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6 J A N U A R Y 2 0 1 5
gladhanding and carpet-bagging
among the wealth of weekly commentary, we track local issues with global impact
cp.leads has undergone reform. Opening with a macroclimate report, we will then canvass views on China's global footprint, identifying local institutional settings and assumptions playing out internationally. We will also monitor leadership visibility overseas. In December they mainly stayed at home sorting out anti-corruption and its attendant personnel dividends, providing our subject this week. Domestic policy issues and shifts have moved to a new weekly sister report, cp.signals. cp.leads will return to its regular Monday slot next week.
As even officials whisper of a property market fiasco, promised deepening reform is being trumped by another stimulus. In relation to the US, where a buoyant Obama declares ‘our resurgence is real’, deference seems to be in the air. Wang Yang 汪 洋 speaking in Chicago, seemed in this context to seek cooperation in preserving economic stability, while cybersecurity chief Lu Wei's 鲁炜 haj to Silicon Valley displays ‘offensive defence’. Prioritising domestic retrenchment and consolidation, Xi Jinping 习 近平 seems to be moving on both the economic and security fronts to reduce tension with ‘Western forces’; yet simultaneously blocking gmail delivered Google its biggest disruption since its decision to leave China in 2010.
China’s diplomatic risks as reflected in ‘one belt, one route' Xue Li 薛力 | Economic Information Yidai yilu [one belt, one route] became a key term in diplomacy in 2014. Now Beijing’s foreign grand strategy, it will be advanced in economic, political, military and cultural fields over the next 8-10 years. 2015 is set to be the launch year. ‘New normal’ anxieties render running down foreign exchange reserves and providing overseas outlets for overcapacity clearly attractive. Warning voices, whispering for some time, reiterate: don’t let qincheng huirong (another new foreign policy term: ‘warm, honest, open-handed and inclusive’), i.e. big-ticket international projects, morph into a carpet-bagging fiasco. Sino-American game of anti-monopoly enforcement Chen Litong 陈立彤 | Caixin Controversy simmers over Wang Yang’s conciliatory remarks at the Sino-US Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade held in Chicago from 16 to 18 December 2014. Was the vice premier speaking for Xi? We thought so (cp.leads 141222). US-qualified lawyer Chen Litong finds a win-win for Chinese and American agencies and firms in the Joint Fact Sheet. Counter to nationalist bias that would keep protectionist policies in place, Chen views the Anti-Monopoly Law's explicit pursuit of 'macro control' as a problem which, hopefully, this new Fact Sheet resolves.
The challenges of globalising Chinese enterprises Wu Jiayu 吴家裕 | Financial Times Chinese Following the APEC meeting in December, regional development opportunities are endless. The rising flows of products between different economies catalyses more local companies to expand their business on a global scale. However, the 'swarm' of overheated overseas M&As has subsided; Chinese enterprises have come into their 'age of reason': firms cannot globalise without conforming to international norms.
Keep in touch, 保持联系吧！ David
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Xue Li 薛力 CASS Institute of World Economy and Politics Focusing on China’s relations with neighbouring states, Xue seeks to channel how China’s stance appears from their point of view. Xue has written extensively on this increasingly popular topic.
Chen Litong 陈立彤 MWE China Law Offices partner Caixin columnist specialising in competitiveness and monopoly, Chen is licensed to practice law in China and New York. He is the author of Commercial Bribery Risk Management 商业贿赂风险管理. Wu Jiayu 吴家裕 PriceWaterhouse Coopers Partner and Asia Pacific Tax Versed in international taxation, M&As, corporate restructuring, and tax audits, Wu qualified as a chartered accountant in Canada. He worked with multinational companies in Hong Kong, consulting on the retail and consumer goods and automotive industries, before moving to China as PwC Asia Pacific taxation director in 2008.
L E A D E R S H I P O N T H E M O V E 2014 came to a close with a flurry of senior personnel transfers moving some of Xi Jinping’s close long-term intimates into strategic positions; to be confirmed in due course. Clearly placing a trusted personal team in sensitive central, local and military posts, Xi raises doubts about his repeated vetoes on intra-Party factions and interest groups (141201 cp.focus 4th Plenum). Colleagues from his Zhejiang and Nanjing military region days rise up the ladder, and as gamesmanship over the 19th National Party Congress (2017) gets under way, contenders— even notional ones—will seek refuge in building networks of their own.
Liu Cigui 刘賜贵 Hainan deputy party secretary and governor Newly appointed deputy party secretary and acting governor of Hainan, Liu was a PLA political commissar under Xi Jinping during his term in Fujian (1985-2002). As State Ocean Administration director (2013-14), he has been in the public eye as a spokesman on the South China Sea, Maritime Silk Road and ambitious long-term Arctic policy. With Hainan having direct oversight over the South China Sea, Liu may be apt to end the agency turf wars over maritime policy.
Huang Xingguo 黄兴国 Tianjin party secretary When Xi Jinping became Zhejiang Party Secretary in 2002, Huang was party secretary of CPC Ningbo Committee. Moving from mayor to party secretary of Tianjin, he appears to rely on little more than an old association with Xi’s ‘Zhejiang new forces’ for his ascent to power.
Sun Chunlan 孙春兰 United Front Work Department director Politburo member Sun Chunlan, 64, previously served as Tianjin party secretary from 2012-14, now recently replaced the fallen Ling Jihua 令计划 as United Front Work Department director. A less influential role, the move is seen as making room for current mayor Huang Xingguo, rather than a straight- up promotion.
Song Puxuan 宋普选 Beijing Military Region commander-in-chief Newly-appointed commander-in-chief of the Beijing Military Region, Lieutenant General Song was deputy commander-in-chief of the Nanjing Military Region before rising to National Defence University president in 2013. He now trades places with Zhang Shibo 张仕 波.
O T H E R N O T A B L E M O V E M E N T S The above moves are consistent with the appointment last year of a series of officials who share Xi Jinping's Zhejiang and Nanjing military region background.
Xia Baolong 夏宝龙 becomes Zhejiang party secretary Li Qiang 李强 becomes Zhejiang governor Bayinqolu 巴音朝鲁 becomes Jilin party secretary Chen Miner 陈敏尔 becomes Guizhou governor Lou Yangsheng 楼阳生 becomes Shanxi deputy party secretary Ying Yong 应勇 becomes Shanghai deputy party secretary
This is a brief sample of the wave of appointments that form a pattern. If you have further interest, please reply to this email or give me a call - always happy to discuss further. J U S T I N C A S E Y O U M I S S E D I T . . . I hope you had a relaxed holiday and a chance to look at some of our hip flicks. Please note that we have uploaded a new version with subtitle language indicated. cp.focus—exploratory analysis The project system: China's fiscal pacemaker and its cyclical legacy 4th Plenum: narrowing the space for special interests cp.signals—domestic policy signals Central Economic Work Conference: old normal? ChAFTA what's in it for China? cp.record—systematic policy audits Social Policy Record Economy Record Governance and Law Record cp.public hip flicks for sinophiles
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