The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project WILLIAM D. BRODERICK Interviewed by: Henry B. Ryan Initial interview date: October 8, 1990 Copyright 1998 ADST TABLE OF CONTENTS Bolivia/ hile Affairs 1967 he Guevara Guerilla operations in Bolivia IA assistance to Bolivia Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario Victor Paz AID program in Bolivia ,a Paz, Bolivia 196.-1966 0conomic, ounselor/Deputy AID Director OMIBO, Am1assador Henderson Bac2ground 3niversity of Detroit 3. S. Army Foreign Service Medellin, olom1ia 1951-1953 Orchid capital Am1assador apus 7aynic28s une9pected arrival 7indsor, anada 1953-1955 Visa mill Passport Office, Mrs. Shipley Palavche2 visa case Ser1o- roatian language training 1956 Bureau of Intelligence and Research 1957-1959 Situation in :ugoslavia Soviets and Tito 1 Belgrade, :ugoslavia 1959-1962 Am1assador Karl Ran2in Am1assador George Kennan 0conomic section and AID 09-Im Ban2 loans 0lim O8Shaughnessy 0conomic Training 1962-1963 ,a Paz, Bolivia 1963-1965 Am1assador Douglas Henderson Miners hostage crisis AID mission ARA 1969-1972 Deputy Director, Bolivia/ hile Inter-regional affairs Senior Seminar Director, ari11ean Affairs Bau9ite Am1assador to Jamaica, Peter de Roulet Dominican Repu1lic em1assy Foreign Service Institute 1972-1976 Kissinger8s NSSM (National Security Study Memorandum) Dean of Professional Studies D M Seminar Diplomats in Residence Program Retirement 1976 INTERVIEW BROD0RI K: I have urged Am1assador Henderson to tell a1out his e9periences. One reason I thought he should Arite a boo2, particularly a1out his Bolivian e9perience, is that he had a remar2a1le bac2ground that feA others had. He had served in Bolivia from a1out, I believe, 19.1 to B.2 as a junior officer involved in efforts to control German access to ru11er and other strategic materials. ,ater, in addition of course, he served as Am1assador to Bolivia around the times of President Paz and President Barrientos, the revolution of 196., and the he Guevara business. HoAever, I gather he has not Aritten a memoir and pro1a1ly doesnBt intend to, Ahich is unfortunate. It Aill have to be reconstructed from the historical records. 2 Regarding he Guevara, I Aas actually out of Bolivia Ahen the Guevara phenomenon surfaced in early 1967. I Aas deputy director of the Office of Bolivia/ hile Affairs at the time and in March 1967 made a trip first to hile and then to Bolivia. On arrival in ,a Paz, Am1assador Henderson invited me to join him and the AID mission director--IBm not sure if the D M Aas there or not--at a meeting Aith the then co-presidents, Generals Barrientos and Ovando at BarrientosBs home Ahere brea2fast, Ahich consisted of cold fried eggs, Aas served. 7hat Ae got Ahich Aas much 1etter than the eggs Aas a marvelously fantastic story. The tAo generals had Aith them a young Bolivian soldier Aho told of having been Aith an army unit that had 1een captured by these guerrillas at a time Ahen it had not been esta1lished that he Guevara Aas in the group or the leader of the group, although there Aere many rumors a1out it. According to the man, there Aere several hundred in the group that surrounded them and captured them. Among other things, they Aere a1le to survive in the Ailderness because they had special pills they could ta2e Ahich satisfied their hunger needs so they Aould not have to have provisions Aith them. They had doctors and nurses Aith them to care for anyone Aho Aas injured. These guerrillas held the group for several hours before he Aas either released or escaped, I donBt remem1er Ahich. The main thrust of his story Aas that this Aas a tremendously large, Aell-organized and Aell-led group of guerrillas that really threatened the future of Bolivia. 7e heard the storyC the generals loo2ed at us and Ae loo2ed at each other and the generals said, D7ell, Ahat do you thin2ED 7e tried to 2eep from laughing. The generals divided us, Barrientos too2 Henderson, Ovando too2 Bo1 HurAitch, the D M, Aho I noA remem1er Aas there. $: This was a divided presidency& BROD0RI K: Ovando Aas the commander of the army, Barrientos had been chief of the air force. Just those tAo generals Aere present. 0ach had the title of o-President. $: What was your job at that time& BROD0RI K: Deputy Director of the office of hilean/Bolivian Affairs in 7ashington. So as the visiting dignitary, it gave me status that I never had Ahen I Aas there as economic counselor of the em1assy. 7ell, after hearing the story one co-president too2 Henderson and the other HurAitch and I Aas sort of left to fend for myself. 0ach of them separately made pitches for financial and military assistance. NoA there had been some 2ind of IA assistance to Bolivia in periods there, and Barrientos, in particular, 2neA a1out it and may have even benefitted from it, so they 2neA it Aas possi1le. The Ahole point of giving this coc2-and-1ull story Aas to provide some 2ind of rational or motivation for getting large scale 3S assistance. $: Did they want money, equipment, troops, or all the above& 3 BROD0RI K: Based on my memory, I canBt tell you for sure, and given Ahat su1seFuently happened, it Aas pro1a1ly all three. They did get Green Beret types Aho came doAn and trained them. The real pro1lem Aith the guerrillas Aas not hoA many there Aere, but the a1solute incompetence and lac2 of eFuipment of the Bolivian army. These poor peasant privates had rifles that Aould not fire, and they Aere barefoot. This Aas by-and-large not because the Bolivian army did not have this 2ind of eFuipment, but 1ecause it Aas all plundered by higher ups as it came doAn the line. $: What would they do with it& Sell it to somebody else& BROD0RI K: :es, the military Aere selling it. In the case of rations they Aere most li2ely selling it on the blac2 mar2et. I donBt 2noA Ahat they did Aith the eFuipment, perhaps 2ept it bac2 in headFuarters companies that did not ris2 having to go into battle and lose the eFuipment. In any case, that Aas my only direct contact Aith the Guevara phenomenon e9cept for the su1seFuent story of the captured material. It Aas later verified that it Aas in fact Guevara and also that the num1er of people that he had Aith him in this band Aas never higher than tAenty-five or so, of Ahom three or four possi1ly, Aere u1ans. The fascinating thing that came out a1out Guevara and the Bolivian peasantry Aas that in the face of his e9pectation that he could generate a popular uprising against this military government, he found, first of all, that a large num1er of the peasants in that area had benefitted in some degree from the land reform of the 50Bs Ahen the MNR came into poAer, so they Aere not loo2ing for any major changes. The second thing Aas that Guevara and his cohorts Aere regarded as foreigners and Aere referred to by the Bolivian peasantry as DgringosD 1ecause they spo2e Aith this very strange accent. $: Did the peasantry spea, $uechue or Spanish& BROD0RI K: DoAn there in the Santa ruz area largely, they Aould pro1a1ly not be Huechue but Aymara, but they Aere also Spanish spea2ing. Su1seFuently the Bolivian army did come across a cave in Ahich this group had been staying and they did find a miscellaneous bunch of material, including a passport Ahich the leader of the group had carried. This Aas ta2en over by the Bolivian army. At the urging of the 3S, the Bolivian government reluctantly agreed to send it up to 7ashington for evaluation--primarily to determine if it Aas Guevara. The e9perts in the field Aere comparing photographs of him Ahere he had shaved his beard and his hair and so forth. They Aere loo2ing at things such as the size of ear lo1es to see if this Aas the same one. They finally concluded it Aas the same person. The Bolivians Aanted their materials bac2C they had itemized them all very carefully, and Ahen Ae sent them bac2 in ,a Paz the government had protested that there Aas one item missing and Ahat had happened to itE That item Aas a cigar butt. So Ae as2ed IA Ahat had happened to the cigar butt and the ansAer came bac2, D onsumed in analysisD. 7e did not hear any more a1out it. 4 So that is the e9tent of my 2noAledge of the he Guevara matter. $: There are a couple of questions I would li,e to as, you in that regard. .ou mentioned that the CI had been helping before Barrientos came to power. What ,ind of help was that& BROD0RI K: To my 2noAledge it Aas financial. Victor Paz Aas getting it. $: What were they worried about then, was there evidence of guerrilla activity before the /uevara episode& BROD0RI K: That Ahole area is an arcane mystery to me as to Ahy Ae ever do those things. It Aas not for guerrilla purposesC it Aas just general support for this MNR government Ahose policies Ae Aere favoring. $: M1R& BROD0RI K: Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario, Ahich Aas the party Victor Paz had first led to poAer in 1952C it stayed in poAer until 196. until he Aas ousted by the military. He had been in and out of office and other party leaders had also been president. $: Was there general support for the government& BROD0RI K: :es, this Aas a period in Ahich, in the early B60s, Ae Aere giving through the AID program huge amounts of assistance, including budget support, in return for the Bolivian government giving certain assurances a1out controlling e9penditures and so forth.