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((QUESTION)) for a Single Task in Protected Mode, the 80386 Can Address--- Al Memory of Virtual Memory 32 GB

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((QUESTION)) for a Single Task in Protected Mode, the 80386 Can Address--- Al Memory of Virtual Memory 32 GB ((MARKS)) 1 (1/2/3...) ((QUESTION)) For a single task in protected mode, the 80386 can address--- ----Vitual memory the virtual memory of Virtual memory ((OPTION_A)) 32 GB ((OPTION_B)) 64 MB ((OPTION_C)) 32 TB ((OPTION_D)) 64 TB ((CORRECT_C D HOICE)) (A/B/C/D) ((EXPLANATI ON)) (OPTIONAL) ((MARKS)) 1 (1/2/3...) ((QUESTION)) The mechanism to provide protection, that is accomplished with the help of read/write privileges is with the help of read/write ((OPTION_A)) restricted use of segments ((OPTION_B)) restricted accesses to segments ((OPTION_C)) privileged instructions ((OPTION_D)) privileged operations ((CORRECT_C A HOICE)) (A/B/C/D) ((EXPLANATI ON)) (OPTIONAL) ((MARKS)) 1 (1/2/3...) ((QUESTION)) The mechanism that is accomplished using descriptor usages limitations, and rules of privilege check is ((OPTION_A)) privileged instruction check ((OPTION_B)) operation reference check ((OPTION_C)) segment load check ((OPTION_D)) none of the mentioned ((CORRECT_C B HOICE)) (A/B/C/D) ((EXPLANATI ON)) (OPTIONAL) ((MARKS)) 1 (1/2/3...) ((QUESTION)) The mechanism that is executed at certain privilege levels, determined by CPL (Current Privilege Level) and I/O privilege level (IOPL) is ((OPTION_A)) restricted use of segments ((OPTION_B)) restricted accesses to segments ((OPTION_C)) privileged instructions or operations ((OPTION_D)) none of the mentioned ((CORRECT_C C HOICE)) (A/B/C/D) ((EXPLANATI ON)) (OPTIONAL) ((MARKS)) 1 (1/2/3...) ((QUESTION)) The paging unit is enabled only in ((OPTION_A)) virtual mode ((OPTION_B)) addressing mode ((OPTION_C)) protected mode ((OPTION_D)) none of the mentioned ((CORRECT_C c HOICE)) (A/B/C/D) ((EXPLANATI ON)) (OPTIONAL) ((MARKS)) 1 (1/2/3...) ((QUESTION)) The bit that is used for providing protection is ((OPTION_A)) User/Supervisor bit ((OPTION_B)) Read bit ((OPTION_C)) Write bit ((OPTION_D)) all of the mentioned ((CORRECT_C d HOICE)) (A/B/C/D) ((EXPLANATI The User/Supervisor (U/S) bit and Read/Write (R/W) bit are used ON)) to provide protection (OPTIONAL) ((MARKS)) 1 (1/2/3...) ((QUESTION)) To enter in protected mode,____________ bit should be at logic 1. ((OPTION_A)) PG ((OPTION_B)) ET ((OPTION_C)) PE ((OPTION_D)) NT ((CORRECT_C C HOICE)) (A/B/C/D) ((EXPLANATI ON)) (OPTIONAL) ((MARKS)) 1 (1/2/3...) ((QUESTION)) In 80386, privilege levels are defined by _______ ((OPTION_A)) DPL ((OPTION_B)) CPL ((OPTION_C)) RPL ((OPTION_D)) All of above ((CORRECT_C D HOICE)) (A/B/C/D) ((EXPLANATI) ) (OPTIONAL) ((MARKS)) 1 (1/2/3...) ((QUESTION)) How many privilege levels are available in 80386 ((OPTION_A)) 1 ((OPTION_B)) 2 ((OPTION_C)) 3 ((OPTION_D)) 4 ((CORRECT_C D HOICE)) (A/B/C/D) ((EXPLANATI ON)) (OPTIONAL) ((MARKS)) 1 (1/2/3...) ((QUESTION)) Which is highest privilege level in 80386 ((OPTION_A)) 1 ((OPTION_B)) 3 ((OPTION_C)) 2 ((OPTION_D)) 0 ((CORRECT_C D HOICE)) (A/B/C/D) ((EXPLANATI ON)) (OPTIONAL) ((MARKS)) 1 (1/2/3...) ((QUESTION)) Which is LOWEST privilege level in 80386 ((OPTION_A)) 1 ((OPTION_B)) 0 ((OPTION_C)) 3 ((OPTION_D)) 2 ((CORRECT_C C HOICE)) (A/B/C/D) ((EXPLANATI) ) (OPTIONAL) ((MARKS)) 1 (1/2/3...) ((QUESTION)) The unit that provides a four level protection mechanism, for system‟s code and data against application program is ((OPTION_A)) central processing unit ((OPTION_B)) segmentation unit ((OPTION_C)) bus interface unit ((OPTION_D)) none of the mentioned ((CORRECT_C B HOICE)) (A/B/C/D) ((EXPLANATI) ) (OPTIONAL) ((MARKS)) 1 (1/2/3...) ((QUESTION)) In protected mode of 80386, the VM flag is set by using ((OPTION_A)) IRET instruction ((OPTION_B)) task switch operation ((OPTION_C)) IRET instruction or task switch operation ((OPTION_D)) none of the mentioned ((CORRECT_C C HOICE)) (A/B/C/D) ((EXPLANATI) ) (OPTIONAL) ((MARKS)) 1 (1/2/3...) ((QUESTION)) By using privilege mechanism the protection from unauthorised accesses is done to ((OPTION_A)) operating system ((OPTION_B)) interrupt handlers ((OPTION_C)) system softwares ((OPTION_D)) all of the mentioned ((CORRECT_CHO D ICE)) (A/B/C/D) ((EXPLANATIOPT IONAL) ((MARKS)) 1 (1/2/3...) ((QUESTION)) The task privilege level at the instant of execution is called ((OPTION_A)) Descriptor privilege level (DPL) ((OPTION_B)) Current privilege level (CPL) ((OPTION_C)) Effective privilege level (EPL) ((OPTION_D)) none of the mentioned ((CORRECT_CH B OICE)) A/B/C/D) ((EXPLANATIO N)) (OPTIONAL) ((MARKS)) 1 (1/2/3...) ((QUESTION)) Once the CPL is selected, it can be changed by ((OPTION_A)) HOLD ((OPTION_B)) transferring control using system descriptors ((OPTION_C)) transferring control using gate descriptors ((OPTION_D)) transferring control using interrupt descriptors ((CORRECT_C C HOICE)) (A/B/C/D) ((EXPLANATI ON)) (OPTIONAL) ((MARKS)) 1 (1/2/3...) ((QUESTION)) The data segments defined in GDT (global descriptor table) and the LDT (local descriptor table) can be accessed by a task with ((OPTION_A)) privilege level 0 ((OPTION_B)) privilege level 1 ((OPTION_C)) privilege level 2 ((OPTION_D)) privilege level 3 ((CORRECT_C A HOICE)) (A/B/C/D) ((EXPLANATI ON)) (OPTIONAL) ((MARKS)) 1 (1/2/3...) ((QUESTION)) A task with privilege level 0, does not refer to all the lower level privilege descriptors in ((OPTION_A)) GDT (global descriptor table) ((OPTION_B)) LDT (local descriptor table) ((OPTION_C)) IDT (interrupt descriptor table) ((OPTION_D)) none of the mentioned ((CORRECT_C B HOICE)) (A/B/C/D) ((EXPLANATI ON)) (OPTIONAL) ((MARKS)) 1 (1/2/3...) ((QUESTION)) The selector RPL that uses a less trusted privilege than the current privilege level for further use is known as ((OPTION_A)) Least task privilege level ((OPTION_B)) descriptor privilege level ((OPTION_C)) effective privilege level ((OPTION_D)) none of the mentioned ((CORRECT_C C HOICE)) (A/B/C/D) ((EXPLANATI ON)) (OPTIONAL) ((MARKS)) 1 (1/2/3...) ((QUESTION)) The effective privilege level is ((OPTION_A)) maximum numeric of RPL and CPL ((OPTION_B)) minimum privilege of RPL and CPL ((OPTION_C)) numeric minimum and privilege maximum of RPL and CPL ((OPTION_D)) none of the mentioned ((CORRECT_C C HOICE)) (A/B/C/D) ((EXPLANATI ON)) (OPTIONAL) ((MARKS)) 1 (1/2/3...) ((QUESTION)) The task requesting an access to a descriptor is allowed to access after checking the ((OPTION_A)) type of descriptor ((OPTION_B)) privilege level ((OPTION_C)) type of descriptor and privilege level ((OPTION_D)) corresponding segment ((CORRECT_C C HOICE)) (A/B/C/D) ((EXPLANATI ON)) (OPTIONAL) ((MARKS)) 1 (1/2/3...) ((QUESTION)) A CALL instruction can reference only a code segment descriptor with ((OPTION_A)) DPL less privilege than CPL ((OPTION_B)) DPL equal privilege to CPL ((OPTION_C)) DPL greater privilege than CPL ((OPTION_D)) all of the mentioned ((CORRECT_C B HOICE)) (A/B/C/D) ((EXPLANATI ON)) (OPTIONAL) ((MARKS)) 1 (1/2/3...) ((QUESTION)) The RPL of a selector that referred to the code descriptor must have a) b) c) d) ((OPTION_A)) less privilege than CPL ((OPTION_B)) greater privilege than CPL ((OPTION_C)) equal privilege than CPL ((OPTION_D)) any privilege regarding CPL ((CORRECT_C C HOICE)) (A/B/C/D) ((EXPLANATI ON)) (OPTIONAL) ((MARKS)) 1 (1/2/3...) ((QUESTION)) The instruction that refers to only code segment descriptors with DPL equal to or less than the task CPL is ((OPTION_A)) CALL ((OPTION_B)) IRET ((OPTION_C)) ESC ((OPTION_D)) RET and IRET ((CORRECT_C D HOICE)) (A/B/C/D) ((EXPLANATI ON)) (OPTIONAL) ((MARKS)) 1 (1/2/3...) ((QUESTION)) By using privilege mechanism the protection from unauthorised accesses is done to ((OPTION_A)) operating system ((OPTION_B)) interrupt handlers ((OPTION_C)) system softwares ((OPTION_D)) all of the mentioned ((CORRECT_C D HOICE)) (A/B/C/D) ((EXPLANATI ON)) (OPTIONAL) ((MARKS)) 1 (1/2/3...) ((QUESTION)) The mechanism to provide protection, that is accomplished with the help of read/write privileges is ((OPTION_A)) restricted use of segments ((OPTION_B)) restricted accesses to segments ((OPTION_C)) privileged instructions ((OPTION_D)) privileged operations ((CORRECT_C A HOICE)) (A/B/C/D) ((EXPLANATI ON)) (OPTIONAL) ((MARKS)) 1 (1/2/3...) ((QUESTION)) The mechanism that is accomplished using descriptor usages limitations, and rules of privilege check is ((OPTION_A)) privileged instruction check ((OPTION_B)) operation reference check ((OPTION_C)) segment load check ((OPTION_D)) none of the mentioned ((CORRECT_C B HOICE)) (A/B/C/D) ((EXPLANATI ON)) (OPTIONAL) ((MARKS)) 1 (1/2/3...) ((QUESTION)) The mechanism that is executed at certain privilege levels, determined by CPL (Current Privilege Level) and I/O privilege level (IOPL) is ((OPTION_A)) restricted use of segments ((OPTION_B)) restricted accesses to segments ((OPTION_C)) privileged instructions or operations ((OPTION_D)) none of the mentioned ((CORRECT_C C HOICE)) (A/B/C/D) ((EXPLANATI ON)) (OPTIONAL) ((MARKS)) 1 (1/2/3...) ((QUESTION)) If CPL is not of the required privilege level, then the instructions that get affected is ((OPTION_A)) IRET ((OPTION_B)) POPF ((OPTION_C)) IRET and POPF ((OPTION_D)) none of the mentioned ((CORRECT_C C HOICE)) (A/B/C/D) ((EXPLANATI ON)) (OPTIONAL) ((MARKS)) 1 (1/2/3...) ((QUESTION)) If CPL is greater than zero, then the instruction that remains unaffected is ((OPTION_A)) IRET ((OPTION_B)) POPF ((OPTION_C)) IRET and POPF ((OPTION_D)) none of the mentioned ((CORRECT_C C HOICE)) (A/B/C/D) ((EXPLANATI ON)) (OPTIONAL) ((MARKS)) 1 (1/2/3...) ((QUESTION)) The condition, “CPL not equals to zero” satisfies, when executing the instruction ((OPTION_A)) LIDT ((OPTION_B)) LGDT ((OPTION_C)) LTR ((OPTION_D)) all of the mentioned ((CORRECT_C D HOICE)) (A/B/C/D) ((EXPLANATI ON)) (OPTIONAL) ((MARKS)) 1 (1/2/3...) ((QUESTION)) While
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