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UK policy Stuart Adam

© Institute for Fiscal Studies

Aims

• Describe the current UK tax system

• Historical and international context

• Recent policy developments and debates

• Strengths and weaknesses

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Outline

• Revenues

– Direct personal – Corporate income taxes – Indirect taxes – Property and local taxes – Cross-cutting issues

• The tax policy-making process

 Not going to talk (much) about benefits

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Useful links

• This presentation – http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/7378 • HM Revenue and (HMRC) Statistics – https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/hm-revenue- customs/about/statistics • HM Treasury – https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/hm-treasury • Office for Budget Responsibility: official public finances monitor – http://budgetresponsibility.org.uk/ • User-friendly facts and figures, Budget analysis, etc – http://www.ifs.org.uk/tools_and_resources • The Mirrlees Review of tax policy – http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/mirrleesreview

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Some background

• Tax year runs from 6 April to 5 April

• Budgets usually in March (and Autumn Statements in Nov/Dec)

• Coalition government in office from May 2010 to May 2015

• Big government budget deficit following the 2008 crisis – But mostly being closed by spending cuts, not tax increases

• Scotland’s independence referendum

© Institute for Fiscal Studies UK

46% Total receipts 44% Net taxes and social security contributions 42%

40%

38%

% of of GDP % 36%

34%

32%

30%

07 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 09 11 13 15 17 19

------

2006 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018

Source: Office for Budget Responsibility © Institute for Fiscal Studies as a share of GDP

60% 1978 2011 50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0% UK OECD USA Fra Ger Ita Jap Can Swe Ire Aus

Source: OECD.stat © Institute for Fiscal Studies Composition of revenue, 2014-15 forecast

Other receipts 26% Local 14% (council) tax 4% Capital taxes 4%

Corporation tax 7%

Other indirect National taxes 11% 17%

VAT 17%

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Source: Office for Budget Responsibility Composition of revenue

100% Other receipts 90% Local taxes 80% Capital taxes 70% Corporation tax 60% 50% Other indirect taxes 40% VAT

30% National Insurance 20% Income tax 10% 0% 1978-79 1997-98 2007-08 2010-11 2014-15

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Source: Office for Budget Responsibility, HM Treasury, author’s calculations Composition of tax revenue, 2011

100% Other taxes 90% Other capital taxes 80% Recurrent buildings 70% taxes Corporation tax 60% Other indirect taxes 50% VAT/GST 40% SSCs + 30% Income tax + CGT 20%

10%

0% UK OECD USA Fra Ger Ita Jap Can Swe Ire Aus

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Source: OECD.stat Income tax schedule For earned income, April 2014 prices

90% 1978-79

80% 2009-10

70% 2014-15

60%

50%

40%

30%

20% Marginal income tax income Marginal

10%

0% £0 £25,000 £50,000 £75,000 £100,000 £125,000 £150,000 £175,000 Income

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Income tax schedule For earned income, April 2014 prices

90% 2009-10

80%

70% 2014-15

60%

50%

40%

30%

20% Marginal income tax rate tax income Marginal

10%

0% £0 £25,000 £50,000 £75,000 £100,000 £125,000 £150,000 £175,000 Income

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Recent reforms to the income tax schedule

• Personal allowance to reach £10,500 in 2015-16 – £2,855 higher than plans govt inherited – costs over £12 billion per year – Basic-rate taxpayers gain £571 a year; 2.4 million taken out of income tax

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Increasing the personal allowance Distributional impact of an increase from £10,000 to £12,500 2.5%

2.0% income 1.5%

1.0% Change net in Change

0.5%

0.0% Poorest 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Richest All Income Decile Group

Assumes higher-rate threshold held constant. Source: Figure 7.4 of The IFS Green Budget: February 2014 © Institute for Fiscal Studies Income tax schedule For earned income, April 2014 prices

90% 2009-10

80%

70% 2014-15

60%

50%

40%

30%

20% Marginal income tax rate tax income Marginal

10%

0% £0 £25,000 £50,000 £75,000 £100,000 £125,000 £150,000 £175,000 Income

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Recent reforms to the income tax schedule

• Personal allowance to reach £10,500 in 2015-16 – £2,855 higher than plans govt inherited – costs over £12 billion per year – Basic-rate taxpayers gain £571 a year; 2.4 million taken out of income tax

• Higher-rate threshold will be £5,560 lower than plans inherited – 1.4m more higher-rate taxpayers

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Number of higher-rate taxpayers

6

5

4

3 Millions 2

1

0

79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15

------

1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014

Note: includes additional rate taxpayers. © Institute for Fiscal Studies Source: HMRC Statistics and IFS projections Income tax schedule For earned income, April 2014 prices

90% 2009-10

80%

70% 2014-15

60%

50%

40%

30%

20% Marginal income tax rate tax income Marginal

10%

0% £0 £25,000 £50,000 £75,000 £100,000 £125,000 £150,000 £175,000 Income

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Recent reforms to the income tax schedule

• Personal allowance to reach £10,500 in 2015-16 – £2,855 higher than plans govt inherited – costs over £12 billion per year – Basic-rate taxpayers gain £571 a year; 2.4 million taken out of income tax

• Higher-rate threshold will be £5,560 lower than plans inherited – 1.4m more higher-rate taxpayers

• 50% rate introduced above £150,000, then reduced to 45% – The 1% of taxpayers affected provide 30% of income tax revenue – Best guess is little revenue effect, but no-one really knows

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Top tax rate and revenue: the government’s view

Source: HMRC (2012), The Exchequer effect of the 50 per cent additional rate of income tax

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Income tax schedule For earned income, April 2014 prices

90% 2009-10

80%

70% 2014-15

60%

50%

40%

30%

20% Marginal income tax rate tax income Marginal

10%

0% £0 £25,000 £50,000 £75,000 £100,000 £125,000 £150,000 £175,000 Income

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Recent reforms to the income tax schedule

• Personal allowance to reach £10,500 in 2015-16 – £2,855 higher than plans govt inherited – costs over £12 billion per year – Basic-rate taxpayers gain £571 a year; 2.4 million taken out of income tax

• Higher-rate threshold will be £5,560 lower than plans inherited – 1.4m more higher-rate taxpayers

• 50% rate introduced above £150,000, then reduced to 45% – The 1% of taxpayers affected provide 30% of income tax revenue – Best guess is little revenue effect, but no-one really knows

• Personal allowance gradually withdrawn once income exceeds £100k – Equivalent to a 60% tax band – why not call it that?

– Bizarre shape for the rate schedule!

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Income tax treatment of the family

• Shift from (largely) joint to individual taxation in 1990 – Part of an international trend

• Abolition of additional allowances for marriage and children

• Shift towards providing support for low-income families via tax credits – 2003 reforms created big practical problems

• Tax credits now starting to be merged with several means-tested working-age benefits into a single ‘universal credit’ – But implementation problems  running far behind schedule

• Income tax now starting to depend on family circumstances again – Used to withdraw child benefit from those with high incomes – 10% of tax allowance transferable to basic-rate spouse from April 2015

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Collecting income tax

• 90% collected via Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE) – Exact cumulative deduction of tax by employers – So two-thirds of taxpayers don’t fill in a tax return – Unusual internationally – Works well for most, but goes badly wrong for a sizeable minority – Similar system withholds basic-rate tax from bank interest

• Self-assessment (tax returns) for those with more complex affairs

• Real-Time Information (RTI) reporting introduced in April 2013 – Employers must report salaries when paid, not at end of year – Partly so government can use information to adjust benefit awards – ‘Temporary’ easing of requirements for many small firms

© Institute for Fiscal Studies National Insurance contributions (NICs)

• Simple rate schedule, applied to earnings only: – Employers: 13.8% of earnings above £153 per week – Employees: 12% between £153 and £805 per week; 2% above that – Self-employed pay much less • Since April 2014, each employer gets £2,000 deduction • Just another income tax – not really social insurance – Link between ‘contributions’ and benefits small and shrinking – Could be transformed into a true social insurance scheme. Otherwise... • Should be merged with income tax: a major simplification • Not perceived as just another income tax – leads to bad policymaking – Why increase income tax allowance but not NICs threshold? – 2001 election: promised not to increase income tax, then increased NICs

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Income tax and NICs treatment of saving

• By default, savings income subject to normal income tax, but not NICs – Lower income tax on dividends, reflecting corporation tax already paid • However... • Individual Savings Accounts (ISAs) are tax-free – Can put up to £15,000 per year into these, in cash or shares • No tax on imputed income from owner-occupied housing • : – Income tax relief on contributions, up to a limit which has been reduced in recent years (NICs relief on employer contributions only) – No tax on income within the fund – Income tax (but not NICs) on money withdrawn except a 25% lump sum • So in practice most savings are tax-free – And pensions are subsidised in ill-designed ways

© Institute for Fiscal Studies

• Levied on gains above £11,000 realised in a particular year

• 18% for basic-rate taxpayers, 28% for higher-rate taxpayers – Only 10% for first £10m of lifetime gains on owner-managed businesses

• Policy has gone round in circles – Tension between encouraging investment and preventing avoidance

• Exemptions: – Main homes, pensions, ISAs – Any gains unrealised at death

© Institute for Fiscal Studies

• Levied at 40% on estates above £325,000 – Since 2007, any unused allowance passed to surviving spouse£650,000 • Threshold frozen from 2009-10 to 2017-18: 22% real-terms reduction – Despite Prime Minister’s stated desire to increase the threshold

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Inheritance tax

0.30 Receipts as a share of national income (left axis) 12 Taxpayers as a share of deaths (right axis) 0.25 10

0.20 8

0.15 6 % of of GDP % 0.10 4 of deaths %

0.05 2

0.00 0

95 05 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 97 99 01 03 07 09 11 13 15 17 19

------

1994 2004 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1996 1998 2000 2002 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018

Note: estates subject to inheritance tax, or capital transfer tax before 1986-87 © Institute for Fiscal Studies Source: authors’ calculations based on data from HMRC, OBR and ONS Inheritance tax

• Levied at 40% on estates above £325,000 – Since 2007, any unused allowance passed to surviving spouse£650,000 • Threshold frozen from 2009-10 to 2017-18: 22% real-terms reduction – Despite Prime Minister’s stated desire to increase the threshold • Gifts made in the seven years before death taxed on a sliding scale – Gifts made earlier than that escape tax altogether • Exemptions: spouse, charities; agricultural land, some business assets • Easier to avoid for the very wealthy than the moderately wealthy • Unpopular • Should either abolish or transform into tax on lifetime receipts – At the very least, remove some of most obvious avoidance opportunities

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Corporation tax

• Revenue heavily reliant on a few big companies – 390 companies (<0.1% of taxpayers) accounted for 45% of revenue in 2012-13

• Unusually, current government published a ‘ roadmap’ soon after taking office and has largely stuck to it

• Recently moved to exempting foreign-source income from tax – Except some ‘passive’ income from low-taxed subsidiaries

• Concern over debt-equity bias, but little done about it

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Corporation tax rates

60% Main rate 50% Small profits rate

40%

30% £8bn per year 20%

10%

0%

1980 1978 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Corporate income tax rates, 2014

Ireland Slovenia Czech Republic Hungary Poland Chile Finland Iceland Turkey Estonia UK Switzerland Slovak Republic Sweden Korea Denmark Austria Netherlands OECD average Greece Canada Israel Norway Italy New Zealand Luxembourg Australia Mexico Spain Germany G7 average Portugal Belgium France Japan USA 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Source: OECD Tax Database Corporation tax revenue, % of GDP

4.0%

3.5%

3.0%

2.5%

2.0%

1.5%

1.0%

0.5%

0.0%

01 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19

------

2000 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018

Sources: HM Treasury; Office for Budget Responsibility © Institute for Fiscal Studies Capital allowances for depreciation

• Allowances vary between asset classes – Set down in law, not based on accounting depreciation

• Gradually made less generous – In line with international trend towards broadening corporate tax base – But UK’s allowances look stringent by international standards

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Present value of capital allowances, 2012

Greece Slovak Republic Belgium Switzerland South Korea Czech Republic Spain France Portugal Israel Luxembourg Sweden Iceland Finland Denmark Turkey Italy OECD average Mexico Australia Slovenia Ireland Canada Austria USA G7 average Germany Hungary Norway Poland Netherlands Japan New Zealand UK Chile 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%

Note: weighted average of selected investments. See Bilicka and Devereux (2012), © Institute for Fiscal Studies CBT corporate tax ranking 2012 for details and other assumptions. Effective average tax rates, 2012

Ireland Slovenia Slovak Republic Czech Republic Greece Poland Turkey Switzerland Iceland South Korea Hungary Netherlands Chile Israel Austria Finland Denmark OECD average Italy Sweden Luxembourg Canada UK Portugal New Zealand Norway Mexico Australia Germany Belgium G7 average France Spain USA Japan 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%

Note: weighted average of selected investments. See Bilicka and Devereux (2012), © Institute for Fiscal Studies CBT corporate tax ranking 2012 for details and other assumptions. Effective marginal tax rates, 2012

Italy Greece Switzerland South Korea Ireland Slovak Republic Netherlands Czech Republic Turkey Slovenia Poland Luxembourg Iceland Israel Hungary Austria Belgium OECD average Portugal Canada Sweden Finland Denmark G7 average Mexico France Germany Spain Australia Chile New Zealand Norway UK USA Japan -10% -5% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%

Note: weighted average of selected investments. See Bilicka and Devereux (2012), © Institute for Fiscal Studies CBT corporate tax ranking 2012 for details and other assumptions. Capital allowances for depreciation

• Allowances vary between asset classes – Set down in law, not based on accounting depreciation

• Gradually made less generous – In line with international trend towards broadening corporate tax base – But UK’s allowances look stringent by international standards

• Since 2008, Annual Investment Allowance writes off some plant and machinery investment immediately – Generally covers all plant and machinery investment for small firms – Size of allowance has been very unstable

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Annual investment allowance

£500,000 £450,000 £400,000 £350,000 £300,000 £250,000 £200,000 £150,000 £100,000 £50,000 £0 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Tax treatment of intellectual property

• R&D relief – Introduced in April 2000 and expanded since – Additional relief over and above deducting 100% of R&D expenditure – More generous for small and medium-sized enterprises

• Patent Box – 10% tax rate on income from (products incorporating) patents – Being phased in from April 2013 – One of 14 European countries to introduce such a ‘box’ for IP – May be well targeted at attracting mobile profits – Not well targeted at stimulating innovation – Big cost of apply to lots of income not generated by patent itself – Scope to avoid tax by including patented items in products

© Institute for Fiscal Studies North Sea tax revenue, % of GDP

4.0%

3.5%

3.0%

2.5%

2.0%

1.5%

1.0%

0.5%

0.0%

01 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19

------

2000 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018

Sources: HM Treasury; Office for Budget Responsibility © Institute for Fiscal Studies Tax treatment of North Sea oil & gas production

• Much higher rate of corporation tax, 62% – Plus petroleum revenue tax  81% on profits from fields predating 1993 – More generous capital allowances, generally 100%

• Both high rate and 100% allowances make sense – 100% allowances minimise discouragement to investment – Oil and gas are in fixed location  no need for rate to be competitive

• Policy in this area has been subject to frequent change – Instability here especially undesirable given long planning horizons

• Review of policy currently under way

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS)

• A big political issue – Public anger that some firms sell a lot in the UK but pay little CT

• No-one knows how much revenue is being lost

• UK is enthusiastic participant in OECD project to counter BEPS – Tension with measures designed to attract profits to UK

• Likely to make some progress but not solve fundamental problem – How much of a multinational’s profit derives from UK production? – ‘Arm’s-length’ prices often not measurable

© Institute for Fiscal Studies VAT

• The EU is a major player in VAT policy – All member states must have a VAT – Minimum 15% main rate – Use of reduced rates restricted – Scope of zero rates cannot be extended – Various exemptions mandatory – Standardised definitions, rules and procedures

• Still lots of scope for national variation within these boundaries

© Institute for Fiscal Studies The main rate of VAT

20% £13bn 18% per year 16% 14% 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2%

0%

2006 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2008 2010 2012 2014

© Institute for Fiscal Studies VAT/GST rates, 2014

Hungary Iceland Denmark Norway Sweden Finland Greece Ireland Poland Portugal Italy Slovenia Belgium Czech Republic Netherlands Spain Austria Estonia France Slovak Republic UK OECD average Chile Germany Israel Turkey Mexico Luxembourg New Zealand Australia Korea Switzerland Canada Japan 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%

Note: USA excluded as it has no VAT. © Institute for Fiscal Studies Source: OECD Tax Database The VAT base

• UK applies a zero rate to more items than almost any other country – Most food, water, books, children’s clothes, transport, new housing… – Cost £40bn in 2013-14 (vs. total VAT revenue of £107bn) – A complex and distortionary way to achieve redistribution – can do better!

• Reduced rate of 5% applies principally to domestic fuel – Looks particularly bad given environmental concerns

• Exemptions are the most damaging aspect of VAT – VAT paid on inputs cannot be recovered  distorts production patterns – Principally financial services, public services and the public sector – Mostly mandated by EU for practical reasons, but there are alternatives – Effective exemption via high registration threshold (£81,000) more defensible

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Estimated VAT ‘gaps’ across the EU, 2011 % of theoretical liabilities

Romania Latvia Greece Slovakia Lithuania Hungary Czech Republic Italy Spain EU average France Estonia Luxembourg Belgium Portugal Bulgaria Poland Finland Austria UK Germany Denmark Ireland Slovenia Netherlands Malta Sweden 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%

Source: CASE & CPB (2013), Study to quantify and analyse the VAT Gap in the EU-27 Member States

© Institute for Fiscal Studies VAT revenue ratios, 2009 VAT revenue as % of (main rate x total consumption expenditure)

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0% Mex Spa Ita Fra Ire UK Aus OECD Ger Swe EU* Jap Lux NZ Cyp*

* 2008 figures © Institute for Fiscal Studies Sources: OECD Trends 2012; Adam et al. (2011) Other indirect taxes

• Alcohol and tobacco - £20.3bn – Among the highest rates in the EU

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Real-terms alcohol and tobacco duties (1978=100)

300

250 Cigarettes

200 Beer 150

100 Wine

50 Spirits

0

1980 1994 2008 1978 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2010 2012 2014

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Other indirect taxes

• Alcohol and tobacco - £20.3bn – Among the highest rates in the EU • Betting - £2.3bn • Road fuel - £26.8bn

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Real on a litre of petrol Pence, April 2013 prices

72

67 Current policy Policy inherited £6bn 62 per year 57

52

47

42

37

32

27

Apr 1982 Apr 2005 Apr Apr 1978 Apr 1979 Apr 1980 Apr 1981 Apr 1983 Apr 1984 Apr 1985 Apr 1986 Apr 1987 Apr 1988 Apr 1989 Apr 1990 Apr 1991 Apr 1992 Apr 1993 Apr 1994 Apr 1995 Apr 1996 Apr 1997 Apr 1998 Apr 1999 Apr 2000 Apr 2001 Apr 2002 Apr 2003 Apr 2004 Apr 2006 Apr 2007 Apr 2008 Apr 2009 Apr 2010 Apr 2011 Apr 2012 Apr 2013 Apr 2014 Apr 2015 Apr

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Fuel duty: to uprate or not to uprate?

Dates uprating Autumn Autumn Autumn Budget Budget due before Statement June 2012 Statement Statement 2011 2013 Budget 2011 2011 2012 2013

Apr 2011

Apr 2012

Apr 2013

Apr 2014

Apr 2015

Apr 2016

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Fuel duty: to uprate or not to uprate?

Dates uprating Autumn Autumn Autumn Budget Budget due before Statement June 2012 Statement Statement 2011 2013 Budget 2011 2011 2012 2013

Apr 2011 Jan 2012

Apr 2012 Aug 2012

Apr 2013 Apr 2013

Apr 2014 Apr 2014

Apr 2015 Apr 2015

Apr 2016 Apr 2016

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Fuel duty: to uprate or not to uprate?

Dates uprating Autumn Autumn Autumn Budget Budget due before Statement June 2012 Statement Statement 2011 2013 Budget 2011 2011 2012 2013

Apr 2011 Jan 2012 Aug 2012

Apr 2012 Aug 2012 Cancelled

Apr 2013 Apr 2013 Apr 2013

Apr 2014 Apr 2014 Apr 2014

Apr 2015 Apr 2015 Apr 2015

Apr 2016 Apr 2016 Apr 2016

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Fuel duty: to uprate or not to uprate?

Dates uprating Autumn Autumn Autumn Budget Budget due before Statement June 2012 Statement Statement 2011 2013 Budget 2011 2011 2012 2013

Apr 2011 Jan 2012 Aug 2012 Jan 2013

Apr 2012 Aug 2012 Cancelled Cancelled

Apr 2013 Apr 2013 Apr 2013 Apr 2013

Apr 2014 Apr 2014 Apr 2014 Apr 2014

Apr 2015 Apr 2015 Apr 2015 Apr 2015

Apr 2016 Apr 2016 Apr 2016 Apr 2016

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Fuel duty: to uprate or not to uprate?

Dates uprating Autumn Autumn Autumn Budget Budget due before Statement June 2012 Statement Statement 2011 2013 Budget 2011 2011 2012 2013

Apr 2011 Jan 2012 Aug 2012 Jan 2013 Cancelled

Apr 2012 Aug 2012 Cancelled Cancelled Cancelled

Apr 2013 Apr 2013 Apr 2013 Apr 2013 Sep 2013

Apr 2014 Apr 2014 Apr 2014 Apr 2014 Sep 2014

Apr 2015 Apr 2015 Apr 2015 Apr 2015 Sep 2015

Apr 2016 Apr 2016 Apr 2016 Apr 2016 Apr 2016

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Fuel duty: to uprate or not to uprate?

Dates uprating Autumn Autumn Autumn Budget Budget due before Statement June 2012 Statement Statement 2011 2013 Budget 2011 2011 2012 2013

Apr 2011 Jan 2012 Aug 2012 Jan 2013 Cancelled Cancelled

Apr 2012 Aug 2012 Cancelled Cancelled Cancelled Cancelled

Apr 2013 Apr 2013 Apr 2013 Apr 2013 Sep 2013 Cancelled

Apr 2014 Apr 2014 Apr 2014 Apr 2014 Sep 2014 Sep 2014

Apr 2015 Apr 2015 Apr 2015 Apr 2015 Sep 2015 Sep 2015

Apr 2016 Apr 2016 Apr 2016 Apr 2016 Apr 2016 Apr 2016

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Fuel duty: to uprate or not to uprate?

Dates uprating Autumn Autumn Autumn Budget Budget due before Statement June 2012 Statement Statement 2011 2013 Budget 2011 2011 2012 2013

Apr 2011 Jan 2012 Aug 2012 Jan 2013 Cancelled Cancelled Cancelled

Apr 2012 Aug 2012 Cancelled Cancelled Cancelled Cancelled Cancelled

Apr 2013 Apr 2013 Apr 2013 Apr 2013 Sep 2013 Cancelled Cancelled

Apr 2014 Apr 2014 Apr 2014 Apr 2014 Sep 2014 Sep 2014 Cancelled

Apr 2015 Apr 2015 Apr 2015 Apr 2015 Sep 2015 Sep 2015 Sep 2015

Apr 2016 Apr 2016 Apr 2016 Apr 2016 Apr 2016 Apr 2016 Apr 2016

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Other indirect taxes

• Alcohol and tobacco - £20.3bn – Among the highest rates in the EU • Betting - £2.3bn • Road fuel - £26.8bn – Big swings of direction; no clear policy – Too high to reflect emissions; not well targeted at congestion • Vehicle ownership - £5.9bn • Small environmental taxes introduced more recently: – (1994) - £3.2bn – tax (1996) - £1.3bn – levy (2001) - £2.0bn – (2002) - £0.3bn – London congestion charge (2003) - £0.2bn

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Implicit , 2013 £ per tonne CO2

£80 Electricity Gas £70 £60 £50 £40 £30 £20 £10 £0 -£10 -£20 Household Small business Medium business Large energy- intensive business

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Source: Advani et al. (2013), Energy use policies and carbon pricing in the UK Property and local taxes

Recap: • No VAT on housing • Income tax and CGT on rental housing but not owner-occupied – Though no tax relief on mortgage interest for owner-occupiers

3 taxes specifically on property: • - £27.6bn • Business rates - £26.9bn • - £12.7bn

 The UK’s three worst-designed taxes?

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Council tax • Replaced the short-lived and massively unpopular ‘poll tax’ in 1993 • Central government sets structure; local authorities choose rate – Though rises deemed ‘excessive’ by central govt now require referendum

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Council tax, 2014-15 In English local authority setting & Wales average Band D rate

£3,000

£2,500

£2,000

£1,500 Tax payable Tax

£1,000

£500

£0 £0 £50,000 £100,000 £150,000 £200,000 £250,000 £300,000 £350,000 £400,000 1991 property value

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Council tax • Replaced the short-lived and massively unpopular ‘poll tax’ in 1993 • Central government sets structure; local authorities choose rate – Though rises deemed ‘excessive’ by central govt now require referendum • Design has obvious weaknesses – Still based on 1991 property values in England and Scotland – Wide bands – Regressive – 25% discount for single occupancy  2 of 3 main parties now propose a ‘mansion tax’ – but better to fix CT • Discounts for low-income families – Working-age discounts localised in April 2013 • Unpopular – Central govts incentivised cash freezes since 2010 (2007 in Scotland) • Northern Ireland has different (more sensible) tax

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Receipts from recurrent taxes on non-domestic immovable property, 2011

Israel United Kingdom Australia* Poland* Netherlands* France OECD average* Sweden Belgium Slovenia Finland Slovakia Germany Mexico* Austria Czech Republic Norway South Korea 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 % of GDP

* Data for 2010 © Institute for Fiscal Studies Source: Figure 11.3, The IFS Green Budget 2014. Business rates

• A percentage of estimated market rental value of properties – 48.2% for high-rent properties in most of England & Scotland in 2014-15 – Reduced for low-rent properties – Rise in average bills linked to RPI inflation – bills didn’t fall in recession • Removed from local government control in 1990 – Though recent reform lets local govt keep some revenue from base growth • Had been admirably stable until recently... – 5-yearly revaluation delayed for the first time – Rate failed to keep pace with inflation for the first time – ‘Temporary’ doubling of small business rate relief, extended 4 times – Temporary relief for retail properties introduced • Discourages development and use of business property – Taxing value of land (excluding buildings) would not do this

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Stamp duty land tax

£180,000 May 1997 £160,000 May 2014

£140,000

£120,000 £40,000

£100,000

£80,000 Tax payable Tax

£60,000

£40,000

£20,000

£0 £0 £500,000 £1,000,000 £1,500,000 £2,000,000 £2,500,000 Sale price

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Note: residential property. Exemption threshold higher for non-residential property Stamp duty land tax

• ‘Slab’ structure absurd – £1 higher price can mean £40,000 higher tax bill

• More fundamentally, transactions should not be taxed at all – Why impose heavier tax on properties that change hands more often? – Assets should be held by the people who value them most – Reduced labour mobility one symptom of this more fundamental problem

• Stamp duties should not be part of the tax system – But don’t want to give up revenue / give windfall gains to current owners – So look to replace with better taxes rather than simply abolish

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Some issues that cut across taxes

• Avoidance and evasion – ‘Tax gap’ is a concern

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Estimated ‘tax gaps’, 2011-12

% of total (£35bn) Tobacco duties Alcohol duties Fuel duties 1% Other VAT 2% 3% Tobacco Income tax, duties NICs, CGT Corporation tax 4% 44%

Overall Corporation tax Alcohol duties 13%

Income tax, NICs, CGT

Other

Fuel duties VAT 33% 0% 4% 8% 12%

Tax gap (%)

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Source: HMRC, Measuring Tax Gaps 2013 Composition of tax gap by behaviour, 2011-12

Error Criminal Failure to 8% attacks take 13% reasonable care 12% Evasion 15%

Non-payment 13%

Hidden economy Legal 15% interpretation Avoidance 12% 12%

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Source: HMRC, Measuring Tax Gaps 2013 Some issues that cut across taxes

• Avoidance and evasion – ‘Tax gap’ is a concern – A raft of measures in every Budget and Autumn Statement – And a new General Anti-Abuse Rule (GAAR) since July 2013

• Distributional effects of the system as a whole

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Distributional effect of the tax and benefit system 2012-13, excluding most ‘business taxes’

60%

40%

20%

0%

-20%

% ofdisposable % income -40%

-60%

-80% Poorest 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Richest All Income Decile Group

Source: Author’s calculations from ONS (2014), The effects of taxes and © Institute for Fiscal Studies benefits on household income, 2012/2013 Impact of tax and benefit reforms Implemented June 2010 - April 2015 inclusive

£500

£0

-£500

-£1,000 income

-£1,500

-£2,000

Change net in Change -£2,500

-£3,000

-£3,500

-£4,000 Poorest 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Richest All Income Decile Group

For details see Adam and Browne (2013), Do the UK government’s © Institute for Fiscal Studies welfare reforms make work pay? Cumulative shares of tax liability, 2013-14

120%

100%

80%

60%

40%

Cumulative percentage Cumulative paid % of tax-minus-benefits paid by highest-income households 20% % of tax paid by highest-income households

0% Top 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Percentage of households (all)

Note: excludes corporation tax, business rates, stamp duties, CGT and IHT. © Institute for Fiscal Studies Source: Figure 9.4 of The IFS Green Budget: February 2013 Some issues that cut across taxes

• Avoidance and evasion – ‘Tax gap’ is a concern – A raft of measures in every Budget and Autumn Statement – And a new General Anti-Abuse Rule (GAAR) since July 2013

• Distributional effects of the system as a whole

• Work incentive effects of the system as a whole

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Two kinds of financial work incentives

• Incentive to be in paid work at all – Replacement rate (RR): out-of-work income / in-work income – Participation tax rate (PTR): proportion of total earnings taken in tax and withdrawn benefits

• Incentive for those in work to increase their earnings – Effective marginal tax rate (EMTR): proportion of an extra £1 of earnings taken in tax and withdrawn benefits

 In all cases, higher numbers = weaker incentives

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Average RR by earnings, 2015 With and without coalition government reforms

80% No tax and benefit reforms 75% Tax reforms only 70% 65% Tax and benefit reforms 60% 55% 50%

Replacement rate Replacement 45%

40% 35% 30% £0 £10,000 £20,000 £30,000 £40,000 £50,000 £60,000

Gross employer cost

Source: Adam and Browne (2013), Do the UK government’s welfare reforms make work pay?

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Average PTR by earnings, 2015 With and without coalition government reforms

60%

55%

50%

45% No tax and benefit reforms

40% Tax reforms only

Participation rate tax Participation

35% Tax and benefit reforms

30% £0 £10,000 £20,000 £30,000 £40,000 £50,000 £60,000

Gross employer cost

Source: Adam and Browne (2013), Do the UK government’s welfare reforms make work pay?

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Average EMTR of workers by earnings, 2015 With and without coalition government reforms

70%

65%

60%

55%

50%

45% No tax and benefit reforms

40% Tax reforms only

Effective marginal taxrate Effective

35% Tax and benefit reforms 30% £0 £10,000 £20,000 £30,000 £40,000 £50,000 £60,000

Gross employer cost

Source: Adam and Browne (2013), Do the UK government’s welfare reforms make work pay?

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Some issues that cut across taxes

• Avoidance and evasion – ‘Tax gap’ is a concern – A raft of measures in every Budget and Autumn Statement – And a new General Anti-Abuse Rule (GAAR) since July 2013

• Distributional effects of the system as a whole

• Work incentive effects of the system as a whole

• Choice of legal form – Employment is penalised relative to self-employment and incorporation

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Marginal tax rates by legal form, 2014-15

Employed Self-employed Small company

Basic rate 40% 29% 20%

Higher rate 49% 42% 40%

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Part of an international trend?

YES: • Cuts in top and basic rates of income tax • SSC rates up even as income tax rates down • Shift from family to individual taxation • Shift from taxes on specific goods towards VAT • Corporate tax rates cut, base broadened • Introduction of environmental taxes

NO: • Unusual in removing mortgage interest relief • Centralisation The coalition government’s priorities for tax

• Current government has increased tax overall – Biggest contributors: VAT increase and anti-avoidance measures

• Yet still found money for tax cuts in its three priority areas – £12bn - personal allowance – £8bn - headline rate of corporation tax – £6bn - fuel duty

• Two of these three were ambitions clearly stated in advance – Fuel duty more piecemeal

• Little sign of a coherent strategy for the tax system as a whole

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Room for improvement Ideas from the Mirrlees Review

• Merge income tax and National Insurance

• Broaden the VAT base (with appropriate compensation package)

• Major overhaul of property taxation

• More consistent carbon price; target motoring taxes on congestion

• Reform the taxation of savings and profits – Full allowance for amounts saved/invested – Apply same overall statutory rate to income from all sources

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Tax policy-making

• Hyperactive – Perceived need to pull rabbits out of the hat in Budgets, Autumn Statements and party conferences (as well as elections) – Exacerbated by rise of 24-hour news coverage • Taxes tend to rise in post-election Budgets • Some recent improvements in institutional arrangements – Independent Office for Budget Responsibility – More transparency re policy costings – Somewhat better consultation • Very centralised – Tax policy-making very concentrated in the Treasury – Council tax is the only (mostly) local tax: only 4% of revenues – Some devolution of powers to Wales and Northern Ireland – As for Scotland...

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Scotland has just voted against independence

• But radical change still likely – Main political parties all promising much more devolution, quickly • Scotland has had some tax-setting powers for years – Full control over council tax and business rates  but done little – Vary basic rate of income tax by up to 3 percentage points  not done • Already due to get more – Stamp duty land tax  replacing with (slightly) more sensible tax – Landfill tax  little change planned – Vary all rates of income tax (together, on unchanged tax base)  given haven’t used existing powers, how valuable is this? • What else will be devolved? – Each party’s proposals so far slightly different – Recent rhetoric has sounded radical, but not specific – More devolution to the rest of the UK too?

© Institute for Fiscal Studies UK tax policy Stuart Adam

© Institute for Fiscal Studies