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Military and Strategic Affairs Volume 5 | No. 2 | September 2013 Processes of Military Decision Making Dudi (Yehuda) Alon Korea’s Wartime Command: Sovereignty, Security, and Independence Alon Levkowitz Military Contrarianism in Israel: Room for Opposition by the Chief of Sta to Politicians Yagil Levy Who Will Stop the Robots? Liran Antebi The Military Secretary at the Junction of Israel’s Security Decisions Shmuel Even The Revolutionary Guards and the International Drug Trade Sami Kronenfeld and Yoel Guzansky Cyber Weapons and International Stability Guy-Philippe Goldstein Don’t Terminate: Deter to Prevent Uri Rechav המכון למחקרי ביטחון לאומי THE INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITYc STUDIES INCORPORATING THE JAFFEE bd CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES ISSN 2307-193X (print) • E-ISSN 2307-8634 (online) Military and Strategic Affairs Volume 5 | No. 2 | September 2013 CONTENTS Processes of Military Decision Making | 3 Dudi (Yehuda) Alon Korea’s Wartime Command: Sovereignty, Security, and Independence | 21 Alon Levkowitz Military Contrarianism in Israel: Room for Opposition by the Chief of Staff to Politicians | 39 Yagil Levy Who Will Stop the Robots? | 61 Liran Antebi The Military Secretary at the Junction of Israel’s Security Decisions | 79 Shmuel Even The Revolutionary Guards and the International Drug Trade | 105 Sami Kronenfeld and Yoel Guzansky Cyber Weapons and International Stability | 121 Guy-Philippe Goldstein Don’t Terminate: Deter to Prevent | 141 Uri Rechav The purpose of Military and Strategic Affairs is to stimulate Military and and enrich the public debate on military issues relating to Strategic Affairs Israel’s national security. Military and Strategic Affairs is a refereed journal published three times a year within the framework of the Military and Strategic Affairs Program at the Institute for National Security Studies. Articles are written by INSS researchers and guest contributors. The views presented here are those of the authors alone. The Institute for National Security Studies is a public benefit company. Editor in Chief: Amos Yadlin Editor: Gabi Siboni Editorial Board: Udi Dekel, Oded Eran, Zaki Shalom Journal Coordinator: Daniel Cohen Editorial Advisory Board • Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Swiss Federal • Jeffrey A. Larsen, Science Applications Institute of Technology Zurich, Switzerland International Corporation, US • Frank J. Cilluffo, George Washington • James Lewis, Center for Strategic and University, US International Studies, US • Stephen J. Cimbala, Penn State University, • Theo Neethling, University of the Free US State, South Africa • Rut Diamint, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, • John Nomikos, Research Institute for Argentina European and American Studies, • Maria Raquel Freire, University of Coimbra, Greece Portugal • T.V. Paul, McGill University, Canada • Metin Heper, Bilkent University, Turkey • Glen Segell, Securitatem Vigilate, Ireland • Peter Viggo Jakobson, Royal Danish • Bruno Tertrais, Fondation pour la Defence College, Denmark Recherché Strategique, France • Sunjoy Joshi, Observer Research • James J. Wirtz, Naval Postgraduate School, Foundation, India US • Efraim Karsh, King’s College London, • Ricardo Israel Zipper, Universidad United Kingdom Autónoma de Chile, Chile • Kai Michael Kenkel, Pontifical Catholic • Daniel Zirker, University of Waikato, University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil New Zealand Graphic Design: Michal Semo-Kovetz, Yael Bieber, Tel Aviv University Graphic Design Studio Printing: Elinir The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) 40 Haim Levanon • POB 39950 • Tel Aviv 6997556 • Israel Tel: +972-3-640-0400 • Fax: +972-3-744-7590 • E-mail: [email protected] Military and Strategic Affairs is published in English and Hebrew. The full text is available on the Institute’s website: www.inss.org.il © 2013. All rights reserved. ISSN 2307-193X (print) • E-ISSN 2307-8634 (online) Processes of Military Decision Making Dudi (Yehuda) Alon This essay examines the prevalent theoretical approaches to decision making and surveys practical models appropriate to the military setting. It discusses and compares the relative advantages and disadvantages of each model, and then makes recommendations about their application to the military decision making process. Currently, two major approaches, the rational and the cognitive, offer an orderly process that may help military leaders make better decisions. Neither is yet complete. Each approach offers its own set of concepts to attain the chief products of the decision making process. These sets of concepts blur the real differences between the approaches and draw one into a debate that does not deal with essence. In addition, both approaches tend at times to take the tools and the ideas and over-develop them into hobbling, constraining techniques, thereby missing the fruits that could have been reaped by a more informed, tempered use of them as ideas. Thus finding a bridge between the approaches that recognizes the advantages and disadvantages of each and makes a temperate, judicious use of the respective tools can allow us to enjoy the best of both worlds. Keywords: decision making; situation assessment; strategic planning; strategic military leadership Orderly processes of decision making are supposed to give the decision makers – and those who are charged with evaluating their conduct – means to construct and oversee good judgment that will be helpful in reducing the risk of uncontrolled reliance on emotion, unfounded intuition, impulsive response, and personal or political considerations liable to be disruptive to an orderly routine. The Winograd Commission Report, p. 54 Lt. Col. (ret.) Dudi Alon served as head of the joint doctrine branch in the IDF Doctrine and Training Division. Military and Strategic Affairs | Volume 5 | No. 2 | September 2013 3 DUDI (YEHUda) ALON | Processes OF Military DECISION MAKING 4 Introduction It is impossible to overstate the importance of the decision making process for the military leader tasked with fulfilling a mission imposed on him by the political echelon. The quality of the decision making process among the upper command levels is among the factors determining the army’s success in attaining the desired political goals, and some claim it is even more important than the combat itself.1 Similarly, more than anything else, history tends to associate successes and failures with the quality of the situation assessment and the decisions made by the military commander | Volume 5 | No. 2 | September 2013 5 | No. Volume | in preparation for operations and in their execution. Is military leadership an art or is it an orderly, organized analytical process? Is it the result of brilliance and intuition or of calculated, logical deduction? Or is it a combination of these and other factors? What are Strategic Affairs the major obstacles in the attempt to provide a process to guide military and decision making using an orderly format so that the commander and the members of his staff can make decisions in an effective, harmonious, Military synchronized way? This essay examines the prevalent theoretical approaches to decision making and, with that as background, surveys practical models deemed appropriate to the military setting. The essay discusses and compares the relative advantages and disadvantages of each model, and then makes recommendations about their application to the military decision making process. The Essence of the Doctrine in Planning Military Operations The key issues a commander and his staff face when planning operations are decisions regarding definition of the operation and definition of the method to execute it. To make these decisions, the command must understand the intention and goals of the upper echelon regarding the specific operation. While there are concomitant secondary processes, the core of the planning and its major outcomes lies in defining the task and the way to accomplish it.2 The mission is defined by the commander on the basis of a command or directive from the upper echelon or on the basis of his own initiative given his understanding of the situation and the responsibility with which he has been charged. Deciding on how to use force to fulfill a mission is an expression of the commander’s military leadership. In order to execute a decision making process the commander must gain an in-depth DUDI (YEHUda) ALON | Processes OF Military DECISION MAKING 5 understanding of the operational problems and formulate the solutions that will attain the mission’s goals in the most efficient and effective way possible. Military doctrine tries to provide a process of decision making for the planning of operations to generate these two products, that is, definition of the mission and definition of the method, along with other aspects required of the command, from receiving operational tasks from superiors to giving operational tasks to subordinates. The decision making process is usually presented as a model consisting of steps and outcomes. A direct continuation of the decision making process during planning is the 2 | September 2013 5 | No. Volume | operational command and control process, but that is beyond the scope of this essay. Theoretical Approaches Strategic Affairs One may divide the many models in this field into two major currents and and approaches. a. The rational-philosophical current3 relies on logic as its primary tool, i.e., Military calling for as good an analytical assessment as possible of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and risks. The rational current perceives the