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Pinker , S. , and R. Jackendof . 2005. “T e faculty of : What’s spe- , the of F is the that maps the refer- cial about it? ” , 95 .2: 201 –36. ent of X onto the referent of F (X ). T us, the referent of a complex Stone , V. E. , and P. Gerrans . 2006. “ What’s domain-specif tag">c about is always the result of applying the referent of one of its of mind? ” Social Neuroscience 1.3/4 : 309 –19. constituents, as a function, to the of its constitu- Suddendorf , T. 1999. “T e rise of the metamind.” In T e Descent of Mind , ents, taken as arguments. T e referent of a as a whole is ed. M.C. Corballis and S. E. G. Lea , 218–60. Oxford : Oxford University identif ed with its value. T us, the referent of “Chomsky” is Press. ———. 2006. “ Foresight and evolution of the human mind .” Science, Chomsky, the referent of “is clever” the function that maps each 312 .5776 : 1006 –7. x onto truth if x is clever and onto falsehood otherwise, and Suh , E. 2007. “Recursion and interation.” Available online at: http://www. the referent (truth value) of “Chomsky is clever” is truth if and aihorizon.com/essays/basiccs/general/recit.html. Retrieved from AI only if Chomsky is clever. Horizon February 5, 2007. It may seem surprising that the referent of a sentence is its , but it should be kept in mind that reference is used as a technical within compositional . Given the REFERENCE AND EXTENSION use to which the concept is put, this is not an unnatural assump- Extension and reference are technical terms in the of tion: Frege was interested in a compositional semantics that language, formal semantics, and . We outline their would tell us how the truth values of sentences are determined roles in three types of theoretical ef ort – compositional seman- by the referents of their parts, and all natural have tic (which make use of both terms), various theories of fragments in which, when a sentence has other sentences as parts, reference , which purport to tell us what it is for a to have a the truth value of the whole depends only on the truth values of certain referent, and views that understand reference as some- the constituent sentences. Fragments of languages in which this thing people do with . T e f rst two are semantic accounts; is the case, and in which the referent of a complex expression the last conceives of reference as a matter of language use, so of in general depends only on the referents of its parts, are called pragmatics. extensional . T us, in an extensional fragment, expressions hav- ing the same referent can be substituted in any sentence with- Reference and Extension in Compositional Semantics out altering its truth value (contexts in which such substitutions We begin with the use of reference and extension in composi- preserve truth value are also called extensional). Frege was pri- tional semantic theories. In this domain a referent is generally a marily interested in constructing a semantics for the language thing that a proper “refers to” or “,” and an exten- of mathematics, which is extensional, and so choosing truth sion a of objects to which a applies (the term deno- values as referents of sentences was natural. However, natural tation is sometimes used interchangeably with both reference languages as wholes are not extensional. In contexts involving and extension). However, compositional semanticists often gen- propositional attitudes, , and counterfactuals, eralize one or the other notion so that almost any kind of expres- the of clauses having the same truth value may alter sion, including a sentence, can be said to have a referent or an the truth value of the whole sentence. To account for such con- extension. texts, Frege held that each sentence or other expression has, in With few exceptions, compositional semantic accounts are addition to a referent, another kind of semantic value, which he versions of truth conditional semantics – attempts to called the expression’s sense (Sinn ). T e sense of a sentence is specify the meanings of sentences in terms of their truth con- what he called a thought , or, in contemporary terms, a propo - ditions. Since natural languages allow for inf nitely many sen- sition . In order to maintain a version of the principle of com - tences, the truth conditions of sentences must be specif ed positionality , he held that the truth values of nonextensional recursively in terms of the semantic values of their parts, and sentences are determined in part by the senses of their constitu- referents and extensions are semantic values that enable us to ents (see ). do just this. For example, we can specify the truth condition of For various , Frege’s approach is now considered anti- the sentence “John smokes” in terms of the referents and exten- quated. Most recent work in formal semantics for natural lan- sions of its parts as follows: “John smokes” is true if and only if guages is inspired by ’s work on the def nability of the referent of “John” (namely, John himself) is a member of the TRUTH for formal languages. ( 1974 ) was the extension of “smokes” (the set of things that smoke). f rst to apply Tarski’s work productively to (fragments of) natural T e primary historical source for compositional semantics languages. Here, extension is the preferred term. T e extension of along these lines is ’s ([ 1892 ] 1997) account of a predicate is, again, the set of things to which it applies. Although Bedeutung – often translated as “reference” (also as “denota- terminology varies, in this framework, too, one can speak of the tion”). In it, a referent is assigned to every meaningful expres- extension of almost any expression, including a sentence, so that sion. Frege assumed that each complex expression is the result one identif es a sentence’s extension with its truth value. Applying of combining a functional expression (such as a predicate) with Tarski’s approach, the aim is to recursively characterize not only one or more arguments (such as names) (see predicate and the truth conditions of sentences but also the (logi- argument ). Further, he assumed that the referent of a func- cal consequence) for a language using the notion of extension: A

tional expression F is always a function f , and that the referent sentence S1 is said to entail a sentence S2 in language L if and only of any expression X that F accepts as an argument is the sort if there is no assignment of extensions to the semantically simple

of object that is among the arguments of f . Specif cally, if F is a expressions of L (no “model of L”) under which S 1 is true and S 2 functional expression and X an expression that F accepts as an false. On this approach, the logical constants dif er from other

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expressions in that they are not assigned extensions/referents maintain uniformity – to ensure “rigidity” in reference. In fact, (see and language ). speakers – paraphrasing Wittgenstein – play all sorts of games Montague’s approach dif ers notably from Frege’s: It does with language. not assign senses to expressions to account for nonextensional In taking reference as a form of action and treating refer as contexts. Instead, it employs the tools of possible worlds a , we come closest to the commonsense idea of a person semantics to this end. One can, however, within Montague’s “referring to” or “talking about” an object. Critical work on framework def ne objects corresponding roughly to Frege’s ’s of definite by senses: T e sense of an expression could be thought to corre- P. F. Strawson ( 1950 ) and ( 1966 ), as well as spond to the function that maps each onto the H. ’s work on the semantics/pragmatics distinction, extension that the expression has in that world. Such functions inspired a distinction between speaker’s reference and semantic are often called (see and extension ) . reference , the latter being central to both compositional seman- tics and theories of reference of the sorts considered in the pre- Theories of Reference, New and Old vious section. T e speaker’s reference of an expression, on an T e second set of theories (often called theories of reference) occasion, is whatever object that speaker uses the expression to in which the terms reference and extension are found appear in pick out, typically in order to assert (query, etc.) something about the works of philosophers of language who aim to describe and that object. You may use the phrase “the man drinking a mar- explain the word–world relations that compositional semantic tini” to refer to a certain person, although the person you have in theories of the sort discussed previously take for granted. mind is, unbeknownst to you, drinking water: He is not, then, the In this area, too, a classical source is Frege. According to semantic referent of the phrase. Frege, a word has a specif c referent because its users associate it Some writers hold that semantic reference either does not with a particular sense – something like a conceptual represen- exist (Strawson 1950 can be read this way), or – if it is to sus- tation of its referent. Applied to proper names, his view was that tain theoretical investigation – must be reconceived (Chomsky). a , say, “George W. Bush,” is associated by its users with a Chomsky points out that use (not in-house use certain descriptive condition, say, being the 43d president of the of the of mathematics or natural science, where practi- United States , and that its referent is that object (if any) which tioners constrain their actions) displays “creativity,” where this uniquely satisf es this condition. is thought of in terms not only of the uncaused production of Another view, the so-called new theory of reference (in vogue novel expressions but also of their free use for any number of since the 1970s), maintains that at least some expressions do purposes (“appropriateness”). Because referring is a form of not have senses, but simply refer. Proper names are paradigm free action and cannot sustain naturalistic study, Chomsky - examples. According to the approach, what cements the relation poses the elimination of the semantic study of natural languages between a name and its referent is not a mediating conceptual as usually conceived (of ering theories of word–world relation- in the speaker’s mind but a causal and historical ships), placing the study of reference in a part of pragmatics relationship between the name’s user and its referent. T e idea, that resists theoretical investigation, and placing the study of articulated by Kripke (1972), is that a name is introduced by an what he calls “” (a psycholinguistic version of Fregean initial “baptism,” which involves a causal interaction between a senses) in broadly conceived as the study of the intrinsic speaker and the referent itself, and reference for all other speakers properties of the mind/brain. T e study of meaning – semantics is preserved in chains of in which each speaker reconceived – becomes a psycholinguistic enterprise focusing intends to use the name to refer to the same object as those from on the natures of mind-internal elements, such as lexical items, which he or she acquired the name. Extending Kripke’s view in their “semantic features,” and the computations in which they ways suggested by Kripke himself, (1975 ) pro- f gure. Chomsky (2000 , 38 f) points out that this kind of study posed baptism + history as an account of how natural kind might employ a theoretical device called “relation R,” construed terms come to have and maintain their extensions (see essen - as a postulated relationship between theoretically def ned tialism and meaning ) . expressions and objects in some introduced, stipulated domain. Relation R is not reference “outside the head” that is not apt Reference as Action for naturalistic study. Relation R and the domain D are, rather, T e third view we discuss maintains that reference depends construed to be part of syntax – theoretical devices aiding the essentially on individual speakers (and possibly interpreters) naturalistic study of syntax conceived as “language in the head.” with interests: An appropriate slogan might be “Words T e members of D could be stipulated to be semantic values. don’t refer; people do.” One root of this view is found in the T is might allow Chomsky to absorb the insights of Montague work of the later , another in Descartes. and other developing theories within formal semantics i n t o T ose who defend it point out that it is dif cult to f nd cases syntax. It would also emphasize a view Chomsky maintains for of uniform word–world relationships in the use of natural lan- other reasons: Semantic compositionality is syntactic computa- guages. T ey grant that the practices of mathematicians dis- tion. Whether absorbing formal semantic accounts of composi- play uniformity, but these practices aside, reference varies tionality in this way suits the intuitions and aims of those who with time, , speaker’s interests, and so on. T ey also want their semantic ef orts to provide explications of truth con- grant that some who of er theories of reference, such as Kripke ditions is another matter. (1972), acknowledge a role for speaker intentions. But Kripke and others incorrectly assume that ordinary speakers desire to – James McGilvray and Juhani Yli-Vakkuri

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WORKS CITED AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER : -verb agreement , person , number , and Chomsky , Noam. 2000. New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind . gender (see gender marking agreement (French, German, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press . and Turkish); the switch-reference (Amele); or topic/ Donnellan , Keith. 1966. “ Reference and def nite descriptions. ” subject markers (Japanese). analysis (see discourse Philosophical Review 75 .3: 281 –304. analysis [linguistic]) f nds that reference usage follows the Frege , Gottlob. [1892] 1997. “On Sinn and Bedeutung. ” In T e Frege constraints of f ow: T e grammatical subject of a Reader , ed. M. Beaney . Oxford : Blackwell . transitive clause tends to be coded with a in English, or Kripke , Saul. 1972. “Naming and necessity.” In Semantics of Natural zero in Chinese or Japanese, to present given or acces- Language , ed. Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman, 253–355, 763–69. sible information (the light subject constraint ), for instance, “He” Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Reidel. in the example, whereas the grammatical object tends to be an ———. 1976. “Speaker’s reference and semantic reference.” Midwest NP carrying new information (e.g., one plant). T is allows easy Studies in the 2 : 255–76. processing of accessible information early in an utterance, while ———. 1980. Naming and Necessity . Cambridge : Harvard University Press. the rest of the utterance introduces the new referent, thus facili- Montague , Richard. 1974. Formal Philosophy . New Haven and tating reference tracking and discourse processing. London : Yale University Press . Experimental studies f nd that the discourse pattern of a Putnam , Hilary. 1975. “T e meaning of ‘meaning.’” In Language, Mind, language engenders specif c reference tracking strategies in its and Knowledge , ed Keith Gunderson, 131–93. Minneapolis : University native speakers. T erefore, speakers of dif erent languages may of Minnesota Press . develop dif erent cognitive strategies to track reference during Strawson , P. F. 1950. “ On referring. ” Mind 59 .235: 320 –44. discourse processes .

– Liang REFERENCE TRACKING WORKS CITED AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING Reference tracking, or ANAPHORA resolution, concerns how language users track who or what the speaker is referring to in Chafe , Wallace. 1994. Discourse, Consciousness, and Time: T e f ow discourse. Because everyday language use generally concerns and Displacement of Conscious Experience in Speaking and . who does what to whom, reference tracking is important in Chicago : University of Chicago Press . studying human language and cognition. Kintsch , Walter. 1988. “ T e role of knowledge in discourse compre- hension: A construction-integration model .” Psychological Review Anaphora devices include noun phrases (NPs), , 95 : 163 –82. and zero anaphora, whose identities depend on their anteced- Tao , Liang , and Alice Healy . 2005. “ Zero Anaphora: Transfer of Reference ents in discourse. In the example “Isabel went to China, and this Tracking Strategies from Chinese to English .” Journal of Psycholinguistic volunteer/she helped with midwifery training,” “T is volunteer” 34 : 99 –131. is an NP that refers back to its antecedent Isabel. It could be replaced by the pronoun she or by an empty slot (zero anaphora) REGISTER as in the sentence “Isabel went to China and ____ helped with midwifery training.” Speakers of a language use dif erent words and grammatical Pronouns and zero anaphora give less explicit information structures in dif erent communicative situations. For example, than full NPs. Still, the reader/hearer benef ts from the ef ciency we do not use the same words and structures to write an aca- of these devices in conveying information that has been intro- demic term paper that we would use when talking to a close duced/given in the prior discourse or can be accessed/inferred friend about weekend plans. from the context. T ese devices are crucial for global cohesion Researchers study the language used in a particular situation and local coherence in discourse. Experimental studies f nd that under the rubric of register : a language def ned by its situ- without a specif c need, replacing a pronoun with an NP for given ational characteristics, including the setting, interactiveness, the information may hinder . channel (or mode) of communication, the production and pro- A discourse topic provides a means for tracking the cessing circumstances, the purposes of communication, and the of a pronoun or zero anaphora because the topic tends topic. to recur as given information continuously. Cross-linguistic Although registers are def ned in situational terms, they can studies f nd that people can track the identity of a pronoun or also be described in terms of their typical linguistic characteris- zero anaphora even when its referent is not in the immediately tics; most linguistic features are functional and, therefore, they preceding clause but in the prior context. T erefore, although tend to occur in registers with certain situational characteristics. may be linear due to human physical limi- For example, f rst and second person pronouns (I and you ) are tations, language processing and reference tracking are hierar- especially common in . Speakers in conversation chical cognitive processes. talk a lot about themselves, and so they commonly use the pro- Reference tracking requires the hearer to make noun I . T ese speakers also interact directly with another person, from world knowledge about likely events, especially for lan- often using the pronoun you . guages that have no morphological markings (Chinese) yet T ere are many studies that describe the characteristics of allow abundant zero anaphora, as in “He grew only one plant, a particular register, such as sports announcer talk (Ferguson but ___ blossomed well.” Many languages make reference track- 1983 ), note taking (Janda 1985 ), classif ed advertising (Bruthiaux ing easier with specif c grammatical markings, such as agreement 1996 ), and scientif c writing (Halliday 1988 ). Other researchers

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