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Claims Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: Protecting Victims of Non- Class Based Discrimination from Vindictive State Action

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Valparaiso University Law Review Volume 35 Number 1 Fall 2000 pp.197-263 Fall 2000 A Standard for "Class of One" Claims Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: Protecting Victims of Non- Class Based Discrimination From Vindictive State Action Nicole Richter Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Nicole Richter, A Standard for "Class of One" Claims Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: Protecting Victims of Non-Class Based Discrimination From Vindictive State Action, 35 Val. U. L. Rev. 197 (2000). Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol35/iss1/3 This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Valparaiso University Law Review by an authorized administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a ValpoScholar staff member at [email protected]. Richter: A Standard for "Class of One" Claims Under the Equal Protection C Notes A STANDARD FOR "CLASS OF ONE" CLAIMS UNDER THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: PROTECTING VICTIMS OF NON-CLASS BASED DISCRIMINATION FROM VINDICTIVE STATE ACTION The purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrarydiscrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents) I. INTRODUCrION Grace and Thaddeus Olech ("Olechs") occupied a single family home in the Village of Willowbrook. 2 Until the spring of 1995, the Olechs received their water from a private well on the property. 3 When the well broke down beyond repair, they immediately requested to be hooked up to the Willowbrook municipal water system. 4 The Village of Willowbrook agreed to provide the Olechs with water; however, it required them to grant a thirty-three foot easement for the construction and maintenance of a roadway.5 The Olechs protested, believing that this policy was unfair because the Village only required a fifteen foot I Viii. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 1073 (2000), 120 S. Ct. 1073, 1074-75 (2000) (per curiam) (quoting Sioux City Bridge Co. v. 2 Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441,445 (1923)). Olech v. Viii. of Willowbrook, No. 97 C 4935, 1998 WL 196455, at *1 (N.D. Ill.April 13, 1998); Brief of Respondent at 3, Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000) (per curiam) (No. 98-1288). 3Respondent's Brief at 3, Olech (No. 98-1288). IOlech, 1998 WL 196455, at *1. The Village of Willowbrook was required by law to provide water to the Olechs on the condition that they paid for the costs of the project. Respondent's Brief at 4, Olech (No. 98-1288). On July 11, 1995, the Olechs paid the Village $7,012.67 for their share of the costs. Id. 5Olech v. Viii. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386,387 (7th Cir. 1998), affd, 120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000) (per curiam). 197 Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2000 Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 1 [2000], Art. 3 198 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35 easement from other property owners for the construction of a water main.6 Meanwhile, the Olechs were forced to hook up an overground rubber hose to their neighbor's well to obtain water for their house.7 In the fall of 1995, the Village finally relented, and agreed to provide the Olechs with water services in exchange for a fifteen foot easement.8 In a letter to the Olechs, the Village attorney conceded that a fifteen foot easement would be sufficient.9 By this time, it was too late to begin construction of a water main.' 0 Their overground hose had frozen and the Olechs, who were both in their seventies, spent the winter without running water." The lack of running water caused the Olechs to suffer great inconvenience and mental and physical distress.12 Grace Olech filed a claim in federal court against the Village and two Village officials,13 alleging that she had been singled out for vindictive treatment because of a prior lawsuit they had won against the Village six years earlier.14 She claimed that the prior lawsuit had generated substantial ill will toward 6Id. It is interesting to note that the Village of Willowbrook had already developed a plan to require all home owners on the Olech's street who were not already hooked up to the Village's water system to do so within two years. Respondent's Brief at 4, Olech (No. 98- 1288). The plan did not contain a provision requiring land owners to grant an easement to the Village. Id. 7 Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, No. 97 C 4935, 1998 WL 196455, at *1 (N.D. Ill.April 13, 1998). The Olechs viewed this as a "temporary" way of obtaining water, and asked Village officials to be hooked up to municipal water supplies "right away" because they knew that their overground hose would freeze in winter. Id. 3Olech, 160 F.3d at 387. 9 Id. at 387-88. The Village attorney sent a letter to the Olechs on November 10, 1995, informing them that, "[a) fifteen foot (15') easement, along with a temporary construction easement of five feet (5') on each side, will be sufficient to install the water main. This is consistent with Village policy regarding all other property in the Village." Brief of Respondent at 6, Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000) (per curiam) (No. 98- 1288). After receiving the letter, the Olechs granted the fifteen foot easement. Id. at 7. 1oOlech, 1998 WL 196455, at *2;Respondent's Brief at 7-8, Olech (No. 98-1288). 11Id. 12 Respondent's Brief at 8, Olech (No. 98-1288). 13Id. at 1. Grace Olech sued the President of Willowbrook and the Director of Public Services of Willowbrook in their individual capacities. Id. 11Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d at 386,387-88 (7th Cir. 1998). Thaddeus Olech has since passed away, and his wife, Grace Olech, has continued to pursue legal recourse for the Village's actions. Id. See genwrally Zimmer v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 610 N.E.2d 709 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). In Zinrer, the Olechs, along with their neighbors, sued the Village for damages as the result of storm water flooding their properties. Id. at 711. While they were ultimately successful against the Village, the lawsuit generated substantial ill will toward the Olechs on behalf of the Village. Oleci, 160 F.3d at 388. https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol35/iss1/3 Richter: A Standard for "Class of One" Claims Under the Equal Protection C 2000] A STANDARD FOR "CLASS OF ONE" 199 them on the part of Willowbrook and its officers.'5 She alleged that the ill will motivated the Village to single them out for disparate treatment in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 16 Amendment to the United States Constitution. Grace Olech's case represents a situation that many individuals find themselves in as the result of irrational or vindictive treatment by state or local government officials. 17 Individuals, such as the Olechs, are singled out for differential treatment, causing physical and mental anguish.' 8 One avenue of relief is a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, which declares that a state government shall not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 19 While this language has been interpreted to mean that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike,20 it does not offer much guidance for courts seeking to apply its principles. 21 Despite the lack of clear standards, the Equal Protection Clause has traditionally been interpreted to protect members of vulnerable groups and the exercise of 22 fundamental rights from arbitrary government conduct. Recently, in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech,23 the United States Supreme Court affirmed that the Equal Protection Clause protects individuals, as well as vulnerable groups and fundamental rights from 15Olech, 160 F.3d at 388. 161d. 17 J.Michael McGuinness, Equal Protection for Non-Suspect Class Victims of Governmental Misconduct: Teonj and Proof of Disparate Treatment and Arbitrariness Clahns, 18 CAMPBELL L. REV. 333, 356 (1996). Professor McGuinness contends that the vast majority of Americans have not been given some "special status or privilege" through suspect class or fundamental rights protection. Id. See also infra notes 66-77 and accompanying text for an explanation of suspect class and fundamental rights. IS See, e.g., Brief of Respondent at 6, Viii. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S. Ct. 1073 (per curiam) (No. 98-1288) (alleging that the Olechs suffered mental and physical distress because they spent the winter without running water); Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176,178 (7th Cir. 1995) (contending that the mayor conducted a "campaign of vengeance" against him by denying a license and causing the police to harass him); Rubinovitz v. Rogato, 60 F.3d 906,912 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding that local officials may have engaged in a conspiracy to cause substantial harm to the plaintiffs for malicious reasons). 9 1 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. 2 See infra note 60 and accompanying text. 21 McGuinness, supra note 17, at 334-35 ("The constitutional text offers virtually no guidance into the meaning of equal protection."); see also Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537,542 (1982). 22 See infra Part IL.A for the traditional types of protection that the Supreme Court has recognized under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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