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Submission Data for 2020-2021 CORE Conference Ranking Process Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium (Was International Workshop of Privacy Enhancing Technologies)

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Submission Data for 2020-2021 CORE Conference Ranking Process Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium (Was International Workshop of Privacy Enhancing Technologies) Submission Data for 2020-2021 CORE conference Ranking process Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium (was International Workshop of Privacy Enhancing Technologies) Shaanan Cohney, Matthew Wright, Aaron Johnson, Veelasha Moonsamy Conference Details Conference Title: Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium (was International Workshop of Privacy Enhancing Technologies) Acronym : PETS Rank: B Requested Rank Rank: A Recent Years Proceedings Publishing Style Proceedings Publishing: journal Link to most recent proceedings: https://dblp.org/db/journals/popets/popets2020.html Further details: PETS papers are published in the journal Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PoPETs). PoPETs is an open-access journal published by Sciendo, part of the De Gruyter publishing house. PoPETs has four issues per year, and all papers that appear in PoPETs are full papers and are presented at the PETS conference. PoPETs builds on the scholarly tradition initiated by PETS in July 2000. The membership of the Editorial Board and Program Committee, as well as the high-quality publications, make PoPETs a premier venue for scholarship in the area of privacy and technology. Regarding Google Scholar Metrics, PoPETs is listed. However, the PoPETs journal only started in 2015, and Google Scholar Metrics doesn’t include the 2000âĂŞ2014 PETS proceedings published in Springer LNCS. Therefore, rankings are inaccurate that use metrics dependings on papers published before 2015 (e.g. h5-index). Most Recent Years Most Recent Year Year: 2019 URL: https://petsymposium.org/cfp19.php Location: Stockholm, Sweden Papers submitted: 300 Papers published: 67 Acceptance rate: 22 Source for numbers: https://petsymposium.org/acceptance-rates.php General Chairs Name: Panos Papadimitratos Affiliation: KTH Gender: M H Index: 52 GScholar url: https://scholar.google.ca/citations?hl=en&user=Iv2wBQ8AAAAJ DBLP url: Name: Simone Fischer-HÃijbner Affiliation: Karlstad University, Sweden Gender: F H Index: 22 GScholar url: DBLP url: https://dblp.org/pid/f/SimoneFischerHubner.html 1 Program Chairs Name: Carmela Tronosco Affiliation: EPFL Gender: F H Index: 27 GScholar url: https://scholar.google.ca/citations?user=sMkt3SgAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao DBLP url: https://dblp.org/pid/01/4825.html Name: Kostas Chatzikokolakis Affiliation: University of Athens Gender: M H Index: 23 GScholar url: https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=0XpXCu8AAAAJ&hl=en&oi=sra DBLP url: https://dblp.org/pid/32/858.html Second Most Recent Year Year: 2018 URL: https://petsymposium.org/cfp18.php Location: Barcelona, Spain Papers submitted: 229 Papers published: 36 Acceptance rate: 16 Source for numbers: https://petsymposium.org/acceptance-rates.php General Chairs Name: Gemma GaldÃşn Clavell Affiliation: Eticas Gender: F H Index: 10 GScholar url: https://scholar.google.ca/citations?user=n9ALpfAAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao DBLP url: https://dblp.org/pid/130/9216.html Program Chairs Name: Damon McCoy Affiliation: NYC Gender: M H Index: 40 GScholar url: https://scholar.google.ca/citations?user=pT8-2f0AAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao DBLP url: Name: Rachel Greenstadt Affiliation: NYU Gender: M H Index: 30 GScholar url: https://scholar.google.ca/citations?hl=en&user=FsbND-sAAAAJ DBLP url: https://dblp.org/pid/93/655.html Name: Carmela Tronosco Affiliation: EPFL Gender: F H Index: 27 GScholar url: https://scholar.google.ca/citations?user=sMkt3SgAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao DBLP url: https://dblp.org/pid/01/4825.html Third Most Recent Year Year: 2017 URL: https://petsymposium.org/cfp17.php Location: Minneapolis Papers submitted: 229 Papers published: 52 Acceptance rate: 23 Source for numbers: https://petsymposium.org/acceptance-rates.php General Chairs 2 Name: Nick Hopper Affiliation: University of Minnesota Gender: M H Index: 38 GScholar url: https://scholar.google.ca/citations?user=4e2pnKYAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=sra DBLP url: Program Chairs Name: Rachel Greenstadt Affiliation: NYU Gender: F H Index: 30 GScholar url: https://scholar.google.ca/citations?hl=en&user=FsbND-sAAAAJ DBLP url: https://dblp.org/pid/93/655.html Name: Claudia Diaz Affiliation: KU Leuven Gender: F H Index: 34 GScholar url: https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=AUGbCSkAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao DBLP url: https://dblp.org/pid/d/ClaudiaDiaz.html Policies Chair Selection: ”The PET Board is responsible for guiding PETS, including PoPETs, by selecting each year’s General Chair and the Program Co-Chairs (who also serve as the PoPETs Co-Editors-in-Chief), as well as overseeing the operations of both the symposium and the journal. The Co-Editors-in-Chief have the primary responsibility for their issues of PoPETs and the program of PETS.” Policy name: Code of Conduct Policy url: https://petsymposium.org/code-of-conduct.php Policy name: Review Policy Policy url: https://petsymposium.org/reviews.php#guidelines (Senior) Program Committee Link to (s)pc: https://petsymposium.org/cfp20.php File: http://portal.core.edu.au/core/media/conf_submissions_spc_file/popetspc H-index plot: http://portal.core.edu.au/core/media/conf_submissions_hindex_plots/hindex_buckets_1035.png Information Contained within this graph is derived using the Elsevier Scopus Database 2021. 3 Data and Metrics Google Scholar Metrics Sub-category url: https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=top_venues&hl=en&vq=eng_computersecuritycryptography Position in sub-category: 15 Image of top 20: http://portal.core.edu.au/core/media/changes_h5/higherrank1035_gscholar_minh5.png 4 h5-index for this conference: 35 ACM Metrics Not Sponsored by ACM Aminer Rank Not Listed in Aminer Other Rankings URL: http://jianying.space/conference-ranking.html Description: Quantitative ranking of academic security conferences based on ”Conference impact factor” Coheres closely with community expectations and matches CORE rankings for most conferences, as evidenced by the significant number of top people who contributed to the ranking system. Rank: 8 Conferences in area: IEEE S&P CCS USENIX PETS ESORICS SOUPS Top People Publishing Here name: Jean-Pierre Hubaux justification: Jean-Pierre Hubaux is a top researcher in wireless security and data privacy, with over 41, 000 citations. He has won an Distinguished Paper Award (2018) and Distinguished Student Paper Award (2015) from the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. He is an IEEE and ACM Fellow. Paper counts: Most Recent: Second most recent: Third most recent: Fourth most recent: Fifth most recent: 1 2 0 2 1 Attendance: SOMETIMES name: Ian Goldberg justification: Ian Goldberg is a top researcher in cryptography and computer security. He was awarded the USENIX Security Test of Time Award (2019), the Caspar Bowden Award for Outstanding Research in Privacy Enhancing Technologies (2018), and he won the EFF Pioneer Award (2011). He is an ACM Distinguished Member. Paper counts: Most Recent: Second most recent: Third most recent: Fourth most recent: Fifth most recent: 2 1 3 0 4 Attendance: ALWAYS 5 name: Tadayoshi Kohno justification: Tadayoshi Kohno is a well-known researcher in security and privacy, with over 19, 000 citations. He is the recipient of a Sloan Research Fellowship, a U.S. National Science Foundation CAREER Award, and a Technology Review TR-35 Young Innovator Award. Kohno is also a member of the National Academies Forum on Cyber Resilience, the IEEE Center for Secure Design, and the USENIX Security Steering Committee. Paper counts: Most Recent: Second most recent: Third most recent: Fourth most recent: Fifth most recent: 2 0 1 1 1 Attendance: OCCASIONALLY name: Bryan Ford justification: Bryan Ford is a top researcher in distributed systems. He won the ACM CCS Test of Time Award (2020), the IRTF Applied Networking Prize (2020), the IEEE S&P Distinguished Paper Award (2018), and an NSF CAREER Award. He served as Program Chair of USENIX ATC 2017 and is a member of the IETF and IRTF security and cryptography working groups. Paper counts: Most Recent: Second most recent: Third most recent: Fourth most recent: Fifth most recent: 1 2 0 1 1 Attendance: SOMETIMES name: N. Asokan justification: N. Asokan is a top scholar in system security, with over 14, 000 citations. He is an ACM Fellow, and ACM Distinguished Member, an IEEE Fellow. In 2018, he won the ACM SIGSAC Outstanding Innovation Award. He has served as a member of the steering committee of the ACM Wireless Security conference, as an associate editor-in-chief of IEEE Security & Privacy Magazine, and as an associate editor of ACM Transactions on Information and Systems Security. Paper counts: Most Recent: Second most recent: Third most recent: Fourth most recent: Fifth most recent: 2 1 1 1 0 Attendance: OCCASIONALLY name: Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi justification: Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi is a top researcher in computer security, with major contributions to mobile security, hardware-based security, and applied cryptography. He has over 22, 000 citations. He was Editor-In-Chief of IEEE Security and Privacy Magazine, and he served 5 years on the editorial board of the ACM Transactions on Information and System Security. In 2018 he received the ACM SIGSAC Outstanding Contributions Award. Paper counts: Most Recent: Second most recent: Third most recent: Fourth most recent: Fifth most recent: 0 0 0 2 1 Attendance: OFTEN name: Nick Feamster justification: Nick Feamster is a top researcher in networking and security, with over 21, 000 citations. He received the Presidential Early Career Award for Scientists and Engineers (PECASE) for his contributions to cybersecurity, a Sloan Research Fellowship, the NSF CAREER award, the IRTF Applied Networking Research Prize, and the USENIX Test of Time Award. He is an ACM Fellow. Paper counts: Most Recent: Second most recent: Third most recent: Fourth most recent: Fifth most recent: 0 2 0 1 None Attendance: SOMETIMES name: Vern Paxson justification: Vern Paxson is a leader of the Internet measurement community, with over 64, 000 citations. He has won the IEEE S&P Test of Time Award (2020), the Internet Defense Prize (2017), the IEEE Internet Award (2015), the SIGCOMM Award (2011), the ACM Grace Murray Hopper Award (2007), and the SIGCOMM Test of Time Award (2006). He served as Chair of the Internet Research Task Force (2001âĂŞ2005) and was a co-founder of the Internet Measurement Conference.
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