DOCSLIB.ORG

The Insecurity of 802.11

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Insecurity of 802.11 Intercepting Mobile Communications: The Insecurity of 802.11 Nikita Borisov Ian Goldberg David Wagner UC Berkeley Zero-Knowledge Systems UC Berkeley [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] ABSTRACT cipher, WEP contains several major security flaws. The flaws give The 802.11 standard for wireless networks includes a Wired Equiv- rise to a number of attacks, both passive and active, that allow alent Privacy (WEP) protocol, used to protect link-layer communi- eavesdropping on, and tampering with, wireless transmissions. In cations from eavesdropping and other attacks. We have discovered this paper, we discuss the flaws that we identified and describe the several serious security flaws in the protocol, stemming from mis- attacks that ensue. application of cryptographic primitives. The flaws lead to a num- ber of practical attacks that demonstrate that WEP fails to achieve The following section is devoted to an overview of WEP and the its security goals. In this paper, we discuss in detail each of the threat models that it is trying to address. Sections 3 and 4 identify flaws, the underlying security principle violations, and the ensuing particular flaws and the corresponding attacks, and also discuss the attacks. security principles that were violated. Section 5 describes potential countermeasures. Section 6 suggest some general lessons that can 1. INTRODUCTION be derived from the WEP insecurities. Finally, Section 7 offers In recent years, the proliferation of laptop computers and PDA’s some conclusions. has caused an increase in the range of places people perform com- puting. At the same time, network connectivity is becoming an 2. THE WEP PROTOCOL increasingly integral part of computing environments. As a re- The Wired Equivalent Privacy protocol is used in 802.11 networks sult, wireless networks of various kinds have gained much popu- to protect link-level data during wireless transmission. It is de- larity. But with the added convenience of wireless access come scribed in detail in the 802.11 standard [15]; we reproduce a brief new problems, not the least of which are heightened security con- description to enable the following discussion of its properties. cerns. When transmissions are broadcast over radio waves, inter- ception and masquerading becomes trivial to anyone with a radio, WEP relies on a secret key £ shared between the communicating and so there is a need to employ additional mechanisms to protect parties to protect the body of a transmitted frame of data. Encryp- the communications. tion of a frame proceeds as follows: The 802.11 standard [15] for wireless LAN communications intro- Checksumming: First, we compute an integrity checksum ¤¦¥¨§ © duced the Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol in an attempt on the message § . We concatenate the two to obtain a plain- to address these new problems and bring the security level of wire- text ¨§¤¥¨§© , which will be used as input to the sec- less systems closer to that of wired ones. The primary goal of WEP ond stage. Note that ¤¥¨§© , and thus , does not depend on is to protect the confidentiality of user data from eavesdropping. the key £ . WEP is part of an international standard; it has been integrated by manufacturers into their 802.11 hardware and is currently in Encryption: In the second stage, we encrypt the plaintext de- widespread use. rived above using RC4. We choose an initialization vector (IV) . The RC4 algorithm generates a keystream—i.e., a Unfortunately, WEP falls short of accomplishing its security goals. long sequence of pseudorandom bytes—as a function of the £ ¥£© Despite employing the well-known and believed-secure RC4 [16]1 IV and the key . This keystream is denoted by . Then, we exclusive-or (XOR, denoted by ) the plaintext The work was done while Ian Goldberg was a student at UC with the keystream to obtain the ciphertext: Berkeley ¡ A public description of the alleged RC4 algorithm can be found !"¥£©$# Transmission: Finally, we transmit the IV and the ciphertext over Published in the proceedings of the Seventh Annual International Confer- the radio link. ence on Mobile Computing And Networking, July 16–21, 2001. Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for per- sonal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not Symbolically, this may be represented as follows: made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear % &('*) ¨§ ¤¦¥¨§ ©$# this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components +¥, !"¥-£.©© where of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to The format of the encrypted frame is also shown pictorially in Fig- redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. ure 1. ¢ c 2001 ACM in [17]. specifies the use of 40-bit keys, so chosen because of US Govern- 1 Plaintext ment restrictions on the export of technology containing cryptogra- 0 / Message CRC phy, which were in effect at the time the protocol was drafted. This key length is short enough to make brute-force attacks practical XOR to individuals and organizations with fairly modest computing re- 2 Keystream = RC4(v,k) sources [3, 8]. However, it is straightforward to extend the protocol to use larger keys, and several equipment manufacturers offer a so- called “128-bit” version (which actually uses 104-bit keys, despite 0 3 v Ciphertext its misleading name). This extension renders brute-force attacks impossible for even the most resourceful of adversaries given to- Transmitted Data day’s technology. Nonetheless, we will demonstrate that there are shortcut attacks on the system that do not require a brute-force at- tack on the key, and thus even the 128-bit versions of WEP are not secure. Figure 1: Encrypted WEP Frame. In the remainder of this paper, we will argue that none of the three security goals are attained. First, we show practical attacks that al- We will consistently use the term message (symbolically, § ) to refer to the initial frame of data to be protected, the term plaintext low eavesdropping. Then, we show that it is possible to subvert the integrity checksum field and to modify the contents of a transmit- ( ) to refer to the concatenation of message and checksum as it is presented to the RC4 encryption algorithm, and the term ciphertext ted message, violating data integrity. Finally, we demonstrate that ( ) to refer to the encryption of the plaintext as it is transmitted our attacks can be extended to inject completely new traffic into the over the radio link. network. To decrypt a frame protected by WEP, the recipient simply re- A number of these results (particularly the IV reuse weaknesses verses the encryption process. First, he regenerates the keystream described in Section 3) have been anticipated in earlier indepen- dent work by Simon et. al [19] and by Walker [24]. The serious ¥-£© and XORs it against the ciphertext to recover the initial plaintext: flaws in the WEP checksum (see Section 4), however, to the best of our knowledge have not been reported before. After our work was 7¥-£.© 546 completed, Arbaugh et. al have found several extensions that may ¥, !"¥-£.©©89.¥-£© make these weaknesses even more dangerous in practice [2, 1]. :# 2.2 Attack Practicality Next, the recipient verifies the checksum on the decrypted plaintext Before describing the attacks, we would like to discuss the fea- ¨§ ¤ 4 4 4 by splitting it into the form , re-computing the check- sibility of mounting them in practice. In addition to the crypto- ¤¥¨§ © sum 4 , and checking that it matches the received checksum graphic considerations discussed in the sections to follow, a com- ¤ 4 . This ensures that only frames with a valid checksum will be mon barrier to attacks on communication subsystems is access to accepted by the receiver. the transmitted data. Despite being transmitted over open radio waves, 802.11 traffic requires significant infrastructure to intercept. 2.1 Security Goals An attacker needs equipment capable of monitoring 2.4GHz fre- The WEP protocol is intended to enforce three main security goals quencies and understanding the physical layer of the 802.11 proto- [15]: col; for active attacks, it is also necessary to transmit at the same frequencies. A significant development cost for equipment manu- facturers lies in creating technologies that can reliably perform this Confidentiality: The fundamental goal of WEP is to prevent ca- task. sual eavesdropping. Access control: A second goal of the protocol is to protect access As such, there might be temptation to dismiss attacks requiring to a wireless network infrastructure. The 802.11 standard link-layer access as impractical; for instance, this was once es- includes an optional feature to discard all packets that are not tablished practice among the cellular industry. However, such a properly encrypted using WEP, and manufacturers advertise position is dangerous. First, it does not safeguard against highly the ability of WEP to provide access control. resourceful attackers who have the ability to incur significant time and equipment costs to gain access to data. This limitation is es- Data integrity: A related goal is to prevent tampering with trans- pecially dangerous when securing a company’s internal wireless mitted messages; the integrity checksum field is included for network, since corporate espionage can be a highly profitable busi- this purpose. ness. Second, the necessary hardware to monitor and inject 802.11 traf- In all three cases, the claimed security of the protocol “relies on fic is readily available to consumers in the form of wireless Eth- the difficulty of discovering the secret key through a brute-force ernet interfaces. All that is needed is to subvert it to monitor and attack” [15].
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Consensgx: Scaling Anonymous Communications Networks With
    Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies ; 2019 (3):331–349 Sajin Sasy* and Ian Goldberg* ConsenSGX: Scaling Anonymous Communications Networks with Trusted Execution Environments Abstract: Anonymous communications networks enable 1 Introduction individuals to maintain their privacy online. The most popular such network is Tor, with about two million Privacy is an integral right of every individual in daily users; however, Tor is reaching limits of its scala- society [72]. With almost every day-to-day interaction bility. One of the main scalability bottlenecks of Tor and shifting towards using the internet as a medium, it similar network designs originates from the requirement becomes essential to ensure that we can maintain the of distributing a global view of the servers in the network privacy of our actions online. Furthermore, in light to all network clients. This requirement is in place to of nation-state surveillance and censorship, it is all avoid epistemic attacks, in which adversaries who know the more important that we enable individuals and which parts of the network certain clients do and do not organizations to communicate online without revealing know about can rule in or out those clients from being their identities. There are a number of tools aiming to responsible for particular network traffic. provide such private communication, the most popular In this work, we introduce a novel solution to this of which is the Tor network [21]. scalability problem by leveraging oblivious RAM con- Tor is used by millions of people every day to structions and trusted execution environments in order protect their privacy online [70].
    [Show full text]
  • Doswell, Stephen (2016) Measurement and Management of the Impact of Mobility on Low-Latency Anonymity Networks
    Citation: Doswell, Stephen (2016) Measurement and management of the impact of mobility on low-latency anonymity networks. Doctoral thesis, Northumbria University. This version was downloaded from Northumbria Research Link: http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/30242/ Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users to access the University’s research output. Copyright © and moral rights for items on NRL are retained by the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. Single copies of full items can be reproduced, displayed or performed, and given to third parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, provided the authors, title and full bibliographic details are given, as well as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata page. The content must not be changed in any way. Full items must not be sold commercially in any format or medium without formal permission of the copyright holder. The full policy is available online: http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/policies.html MEASUREMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF THE IMPACT OF MOBILITY ON LOW-LATENCY ANONYMITY NETWORKS S.DOSWELL Ph.D 2016 Measurement and management of the impact of mobility on low-latency anonymity networks Stephen Doswell A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of Northumbria at Newcastle for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Research undertaken in the Department of Computer Science and Digital Technologies, Faculty of Engineering and Environment October 2016 Declaration I declare that the work contained in this thesis has not been submitted for any other award and that it is all my own work.
    [Show full text]
  • Threat Modeling and Circumvention of Internet Censorship by David Fifield
    Threat modeling and circumvention of Internet censorship By David Fifield A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor J.D. Tygar, Chair Professor Deirdre Mulligan Professor Vern Paxson Fall 2017 1 Abstract Threat modeling and circumvention of Internet censorship by David Fifield Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science University of California, Berkeley Professor J.D. Tygar, Chair Research on Internet censorship is hampered by poor models of censor behavior. Censor models guide the development of circumvention systems, so it is important to get them right. A censor model should be understood not just as a set of capabilities|such as the ability to monitor network traffic—but as a set of priorities constrained by resource limitations. My research addresses the twin themes of modeling and circumvention. With a grounding in empirical research, I build up an abstract model of the circumvention problem and examine how to adapt it to concrete censorship challenges. I describe the results of experiments on censors that probe their strengths and weaknesses; specifically, on the subject of active probing to discover proxy servers, and on delays in their reaction to changes in circumvention. I present two circumvention designs: domain fronting, which derives its resistance to blocking from the censor's reluctance to block other useful services; and Snowflake, based on quickly changing peer-to-peer proxy servers. I hope to change the perception that the circumvention problem is a cat-and-mouse game that affords only incremental and temporary advancements.
    [Show full text]
  • Changing of the Guards: a Framework for Understanding and Improving Entry Guard Selection in Tor
    Changing of the Guards: A Framework for Understanding and Improving Entry Guard Selection in Tor Tariq Elahi†, Kevin Bauer†, Mashael AlSabah†, Roger Dingledine‡, Ian Goldberg† †University of Waterloo ‡The Tor Project, Inc. †{mtelahi,k4bauer,malsabah,iang}@cs.uwaterloo.ca ‡[email protected] ABSTRACT parties with anonymity from their communication partners as well Tor is the most popular low-latency anonymity overlay network as from passive third parties observing the network. This is done for the Internet, protecting the privacy of hundreds of thousands by distributing trust over a series of Tor routers, which the network of people every day. To ensure a high level of security against cer- clients select to build paths to their Internet destinations. tain attacks, Tor currently utilizes special nodes called entry guards If the adversary can anticipate or compel clients to choose com- as each client’s long-term entry point into the anonymity network. promised routers then clients can lose their anonymity. Indeed, While the use of entry guards provides clear and well-studied secu- the client router selection protocol is a key ingredient in main- rity benefits, it is unclear how well the current entry guard design taining the anonymity properties that Tor provides and needs to achieves its security goals in practice. be secure against adversarial manipulation and leak no information We design and implement Changing of the Guards (COGS), a about clients’ selected routers. simulation-based research framework to study Tor’s entry guard de- When the Tor network was first launched in 2003, clients se- sign. Using COGS, we empirically demonstrate that natural, short- lected routers uniformly at random—an ideal scheme that provides term entry guard churn and explicit time-based entry guard rotation the highest amount of path entropy and thus the least amount of contribute to clients using more entry guards than they should, and information to the adversary.
    [Show full text]
  • A Secure Environment for Untrusted Helper Applications (Confining the Wily Hacker)
    The following paper was originally published in the Proceedings of the Sixth USENIX UNIX Security Symposium San Jose, California, July 1996. A Secure Environment for Untrusted Helper Applications (Confining the Wily Hacker) Ian Goldberg, David Wagner, Randi Thomas, and Eric Brewer Computer Science Division University of California, Berkeley For more information about USENIX Association contact: 1. Phone: 510 528-8649 2. FAX: 510 548-5738 3. Email: [email protected] 4. WWW URL: http://www.usenix.org A Secure Environment for Untruste d Help er Applications Con ningtheWilyHacker Ian Goldb erg David Wagner Randi Thomas Er ic A. Brewer fiang,daw,randit,[email protected] University of California, Berkeley cious programs to spawn pro ce ss e s andto read or Ab stract wr iteanunsusp ecting us er's le s [15,18,19,34,36]. Whatisnee ded in thi s new environment, then, i s Manypopular programs, suchasNetscap e, us e un- protection for all re source s on a us er's system f rom trusted help er applications to pro ce ss data f rom the thi s threat. network. Unfortunately,theunauthenticated net- workdatathey interpret could well have b een cre- Our aim i s tocon netheuntrusted software anddata ated byanadversary,andthehelp er applications are by monitor ingand re str ictingthe system calls it p er- 1 usually to o complex to b e bug-f ree. Thi s rai s e s s ig- forms. We builtJanus , a s ecure environment for ni cant s ecur ity concer ns. Therefore, it i s de s irable untrusted help er applications, bytaking advantage to create a s ecure environmenttocontain untrusted of the Solar i s pro ce ss tracing f acility.
    [Show full text]
  • Effective Attacks and Provable Defenses for Website Fingerprinting
    Effective Attacks and Provable Defenses for Website Fingerprinting Tao Wang, University of Waterloo; Xiang Cai, Rishab Nithyanand, and Rob Johnson, Stony Brook University; Ian Goldberg, University of Waterloo https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity14/technical-sessions/presentation/wang_tao This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 23rd USENIX Security Symposium. August 20–22, 2014 • San Diego, CA ISBN 978-1-931971-15-7 Open access to the Proceedings of the 23rd USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX Effective Attacks and Provable Defenses for Website Fingerprinting Tao Wang1 Xiang Cai2 Rishab Nithyanand2 Rob Johnson2 Ian Goldberg1 1University of Waterloo 2Stony Brook University t55wang,iang @cs.uwaterloo.ca xcai,rnithyanand,rob @cs.stonybrook.edu { } { } Abstract When a client browses the web, she reveals her desti- Website fingerprinting attacks allow a local, passive nation and packet content to intermediate routers, which eavesdropper to identify a user’s web activity by lever- are controlled by ISPs who may be susceptible to ma- aging packet sequence information. These attacks break licious attackers, eavesdroppers, and legal pressure. To the privacy expected by users of privacy technologies, protect her web-browsing privacy, the client would need including low-latency anonymity networks such as Tor. to encrypt her communication traffic and obscure her In this paper, we show a new attack that achieves sig- destinations with a proxy such as Tor. Website finger- nificantly higher accuracy than previous attacks in the printing refers to the set of techniques that seek to re- same field, further highlighting website fingerprinting as identify these clients’ destination web pages by passively a genuine threat to web privacy.
    [Show full text]
  • D6.2 Altcoins – Alternatives to Bitcoin and Their Increasing Presence In
    Ref. Ares(2018)1599225 - 22/03/2018 RAMSES Internet Forensic platform for tracking the money flow of financially-motivated malware H2020 - 700326 D6.2 Altcoins: Alternatives to Bitcoin and their increasing presence in Malware-related Cybercrime Lead Authors: Darren Hurley-Smith (UNIKENT), Julio Hernandez-Castro (UNIKENT) With contributions from: Edward Cartwright (UNIKENT), Anna Stepanova (UNIKENT) Reviewers: Luis Javier Garcia Villalba (UCM) Deliverable nature: Report (R) Dissemination level: Public (PU) (Confidentiality) Contractual delivery date: 31/08/2017 Actual delivery date: 31/08/2017 Version: 1.0 Total number of pages: 36 Keywords: Cryptocurrency, altcoin, malware, darknet market, privacy Abstract Bitcoin is a relatively well-known cryptocurrency, a digital token representing value. It uses a blockchain, a distributed ledger formed of blocks which represent a network of computers agreeing that transactions have occurred, to provide a ledger of sorts. This technology is not unique to Bitcoin, many so-called ‘altcoins’ now exist. These alternative coins provide their own services, be it as a store of value with improved transactions (lower fees, higher speed), or additional privacy. Malware and Dark Net Market (DNM) operators have used Bitcoin to facilitate pseudo-anonymous extraction of value from their victims and customers. However, several high-profile arrests have been made using Bitcoin transaction graphing methods, proving that the emphasis is on the pseudo part of pseudo-anonymity. Altcoins specialising in masking the users’ identity – Monero, ZCash, and Dash – are therefore of interest as the next potential coins of choice for criminals. Ethereum, being the second largest crypto-currencies and imminently implementing its own privacy features, is also of interest.
    [Show full text]
  • Deniable Key Exchanges for Secure Messaging
    Deniable Key Exchanges for Secure Messaging Nik Unger Ian Goldberg Cheriton School of Computer Science Cheriton School of Computer Science University of Waterloo, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada Waterloo, ON, Canada [email protected] [email protected] ABSTRACT the lack of security and privacy in our messaging tools and spurred In the wake of recent revelations of mass government surveillance, demand for better solutions [20]. A widespread weakness in cur- secure messaging protocols have come under renewed scrutiny. A rent secure messaging tools is the lack of strong deniability proper- widespread weakness of existing solutions is the lack of strong ties [28]. Deniable secure messaging schemes allow conversation deniability properties that allow users to plausibly deny sending participants to later plausibly deny sending messages, or even par- messages or participating in conversations if the security of their ticipating in a conversation, while still providing authentication to communications is later compromised. Deniable authenticated key the participants at the time of the conversation. This notion was exchanges (DAKEs), the cryptographic protocols responsible for popularized in the secure messaging context with the release of providing deniability in secure messaging applications, cannot cur- Off-the-Record Messaging (OTR) a decade ago [3]. Unfortunately, rently provide all desirable properties simultaneously. the OTR protocol is not well suited to modern settings such as mo- We introduce two new DAKEs with provable
    [Show full text]
  • Walking Onions: Scaling Anonymity Networks While Protecting Users Chelsea H
    Walking Onions: Scaling Anonymity Networks while Protecting Users Chelsea H. Komlo, University of Waterloo; Nick Mathewson, The Tor Project; Ian Goldberg, University of Waterloo https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/komlo This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium. August 12–14, 2020 978-1-939133-17-5 Open access to the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX. Walking Onions: Scaling Anonymity Networks while Protecting Users Chelsea H. Komlo Nick Mathewson Ian Goldberg University of Waterloo The Tor Project University of Waterloo Abstract Anonymity networks in practice [13] have prevented these Scaling anonymity networks offers unique security chal- attacks by requiring all participants to share a globally consis- lenges, as attackers can exploit differing views of the net- tent view of the entire state of the network, and giving clients work’s topology to perform epistemic and route capture at- complete control over selecting relays for their paths. While tacks. Anonymity networks in practice, such as Tor, have this approach prevents the described attacks, requiring a glob- opted for security over scalability by requiring participants ally consistent view results in quadratic bandwidth growth as to share a globally consistent view of all relays to prevent the number of clients increases [26], because the number of these kinds of attacks. Such an approach requires each user relays must also increase to provide more capacity, and all to maintain up-to-date information about every relay, causing parties must download information about all relays. While the total amount of data each user must download every epoch today’s Tor network requires only approximately half a per- to scale linearly with the number of relays.
    [Show full text]
  • SIGCHI Conference Proceedings Format
    What’s the deal with privacy apps? A comprehensive exploration of user perception and usability Hala Assal Stephanie Hurtado Ahsan Imran School of Computer Science School of Computer Science School of Computer Science Carleton University Carleton University Carleton University [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Sonia Chiasson School of Computer Science Carleton University [email protected] ABSTRACT Statistics show that the number of global mobile users sur- We explore mobile privacy through a survey and through us- passed the number of desktop users in 2014, with an increas- ability evaluation of three privacy-preserving mobile appli- ing number of people switching to mobile devices for their cations. Our survey explores users’ knowledge of privacy daily online activities [15]. risks, as well as their attitudes and motivations to protect In this paper, we present a comprehensive look at the topic their privacy on mobile devices. We found that users have of mobile privacy. We particularly focus on three privacy as- incomplete mental models of privacy risks associated with pects: private/secure messaging, privacy-aware photosharing, such devices. And, although participants believe they are and anonymity. First, we seek to assess users’ knowledge of primarily responsible for protecting their own privacy, there mobile privacy and determine whether users rely on privacy- is a clear gap between their perceived privacy risks and the preserving applications (apps henceforth) to protect their pri- defenses they employ. For example, only 6% of participants vacy. Second, for users who do not, we discern whether they use privacy-preserving applications on their mobile devices, are consciously rejecting the use of such apps.
    [Show full text]
  • Submission Data for 2020-2021 CORE Conference Ranking Process Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium (Was International Workshop of Privacy Enhancing Technologies)
    Submission Data for 2020-2021 CORE conference Ranking process Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium (was International Workshop of Privacy Enhancing Technologies) Shaanan Cohney, Matthew Wright, Aaron Johnson, Veelasha Moonsamy Conference Details Conference Title: Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium (was International Workshop of Privacy Enhancing Technologies) Acronym : PETS Rank: B Requested Rank Rank: A Recent Years Proceedings Publishing Style Proceedings Publishing: journal Link to most recent proceedings: https://dblp.org/db/journals/popets/popets2020.html Further details: PETS papers are published in the journal Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PoPETs). PoPETs is an open-access journal published by Sciendo, part of the De Gruyter publishing house. PoPETs has four issues per year, and all papers that appear in PoPETs are full papers and are presented at the PETS conference. PoPETs builds on the scholarly tradition initiated by PETS in July 2000. The membership of the Editorial Board and Program Committee, as well as the high-quality publications, make PoPETs a premier venue for scholarship in the area of privacy and technology. Regarding Google Scholar Metrics, PoPETs is listed. However, the PoPETs journal only started in 2015, and Google Scholar Metrics doesn’t include the 2000âĂŞ2014 PETS proceedings published in Springer LNCS. Therefore, rankings are inaccurate that use metrics dependings on papers published before 2015 (e.g. h5-index). Most Recent Years Most Recent Year Year: 2019 URL: https://petsymposium.org/cfp19.php
    [Show full text]
  • A Pseudonymous Communications Infrastructure for the Internet by Ian
    A Pseudonymous Communications Infrastructure for the Internet by Ian Avrum Goldberg B.Math. (University of Waterloo) 1995 M.Sc. (University of California at Berkeley) 1998 A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science in the GRADUATE DIVISION of the UNIVERSITY of CALIFORNIA at BERKELEY Committee in charge: Professor Eric Brewer, Chair Professor Doug Tygar Professor Hal Varian Fall 2000 The dissertation of Ian Avrum Goldberg is approved: Chair Date Date Date University of California at Berkeley Fall 2000 A Pseudonymous Communications Infrastructure for the Internet Copyright Fall 2000 by Ian Avrum Goldberg 1 Abstract A Pseudonymous Communications Infrastructure for the Internet by Ian Avrum Goldberg Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science University of California at Berkeley Professor Eric Brewer, Chair As more and more of people’s everyday activities are being conducted online, there is an ever-increasing threat to personal privacy. Every communicative or commercial transac- tion you perform online reveals bits of information about you that can be compiled into large dossiers, often without your permission, or even your knowledge. This work presents the design and analysis of a Pseudonymous Communications In- frastructure for the Internet, which we call a Pseudonymous IP Network, or PIP Network. This system allows parties to communicate in real time over the Internet without being forced to reveal their identities, thus forming the basis for communications and electronic commerce systems that respect the privacy of the individual. This work also presents the Nymity Slider, an abstraction that can be useful when talking about how much personally identifying information a given transaction reveals, 2 and when designing privacy-friendly technologies.
    [Show full text]