T ...... 52

References5T 5T ...... 54

Chapter5T 2: Urban neoliberalism vs. ethno-national division: The case of West Jerusalem's

shopping malls 5T ...... 58

5TIntroduction 5T ...... 58

The5T terms of engagement: occupation, inequality and violence in Jerusalem...... 5T 59

6 Conceptual5T background 5T ...... 59

Neoliberalism5T in the Holy City 5T...... 60

Methodology5T 5T ...... 60

Palestinians5T at West Jerusalem's Shopping Malls: Two Case Studies 5T ...... 61

The5T particularities of the two spaces of encounter 5T ...... 62

Conclusions5T 5T ...... 63

References5T 5T ...... 64

Chapter5T 3: Urban Geopolitics of Neighboring: Conflict, Encounter and Class in Jerusalem’s

Settlement/Neighborhood 5T ...... 66

Abstract5T 5T ...... 66

5TIntroduction 5T ...... 66

Urban5T Geopolitics, Ethno-nationalism and Class 5T ...... 70

5TIsraeli Urban Space and Neighborhood Transitions 5T ...... 72

Palestinian5T Migration to Jewish Localities 5T ...... 72

The5T Modern Haredi Middle Class 5T ...... 74

A5T Colonial-Neighborhood in Transition 5T ...... 75

French5T Hill Revisited 5T ...... 77

The5T Search for "Quality of Life" 5T ...... 78

Fearing5T Diversity 5T ...... 80

Choose5T Your (Urban) Battles 5T ...... 82

Towards5T Israeli Urban Geopolitics 5T ...... 85

Conclusions5T 5T ...... 87

References5T 5T ...... 88

Appendixes5T 5T ...... 96

Discussion5T 5T ...... 100

Urban5T Entrapment and spillover 5T ...... 100

Challenging5T segregation 5T ...... 101

Antagonistic5T conditions for Encounter 5T ...... 102

Toward5T a neoliberal geography of encounter 5T ...... 105

The5T class factor 5T ...... 107

The5T structural formation of the geographies of encounter in Post-Oslo Jerusalem5T ...... 108

Towards5T a micro-geography of encounter 5T ...... 113

Scientific5T Contribution 5T ...... 117

Prospects5T for Future Research 5T ...... 118

References5T 5T ...... 120

7 Introduction

"Urbanism highlights the challenges of negotiating class, gender and ethnic or racial differences placed in close proximity. It also profiles the newness that arises from spatial juxtaposition and global flow and connectivity, forever forcing responses of varying type and intensity in the face of negotiating strangers, strangeness and continuous change" (Amin, 2006:1009).

"Where almost all cities are divided socio-economically and culturally, polarized cities contain a depth of antagonism and opposition, beyond what the word 'divided' connotes. [..] These are war-torn, hurt-filled, and often emotionally transcended places. Much like chain-smoking cigarettes, these cities exude a dangerous and addictive excitement.” (Bollens, 2012:5).

"Yet, beyond the Israeli rhetoric representing Jerusalem as a unified city, its planning policies have been paradigmatic of a colonial city. Both state and city pursue these policies, which have persistently promoted a project of Judaization: that is, the expansion of Jewish political, territorial, demographic, and economic control" (Yacobi, 2012:2708).

Over the last decade, several studies have examined the political, economic and spatial transformations of East Jerusalem in the wake of the apparent collapse of the Oslo Accords, the Second Intifada and the excising of East Jerusalem from the West Bank through construction of the separation wall in 2005 (see Bollens, 2018; Cohen, 2013). This literature has generally emphasized the resulting deprivation and increased colonization of Palestinian Jerusalem in this period (see Dumper, 2014; Shlomo, 2017a, 2017b). In this dissertation, I focus on the effects of this geopolitical shift with regard to inter-group economic, political and spatial relations between the city’s Israeli and Palestinian residents. As I will demonstrate, in post-Oslo Jerusalem, Palestinian Jerusalemites have grown ever more dependent upon the urban services, economy and labor market of West Jerusalem, which has led to a proliferation of novel spaces of encounter between these rival communities in Jewish sections of the city. Driven by urban entrapment and economic dependency, this growth in inter- group daily encounters occurs not only in the context of increasing polarization and

8 periodic eruptions of political violence (such as the al-Aqsa Intifada of 2014-15), but also amid an increasing urban neoliberalization of daily life.

I posit that Jerusalem is not only a 'nationally contested' (Bollens, 2000, 2018), 'ethnocratic' (Yiftachel & Yacobi, 2002), or even 'colonial' (Abowd, 2014) city, in which polarized national movements fight for sovereignty, territorial control and ethno-religious superiority in a context of unbalanced power relations. Jerusalem is at once a global and Israeli urban space; as such, it is subject also to national and global transitions, including immigration, the transformation of neighborhoods and, principally, neoliberalism. Therefore, the new geographies of encounter (Valentine, 2008) between Israelis and Palestinians in post-Oslo Jerusalem are a product not only of ethno-national policies and the strategies of these communities, but also to the rising power of free market actors and their growing influence in the local urban realm.

The main theoretical contribution of this work is trifold. First, I aim to critically analyze inter-group relations in Jerusalem in the spheres of labor, commerce and housing. In contrast to single-dimensional explorations of geopolitics in Israel/Palestine (e.g., post-colonial studies; see Abowd, 2014), I employ a multi- dimensional approach (Yiftachel, 2016) to investigate the intersections between a number of structural forces—in particular, ethnonationalism and neoliberalism—in the analysis of contemporary urban geopolitics (Yacobi, 2009). Second, I adapt the literature of 'geographies of encounter' (Valentine, 2008; Wilson, 2011) from western 'multicultural' cities (Amin, 2006) to the local reality of a nationally contested urban space. Third, I challenge the notion of ever-increasing segregation prevalent in scholarship of Jerusalem as a 'divided city'—an urban cynosure competing national movements (see Boal, 1999; Bollens, 2000). I aim to illuminate not only the outward colonial relations between the Israeli occupier and Palestinian subject, but a more complex and subtle reality of daily inter-group encounters, as well as hidden cores of multiculturalism in daily urban life that have been concealed and suppressed by forces of segregation, violence and fear.

9 Romann and Weingrod’s seminal work, Living together Separately: Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem (1991), described structural relations and personal interactions among Jews and Arabs in pre-Intifada Jerusalem (1967-1987). During this period, despite growing political discontent among Palestinian Jerusalemites, political violence was sparse and the surrounding Israeli and Palestinian hinterlands were integrated within city in both political and economic terms (Kimchi, Reichman & Schweid, 1984). Since then, Jerusalem has undergone considerable geopolitical, economic and geographical transformation. So too have inter-group relations in the city, increasingly torn by national polarization and violence. Yet no further systematic research has since been conducted on Israeli-Palestinian inter-group relations in city. The following dissertation addresses this empirical lacuna, presenting an updated systematic analysis of inter-group spatial, economic and political relations between Israelis and Palestinians in post-Oslo Jerusalem.

The methodology employed in the dissertation reflects its theoretical integrative character. I utilize a mixed-method analysis (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007) that combines quantitative field research tools (questionnaire-based surveys and statistical analysis) with qualitative investigation (interviews and discourse analysis) in order to present inter-group relations holistically, from mundane daily interactions, to material conditions and political constructs. Through the case studies, I explicate the ethno-national division of labor in the urban labor market, inter-group encounters at local shopping malls (Malha mall and Mamilla quarter) and resident relations in a mixed neighborhood (The French Hill). The multi-dimensional theoretical framework and mixed method analysis of three representative case studies enable a comprehensive exploration of the geographies of encounter in post-Oslo Jerusalem.

The dissertation is comprised of three peer-reviewed articles, each published in a leading journal of Urban Studies: Cities (Q1 [6/40: Urban Studies], IF: 2.704 [JCR]), Urban Studies (Q1 [7/40: Urban Studies], IF: 2.604 [JCR]), and Urban Geography (Q1 [9/40: Urban Studies], IF: 2.307 [JCR]), respectively. Due to this structure, the final version of the first article of this work, Towards ethno-national peripheralization, diverges from the original research plan. The article entails a geopolitical discursive analysis of post-Oslo East Jerusalem. Originally, as a

10 monograph, the first chapter was intended to include a detailed analysis of inter-group interactions in mixed work spaces. This has been abridged in the form of an article, due to editorial considerations, to a presentation of structural employment relations, i.e., the integration of Palestinians within the Israeli labor market and broader trends in the ethnic division of labor. However, the findings of the extensive field study and qualitative research of interactions in mixed work spaces have been published as the Hebrew-language report, Beyond the Glass Ceiling: Palestinians and Israelis in Jerusalem labor market (Shtern, 2017a). I make reference to select findings of this detailed work elsewhere in the Introduction and subsequently in the Discussion.

Theoretical Trajectories

In this section, I introduce the emergent terminologies and key concepts employed in this study of contemporary Jerusalem. I then present a review of extant literature discussing the role of neoliberalism in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the ongoing Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem. Subsequently, I turn to the vast theoretical corpus on geographies of encounter in Western cities and relate their relevance to the study of post-Oslo Jerusalem.

Urban Segregation Urban division has long been a focus of human and social geographers. Since the end of the Cold War, neoliberal economic globalization has fostered mass urban migration, leading to the political and socio-economic polarization of cities across the world. As Haim Yacobi (2009) noted, "In the present global context, more and more cities become polarized, ghettoized and fragmented in surprising similar ways" (preface). Correspondingly, urban division has been studied through various prisms in the last three decades. This extensive body of literature has investigated the role of free-market economic globalization in the socio-economic polarization of urban centers (Marcuse & Van Kampen 2002, 2011; Sassen 1999, 2006), demonstrated resulting residential segregation (Maloutas, 2016, Massey, 1996), and highlighted the roles of fear and violence in affecting urban partition (Caldeira, 2000, 2012). Research has also explored the roles played by urban planners in framing inter-group relations (Bollens, 2000, 2009; Pullan et al., 2007, Pullan & Baillie, 2013;

11 Sandercock, 2000; Yiftachel, 1992, 1994; Watson, 2003; 2006), as well as the growing intersectionality of socio-economic disenfranchisement and ethnic difference in Western cities (Amin & Parkinson, 2002; Sandercock & Lysiottis, 1998; Vertovec, 2007).

In many divided cities and societies, the political hegemony of the dominant group leads to policies of forced spatial segregation that disadvantage the subordinated rival group (Bairner & Shirlow, 2003; Boal, 1996, 1999; Peach, 2000; Shirlow, 2001; Shirlow & Murtagh, 2006). Usually driven by nationalistic or racist motives, structural discrimination manifests at the both local and national levels of government. Illustrative examples of this process include the Apartheid cities of South Africa (Lemon, 1991; Robinson, 1996) and the enduring Black ‘ghettos’ in American cities (Goldsmith & Blackly, 1992). In these situations, the dominant group seeks to minimize inter-group encounters in order to create “purified” spaces (Sibley, 1988), thereby forming social, cultural and physical boundaries for the exclusion of unwanted elements.

On the other hand, given conditions of economic and political inferiority, members of the subaltern groups can also seek to self-segregate (Boal, 2002), enabling the cultural preservation of their group (see Ultra-Orthodox Jews in Jerusalem: Shilhav, 1984) and conditionally sustainable economic independence (see: the inner-economy of Chinese minority communities in American cities: Paul & Siu, 1987). The self-segregated enclaves of the disempowered rival community also serve as safe-havens from the dominant group’s attacks and from police violence, or as zones of political empowerment and demonstration, as seen in the Catholic enclaves of Belfast (Boal, 1999; Gaffikin & Morrisey, 2011; Peach, 2000).

Whether voluntary or compulsory, Peach (ibid) claims that segregation limits the possibilities of rapprochement by sustaining and emphasizing inter-group cultural differences, promoting separate social networks, elevating mutual prejudice, and reducing the likelihood of positive encounters. It also undermines urban vitality and economic sustainability by maintaining dual urban community facilities and constraining the local labor market (Boal, 1999). Boal suggests that once in place, 12 these patterns tend to self-reproduce. “The force that is mainly responsible for sustaining the residential pattern is simply inertia. By inertia is meant those processes, often self-generated, which tend to keep people within a restricted life space,” (Ibid: 595).

Many studies differentiate between two main categories of urban division. The first is the multicultural conflict—a socio-economic or ethnic urban dispute, which even when violent, is negotiated within an acknowledged political framework enabling mediation and coalition-building for local-level conflict resolution (Nordlinger & Huntington, 1972). Such would be the case for racial disparity in north-American cities and ethnic tension between African immigrant and native European communities in British cities. However, when the urban conflict involves a national dimension, as in Jerusalem, Nicosia and Belfast, an additional level of division arises that cannot be bridged at the municipal level. In such situations, every layer of the broader conflict carries national-political sensitivities able to transform casual disputes of urban life into matters of sanctity (Benvenisti, 1995).

Gaffikin and Morrissey (2011) defined the core difference between these two types of urban dispute as conflicts over pluralism (i.e., disputes predominantly concerned with issues related to pluralism, such as “social class, status, power and equity”) versus conflicts over sovereignty (i.e., wherein major cities become a microcosm of “macro disputes about state sovereignty”) (21).

However, as noted by Allegra, Casaglia and Rokem (2012), research on urban polarization has moved continuously across categories and parameters chosen by the observer. As such, while there is general agreement regarding structural difference, there remain inconsistent and overlapping terminologies. Klein (2001), for example, describes “multicultural” and “frontier” cities, the latter “in which there is an ethnic- national confrontation between two communities” (11). Bollens (1998, 2000, 2009), on the other hand, distinguishes ‘divided’ and ‘polarized’ cities. According to him, while both feature high levels of social and spatial segregation between populations predicated on race, religion, nationality or economic status, in the ‘divided city,’ a

13 local authority is generally recognized by all parties; in the ‘polarized city,’ the conflict is essentially a matter of sovereignty.

What is Jerusalem? Divided, contested or colonial? As the urban center of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the geopolitical study of Jerusalem has also differed along various theoretical prisms, parameters and terminologies. Historically, Jerusalem has been a multi-polarized city characterized by conflicts between a number of rival groups divided along national, ethnic and religious lines at multiple sites across the city (Shlay & Rosen, 2014, 2015). Jerusalem is characterized by prevailing fractionation of the Jewish population (mainly along lines of religious identity), however, the deepest division in the city runs between the Israeli-Jewish majority and Palestinian-Arab minority. This fault-line represents all possibilities of division: national, religious, cultural and socio-economic, comprising a fundamental contestation over control and sovereignty.

Two main phases are observed in the study of ethno-national conflict in the city. The first is known as the ‘divided cities’ discourse: the study of Jerusalem as a nationally contested city and focal point of the “ethnic-national confrontation” (Klein, 2005) between Israelis and Palestinians. Study of Jerusalem as a 'divided city' thrived during the peace negotiations of the Oslo Accords, at which point Jerusalem was considered and unofficially recognized as the future capital of both national movements. As a ‘divided city,’ Jerusalem was compared to other ethno-nationally divided cities, including Belfast (Benvenisti, 1982; Boal, 1999; Bollens, 2000, 2018), Nicosia (Bollens, 2001; Pullan, 2011), Mostar and Beirut (Calame & Charlesworth, 2011), in order to explain the mutually discursive construction of ethno-national lines of segregation and the social and political dimensions of urban conflict.

Notable examples of the study of Jerusalem as a 'divided city' include Kliot and Mansfeld’s (1999) work analyzing Jerusalem as a paradigmatic and even idiosyncratic example of a divided city, and Klein's (2001) analysis of Jerusalem as a ‘frontier’ city in which Jews and Arabs “bear the burden of confrontation” in the "rear" (11). Other scholars have studied more epistemological case studies, including Bollens (1998, 2000) on the role of planners in the partisan articulation of Israeli 14 national policies in the city and Dumper's (2005) work on the political contestation over Jerusalem’s old city. Both are geopolitically contextualized within ongoing peace negotiations and frame Jerusalem as the principal locus of macro-national rivalry. The most recent studies have focused on the shifting of ethno-national borders within and around the city—including the green-line and separation wall—as means of symbolic boundary reconstruction at “the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” (Shlay & Rosen, 2010, 1) and the contemporary trajectories of peace and conflict in post-Oslo Jerusalem (Bollens, 2018).

The collapse of the Oslo Accords, eruption of the violent Second Intifada and construction of the separation wall have shoved aside many Palestinian and Israeli peace activists’ hope for a divided or shared capital in Jerusalem. Concurrently, Israel has cracked down on official activities of the Palestinian Authority in East Jerusalem (Cohen, 2013). The striking imbalance of power in the city and maintenance of the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem through marginalization of the Palestinian minority (Baumann, 2016; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015) have strengthened the post- colonial outlook on ethnic conflict in the city. What had long been seen as a national contestation has been reframed by many scholars as colonial relations and even apartheid.

Since the 1990s, a large number of studies have asserted the relevance of colonial theory to the socio-political study of Israel/Palestine. Such research has described power relations between Jewish-Israelis and Arab-Palestinians according to their ostensible colonial features. Most of these studies build on the canonical work of Said (1978), Fanon (1965) and Bhabba (1984), who provide a critical epistemology for understanding past and present power and cultural relations between the West (mainly Western Europe) and the rest of the world (Africa, Asia and the Middle East), through 400 years of colonialism to the present day. As observed by Porter (2006),

Colonialism is understood then as the process and material effects of appropriation of territory by a foreign power, and the construction of radicalized hierarchy of difference within and through this appropriation, such that the myriad, locally constitute relationships between colonizer and colonized become embedded between structures of economy and power, as well as embedded in frames of meaning. (383)

15 Holston (1998), King (1990) and Yiftachel (2006) claim that the critical examination of contemporary cities reveals colonial relations in the promotion of dominant group interests, subjection of minorities, urban policies based on essentialism and enforced hierarchical segregation.

Post-colonial researchers of Jerusalem (see, for example, Abowd, 2014; Tamari, 2004; Yacobi, 2012, 2015; Yiftachel & Yacobi, 2002) have identified the city’s post- war (1948) colonial attributes and, moreover, since its occupation and annexation by Israel in 1967. Abowd (2014) claims that the central ideological position of the Zionist discourse on Jerusalem—that of a “mythical space which belongs eternally to the Jewish people” (13) has produced colonial policies that promote the erasure of western Jerusalem’s Palestinian past amid an ongoing effort to exclude Palestinians also from East Jerusalem. In this approach, the focus has shifted from the mutual rivalry of two national movements within the city to Israeli modes of control and deprivation as an “advanced form of settler-colonialism […] emptying Jerusalem of its native inhabitants in a systematic way” (Abed & Samman, 2018, 1-2). In the words of Yiftahcel (2016),

[T]he civil nature of Israeli control and the constant settlement of Jews, make it (Jerusalem) more akin to a settler-colonial regime rather than military rule. Hence, in order to be credible, any analysis of metropolitan Jerusalem must deal with the colonial nature of urban development and the associated discrimination, racism, resistance, violence and terror. (486)

Accordingly, post-colonial research of Jerusalem has involved case studies examining the delineation of boundaries as a means of enforced segregation and exclusion of East Jerusalem Palestinians, including the functioning of the separation barrier (Chiodelli, 2013; Klein, 2005) and Road no. 1 as physical means of dividing populations (Baumann, 2016; Pullan et al., 2007). Post-colonial scholarship has also examined new modes of neoliberal governance in post-Oslo East Jerusalem, such as the outsourcing of public transportation, education and health (Shlomo, 2016, 2017a) and a shift to the micro-planning of housing in Palestinian neighborhoods (Braier, 2013). Special focus has been given to infrastructure politics, the use of the light-rail network as means of consolidating Israeli presence in East Jerusalem (Nolte &

16 Yacobi, 2015; Nolte, 2016), and the demographic dynamics in residential colonial spaces in Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem (Yacobi & Pullan, 2014).

However, recent studies have taken a more comprehensive and holistic approach, engaging several theoretical prisms in the Urban Studies in general, and Urban Geopolitics in particular. These researchers have rejected unidimensional approaches that privilege a ‘theory of everything’—be it neo-Marxism, Foucauldian or post-colonialism—at the expense of competing and complementary scholarship (Yiftachel, 2016). Critical scholars have called for an opening of Jerusalem research trajectories to facilitate “a more nuanced understanding of urban processes” (Yacobi, 2015: 582), looking at Jerusalem as “an arena of power relations where also ‘bottom- up’ protest, global forces and a wide spectrum of political institutions […] produce and reproduce urban space” (Ibid: 583). Boano (2016) reflects as well on the manifold uneven and unstable economic, colonial and political urban forces and spatial dispositives in Jerusalem. Applying this multi-dimensional approach, Yiftachel (2016) has suggested the Aleph epistemology, a dynamic structuralism in which several central forces are identified “as most powerful for a particular place or time” (485). In Jerusalem, Yiftachel identified six main structural forces that interact with each other with changing significance: colonialism, nationalism, religion, gender, globalization (capitalism) and politics (ordinary city) and called for further in-depth research on the inter-relations between the various urban logics that construct the geopolitical space of Jerusalem.

Building on Yiftachel's dynamic structuralism, I have adopted in this dissertation a multi-dimensional theoretical analysis in the study of inter-group relations between Israelis and Palestinians in Jerusalem. While acknowledging and analyzing the significance of various urban forces in shaping modes of segregation, discrimination and interaction in the city, I focus on the structural intersection between the two most dominant logics of space: the ethno-national and neoliberal. The following chapter comprises a review of literature concerning urban neoliberalism in general, and in Israel and Jerusalem in particular.

17 Urban neoliberalism in nationally contested cities Since the late 1980s, a litany of scholars has examined the impacts of globalization and the spread of the free market economy upon the social and economic structures of national and regional economies (see, for example, Alfasi & Fenster, 2009; Block & Somers, 2014; Brown, 2015; Harvey, 2005). As shorthand for these social and economic changes, the term ‘neoliberalism’ references an economic- political ideology based on a belief in market competition as the most efficient mechanism for the generation of prosperity and individual liberty (Friedman, 2009; Hayek, 2012). Rejecting Keynesian notions of governmental responsibility for social welfare and full employment, neoliberalism encourages private corporations to maximize global opportunities for cheap labor and production. Neoliberal restructuring favors privatization, free trade, deregulation, corporate tax breaks and cuts in social spending. Neoliberal policies seek to unwind the influence of labor unions and state regulation in the promotion of individualism, self-responsibility and entrepreneurship. Yet as critical scholars have observed, the doctrine of neoliberalism hardly aligns with its praxis; neoliberal economies maintain strong reliance on state intervention for the promotion of capital accumulation (Block & Somers, 2014; Brenner, Peck & Theodore, 2010; Brown 2015; Clarno, 2017; Harvey, 2005). Moreover, Brenner & Theodore (2002) argues that neoliberalism is always context- specific, adopted variously across states and organizations in particular hybrid formations. The uneven process of neoliberalization always prompts local opposition, which in turn spurs neoliberal reaction and innovation (e.g., the private security industry) to manage tensions between the market and prevailing social order (Peck, 2010).

Accordingly, scholars have in the last two decades thoroughly engaged with the neoliberalization of urban governance and economies as a catalyst of novel class- based restrictions on access to public, residential and commercial spaces (Sassen, 1999, 2006; Smith, 2002). These scholars have regarded the reshaping of social and political spaces through the privatization of municipal services and resulting social polarization and inequality. In particular, the reconstruction of city centers and other public spaces through ‘public-private partnerships’ has served to deny disadvantaged communities and minority groups their ‘right to city’ (Harvey, 2005; 2012). Erosion

18 of the social policies of welfare societies has produced old-new class divisions that manifest in the transformation of urban public domains. This process has led some scholars to eulogize city life and even to mourn the “erosion of public space” (Zukin, 1996) through the rise of private urban shopping centers in lieu of civic public space.

Shopping centers have replaced political meetings and civic gatherings as arenas of public life. In that respect, shopping has become not only a practical economical behavior but also a cultural activity. (Zukin, 2004:7)

Due to their economic fragility and high dependency on governmental support, most nationally contested cities did not develop into major hubs of global capital flow. As observed by Pullan (2013), even post-conflict cities—still carrying the physical signifiers of division—fail to flourish for decades. At the same time, these cities do not evade the growing effects of cultural globalization and urban neoliberalism, in particular the adaptation of globally themed urban development strategies and the creation of micro-scale sites of neoliberal residence, culture and consumption.

In Belfast, for example, neoliberal urban revitalization was at the forefront of official efforts to transform the city’s image from a vision of violent contestation into a space of normality and possibility (Neill, 2006). This process included the development of new quarter apartment blocks, a concert venue (“The Waterfront Hall"), five-star hotels, shopping malls and other commercial spaces. Urban critics have referred to this effort as a shallow masking of the ongoing cultural war between Republicans and Loyalists and highlighted the potential creation of new socio- economic fringes (Bairner, 2006; Neil, 2006; Shirlow, 2006). “In modernizing Belfast,” Murtagh (2008) observes, “difficult territories and pasts are sanitized with the zoning of new quarters that tell of a different social economic history” (9). Nonetheless, the reinventing of post-conflict Belfast is seen by these experts as a mediating strategy, which though problematic, is an integral part of peace-building and not considered a cloak for the reinforcement of colonial spaces. Another example may also be found in the developments of post-war Beirut’s central business district, where private capital has invested massively in high-rise buildings, esplanades and luxurious commercial spaces (e.g., Zaitunai Bay). These projects have also been

19 criticized for marginalizing local residents and damaging city life (Larkin, 2010, Nagle, 2017).

Neoliberalism, colonialism and space in Israel/Palestine Notwithstanding the growing body of critique of the neoliberal rendering of ethno-national bifurcation as socio-economic polarization, the posited neoliberal restructuring of Israel as a space of conflict—Jerusalem, in particular—is strongly contested. Since the mid-1980's Israel has undergone drastic economic liberalization and withdrawal of the state from its historical financial and institutional roles. These transformations, accelerated during the 2000's, have transformed Israel’s political-economy from welfare state to neoliberal state (Krampf, 2018). Despite boasting the world’s 28th largest gross national income (2016), Israel maintains some of the highest levels of inequality and poverty among world’s developed countries (OECD, 2018). This outcome is seen as a result of the Israeli government’s gradual withdrawal from its social obligations (Mandelkern & Paz-Fuchs, 2018). In parallel, Israeli localities have undergone a process of urban economic and social neoliberalization. This has been reflected in the privatization of urban services (Leshem & Paz-Fuchs, 2012), growing socio-economic residential segregation (Rosen & Razin, 2009) and proliferation of exclusive gated communities in Israeli cities (Alfasi & Gonen, 2015; Yacobi, 2009).

Political economists studying neoliberalism in Israel have reflected on the anomaly of its economic restructuring. Unlike the ‘normative’ model, Israel’s transition from welfare state to market-based economy was not promoted by global financial institutions or other free-market actors, but as a “state project,” led by Academic economists and governmental agencies including the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of Israel (Mandelkern, 2015; for further discussion, see Maron & Shalev, 2018). Krampf (2018) has also pointed out the unique linkage between the rise of Israeli capitalism and the state’s parallel turn to hawkish isolationism in the age of (current Prime Minister) Binyamin Netanyahu.

As demonstrated above, the nexus between neoliberalism and ethno- nationalism in Israel—ever stronger in relation to the political geography of Israeli

20 space—is key to understanding the state’s prevailing political economy. Tzfadia and Yacobi (2011) have argued that in Israel, neoliberalism has gone hand-in-hand with policies fostering segregation between Jews and Arabs in mixed localities. They consider neoliberalism to be an institutional force, not undermining state or government power, but rather reinforcing the ethno-national discourse of spatial control and purification:

Ethno-nationalism is capable of adapting to myriad threats—including globalization, multiculturalism and neoliberalism, and to manipulate these threats for realizing territorial control. (121)

This position is also at the core of Clarno’s (2017) recent publication, Neoliberal Apartheid. According to Clarno, Israel’s political-economic transition from Fordist apartheid to neoliberal apartheid has been characterized by extreme inequality, racialized marginalization, extensive securitization and constant crisis (201). By outsourcing the occupation to the Palestinian Authority—funded under the guidance of the IMF and World Bank in accordance with (privately led, export- oriented) free market ideology—the Oslo peace process tied Israel's aggressive settler colonialism to neoliberal racial capitalism. While the liberalization of the Palestinian economy fostered the growth of the Palestinian middle class and elite, Clarno argues this façade of equality papers over deeper issue of racial marginalization and internal polarization. Clarno emphasizes the role of neoliberal apartheid in rendering Palestinian labor redundant to the Israeli Economy. By harshly limiting the access of West Bank Palestinians to Israel and substituting these workers with migrant labor from developing countries, Israel has contained the West Bank Palestinian working class to two dominant fields: construction of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and service in the security forces of the Palestinian Authority.

Recent publications have also noted the neoliberal turn of Palestinian society (see Dana, 2015) and the resulting confluence between neoliberalism and Israeli colonial policies in the occupied Palestinian territories. US-led Neoliberal restructuring of Palestinian institution in the late 2000's were described as redefining and diverting Palestinian national struggle to economic revitalization, thus

21 challenging its core motivation of state building (Khalidi & Samour, 2011). This position is echoed in the critical study of Rawabi, the first planned Palestinian city in the West Bank. Designated to upper middle-class Palestinian it is also fully privately owned by a Palestinian entrepreneur and advocated by Arab and Jewish business men and politicians. As a distinct neoliberal project, Rawabi depoliticizes economic development under the Israeli occupation (Grandinetti, 2015) and promotes a middle- class Palestinian ethos that departs from spaces of resistance for the capitalistic promise of modernity and personal advancement (Roy, 2016). Similar lines of criticism have been addressed to a modern development paradigm promoted by international NGO's in Palestine that “[transforms] societies and subjectivities around the notion of enterprise and weakens the collective national resistance movement” (Merz, 2012:50). In sum, the above critique, posit that privatization and neoliberalization in Israel/Palestine are harmonizing, and as Yacobi (2012) claims they represent “local ethno-security discourses and global neoliberal urban policies which do not contradict each other, but are, rather, complementary” (1).

Urban neoliberalism and contested Jerusalem Studies of the urban neoliberalization of Jerusalem likewise use the nexus of neoliberalism and ethno-national control as a common point-of-departure. While neoliberalism has been diffused and deployed in support of Israeli control and division of the West Bank and Gaza—furthering the polarization and deprivation of Palestinian society—case studies of post-Oslo Jerusalem contribute additional complexity. Shlomo (2017a, 2017b, 2017c) has described state regulation of previously “grey” services like transportation, health and education in East Jerusalem. This mode of re-enforced governmentalization took shape through sub-contracting and franchising to private entrepreneurs, a sub-formalization “introduced by state and local market actors with a combination of objectives in mind, including those of territorial control; whereas the population’s right to the delivery of proper urban services has been addressed only indirectly and partially” (Shlomo, 2017b:271). Thus, while common mechanisms of neoliberalism have on the one hand modestly improved the overall quality of local services, in the context of ethno-national territorial contestation, they simultaneously reinforce Israeli control and normalize the

22 occupation—"a ‘softer’ manifestation of state power performed in urban margins or peripheries” (Shlomo, 2017b:271).

In their analysis of official protocols for housing in East Jerusalem Palestinian neighborhoods, Braier (2013) and Braier & Yacobi (2016) highlight the contradictory results of imposing free-market logic on local planning processes. The introduction of independent micro-scale local zoning plans submitted by Palestinians to legalize and expand their houses has allowed them to advocate their rights and demands. Notwithstanding the release of “steam” in the deprived East Jerusalem housing market, micro-zoning did not address the overarching, blatant structural discrimination against Palestinians in Jerusalem with regard to the distribution of territorial resources.

Another space of ambivalence between neoliberalism and colonial control in Jerusalem is the case of the Jerusalem Light Rail (JLR), a private-public, build- operate-transfer (BOT) project and the first public transportation line connecting Jewish and Palestinians neighborhoods in the city. Roundly condemned by urban critics as another means of colonial expansion and political normalization in East Jerusalem (Nolte & Yacobi, 2015; Nolte, 2016; Baumann, 2016), the JLR has been cast as political infrastructure for the deepening of local divisions (Nolte, 2016:451). Diverging, Rokem & Vaughen (2017) reflect on ways in which the JLR functions as a space of inter-group encounter, illuminating avenues of spatial mobility typically obscured in studies of housing segregation.

Each of these cases—the deregulation of governmental services, Palestinian micro-zoning and the JLR—illustrate prevailing tensions between Israel’s ethno- national, colonial logic—inherent in every Israeli institutional action in East Jerusalem—and neoliberalism’s 'liberalizing' potential within Israel’s rigid ethno- national hierarchy. This tension reflects the dialectical relations between political rights and socio-economic equality. As part of the growing body of literature on the structural forces shaping the social and political spaces of post-Oslo Jerusalem, this dissertation therefore aims to deepen our understanding of the dialectics between neoliberalism and ethno-nationalism in contested urban spaces. As I will demonstrate,

23 Neoliberalism reconfigures ethno-national territoriality and creates new geographies of encounter. Urban neoliberalism indeed challenges the predominant national praxis of spatial segregation in Jerusalem.

Towards geographies of encounter In order to analyze the patterns and impact of inter-group encounters in Jerusalem, I have utilized in this dissertation some of the basic rationalities of the ‘contact hypothesis,’ suggested by social psychologist Gordon Allport. Allport (1954) claimed that encounters between majority and minority social groups can reduce prejudice and fear under five conditions:

1) Equal status—Both groups perceive equal status within the situation, shown to effectively promote positive inter-group attitudes even when groups initially differ in status (Schofield & Eurich-Fulcher, 2001); 2) Common goals—Groups exert mutual action towards a common goal (e.g., mixed athletic team); 3) Inter-group cooperation—Attainment of a common goal based on cooperation rather than competition; 4) Support of the authorities, law or custom—Inter-group contact backed by explicit support from authorities and social institutions. 5) Personal interaction - The contact situation needs to involve informal, personal interaction with outgroup members.

While the contact hypothesis has been validated in thousands of field and lab studies conducted since the 1960’s (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006), it has also been criticized for its reliance upon ‘ideal’ conditions—rarely sustained in real life (Amir, 1969). In ethnic disputes, the core conflict stems not merely from individual psychological processes, but from broader social and political conditions (Forbes, 2004); under such conditions, increased contact often produces negative outcomes.

Building upon the contact hypothesis since the 2000’s, human geographers of contemporary Western cities developed a novel theorization of geographies of encounter, which focus on the potential of everyday interactions to foster recognition

24 of diversity (Valentine, 2008, 2010; Wilson, 2011). In light of the accelerated globalization of economies, conflict and human mobility, international cities have been described as sites of 'super diversity' (see, for example, Binnie et al., 2006; Law, 2002). In what has been described as the ‘cosmopolitan turn’ in geographical thinking (Valentine, 2013), cities of the 21st century have thus been re-imagined as sites of connection and celebration of “the potential for […] new hybrid cultures and ways of living with difference” (Ibid:5).

Amin (2002), for example, has argued that micro-geographies of encounter can provide opportunities for majority groups to come into contact with difference that may later be translated into mutual recognition and respect. Thirft (2005) observes overlooked geographies of kindness and compassion in cities that encompass mundane friendliness and civility between strangers and which may represent a new ideal of urban citizenship. Even ‘banal’ exchanges in public spaces may give rise, according to Wilson (2011), to the “formation of a collective culture and temporary community” (647).

Geographers such as Gill Valentine (2008, 2010), however, have criticized the rise of cosmopolitanism and the base assumption that contact with ‘others’ will translate into respect for difference as careless romantization. As Holland et al. (2007) argue, spatial mixing of diverse peoples does not necessarily indicate meaningful inter-group contact. Indeed, city streets may serve as mere spaces of transit that produce minimal exchange between strangers (Amin, 2002). Moreover, everyday courtesy between strangers in public spaces should not be mistaken for respect of difference, when the same individuals simultaneously articulate prejudice in private settings (Valentine, 2008). Where there is (perceived or actual) unequal access to resources, inter-group spatial proximity may actually exacerbate defensiveness and delineation of group boundaries. In a study of economically deprived diverse neighborhoods in England, Valentine (2010) demonstrated that white, working-class individuals projected narratives of prejudice towards local minority groups despite having positive social encounters with them. In the context of socio-economic insecurity, she hypothesized, white, working-class individuals tend to scapegoat weaker groups as an economic and cultural threat. While increased inter-group

25 encounters have diverse effects on different individuals, Laurence (2014) observes that they generally reinforce previously held attitudes—whether positive or negative—towards inter-ethnic ties. Thus, while contemporary cities certainly produce greater levels of inter-group encounter, the extent to which these circumstantial geographies of encounter bear the potential for positive impact remains unresolved.

Scholars of geography of encounter have also paid considerable attention to ways in which inter-group interactions shape and are shaped by space (Leitner, 2012). This includes spaces of work (Ellis, Wright & Parks, 2004; Shtern, 2017b), education (Wilson, 2014), consumption (Laurier & Philo, 2006; Shtern, 2016), public transport (Wilson, 2011), streets and plazas (Pikner, 2016), and leisure and community (Neal et al., 2015; Parks, 2015). From this corpus, Peikut and Valentine (2017) suggest five typologies of urban spaces of encounter distinguished by the quality of social interaction they facilitate:

a) Public space (streets, parks, public transport, public services)—offers higher probability of trivial (and potentially antagonistic) inter-group encounter; b) Institutional space (workplace, school)—spaces where, given equitable distribution of power and resources, encounters with difference may be developed and sustained; c) Socialization space (social organizations, sport and hobby clubs, activities around children’s schools, places of religious meeting)—spaces where social relations are often voluntarily initiated, they enhance the potential development of ‘meaningful contact’; d) Consumption space (cafes, bars, restaurants, clubs)—quasi-public, these spaces facilitate intimate connection and acquaintance between strangers; e) Private space (immediate and extended family)—Spaces wherein people develop strong attachment predicated foremost on emotional bonds.

In their extensive empirical study of the European cities of Leeds and Warsaw, Peikut and Valentine (ibid) attempt to explicate observed variation in the quality of inter-

26 group encounter unfolding in the categories of spaces summarized above. However, they found no distinct explanation for the different qualities of encounter in these spaces. It may be that articulated typologies conflate categories of activity (e.g., consumption, socialization) with categories of structural identity (e.g., private, public, institutional). Moreover, a lack of attention has been given to other important attributes of each space of encounter, including urban design, location and accessibility.

Building on this literature, I utilize the notion of ‘spaces of encounter’ to describe daily inter-group interactions in the contested city. Prevailing discourse on multicultural cities has focused on cities that are socially or culturally divided—but not nationally contested (Watson, 2006). At the same time, the post-colonial literature has either insufficiently examined the nature of encounter in colonial urban spaces or dismissed the particularities of inter-group interactions in colonial contexts as exceptional and involuntary (Abowd, 2014; Yiftachel & Yacobi, 2003). To adapt a theorization of ‘spaces of encounter’ to the violent colonial reality of Jerusalem, I narrow its application to the inter-group space-sharing in which, despite the rarity of personal interactions, it nonetheless brings the two rival groups into mutual sight and awareness under non-violent circumstances

Inter-group encounter in contested Jerusalem In Living together separately, Romann and Weingrod (1991) aptly described pre-Intifada relations between Jews and Palestinians in Jerusalem. The authors underscored not only the parallel social and cultural realities of the two communities in the ‘unified’ city, but also the strong influence of disparate power relations and uneven patterns of spatial mixing. From 1967, Palestinians remained highly dependent upon the Israeli labor market and urban utilities of West Jerusalem, while Jews were afforded greater prerogative regarding the range, type and location of their daily inter-group interactions. Such interactions were thereby kept to the minimum functional level, maintaining rigid social boundaries and facilitating detachment in the event of political deterioration.

27 Inter-group interaction between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs receded dramatically during the first Intifada (Romann, 1992). In the subsequent years of the Oslo Accords and second Intifada, the study of Jerusalem has shifted toward a focus on modes of segregation and amenable division. Jerusalem has often been described in the literature as a deeply segregated city, with clear geographical boundaries separating Israeli-Jewish areas from Palestinian-Arab areas (Bollens, 2000; Dumper, 2014; Klein, 2005). Yet, as I will demonstrate, over the last decade and in the aftermath of the failure of the Oslo Accords—especially following the abatement of the horrific violence of the second Intifada—the number of Palestinians from East Jerusalem commuting and migrating to Jewish spaces in Jerusalem has increased significantly. Recent studies describe a resurgent Palestinian presence in Jewish areas of the city. Greenberg-Raanan and Shoval (2014) focus on the interplay between gender, national and religious identities as manifested in the spatial activities of Palestinian women in Jewish areas. Others consider the function of the JLR as a daily contested space of encounter (Baumann, 2016; Nolte, 2016; Nolte & Yacobi, 2015; Rokem & Voughen, 2017). Yacobi and Pullan (2014) examine the discrimination experienced by Palestinians when attempting to purchase or rent apartments in the East Jerusalem Jewish settlement of French Hill.

However insightful, the above studies do not comprise a comprehensive review of contemporary modes of inter-group interaction in Jerusalem. The following dissertation is addressed to this lacuna, providing a broad review of typologies of encounter with emphasis on mores of engagement in post-Oslo Jerusalem. Moreover, unlike the local modes of encounter of the 1970’s and 1980’s vividly described by Romann and Weingrod (1991), contemporary Jerusalem is characterized by periodical eruptions of political violence, urban entrapment and growing deprivation and colonization in East Jerusalem and strongly neoliberal processes. These evolving circumstances provide a sufficient basis for an updated assessment of inter-group relations in the city.

Last, from the point of view of research on nationally contested cities, a growth in spaces of encounter between the rival groups seems to challenge prevailing ideologies and collective mentalities that reinforce sectarian separation through the

28 purification of spaces (Falah, 1996; Sibley, 1988). It bears the potential to undermine the unassailability of urban spatial segregation in the absence of national reconciliation at the macro-level (Boal, 2002; Doherty & Poole, 1997; Gaffikin & Morissey, 2011; Shirlow, 2006). However, as I will demonstrate in this dissertation, post-Oslo Jerusalem represents a counter-example in which inter-group spatial formations undergo de-segregation despite ongoing volatile conflict. Yet trends of desegregation remain strictly uneven and polarized, and are limited principally to cursory daily activities.

29 Research Questions

From the literature that described above, several theoretical and empirical questions emerge. Principally:

In what ways do the praxes of neoliberalism and ethno-nationalism intersect, contradict and mutually reinforce each other in post-Oslo Jerusalem?

Beyond this central question arise the following secondary research questions:

1. From the divided discourse point-of-view, in which segregation is often described as deterministic and self-reinforcing, what motivations, needs and geopolitical contexts serve to explain the growing Palestinian presence in Jewish areas of contemporary Jerusalem? 2. What is the role of neoliberalism in constructing the geography of encounter in post-Oslo Jerusalem? How do modes of urban and cultural neoliberalism— such as privatization of public spaces and the ascendance of consumerist culture—influence Jewish-Arab inter-group encounter and power relations? 3. What does the growing trend of asymmetric spatial mixing imply with regard to the colonial context of inter-group relations in Jerusalem? Does the new geography of encounter challenge or strengthen predominant assumptions of post-colonial discourse on contemporary Jerusalem and Israel/Palestine as a whole? 4. In light of recent literature on the ‘geography of encounter,’ what types of encounter take place in the new spaces of encounter in West Jerusalem? Do these encounters extend beyond the practical, non-personal level? What transformative possibilities do they carry in terms of extant mutual perception, fear and mistrust?

Methodology The dissertation employs a mixed-method approach that includes a review and analysis of extant literature and statistical data, primary quantitative research and in-

30 depth qualitative study. In the following section, I present the methodological rationale of each chapter.

In the first chapter, I conduct a review and theoretical analysis of secondary data, supplemented with primary research on the integration of East Jerusalem Palestinians within the Israeli labor market. In the second and third chapters, I employ a mixed methodological approach (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998), i.e., an integration of quantitative and qualitative research methods. The integration of ethnographic fieldwork and quantitative surveying serves to leverage the relative strengths of these methodologies, avoid holistic fallacies and triangulate the results of each analysis (Sieber, 1973).

The literature review and secondary data analysis exploited a vast body of accumulated academic and professional knowledge regarding the geopolitics, society and economy of Jerusalem since 1967. In particular, the dissertation benefitted from the extensive empirical data and scholarly analysis available through the annual yearbooks of the Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research (JIPR). Another important source of information was the Jerusalem yearbook of the Palestinian Central Bureau of statistics (PCBS), as well as an important economic survey conducted in 2011- 2012 by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in East Jerusalem. Although these respective Israeli, Palestinian and international sources apply different methodologies and spatial definitions of Jerusalem, taken together, they comprise a comprehensive trove of empirical data.

The dissertation’s qualitative component included 49 in-depth interviews with various Israeli and Palestinian interviewees illustrating from personal and professional points-of-view the essence of inter-group interactions in Jerusalem. Interviewees included 20 Palestinians and 29 Israelis, among them urban planners, community activists, managers of professional unions in Jerusalem (such as industry magnates and union representatives), contractors, managers, shop owners and chiefs of mall security (Malha and Mamilla). Interviewees included both professionals and ‘ordinary’ Jerusalemites with experiences of inter-group encounters in residential, employment and/or commercial spaces.

31 Another layer of qualitative work included four focus-groups of Israeli and Palestinian workers who had been employed in mixed working spaces (Shtern, 2017a). Focus-groups were ethno-nationally homogenous and conducted in either East or West Jerusalem, to facilitate the creation of secure environments for the participants. The two Palestinian focus-groups were convened in the office of Riyan Center in the Shuaffat neighborhood of East Jerusalem with a total of 27 Arab participants. The Riyan Center, is an Israeli- Arab NGO that promotes labor integration among Israeli Arabs. The focus group’s Palestinian participants were all participants in Riyan’s projects in East Jerusalem, and were invited by the center’s coordinators to join the focus-group. The two Israeli focus groups convened in the JIPR offices in the Rehavia neighborhood of West Jerusalem with a total of 18 Jewish participants. The Israeli participants selected among the survey respondents were those who asserted, in the questioner, their willingness to participate in further research.

The final qualitative component comprised a discourse analysis of official documents, urban plans, newspaper articles, commercials and street signs. Texts were selected in order to illuminate patterns of interactions, institutional policies with regard to community relations, public responses of Jews and Arabs to spatial mixing, and the role of businesses and other free market actors in cultivating the conditions of inter-group cohabitation in Jerusalem.

Qualitative data analysis was undertaken within an ‘urban ethnographic’ framework, designed for thick anthropological observation (Geertz, 1973) of urban geographic communities (Jackson, 1985). Urban ethnography stems from an urban anthropological tradition (see, for example, Roy, 2003, 2005; Holston, 1989, 1999), in which interviews and other texts are viewed as drawing local practices into broader structures of social relations through which standardized codes of behavior are created and enforced, illustrating “cultural and sociopolitical manifestations of urban lives and everyday practices” (Low, 1999:2). In addition, I have employed textual analysis that entailed coding for emerging and recurring themes and categories (Charmaz & McMullan, 2011).

The quantitative part of the research included three questionnaire-based surveys (one for each space of encounter). A total of 753 questionnaires were completed, including 428 (226 Jewish and 202 Palestinian) responses32 to the work spaces questionnaire, 195 (110 Jewish and 85 Palestinian) responses to the neighborhood survey and 125 responses (62 Jewish and 62 Palestinian) to the shopping malls survey. Each questionnaire included closed and open questions regarding the interviewee’s position vis-à-vis and interpretation of spatial mixing with the outer-group. Special attention was given to interviewees’ sense of security during space-sharing and the effect of encounter on previous social and political positions. Questionnaires were invigilated by Arabic and Hebrew-speaking research assistants. Statistical analysis was undertaken to characterize sample distributions, variance and significant differences of item means. Open responses were coded and analyzed for recurring themes and categories. For further information regarding the methodology of each study-case, see pp. 60-61 and pp. 77-78, as well as the methodological chapter in the report on inter- group interactions in Jerusalem work spaces - Beyond the Glass Ceiling: Palestinians and Israelis in Jerusalem employment market (Shtern, 2017a: 33-37).

Throughout my doctoral studies, I served as an associate researcher at the JIPR (Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research). I thank the institute for the opportunity and for the financial support they provided me during my studies. While my dissertation draws extensively upon research activities undertaken at JIPR, as mentioned before, important fieldwork results, including a questionnaire- based survey on shared work spaces, the focus groups of Jewish and Palestinian employees, and a number of interviews are excluded from the final draft.

Research Ethics As a Jewish-Israeli researcher studying inter-group relations between Jews and Palestinians in Jerusalem, in a context of the ongoing Israeli occupation and discrimination against Palestinians, I found myself in various ethical dilemmas throughout the course of my research. In the following section, I address key ethical questions brought to the fore during this research and convey the various strategies I have employed in their mitigation.

Protecting the privacy of participants in research is a crucial task (Goode, 1996). To the extent possible, interviewees provided signed informed consent prior to participation. At the outset of each interview, I explained to interviewees the purpose of the study and reminded them of their right terminate participation, including rescission of all information collected, at any time. Moreover, if necessary and in accordance with participants’ wishes, interview transcripts and narrative reference thereto have been anonymized.

33 Notwithstanding these procedures, the issue of informed consent in qualitative research remains controversial. Smith (1998) maintains that informed consent is a mechanism embedded in Western culture and its inherent power relationships. These define not only the protection of individual and property rights of citizens, but through their omission, the negation the inherent rights of the subjected population. Goodhand (2000) has argued that a researcher from the industrialized world cannot garner an informed consent that necessarily corresponds to Indigenous cultural codes and ethical values. It has also been argued that the power imbued in the researcher make it very difficult to create safe spaces that encourage genuine partnership (Mackenzie, C., McDowell, C., & Pittaway, E., 2007). Research dealing with East Jerusalem and daily life elsewhere in the West Bank acknowledges that Jewish-Israeli researchers encounter a great deal of difficulty in gathering information through interviews and surveys of Palestinian respondents. At the same time, the request to sign forms of agreement is liable to arouse suspicion, reluctance and avoidance on the part of interviewees. As solicitation of signed informed consent was likely to deter the participation of Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem, prior informed consent was generally obtained from these informants orally. Collection of informed consent in this way is predicated on the assumption that the exercise of discretion, boundaries of discourse and sensitivity enable interviews to be conducted on the basis of respect. Interviewees were thereby informed of the meaning of the research in an attempt to minimize the burden imposed through discursive power relations.

Another issue is the critical-interpretive nature of the study. The study seeks to examine critically the patterns of interaction between Israelis and Palestinians revealed through discourse analysis, interviews, questionnaires, and quantitative data. Participants in the study were asked to evaluate and characterize patterns of interaction between groups. It is possible that participants would feel the interpretations offered in this dissertation lack fidelity to their own positions and perceptions and, by extension, present a critical picture they do not share. To mitigate this possibility, I follow Stahl (2008) who argues that critical research can be justified ethically when it seeks to expose social and political relations to improve actual social reality. Thus, while interviewees exposed to the results of the research may feel that there is a conceptual or ideological gap between their positions and the critical

34 position of the research, the outcome of the research should enable civil society activists, policymakers and community leaders to bring about better conditions for inter-group relations in Jerusalem. Thus achieved, the ethical task of the research is an end bridging the gap between interviewees’ attitudes and the final product.

The Articles This dissertation is comprised of three articles, each published in a leading journal in the field of Urban Studies. Each article illuminates a different angle of the emerging geography of encounter in post-Oslo Jerusalem. The first article, Toward ethno-national peripheralization: Economic dependency and political resistance in Palestinian East Jerusalem, was published in April 2018 in the journal Urban Studies, is presented in Chapter 1. The article combines extant literature on the geopolitics and economy of Jerusalem with the Center-Periphery theoretical framework (Shils, 1975) in order to analyze the development and decline of East Jerusalem’s socio-economic status and political environment from 1967 to 2016. As I illustrate, since the beginning of the 1990s, Israeli national security policies have transformed East Jerusalem from a Palestinian metropolitan center into a region on the socio-economic periphery of Israel. I term this particular type of marginalization ‘ethno-national peripheralization,’ a process of socio-economic decline that is an output of ethno- national policies of division and annexation. The radical shift in East Jerusalem’s regional socio-economic status, from a center of one national realm to the periphery of another, transforms urban life and political spatial strategies in East Jerusalem. This chapter provides the geopolitical and historical context of contemporary processes of inter-group spatial mixing in Jerusalem. The peripheralization of East Jerusalem catalyzes the increased ‘functional Israelization’ of Palestinians, which strengthens their incorporation within Israeli spaces of West Jerusalem. As I demonstrate, transforming modes of spatial integration are signaled, inter alia, by evolving patterns of Palestinian participation within the labor market of West Jerusalem.

The second article, Urban neoliberalism vs. ethno-national division: The case of West Jerusalem's shopping malls, was published in December 2016 in the journal Cities, is presented in Chapter 2. The article examines patterns of inter-group encounter in two shopping malls in West Jerusalem: Mammilla quarter and Malha mall. Despite periodic waves of political violence in post-Oslo Jerusalem, the city has

35 seen the emergence of neoliberal spaces of consumption that serve as resilient spaces of inter-group encounter between populations. Based on a field survey and in-depth interviews, I demonstrate how these malls provide a sense of security sufficient for non-violent co-habitation. The case studies indicate that privatized urban spaces can undermine processes of ethno-national segregation. I argue that patterns of spatial division between members of the two groups are challenged and reshaped by neoliberal spaces and that the relocation of ethno-national inter-group encounters from public streets to privatized spaces of consumption may represent a temporal shift to a class-based encounters.The third article, The Urban Geopolitics of Neighboring: Conflict, Housing and Class in Jerusalem’s Settlement/Neighborhood co-authored with my PhD supervisor Prof. Haim Yacobi, is presented in Chapter 3. Accepted for publication in July 2018 in the journal Urban Geography. This paper examines a unique yet paradigmatic case study of a colonial neighborhood in East Jerusalem. The French Hill neighborhood, built in 1971, was one of the first Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem. Initially populated by upper-middle class secular-Jewish residents, an ongoing demographic transformation has rendered the French Hill the most ethno- nationally mixed neighborhood in the city. Two distinct new groups—middle class Ultra-Orthodox Jews and Palestinians—are increasingly moving into the neighborhood. This volatile social mix has yielded intense inter and intra-ethnic collisions. Based on a mixed-method analysis, I argue that the juxtaposition of colonial and neoliberal logics of space informing political relations in the neighborhood reveals a shared, if fragile, middle-class identity. My co-author and I suggest that this new geopolitical space of neighboring calls for a discussion of political conflict, housing and current colonial conditions to restore notions of class within analyses of the production of contested space.

Due to the structure of this dissertation as a thesis by publication, it is important to note that the first article (Toward ethno-national Peripheralization) has diverged from the original research plan. The article, which entails a geopolitical discursive analysis of post-Oslo East Jerusalem was originally planned as a detailed analysis of inter-group interactions in mixed work spaces. Because of editorial considerations, the scope of this article was reduced to an analysis of structural employment relations, including the integration of Palestinians within the Israeli labor

36 market and broader trends in the ethnic division of labor. Results of the extensive field study and qualitative research informing this research, however, have been published in the detailed Hebrew-language report, Beyond the Glass Ceiling: Palestinians and Israelis in Jerusalem employment market (2017). Findings of this work are cited in the Introduction and Discussion sections of the dissertation as ‘Shtern, 2017a.’

The articles are constructed around three case studies of spaces of encounter: the labor market, shopping malls and a residential settlement/neighborhood. These empirical pillars entail the detailed description and investigation of the nature, patterns and inter-personal effect of the inter-group geography of encounter in post- Oslo Jerusalem, enabling a deeper understanding of these elements in structural terms. In each case study, a distinct social and political space is constructed. Each space differs with regard to its placement vis-à-vis Jerusalem’s ethno-national (and cartographic) landscape, attributes of urban design, level and intensity of inter-group exchange, and type of urban activity in which the parties engage.

Through a comparison of these three fundamental realms of daily life in the city—the economic (employment), cultural (consumption) and territorial (the neighborhood)—I construct a comprehensive illustration of the patterns of Israeli- Palestinian interaction in Jerusalem. While some daily encounters are fleeting and banal (e.g., passing eye contact in a mall), others represent recurring and sustainable interactions (e.g., residence in a mixed building). Through a thick exploration over time and space, I provide a picture of a complex habitat in which neoliberal and ethno-national logics interact.

My focus on labor and commerce relates also to the importance of these spheres as resilient forms of inter-group interaction in Jerusalem. As Romann (1992) demonstrated, the strong—if uneven—economic inter-dependency that has evolved between East and West Jerusalem since 1967 has forged material ties that are the last to be severed in the onslaught of the violence and the first to be re-established thereafter. The focus on a residential space illuminates the converse, as housing is the

37 most segregated form of habitation in Jerusalem.1 Hence the French Hill mixed neighborhood represents an exceptional and most intriguing case study.

1 Residential segregation between Jews and Arabs was upwards of 98% in 2016 (JIPR, 2018: table C/5)

38 Article

Urban Studies 1–19 Ó Urban Studies Journal Limited 2018 Towards ‘ethno-national Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav peripheralisation’? Economic DOI: 10.1177/0042098018763289 dependency amidst political journals.sagepub.com/home/usj resistance in Palestinian East Jerusalem

Marik Shtern Department of Politics and Government, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel

Abstract Recent studies discuss ‘peripheralisation’ as an uneven socio-spatial phenomenon driven by pro- cesses of economic centralisation and marginalisation (Ku¨hn and Bernt, 2013) in capitalist (or capitalising) societies (Bernt and Colini, 2013). In this article, I utilise the concept of peripheralisa- tion in the context of an ethno-national dispute in which spatial, economic and regional dynamics are largely determined by territorial policies of control and exclusion. I combine extant literature on the geopolitics and economy of Jerusalem with the Centre–Periphery framework in order to analyse the development and decline of East Jerusalem’s socio-economic status and political envi- ronment from 1967 to 2016. As I will show, since the beginning of the 1990s, Israeli national secu- rity policies have transformed East Jerusalem from a Palestinian metropolitan centre into a region on the socio-economic periphery of Israel. I term this particular type of marginalisation ‘ethno- national peripheralisation’, a process of socio-economic decline that is not a relational product of neoliberal centralisation, but an output of ethno-national policies of division and annexation. The radical shift in East Jerusalem’s regional socio-economic status, from a centre of one national realm to the periphery of another, transforms urban life and political spatial strategies in contem- porary Jerusalem. The case of East Jerusalem’s peripheralisation demonstrates the ways in which ethno-national policies can create counter outcomes of ethno-national desegregation accelerated by physical entrapment, economic dependency and urban neoliberalism.

Keywords Centre–Periphery, divided cities, Israel/Palestine, Jerusalem, neoliberalism

Corresponding author: Marik Shtern, Department of Politics and Government, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, P.O.B. 653, Beer- Sheva, 84105, Israel. Email: [email protected]

39 2 Urban Studies 00(0)

᪈㾱 ᴰ䘁Ⲵ⹄ウሶĀ䗩㕈ॆā㿶Ѫ⭡䍴ᵜѫѹ˄ᡆ䍴ᵜॆ˅⽮Պ˄Bernt ઼ Coliniˈ2013˅ѝⲴ 㓿⍾䳶ѝ઼䗩㕈ॆ䘋〻˄Kühn ઼ Berntˈ2013˅傡ࣘⲴн൷㺑⽮Պオ䰤⧠䊑DŽᵜ᮷൘≁᯿ ҹㄟⲴ䈝ຳѝ䘀⭘䗩㕈ॆᾲᘥˈަѝൠฏᙗⲴ᧗ࡦ઼ᧂᯕ᭯ㆆᖸབྷ〻ᓖкߣᇊҶオ䰤ǃ㓿 ⍾઼४ฏⲴ⍫࣋DŽᵜ᮷ሶޣҾ㙦䐟᫂ߧൠ㕈᭯⋫઼㓿⍾Ⲵ⧠ᆈ᮷⥞оѝᗳ-䗩㕈⨶䇪Ṷᷦ㔃 ਸ䎧ᶕˈ࠶᷀ 1967 㠣 2016 ᒤь㙦䐟᫂ߧ⽮Պ㓿⍾ൠս઼᭯⋫⧟ຳⲴਁኅ઼㺠䘰DŽ↓ྲᵜ ᮷ሶ㺘᰾Ⲵ䛓ṧˈ㠚 1990 ᒤԓԕᶕˈԕ㢢ࡇⲴഭᇦᆹޘ᭯ㆆᐢ㓿ሶь㙦䐟᫂ߧӾᐤंᯟඖ Ⲵањབྷ䜭ᐲѝᗳ䖜ਈѪԕ㢢ࡇⲴ⽮Պ㓿⍾䗩㕈ൠ४DŽᵜ᮷ሶ䘉⿽⢩↺㊫රⲴ䗩㕈ॆ〠Ѫ Ā≁᯿䗩㕈ॆāˈ䘉ᱟа⿽⽮Պ㓿⍾㺠䘰䗷〻ˈнᱟᯠ㠚⭡ѫѹ䳶ᵳⲴ⴨ޣӗ⢙ˈ㘼ᱟ≁ ᯿࠶㻲઼ެᒦ᭯ㆆⲴӗ⢙DŽь㙦䐟᫂ߧⲴ४ฏ⽮Պ㓿⍾ൠսӾањഭᇦⲴѝᗳੁਖањഭ ᇦ䗩㕈ൠ४Ⲵṩᵜᙗ䖜ਈˈ᭩ਈҶᖃԓ㙦䐟᫂ߧⲴ෾ᐲ⭏⍫઼᭯⋫オ䰤ᡈ⮕DŽь㙦䐟᫂ߧ 䗩㕈ॆⲴᛵߥ㺘᰾ˈ൘ᇎ䱵⋖䲧ǃ㓿⍾׍䎆઼෾ᐲᯠ㠚⭡ѫѹⲴ࣐䙏лˈ≁᯿᭯ㆆਟԕӗ ⭏о≁᯿㶽ਸ⴨৽Ⲵ㔃᷌DŽ ޣ䭞䇽 㙦䐟᫂ߧǃԕ㢢ࡇ/ᐤंᯟඖǃ࠶㻲Ⲵ෾ᐲǃᯠ㠚⭡ѫѹǃѝᗳ-䗩㕈

Received November 2016; accepted February 2018

Introduction phenomenon may indicate a partial shift in local Palestinian politics of space. I term this In the fall semester of 2015, 286 East shift ‘functional Israelisation’, a pragmatic Jerusalem Palestinian students enrolled in engagement in Israeli practices that stems from preparatory programmes at Israeli higher economic dependency and geographical education institutions in West Jerusalem. entrapment. This ostensibly minor number of students Against the backdrop of continued socio- represents a 63% increase over the enrol- economic decline (UNCTAD, 2013) and ments of the previous school year (175 stu- increased functional Israelisation, the con- dents) (Council for Higher Education, 1 temporary political environment of East 2016). In the last decade, several reports Jerusalem has been characterised by overt have indicated an unprecedented growth in national radicalisation. Since July 2014, East demand among East Jerusalem Palestinian Jerusalem has been experiencing a wave of youth for Israeli tertiary education (Hasson, violent political upheaval bringing signifi- 2015). This phenomenon is mirrored by cant human and economic cost for the city’s increased utilisation of other Israeli facilities Palestinian and Israeli residents. The in West Jerusalem by East Jerusalem increasing socio-economic distress and Palestinians, including commercial centres deprivation, ongoing attempts to settle Jews (Shtern, 2016) and public transport (Nolte, in Palestinian neighbourhoods, growing 2016; Rokem and Vaughan, 2017). In addition, national religious tensions around the since 2004 there has also been a significant rise Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount complex, in the number of applications for Israeli citi- radical Islamic incitement and ongoing colli- zenship by East Jerusalem Palestinians (Lieber, sions with the Israeli security forces have 2016). In light of the traditional residential, cul- culminated in a series of violent incidents tural and social segregation of Palestinians in (Ramon and Lehrs, 2014). Unlike during the Jerusalem (both enforced and voluntary) Palestinian uprising of the early 2000s, East (Bollens, 1998, 2000; Dumper, 1997, 2014), this

40 Shtern 3

Jerusalem Palestinians have taken a leading role principal conceptual contribution of this in the most recent wave of resistance – dubbed article is to illustrate the importance and by Israeli journalists the ‘Jerusalemite Intifada’ applicability of the Centre–Periphery con- (Issacharoff, 2014). cept for the study of nationally contested cit- In this article, I posit that novel patterns ies and regions. As I will show in the case of of political resistance and practical integra- ‘post-Oslo’ Jerusalem (2005–present), the tion – stemming from the reactions and prism of Centre–Periphery can provide new adaptations of local denizens to new geopo- insights concerning recent geopolitical devel- litical realities in East Jerusalem – represent opments in this volatile urban sphere. a period of ‘ethno-national peripheralisa- Moreover, based on the case of East tion’. Based on extant literature concerning Jerusalem in the context of recent studies of the geopolitical and economic history of peripheralisation, I suggest a differentiation Jerusalem since 1967, analysis of Israeli and between neoliberal and ethno-national per- Palestinian official statistical data and recent ipheralisation. Although the outcomes of unpublished governmental reports, I argue dependence, disconnection and poverty that the status of East Jerusalem has under- (Bernt and Colini, 2013: 3) are similar in gone a radical shift from the economic, both cases, they differ significantly in terms social and political centre of the Palestinian of logic (ethno-national) and spatiality West Bank to a struggling, marginalised (inclusion/exclusion). I suggest further inves- social periphery of Israel. This particular tigation of the intriguing dialectics between geopolitical phenomenon raises theoretical neoliberalism and ethno-nationalism and the questions on regional Centre–Periphery rela- competing and completing roles they play in tions in a nationally contested setting, and the ‘game’ of peripheralisation. As I will can also elucidate recent developments con- show, though the socio-economic periphera- cerning Israeli/Palestinian politics of space lisation of East Jerusalem is a product of in Jerusalem. Israeli politics of annexation and exclusion, Theoretically, this article draws on Shils’ urban neoliberalism furthers the subjectifica- (1975) model of ‘Center and Periphery’ and tion of East Jerusalem Palestinians to Israel’s the geopolitical study of nationally contested ‘Central Value System’ (Shils, 1975: 3). cities (Pullan and Baillie, 2013). This theore- The following section articulates this arti- tical combination is built on the understand- cle’s theoretical framework: Shils’ Centre– ing that geopolitics can be used as a useful Periphery model; recent studies on regional analytical framework for studying the pro- peripheralisation and their relevance to eth- duction of space, politics of fear and every- nic disputes; and a brief background on day life in the urban context (Yacobi, 2009). Centre–Periphery dynamics in the context of Another pertinent theoretical trajectory con- Israeli society and its Palestinian peripheries. cerns the reconstruction of urban economies This is followed by a theoretical problemati- in the age of globalisation and neoliberalisa- sation of the term ‘urban neoliberalism’. The tion (Harvey, 2005; Sassen, 1999). Recent second section provides a detailed chronol- studies have conceptualised peripheralisa- ogy of East Jerusalem’s shifting socio- tion of cities and regions throughout the economic regional status from 1967 until world in the age of neoliberalising govern- the present. I demonstrate the shifting ance and values (Naumann and Fischer- regional position of East Jerusalem empiri- Tahir, 2013). However, the study of periph- cally through data on its labour market, eralisation in the context of ethnic disputes economic functionality and political environ- has been sporadic and inconsistent. The ment. Greater focus is given to the current

41 4 Urban Studies 00(0) period of ethno-national peripheralisation masses, which creates an integrative centri- (2005 onwards), during which the Palestinian petal movement from the Periphery towards city has experienced heightened economic the Centre. On the other hand, rejection of dependency and functional integration within the Centre’s core value system by leaders on the Israeli space and, concurrently, increased the Periphery may generate opposing, disin- political resistance. The third section contains tegrative centrifugal forces (Horowitz and a contextualisation of the presented modes of Lissak, 1989). functional integration in the context of neolib- In the last 50 years, Shils’ model has been eral transformation and globalisation. The refined and discussed through various discussion unpacks the particular nature of prisms: regional geographic history (Rokkan East Jerusalem’s peripheralisation, the role of and Urwin, 1983), the global economy urban neoliberalism in the acceleration of this (Wallerstein, 1979), urban studies (Scott and process and conceptual attributes of East Soja, 1996; Wacquant, 1999), political Jerusalem as a case study for further theorisa- sociology (Castells, 1997; Kimmerling, 2001; tion of peripheralisation in the context of eth- Wellhofer, 1989) and post-colonial studies nic disputes. (King, 1990; Yiftachel and Tzfadia, 2004; Tzfadia and Yacobi, 2011). In most studies, Ethno-national peripheralisation: the Centre–Periphery is conceptualised as a binary logic, i.e. as a ‘particular socio-spatial Theoretical background configuration of power relations leading to During the 1950s, the sociologist Edward uneven socio-spatial development’ (Ku¨hn Shils (1975) developed his seminal theoreti- and Bernt, 2013: 303). cal model concerning the interdependency of This article utilises a Centre–Periphery the Centre and Periphery. According to framework to unfold processes of urban and Shils, the Centre is the source of authority regional peripheralisation. According to and legitimacy, ‘a phenomenon of the realm Ku¨hn (2015), peripheralisation implies pro- of values and beliefs, [the] realm of action’ cesses of centralisation and polarisation, (Shils, 1975: 1). The production and distri- thus spatial centralisation constructs the per- bution of human resources take place in the ipheralisation of other spaces/regions/cities Centre. It is the foundation of society’s cen- by spurring immigration, localised economic tral value system, according to which the productivity and infrastructural concentra- social order is governed and collective iden- tion. Recent studies on regional and urban tity determined. Conversely, the Periphery is peripheralisation in Central and Eastern defined as layers or sectors passively receiv- Europe (Bartholomae et al., 2017; Ehrlich ing the authority, order and values of the et al., 2012; Lang, 2012), Turkey (Du¨zgu¨n, Centre, without taking part in their produc- 2013) and India (Kundu, 2012) point to the tion or distribution (Gottman, 1980). In decline of the welfare system, the rise of neo- many cases, the Periphery suffers geographic liberal spatial policies and deindustrialisa- remoteness, low status and lack of social tion/financial concentration in the growing activity – its image and identity the products polarisation between metropolitan and rural of a marginality derived from the Centre areas, urban shrinkage and regional margin- (Shields, 1991; Yiftachel and Tzfadia, 2004). alisation. Throughout this corpus, peripher- According to Shils (1975), the Centre– alisation is primarily depicted as relational, Periphery dichotomy is not necessarily static. i.e. ‘the structural opposite of processes of The emergence of nationalism and moder- centralization’ (Ku¨hn and Bernt, 2013: 314). nity extends the central value system to the In this article, I use the term ‘neoliberal

42 Shtern 5 peripheralisation’ to describe economically Palestinian Peripheries in Israel driven regional marginalisation, a relational Many sociologists and critical political scien- product emerging from an over-arching, tists have used the Centre–Periphery meta- ‘intrinsic logic of uneven development in phor to illuminate the social construction of capitalist societies . the result of specific Israeli society (see Horowitz and Lissak, capital investment policies and political 1989; Kimmerling, 2001; Tzfadia and decision-making on particular scales’ (Ku¨hn Yacobi, 2011; Yiftachel and Tzfadia, 2004). and Bernt, 2013: 18). The prevailing conceptualisation argues that Several studies have highlighted the parti- Israel was established by a Jewish socio-politi- cularity of core–periphery relations in the cal elite of Eastern European origin, who were context of ethnic disputes. On the political motivated by national-secular Zionism and peripheralisation of Sindh province in supported the notion of the socialist welfare Pakistan, Wright (1991) illustrated the possi- state. Accordingly, the periphery in Israel bility of shifting positions between core and includes a variety of ‘others’ perceived as mar- periphery as a result of ethno-political riv- ginal to the Zionist project, namely, non- alry. Moreover, he claimed that different Jewish minorities, Mizrahi Jews (of Middle ethnic groups can occupy statuses of core Eastern origin) and Jewish immigrants who and periphery within a single region accord- did not embody the European-Zionist ideal. ing to their alliances with the dominant cen- These groups were marginalised with respect tre. Studies on the tensions between the to their ethnic descent through stereotyping Spanish nation and its ethnic Basque and and spatial policies (Smooha, 1978). Catalonian peripheries demonstrate how It is important to distinguish between the national identities are constructed and soli- Jewish and non-Jewish peripheries of Israeli dified in a dialectical core–periphery rela- society. Palestinian citizens of Israel, as an tionship (Muro and Quiroga, 2004). Pullan ethno-national periphery, have been system- (2011) has suggested that in nationally con- atically marginalised since 1948 by Israeli tested cities such as Jerusalem, Nicosia and intrastate colonial planning policies, includ- Guben, persisting intra-urban frontiers con- ing disparate public budget allocations and flate the delineation of Centre and expenditures (Hamdan et al., 2010; Periphery, structuring ‘communal tensions Yiftachel, 1994). They remain markedly seg- and violence’ (Pullan, 2011: 31). These stud- regated from the Jewish majority in terms of ies underscore the particularities of peripher- housing and labour markets. Yiftachel and alisation in nationally contested spaces, Tzfadia (2004) characterised the difference where top-down ethno-national policies, between the Jewish and Arab peripheries in rather than free-market mechanisms, are Israel as ‘entrapment within’ – as opposed to transforming regional orders. They also ‘trapped outside’, respectively – the Zionist reveal the need to further theorise the nation-building project (Yiftachel and Centre–Periphery model in the context of Tzfadia, 2004: 204). Nonetheless, the Israeli- regional and urban ethnic disputes. Building Palestinian middle class has grown in recent on this literature, I suggest the term ‘ethno- years (Dagan-Buzaglo and Konor-Attias, national peripheralisation’ to describe a pro- 2013), slightly easing residential segregation cess of regional socio-economic decline and demonstrating higher levels of education resulting from an ethnic/national dispute, as and Western cultural engagement and con- well as related geopolitical policies of sumption (Falah et al., 2000; Monterescu, annexation and exclusion. 2016). These contemporary processes are

43 6 Urban Studies 00(0) related to the increased privatisation and Throughout the developing world, urban deregulation of the Israeli economy, begin- neoliberalism is reshaping urban spaces by ning with the 1985 economic stabilisation privatising municipal services and public and enhanced through Israel’s incorporation spaces, leading to social polarisation and into the Organisation for Economic Co- inequality (Harvey, 2005; Sassen, 1999; operation and Development (OECD) in 2010 Smith, 2002). Recent studies have empha- (Mandelkern and Shalev, 2010). This neolib- sised the dynamic nature of neoliberal recon- eral shift plays a dialectical game in the sub- struction and its particular localised sequent socio-economic inclusion of manifestations in different urban localities Palestinians in Israel. While broadening gaps (Peck et al., 2009). along the lines of ethnicity and class, Israel’s Since the 1990s, Israeli localities have new economic configuration has also undergone a process of urban economic and enhanced inclusion in the areas of private social neoliberalisation (Rosen and Razin, tertiary education and the service industry 2009). In Jerusalem, urban infrastructure and (Marantz et al., 2014), among others. public services have been fully or partially pri- As a sub-group of the Palestinian minor- vatised, commercial life has been relocated ity in Israel, however, East Jerusalem from the public street to 12 inner-city and Palestinians differ significantly in terms of suburban shopping malls (Shtern, 2016) and their temporal, legal and socio-political cir- luxurious private residential compounds have cumstances from both Palestinian citizens of proliferated in the Western central business Israel and West Bank Palestinians. Their district (Alfasi and Ganan, 2015; Yacobi, particular sub-civic status as permanent 2012). Since 1967, the Israeli State and several Israeli residents subjected to quasi-military quasi-governmental agencies had been tradi- governance since 1967 (Lapidoth, 2011), as tionally the most dominant actor in the pro- well as ongoing resistance to their political duction of urban spaces in Palestinian and social subjection to the Israeli occupa- neighbourhoods and their environs. In East tion (about which I elaborate in the next sec- Jerusalem (2004 and onwards), however, a tion), have kept East Jerusalem Palestinians range of colonial practices of control and gov- for decades in a distinct socio-political cate- ernmentalisation have been privatised. Social gory. Although their shifting regional status services including public transportation, medi- indicates movement away from the outer cal services and education have been out- margins of Israelis’ realm of action in the sourced to private Palestinian contractors West Bank, the economic, social and politi- (Shlomo, 2017a, 2017b). cal mobilities of East Jerusalem Palestinians remain constrained by rigid ethno-national hierarchies that demarcate the peripherality East Jerusalem peripheralisation: of Arab society within Israel. Historical preview The roots of the ethnic division of Urban neoliberalism and Jerusalem’s economy between Jews and Jerusalem Arabs can be traced to the periods of late Ottoman and British rule in Palestine In this article, I use the term ‘urban neoliber- (Klein, 2014). Yet the distinct separation alism’ to refer to the ways by which globali- between Arab-Palestinian and Jewish-Israeli sation and the spread of the free market economies in Jerusalem began only after the economy serve to reconstruct the social and physical and national division of the city in economic structure of urban centres. the 1948 war. To illuminate the process of

44 Shtern 7 ethno-national peripheralisation of Palestinian underdevelopment of basic infrastructure in East Jerusalem, as well as its socio-political Palestinian East Jerusalem, with the transpor- outcomes, I present a chronology of East tation, education, water and sewage systems Jerusalem’s regional status transformations in all bearing signs of institutionalised neglect. three historical periods: 1) Partial Discriminatory zoning policies have severely Incorporation (1967–1987); 2) Contestation curtailed the ability of Palestinians to acquire (1987–2004); 3) Peripheralisation (2005–2017). building permits, leading to a critical housing To illustrate the regional status of East shortage, widespread unregulated construc- Jerusalem in relation to the Palestinian and tion and vast migration to the West Bank Israeli socio-economic realms, I describe each (Chiodelli, 2012). period’s socio-economic conditions, political The political and economic dominance of environment and modes of collaboration/segre- the Jewish majority in Jerusalem also con- gation between East and West Jerusalem. For tributed to the formation of a highly the purpose of this article, I elaborate more polarised, ethnically stratified labour mar- deeply upon the third period: Peripheralisation. ket. While a portion of the local Palestinian workforce was absorbed into the Israeli economy, the reverse is not true. Ironically, Period 1: Partial Incorporation mass construction of Israeli settlements in (1967–1987) East Jerusalem during the 1970s and 1980s The war of 1967 ended with the Israeli occu- comprised a major source of employment pation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Sinai for both East Jerusalem Palestinians and their Peninsula and Syrian Golan Heights. Soon counterparts in the West Bank (Romann, after the war, Israel annexed approximately 1984). In 1980, the Jewish sector of Jerusalem 70 km2 surrounding Jerusalem, including employed approximately 8600 East Jerusalem areas of Jerusalem previously controlled by Palestinians (40% of the East Jerusalem Jordan and some 15 Palestinian villages in the Palestinian workforce) and 10,000 West city’s immediate environs. The annexation Bank Palestinian day labourers (Romann and established nascent political and economic Weingrod, 1991: 104–105). Though labour boundaries (if not yet physical separation) integration induced a sharp increase in the between Arab territories now subjected to East Jerusalem gross regional product, East Israeli civil law and the rest of the West Bank, Jerusalem Palestinians employed in the Jewish which was placed under military rule. Thus, sector worked almost exclusively in manual in June 1967, 67,609 Palestinian residents of labour or other low-status occupations. The Jerusalem (26% of the city’s population) were ethnic stratification of the city intensified dur- granted permanent residency in Israel ing the 1980s. While deindustrialisation (Schmelz, 1987: 64). This quasi-citizenship increasingly elevated Jewish workers into ser- denoted a two-tiered citizenship system within vice industries and white-collar occupations, Jerusalem (Lapidoth, 2011), reinforced by East Jerusalem Palestinian workers in skilled Israeli national and municipal planning and occupations within the Israeli labour market development policies that exacerbated remained rare and marginal (Romann and inequality. Two principles undergirded Israeli Weingrod, 1991: 30). Tertiary-educated policies vis-a-vis Palestinian residents of Palestinianstendedtofindworkinthelocal Jerusalem: maintenance of the city’s Jewish Arab economy, in other Palestinian cities or majority and preventing re-division of the ter- further afield in Arab countries. ritory (Klein, 2005). The central legacy of Jerusalem’s dual labour market was not these principles has been the systemic just a product of structural discrimination

45 8 Urban Studies 00(0)

(Romann, 1984), but also an outcome of Period 2: Contestation Palestinian political resistance to the integra- (1987–2004) tion of an Israeli curriculum within East Jerusalem public schools in the period 1967– The outbreak of the first Palestinian intifada 1972. Palestinians viewed the curriculum as (uprising) in December 1987 marked the end a threat to the preservation of Palestinian of the relatively non-violent period of Partial national identity and a clear legitimatisation Incorporation and the beginning of a period of Israeli control over their city (Benziman, of intense upheaval and national contesta- 1980). Hence public and private Arab schools tion for sovereignty over the city. Two in Jerusalem administered the Jordanian cur- Palestinian uprisings (1987–1992 and 2000– riculum (from 1994, the Palestinian national 2004) and, in the interim, a faltering political curriculum). Israeli institutions of higher rapprochement (i.e. the Oslo peace process: education and many employers rejected 1993–1999) produced new policies of exclu- Arab academic certifications. The case of sion and disintegration in East Jerusalem. Jerusalem’s labour market during the period The signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 of Partial Incorporation illustrates how initiated a period of ‘Palestinisation’ of East Israeli political and economic dominance con- Jerusalem political life towards the establish- tributed to the economic dependency and ment of a future Palestinian capital in the exploitation of East Jerusalem Palestinians. city (Cohen, 2013). Among other changes, Concurrently, Palestinian anti-normalisation official and unofficial institutions of the policies (see Salem, 2005) and political non- newly minted Palestinian Authority (such as recognition of Israeli sovereignty in East the ‘Orient House’ and the local Palestinian Jerusalem erected boundaries against further Chamber of Commerce) were established, assimilation within Israeli society. and East Jerusalem public schools adopted In all, the regional economic and political the Palestinian national curriculum. As part status of East Jerusalem as a Palestinian of the interim agreement, however, the metropolitan centre did not erode signifi- administrative capital and presidential resi- cantly – and, in certain regards, it was dency of the Palestinian Authority were strengthened – during the first two decades established in nearby Ramallah, which of Israeli occupation. Critically, the lack of thereafter served as the de-facto Palestinian physical barriers and lax restrictions on the political centre (Aruri, 2012). movement of visitors, goods and workers In light of the ‘Palestinisation’ of East between East Jerusalem and the West Bank Jerusalem, Israeli state, municipal and non- between 1967 and 1991 sustained the city’s governmental actors intensified efforts to regional centrality. Nevertheless, some ‘Judaise’ the city in order to preclude (or changes did occur. Tourism emanating from derail) resolutions of the peace process. Jordan and the other Arab countries was Revocation of Palestinian residency permits effectively cut off. Due to the bureaucracy escalated dramatically in 1995 (Hamoked, and juridical decentralisation of the Israeli 2010), followed by the demolition of thou- military regime, East Jerusalem was demoted sands of unregulated houses and the strate- as an administrative centre. In addition, gic insertion of Jewish micro-settlements annexation led to an increased tax burden deep within Palestinian neighbourhoods and local price inflation relative to the rest of (Alyan et al., 2012). the West Bank, causing a per capita decline The Oslo Accords, which led to the bifur- in expenditure by West Bank Palestinian vis- cation of the West Bank from Gaza, frag- itors to Jerusalem (Kimchi et al., 1984). mentation of the West Bank by settlements

46 Shtern 9

Figure 1. Jerusalem and its environs, 2018. and bypass roads and a strict permit regime weak and confused, with a hybrid political that diminished Palestinian access to many identity and a question mark hanging over parts of the land, has created a situation for its political future’ (Cohen, 2013: 129). Palestinians ‘that is untenable for most and unbearable for hundreds of thousands’ (Hammami and Tamari, 2001: 11). It led Period 3: Peripheralisation eventually to the unofficial collapse of the (2004–2016) accords and the outbreak of the second inti- fada in September 2000. The purported The socio-economic peripheralisation of involvement of the Palestinian Authority in East Jerusalem was radically accelerated the unrest provided Israeli authorities with the construction of Israel’s separation the needed rationale to shutter official wall in the midst of the city. The intensity of Palestinian institutions, as well as detain and the second intifada within Israel – West deport local Palestinian leaders and activists Jerusalem, in particular – catalysed finalisa- based in Jerusalem (Cohen, 2013). The eco- tion of Israel’s ‘Hafrada’ (separation) policy. nomic and political amputation of East In 2004, ground was broken on a 790 km Jerusalem from the West Bank, during the system of barriers around the West Bank. accords and after the second intifada, preci- While officially built to prevent the infiltra- pitated economic and social collapse. tion of Palestinian terrorists and unper- Palestinian East Jerusalem was left ‘divided, mitted job seekers (Barda, 2003), the barrier also served in the deliberate annexation of

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Palestinian land (Klein, 2005). In Jerusalem, The end of the Peripheralisation period is the barrier manifested as a 168 km long, 8 m marked by the resurgence of political violence high concrete wall encircling East Jerusalem in East Jerusalem from July 2014 onwards. from three directions (Figure 1). Here, the The growing centrality of Jerusalem to wall cuts through the urban realm, dividing Palestinians and Israelis as a national- neighbourhoods and dramatically destabilis- religious symbol (Cohen, 2017) and the lead- ing daily life and eroding social and eco- ing role played by East Jerusalem Palestinians nomic vitality (Chiodelli, 2013; UNCTAD, (especially teenagers) in the recent clashes 2013). The economic marginalisation of have led commentators to coin recent events East Jerusalem during the periods of the ‘Jerusalemite’ intifada (Issacharoff, 2014). Contestation and Peripheralisation is This wave of violence has been spurred by reflected in the city’s contribution to the long-term socio-economic deprivation, mass gross regional product of the West Bank, Palestinian casualties resulting from Israel’s which decreased from 14%–15% in 1987 to most recent major military operation in Gaza 8% in 2000 and below 7% in 2010 (‘Protective Edge’) and ongoing attempts of (UNCTAD, 2013: 12–13). The economic right-wing Israeli politicians and activists to decline of East Jerusalem yielded new depths visit and pray at the Haram Al Sharif/Temple of deprivation and neglect; the share of Mount (Ramon and Lehrs, 2014). In Arab families in Jerusalem living under the Jerusalem, grievances have reverberated in a Israeli ‘poverty line’ rose from 64% in 2003 series of individual Palestinian attacks on to 69% in 2009, reaching 79% by 2015 Israeli military and civilian targets, Israeli (JIIS, 2004: Table VI/2; JIIS, 2011: Table police repression in East Jerusalem, racially VI/2; JIPR, 2017: Table VI/1). motivated violence against Palestinians in Soon after construction of the wall in West Jerusalem and a renewed atmosphere of East Jerusalem, the Israeli Ministry of mutual fear and mistrust. Notable among Interior revoked another wave of Palestinian recent events are repeated attacks on residential permits (4577 in 2008 alone; Jerusalem’s light rail system (JLR), estab- B’Tselem, 2015). The threat of displacement lished in 2011 as the first public transporta- spurred a mass influx of Palestinians from tion service connecting East Jerusalem’s West Bank suburbs back into the city, northern Palestinian neighbourhoods and sharply increasing residential density and Israeli settlements to West Jerusalem. In July real estate prices in Palestinian neighbour- 2014, local Palestinian youth from the neigh- hoods (Nasrallah, 2008). In spite of Israeli bourhoods of Shuafat and Beit Hanina van- policies of exclusion and marginalisation, dalised several light rail stations. These Jewish-Israeli efforts to tip the demographic attacks on Israeli infrastructure are highly balance in Jerusalem have failed. Increased symbolic acts in defiance of the ‘representa- Jewish out-migration in the wake of the tional unification of Jerusalem that the JLR first intifada sharply increased the Arab stands for’ (Nolte, 2016: 450), and epitomise proportion of Jerusalem’s population, from the strong national sentiments of the latest 27.9% in 1990 to 31.7% in 2000 and 37.4% uprising. in 2015 (JIPR, 2017: Table III/1). This growth has exacerbated the gap between Functional integration in East Jerusalem’s scarce economic, social and neoliberal Jerusalem physical infrastructure and the demands of its Palestinian population (Alkhalili et al., Facing limited alternatives, Palestinian adap- 2014). tations to the lack of economic opportunity

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Figure 2. Arab employees in Jerusalem’s Jewish sector by occupation. in East Jerusalem reveal shifting patterns of employees working in West Jerusalem’s pri- behaviour and what I term their ‘functional vate sector (MEI, 2016: 16). Israelisation’. While functional Israelisation As during Partial Incorporation, the period takes various forms, in this section I elabo- of Peripheralisation has seen Arab workers in rate on three particular fields of transforma- Jerusalem overrepresented in low-skilled sec- tion: the labour market, education and civic tors. Though they represented in 2015 only status. 28% of the local workforce, they comprise Recent research and data indicate a 71% of employees in construction, 57% in deeper integration of East Jerusalem transportation and 40% in accommodation Palestinians within the Israeli labour market and food service (Shtern, 2017a: 21). However, since the second intifada. Unemployment in in contrast to the first decades of occupation, East Jerusalem and the West Bank peaked some East Jerusalem Palestinian workers have in that period at 28% in 2003, declining gra- entered skilled employment in the Jewish sec- dually to 17% in the West Bank and 12% in tor. The number of Arab academics, managers East Jerusalem by 2010 (UNCTAD, 2013: and other skilled professionals working in 22). Greater reduction in the East Jerusalem West Jerusalem increased from 8% in 1980 to unemployment rate is attributed to residents’ 27%2 in 2010 (Romann and Weingrod, 1991: access to the Israeli labour market 103; Shtern, 2017b: 127) (Figure 2).3 Thus, (UNCTAD, 2013). In 2010–2011, the num- while their dependency upon the Israeli labour ber of East Jerusalem Palestinian workers in market has deepened, new fields of employ- West Jerusalem and other Israeli cities ment have opened to East Jerusalem amounted to 47% of the city’s Palestinian Palestinians, particularly in the service indus- workforce (Shtern, 2017a: 27). An internal try, retail and health services. Notwithstanding poll of private sector employers in Jerusalem persistent conditions of underemployment, conducted by the Israeli Ministry of tertiary-educated Palestinians are gradually Economy and Industry revealed that asserting increased clout in the Israeli labour between 2014 and 2015, there was a 12% market and social sphere. rise in the number of East Jerusalem

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These seemingly contradictory trends of East Jerusalem Palestinians, this process is deprivation and integration must be under- not only expensive, unpredictable and stood within the particular context of East lengthy, it also epitomises submission to the Jerusalem’s ethno-national peripheralisation. Israeli occupation and therefore carries sig- The enhanced incorporation of East nificant negative social implications. Yet, the Jerusalem Palestinians – from the developing construction of the separation wall and the economy of the West Bank into the devel- recent wave of residency permit revocations oped, de-industrialised Israeli economy – has have driven thousands of East Jerusalem indeed brought new employment opportuni- Palestinians to seek refuge in the relative sta- ties (as shown in Figure 2). Yet sectors of bility of Israeli citizenship.5 the Israeli labour market accessible to East The preceding examples of functional Jerusalem Palestinians are undergoing a pro- Israelisation are all connected to the state of cess of rapid neoliberalisation characterised physical entrapment, deprivation and eco- by minimum wage, partial employment and nomic dependency of East Jerusalem insecure employment (Swirski et al., 2016). Palestinians in the period of Peripheralisation. Incorporation has deepened socio-economic In addition, urban neoliberalism and globali- polarisation between Palestinians in East sation in Jerusalem have increased the pres- Jerusalem and Jewish Israelis. Although a ence of East Jerusalem Palestinians in the few thousand Palestinian professionals have Jewishpartofthecity.Thetransitionfrom gained employment in the middle tiers of locally based, personalised retail to globally West Jerusalem’s labour market (as shown themed shopping malls has enabled the ero- in Figure 2), the majority of East Jerusalem sion of ethno-national boundaries and Palestinians now working in the Jewish sec- expanded employment opportunities for tor earn the minimum wage in blue-collar excluded groups in Israel (Marantz et al., and service-industry occupations (Shtern, 2014). Thus, corporate retail outlets in West 2017a).4 Jerusalem now openly cater to Palestinian cus- Another notable social development tomers in a bid to increase profits, and in among East Jerusalem Palestinian youth is a some Jerusalem malls middle-class East growing demand for Israeli higher educa- Jerusalem Palestinians now comprise a sub- tion. This demand parallels the increased stantial proportion of customers and customer number of Palestinian pupils who now pur- service employees (Shtern, 2016). In summary, sue the Israeli bagrut (high school matricula- the peripheralisation ofEastJerusalemhas tion certificate), rising demand for Hebrew been marked by economic contraction, the language instruction in Palestinian schools decline of Jerusalem as Palestinian regional (Hasson, 2015) and the steadily increasing centre and a subsequent dependency on the enrolment of East Jerusalem Palestinian stu- Israeli ‘Centre’, not only as a source of dents in Israeli higher education preparatory income, but also as a functional space. programmes, local colleges and the Hebrew University (Council for Higher Education, Discussion 2016). Finally, functional Israelisation of East The socio-economic history of East Jerusalem Palestinians is indicated by the Jerusalem since 1967 exemplifies a particular relatively dramatic rise in applications for case of political marginalisation that I term Israeli citizenship (Lieber, 2016). Israeli law ‘ethno-national peripheralisation’. During allows permanent residents to apply indivi- the period of Partial Incorporation (1967– dually for citizenship (Lapidoth, 2011). For 1987), the city maintained its central role as

50 Shtern 13 the Palestinian economic, political and cul- national or regional economy. Rather, the tural centre. It was the period of city was excised from the centre of the Contestation (1987–2004), with its failing Palestinian political economy and annexed peace process and two major Palestinian by a distinct Israeli ecosystem. As East uprisings, that diminished the centrality of Jerusalem’s geopolitical amputation moves East Jerusalem. Post-Oslo, conclusive Israeli it towards the Israeli centre, its peripherali- dominance (exemplified through the separa- sation can be understood as a temporary tion wall) has brought the area to new levels stage towards centralisation. However, join- of marginalisation and subjugation; East ing the Palestinian peripheries in Israel, Jerusalem now dwells unambiguously on the Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem can Israeli periphery. expect only limited integration. The ethno- Thus far, the shifting of East Jerusalem national nature of this process frames it from Palestinian centre to Israeli periphery within the strict socio-political hierarchy of has manifested principally in economic and the Israeli ethnocracy (Yiftachel, 2006), functional terms. This is not to imply that thereby limiting its progression towards and social and economic relations between East integration within the Israeli space. Jerusalem and the West Bank have been The process of ethno-national peripherali- eliminated; naturally, these connections are sation, as demonstrated in the case of East not easily eroded. Moreover, as seen in Jerusalem, differs significantly in its logic, recent Palestinian resistance to Israel’s spatiality and structure from neoliberal per- attempt to alter the security regime at the ipheralisation. Neoliberal peripheralisation entrances to the Al-Aqsa Mosque, the politi- entails the socio-spatial marginalisation of cal realm of East Jerusalem Palestinians cities/regions, driven by free-market eco- remains closely tied to the broader nomic reconstruction. It is a relational pro- Palestinian national identity, culture and cess of socio-economic centralisation, social space. Al-Aqsa Mosque remains the binding major cities/regions within a unified central binding and mobilising symbol of regional or national economic system. Palestinian religious and national identity in However, as I have demonstrated in this arti- Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza cle, the economic decline of East Jerusalem (Cohen, 2017). Moreover, ethno-national is a direct result of long-term Israeli policies peripheralisation may serve to reinforce of ethno-national annexation and exclusion. among East Jerusalem Palestinians the polit- The logic behind the harsh peripheralisation ical imperatives of national allegiance and of East Jerusalem within the Israeli space anti-normalisation, and must be viewed in serves Israeli strategic interests in the city, light of their unprecedented level of partici- such as preventing its physical and political pation in recent violent and non-violent re-division, as well as ongoing efforts to action against Israeli security forces and reduce the Palestinian population of the city civilian targets. While resistance to Israeli in neighbourhoods east of the wall. occupation appeared in the city soon after Nonetheless, urban neoliberalism has 1967, analysis of its contemporary resur- played a significant complementary role in gence must acknowledge Palestinian resi- the functional and spatial integration of East dents’ rejection of East Jerusalem’s declining Jerusalem Palestinians into Israeli economic centrality and emerging status as an Israeli and cultural space. Mainly, the privatisation periphery. of public services (e.g. education and medi- East Jerusalem’s peripheralisation did not cal services) and urban spaces (i.e. through take place beneath a single, over-arching consolidation of street-based commercial

51 14 Urban Studies 00(0) activity in private malls) has shifted the logic presence of East Jerusalem Palestinians in of leading private and public institutions in West Jerusalem and subsequent ethnic mix- West Jerusalem. East Jerusalem Palestinians ing in public spaces has challenged tradi- have become desired customers (Shtern, tional patterns of ethno-national division of 2016) and a potential boon to student enrol- space in the city stemming from 1967. ments in the various institutions of higher Second, growing political instability under- education in West Jerusalem (Hasson, 2017). mines the economic vitality of the city as a In East Jerusalem itself, outsourcing to whole. Yiftachel and Yacobi (2003: 673) Palestinian private contractors comprises a write: ‘The production of urban space in convenient mechanism for formalisation of Israeli mixed cities stems from the exclusion- public services in East Jerusalem, including ary Israeli-Jewish national identity, which kupot holim (health clinics), secondary edu- works to essentialize and segregate Arabs cation and public transportation (Shlomo, and Jews.’ I would add that the colonial 2017a). These services were defined by ethno-national logic that brought about the Shlomo (2017a) as sub-formalisation ‘intro- peripheralisation of East Jerusalem reveals duced by state and local market actors with inherent contradictions and limitations. a combination of objectives in mind, includ- Enforced segregation in a unified urban ing those of territorial control; whereas the space is undermined by neoliberal municipal population’s right to the delivery of proper governance and the evolving demands of urban services has been addressed only emerging consumer and labour markets. indirectly and partially’ (Shlomo, 2017a: 12). Tools of urban neoliberalism in the context of ethno-national territorial contestation Conclusions have likewise become useful for control and In this article, I have used the Centre– normalisation – ‘a ‘‘softer’’ manifestation of Periphery metaphor to analyse the socio- state power performed in urban margins or economic and regional decline of Palestinian peripheries’ (Shlomo, 2017a: 12). East Jerusalem from 1967 to 2016. Adapting The preceding examples illustrating the the geopolitics of Jerusalem to the relational functioning of neoliberalism within the context framework of the Centre–Periphery, I have of ethno-national division and colonial control suggested the concept of ‘ethno-national in Jerusalem reflect the flexibility of this logic peripheralisation’. As I have shown, ethno- within a contested urban space. Neoliberalism national peripheralisation in East Jerusalem can serve simultaneously as a governmental differs from the neoliberal peripheralisation tool of ethnic exclusion and territorial control of cities/regions in the margins of the capi- (Clarno, 2017), and as an engine of mixing that talist world in two aspects: structural (logic) undermines spatial purity and ethno-national and geo-political (space). segregation (Shtern, 2016). In structural terms, the ethno-national Abowd (2014) claims that the central peripheralisation of East Jerusalem is a top- ideological position in the Zionist discourse down process of socio-economic marginali- on Jerusalem – that of a ‘mythical space sation derived from policies of territorial which belongs eternally to the Jewish people’ annexation and exclusion. Market forces (Abowd, 2014: 13) – produced colonial poli- play an important but secondary role in the cies that promote the erasure of West inclusion/exploitation of East Jerusalem Jerusalem’s Palestinian past. Yet the process Palestinians as an Israeli periphery. While of peripheralisation has yielded unintended the ethno-national logic enforces (and elicits consequences. First, there is a growing resistance to) urban entrapment, neoliberal

52 Shtern 15 logics draw East Jerusalem Palestinians logics of capital and nationality and the towards the labour market and urban ser- everyday practices that comprise contested vices of West Jerusalem. and colonial relations in urban disputes. Geo-politically, the peripheralisation of East Jerusalem was implemented through Acknowledgements physical demarcation, which excised the city from the centre of one political economy into I would like to acknowledge the Kreitman Institute the margins of a separate ecosystem. This for Advanced Graduate Studies at the Ben-Gurion University in the Negev for providing generous process did not unfold, as was the case in the material support for my studies. I am also thankful peripheralisation of Eastern European cities, to the Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research, for under a single over-arching national or supporting this research. In addition, I am grateful regional economy. The radical transformation for the substantial and constructive criticism made of East Jerusalem’s status was therefore not by Professor Haim Yacobi, and the anonymous only socio-economical, but also more pro- reviewers of this journal. foundly political, therefore bearing dramatic consequences in all spheres of local life. Notes As a conceptual framework, the ethno- national peripheralisation of East Jerusalem 1. Though East Jerusalem Palestinian enrol- ments have increased, this figure still repre- helps to explain some of the radical transfor- sents a small fraction of the total number of mations this Palestinian city has undergone, Jewish and Arab students in Israeli universi- from a Palestinian metropolitan centre to an ties and colleges in Jerusalem (37,041 in 2015; Israeli periphery. This transition coincides JIPR, 2017). with a spectrum of adaptations among East 2. Reference to skilled professionals as ‘non- Jerusalem Palestinians, from functional inte- manual’ or ‘non-service’ workers includes gration to violent and non-violent resistance. four categories: clerical staff, managers, lib- Basing an inductive theorisation on a sin- eral and technical professionals and scientific gle case study risks characterisation of the and academic professionals. framework presented here as overly condi- 3. Approximately half of the skilled workers are Palestinian citizens of Israel who immigrated tional. Further research utilising the Centre– to Jerusalem for education and employment, Periphery metaphor as an analytical tool is due to their civic status, Israeli formal educa- therefore needed to examine additional cases tion and Hebrew language skills (Masry- of nationally contested cities and regions. Herzalla and Razin, 2014). Such research may illuminate the ways that 4. In 2015, the average salary of Arab employ- national and regional territorial policies re- ees in Jerusalem was NIS 6047, less than 70% inforce and challenge neoliberal economic of the average salary of their Jewish counter- reconstruction elsewhere in the world. The parts (Shterna, 2017a: 18). Centre–Periphery framework may also serve 5. According to the Israeli Ministry of the to elucidate cycles of resistance and integra- Interior, since 2003 the number of tion that characterise the adaptations of Palestinians applying for Israeli citizenship rose from a few dozen to more than 1000 deprived societies on the socio-economic and each year (as quoted in Lieber, 2016). The political margins of the developed world. importance of this phenomenon lies not, per- This article also demonstrates the useful uti- haps, in its absolute magnitude (more than lisation of a multi-layered analysis, looking 300,000 Palestinian residents of East critically and reflectively at the adaptations Jerusalem remain without Israeli citizenship), and contradictions between the different but in the unprecedented scale of change.

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57 Cities 52 (2016) 132–139

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Cities

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/cities

Urban neoliberalism vs. ethno-national division: The case of West Jerusalem's shopping malls

Marik Shtern

The department for Politics and Government, Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Israel article info abstract

Article history: Most research on ethnically and nationally contested cities posits that urban spatial segregation trends will re- Received 6 July 2015 main decisive so long as the macro level national conflict persists, and assumes that the neoliberalization of Received in revised form 18 November 2015 urban space would only strengthen such trends. Over the last decade however, and despite the ever deepening Accepted 22 November 2015 national conflict, Jerusalem has seen the emergence of neoliberal spaces of consumption that serve as resilient Available online xxxx spaces of intergroup encounter between Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian-Arab populations. In this article I will ex- Keywords: amine and compare two such neoliberal spaces in Jerusalem, and show how under certain conditions, privatized Divided cities urban spaces can undermine processes of ethno-national segregation. I argue that interactions between members Urban neoliberalism of the two rival groups are challenged and reshaped by neoliberal spaces and that the relocation of the ethno- Segregation national intergroup encounters to privatized spaces of consumption could represent a temporal shift to a class Jerusalem based encounters. Israel–Palestine conflict © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Consumerism

1. Introduction operation in Gaza. In Jerusalem, these events reverberated in a series of violent incidents, police oppression and a wave of fear and mistrust. Jerusalem is commonly described in the literature as a deeply segre- One of the results of the violence was a mass Palestinian boycott of gated city, with a clear geographical boundary separating Jewish-Israeli West Jerusalem retail areas, which was almost absolute throughout from Arab-Palestinian areas. Yet over the past decade it has seen a July and August but gradually tapered off in the latter months of 2014 growing trend of daily encounters between Israelis and Palestinians tak- (Nasrallah, 2014). However, not all of West Jerusalem's commercial ing place primarily in the city's new neoliberal privatized spaces of con- areas suffered to the same extent from the absence of Palestinian cos- sumption. Between 2005 and 2014, the number of Palestinians from tumers. While the largest mall in Jerusalem – Malha Mall – suffered East Jerusalem crossing into West Jerusalem increased significantly. from a near total decline in the number of Palestinian shoppers Their growing presence in West Jerusalem has created new spaces of (Pundaminsky, 2014), in Mamilla Mall any visitor would have been encounter not only in commercial centers (Shtern, 2010), but also in none the wiser. Even at the peak of the urban violence, Palestinian the public transport system (Greenberg Raanan & Shoval, 2014; Nolte and Israeli Jerusalemites still came to shop side-by-side in this Israeli & Yacobi, 2015), parks and even in residential areas (Yacobi & Pullan, luxurious open strip mall. Despite the fact that prior to the events of 2014). These spatial desegregation trends are a far cry from any kind the summer of 2014 both malls were highly popular among Jerusalem- of “urban coexistence”. In many ways they are forced on the ite Palestinian customers, only Mamilla Mall showed a high degree of Palestinians, driven as they are by long-term structural inequality and resilience as a site of intergroup encounter throughout this extremely the severing of East Jerusalem from the West Bank following the con- violent period. struction of the separation barrier (Cohen, 2013). Yet, they have had a This example illustrates the role of commercial centers as spaces of significant impact on increasing daily encounters between Palestinians encounter in the context of a violent ethno-national conflict. It shows and Israelis in West Jerusalem. how neoliberlism through processes of privatization and consumerism The summer of 2014 marked a new phase in Jerusalem's urban con- can influence intergroup spatial dynamics in various and particular flict. The latest round of violence began with the abduction and killing of ways. This paper will analyze the role of neoliberlism in the daily life three Israeli settler youth and a Palestinian teenager from East Jerusa- of a contested Jerusalem and the way it manifests in privatized spaces lem and concluded with Operation Protective Edge, Israel's most recent of encounter. I will also try to explain how different patterns of interac- tions and ethnic inclusivity have been created in each of the malls. To this end I offer an in-depth examination of the patterns of interaction in the two shopping centers, the Malha Mall and the Mamilla Mall, in E-mail address: [email protected]. the years 2008–2014.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2015.11.019 0264-2751/© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

58 M. Shtern / Cities 52 (2016) 132–139 133

Between 2007 and 2014, Palestinian Jerusalemites constituted on (Chiodelli, 2012; Braier, 2013). As a result, the percentage of poor fam- average 25% of the visitors to the Mamilla and Malha malls.1 Based on ilies in East Jerusalem grew from 64% in 2006 to 84% in 2011 (Alyan, the research, I argue that market forces, consumerism and processes Sela, & Pomerantz, 2012). of globalization relocated the intergroup interactions from national The Second Intifada from September 2000 to the end of 2004 left the spaces to the privatized commercial sphere. These new spaces of en- city in a state of trauma and fear. In West Jerusalem, the 26 suicide at- counter challenge the spatial sectarian logic of the nationally contested tacks resulting in 173 deaths (ISA, 2009) led to a rise in Jewish emigra- city. In comparing the two malls, I will show how differences in location tion from the city and caused many Jewish residents to cease contact and security policies create different patterns of intergroup interactions. with East Jerusalem Arabs. In East Jerusalem, Israeli military action left In what follows, I will first review the political–geographical pat- 64 people dead (PCBS, 2006). The Israeli authorities systematically terns of spatial segregation and the conditions under which interactions closed down all Palestinian political institutions, arresting or deporting take place in contested Jerusalem. I will then provide an analytical most of its local leadership (Cohen, 2011). framework to demonstrate how the literature on divided cities and Another dramatic step was the construction of the separation barri- the study of the neoliberal urbanism can be used to understand the na- er, officially called the “Defense Barrier”. Completed in 2005, it was built ture of intergroup encounters in colonial contexts. My contribution to to stop the infiltration of terrorists from the West Bank into Israel. One the research on divided cities will be to demonstrate how a pattern of of the key results of the wall was a brutal physical severing of East Jeru- desegregation can emerge in a nationally contested city even under salem from the rest of the West Bank. It had a crucial impact on the func- conditions of deepening conflict, national resistance and with no politi- tional and economic viability of East Jerusalem as a regional cal resolution in sight. My second conceptual contribution will be metropolitan center. The wall left approximately 80,000 Palestinian res- achieved through juxtaposing the post-colonial discourse on mixed cit- idents of Jerusalem in neighborhoods which are trapped outside the ies in Israel/Palestine with ideas related to neoliberalism and the city. I wall but within the municipal border (Chiodelli, 2013; Shlay & Rosen, will show how even the most persistent ethno-national divisions can 2010; Kimchi, 2006). Overall, the aftermath of the Second Intifada left be temporarily undermined by privatization and the growth of com- Palestinian society in Jerusalem “divided, weak and confused, with a hy- mercialism which give rise to a new mode of daily encounters. Based brid political identity and a question mark hanging over its political fu- on combined quantitative and qualitative detailed field research, two ture,” (Cohen, 2011, 129). This is the context for the current case studies will follow in which I will discuss how the particular char- phenomenon whereby large numbers of Palestinians are crossing the acteristics of the two sites shape the nature of the encounter. I will con- invisible border into West Jerusalem on a daily basis and co-habiting clude with theoretical understandings about the economic and geo- spaces with local Jews. The unequal civic status and vast disparity in ma- political dynamics that are involved in creating spaces of encounter in terial conditions are two of the basic themes underlying intergroup spa- the malls of western Jerusalem, and how these transform the ethno- tial dynamics between Jews and Palestinians in Jerusalem. The presence national logic of space into the capital logic of class-based divisions. of Palestinians in the parks or malls of West Jerusalem is not a sign of voluntary social mixing because it is primarily driven by the lack of de- 2. The terms of engagement: occupation, inequality and violence cent recreation and consumption facilities in East Jerusalem (Nasrallah, in Jerusalem R., personal interview, May 18, 2009).

Power relations between Palestinians and Jews in Jerusalem are un- 3. Conceptual background even on many levels. On a basic level, the inequality between the two populations stems from their different civic status. Soon after the 1967 Research on nationally contested cities has shown how intergroup war, the Israeli government granted every Palestinian Arab that lived encounters are charged with symbolic meaning and are dictated by fl in Jerusalem permanent residency. This quasi-citizenship status created the sectarian logic of the macro level national con ict, thus deepening a two-tiered citizenship system within Jerusalem. While Israelis are full spatial segregation (Bairner & Shirlow, 2003; Boal, 1996, 1999; citizens whose status and residency cannot be revoked, Palestinians are Romann & Weingrod, 1991; Peach, 2000; Shirlow, 2001; Shirlow & only eligible for social benefits and their permanent resident status is Murtagh, 2006). In many divided cities and societies, the political hege- contingent upon proving continuous physical presence in the city. In mony of the dominant group results in policies of forced spatial segrega- practice, Palestinian permanent residencies are frequently revoked tion, which are unfavorable towards the subordinated rival group. (Lapidoth, 2011). Driven by nationalistic or racist motives, these policies are manifested The official Israeli national and municipal planning and development in structural discrimination at the local and national government levels policies for East Jerusalem and its Palestinian residents further reflect (Lemon, 1991). The dominant group, seeking to minimize intergroup “ fi ” and drive this inequality. Two principles underline these policies: main- encounters in order to create puri ed spaces (Sibley, 1988), erects so- “ ” taining a Jewish majority and preempting any likelihood that the city cial, cultural and physical barriers to exclude unwanted elements. On could be divided (Amirav, 2007). Bollens (1998, 2000) termed these a broader level, the lack of secure and diverse transnational topogra- policies “partisan planning”,whileYiftachel and Yacobi (2003) describe phies in contested cities (Pullan & Baillie, 2013) limits the possibilities fl them as those of an urban ethnocracy. of reaching con ict resolution by sustaining and emphasizing inter- The result is acute inequality between the two populations in almost group cultural differences, promoting separate social networks, elevat- all spheres of life, but particularly in physical infrastructure, housing and ing mutual prejudice, and reducing the likelihood of positive education (Rom, Tatarsky, & Maimon, 2014; UNCTAD, 2013). Basic in- encounters (Peach, 2000). It also damages urban vitality and sustain- frastructure in Palestinian East Jerusalem neighborhoods such as ability by maintaining dual urban community facilities and reducing roads, sewage systems, schools and water systems suffer from tremen- the size of the local employment market (Boal, 1999). dous neglect. Discriminatory zoning policies have made it almost im- In Israel, structural segregation is manifested in government housing possible for Palestinians to acquire building permits, thereby creating policies that give rise to separate Jewish and Arab neighborhoods, cities a severe housing crisis and leading to the widespread phenomenon of and settlements and limit Arab urban development in mixed cities unregulated construction. This, in turn, has given rise to the widespread (Yiftachel, 1992, 1994; Yiftachel & Yacobi, 2003). As Yiftachel and “ practice by the Israeli authorities of demolishing Palestinian homes Yacobi write, the production of urban space in Israeli mixed cities stems from the exclusionary Israeli-Jewish national identity, which works to essentialize and segregate Arabs and Jews,” (Yiftachel & 1 The numbers are based on estimations and market polls done by the management of fl both malls: O. Bar Zvi, CEO Mamilla Avenue (2009), S. Ben Shmuel, CEO Mamilla Avenue Yacobi, 2003, 673). In Jerusalem, this approach was re ected in the (2014) and G. Avrahami, CEO Malha Mall, (2008 & 2014). local outline plan by the City Planning Department, titled “Jerusalem

59 134 M. Shtern / Cities 52 (2016) 132–139

2000”. Using multicultural terminology, the plan gave de jure justifica- reconstructed by public–private partnerships (Harvey, 2005, 2012). tion for ethno-national segregation within an Israeli controlled The erosion, undermining and even the elimination of social policies Jerusalem: of welfare societies are creating old-new class divisions which are man- ifested in the transformation of urban public domains. This process has “Within the boundaries of the city of Jerusalem a process of spatial led some scholars to eulogize city life and even to mourn the “erosion of segregation between the various populations inhabiting the city public space” (Zukin, 1996) characterized by the rise of private urban has occurred, and continues to occur. In a multicultural city such as shopping centers at the expense of civic public spaces: “shopping cen- Jerusalem, spatial segregation of the various population groups in ters have replaced political meetings and civic gatherings as arenas of the city is a real advantage. Every group has its own cultural space public life. In that respect, shopping has become not only a practical eco- and can live its lifestyle. The segregation limits the potential sources nomical behavior but also a cultural activity,” (Zukin, 2004,7). of conflict between and among the various populations. It is appro- As in most of the urban centers in the developed world, some attri- priate, therefore, to direct a planning policy that encourages the con- butes of urban neoliberalism have taken hold in West Jerusalem. The tinuation of spatial segregation with a substantial amount of city has seen an unprecedented growth in private and public–private tolerance and consideration.” urban projects over the last fifteen years: in transportation (Nolte & (Jerusalem Municipality, 2004, chapter 7.2.2). Yacobi, 2015), education (Leshem & Paz-Fuchs, 2012) and sanitation The outline plan represents the Israeli municipal policy towards eth- (Osherov & Meniv, 2011). In some cases, the manifestations of nic spatial mixing following the violent clashes of the Second Intifada neoliberlism are shaped by Jerusalem's particular geo-political context. fl (2000–2005). This type of strategy, which aims to diminish potential se- The establishment of a series of malls during the 1990s was in uenced curity risks, has in fact encouraged the reduction of intergroup interac- by global trends but fostered by the terror attacks in western tions in Jerusalem. Boal (2002) suggests that these types of segregative Jerusalem's city business district (CBD). Many of West Jerusalem's retail patterns, once in place, tend to self-reproduce: “the force that is mainly shops and restaurants relocated from the central CBD to new industrial responsible for sustaining the residential pattern is simply inertia. What areas and 12 newly built malls around the city. This process has led to a are meant by inertia are those processes, often self-generated, which sharp decline in business activities in the old CBD. Despite the immense tend to keep people within a restricted life space” (ibid, 595). renovation projects carried out in the old CBD, most Jerusalemites re- In this paper, I use the term “space of encounter” to describe inter- frain from shopping or seeking recreation there, preferring one of the group space-sharing. This term is predominantly used to describe ev- local malls (Yalink, 2011). fl eryday interactions between majority and minority groups in Neoliberalism in Jerusalem is not only in uenced by the city's con- fl multicultural cities (Valentine, 2008, 2010; Wilson, 2011), which tend ictual nature but also by consistent governmental intervention in the to be socially or culturally divided but not nationally contested city's management. Alfasi and Fenster (2005) have pointed out that Je- (Gaffikin & Morrissey, 2011). Public spaces in contested cities can func- rusalem is branded by the Israeli government as a city that belongs to tion as spaces of encounter and of risk, because unlike residential areas, the Jewish nation, as opposed to Tel Aviv which Israel markets as a glob- “ “active and performative qualities of conflicts are located mostly in the al city belonging to the world. They argue that Jerusalem acts as the fi public sphere,” (Pullan & Baillie, 2013, 6). Therefore, in order to adapt capital of Israel, a city with religious, historical and national signi cance, the idea of “encounter” to the violent reality of a city such as Jerusalem, in which the State, via its different governmental ministries, interferes ” I will limit this concept to urban spaces in which personal intergroup in- in local matters, (ibid). While Jerusalem's real-estate economy relies teractions may be absent, yet still create conditions for mutual sight and on Jewish investment (Yacobi, 2012), the municipal budget relies on co-habitation. strong government support and subsidies which constituted around To conclude this section, spaces of encounter between rival groups 25% of its annual budget in 2011 (Choshen et al., 2014). would appear to challenge – from the point of view of research on divid- Tzfadia and Yacobi, post-colonial researchers, have argued that in ed cities – the prevailing ideology and collective tendencies that rein- Israel neoliberalism has gone hand in hand with segregationist policies. force sectarian separation through the purification of spaces (Sibley, They consider neoliberalism to be an institutional force, not 1988; Falah, 1996). Furthermore, a proliferation of spaces of encounter undermining state and government power but rather reinforcing the fi “… in divided cities could undermine the assumption that urban spatial ethno-national discourse of spatial control and puri cation: ethno- — segregation cannot be challenged until the macro-level national conflict nationalism is capable of adapting to myriad threats including global- is resolved (Doherty & Poole, 1997; Boal, 2002). ization, multiculturalism and neoliberalism, and to manipulate these threats for realizing territorial control,” (Tzfadia & Yacobi, 2011, 121). From this point-of-view, the privatized urban developments in Jerusa- 4. Neoliberalism in the Holy City lem represent “local ethno-security discourses and global neoliberal urban policies which do not contradict each other, but are, rather, com- Since the late 1980s, many scholars have examined the ways by plementary, ”(Yacobi, 2012, 1). In light of the research findings, which I which globalization and the spread of the free market economy have will present in the following section, I argue that the consequences of been changing the social and economic structure of urban centers. The neoliberalism are not necessarily in line with governmental segrega- shorthand for these social and economic changes is the term “neoliber- tionist policies. They can, rather, transform the nature of the division alism”. Scholars consider urban neoliberalism to be a key catalyst of new from one which is ethno-national to another which is based on class. class-based restrictions on access to public, residential and commercial spaces (Sassen, 1999, 2006; Smith, 2002). 4.1. Methodology The urban center is a strategically important arena for neoliberal re- forms (Peck, Theodore, & Brenner, 2009). Neoliberal policies have “been In the following section, I will present the results of the urban- directly ‘interiorized’ into urban policy regimes as newly formed territo- geographical field research which I conducted in two shopping malls rial alliances attempt to rejuvenate local economies through a ‘shock in Jerusalem between March 2008–April 2009. The field research in- treatment’ of deregulation, privatization, liberalization and enhanced cluded a field survey which was validated by 19 in-depth interviews, fiscal austerity,” (ibid, 58). Throughout the developing world, urban news reports and ethnographic field observations. The two chosen neoliberalism is reshaping social and political spaces by privatizing mu- study areas for the survey were the Malha shopping mall in West Jeru- nicipal services, leading to social polarization, inequality, and a growing salem and the Mamilla Quarter Mall on the seam-line between East and exclusion of lower classes and minority groups from the ‘right to the West Jerusalem. Both commercial centers are characterized by a sub- city’ as more and more public spaces, especially in city centers, are stantial number of Palestinian customers. Both consist of conflicting

60 M. Shtern / Cities 52 (2016) 132–139 135 and competing layers of identity: Jewish/Arab, Israeli/Palestinian, yet In 2014, the management of the mall estimated that around 10% of they differ in their degree of resilience to the polarization brought the customers on weekdays to 25% during Muslim or Christian holidays about by inter-ethnic violence. (approx. 3000 people a day) were Palestinians from East Jerusalem For the field survey, 125 adults (62 men and 63 women) aged 18 and (Avrahami, G., personal interviews, December 16, 2008, December 28, above were surveyed in the two study areas. The respondents were cho- 2014). sen from the crowd of visitors to both sites, while maintaining an equal Typically, the intergroup encounter at Malha Mall is peaceful. The composition of nationality and gender (Table 1). The questionnaires management has a strict policy regarding racist statements by workers were delivered by an Israeli/Palestinian team of research assistants; all and security personnel, and sees its role as providing security to all vis- questionnaires were included in the study. itors (Avrahami, G. personal interview, December 28, 2014). However, On the issue of space-sharing in commercial sites, the survey used in March 2012, this relatively peaceful co-habitation was breached open and closed questions aimed at assessing the sense of security for when 300 soccer fans of the team “Beitar” surged into the mall after a both populations and their position towards space-sharing with the match, verbally and physically attacking some of the Arab workers. rival community. Given the fact that both study areas are located in The police arrived and dispersed them only after 40 min of violent ram- West Jerusalem, the respondents were also asked about the way they paging (Rosenberg, 2012). This event, though it did not represent the identify the ethno-national territorial identity of the site. daily interactions at the mall, drew a lot of attention in the local and na- The in-depth interviews were conducted with 19 Israeli and Pales- tional media, and marked a new stage in the deterioration of physical tinian professionals and costumers, among them: 2 Palestinian and 1 safety for Palestinians in West Jerusalem (Tatarsky, 2013). Israeli urban planners, 2 Palestinian community leaders, 2 Israeli mall The Mamilla Mall opened almost 15 years later, in 2007. Local news- managers, 1 Israeli sales personnel. Twenty-six hours of ethnographic papers praised the mall as a “step up in the level of commercial net- field observations were undertaken at both sites, using the thick de- works and visual standards in Jerusalem,” (Berger, 2008). The strip scription method (Geertz, 1973). mall is the heart of the Mamilla Quarter: a straight 270 m narrow shop- ping alley with 200 shops that links the busy Agron/King Solomon streets of western Jerusalem's CBD to the plaza in front of Jaffa gate 5. Palestinians at West Jerusalem's Shopping Malls: Two Case Studies (the main entrance to the Old City which is in East Jerusalem). Mamilla's history has always been shaped by the fact that it is located on a border, The Malha Mall (officially called the Jerusalem Mall), was built in just outside the Old City. In its 150 years history, the quarter has served March 1993 in the Jewish neighborhood of Malha in southwest Jerusa- as a space for commercial exchange and social engagement, violent con- lem on the grounds of the pre-1948 Palestinian village al-Maliha. In testation, occupation, colonization and most recently, privatization. 1949 the Palestinian village was re-settled by poor Jewish immigrants Since its construction in the mid-19th century and until the war of and until 1967 it remained in a state of neglect, like many of the run- 1948, the Mamilla neighborhood developed organically as a nationally down frontier neighborhoods in Israeli Jerusalem. During the 1970s, mixed CBD outside the western entrance to the historic Old City of Jeru- the neighborhood (which was officially re-named “Manahat”) was gen- salem (1920–1947). During the 1948 war, the Mamilla Quarter was at trified and merged into a continuum of modern Israeli neighborhoods the heart of a war zone between Israeli, Jordanian and Palestinian forces. (Gonen, 1995). The mall was built in that area, as part of a new urban Following the partition of the city between Israel and Jordan, it became district developed during the 1980s and 90s, with a high-tech small partly a no-man's land and partly a rundown Israeli border neighbor- business district, national soccer stadium, basketball and tennis courts hood. After 1967, the Israeli government expropriated the former no- and the Biblical Zoo. Today, even though as the crow flies the mall is sit- man's land territories in the Mamilla area. Soon afterwards, the author- uated just 400 m away from the southern Green Line, it is in the midst of ities relocated the Jewish residents of Mamilla, and after four decades of a main Western Jerusalem sub-CBD (Image 2). As I will show in the sur- bureaucratic and financial delays, it was rebuilt by a joint public-private vey results, it is also conceived by Palestinians and Israelis as Jewish- partnership – the ‘Karta’ company – which eventually sold it to a real es- Israeli territory. tate entrepreneur, Alfred Akirov, and his company Alrov. In place of the The mall was built and is currently managed by the Azrieli group, old neighborhood, a luxurious quarter arose in Mamilla, including two which as of 2015 owns 13 other major malls in Israel (Jerusalem. luxury hotels, an exclusive luxury residential neighborhood and an azrieli.com). It was planned by Avraham Yaski, a well-known main- open commercial boulevard — The Mamilla Quarter Avenue. stream Israeli architect. Its architectural style has been defined as local The new Mamilla compound was designed by an Israeli star archi- postmodernism (Kroyanker, 2008). The 3-story mall features glass tect, Moshe Safdi, who also designed prominent national institutions, domes, reminiscent of a basilica, and arches that imbue the consump- such as the Holocaust Museum (Yad Vashem) and Ben Gurion Airport. tion experience with religious motifs. The mall is surrounded by a free Like Malha Mall, the compound was designed in a neo-oriental style parking lot and major inner-city roads which isolate it from adjacent (Kroyanker, 2008) with stone domes and arches. Its narrow layout neighborhoods and other sites. The inner space resembles many other and design resembles the restored Jewish quarter, but also integrates malls in Israel and around the world, with a cluster of 200 shops over features characteristic of modern Middle Eastern Arabic architecture. 40,000 sqm, 2 escalators, and transparent elevators (Image 3). The avenue is a hybridization of a street and a mall. It is organically Malha Mall is the most popular shopping center in West Jerusalem, built into the urban realm of the western CBD, but apart from the am- and is also the most profitable mall in Israel. Each day, the mall draws phitheater there are no benches or resting spots along the avenue of an estimated 30,000 visitors, making it one of the most populated public shops and restaurants (Image 5). spaces in Jerusalem. Since its inauguration, the Malha Mall has been Within a few months after opening, Mamilla was drawing more than very popular among middle and upper-class Palestinians from Jerusa- 10,000 visitors per day. Its prime location between the Old City and the lem and even from neighboring Arab states, such as Jordan and Egypt. West Jerusalem CBD, its proximity to 15 hotels located in the city center and its huge underground parking lot made the avenue a popular pe- destrian route and a commercial success. Although Mamilla is clearly

Table 1 an Israeli compound built on expropriated land, on the boundary be- Number of respondents by nationality and site. tween the two parts of the city, its territorial identity is continuously ne- gotiated and contested by the stream of Palestinian customers and Israeli respondents Palestinian respondents ∑ visitors. In 2008, the management of the mall estimated that the num- Mamilla 32 33 65 ber of Palestinian visitors in Mamilla was anywhere between 20% and Malha 30 30 60 25% of the total number of visitors. Like the Malha Mall, Mamilla

61 136 M. Shtern / Cities 52 (2016) 132–139

Table 2 Table 3 Respondents' sense of security by location. Position of Israeli respondents towards space-sharing by location. ⁎ Israelis (m) n1 Palestinians (m) n2 pt Negative Neutral Positive nm p t

Mamilla 4.48 32 4.46 33 .92 .09 Mamilla 22% 22% 56% 32 3.63 .02 2.30 Malha 4.33 30 4.03 30 .12 1.57 Malha 35% 35% 30% 30 2.93

Note: scale: 1–5. Note: scale: 1–5. ⁎ All the T-tests in the paper are based on two-tailed solution. draws Palestinians from all socio-economical levels, but the presence of To further illustrate Malha Mall's conflicting terms of inclusiveness the upper-middle classes is particularly marked (Bar Zvi, O., personal in- towards Palestinians, the findings show that a substantial number of terview, July 20, 2008). The avenue is also a central employment center Palestinians attributed their feelings of exclusion to the security checks for young East Jerusalem Palestinians, which constitute 66% (approx. at the entrances to the mall which are operated by a private Israeli secu- 1500) of the quarter's total sales personnel (Ben Moshe, S., personal in- rity company. Many Palestinian interviewees mentioned that they felt terview, November 14, 2014). as though they were treated with a greater degree of harshness at these checkpoints compared to Israeli-Jewish visitors, and that they were singled out as a potential threat to public safety: 6. The particularities of the two spaces of encounter “When there's a Palestinian attack, let's say, [Palestinian] women Upon analyzing the findings of the field research, I discovered that tend to boycott the mall out of fear that they will search them, like the malls are different regarding their level of inclusivity towards Pales- they do at the airport. Once I took my wife to the mall. As soon as tinian customers. In Malha Mall, Palestinians' sense of security was the guard started asking me all kinds of strange things, I said to lower than in Mamilla, and Israeli shoppers' hostility towards him: ‘excuse me. Stop. Give my ID back. I'm going home. I don't want Palestinians was higher. In what follows, I use interview and survey ev- to spend my money here and be humiliated …” idence to illustrate this difference and point to possible reasons for its occurrence. (Ayub, A., personal interview, April 7, 2009). Broadly speaking, research findings show that during periods of calm in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict both compounds offer the neces- Apart from the understandable appeal for respect and equal treat- sary conditions for relatively peaceful intergroup encounters. In 2008– ment, in between the lines you can also hear Ayub's plea for anonymity. 2009, visitors to both sites indicated a high sense of security (Table 2). Ayub wishes to be treated as just another costumer in the mall without However, the research shows that the respondents' attitude towards the burden of the ethno-national label. He feels that the disrespectful space-sharing underlies substantial differences in the level of mutual and at times aggressive attitude towards him (and his wife) at Malha tolerance at each site. At the Malha Mall, the presence of Palestinians transforms his shopping experience from a neutral consumerist experi- was received much less favorably by Israeli shoppers, when compared ence into a controversial political act. to the latter's attitudes towards Palestinians at Mamilla Mall (Table 3). By contrast, Mamilla Mall has no security checks at the entrance to Palestinian shoppers' attitudes, on the other hand, were overwhelming- the compound which has a positive effect on Palestinians' sense of in- ly positive towards the presence of Israeli shoppers at both sites clusion at the site. Instead, security guards freely patrol the open-air (Table 4). mall. The absence of a security check is also a clear cause of the much The difference between the reactions of the Israeli costumers to the higher degree of security felt by Palestinians there when compared presence of Palestinians can be explained by three particular factors: with Malha. However, Palestinians did not object to the presence of se- geo-political location, security policy and class affiliation. In most curity guards in principle, and explained that security measures that do people's minds, Malha Mall has an indisputable ‘West Jerusalem’ identi- not include checkpoints increase their sense of security in the same way ty. Although it is located not far from the former southern border that they do for Israelis. A Palestinian design student said “the security (‘green line’), today it is an integral part of West Jerusalem, far from guards don't bother me, they are just there,” (interview, 2009). A textile the large East Jerusalem Palestinian centers. When the respondents merchant in the Old City said that the absence of checkpoints is what were asked what in their opinion is the national territorial identity of makes the Mamilla Mall into “…the best mall for Palestinians in Jerusa- the Malha Mall, the vast majority of both populations identified it as a lem,” (interview, 2009). Palestinian respondents' focus on security pol- Jewish territory (Tables 5 and 6). This can explain the objection by icy issues in both Malha and Mamilla attest to the centrality of this issue many of the Jewish costumers to the presence of Palestinians at the in Israeli–Palestinian intergroup encounter patterns. mall. As one of the interviewees in Malha said: “I'd prefer it if they Another key reason for the greater sense of inclusiveness felt by stayed in Ramallah. We can't go there, so why should they come Palestinians in Mamilla is the overwhelming presence of both Palestin- here?” (interview, 2008). ian visitors as well as Palestinian sales personnel. Many Palestinian re- Even Israeli visitors who expressed a positive attitude towards the spondents stated that they “came to visit a friend who works here.” presence of Palestinians at Malha Mall did not base it on a desire for co- The large numbers of Palestinian visitors and salespeople creates a ‘crit- existence, but rather on a respect for the “the constraints of democracy”. ical mass’ which itself becomes an attraction for Palestinian visitors. The For example, an Israeli university lecturer said that “as long as they all ob- most popular argument in favor of Mamilla among Palestinian respon- serve the law, its fine. Everybody needs to shop…” (interview, 2008). An- dents, however, was the compound's proximity to East Jerusalem, the other Israeli teacher said “the Palestinians that come here don't bother anyone. They're human beings just like us. The ‘Arsim’2 bother us more,” (interview, 2008). Both quotes demonstrate the terms under Table 4 which Palestinians can be granted legitimacy by some of the Jews at Position of Palestinian respondents towards space-sharing by location. the Israeli mall: as shoppers or as members of the “decent” middle class that “play by the rules”. Negative Neutral Positive nm p t Mamilla 0% 18% 82% 33 3.93 .002 3.17 Malha 353 7% 90% 30 4.47 2 “Ars” is derogatory Hebrew slang for the Israeli stereotype of a lower class young man, usually dark-skinned and speaking in Arabic-inflected Hebrew. Note: scale: 1–5.

62 M. Shtern / Cities 52 (2016) 132–139 137

Table 5 by both Israelis and Palestinians as a more “global” space. The fact that Territorial identity by Israeli respondents. Mamilla is not perceived to belong to any one national group makes Jewish Hybrid Arab Nm p t more tolerant, profit-oriented policies more likely. Malha, on the other hand, has been identified as a space that prioritizes one ethnicity, Mamilla 72% 25% 3% 32 1.22 .501 .67 Malha 90% 7% 3% 30 1.13 Jewish-Israeli, over the Palestinian rival group. These findings help explain why the latest wave of violence in the Note: scale = 1–3. summer of 2014 affected the two malls so differently. As intergroup vi- olence escalated dramatically culminating in “the Jerusalem Intifada”, Old City and the Arab central business district. Many Palestinians re- the number of Palestinian visitors to Malha declined to almost zero. spondents said that they perceive Mamilla as being on the edge of Pal- This was primarily due to a Palestinian political boycott of West Jerusa- estinian home territory. lem commercial areas in response to Israeli policies as well as to The Mamilla Mall's higher level of inclusiveness in comparison with Palestinians' fear of racially motivated attacks (Nasrallah, 2014). The de- Malha is also reflected in the higher degree of tolerance displayed by cline in the number of Palestinian visitors resulted in a sharp 15% de- Israeli shoppers towards Palestinian shoppers. Unlike Malha, which crease in general retail income (Pundaminsky, 2014). In the months Israelis perceived as Jewish-Israeli, Mamilla was perceived as a frontier following the Gaza ceasefire, the number of Palestinian visitors gradual- site with an international character and a diversity of visitors (Tables 4 ly rose again, but only up to a third of the previous figure (Avrahami, G., and 5). Its location on the main tourist circuit in and out of the Old personal interview, December 28, 2014). City serves to identify it as a tourist destination rather than Israeli The events of the summer of 2014 also had an impact on the revenue home territory, even for local Israeli Jerusalemites. Any tourist coming of businesses in Mamilla Mall. During the summer, some of the com- to Jerusalem will almost inevitably walk through the Mamilla Quarter mercial avenue's shops suffered a 30% decrease in daily income Mall on their way to the Old City through Jaffa Gate, which means that (Dovrat-Mezritz, 2014). However, in contrast with Malha Mall, the de- the number of foreign tourists sometimes exceeds the number of local cline in numbers of visitors was equal among both Israelis and Israeli and Palestinian customers at the compound. In these conditions, Palestinians (Bitton, K., personal interview, November 14, 2014). In ad- being Israeli or Palestinian becomes just another option in this temple of dition, Palestinians did not call for a boycott of Mamilla as they did with global consumption. Malha. The fact that Mamilla faired differently to Malha in the wake of This notion was articulated by both Israeli and Palestinian respon- the events of 2014 is a dramatic illustration of the link between com- dents. Ido, one of the managers of an Israeli coffee shop in Mamilla, mercial resilience and an inclusive geopolitical identity. Mamilla's par- said “the place is like a floating balloon, it's not connected to anything, ticular characteristics, in this regard, have created a more sustainable there are many tourists, and it feels like abroad...” (Halevy, I., personal and resilient space of intergroup encounter. interview, June 3, 2009). Two Palestinian high school students talked about the more inclusive feeling that Mamilla offers as a space of encounter: “the differences between people coming here are not that 7. Conclusion substantial. It brings us together, and almost eliminates the sense of oth- erness... You don't feel the difference and nobody harms us,” (interview, The existence of privatized spaces of encounter is a challenge to the 2009). The heterogeneous character of Mamilla and the gradual rise in ethno-national logic that has shaped segregationist policies and the the number of Palestinian customers has become part of the mall geo-political reality in Jerusalem since the Second Intifada. In both management's sales strategy. In a surprising admission, Shmuel Ben malls, but in Mamilla in particular, the profit interest partially super- Moshe, CEO of the Alrov Israel company which owns the Mamilla Quar- sedes the logic of ethno-national segregation. The malls' owners cater ter, disclosed his role in creating its current social composition: to Palestinians as customers in a bid to increase their profits, but they do so in a context where Palestinians and Israelis are contesting space “I have many Arab workers in the shops. It's intentional. It's because I and sovereignty. want the Arabs that come to the shops to feel at ease when one of In West Jerusalem, where the management of public space is domi- their own is serving them. It was tremendously successful, which nated by the Israeli Jewish collective, it is to be expected that the reloca- was reflected not only in sales, but also in the fact that there is no tion of daily intergroup encounters to newly privatized commercial vandalism or destruction of any kind, or anything like that. Because spaces would, under certain conditions, make those spaces less exclu- when rough (Arab) children see that in the store there's an Arab sively Israeli-Jewish. Thus, while the privatization of civic spaces dictat- manager or a salesperson, they won't damage it, they feel like it be- ed by neoliberal policies has been identified globally with increasing longs to them as well. They respect us and we respect them, and it's restrictions on lower classes and minority groups' rights to the city, it beautiful.” is precisely this process which has created relatively inclusive enclaves (Ben Moshe, S., personal interview, November 14, 2014). for ethnic mixing in western Jerusalem. But this type of temporary in- clusion is possible only for middle class Palestinians and Israelis who Ben Moshe's statement demonstrates that processes of privatization share global consumerist cultural preferences. In this respect, the trans- of public spaces in Jerusalem have given rise to marketing strategies and national nature of neoliberalism temporarily transforms the ethno- policies that are to some degree independent of segregative sectarian national division into a class-based encounter. motives, and in fact have the potential to actually foster intergroup en- In neoliberal spaces, such as Malha or Mamilla, Palestinians are de- counters. While both the Malha and Mamilla malls appeal to shoppers sired by retailers as customers. As a result, Palestinians wield power as on the basis of a global consumerist culture, Mamilla's different security consumers in these spaces, a power that they made full use of during policy and its proximity to the Old City means that it has been marked the summer of 2014. The Palestinian boycott of the Malha Mall in the summer of 2014, and the refusal of Palestinian newspapers to publish Malha Mall ads at this time, is one way in which Jerusalemite Table 6 Territorial identity by Palestinian respondents. Palestinians have been making use of their status as legitimate partici- pants in new neoliberal spaces of consumption and asserting their role Jewish Hybrid Arab Nm p t as urban actors. These developments suggest that although Palestinian Mamilla 18% 76% 6% 33 2.16 b.00001 6.75 participation in West Jerusalem's new commercial centers was initially Malha 77% 20% 3% 30 1.26 motivated by economic dependency and political oppression, the desta- Note: scale = 1–3. bilization of spatial segregation brought about by neoliberalism is,

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65 Chapter 3: Urban Geopolitics of Neighboring: Conflict, Encounter and Class in Jerusalem’s Settlement/Neighborhood

This article was co-authored with Haim Yacobi. It was accepted for publication in July 7, 2018 at the journal Urban Geography.

Abstract

This article examines a unique, yet paradigmatic, case study of a colonial neighborhood in East Jerusalem that is undergoing a significant demographic transformation.2 The French Hill neighborhood, built in 1971, was one of the first settlements in East Jerusalem. Initially, it was populated primarily by upper-middle class secular-Jewish residents. This group has been steadily diminishing as two other distinct new groups moved into the neighborhood: Ultra-Orthodox Jews and Palestinians. This volatile social mix has caused intense inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic collisions. Based on qualitative and quantitative studies, we argue that the juxtaposition of colonial and neoliberal logics of space reveals a shared, yet fragile, middle-class identity. We suggest that this new geopolitical space of neighboring calls for a discussion of political conflict, housing and current colonial conditions that brings class back to our understanding of the production of contested space.

Introduction

“We will arrange street parties on Shabbat and make the Haredim3 understand that they are not welcome in the neighborhood. A Haredi that will come to this place should know that we won't allow him to build Sukkot [religious temporary structure] in the yards. We will insist on a secular environment in the public sphere. As for the kindergartens and educational institutions - we will fight to keep the institutions

2 This article forms part of the research “Patterns of Interaction and Conflict among Palestinians and Israelis in the French Hill” funded by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research.

3 Haredim (plural) or Haredi (singular) refers to various groups of Ultra-Orthodox Jews in Israel, which are characterized by strict religious codes of behavior and rejection of secular culture.

66 Zionist [...] The educated Arabs that live like us and integrate in the neighborhood do not bother me, and as for the Arabs of Issawiya,4 there is a struggle aimed at preventing them from moving into the neighborhood and changing its nature."

Gideon Yegger, Chair of neighborhood council of the French Hill (Kuperman & Landa, 2009)

The French Hill (FH) neighborhood (officially named Giv’at Shapira) was built in 1971 as one of the first Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem.5 For many years it was an upper-middle class, mostly secular-Jewish neighborhood (Gonen, 1994). However, demographic changes since the 1980s have altered the city's ethnic and religious composition, while ongoing Jewish emigration (Choshen et al., 2017, table v/1), has increased the Arab portion of the city's population from 26% in 1967 to 37% in 2015 (ibid, table III/5). Correspondingly, within the Jewish population, the Haredi groups has grown substantially and become the largest Jewish sub-community in the city (ibid, III/19). These changes have transformed the demographic characteristics of several Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem, including FH.

While the veteran residents have emigrated from the neighborhood, middle class Palestinians, especially those with Israeli citizenship,6 and Haredi Jews have been drawn to FH due to low housing prices, good infrastructure and services, as well as proximity to, respectively, Palestinian and Jewish Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) parts of the city. FH became the only residential area in Jerusalem which is cohabited by these three distinct and, until recently, highly segregated communities of the city, namely secular Jews, Haredi Jews and Palestinians (Rosen & Shlay, 2014).

4 A Palestinian neighborhood in East Jerusalem located within the city’s municipal border. 5 The term “East Jerusalem” refers to 70 SQKM surrounding Jerusalem, which were unilaterally annexed by Israel following the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in June 1967. According to international law, East Jerusalem is considered as an illegally occupied territory. In contrast, the term “West Jerusalem” refers to the main Jewish part of the city, which was part of Israel before 1967, and is located today within the “Green Line.” 6 Palestinian citizens of Israel are graduates of the Israeli educational system; thus, they speak very good Hebrew and are accustomed to interacting and engaging with Israeli society. In that respect, they differ significantly in their political and social status from the Jerusalem Palestinians, who mostly are not citizens, but have only a “permanent residential” status in Israel. Most of Jerusalem Palestinians study the Palestinian high-school curriculum, speak poor Hebrew and have minimal contact with Israeli society.

67 Another phenomenon has simultaneously contributed to the changes in the neighborhood: Palestinians from the neighboring villages in East Jerusalem - Issawiya, a-Tur and Shuafat began to make frequent use of the playgrounds, amenities and commercial center in FH (Yacobi & Pullan, 2014). This was observed in recent years as well in some other Jewish areas in East and West Jerusalem (Shtern, 2016; Nolte & Yacobi, 2015; Rokem & Vaughan, 2017). The growing presence of both Haredi and Palestinian residents and transients alike has provoked considerable opposition among the long-term residents of FH. Driven by the fear of demographic transition, local activists and the neighborhood council were drawn into a series of conflicts over spatial and political control, as noted in the opening quotation of this article. Ideological movements and political coalitions were established in reaction to Haredi or Palestinian presence on one hand, and to represent an anti-racist agenda on the other.

In this way, a Jewish neighborhood/settlement with a predominant secular majority, which was integral to the colonization project of East Jerusalem (Yacobi & Pullan, 2014), became ethnically and religiously heterogeneous. This neighborhood intersects the two major conflicts of contemporary Israeli space: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the internal struggle between secular and ultra-Orthodox Jews. As such, we would argue, the FH neighborhood is one of the most paradigmatic sites of contemporary urban dynamics in Israel.

In this article, we present the findings from a questionnaire survey of 195 Israeli and Palestinian respondents, residents of FH. In addition, we have conducted 10 in-depth interviews with active residents from the neighborhood and an analysis of local news reporting, with the aim of describing the main ethnic/religious groups that reside in the neighborhood. This paper conceptualizes the ways in which class affiliations are relevant to the analysis of nationally contested spaces. Based on the case of the FH settlement/neighborhood in Jerusalem, we will demonstrate how ethno-national and class identities are entangled in the framing of new coalitions and territorial positionings in a context of spatial contestation. We aim to study the social order and power relation that has been constructed in FH, not only between the macro political categories of Israelis and Palestinians, but also among social sub-categories: Jerusalem Palestinians, Israeli Palestinians, secular Jews and Haredi Jews. By

68 intersecting these political and social identities we suggest an analysis of the geopolitics of neighboring in a dual context; being part of the colonial project of Judaizing East Jerusalem on the one hand, and an ordinary habitat which embodies transitions of neighborhood succession and opposition, on the other.

We propose that the social category of class should be revisited and understood as a potential sphere of habitation that can challenge the ethno-national divide. Without overlooking the very colonial politics of Jerusalem, we claim that neoliberal restructuring of the Israeli economy has promoted the development of a new middle-class among the two deprived minorities of Israeli society: Palestinians and Haredi Jews. Both are driven by neoliberal ideals, namely a set of political economic practices proposing that human wellbeing can best be advanced by “the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterized by private property rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets, and free trade” (Harvey, 2007, 22). These two emerging sub-groups are drawn to mixed urban localities in which they can actualize their hybrid identities.

Therefore, the main contribution of this article lies in the nexus between urban and political geography. This theoretical combination is built on the understanding that geopolitics is a useful analytical framework for studying the production of space, politics of fear and everyday life in cities (Yacobi, 2009; Rokem & Boano, 2017), and that urban geopolitics is a necessary prism through which to study neo-liberalization, ethno-nationalism and international migration, when the majority of world population is urban (Rokem & Boano, 2017, Luz & Stadler, 2017). In the case of FH, the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian ethno-national conflict and the subsequent Israeli colonial control in East Jerusalem frame the top-down geopolitical outline. On the other hand, the neighborhood itself, as an integral organ of the city of Jerusalem, extracts bottom- up resilient urban logics that adopt or challenge the macro geopolitics (Bollens, 2018).

Importantly, this article employs a new approach towards the study of East Jerusalem. While most urban scholars focus on modes of domination, control and colonial practices (i.e. Shlomo, 2017, Chiodelli, 2016, Dumper, 2014), we also account for the role of "ordinary" urban phenomena (Robinson, 2013; Rosen &

69 Charney, 2016) in the construction of residential space in East Jerusalem. Notwithstanding the colonial apparatus, we emphasize the function of neighborhood transitions, urban neo-liberalism and especially class affiliation as important factors in understanding contemporary urban geopolitics. Therefore, we refer not only to the post-colonial framework, but also to the production of urban spaces in the age of the globalization of neo-liberalism. We live in an era in which Jerusalem appears to have become a "paradigm for urban studies [..] signifier of future urbanisms" (Boano, 2016, 457), where Western cities are being “Jerusalemized,” transforming into sites of not only racial and ethnic collision, but also of re-emerging ethnonational identities (Kinnvall, 2016). Thus, learning from Jerusalem's geopolitics can illuminate hidden or future complexities in global contemporary urban spaces.

This article opens with our theoretical framework, contextualizing the urban geopolitics of FH and its transformation. Here, we will also present how the perception of the role of class has evolved in accumulated literature on nationalism, geopolitics and urban space. In the second section, we will provide a chronology of FH demographic transitions from 1967 until the present. In the following section, we will present the results of our survey and the ways in which Israeli and Palestinian inhabitant groups in FH contest and negotiate its territorial identity. Finally, in the discussion section we will conceptualize the urban-colonial dialectics of FH and the suggested relevance of class affiliations to the study of ethno-nationally contested spaces in a neoliberal era.

Urban Geopolitics, Ethno-nationalism and Class One of the central discussions in urban studies is the interrelationships between the production of urban space and the power relations that shape it. The sub- field of urban geopolitics has stemmed from the study of urban political geography, engaging with the militarization of urban space, security and surveillance in an age of global terrorism (Crang & Graham, 2007; Graham, 2008; Waquant, 2008; Rokem & Boano, 2018). This sub-field has attempted to scale down geopolitical focus from inter-state relations and territorial control to urban arenas and local sites (Fregonese, 2012; Yacobi, 2009). In the last decade, many studies have focused on urban conflicts within ethno-nationally contested cities, especially in relation to the role of urban planning (f.e. Braier & Yacobi, 2017; Gaffikin & Morrisey, 2011; Bollens, 2018;

70 Rokem, 2016). The influential works of Dumper (2005), Bollens (2000) and Pullan (2011), among others, provide illustrations of the powerful - and regularly explosive - links between the drive for ethnic control over national space and the conflictual reality of ethnically mixed cities and regions. Despite extensive discussions of cities and nationalism in general, there have been very limited attempts to engage seriously with the tensions and relations associated with the simultaneous effect of two major structural forces shaping contemporary cities, namely class and ethno-nationalism. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss this matter in depth; however, we refer to the Marxist critique that focused on modernization, industrialization and class classifications as major actors, which influence urban dynamics and urbanization processes that produce and reproduce social stratification and wealth. This position characterized Marxist critique until the 1970s, when the identification of the forces operating in the urban space had changed. This shift points to other factors - in addition to class – that shape the social, political and cultural space of the capitalist city (Castells, 1978). The significant stage in the development of this concept, also referred to as neo-Marxism, suggests that although class should be seen as an important element in understanding urban processes and conflicts, it must be understood as a component within a framework of other identities including gender, ethnicity and race (Castells, 1983, 291). Even the recent seminal work on ethno-national contested cities (Bollens, 2018; Dumper, 2014; Pullan, 2011) has tended to favor issues of national control over the urban dynamics and everyday life in the city, concealed beneath the more visible national surface – a lacuna that this article aims to fill.

In this paper, we emphasize the relevance of urban geopolitical micro-analyses of the neighborhood’s scale, by examining layers of neighborhood transitions, urban cultural-religious contestation (i.e. the Haredi/secular conflict) and the role of middle- class identity in residential spaces, we are advancing a more nuanced understanding of urban processes. Indeed, instead of focusing solely on top-down forces of division and exploitation, we suggest studying the city as “a contested space, as an arena of power relations where also ‘bottom-up’ protest, global forces and a wide spectrum of political institutions (NGOs, [non-governmental organizations], religious organizations, professionals) produce and reproduce urban space.” (Yacobi 2015: 583)

71

Israeli Urban Space and Neighborhood Transitions Since the establishment of the State of Israel, the demographics of Israeli urban spaces have evolved in terms of the tension between ethno-national and economic transitions. Between 1948 and the 1970s most of the Israeli housing market was centralized and regulated by the government. Key planning rationales were (and still are) determined by ethno-national policies of division and territorial control (Yiftachel, 1994), aimed at reinforcing Jewish spatial domination. This top-down imposed and fostered segregation was created along multiple fault lines: ethno-national (Jews/Arabs), Jewish ethnic origin (European/Arabic/Russian/Ethiopian), Jewish religious-cultural identity (secular/Modern-Orthodox/Ultra-Orthodox), ideological (Kibbutz vs. Moshav) and socio-economic (social housing/private compounds) (Tzfadia & Yacobi, 2011). Thus, until the 1970s, residential mobility and neighborhood demographic transitions were limited and marginal (Gonen, 1994).

Significant trends of ethnic and national diversification in the neighborhoods became dominant once the national economy and urban culture entered the globalization era, and the housing market was privatized (Yacobi and Tzfadia, 2017). Nationwide liquidation of agricultural lands, which began in 1991 and were followed by dramatic suburbanization processes, has led to the transformation of the Israeli urban human-scape. While upper-middle-class Jews moved to the new suburbs, other populations entered urban centers in Israel, among them Russian and Ethiopian Jewish immigrants, global labor migrants and African refugees. However, the two most significant groups, which are situated at the center of our discussion, that have profoundly challenged the predominant homogenous nature of middle-class Israeli neighborhoods are Israeli-Palestinians and Ultra-Orthodox Jews.

Palestinian Migration to Jewish Localities Since 1948, Palestinian towns and villages in Israel have been economically deprived and spatially limited (Yiftachel, 1994; Falah, 1996). New Jewish-Israeli towns, such as Carmiel and Upper Nazareth, were established on expropriated Palestinian land in order to strengthen Jewish domination in frontier territories (Hamdan, 2006). Though out-migration from Palestinian to Jewish localities began as early as the 1960s, it has rapidly grown since the 1990s (ibid).

72 While Israeli-Palestinian intra-immigration to Jewish and mixed towns is diverse (Yacobi, 2009), the more significant groups are students and nuclear families (Masry- Herzallah & Razin, 2014). These movements take place due to various push and pull factors: on one hand, shortage of land, insufficient housing and lack of job opportunities in Arab villages and towns (Al-Haj, 2012); on the other hand, relocation for purposes of higher education and search of a higher quality of life (Arar & Haj-Yehia, 2016), as well as liberation from a confining traditional and gendered order (Herzog, 2007).

When Israeli-Palestinians move further away from their hometowns, they may experience disconnection from their communities that may be translated to a loss of identity and belonging (Pullan & Yacobi, 2017). Furthermore, there is evidence that in spite of the growing geographical proximity in the new locations, Israeli-Palestinians retain high social segregation from their Jewish neighbors (Goldhaber, 2007; Blatman- Thomas, 2017). The growing presence of Palestinians in Israeli Jewish and mixed cities has prompted negative reactions from local Jewish residents who fear the loss of domination and the decline in housing prices (Falah, 1996; Monterescu, 2016). Thus, Palestinians in Jewish-Israeli towns face discrimination in housing (Pullan & Yacobi, 2017), as well as local political opposition (Shafir, 2018).

Israeli-Palestinians began to immigrate in considerable numbers to Jerusalem following the occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967. Primarily in order to study at the Hebrew University, some of them settled in the city and composed a solid layer of a middle class, professional and social group. Since they were fluent in both languages they were absorbed in the local labor market, as a “middle-man minority,” mediating between the Israeli establishment and the local Palestinian population (Masry- Herzallah & Razin, 2014). Being neither part of Jerusalem’s Jewish society nor of East Jerusalem’s Palestinian society, Israeli-Palestinians have experienced “double marginality” in Jerusalem (Weingrod & Manna, 1998). As housing densities grew in East Jerusalem and physical conditions deteriorated following the Second Intifada, more Israeli-Palestinians moved to Jewish neighborhoods in the city (Masry-Herzallah & Razin, 2014). Among these, one of the most popular destinations is the FH neighborhood.

73 The Modern Haredi Middle Class Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the Haredi population in Palestine has preferred to maintain territorial segregation of their dwelling spaces by maintaining clear boundaries from the outer, secular world. The spatial division serves as a means for facilitating the socialization of the younger generations into the Haredi society and for the prevention of their exposure and assimilation into the surrounding secular society and culture (Shilhav, 1993; Efron 2003). Thus, for many years most of the Haredi population lived either in Haredi towns or in Haredi enclaves within cities. Yet, due to their ongoing demographic growth (Rebhun & Malach, 2012), Haredi Jews are constantly expanding their residential territories by moving to new locations. This expansion, which takes form alongside a concurrent process of cultural and social introversion, fosters constant territorial struggles with local non-Haredi populations (Efron, 2003).

In Jerusalem, Haredi Jews were always a dominant group among the general Jewish population. However, until the 1960s, they were concentrated northwest of the Old City (Shilhav, 1984). The demographic growth led to spatial residential expansion to adjacent neighborhoods, to Haredi-designated neighborhoods, or to non-Haredi neighborhoods in which housing prices were affordable. In order to maintain the properties of a controlled space, codes of Haredi behavior were imposed on new territories (Gazit, 2010; Rosen & Shlay, 2014). Thus, territorial struggles between the Haredi community of Jerusalem and secular or Modern-Orthodox communities have become one of the dominant features of West Jerusalem's local politics (Hasson, 2002).

In the last decade, scholars have identified sub-current trends of class mobility and Israelization within Haredi society (Cahaner & Mansfeld, 2012; Zicherman & Cahaner, 2012). The introduction of smartphones and exposure to the internet have undermined the imposed information closure on community members, alongside a growing tendency towards consumption culture. Economic demand for better employment has led to the formation of a new social layer of integrated modern Ultra- Orthodox. These modern Haredi groups prefer to live in mixed localities, on the edges of classic Haredi neighborhoods, where they alternate between Haredi facilities and non-Haredi services (Ibid). However, despite their modern character, their presence in

74 non-Haredi residential urban spaces is still perceived by many secular residents as invasive and domineering (Shteinmatz, 2016).

A Colonial-Neighborhood in Transition

Following the War of 1967, the Israeli government unilaterally annexed East Jerusalem, expanded the municipal boundaries and applied Israeli law to all of the city. These measures were taken despite international objection and lack of recognition. Beyond Israeli rhetoric representing Jerusalem as a unified city, the planning policies have contributed to the paradigm of a colonial city (Pullan & Yacobi, 2017). Both the state and the city pursue these policies, which have persistently promoted the expansion of Jewish political, territorial, demographic and economic control to all parts of the city.

As already discussed (Yiftachel & Yacobi, 2002; Dumper, 2014; Shlomo, 2017), Israel has used its military might and economic power to relocate borders and boundaries, grant and deny rights and resources, shift populations and reshape the occupied territories to ensure Jewish control. In the case of East Jerusalem, two complementary strategies have been implemented by Israel: the massive construction of an outer ring of Jewish neighborhoods (including FH), which now houses over half of the Jewish population of Jerusalem, and the containment of Palestinian development, implemented through housing demolition, the limited issuing of building permits, the establishment of national parks along the edges of areas of Palestinian habitation and the prevention of immigration to the city. Furthermore, Israel has also maintained control of most infrastructures, even those that serve the Palestinian population such as major access roads (Dumper, 2014).

It is within this colonial logic that an analysis of FH’s transformation should be understood. In July 1967, the Israeli Prime Minister's office began planning the first settlement strip in East Jerusalem, including four Jewish neighborhoods that created physical continuity between Northwest Jerusalem and the former enclave of Mount Scopus – Ramat Eshkol, Maalot Dafna, Giv'at Hamivtar and FH.

75 As noted by Yacobi and Pullan (2014), the initial demographic goal for FH was to house 2,400 Jewish families. This number increased later due to a decision to allocate 37 dunams (approx. 9 acres) for the expansion of the Hebrew University campus. Public buildings were located on the eastern slope of FH and the housing zones were designed around the hilltop. The design scheme proposed separation of cars from pedestrians, and most housing units were planned in four-story buildings. At the time, many of the planning decisions reflected a cutting-edge approach to modern housing.

In December 1969, the Rogers’ Plan (named after US Secretary of State William Rogers) was published, calling for a shared administration of Jerusalem by representatives of the three main religions. This recommendation was rejected by the Israeli authorities and as a result the plans for low-rise housing in FH were pushed aside and three to four floors were added to each building, in order to intensify the Jewish presence in East Jerusalem (ibid). The new neighborhood included a Palestinian enclave of former Palestinian refugees who fled their village, Lifta, in West Jerusalem during the 1948 War (Morris, 1989: 76), and resettled on their own properties north of Jordanian Jerusalem. The “Liftawee compound” has grown and developed during the years and became a relatively prestigious Palestinian sub- neighborhood in East Jerusalem, attached to FH (Figure 1).

The neighborhood was initially designated for upper-middle class Jews and many of the establishing communities during the 1970s were either immigrant Jews from North America and Western Europe or families of Hebrew University faculty (Al Hamishmar, 1968, Gonen, 1994, 58-60). In socio-political terms, they were related to the Israeli establishing Ashkenazi, liberal and secular hegemony (Kimmerling, 2001). However, during the events of the First and Second Intifadas (1987-1991; 2000-2004), FH was caught in the "line of fire" between Israeli security forces and Palestinian protestors from its surrounding villages. The university and the road junction at the entrance to the neighborhood were both targets of terroristic attacks, and the overall sense of security in the neighborhood diminished (Savitch, 2005). Property values declined, the affluent establishing communities began to emigrate, and the neighborhood entered a new demographic period of ethnic and national hybridization. Thus, in the last two decades, the diminishing establishing

76 upper-middle class secular-Jewish population of FH, was joined by two distinct new groups: Haredi Jews and Israeli-Palestinians.

Official data indicates that in 2015, the number of inhabitants in FH (including the Liftawee compound) was 7,241, of which 78% were Jewish inhabitants, 18% were Arabs (Muslim, Christians and Druze) and 4% were non-Arab Christians and others. (ICBS, 2017). There is no official data regarding the exact size of the Jewish Haredi community in the neighborhood. However, there are sources that can indicate their current extent. In the national elections of 2015, 6.3% of the neighborhood residents eligible to vote had voted for Haredi parties (Choshen et al., 2015, table XVI/22). Also, according to the Jerusalem municipality, in 2016, 28% of the children living in FH went to Haredi kindergartens (Jerusalem Municipality, 2017). Overall, we estimate that in 2017, FH's population was grossly composed of: 55% - secular and traditional Jews; 20% - Palestinians (Israeli and Jerusalemites); 15% - Ultra-Orthodox Jews; 5% - National-Religious Jews and 5% others.

French Hill Revisited

With this background in mind, we now present the results of our survey, conducted between June 2016 - October 2017. The research included a questionnaire survey in Hebrew and Arabic. Respondents to the questionnaires were residents of FH, composed of 195 adults, 110 Jews and 85 Palestinians. Among the Jewish respondents, 74 were secular Jews7 and 36 were Haredi Jews. Among the Palestinian respondents, 52 were Israeli-Palestinians and 33 were Jerusalem Palestinians. Of the questionnaires, 48% were distributed in a digital version through email lists and Facebook groups, and 52% were manually circulated and delivered by an Israeli/Palestinian team in the local commercial center.

The choice to divide the respondents into these four social/ethnic groups stems from our extensive observation that these categories represent the main dominant socio-political divisions in the neighborhood. However, it is important to note that secular Jews, Haredi Jews and Israeli-Palestinians are all Israeli citizens, relatively

7 Including traditional (“Masorti”) Jews.

77 accustomed to the Israeli social space and live in mixed residential buildings. Jerusalem Palestinians, on the other hand, are not Israeli citizens, they live in a politically and socially isolated environment and geographically reside in a segregated compound at the southern end of the neighborhood ('The Liftawee Compound').

The survey used both open and closed questions, aimed at assessing the attitude and sense of belonging of the respondents to the neighborhood, and the quality and quantity of their social relationships with other group members. Thus, the questionnaire related to issues regarding the residents’ motivations for choosing to live in the neighborhood, their level of satisfaction from various factors as well as services provided in the neighborhood and their social relations with both their in- group and with out-groups’ residents.

Ten in-depth interviews were conducted with Israeli and Palestinian residents of FH, which represent the various social sub-groups. In addition, we used textual analysis and archival investigation to examine written sources about FH. This entailed coding for emerging and recurring themes and categories (Charmaz & Mcmullan, 2011). Acknowledging the limitations of our non-representative survey, we have employed a mixed methodology (Johnson et al., 2007). The integration of fieldwork and the quantitative survey serves to strengthen both methodologies, avoid holistic fallacies and clarify as well as validate the results of each analysis (Sieber, 1973).

The Search for "Quality of Life" As shown in earlier studies (Masry-Harzzallah & Razin, 2014; Yacobi & Pullan, 2014), many Israeli-Palestinians choose to live in FH due to its relatively high standard of living, its seamline location between East and West Jerusalem and its proximity to the Hebrew University and the Hadassah Hospital. Our survey shows (Table 1) that the dominant factor in the Israeli-Palestinian respondents’ choice to live in FH was "quality of life," followed by location-related factors as secondary motivations to move into the neighborhood. Moreover, the profile of the Israeli- Palestinian respondents reflects an upper-middle class socio-economic status: 84% of them have tertiary education qualifications and 46% hold academic and professional occupations.

78 A dominant theme among our Israeli-Palestinian respondents was their deliberate choice to live in a Jewish neighborhood. Many of them tend to consume community services in the neighborhood community center, take part in recreational events and some even send their children to the local Jewish kindergartens and elementary school (L.E., personal interview, September 20, 2017). H., an Israeli- Palestinian employed in an Israeli government ministry, is an example of a highly integrated Israeli-Palestinian inhabitant of the neighborhood. She told us that FH is the only place in Jerusalem in which she and her family can live:

There's a large concentration [in FH] of Arabs from the north, and I never thought about living elsewhere in East Jerusalem. It's a different population, [elsewhere in East Jerusalem], different customs, they teach [at schools] the Jordanian curriculum and the living conditions there... [are] not even worth considering.

(H., personal interview, October 3, 2017).

Many of our Israeli-Palestinian respondents stated that they have good relations with their Jewish neighbors, and that they do not experience overt racism in their daily lives in the neighborhood: "A relationship of good neighboring"; "Few (inter- group) connections, but good relations with our Jewish neighbors based on mutual respect." However, it seems that tolerance ends when it faces formal real-estate acquisitions. FH as a Jewish residential space holds considerable obstacles for them. As Yacobi and Pullan (2014) have shown, Palestinians who try to rent or buy an apartment in the neighborhood face discrimination, avoidance and are even expected to pay an additional fee for competing with Jewish buyers. Furthermore, Israeli- Palestinians have no designated educational or community services in FH. If they wish to send their children to Arab kindergartens or schools they must send them to one of the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem (N. K., personal interview, August 19, 2017). Thus, for Israeli-Palestinians scaling up in Jewish-Israeli localities such as FH – means not merely socio-economic mobility, but a process which constantly reveals their structural inferiority as Arab-Palestinians within the Israeli social space.

Our findings show a striking similarity in the socio-economic profile and residential preferences of the Israeli-Palestinians and Haredi Jews. Interviews with Haredi residents show that most Haredi inhabitants of FH are part of the rising Haredi

79 middle class (Zicherman & Cahaner, 2012). They are attracted to the neighborhood not only because of the lower housing prices and good services, but also since principally they prefer to live in a mixed locality (Table 1). Until recently, Haredi Jews did not receive designated educational services in FH. Only after a prolonged political campaign against the neighborhood city council and a mediation process did they managed to achieve in 2017 a legal status for two Haredi kindergartens (FHNC, January 31, 2017). The profile of our Haredi respondents indicates that a high percentage (61%) are engaged in "secular" occupations, such as university students, high-tech engineers and lawyers. As quoted in the previous chapter, modern Haredi Jews are drawn to neighborhoods with diverse populations, which allow them to alternate between both worlds. E., a Haredi resident, suggests that these preferences are related to notions of individualism and a search for privacy:

We are the type of people who don't want to live in a Haredi Chulent pot [traditional Jewish dish], but prefer to live in a quieter area, an area which is not completely Haredi. We're not looking to live with hilonim [secular Jews], but seek a place where each family can live independently, within itself, rather than a place where everyone interferes in everybody else's lives.

(E. E., personal interview, September 25, 2017).

Albeit major differences in their ethno-nationality and political position in Israel, as shown in Table 1, the search for a residential space with good "quality of life" was a major drive for both Haredi Jews and Israeli-Palestinians to settle in the neighborhood. Other influential factors are related to the neighborhood’s location, its housing prices and diversity. It seems that the sociological context of the immigration of both groups to FH, relates to modern ambitions for freedom from traditional community boundaries. However, as we will show in the following section, the Haredi presence in FH fosters greater resentment and active political rejection by the Jewish secular group.

Fearing Diversity Secular Jews are the largest demographic group in FH. Among them are the most veteran families in the Jewish neighborhood. To this day, this group is characterized by a high socio-economic status and Zionist-liberal political

80 tendencies.8 In the last decade, a renewed wave of immigration of young secular Jewish families has somewhat revived this community (N. K., personal interview. September 19, 2017). Nonetheless, aging and emigration have diminished their ratio in the neighborhood throughout the years.

The growing presence of Palestinians and Haredi Jews in the neighborhood has instigated diverse reactions from the secular Jewish majority. Despite their similar demographic size, it seems that the Haredi presence is perceived as a much more threatening "invasion" than that of the Israeli-Palestinian. In the survey, most secular Jews reported minimal social connections and expressed negative reactions to inter- group encounters with both Haredi Jews and Muslim Arabs, however, the extent of social segregation and negative reactions was slightly greater towards the former group than towards the latter (Tables 2 and 3.)9

Moreover, the dominant theme among secular Jewish respondents revealed a clear distinction between their reactions to both communities:

We have good neighboring relations, but not with the Haredim. They don't give (you a) good feeling. They make you feel uneasy, not wanted. We have excellent relations with the Arab population that lives in the neighborhood and is educated in our schools/kindergartens. This is one of the most valuable things that are happening here. Unfortunately, this co-existence happens less with national-religious people, and not at all with the Haredim.

As one of the leading Jewish liberal activists in the neighborhood explained:

Everyone has their limits regarding pluralism. The secular community is terrified of the Haredim, but willing to accept the Arabs. They (the Israeli Palestinian residents) are very close to us culturally.

(C. B., personal interview, August 27, 2017).

An analysis of local news reports and protocols of the neighborhood council (French Hill's Neighborhoods Council) also demonstrate that the main political efforts

8 This is evident in the fact that in the last elections, the most popular national party was the Israeli Social Democratic Party – the Zionist Camp (JIPR, 2015: table XVI/22). 9 When we conducted the survey, we asked the respondents to characterize their relations with five groups according to their religious identity (which seemed most relevant at that stage): Secular Jews, Religious Jews, Haredi Jews, Muslim Arabs and Christian Arabs. However, after analyzing the results, we chose to divide the respondents into the current main four sample groups: secular Jews, Haredi Jews, Israeli-Palestinians and Jerusalem Palestinians. This explains the unique group juxtapositions of Tables 2 and 3.

81 of the secular Jewish members were devoted to diminishing what they perceive as Haredization - a complete succession of the neighborhood by Haredi residents.

The secular Jewish majority of the neighborhood council has politicized its activities since the late 2000s, mobilizing the Community Center's assets as part of the struggle against Haredi succession. Activities such as a campaign using street advertising that portrayed women of the neighborhood (Zorea, 2017), organizing Shabbat cultural events (Malcov, 2012) and rebranding the neighborhood as a university quarter (FHNC, April 29, 2013), were all directed to sketch FH as a secular space, therefore unsuited for Haredi residents. This was the reaction of Elie Rosenfeld, the chair of the neighborhood council since 2013, regarding the municipality's designated budget for Haredi cultural events:

My terms are clear - these activities will not take place in FH, but in Ramat Eshkol only. If I would be pressed to start these activities in FH, and I would see that it is advancing towards here, I would consider this as a red line and I would cancel everything. (FHNC, March 3, 2014).

As part of a larger diminishing ex-hegemonic minority of secular Jews in Jerusalem (Hasson, 2002) the secular Jews of FH fear a demographic transformation similar to other formerly secular neighborhoods. The fear of 'Haredization' in many ways overshadows other inter-group collisions.

Choose Your (Urban) Battles As shown in our study, secular Jews and Israeli-Palestinians have both reported positive neighboring relations. However, in the survey's closed questions, while Israeli-Palestinians reported a relatively significant average of social connections with secular Jews (Table 2), and a relatively positive influence of their daily encounters (Table 3), the secular Jewish respondents have evaluated the same inter-relations negatively in both questions. This apparent contradiction between the qualitative and quantitative results can be explained with an overall non-distinction of the secular Jewish respondents between the different Palestinian groups in the neighborhood. As portrayed by one of the secular Jewish respondents in our survey regarding the daily presence of the transient local Jerusalemite Palestinians in FH's public spaces:

As someone who grew up in the neighborhood, I witnessed the downfall of the neighborhood, from a prestigious and clean place, with well-kept gardens, a sense of

82 security and views to the Judean Desert, into a frontier neighborhood which has a public space that is controlled by gangs of Arabs from Issawiya, Shuafat and Anata. The over-tolerance and liberalism of the population has led to the theft of the public space. This is a suicidal liberalism.

Indeed, these relations between Jewish residents of FH and the adjacent Jerusalem Palestinian neighborhood – Issawiya, take place within the context of ongoing volatile interactions and daily encounters in public spaces. The two communities are divided not only along opposing ethno-national identities (Israeli- Jews vs. Palestinian-Arabs), but also along clear socio-economic cleavage and contradicting cultural affiliations. The former being composed of mostly middle-class westernized-liberal Jews and the latter of impoverished and conservative Muslims (Issar, 2016, 14-17). In times of political upheaval, the open space between the Jewish neighborhood and the East Jerusalem Palestinian village becomes a potentially explosive frontier, a clashing zone between Israeli security forces and Palestinian demonstrators (Ibid, 51). As such, many Jewish residents of FH see the village as a source of political violence, criminal activities and sexual harassments, which is "invading" the neighborhood (Malcov, 2010).

Nevertheless, the neighborhood’s commercial center provides services to many Issawiya Palestinians who regularly use the post office, bank, supermarket, cafés and restaurants. In the last decade, Palestinian presence in the commercial center has become so dominant, that currently some of the businesses in the center are operated by Palestinians and address both groups (N. K., personal interview, August 19, 2017) (Figure 2).

The Jewish population of FH is divided regarding the Palestinian presence. In July 2014, racist Jewish activists burnt down a kindergarten classroom in the Bilingual School in south Jerusalem. Following the incident, some 50 Jewish and Arab families from FH formed a local bi-national community called Ma'an-Yahad (meaning “together” in Arabic and Hebrew). The group celebrates inter-faith holidays together and lobbies to include Arabic language classes in the Jewish elementary schools in the neighborhood (A. H., personal interview, October 6, 2017).

In contrast to the inter-ethnic solidarity reflected in the actions of the bi-national group, for some other Jewish groups Palestinian presence is seen as a threat to the "Jewish identity" of the neighborhood. They emphasize the ways in which

83 Palestinians, both Israeli and Jerusalemite alike, undermine its Jewish character and incite Jewish emigration. The dominant group among these extremists is the national- religious community, called Nofet Tzofim (idiom for gentle and pleasant). Derived from a religious ethnocratic ideology, this group has constant disputes with the community center’s secular management and with the bi-national community (N. K., personal interview, August 19, 2017). Nofet Tzofim conducts frequent cultural and religious events characterized by Jewish Orthodox contents. They have identified the commercial center as a space that requires enhanced Jewish presence. For that purpose, they initiated a series of Jewish-religious concerts in one of the local cafés throughout the winter of 2017 (S. S., personal interview, September 26, 2017). In their Facebook page description, they wrote:

We chose the FH neighborhood because of the unique challenges that face Jerusalem, and FH in particular: emigration of young families, alienation from the city… and the absence of appropriate religious education in the neighborhood and emigration of Jews. In addition, FH is a borderline neighborhood, and is unpopular due to security problems in recent years. We are working to strengthen the sense of security in public spaces, with an emphasis on strengthening the commercial center (Nofet Tzofim, 2017).

Ma'an-Yahad and Nofet Tzofim reflect opposed reactions of residents to the changing ethno-national human-scape of FH. While the first group aspires to normalize its bi-national character, the latter fights for Jewish spatial dominance. However, it seems that political tensions mostly take place among local activists and in neighborhood council discussions. As noted by our interviewees and respondents, daily neighboring relations between the different group members are usually calm and ordinary – and in general, the inhabitants of FH are satisfied and content with their place of residence. This exemplifies the ongoing tensions in FH between ordinary middle-class daily life and the sensitivities over ethno-national territorial identities in Jerusalem.

In summary, our investigation has revealed the ways in which various groups are contesting and negotiating the territorial identity of FH. It has become a space of mixed residency and daily encounters of diverse Israeli groups that live mostly in segregated enclaves. Concomitantly, its initial ethno-national logic as a Jewish urban settlement in East Jerusalem still dominates its political hierarchies and power structure.

84 Towards Israeli Urban Geopolitics

Our geopolitical analysis of the FH neighborhood/settlement reveals its inner ethno-national and cultural stratification of power. Since its establishment, the hegemonic group in the neighborhood has been the secular Jewish community. As a demographic majority, they dominate the neighborhood’s council, and throughout the last decade they have leveraged their political power in an effort to maintain their control and cultural hegemony. Yet since the 2000s, the group's stronghold has been contested by the new rising actors – the religious Jewish communities (National- Religious and Ultra-Orthodox). These groups diversify the territorial identity of the neighborhood and challenge the secular-liberal hegemony.

The various Palestinian groups hold an inferior position of power and their political position correlates to their level of integration within the Israeli systems. The community of Israeli-Palestinians is the more privileged group (in relative terms). They live amidst the Jewish population, use its social and educational services and claim cultural recognition through the introduction of Arabic language classes to the elementary school and the celebration of Muslim holidays in public community events (though this only happens through a mutual Jewish-Arab civic cooperation). The Israeli-Palestinian residents are perceived as sharing a similar class affiliation by the secular Jewish majority, and are not seen as undermining the cultural status-quo. In contrast, the Jerusalemite Palestinians are perceived in more negative terms. They use the commercial and physical infrastructure of the neighborhood, and their presence, albeit mostly transient, is perceived as invasive and threatening by some of the Jewish population. As non-citizens, these Palestinians are of a poorer background, and are seen as disruptive to the middle-class identity as well as to the Jewish-Israeli territorial character of the neighborhood.

Geopolitically, FH embodies two parallel political typologies: by its initial logic, it's a settlement, an integral part of the colonial project of Judaizing East Jerusalem. By means of zoning, social services and budget allocation, it is designated for Jewish residents, while non-Jews are not eligible for particular public community services or institutions. However, as part of the urban realm of Jerusalem, it also functions as an "ordinary" neighborhood, where daily access and residency (by rent or

85 by ownership) are unregulated, thus subject to the Israeli housing free-market dynamics.

As a neighborhood, the gates of FH are open to Palestinian daily users and residents. This locality is also influenced by other urban dynamics that take place in West Jerusalem, such as Haredi territorial expansion and secular emigration. Within the settlement-neighborhood dialectics, ideological groups that are active in FH attempt to influence and shape the neighborhood’s territorial and cultural identity. The national-religious group Nofet Tzofim strives to drive the place back to its initial colonial logic, through religious Judaization. In contrast, the bi-national community Ma'an-Yahad campaigns for the neighborhood’s urban nature by normalizing Israeli- Palestinian co-residency.

FH is located also in a “socio-economic junction,” as a middle class residential space offering a relatively high standard of living (in Israeli terms). It has become an affordable neighborhood for the emerging Israeli-Palestinian and Haredi middle- classes, which prefer to live on the physical margins of their home territory. Our survey displays that both populations are attracted to the neighborhood’s "quality of life" and physical infrastructure, which are more developed and better maintained in comparison to Palestinian or Haredi neighborhoods in Jerusalem. The class identity shared by most residents provides enough common ground for peaceful neighboring, while maintaining social group boundaries. The secular hegemonic group therefore expresses an inclusive attitude towards the Israeli-Palestinians because of their cultural suitability, perceived as sharing similar class values.

However, it seems that middle-class Haredi residents are not perceived as part of the same socio-cultural class and the Jewish-secular hegemonic majority views them as a political and cultural threat. We assume that the difference in attitude derives from the different political status of the two new communities. While the Israeli-Palestinians have no organized leadership, and make no demands for political control, the Haredi group in the neighborhood has political claims backed by its political power in the municipal arena. Thus, the Israeli social order of a Jewish dominated hierarchy frames ethnic and class relations in the neighborhood.

We suggest that the underlying logic of this process is defined by the social transitions of the neoliberal era, in which "individual freedom is redefined as the

86 capacity of self-realization [..] with human behavior reconceptualised along economic lines" (Leitner et al., 2007, 4). However, our study shows that while neoliberalism reconfigures spatial segregation and the ethnic division of social classes, it does not undermine the overall ethno-national hierarchies of Israeli society.

Conclusions

In this article we proposed an urban geopolitical analysis of FH - a settlement/neighborhood in East Jerusalem. Based on a survey and extensive fieldwork, we demonstrated the ways in which, in the wake of considerable demographic transitions, FH has become a junction of two dominant axes of Israeli socio-political contestations: the Israeli-Palestinian ethno-national conflict and the secular/Haredi hegemonic struggle. In this unique intersection, the category of class affiliation has evolved as a crucial factor in the understanding of the negotiation of space between predominant rival communities that found themselves sharing the same residential space. In light of the ongoing immigration of both middle-class Palestinians and Haredi Jews to predominant Israeli Jewish (non-Haredi) cities, we propose that FH is a paradigm for future Israeli urban spaces. It illustrates the need to promote more nuanced analyses of micro-urban geopolitical study cases that can demonstrate the important juncture of neoliberalism, colonialism and ethno- nationalism in contemporary urban spaces in Israel and worldwide.

The study of ethnic conflicts tends to focus on state borders and national territories, ignoring the relevance of such analyses to the urban realm. In this context, some researchers (Newman, 2006) propose that the impact of borders and territoriality is not diminishing; rather, new scales of territorial affiliations and borders are recognizable, which may be flexible but are still selective on a different geographical scale. Indeed, we can conclude that it is necessary to focus on the geopolitics of neighboring in the study of cities. Furthermore, urban geopolitics differ from discussions of international relations and conflicts, or of the roles of military acts and wars in producing space. Rather, urban geopolitics refers to the emergence of discourses and forces connected with technologies of control, patterns of internal migrations by individuals and communities, and the flow of cultures and capital (Yacobi, 2009; Fregonese, 2012; Rokem & Boano, 2017).

87 The urban geopolitics of FH shows the relevance of class, as a dominant neighboring inter-ethnic identity, for the highly politicized geographies of the colonial neighborhoods of Jerusalem. We argue that further study of ethno-nationalist cities should relate to socio-economic class affiliations of people, groups and spaces as crucial factors in the analysis of urban domination and colonialism. Throughout history, cities have functioned as socio-political arenas where different classes, ethnic groups, migrants and "strangers" interacted (Bauman, 2013). Indeed, situations in which "strangers become neighbors" (Sandercock, 2000) are highly political and involve protests, violence and sometimes acceptance – these experiences have become embedded within urban life.

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94 Yacobi, H., and Pullan, W. (2014). The geopolitics of neighborhood: Jerusalem’s colonial space revisited. Geopolitics, 19(3), 514-539. doi:10.1080/14650045.2013.857657.

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Yiftachel, O., and Yacobi, H. (2002). Planning a bi-national capital: Should Jerusalem remain united? Geoforum, 33(1), 137-144.

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Zorea, A. (2017, March 13). The French Hill: Image installations of neighborhoods' women residents. Kol Hair (Hebrew).

95 Appendixes

Figure 1: The French Hill and surroundings (Cartography: Dafna Shemer, JIPR)

96 Figure 2: The French Hill and Refugee Camp Shuaafat (Photography: Marik Shtern)

Figure 3: ATM at the French Hill commercial center (Photography: Marik Shtern)

97

98

99 Discussion In this dissertation, I have systematically characterized the geographies of encounter between Israelis and Palestinians in post-Oslo Jerusalem. My empirical analysis focuses on three spaces of interaction: consumption, labor and housing. Through corresponding case studies, I examine not only patterns of interaction, but also the structural forces that shape the spatiality, quality and power relations of inter- group encounter. As such, my theoretical examination emphasized the interplay between neoliberalism and ethno-nationalism as the prevailing political, economic and cultural logics in the construction of power relations in Jerusalem. My principal aim was to describe the relationship between these simultaneously contradictory and complementary urban forces. In this chapter, I conclude my empirical and theoretical findings and elaborate on the contribution of my research to the literature on neoliberalism in contested ethno-national cities, geographies of encounter in the context of ethno-national dispute, and, in particular the growing literature on the geopolitics of post-Oslo Jerusalem.

From the divided discourse point-of-view, in which segregation is often described as deterministic and self-reinforcing, what motivations, needs and geopolitical contexts serve to explain the growing Palestinian presence in Jewish areas of contemporary Jerusalem?

Urban Entrapment and spillover As presented in Chapter 1, the collapse of the Oslo Accords and the construction of the separation barrier has sealed a 50-year process of physical and functional annexation of East Jerusalem from the West Bank. Since 1967, the status of East Jerusalem has undergone a radical shift from the economic, social and political center of the Palestinian West Bank to a struggling, marginalized social periphery of Israel. Legal annexation (1967), Closure regimes (1990 onward), checkpoints (1993 onward) and, finally, construction of the separation barrier (2002- 2005) have shifted East Jerusalem’s regional socio-economic status—from the center of one national realm to the periphery of another— and transformed urban life and political spatial strategies in the city.

100 The ‘ethno-national peripheralization’ of East Jerusalem created conditions of deprivation and a growing economic dependency upon Israel. The increased movement of Palestinians across social boundaries into Jewish areas of post-Oslo Jerusalem thus comprises an indirect outcome of Israeli colonial and security policies. When the demand for work, education, recreation and consumption cannot be met in East Jerusalem itself—and limited access to the West Bank is further constrained—adjacent Israeli spaces are increasingly seen by Palestinian Jerusalemites as the only viable option. These mobilities reflect circumstances in which deprivation and physical encirclement lead to a spillover into Jewish areas of Palestinians for their daily needs and activities.

Challenging segregation As Frederic Boal described, voluntary segregation may entail positive functions for marginalized groups amid ethnic conflict, including enhanced security, cultural preservation and political empowerment (Boal, 1996). East Jerusalem Palestinians under Israeli occupation have for decades maintained political, social and cultural bulwarks against Israelization (e.g., rejecting Israeli educational curriculum, participation in local Palestinian electoral processes). Notwithstanding such acts, forces of peripheralization continue to undermine ethno-national logics of resistance through self-segregation, illuminating the imposition of contemporary geographies of encounter in Jerusalem.

At the same time, Jerusalem’s sharply divided character embodies Israeli logics of segregation imposed from the top-down by Israeli planners and policy makers at the municipal and national levels. As mentioned in the literature review, Israeli planning policies in Jewish-Arab mixed cities are characterized by the promotion inter-group segregation and purification of Jewish space (Yiftachel & Yacobi, 2003). This is highly evident in the case of Jerusalem, in which neighborhoods were built in East Jerusalem solely for Jewish residents and partisan planning policies (Bollens, 2002) celebrate inter-group division as means of reducing friction (See quote at p. 60). Thus, the growing Palestinians presence in West Jerusalem—including increased (if still marginal) migration of Palestinians into Jewish neighborhoods—clearly challenges official Israeli policies of division, segregation and marginalization. Moreover, as

101 demonstrated in the cases of West Jerusalem shopping malls and the French Hill, many Jewish residents of Jerusalem perceive increased Palestinian presence as threatening. After decades of prevailing Israeli politics of fear—exacerbated by recurrent Palestinian terror—have dehumanized Palestinians in the eyes of many Jews, particularly among religious and politically conservative segments of the population (Bar-Tal, 2000). Benvenisti (1995) termed such paradoxical socio-spatial relations ‘intimate enemies’ (1995)—a life of encounter, proximity and interaction, yet remote, extraneous and alienated.

The new geographies of encounter in post-Oslo Jerusalem have been (de-facto) enforced and were generally unanticipated by either population. This novel order is eroding (both Israeli and Palestinian) ethno-national logics of space that have prevailed in Jerusalem since 1967.

Antagonistic conditions for Encounter The asymmetry of post-Oslo Jerusalem’s geography of encounter is striking. In almost all cases, inter-group spatial mixing unfolds within Jewish areas. Whether in Jewish-owned (private or public) commercial or workplaces, or in Israeli neighborhoods of East Jerusalem (as the French Hill), encounter happens under Jewish- Israeli patronage, with Palestinians cast in the role of guest, foreigner and alien.1 The vast majority of civic interactions2 between Israelis and Palestinians in Jerusalem take place within (or on the margins of) homogenous Jewish areas. This asymmetric spatial framework creates antagonistic conditions for most inter-group encounters. In a context of extreme inter-group polarization and frequently untethered violent conflict, and in which both groups are educated for (and in many cases also experience) mutual hate

1 There are two outstanding cases in which spatial mixing takes place within Palestinian territories. First, Jews visit Palestinian commercial and touristic areas of the Old city and Arab CBD, as well as particular shops in central Palestinian neighborhoods (e.g., Wadi al-Joz, Beit Hanina, Beit Safafa). As presented in previous research (see Shtern, 2010), Jewish visitors to Palestinian areas generally experience low sense of belonging and security, and view the environment with a mixture of alienation and curiosity. Jewish boundary crossings of this kind have become ever more infrequent throughout the last decade. Second, in 2014, approximately 2,000 Jewish settlers live within Palestinian neighborhoods. Ideologically motivated to claim territorial control over Palestinian space, settlers’ relations with their Palestinian surroundings are typically negative and).

2 In contrast to non-civic interactions, such as regular negative encounters between Israeli security forces personnel and East Jerusalem Palestinians.

102 and distrust (Bollen, 2018), asymmetric encounters tend to reflect and reinforce dominant power relations. This context echoes Watson’s (2006) understanding of “Deep Difference” an inter-group polarization that stems from globalization and renewed stress on ethnic identity, and which cannot be bridged by integrative intervention

to achieve collaboration with an increasingly divided and conflictual public […] in part because growing inequalities, and identity differences and hybridities, open the way for the destructive operation of power. (ibid:46)

Mutual reactions of suspicion, fear and resentment thus characterize many inter-group daily interactions in Jerusalem.

Resilient geographies

The most arresting element in most spaces of encounter is their sheer endurance. As shown in each of the case studies, Palestinian presence in West Jerusalem is growing and intensifying. This has not, however, necessarily resulted in violent collision. Notwithstanding periodic flare-ups of inter-group political violence, especially during periods of heightened tension with regard to the broader national conflict (see Hasson, 2017), Israelis and Palestinians continue to cohabitate in parks, malls and work spaces on almost a daily basis.

The resilience of Jerusalem’s geographies of encounter may be explained by mutual conditions of enforced encounter based on necessity (and sometimes shared interest). Jews and Arabs do not choose cohabitation in Jerusalem, yet they apply and adapt themselves to this reality. As Wilson (2017) argued, there is often a paradoxical gap between inter-group encounters in public space—which are often shaped by expectations of polite and appropriate conduct—and the effect of such encounters on “actual values and belief” (460). As Valentine argues, proximity alone does not necessarily equate to a change in values or behavior (Valentine, 2008).

My observations of the myriad micro-level interactions between Jews and Palestinians in Jerusalem also suggest a functional aspect of encounter. In mixed work spaces and even residential housing, shared interests in the attainment of mutual professional objectives or maintenance of a calm residential environment frequently

103 emerge. In the volatile context of contested Jerusalem, including the conservative and nationalistic composition of its resident populations3, revealed adaptation for living with deep difference are surprising. These patterns shed light on the paradoxical nature of urban reality in contested cities. Such cities are neither multicultural (in normative terms), nor homogeneous. While rival ethno-national communities share a single urban space, they experience a rigid geography of fear dominated by “the imperative of communal difference, segregation and exclusion” (Shirlow, 2001:68). At the same time, they grow accustomed to the reality of daily encounter with the other.

Moreover, unlike the relatively new ‘multicultural cities’ of Western Europe, whose historical homogeneity was diluted in the age of global migration, nationally contested cities such as Belfast, Cyprus, Beirut and Jerusalem feature long histories of inter-community cohabitation. Irrespective of the strength of division, whether between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in pre-1963 Nicosia, or Catholics and Protestants before ‘The Troubles’ (see relevant chapters in Calame & Charlesworth, 2011), there exists a significant history of amicable co-existence. Jerusalem itself carries historical memories of mixed neighborhoods and positive relations between Jewish and Arab neighbors throughout the late Ottoman and British-mandate periods (Klein, 2014). I suggest that this embedded memory of plurality and (relative) inter-community tolerance comprise an important platform for spatial encounter—if only in spaces that do not challenge core ethno-national boundaries. Further in this discussion, I elaborate on the potential of micro-geographies of encounter to enable meaningful non-violent encounter.

This dissertation elaborates several cases in which inter-group patterns of interaction were shown to be dynamic, complex and even positive. For example, in Chapter 2, field research in the Mammilla and Malha malls revealed that a majority of respondents from both groups held positive attitudes towards the sharing of space (p. 60). Likewise, within shared work spaces—most employees described inter-group professional relations as positive and productive; a small minority even reported on the development of inter-group social relations (Shtern, 2017a:77-114). In the French Hill, Jews and Arabs report friendly relations between neighbors, and a substantial bi- national community has been established to promote co-existence in the neighborhood

3 In Israel’s national elections of 2015, less than 20% of the Jerusalem electorate voted for central or left-wing candidates (JIIS, 2015: Table XVI/22).

104 (p. 83). While one may be tempted to dismiss these as marginal, unrepresentative or temporal phenomena, they nonetheless represent the possibility of meaningful positive encounter in a range of spaces and situations.

The cases of de-segregation in post-Oslo Jerusalem presented in this work calls for the re-evaluation of a basic tenant of ‘divided cities’ literature—namely, the strong correlation between segregation and conflict (see, for example, Boal, 1999; Doherty & Poole, 1997; Shirlow, 2006). According to Boal’s (1999) scenario model, inter-group relations in cities can be formulated along a spectrum of urban ethnic residential segregation along five axes: assimilation (where differences are erased); pluralism (where ethnic distinction and mixing are accommodated with mutual respect); segmentation (where ethnic or racial separation grows despite an absence contested sovereignty); polarization (a product of ethno-national conflict featuring a breakdown in inter-ethnic relations and near total ethnic segregation; and ethnic cleansing (where the dominant group achieves homogeneity through the physical exclusion of its rivals). This model assumes a dynamic in which intensifying conflict proceeds hand-in-hand with ever-stronger forms of segregation until a final tragic collision in the form of ethnic cleansing (Boal, 1999). De-segregative patterns in post-Oslo Jerusalem (albeit manifested mostly in momentary daily activities) reflect the potential of extreme conditions of urban entrapment and territorial annexation to subvert the inertia of structural and voluntary segregation. It would appear that Israel’s ethno-national logic, which strived for territorial integrity, segregation and Jewish dominance throughout Jerusalem, bears inherent contradictions that may only be stretched so far. Under long- term conditions of severe deprivation, the separation of Jerusalem’s dual urban systems cannot be sustained.

Toward a neoliberal geography of encounter

What is the role of neoliberalism in constructing the geography of encounter in post-Oslo Jerusalem? How do modes of urban and cultural neoliberalism—such as privatization of public spaces and the ascendance of consumerist culture—influence Jewish-Arab inter-group encounter and power relations?

105 As presented in Chapter 2, the (partial) restructuring of Jerusalem’s urban economy in accordance with the principles of free-market governance has transformed its landscape, culture and inter-group economic relations. However, while most of these developments reflect broader national and global economic transitions, the ongoing neoliberalization of Jerusalem (as a national capital and a religious center) reflects a particular ethno-national orientation (Alfasi & Fenster, 2005). First, the municipality of Jerusalem is highly dependent on governmental support and its business sector is fundamentally weak. Market forces thus assert limited influence over matters of urban governance. Second, the majority of capital investment in West Jerusalem in the last two decades has been in the form of real estate speculation originating in modern-orthodox and ultra-orthodox Jewish communities in western Europe and North America. Increasingly, local real estate and retail markets reflect these communities’ particular tastes, languages and national and religious aspirations (Yacobi, 2012).

Third, there is a clear distinction between the processes of neoliberalization unfolding in West and East Jerusalem. While in West Jerusalem neoliberalism promotes the development of urban facilities and services with private capital (within aforementioned constraints) (see Chapter 2), in East Jerusalem, privatization through sub-contractors has strengthened Israeli control and (functional and symbolic) sovereignty over the Palestinian population (Shlomo, 2017a). This has been demonstrated in the sub-contraction of health services, public transportation and education in the last decade. Moreover, crucial security roles in East Jerusalem, including security services for micro-settlements in Palestinian neighborhoods, governmental institutions and checkpoints on Israeli-controlled roads (to West Bank settlements) are increasingly sub-contracted to private companies (Clarno, 2017).

Neoliberalism’s distinct ethno-national formations and modes of implementation in East and West Jerusalem reflect its flexible and adaptive nature as an urban spatial force (Peck, Theodore & Brenner, 2009). This flexibility has yielded divergent results, including some unexpected outcomes with regard to the socio- economic and political status of East Jerusalem Palestinians. For instance, as shown in Chapter 2, the relocation of West Jerusalem retail businesses from public commercial

106 streets into privately owned shopping malls has strengthened the status of East Jerusalem Palestinians as an urban costumer market. Israeli managers of these shopping malls have begun to market their shops in East Jerusalem, employ Palestinian salespersons and promote Muslim holiday sales. This phenomenon is not limited to Jerusalem; in a recent study, Marantz, Kalev and Lewin-Epstein (2014) show that since the 2000’s, Palestinian citizens of Israel have become increasingly prevalent as customers and employees in shopping malls in many Israeli cities. Similar trends can be seen in private colleges (Hasson, 2015), manpower agencies and real estate agents (Yacobi & Pullan, 2014)—all have a role in drawing Palestinians into Jewish-Israeli spaces for the sake of commerce. Neoliberal stakeholders in Israel, in general, and West Jerusalem, in particular, have thus become key agents of spatial mixing.

The class factor Beyond its fundamental essence as a political economic structural force, neoliberalism also has an embedded socio-cultural message. As American consumerism proliferated at the turn of the century, neoliberal political discourse spread throughout the world an image of a “society [that is] preoccupied with consumption, with comfort and bodily well-being, with luxury, spending and acquisition” (Leach, 2011: xiii). Indeed, critical social scientists have pointed out that within the neoliberal project, values of individualism and self-reliance are fostered as the optimal social configuration for the common good (Wrenn, 2014). The ideal of individual freedom has been redefined in the neoliberal era as the capacity of self- realization (Leitner et al., 2007:4). As Margaret Thatcher (1987) famously asserted, “There is no such thing (as society)! There are individual men and women and there are families […]. People look to themselves first” (10). Amid the global spread of the individualized neoliberal identity, ‘class’ resurfaces as a relevant social space—a culture of living organized along socio- economic lines, reflected in an inter-ethnic/religious/national pursuit of quality of life, employment, education, residential preferences, consumption patterns and recreation habits based on Anglo-American liberal ideas of a common good (Habermas, 1991). While the bourgeois lifestyle had been dominant in Europe since the beginning of the 19th century, neoliberal globalization brought this identity to every corner of the

107 world, including Israel/Palestine (Ram, 2013). In post-Oslo Jerusalem, the neoliberal middle-class identity emerges as an important factor in facilitating inter-group encounters between ‘modernized’ and 'westernized' elements of both societies (see Chapter 3). In each of the case studies of this dissertation, class is evident as a mediating factor in the cohabitation of West Jerusalem shopping malls; in inter-group relations between neighbors in the apartments of the French Hill; and in the daily interactions of Jewish and Arab professional employees (Shtern, 2017a). As demonstrated in the introduction, spaces of consumption arise as a dominant form of inter-group space in several nationally contested cities. Such is the case in Belfast, where universities and affluent neighborhoods functioned throughout ‘The Troubles’ as ‘neutral’ or shared spaces. In post-conflict Belfast, many middle-class Catholics and Protestants not only share space provisionally for work and study in the city center, but also in expanding mixed residential areas (Bollens, 2018; Gaffikin & Morrisey, 2011).

Neoliberal ideals such as individualism, self-fulfillment and material progress undermine long-predominant community boundaries and loyalties (Leach, 2011), creating space for complex hybrid identities. However, one should not conclude that the sharing of ‘class’ challenges structural discrimination against Palestinians in Jerusalem. This socio-spatial category is not neutral, and in each class-based encounter presented in this work, the established political order and hierarchy remain intact. It should be noted that positive relations between neighbors in the French Hill were reported among Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel, in contrast to the sustained antagonism between Palestinian Jerusalemites and Israeli Jews. Subject to political equality, class appears to bear potential for integration. Yet without political equality, the latent potential of class toward rapprochement remains unrealized.

The structural formation of the geographies of encounter in Post-Oslo Jerusalem

What does the growing trend of asymmetric spatial mixing imply with regard to the colonial context of inter-group relations in Jerusalem? Does the new

108 geography of encounter challenge or strengthen predominant assumptions of post- colonial discourse on contemporary Jerusalem and Israel/Palestine as a whole?

The central question that arises from the emergent nexus of ethno-nationalism, neoliberalism and spatial mixing in post-Oslo Jerusalem pertains to the impact of these processes on power relations between Jews and Palestinians in the city. In other words, does the neoliberal geography of encounter strengthen or weaken predominant (colonial) inter-group political, economic and spatial relations?

As demonstrated in Chapter 1, Israeli colonial policies in East Jerusalem (i.e., Judaization, deprivation and displacement) created socio-economic crisis, physical entrapment and economic dependency on the Israeli market. This has led to the functional integration of Palestinians within Israeli spaces in the domains of employment, education, consumption, recreation and housing. The rise of the neoliberal economy in Israel (Jerusalem, in particular), fostered this functional integration as Palestinian Jerusalemites emerged as a potential market-base for Israeli retail, recreation and educational industries. The geography of encounter in post-Oslo Jerusalem has thus been a product of colonial urbanism on the one hand and neoliberal urbanism on the other.

Colonial governance and urban and cultural neoliberalism frame this spatial mixing in a powerful structural nexus. Both forces embody deep logics of socio- economic (neoliberalism) and political (colonialism) polarization and conflict. This rigid framework creates a platform of antagonistic spaces of encounter that—on the surface—serve to reproduce and emphasize ethno-national hierarchies and inequality.

Yet, these processes have also led to spatial mixing (in various forms and subject to prevailing conditions and structures). Not all spaces of encounter reproduce the same power relations—many reinforce polarization (e.g., ethnically divided workplaces) while others challenge it (e.g., shared apartment building). However, asymmetric functional integration can also weaken traditional modes of Palestinian resistance to the Israeli occupation of the city, namely anti-normalization stances supported by social and cultural self-segregation (Tamari, 2004). Indeed, in recent years local Palestinian national and religious leaders have referred to current trends of Israelization among East Jerusalem residents—such as citizenship applications,

109 insertion of the Israeli Bagrut high school curriculum and political participation in local elections—as a threat to the Palestinian cause (see PNN, 2018; Salem, 2018). From that political point of view, socio-spatial integration may be seen to reinforce colonization.

Enhanced inter-group spatial mixing may at the same time be seen to undermine the Israeli ethno-national logic of separation. National, ethnic and economic segregation and division are deeply embedded in the planning, design and development of Israeli spaces (Yiftachel, 2006). In many spaces where Israeli-Jews encounter difference (e.g., vis-à-vis immigrants, asylum-seekers and Palestinians), strong political discourses arise that reinforce and legitimize fear and resentment (see, for example, recent Jewish demonstrations against Palestinian home ownership in Afula) (Shpigel, 2018). Racist protest and violence against Palestinian presence in Jewish spaces of Jerusalem have erupted on several occasions over the last decade (p. 58). However, these phenomena did not halt the progress of functional integration and spatial mixing (as evident in the data presented in Chapter 1 and 2). Urban entrapment and neoliberal integration continue to promote the functional Israelization of East Jerusalem Palestinians with few apparent alternatives. If the proliferation of inter-group encounters between Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem, the formal and symbolic capital of Israel, lead to greater mixture in residence and social life, it may be seen—from a mainstream Israeli point of view as assimilation, thus undermining the integrity of the Zionist project in the city as a whole. Hence the explicit segregationist policies manifested in Jerusalem’s latest Master Plan—Jerusalem 2000 (p. 60). It seems that when it comes to concrete planning decisions in the Israeli planning system, separation and control will always triumph over diversity and integration.

The apparent contradiction between enhanced inter-group spatial mixing and the predominant Palestinian and Israeli ethno-national logics illuminates the provocative nature of this phenomenon in its contemporary context. Inter-group spatial mixing in Jerusalem blurs predominant territorial boundaries, distorts mental maps of fear and security, and can lead to feelings of insecurity, resentment and antagonism. However, under certain circumstances, spatial mixing may also allow for new imaginaries of the urban space. Spaces of encounter that combine equality (if even passing) and close proximity of different social categories can project what

110 Amin (2006) defined as the ‘good city’— ‘ideal public sphere […][that] arise from free engagement and visibility among strangers in the city’s public spaces” (1019).

Notwithstanding Jerusalem’s highly polarized condition and de-facto colonial relations, ‘good’ encounters in this antagonistic context evoke the hope for vital urban diversity in lieu of exclusive national visions. Dissolving spatial divisions erected to preserve, control, purify and exclude can reveal the hidden and suppressed core of ‘multiculturalism’ even in contemporary Jerusalem. Temporal and conditioned, this multiculturalism does not reflect an urban celebration of diversity or equality (Amin, 2002), but merely the amiable cohabitation of the urban space by peoples of distinct cultures, ethnicities and faiths. If starkly asymmetric power relations are reproduced, however, then antagonism and fear prevail. In such conditions, spatial mixing cannot produce the multicultural imaginary.

I thus conclude with a proposal for a schematic model of my analysis of the ethno-national/neoliberal nexus in a context of imposed spatial mixing. The polarized nature of the neoliberal integration of Palestinians within Israeli economic and functional spaces has laid an antagonistic foundation for Jerusalem’s geography of encounter. As such, many modes of spatial encounter are likely to reproduce and reinforce skewed power relations. In this closed-loop system, neoliberalism and ethno-nationalism are mutually reinforcing. Yet the case studies presented in this work illuminate alternative micro-geographies in which asymmetric-power relations are temporally disturbed and even eclipsed. In these cases, neoliberalism—through the language of market interest, individualism and middle-class culture, combined with the erosion of territorial boundaries—has yielded agonistic spaces of encounter in which Israelis and Palestinians may imagine temporal moments of multiculturalism in the contested city.

Figure 1 graphically represents the neoliberal/ethno-national nexus as reflected in the geographies of encounter in post-Oslo Jerusalem. The model illustrates the strong interconnection between neoliberalism and ethnonationalism in the assertion of colonial control over East Jerusalem through the privatization of urban and social services. The model also shows the way in which the geographies of encounter in Jerusalem are a product of both ethno-national policies (e.g., colonization, entrapment, deprivation) and neoliberalism (e.g., market driven spatial mixing, shared

111 middle-class culture of consumption and housing). These encounters lend agency: insofar as they reproduce polarization, they reinforce prevailing ethno-national relations and further the political and economic dependency of Palestinians on Israeli’s Jewish majority. Finally, the model highlights the fragile possibilities of multiculturalism contained in encounters framed by (even fleeting) equality.

Figure 1: Geographies of encounter and the neoliberal/ethnonational cycle

Governmentalization and control through Ethno- privatization nationalism

Colonization Neoliberalism Entrapment Polarized Encounter Deprivation Political and economic Peripheralization subjection Market logic Consumption Class Identity Geographies

of Encounter

Weak connection Spatial Mixing Temporal Equality

Fleeting Multiculturalism Strong connection (Imaginaries)

Returning to recent literature exploring the ethno-national/neoliberal nexus (see Clarno, 2017; Shlomo, 2017a; Yacobi, 2012), the case studies of this dissertation counter prevailing assumptions of “complementary relations” in the service of Israeli colonial praxis. Notwithstanding prevailing colonial relations in post-Oslo Jerusalem, the case studies demonstrate the complex, inter-dependent nature of these two urban forces. As I have demonstrated, the neoliberalism of post-Oslo Jerusalem, particularly West Jerusalem, has produced contradictions and structural disruptions of both the Israeli ethno-national project of control and Judaization, as well as the Palestinian ethno-national logic of resistance. The market-driven promotion of spatial mixing destabilizes a core element of both national strategies: segregation. Spatial mixing

112 also fosters new urban identities based on class, globalization and neoliberal individualism that erode urban mental maps and ethno-national social and cultural boundaries. The long-term effect of these processes on the overall inter-group power structure are yet to be revealed.

In the final section, I propose a model of a micro-geography of encounter, illuminating how particular attributes of the shared space may foster positive agonistic cohabitation.

Towards a micro-geography of encounter

In light of recent literature on the ‘geography of encounter,’ what types of encounter take place in the new spaces of encounter in West Jerusalem? Do these encounters extend beyond the practical, non-personal level? What transformative possibilities do they carry in terms of extant mutual perception, fear and mistrust?

So far, I have described the structural forces, mainly ethno-national geopolitics and cultural and economic neoliberalism, that shape the political-geographies of encounter in Jerusalem. However, it is clear that within the general ‘rules of engagement’ and underlining conditions of antagonism and lack of choice, every micro-geography of encounter has its own particular character of interaction. The specific attributes of each space, type of land use and activity, architectural design, and location on the ethnic-territorial map all effect the nature of interactions.

As presented in the Introduction, the study of geographies of encounter has related to various sites of interaction, from work and cafes to public streets and parks (Ellis et al., 2004; Laurier and Philo, 2006; Neal et al., 2015; Parks, 2015; Wilson, 2013). Peikut and Valentine (2017), who were the first to systematically investigate typological forms of urban spaces of encounter, describe five typologies that differ in the quality of the social interactions they facilitate: ‘public’ space, ‘institutional’ space, ‘socialization’ space, ‘consumption’ space, 'quasi-public' spaces, and ‘private’ space. Based on this typology, Peikut and Valentine conducted an extensive empirical study in two European cities: Leeds and Warsaw, in which they attempted to explain variation in the quality of inter-group encounters. They did not, however, establish

113 distinct links between the various spatial types and effect of encounters. Ostensibly, their articulated typologies conflate categories of activity (i.e., consumption and socialization) and structural identity (i.e., private, public and institutional). Moreover, no attention was given to other important attributes of each space of encounter, such as urban design, location and accessibility.

To address this lacuna and further develop the spatial analysis of inter-group encounter, and to adapt this framework to the context of the nationally contested city, I utilize Allport’s (1989) contact hypothesis and formulate a model for the examination of micro-geographies of encounter. Allport emphasized the importance of five factors in attaining meaningful encounter: equal status, common goals, inter- group cooperation, support of authorities and personal interaction. While these conditions can scarcely be found in circumstantial encounters, they represent an optimal point to which the nature of interaction should be directed. For example, if Arab and Jewish families cohabitate an urban park, they temporarily share the status of park dwellers. Despite common goals of family recreation, they typically sit apart without any inter-group interaction or cooperation. Furthermore, in the current political atmosphere, they lack institutional support for such encounter.

Based upon my findings in sites of consumerism, work and mixed residence, I suggest that the following factors may influence the quality of inter-group interaction, on a range between total antagonism to positive meaningful encounter.

Geography—The location of encounter on the local geopolitical map has significant influence on participants’ sense of security, belonging and, potentially, mutual tolerance. Inter-group interactions that take place within the homogenous space of one of the groups—a space conceived as a home-territory—can catalyze fear of invasion, colonization and antagonism (Lymann & Scott, 1967). However, inter- group interactions taking place on the margins, between homogenous home territories, or in neutral spaces (Gaffikin & Morrisey, 2011:102) (if such spaces exist) carry the potential for greater mutual acceptance and relative tolerance. The findings of Chapter 2 revealed higher levels of ethno-national inclusion in Mamilla quarter, situated on the seam-line between two parts of the city, than in Malha mall, situated in the heart of West Jerusalem. Yet, the positive potential of seam-line interactions is predicated upon mutual feelings of safety (see Chapter 2).

114 Ownership—Territorial identity is not only geographically determined, in the context of ethno-national conflict, the question of territorial ownership and control are elementary to the understanding of urban geopolitics (see Rokem & Boano, 2017). Spaces of encounter may be owned and controlled by international, governmental, semi-governmental and municipal public institutions or privately owned by residents or investors. The factor of ownership intersects site attributes of ethno-national control (Israeli or Palestinian) and structural possession (Public or Private). The type of ownership is central to the geopolitical identity of the space of encounter (though in some cases, the issues of ethno-national control and structural ownership may not converge). Ownership defines both ‘native’ and ‘guest,’ who is desired and who is excluded. The type of ownership may also define the mechanisms and management of access to territory. In West Jerusalem for example, the Israeli Border Police is dominant in the security management of commercial areas located in the city center, while private security contractors oversee security in the shopping mall. Each security organization has its own policies and strategies regarding the presence of Palestinians and control of inter-group relations.

Morphology—Urban design has a major influence upon sense of security and belonging in public or semi-public spaces (Foster, Giles-Corti & Knuiman, 2010; Marcus & Francis, 1997; Trancik, 1986). In a context of encompassing inter-group fear and distrust, the questions of visibility, accessibility, physical maintenance and visual symbols are critical. If a space of encounter is not functioning properly as an urban space, if it is neglected, inaccessible or inhospitable to daily users—it will compromise the openness of members towards inter-group encounter. In Mamilla quarter, respondents mentioned that the mall’s open, linear design and numeral lateral exits foster a sense of secure anonymity.

Activity—The type of activity within the space of encounter is highly relevant to the quality of inter-group interaction. Work, consumption, recreation and pedestrian passage yield distinct temporal social spaces. If the activity suggests an opportunity for a trans-national context (such as shopping global brands at the mall or observing animals in a zoo) it may soften ethno-national social and cultural boundaries. If the activity bears a distinct national or religious character (such as a Jewish holiday or a national parade), however, it may be upheld as an exclusive spatial practice. In the case of the French Hill (see Chapter 3) when the national-

115 religious group Nofet Zofim, embarked on a campaign in support of Judaization of the commercial center, they initiated a series of Jewish religious musical performances as

a method of spatial colonization. Religious or national activity is thus utilized as a territorial marker and signifier.

With reference to the study of geographies of encounter in post-Oslo Jerusalem, my research illuminates the need to adapt theorization of (so-called) western ‘multicultural cities’ to the urban geopolitics of nationally contested spaces. In the latter, questions regarding uneven political power relations, fear and territorial claims are generally more acute. Nationally contested spaces also emphasize the role of location and boundaries in the construction of sense of belonging, as well as cultural and political representation in the material, legal and cognitive spheres. We live in an era in which Jerusalem has become a “paradigm for urban studies [and] signifier of future urbanisms” (Boano, 2016:457). A number of European cities have become ‘Jerusalemized’—transformed into sites not only of racial and ethnic collision, but also re-emergent ethno-national identity (Spohn, 2016). The lessons of Jerusalem’s geopolitics of encounter can illuminate obscured and evolving complexities in contemporary urban spaces across the world.

Studies on inter-group interaction in urban spaces should address the particularities of the relevant micro-geographies of encounter, as the unique complexity of each spatial system render fragile attempts to generalize. In contested spaces such as Jerusalem, in which issues of security, fear and territoriality are acute, even small variations in geographic location or architectural design can destabilize the daily functions of place. Collaborative efforts to establish spaces of meaningful encounter must therefore address issues of location, ownership, morphology and activity if they are to foster conditions of mutual security, belonging and equality.

In 2015-2016, Scott Bollens revisited the cities of Jerusalem and Belfast. During the intervening decades following his previous research, each city had developed in apparently opposite directions. Contemporary Belfast is in a stage of post-conflict, in which the EU and Northern Ireland governments are implementing strategies to promote peace and the reconciliation of enduring community divisions. Jerusalem, however, remains mired in conflict; the Israeli government actively stokes urban division through hegemonic and ethno-national policies. Yet Bollens has

116 observed the recent development of a similar pattern in these polarized cities. In both Jerusalem and Belfast, a national-urban disconnection has emerged, in which the translation of the state’s governing ideology has not been straightforward. In Belfast, even after 20 years of ‘peace,’ many inner-city residents oppose ethno-national desegregation. In Jerusalem, despite half a century of hegemonic Israeli political control, efforts to establish a unified, normalized city have yielded an unstable and malfunctioning urban space and continual violent reprisals. The city has disrupted the national agenda (Bollens, 2018).

Following the above notion, I suggest that the proliferation of various geographies of encounter in West Jerusalem can stimulate possibilities to decolonize Jewish-Arab relations in the city. Such a process may bring about new imaginaries of the city and transform inter-group social and economic relations in ways that undermine old logics of ethno-national segregation.

Scientific Contribution To conclude the dissertation, I summarize its contribution to the extant literature on nationally contested cities, urban neoliberalism and geographies of encounter.

Revisiting inter-group relations in Jerusalem—During the 1980’s Michael Romann and Alex Weingrod thoroughly studied inter-group relations between Jews and Arabs in pre-First Intifada Jerusalem (Romann & Weingord, 1991; Romann, 1992). This dissertation is the first study to systematically analyze the magnitude, trends and characteristics of inter-group interactions in post-Oslo Jerusalem. A comparison of the two studies illuminates modes of change and continuation in the spatial, economic and social relations between the two groups.

Multi-dimensional analysis of an urban conflict—Following the suggestion of Yacobi (2015) and Yiftachel (2016) to apply a multidimensional analysis in the geopolitical study of Jerusalem, this work investigates the intersection of several structural forces with regard to inter-group relations in the city. While most studies of Jerusalem have focused on dominant explanatory theory, in this dissertation, I utilize geopolitical (i.e., divided cities); colonial (i.e., Jerusalem a colonial space); capital

117 (urban neoliberalism); and socio-spatial (Geographies of Encounter) theoretical frameworks. Each framework focuses on a dominant logic in the construction of the inter-group political geography of the city.

Desegregation in a volatile, nationally contested city—In contrast to the predominant assumption of reciprocal relations between conflict and segregation in the ‘divided cities’ literature (see, for example, Boal, 1999), this work analyzes a unique case of inter-group de-segregation in a city experiencing continuous violent national contestation. The contradictions inherent to Israel’s colonial project in East Jerusalem have generated urban entrapment and ‘spillover’ into West Jerusalem of East Jerusalem Palestinians in pursuit their basic needs and demands.

Reframing the neoliberal/ethno-national nexus—most critical studies of neoliberal spatial restructuring in Israel/Palestine have emphasized the complementary relations between the neoliberal logic and Israeli colonial policies (see, for example, Clarno, 2017). This study has revealed that while neoliberalism has served ethnonational practices of Israel in East Jerusalem, it has also eroded ethno- national segregation through novel geographies of encounter in work places, commercial zones and mixed residential buildings.

Geographies of encounter in a nationally contested space—The study of urban encounter with difference has been thoroughly developed in the last two decades. Yet, most case studies have been in so-called ‘multicultural’ European cities, in which urban conflict is primarily articulated between the white-European majority and non-white immigrant minority groups from developing countries. In this work, I explore the potential of temporal urban encounters in Jerusalem, a nationally contested city in which elements of urban fear, violence and political control are strongly relevant. Against this background, the case studies of this dissertation expose grains of multiculturalism in the encounters between Israelis and Palestinians in post- Oslo Jerusalem.

Prospects for Future Research

Along with the theoretical and empirical contribution of this research, the current dissertation points to a number of possible directions for future studies on

118 inter-group geographies and the role of neoliberalism in ethnonational contested cities. First, this dissertation research focuses on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and on Jerusalem in particular. Thus, there is clearly room for further research that will explore the factors that construct geographies of encounter in other urban sites of asymmetric conflicts. This would provide us with a broader and more comprehensive picture on the evolution of inter-group relations in spaces which are characterized by deep difference and political contestation.

Second, this dissertation focused mostly on a mixed method field research, based mostly on random sampling and interviews in three different spatial settings (Shopping malls, work places and a neighborhood). Inter-group relations operating in protracted ethno-political conflicts are complex and vary between people and circumstances. Future studies using a representative survey or a broader qualitative study could establish a more nuanced picture regarding each type of space of encounter.

Finally, inter-group relations have been increasingly negotiated and conceived through channels of social media. Groups in urban conflict use social media networks like Facebook and Twitter to gain political leverage and consolidate ethno-national identities and group boundaries. Therefore, future research should also examine how social media networks are used as a platform for inter-group communication (or struggle) in a context of ethnonational contestation in asymmetric conflicts.

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134 139 מנדלקרן, ר. )2016(. קיצור תולדות הנאו-ליברליזם בישראל. בתוך: הארווי, ד., קיצור תולדות הנאו- ליברליזם. ירושלים: מולד. מסרי-חרזאללה, א., רזין, ע. וחושן מ. )2010(. ירושלים כיעד להגירה פנימית של משפחות פלסטיניות- ישראליות. ירושלים: מכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל. עיריית ירושלים ) 2004 (. תכנית מתאר מקומית ירושלים 2000. ירושלים: מינהל התכנון, מהנדס העיר והאגף לתכנון העיר. רמון, א., ילינק, א. וויטמן, א. )2011(. )עורכים( יורדים העירה: מרכז העיר ירושלים. ירושלים: מכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל. שטרן, מ. )2010(. בשדות זרים: דפוסי אינטראקציה בין ישראלים ופלסטינים במתחמי מסחר מעורבים בירושלים. ירושלים: מחקרי פלורסהיימר. שטרן, מ. )2015(. שילוב תעסוקתי במציאות נפיצה: תושבי מזרח ירושלים בשוק העבודה העירוני. ירושלים: מכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל. תמרי, ס. )2004(. ירושלים: שאלות של שלטון וכפיפות. המזרח החדש, 44, 213 – 225.

9 מקורות

Bollens, S., A. (2000). On narrow ground: Urban policy and ethnic conflict in Jerusalem and Belfast. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Clarno, A. (2017). Neoliberal Apartheid: Palestine/Israel and South Africa after 1994. University of Chicago Press. Dumper, M. (2014). Jerusalem unbound: Geography, history, and the future of the holy city Columbia University Press. Klein, M. (2001). Jerusalem: The contested city. New York: NYU Press. Rosen, G., & Razin, E. (2009). The rise of gated communities in Israel: Reflections on changing urban governance in a neo-liberal era. Urban Studies, 46(8), 1702-1722. Romann, M., & Weingrod, A. (1991). Living together separately: Arabs and Jews in contemporary Jerusalem. Princeton: Princeton university press. Shtern, M. (2016). Urban neoliberalism vs. ethno-national division: The case of west Jerusalem's shopping malls. Cities, 52, 132-139. Tashakkori, A., & Teddlie, C. (1998). Mixed methodology: Combining qualitative and quantitative approaches. Sage. Valentine, G. (2008). Living with difference: reflections on geographies of encounter. Progress in human geography, 32(3), 323-337. Yacobi, H. (2009). Towards Urban Geopolitics. Geopolitics, 14(3), 576-581. Yacobi, H. (2012). God, globalization, and geopolitics: on West Jerusalem's gated communities. Environment and Planning A, 44(11), 2705-2720. Yacobi, H., & Pullan, W. (2014). The geopolitics of neighbourhood: Jerusalem’s colonial space revisited. Geopolitics, 19(3), 514-539. Yiftachel, O., & Yacobi, H. (2003). Urban ethnocracy: Ethnicization and the production of space in an Israeli 'mixed city'. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 21(6), 673-693. Yiftachel, O. (2006). Ethnocracy: Land and identity politics in Israel/Palestine. University of Pennsylvania Press. Yiftachel, O. (2016). The Aleph—Jerusalem as critical learning. City, 20(3), 483-494.

Wilson, H. F. (2017). On geography and encounter: Bodies, borders, and difference. Progress in Human Geography, 41(4), 451-471. 8 מבחינה תיאורטית, הרי שהשימוש בתיאוריה רב-ממדית )Yiftachel, 2016( לבחינת המרקם העירוני-פוליטי של מרחבים עירונים בישראל הוא שימוש חדשני. במחקר אקשור בין גופי ידע תיאורטיים אשר אין ביניהם חיבור מספק במחקר העכשווי )כך, לדוגמה, החיבור בין השיח על הגאוגרפיה של המפגש לגישה הפוסט-קולוניאלית(. זהו חיבור בין זרמי מחקר נבדלים, על-פי-רוב, והוא עשוי לסייע להבנת המציאות הנרקמת בערים רבות בעולם, הנתונות כיום, יותר מבעבר, לקונפליקטים המבוססים על תחרות בין זהויות אתנו-לאומיות.

המחקר אף יוצר חיבור ראשוני בין הספרות הקיימת על אודות מרחבי המפגש בערים רב- תרבותיות בעולם )Valentine, 2008; Wilson, 2011( למציאות של מרחב עירוני המצוי בקונפליקט אתנו-לאומי. באמצעות השימוש בספרות הקיימת על יחסי רוב ומיעוט בערים מעורבות בעולם המפותח, ניתן להאיר את הממדים החבויים ביחסי הגומלין וההידוד היום- יומיים בין ישראלים ופלסטינים בישראל בכלל, ובירושלים בפרט.

בעוד הספרות המחקרית מציגה, על-פי-רוב, את הקשר בין אתנו-לאומיות לנאו-ליברליזם כקשר משלים, אשר במסגרתו משרתים כוחות השוק את המדיניות הקולוניאלית )Clarno, 2017(, מעלה מחקר זה כי יחסי הגומלין בין שני הכוחות המבניים הללו מורכבים יותר ואינם חד-כיווניים. הגאוגרפיה של המפגש בירושלים מעידה על כך שהנאו-ליברליזם העירוני מצליח במקרים לא מעטים לייצר עירוב מרחבי ובניית זהות מעמדית משותפת )גם אם זמנית ושברירית(.

מבחינה מעשית, ביכולתו של המחקר לשמש בסיס למסמך מדיניות עירונית אינטגרטיבית אשר תעודד סובלנות ושיתוף פעולה בין האוכלוסיות השונות בערים ישראליות. מהתובנות העולות מהמקרה של ירושלים ניתן להאיר על המורכבות של יחסי הכוח, על פערים בתפיסות ובעמדות תרבותיות ופוליטיות, כמו גם על נקודות ממשק חשובות כגון השפעת תרבות הצריכה הגלובלית, זהות מקומית משותפת ומרחב מעמדי משותף.

7 'איחוד העיר', חיים 98% מתושבי ירושלים בשכונות הומוגניות )יהודיות או ערביות( )מכון ירושלים למחקרי מדיניות, 2018( וחלק גדול מהמערכות העירוניות הן מערכות כפולות ונפרדות )תחבורה ציבורית, חינוך ומוסדות חברתיים וקהילתיים(. אולם, תוצאות המחקר מעלות כי במקרים מסוימים חותרים מנגנוני הנאו-ליברליזם של הכלכלה והתרבות בירושלים תחת מגמות ההפרדה ויוצרים עירוב מרחבי. כאשר הפלסטינים בעיר הופכים לקהל צרכנים פוטנציאלי של עסקים גדולים במערב העיר, אזי הופכים שחקני השוק החופשי, כגון מנהלי קניונים, בעלי חברות כוח-אדם ומתווכים, לסוכנים של עירוב מרחבי. נוסף על כך, מעצב הנאו-ליברליזם העירוני את אתרי המפגש המופרטים כמרחבים תרבותיים טרנס-לאומיים הבנויים על זהות צרכנית ועל ערכים של אינדווידואליזם, הגשמה עצמית וגלובליזציה. באופן זה, הופכים הקניונים לא רק למגנטים של עירוב מרחבי, אלא מתפקדים גם כמובלעות צרכניות-גלובליות המכילות תרבות זמנית משותפת לבני שתי הקהילות – מובלעות שבהן הממד האנטגוניסטי של המפגש מתעמעם ומיטשטש.

זהות מעמדית )שברירית( – המאמרים במחקר מעלים את האפשרות כי לנוכח ההתמרה הנאו- ליברלית של המפגש הבין-קבוצתי, צומחת זהות משותפת אלטרנטיבית המבוססת על מעמד חברתי-כלכלי. כאשר פלסטינים וישראלים נפגשים כצרכנים בקניון, כעובדים מקצועיים )בדרג דומה או קרוב במקום העבודה( או כדיירים בבניין מגורים משותף בגבעה הצרפתית – כללי המפגש מתנהלים לא רק בצל השסע האתנו-לאומי אלא גם לנוכח קודים תרבותיים מעמדיים המאפיינים את הבורגנות הישראלית. אלמנטים אלו באים לידי ביטוי בסממני לבוש, תרבות פנאי ותרבות דיור המשותפים לשני הצדדים. יש לציין, כמובן, כי זהות זו היא זמנית ושברירית ואינה חותרת באופן משמעותי תחת הסדר החברתי ההיררכי ויחסי הכוח הפוליטיים הקיימים בין יהודים וערבים בישראל.

הבניית מרחב המפגש – מתוצאות המאמרים ניתן לגבש חמישה מאפיינים עיקריים המשפיעים על אופי המפגש הנוצר בכל מרחב הידוד: 1( גאוגרפיה – מיקום המרחב במפה הגאו-פוליטית של העיר בין מרחב הומוגני )יהודי או ערבי( למרחב תפר היברידי; 2( בעלות – אופי הבעלות על המרחב – פרטי\ציבורי, יהודי\ערבי; 3( מורפולוגיה – העיצוב הפיזי של המרחב – פתוח\סגור, מתוחזק\מוזנח, נגיש\חסום, נצפה\סמוי; 4( פעילות – תוכן הפעילות במרחב – מסחר\מגורים\פנאי\ספורט.

תרומת המחקר

בשני העשורים האחרונים התמקד עיקר המחקר הגאוגרפי-פוליטי על ירושלים בהשפעת השליטה הישראלית במזרח ירושלים על חיי התושבים הפלסטינים וזכויותיהם. נוסף על כך, מעת כתיבת המחקר המקיף של מיכאל רומן ואלכס ויינגרוד בנושא יחסי הגומלין שבין יהודים וערבים בירושלים בשנים Romann & Weingrod, 1991( 1987-1967( ועד עתה, לא נערך מחקר מקיף ועדכני בנושא זה. בשלושת העשורים שחלפו מעת עריכת המחקר הקודם שינתה העיר את פנייה ותהליכים גאופוליטיים מרכזיים )דוגמת הסכמי אוסלו, האינתיפאדה השנייה והקמת גדר ההפרדה( יצרו מציאות חדשה בשני חלקי העיר. המחקר הנוכחי בא למלא חסך זה במחקר הגאוגרפי-פוליטי של ירושלים. 6 שיטת המחקר

שיטת המחקר בדוקטורט היא שיטת מחקר משולבת )Mixed Methodology(, הכוללת שיטות מחקר כמותיות ואיכותניות )Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998(. המחקר הכמותי כולל ניתוח סטטיסטי של 753 שאלונים שהופצו במרחבי האינטרקציה השונים: 428 שאלונים )ובהם 226 משיבים יהודים ו202- משיבים פלסטינים( נערכו במקומות עבודה מעורבים,1 195 שאלונים )110 משיבים יהודים ו85- משיבים פלסטינים( בשכונת הגבעה הצרפתית ו125- שאלונים )62 משיבים יהודים ו62- משיבים פלסטינים( בקניונים. השאלונים כללו שאלות סגורות ופתוחות אשר עסקו בתחושת הביטחון, בתחושת השייכות ובעמדות בנוגע לנוכחות של בני קבוצת החוץ באתר המחקר. השאלונים הופצו על-ידי עוזרי מחקר ישראלים-יהודים וערבים-פלסטינים. הניתוח הסטטיסטי כלל מבחני שונות ומובהקות. התשובות הפתוחות קודדו ונותחו לפי תמות מרכזיות.

המחקר האיכותני כולל ניתוח תֵ מתי של 49 ראיונות עומק שנערכו עם מקבלי החלטות, אנשי עסקים ומנהיגי קהילות מהחברה היהודית והערבית של ירושלים, כמו גם עם תושבים, לקוחות ועוברי-אורח באתרי המפגש השונים. נדבך נוסף של המחקר כלל ריכוז מחקרים קודמים שנערכו בנוגע למרקמים עירוניים מעורבים בעולם, בארץ ובירושלים. כמו כן, נעשה במחקר שימוש בניתוח של מקורות מידע סטטיסטיים של הלמ"ס הישראלי והפלסטיני, הביטוח הלאומי וסקר נסיעות של תכנית-אב לתחבורה ירושלים.

דיון ומסקנות

שלושת מאמרי המחקר מציגים שלושה מבטים שונים על הגאוגרפיה של המפגש בין ישראלים ופלסטינים בירושלים בעידן פוסט-אוסלו. מן הנתונים המצרפיים, האיכותניים והכמותיים ניתן לגזור את המסקנות העיקריות הבאות:

גאוגרפיה של אנטגוניזם – מרחבי המפגש הבין-קבוצתיים בירושלים הם תוצרים ישירים של המדיניות הקולוניאלית של ישראל במזרח ירושלים, אשר יצרה מלכוד עירוני פיזי )UrbanEntrapment(, אי-שוויון קיצוני ביחסי הכוח הפוליטיים והכלכליים-חברתיים ועודף של צרכים וביקושים בקרב הפלסטינים תושבי העיר אשר באים לידי מענה במרחבים היהודיים של העיר. תנאים מקדמיים אלו מייצרים גאוגרפיה א-סימטרית של המפגש הבין-קבוצתי. בשל כך, כמעט כל המפגשים האזרחיים בין האוכלוסיות מתרחשים באזורים היהודיים של העיר, שבהם הישראלים-יהודים הם 'בעלי הבית' ואילו הפלסטינים הם 'אורחים בטריטוריה זרה'. מכאן, שהמפגש המזדמן )הבלתי מתוכנן( המתקיים במרחבים אלו משקף ואף משכפל, על-פי-רוב, את יחסי הכוח הקיימים ומייצר מפגש אנטגוניסטי )יחסי פחד, חוסר אמון ושנאה(.

שילוב נאו-ליברלי – ההיגיון הפוליטי המרחבי הישראלי והפלסטיני המעצב את המרחב הירושלמי נובע לרוב מחתירה להפרדה אתנו-לאומית. גם בשנת 2016, כחמישים שנה לאחר

1 בשל המבנה הייחודי של הדוקטורט כאסופת מאמרים, חלק ניכר מתוצאות מחקר-השדה אינו נכלל במאמרים שמהם מורכבת העבודה. כך למשל, לא נכללו תוצאות מחקר-השדה במרחבי עבודה משותפים בדוקטורט אלא פורסמו בדו"ח נפרד של מכון ירושלים למחקרי מדיניות. ראו, מבעד לתקרת הזכוכית: פלסטינים וישראלים בשוק התעסוקה בירושלים )שטרן, 2017(. 5 עומק בקרב לקוחות ישראלים ופלסטינים המבקרים בקניונים אלו. ניתוח הממצאים אִ פשר לאפיין את ההשפעה של המרכיבים הייחודיים לכל קניון. מן הנתונים עלה כי מיקום גאוגרפי, עיצוב עירוני ומדיניות אבטחה משפיעים על רמת ההכלה הקיימת בכל אתר כלפי כל אחת משתי האוכלוסיות. דוגמת הקניונים במערב ירושלים מעידה על האופן שבו חותר הנאו-ליברליזם העירוני תחת דפוסי ההפרדה האתנו-לאומיים בעיר באמצעות הפרטת המרחב הציבורי והעצמת תרבות הצריכה הגלובלית.

פרק ג': בין זהות אתנו-לאומית לזהות מעמדית: ישראלים ופלסטינים בשכונת הגבעה הצרפתית במזרח ירושלים

Shtern, M., & Yacobi, H. (2018). The Urban Geopolitics of Neighboring: Conflict, Housing and Class in Jerusalem’s Settlement/Neighborhood. Urban Geography, in press.

בעשורים האחרונים מתרחשת תופעה שולית אך משמעותית של הגירת תושבים ואזרחים ערבים אל תוך שכונות יהודיות שהוקמו במזרח ירושלים לאחר 1967. אחת השכונות "המעורבות" החדשות היא הגבעה הצרפתית, אשר הוקמה בשנת 1971 בעבור תושבים יהודים )לא-חרדיים( בני מעמד בינוני-גבוה כחלק מפרויקט ייהוד מזרח ירושלים. החל משנות התשעים, עם הזדקנות האוכלוסייה המקומית, החלו להגר לשכונה פלסטינים אזרחי ישראל ממרכז וצפון הארץ אשר עברו לירושלים לצורכי עבודה ולימודים )Yacobi & Pullan, 2014; מסרי-חרזאללה, רזין וחושן, 2011(. במקביל, היגרו בעשור האחרון אל השכונה גם תושבים יהודים-חרדים מהשכונות החרדיות הסמוכות. נוסף על תהליכים אלו, גברה בשכונה בשנים האחרונות נוכחותם של פלסטינים ממזרח העיר המגיעים כצרכנים יומיים של שרותי המסחר והפנאי שבה. מסיבות אלו, נוצר בגבעה הצרפתית מרקם דמוגרפי ייחודי ומורכב.

המאמר בוחן את סוגיית הזהות הטריטוריאלית הלאומית של שכונת הגבעה הצרפתית ומאפיין את היחסים הבין-קבוצתיים אשר נוצרו בין ארבע הקהילות העיקריות בשכונה: יהודים-חילונים, יהודים-חרדים, פלסטינים-ירושלמים ופלסטינים-ישראלים. באמצעות מחקר-שדה אשר כלל סקר המבוסס על 195 שאלונים ועשרה ראיונות-עומק, אפיינתי את מרקם היחסים בין הקבוצות. תוצאות המחקר מעלות כי הקונפליקט המשמעותי והנפיץ ביותר בשכונה הוא המאבק על ההגמוניה בין יהודים-חילונים ליהודים-חרדים; לצד זאת, נוצרה בשכונה גם זהות מעמדית, המשותפת לקבוצה היהודית-חילונית ולקבוצה הפלסטינית-ישראלית, אשר חותרת תחת הפער האתנו-לאומי הקיים ביניהן. מסקנת המאמר היא כי הרקע להיווצרותה של הזהות המעמדית המשותפת טמון בתהליכי נאו-ליברליזציה תרבותית של פלסטינים בני מעמד-הביניים אשר מייצרים את הצורך, היכולת והלגיטימציה למגורים בשכונה יהודית מעורבת.

4 קריסת הסכמי אוסלו, האינתיפאדה השנייה והקמת חומת ההפרדה הביאו לשינוי דרמטי במעמד האזורי-תפקודי של מזרח ירושלים )כהן, 2007(. הניתוק הפיזי, התפקודי והכלכלי בין מזרח ירושלים לגדה המערבית הביאו לכך שירושלים הפלסטינית הפכה בתוך עשורים ספורים ממרכז המטרופולין הפלסטיני האזורי לפריפריה ישראלית. תהליך זה הגביר את תלותם הכלכלית של תושבי מזרח ירושלים בתשתיות העירוניות והכלכליות של מערב העיר והביא לשילובם הגובר בשוק העבודה הישראלי ובמערכת ההשכלה הגבוהה הישראלית, כמו גם לעלייה מקבילה בבקשות של תושבי קבע פלסטינים לאזרחות ישראלית. במאמר אני מכנה תהליך זה בשם 'פריפראליזציה אתנו-לאומית' – המובילה לשילוב פונקציונלי של תושבי מזרח ירושלים במרחב הישראלי. זהו תהליך הנובע מהדרה חברתית-כלכלית ומצמצום מרחב אפשרויות הבחירה של תושבי מזרח ירושלים.

בתוך כך, הגבירה הנאו-ליברליזציה של הכלכלה העירונית בירושלים את ממדי השילוב הפונקציונלי באמצעות יצירת ביקוש גובר במערב ירושלים לכוח העבודה ולכוח הצריכה של הפלסטינים. יתר על כן, הניתוק הגובר מאפשרויות תעסוקה והשכלה בגדה המערבית אף העלה את הביקוש בקרב צעירים תושבי מזרח העיר לרכישת השכלה ישראלית ולמציאת עבודה התואמת את כישוריהם בשוק העבודה הישראלי. עם זאת, במקביל לתהליך השילוב הפונקציונלי, התקיימו גם מגמות של הקצנה לאומנית ודתית בקרב פלסטינים תושבי העיר, אשר באו לביטוי באירועי אינתיפאדת אל-אקצה )2015-2014(. השילוב וההקצנה מהווים שניהם תוצר של תהליכי הפריפראליזציה של מזרח ירושלים העכשווית. גורמים אלו מהווים את הרקע הגאו-פוליטי והכלכלי להבניית הגאוגרפיה של המפגש בין ישראלים ופלסטינים בעידן פוסט-אוסלו.

פרק ב': קניונים במערב ירושלים כמרחב מפגש בין ישראלים ופלסטינים

Shtern, M. (2016). Urban neoliberalism vs. ethno-national division: The case of West Jerusalem's shopping malls. Cities, 52, 132-139.

במהלך שנות ה90- של המאה העשרים ובתחילת שנות ה2000- עבר המסחר העירוני הקמעונאי בירושלים שינוי מבני ומרחבי. השפעת הכלכלה הגלובלית וריבוי אירועי טרור של פלסטינים במרכז ירושלים המערבית, הביאו להעתקתם של מרבית העסקים הקמעונאיים לקניונים ולמתחמי מסחר סגורים ומאובטחים בפרברי העיר ובאזורי התעשייה. במקביל, הביאו תהליכי השילוב הפונקציונלי של ערביי מזרח ירושלים רבים מהם לצריכה יום-יומית בקניונים שבמערב העיר. בעקבות זאת, אימצו מנהלי הקניונים מדיניות מכוונת של הגדלת שיעור העובדים הערבים בקרב המוכרים בקניונים כדי לתת מענה למרקם המעורב של קהל הלקוחות. באופן זה, הפכו הקניונים לזירת מפגש משמעותית בין שתי קבוצות האוכלוסייה, הן כצרכנים, הן כעובדים. המאמר מציג את משמעות המפגש המתרחש בקניונים המתפקדים כמרחב מסחר מופרט ואת עליית חשיבותה של הקהילה הפלסטינית בעיר ככוח שוק משמעותי בכלכלה העירונית.

המאמר מבוסס על מחקר-שדה שנערך בשני קניונים במערב ירושלים: קניון ירושלים )מלחה( ורובע אלרוב ממילא. מחקר-השדה כלל הפצה וניתוח של 125 שאלונים ו19- ראיונות

3 הכלכליים-מסחריים בין הקהילות. לראשונה, נוצרו גם מרחבים שבהם שתי הקבוצות מתייצבות )באופן זמני( במעמד שווה כקבוצות של צרכנים במרחבי צריכה, פנאי ומגורים בעלי מאפיינים תרבותיים גלובליים.

המחקר שלהלן יעסוק בשאלות העולות מתוך תיאור מצב הדברים שלעיל ויתמקד בעיקר בשתי שאלות עיקריות: השאלה הראשונה שבה אדון היא השאלה בדבר טיבם ואופיים של מרחבי המפגש העכשוויים בין ישראלים לפלסטינים בירושלים; השאלה השנייה תבחן את תפקידו של הנאו-ליברליזם בהבניית יחסי הגומלין המרחביים בין שתי האוכלוסיות.

מבנה תיאורטי

כדי לחשוף את המתח הקיים בין הכוחות הכלכליים לכוחות האתנו-לאומיים המעצבים את המרחב העירוני של ירושלים, בחרתי בגישה תיאורטית רב-ממדית. במחקר אשלב ארבע פריזמות תיאורטיות העוסקות בגאופוליטיקה עירונית )Yacobi, 2009(: חקר הערים בסכסוך לאומי )Bollens, 2000(; פוסט-קולוניאליזם בישראל/פלסטין )Yiftachel, 2006(; ספרות העוסקת בתהליכי נאו-ליברליזציה עירונית )Harvey, 2005( וחקר הגאוגרפיה של המפגש בערים מעורבות )Valentine, 2008; Wilson, 2017(. מתוך קריאה ביקורתית בגופי ידע אלו ושילובם יחדיו, אנתח את המורכבות ואת הסתירות הפנימיות של המציאות היום-יומית בירושלים, הכורכת בתוכה יחסי כוח קוטביים וא-סימטריים, תהליכי הקצנה לאומנית ודתית בד-בבד עם שילוב מרחבי וכלכלי בעיר השסועה.

פרקי הדוקטורט

כדי לחשוף את מנגנוני הכוח ודפוסי ההידוד אשר מאפיינים את מרחבי המפגש הבין- קבוצתיים כיום בירושלים, בחרתי בשלושה מרחבי מפגש עיקריים: מרחב המסחר, מרחב העבודה ומרחב שכונת המגורים. מקרי הבוחן נבדלים זה מזה ברמת העצימות של ההידוד, במיקום הגאו- פוליטי במפה העירונית ובחשיבותם הפוליטית בתוך הקונטקסט של הסכסוך האתנו-לאומי. הצלבת מקרי הבוחן מאפשרת להגיע לתובנות בנוגע לגאוגרפיה של המפגש בשלושה ממדים: בממד החומרי, בממד המרחבי ובזה האידאולוגי. באמצעות תיאור "עבה" זה, ארכיב תמונה רב- ממדית של דפוסי המפגש בין ישראלים לפלסטינים בירושלים העכשווית.

עבודת הדוקטורט מורכבת מאסופה של שלושה מאמרים אשר פרסמתי במהלך השנים 2018-2016 בכתבי-עת מדעיים מובילים בתחום הלימודים העירוניים )Urban Studies(.

פרק א': פריפרליזציה אתנו-לאומית: תלות כלכלית והתנגדות פוליטית במזרח ירושלים

Shtern, M. (2018). Towards ‘ethno-national peripheralisation’? Economic dependency amidst political resistance in Palestinian East Jerusalem. Urban Studies, 0042098018763289.

2 תקציר

ירושלים מתוארת בדרך-כלל בספרות המחקרית כעיר בעלת דפוסי היבדלות עמוקים אשר קיימת בה הפרדה גאוגרפית מובהקת בין אזורים ישראליים-יהודיים לאזורים פלסטיניים- ערביים (Bollens, 2000; Dumper, 2014(. אולם בעשור האחרון, בעקבות קריסת הסכמי אוסלו וביתר שאת לאחר הקמת גדר הביטחון )חומת ההפרדה( סביב מזרח ירושלים, גדלה תלותם של פלסטינים תושבי העיר בתשתיות העירוניות והמסחריות ובשוק התעסוקה של המגזר היהודי במערב ירושלים )שטרן, 2010). תלות זו הביאה לנוכחות בולטת משהייתה בעבר של תושבי העיר הפלסטינים במערב ירושלים ובשכונות יהודיות במזרח ירושלים )Yacobi & Pullan, 2014( ויצרה מרחבים חדשים של מפגש בין-קבוצתי באתרים ציבוריים, מוסדיים ומסחריים, במתחמי פנאי ונופש ובאזורי מגורים. אולם, תהליכים אלו של עירוב מרחבי אינם משקפים מציאות חדשה של "דו-קיום", אלא מהווים תוצר ישיר של חוסר השוויון העמוק בין שתי האוכלוסיות החיות בעיר ושל יחסי התלות הקוטבית שביניהן. עם זאת, תהליכים אלו מעלים במידה ניכרת את כמותם והיקפם של יחסי ההידוד )אינטרקציות( היומיים בין היהודים והערבים החיים בעיר ומהווים בשל כך כר פורה למחקר אמפירי ותיאורטי.

העניין המחקרי בנושא זה נובע מכך שתהליכי העירוב האתני המרחבי החדש בירושלים חותרים הן תחת ההיגיון הלאומי הישראלי, הן תחת זה הפלסטיני: הם מנוגדים למדיניות התכנון הישראלית, הנהוגה בירושלים ובערים מעורבות אחרות בישראל, המעודדת היבדלות מרחבית בין אוכלוסיות )Yiftachel & Yacobi, 2003; עיריית ירושלים, 2004(. בה-בעת, מנוגד השימוש הגובר של פלסטינים תושבי ירושלים בתשתיות ובשירותים העירוניים במערב העיר גם למדיניות האנטי- נורמליזציה הנהוגה במזרח ירושלים משנת 1967 ביחס למרחב הישראלי )תמרי, 2014(. בנוסף, תופעות אלו מתרחשות אף על רקע תהליכי נאו-ליברליזציה כלכלית ותרבותית הפועלים במרחב העירוני-ישראלי בעשורים האחרונים ומעצבים מחדש את המרקם הכלכלי-חברתי העירוני.

משנות 1990 ואילך, משנות הגלובליזציה הכלכלית והתרבותית והתחזקותה של כלכלת השוק הישראלית את פני המרחבים העירוניים בישראל ומייצרות זהויות תרבותיות חדשות )Yacobi, 2012: Rosen & Razin, 2009(. כמו בערים אחרות בארץ ובעולם, הופרטו בירושלים בשני העשורים האחרונים שירותים עירוניים והפעילות הכלכלית והתרבותית הקיימת בה עברה במידה רבה מרחובות מסחריים למתחמי מסחר פרטיים וקניונים )רמון, ילינק וויטמן, 2010(. מגמות אלו של נאו-ליברליזציה עירונית עיצבו מחדש את החיים האזרחיים והכלכליים בעיר והן מהוות רקע חשוב מאוד להבנת טיב יחסי הגומלין בין הקבוצות האתניות והדתיות השונות החיות כיום בירושלים. כך, למשל, נכרכו שעות הפנאי של התושבים במידה רבה בפרקטיקות הקשורות בתרבות הצריכה הגלובלית. כמו כן, הנאו-ליברליזם אף עיצב מחדש את שוק הדיור הירושלמי, והביא לפתיחת שוק ההשכלה הגבוהה לתחרות חופשית ומניע הפרטה ומיקור-חוץ של שירותים עירוניים. כפי שאראה במחקר, יצרו תהליכים אלו שינוי ביחסי הגומלין שבין ישראלים ופלסטינים בירושלים, בין היתר, עקב התעצמות מעמדם הכלכלי של הפלסטינים כפלח-שוק צרכני בכלכלה העירונית וכמי שלוקחים בה חלק כמועסקים. כתוצאה מכך, גברו יחסי הגומלין

1 הצהרת תלמיד המחקר עם הגשת עבודת הדוקטור לשיפוט

אני החתום מטה מצהיר/ה בזאת: (אנא סמן):

___ חיברתי את חיבורי בעצמי, להוציא עזרת ההדרכה שקיבלתי מאת מנחה/ים.

___ החומר המדעי הנכלל בעבודה זו הינו פרי מחקרי מתקופת היותי תלמיד/ת מחקר . .

___ בעבודה נכלל חומר מחקרי שהוא פרי שיתוף עם אחרים, למעט עזרה טכנית הנהוגה בעבודה ניסיונית. לפי כך מצורפת בזאת הצהרה על תרומתי ותרומת שותפי למחקר, שאושרה על ידם ומוגשת בהסכמתם.

:תאריך 19 ליולי, 2018 שם התלמיד/ה: מריק שטרן חתימה ______העבודה נעשתה בהדרכת: פרופ' חיים יעקובי במחלקה: פוליטיקה וממשל בפקולטה למדעי הרוח והחברה בין החומה לקניון: הגיאוגרפיה של המפגש בין ישראלים ופלסטינים בירושלים

מחקר לשם מילוי חלקי של הדרישות לקבלת תואר "דוקטור לפילוסופיה"

מאת מריק שטרן

הוגש לסינאט אוניברסיטת בן גוריון בנגב

אישור המנחה אישור דיקן בית הספר ללימודי מחקר מתקדמים ע"ש קרייטמן ______

ז' באב, התשס"ח 19 ביולי, 2018

באר שבע בין החומה לקניון: הגאוגרפיה של המפגש בין ישראלים ופלסטינים בירושלים

מחקר לשם מילוי חלקי של הדרישות לקבלת תואר "דוקטור לפילוסופיה"

מאת

מריק שטרן

הוגש לסינאט אוניברסיטת בן גוריון בנגב

ז' באב, התשס"ח 19 ביולי, 2018

באר שבע