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Purple Dragon: the Origin and Development of the United States OPSEC Program, NSA Center for Cryptologic History, 1993

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Purple Dragon: the Origin and Development of the United States OPSEC Program, NSA Center for Cryptologic History, 1993 Description of document: National Security Agency: Purple Dragon: The Origin and Development of the United States OPSEC Program, NSA Center for Cryptologic History, 1993 Requested date: 25-December-2007 Released date: 17-January-2008 Posted date: 06-February-2008 Date/date range of document: Viet Nam War era Source of document: NSA FOIA Requester Service Center: National Security Agency Attn: FOIA/PA Office (DJ4) 9800 Savage Road, Suite 6248 Ft. George G. Meade, MD 20755-6248 Telephone: (301) 688-6527 Fax: (443) 479-3612 Notes: Previously Released by NSA in Freedom of Information Act In Case #: 8481 The governmentattic.org web site (“the site”) is noncommercial and free to the public. The site and materials made available on the site, such as this file, are for reference only. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals have made every effort to make this information as complete and as accurate as possible, however, there may be mistakes and omissions, both typographical and in content. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damage caused, or alleged to have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the information provided on the governmentattic.org web site or in this file. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000 MDR Case 54496 17 January 2008 This responds to your Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) request of 25 December 2007, Purple Dragon: The Origin andDevelopment ofthe United States OPSEC Program. Centerfor Cryptologic History, 1993. The document that you have requested was recently reviewed and released under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requirements. Therefore, the material is enclosed and is being released to you just as it was released in FOIA Case 8481. Certain information, however, has been deleted from the document. Some ofthe information deleted from the document was found to be currently and properly classified in accordance with Executive Order 12958, as amended. This information meets the criteria for classification as set forth in subparagraphs (c) and (g) ofSection 1.4 and remains classified TOP SECRET as provided in Section 1.2 ofthe Executive Order. The information is classified because its disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security. Because the information is currently and properly classified, it is exempt from disclosure pursuant to the first exemption ofthe FOIA (5 U.S.C. Section 552(b)(l». In addition, this Agency is authorized by various statutes to protect certain information concerning its activities. We have determined that such information exists in this document. Accordingly, those portions are exempt from disclosure pursuant to the third exemption ofthe FOIA which provides for the withholding ofinformation specifically protected from disclosure by statute. The specific statutes applicable in this case are Title 18 U.S. Code 798; Title 50 U.S. Code 403-l(i); and Section 6, Public Law 86-36 (50 U.S. Code 402 note). Information regarding other individuals has also been deleted from the enclosures in accordance with 5 U.S.c. 552 (b)(6). This exemption protects from disclosure information which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion ofpersonal privacy. In balancing the public interest for the information you request against the privacy interests involved, we have determined that the privacy interests sufficiently satisfy the requirements for the application of the (b)(6) exemption. Since your request for declassification has been denied in part, you are hereby advised of this Agency's appeal procedures. You may, within 60 days after notification ofthe denial, file an appeal in writing to the NSAlCSS MDR Authority (DJP5), National Security Agency, 9800 Savage Road, STE 6884, Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6884. The appeal shall reference the initial denial ofaccess and shall contain, in sufficient detail and particularity, the grounds upon which you believe the release of information is required. The NSNCSS Appeal Authority will endeavor to respond to the appeal within 60 working days after receipt of the appeal. The CIA has asked that we protect information pursuant to 5 USC 552(b)(3) and DIA, Air Combat Command and Navy have asked that we protect information pursuant to 5 USC 552(b)(l). Those deletions have been marked with the code OGA (Other Government Agency). Any appeal of the denial of CIA, DIA, or Air Combat Command information should be directed to those agencies. In the case of Navy information, refer to case number 02-068, and address the appeal to the Judge Advocate General, (code 14), Department ofthe Navy, Building 33, Washington Navy Yare, 1322 Patterson Avenue, SE, Suite 3000, Washington, DC 20374-5066. The letter of appeal and the envelope both should bear the notation "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Sincerely, RHEA D. SIERS Deputy Associate Director for Policy End: a/s This monograph is a product of the National Security Agency history program. Its contents and conclusions are those of the author, based on original research, and do not necessarily represent the official views of the National Security Agency. Please address divergent opinion or additional detail to the Center for Cryptologic History (E324). Contents 01 this publication should not be ~produt:ed or further disseminated outside the V.S. Intelligence Community without the pennission of the Director, NSA. Inquiries about reproduction and dissemination should be directed to the Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, Fort Geor-ge G. Meade, MD 20755·6000, ATTN: E324. i OP SI!Cft!'f t:/M8ftA UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY Series VI The NSA Period Volume 2 PURPLE DRAGON: The Origin and Development of the United States OPSEC Program _______1 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 .->' -, ~ ..~ CENTER FOR CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 1993 PleT RSbl!L'tS"tBUl Te P8R1318U HNi'I8!lhbB lOP SECRE i UMBRA - 'f6P SECRET ~MBRJIc Table of Contents Page Foreword v Acknowledgment Vll Southeast Asia Map IX . :. '~~-".: ',.", Part I: Introduction 1 Part II: The Beginnings OfOPSEC 7 Part III: Pl;RPLE DRAGON at War 35 Part IV: NSA and Pl;RPLE DRAGON 57 Part V: What Charlie Knew ................................. 65 Part VI: OPSEC Goes Worldwide . 75 Part VII: PURPLE DRAGON at Peace 89 Author's Biography 94 Abbreviations and Covernames 95 Bibliography 99 .:';" :;~ -.:-: ~ ..... -'. .. ~TgT RiibS/zSABI:JB 'fa F8ftBIBff hA'l'I6hAL~ . "~:~'.. -. iii i UP SECRET t:J MaRA .,.' H '," «b) (3)-P.L. Foreword !86-36 .. .', ... Operations Security (OPSEC) as a concept is probably a.s6id as/war ¥tself. Nevertheless, the fact that poor OPSEC practices have been costly in loss of human life and lost objectives in every American war demonstrates. that, despite its venerated age, Operations Security as a doctrine needs ito be learned afresh by each generation. ... .. It is imperative that those with responsibility for military ac~ivities understand that observation of Opera.tions Security principles is as esseptial an ingredient to victory as any of the other tools of war./ To the extent possible, these lessons should be learned in peacetime - experience in recent conflicts shows there is unlikely to be a period of grace once a military eII)~rgency Occurs and troops are committed to combat. I lUi PURPLE DRAGON: The/Origin and Developmetlt of the United States OPSEC Program has given uS a superb monograph about the genesis of Operations Security during the Vietnam War. I ilthorough and readable account describes the initial problems in aIr operatIons which prompted a high-level investigation, explains the weaknesses in U.S. practices which this investigation identified, shows how Operations Security principles were developed through close analysi.s of the problems and weaknesses, and, finally, tells how Operations Security at last became institutionalized. Of primary importance~ ~hows clearly that complacency is dangerous, not only before the principles of Operations Security have been a.pplied, but even after, as situations evolve, personnel change, and the adversary undertakes new intelligence initiatives. The Center for Cryptologic History believes tha~ fonograPh is an important addition to the study of cryptologic Dlstory and, Uldeed, to the literature on the Vietnam War. It has much to say to two audiences: those unfamiliar with Operations Security will find it a good introduction to the concepts and methodology of this important component. Those already familiar with Operations Security should find it an interesting study of OPSEC origins as well as a refresher on the basic principles of the discipline. This story of PURPLE DRAGON is not just for the military; its lessons apply to the civilian cryptologic professional as well. The Center for Cryptologic History hopes that this study will reinforce the importance of the doctrine and help us to exam.ine our premises and practices, military and civilian alike. DAVID A. HATCH Director, Center for Cryptologic History IfOTIt!!:Ll!:A!A!5LE iOEOitEiGN HAIIOl'4ALS v lap SEeK!T tJMBRA TOP 5ECRE I UMBRA (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 Acknowledgments Oppo;.tilnit~totha~keve"XOne (UJ I wish to take this who contributed to the production .. of this. monograph. First, I would like to thank all those / who· graciously "....:' .::' consented to speak wi th~e conc~rnin9 their iexpet- iences with PURPLE DRAGON and OPSEC, especiallyl ; ... I -:-----:::--"""":'"~-:---....Ila11~
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