REDEFINING EURO-ATLANTIC VALUES: RUSSIA`S MANIPULATIVE TECHNIQUES
PREPARED BY THE NATO STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE REDEFINING EURO-ATLANTIC VALUES: RUSSIA`S MANIPULATIVE TECHNIQUES
Project director: Elīna Lange-Ionatamišvili
Text Editor: Anna Reynolds
This report is a product of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE). It is produced for NATO, NATO member countries, NATO partners, related private and public institutions and related individuals. It does not represent the opinions or policies of NATO.
© All rights reserved by the NATO StratCom COE. Products may not be copied, reproduced, distributed or publicly displayed without reference to the NATO StratCom COE. 1.
NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence Riga, Kalnciema iela 11b, Latvia LV1048 www.stratcomcoe.org Ph.: 0037167335463 [email protected]
2 CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...... 4 1.INTRODUCTION...... 15 2.VALUES AND STRATEGIC POLITICAL COMMUNICATION...... 18 3.THE EURO-ATLANTIC VALUES CATALOGUE: WESTERN AND RUSSIA’S INTERPRETATIONS...... 22 3.1. Values Orientation in Western Countries...... 24 3.1.1. Political Values...... 24
3.1.2. Economic values...... 27 1. 3.1.3. Moral values...... 28 3.1.4. International relations and law dimension...... 29 3.1.5. Value Orientation in Western Countries: Conclusions...... 32 3.2. Values Orientation in Russia...... 33 3.2.1. Political values...... 33 3.2.2. Economic values...... 41 3.2.3. Moral values...... 42 3.2.4. The dimension of international relations and rights...... 42 3.2.5. Value Orientation in Russia: Conclusions...... 49 4. MANIPULATIVE TECHNIQUES OF RUSSIA’S STRATEGIC POLITICAL COMMUNICATION...... 51 5. MEDIA ANALYSIS: CASE STUDIES...... 54 5.1. Case Study - The Downing of MH-17...... 54 5.1.1. Used communication tools and redefinition of agenda...... 54 5.1.2. Redefinition of Euro-Atlantic values...... 62 5.1.3. Used narratives in the case of downing of MH-17...... 77 5.2. Implementation of Counter sanctions...... 80 5.2.1. Used communication tools and redefinition of agenda...... 80
3 5.2.2. Redefinition of Euro-Atlantic values...... 86 5.2.3. Used narratives in the case of Implementation of Counter sanctions.....90 5.3. The First Humanitarian Aid Convoy...... 93 5.3.1. Used communication tools and redefinition of agenda...... 93 5.3.2. Redefinition of Euro-Atlantic values...... 98 5.3.3. Used narratives in the case of First Humanitarian Aid Convoy...... 115 5.4. Case study: The Minsk II Agreement...... 121 5.4.1. Used communication tools and redefinition of agenda...... 121 5.4.2. Redefinition of Euro-Atlantic values...... 129 5.4.3. Used narratives in the case of The Minsk II Agreement...... 133 6. CONCLUSIONS...... 136 ACRONYMS...... 139 1.
4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
deconstructed and reconstituted by values derived from an authoritarian regime makes REASONING Western society vulnerable to influence.
Since November 2013, when the uprising of Russia’s international ambitions are not the Ukrainian nation set in motion a wide based on conquering new territories, but spectrum of events and political process, on creating mental landscapes susceptible researchers and policy makers have been to political manipulation. Russia’s foreign policy goals with regard to the West are
questioning the reasoning, consequences, 1. and international implications of those clear: ‘to weaken the West economically, political processes, as well as their impact to split it politically, and to establish Russia on the future of the international political as the hegemonic power on the European 1 environment. continent’ . Extensive material resources are unnecessary; individuals and societies that This study, Redefining Euro-Atlantic Values: question themselves are decisive ‘weapons’ Russia`s Manipulative Techniques, is not in the battle for influence. one of the many investigations published in recent months focusing on Russian Transitioning out of the international information warfare in Ukraine. It is not a relationships that dominated during the Cold study about them. This is a study about us, War was an eye- and mind-opening exercise namely, the ‘transatlantic community’—a for both governments and societies. Most community we consider to be based on of the countries that left the Soviet bloc, democratic values. This study seeks to including the Baltic States, joined those that answer an essential question: how can it be are based on democratic values; however that countries, which enjoy leading positions some keep their old values, fashionably in terms of prosperity, freedom, solidarity, redressed in a style called ‘sovereign innovation, economic competitiveness, and democracy’. seemingly unlimited normative power based on the long-standing democratic traditions have neglected or ignored (intentionally 1 Motyl, A.J. (2015) ‘The West Should Arm and unintentionally) the manipulative Ukraine. Here’s Why—And How’, Foreign Affairs redefinition of their core democratic values. (10.02.2015), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/143056/alexander-j-motyl/the-west-should-arm- By allowing our core democratic values to be ukraine, last time accessed 15.02.2015l.
5 years ago is now undermining the coherence and functioning of core Euro-Atlantic values. ONE CONCEPT, TWO The information fog, actively created by anti- democratic propagandists, makes it easier INTERPRETATIONS for our adversaries to sway public opinion. This path leads only to information chaos International relations are based on and political crisis. The subversion of the communication—communication between Euro-Atlantic political course could become a governments and communication between reality if we continue to ignore Russia’s new societies. Communication that delivers policy tools. international norms, rules, and order depends The study begins by elaborating a catalogue on the use of a language that is understood by of Euro-Atlantic values in order to clarify all parties involved. For twenty-five years the language, illuminate the techniques used to most influential partners in the transatlantic redefine values, and identify how Russia has community seemed to speak the same been using political strategic communication language—a language that contributed to in Ukraine. The current interpretation of cooperation, mutual respect, and mutual international affairs depends on the interplay benefit. However, events in Ukraine have ‘between the politics of territory, guns or clearly shown that while the vocabulary money and the language of narrating the
1. used by the various states is identical, the world in coherent and persuasive stories’3, interpretation and implicit content of the so the catalogue of values has been divided words differs and can even be contradictory. into four categories: a) political values; The ‘foreign policy language’ spoken by b) economic values; c) moral values; d) politicians and experts from both democratic international relations and international law. and authoritarian regimes has brought The indicators attached to each of those four confusion to their respective societies. Values groups on the basis of the results of Values forming the backbone of our belief systems surveys carried out in the West and in Russia and attitudes are being contested. Belief have been used to provide a comparison of the systems that once were stable, durable, and interpretation of the same values in different difficult to influence have become a target political systems. (See Table 1. Summary: The for Russia’s political establishment, the state- Euro-Atlantic values catalogue: West’s and controlled media and other instruments of Russia’s interpretations) social influence. Those in possession of the tools and techniques of influence can ‘get Western society supports democracy as a manifestation of freedom and opportunity, others to do want what they want’2. The Euro- Atlantic community is under attack from the while in Russia democracy is perceived as ‘What Russia wants, Russia gets!’ mind-set and a sign of weakness and lack of leadership. policies of Russian elites. Due to the pressures An open and democratic economic system of the Ukrainian crisis, the manipulative drives growth in the transatlantic community, redefinition of values that began twenty-five
3 Chouliaraki, L. (ed) (2007). The Soft Power of 2 Nye, J. (2004). Soft Power. The Means to Suc- War. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publis- cess in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs, p.5. hing Company, p. 2.
6 while the Russian people prefer a politically Perviy Kanal we traced the process of value- controlled and regulated economy; redefinition. Perviy Kanal is the most popular collectivism and the superiority of the state TV channel among Russian-speakers both in are chosen over respect for human rights, Russia and it’s neighbouring countries. RT is solidarity, individualism, and tolerance. In the a news outlet with a relatively low number realm of international law the West aligns of viewers in Western countries, but with itself with international norms and rules, while increasing potential. These media platforms the popular home-grown opinion that Russia provide information on the tools used to has become a victim of Western pressure and redefine values in the transatlantic space isolation prompts that state to individualistic and in Russia. By applying critical discourse posturing in the global arena. Value surveys analysis to the selected cases, legitimation provide evidence that there are two separate methodology in particular, we have drafted belief systems driving international politics a list of the manipulation techniques used by and policies. The question arises— working Russia during the crisis in Ukraine. from the basis of it’s own belief system, to In all four cases, the five leading techniques what extent can Russia redefine the values and for redefining political values were the belief system of the transatlantic community COMMON MAN, LABELLING, IN/OUT GROUP, in the context of the Ukrainian crisis? COMPARISON, and AUTHORITY. EXPERTISE, SIMPLIFICATION, and MORAL SUPERIORITY were used to influence the moral dimension. The redefinition of international order was 1. MEDIA - based on the use of HYPOTHETICAL FUTURE, SIMPLIFICATION, and INFOTAINMENT MANIPULATION techniques. Examples are the de- legitimisation of Western unity; separating TECHNIQUES APPLIED the US from other Western countries such as the Netherlands or Germany; the vilification of the US in order to delegitimise NATO Without a doubt the media is the most and other international organisations, and comprehensive platform offering a wide to prove that their information cannot be spectrum of tools for influencing people’s trusted; revelations that the European Court hearts and minds and redefining values. The of Human Rights is politicised and biased; Russian information campaign transformed and the legitimisation of BRICS countries. information warfare during the Ukrainian Economic values were mostly redefined by crisis when the manipulation of public opinion the use of the COMMON MAN, AUTHORITY, escalated dramatically both internationally COMPARISON, SILENCE, and VICTIMISATION and domestically. This research project techniques. Europe is portrayed to be the relies on four case studies: the MH-17 main victim of sanctions, whereas the Russian catastrophe; the implementation of counter- agriculture and food industries are portrayed sanctions; the first humanitarian convoy; as making the most of the opportunity to and the Minsk-2 agreement. By analysing revive Russian national agriculture. Each of the audio-visual platforms of news agencies these techniques will be discussed in greater RT (formerly known as Russia Today) and depth below.
7 their respective political leaders, while Russian POLICY IMPLICATIONS leaders enjoy state control over the media that allows them to showcase clear and coherent messages supporting and strengthening A study on the redefinition of Euro-Atlantic the unquestioned policies of Vladimir Putin values is relevant not only for understanding and the Russian political elite. Putin enjoys how various manipulation techniques are immense support for his policies, which applied in the media sphere, but also because adds to his capacity to define values. Russia’s it shows how such manipulations can influence leadership also enjoys impressive support international relations. Some policy makers from its constituents for its policies towards would have us believe that the essence of China, the US, Ukraine and the EU with 90%, Russian propaganda has been revealed and the 85%, 83%, and 82% supporting each policy democratic community has counter-measures respectively4. Furthermore, via RT and Perviy in place that are successfully decreasing Kanal, Russia has free access to democratic its influence. This argument is misleading, societies, while the West’s ability to influence if not entirely false. Russia’s efforts to de- Russian audiences is limited and controlled by construct and re-construct the international the state. environment is sure to be a long-term process, and the manipulation techniques used during As the opinions of European Union member the Ukraine crisis will inevitably became more states grow increasingly divisive across the 1. sophisticated. As time progresses we will entire spectrum of political issues, including surely find manifestations of manipulative policies towards Ukraine, Russia gains the propaganda in Russia’s relations with other upper hand by employing manipulative states and international organisations. techniques. The Russian government has no qualms about implementing separate policies Russia is well armed with knowledge about with each of the twenty-eight EU member both domestic and international target states or exercising its power toward EU groups. An analysis of the narratives in news institutions. programmes presented by RT and Perviy Kanal show that identical messages can be adapted One of the new mechanisms of influence at and contextualised according to the interests Russia’s disposal is the use of the combination of the targeted groups of viewers. In the case of of the VOICE OF EXPERTISE together with the RT, such techniques as LABELLING, AUTHORITY, LABELLING and IN-OUT GROUP techniques. and INFOTAINMENT are used to undermine Think tanks and other similar organisations, the quality of media, the objectivity of the generously financed by the Russian presented news, and the credibility of western government or its affiliates, have proliferated politicians and international organisations. in recent months. Their representatives appear When the quality, objectivity, and credibility on RT screens or at international conferences of available information are called into presenting ‘watered down’ versions of official question, Western society grows increasingly Russian policies and questioning the efficiency divided over the controversies presented in the media. Westerners are drawn into 4 Pew Research Center. Spring 2015 Global questioning the efficiency of their own foreign Attitudes Survey. Available at http://www.pewglobal. and security policies and the credibility of org/2015/06/10/2-russian-public-opinion-putin-praised- west-panned/, last time accessed 01.07.2015.
8 and credibility of the EU and NATO member • The ability to assess our own faults and states. Still, the message these arguments are shortcomings constructively, as well as trying to convey remains the same—economic view attempts to redefine democratic sanctions harm the well-being of Western values by non-democratic regimes with a societies, reductions in social spending harm critical eye. the people, and increases in defence spending • Opponents of the transatlantic community, aggravate the arms race. including Russia, will continue their This study is based on four case studies spanning attempts to negatively redefine democratic a relatively short time period. While too limited values. The countries of the EU and NATO to put forward policy recommendations, there have become better informed about the was enough pertinent evidence to allow dominant narratives used to rewrite the researchers to point towards the dangers of foundations of international order, and have Russia’s increasing and far-reaching influence accumulated skills and practices needed over the long-term. Three warnings were to recognise manipulation. However, the outlined as a result of this research. The success most decisive challenges still lie ahead— or failure of Russian manipulation, locally and to find instruments that can ensure the globally, depends on: continued existence of fundamental Euro- Atlantic values and the introduction of • The ability of the transatlantic community innovative methods to counter balance the to further develop the tools needed manipulation efforts of those who would
to defend and preserve democracy. 1. like to impose their vision. Simplistic counter-measures will not work because the transatlantic community The table on the next page presents the most lacks sufficient knowledge of Russian typical examples of how political, economic, society, has limited financial resources to moral and international Euro-Atlantic values build comprehensive and efficient media are being redefined. platforms, and faces the constraints and barriers put in place by the regime. • The ability to withstand efforts to redefine democratic values. Western societies have taken democratic values for granted, and their role in preserving peace, security, and prosperity has gone largely unappreciated. The complexity of the many crises surrounding the Transatlantic Community has contributed to discussions about whether the existing set of values serves the interests of democratic countries. It is the responsibility of politicians, experts and civil society to disperse the information fog;
9 Redefined values Redefined Russia’s moral moral Russia’s Power of the of the Power is a failed Ukraine Patriots of Russia Patriots • superiority • is the Russian state of its value central citizens • do not complain • state Manipulative techniques Manipulative AUTHORITY (Putin/ AUTHORITY POSITIVE HYPOTHETICAL on (impact MAN COMMON provided A lot of STATISTICS FUTURE • and farmers, Russian customers and customers) farmers Western • civilian and military showing casualties • REPETITION (legal response, (legal • REPETITION market, of the local protection high quality food) of (aggressiveness • LABELLING market) Western the (internal GROUPING IN-OUT • of patriots; dimension – group dimension - splitting external splitting US/EU cooperation, up the EU) in SILENCE (not engaging • ignoring assessment, negative in Ukraine) the conflict • in pseudo Medvedev/ministers communication, face-to-face the of defending narrative interests) national • 10 Radicalisation of Ukrainian society is out of society of Ukrainian Radicalisation Narratives used by Russian-speaking audiences Russian-speaking by used Narratives • is in power oligarchy control, emphasised abandoning their are commanders • Ukrainian well treated are soldiers Ukrainian detained soldiers; to opposed are quickly; parents exchanged and are are soldiers army; their sons serving in the Ukrainian commanders of their orders the follow to not ready by controlled is of Ukraine system • The political (the West) forces external don’t take parliamentarians • Ukrainian their actions for responsibility • Ukraine does not have full control over its military, its military, over full control • does not have Ukraine abandoned area Ukraine Eastern in citizens Ukrainian government central by the and forgotten Russia to Ukraine comparing Order • Chaos vs. side the Ukrainian • Discrediting Russian authorities • Promoting and military to show provided • A lot of statistics civilian casualties in a state as a failure Ukraine’s affirm • Refugees highly emotional manner is forces Armed of the Ukrainian • The hostility • Ukrainian authorities are unable to manage the to manage unable are authorities • Ukrainian spheres, and political in social, economic country towards their duty fulfil cannot they therefore their citizens
1.
Narratives used by by used Narratives Western audiences Western
• Discrediting the • Discrediting side Ukrainian Russian • Promoting authorities and forgotten by the and forgotten government central Order • Chaos vs. to Ukraine comparing Russia over its military, its military, over citizens Ukrainian Ukraine in Eastern abandoned area therefore they cannot cannot they therefore fulfil their duty their citizens towards does not • Ukraine full control have unable to manage manage unable to in social, the country and economic spheres, political • Ukrainian • Ukrainian authorities are
Relations between state and society based on partnerships on based society and state between Relations
Values SUMMARY OF THE EXAMPLES OF THE REDEFINITION OF EURO-ATLANTIC VALUES EURO-ATLANTIC OF REDEFINITION OF THE THE EXAMPLES OF SUMMARY 1. Narratives used by Narratives used by Russian-speaking Values Manipulative techniques Redefined values Western audiences audiences
MORAL VALUES • It is impossible to trust • It is impossible to trust the Ukrainian • SIMPLIFICATION • The trust in Ukrainian the Ukrainian authorities authorities and the army. • TRANSFERENCE and US governments and the army • Topics added: poisoning of Yushchenko, • EXPERTISE should be questioned by • Ukraine and the US are Georgadze case, the civilian plane crash in • AUTHORITIES everyone immoral 2001 • COMPARE IN CONTRAST • Moral superiority of • Supporting the high • Ukraine and the US are immoral • COMPARE SIMILARITIES Russia (in its attitude quality of Russian Supporting the high quality of Russian (West) towards the refugees and
expertise expertise • HYPOTHETICAL FUTURE in handling of the MH-17 1. 1.
• Conspiracy vs. • Conspiracy vs. morality: one cannot trust • MORAL SUPERIORITY1. OF investigation) morality: one cannot the US - the case of Powell regarding the RUSSIA • Lack of western trust the US - lack of evidence on Iraq • COMPARING DIFFERENCES solidarity both among transparency regarding • US benefits from the MH-17 catastrophe ROLE MODEL themselves and with 9/11; the case of The only side willing to help is Russia • COMMON MAN (locals Russia to find a peaceful American intelligence • Russia as peaceful actor supporting a non- in the region, Ukrainian solution to the conflict
“Moral quality of state” “Moral service disguising a violent solution to the conflict refugees, Russian people) and provide aid to those plane flying to Cuba. • Promotion of rebel authorities, silence on • EVALUATION in need any problematic issues concerning the pro- • REPETITION • Dehumanisation of the Russian separatists • SILENCE (not a word of Ukrainian armed forces • Unification of radicals and the irresponsible Ukrainian support) Ukrainian armed forces • Victimization of the Russian side and the pro-Russian separatists 11 Redefined values Redefined of the democratic system system democratic of the of governance • Sanctions against Russia harm Europe Russia’s and strengthen economy national • Economic interests interests • Economic first come • the of Redefinition market logic free of the economy as a• market Free and an disadvantage failure of the illustration Manipulative techniques Manipulative (often without any reference) to reference) without any (often statements) legitimise MAN (Russian and • COMMON farmers) Western • SILENCE (on advantages of free of free • SILENCE (on advantages and threats and on drawbacks market market/economy) the Russian to • constructing (by GROUPING IN-OUT even and competition dishonest of suffering also includes it aggression; EU level the at grouping Russian farmers; ruling elite) The vs. farmers – common of (the voice • PSEUDO-PLURALITY conflict, to the refer does not expertise as the is promoted only one motive action) for reason (the poor conditions • VICTIMISATION the in before were Russian farmers sanctions) counter quality) (of the • COMPARING and figures (numbers • STATISTICS 12 ECONOMIC VALUES ECONOMIC audiences Narratives used by Russian-speaking Russian-speaking by used Narratives West and its farmers and its West Russia of suppliers: • The diversification in Latin markets new opening up to and Asia (for Africa meat), (for America fruit and vegetables) Russian market is harming the Russian is harming the Russian market farmers “free” of the as the face food • Western market Western quality low • against Protection products for future hypothetical • Positive small farmers Russia’s for the future hypothetical • Negative • freedoms economic The EU supports far as their only as and opportunities concerned are farmers own in the goods • of Western The presence
1.
Narratives used by by used Narratives Western audiences Western
from the conflict the conflict from it is not in Ukraine; of in the interests the people or the economy European money by letting letting by money use its other states air-space is suffering • Europe • Ukraine uses the uses • Ukraine to earn conflict Democratic values embedded in the economic system economic the in embedded values Democratic Values 1. Narratives used by Values Narratives used by Russian-speaking audiences Manipulative techniques Redefined values Western audiences
POLITICAL VALUES • Results presented • Results presented before an investigation has • IMPORTANCE (placement) Western media before an started • REPETITION sources are investigation has • Western journalists are biased and influenced by • AUTHORITY unprofessional, started politicians • TESTIMONY lack credibility, and • No space provided • Media used to misinform society, lack of • UNIFICATION are influenced by for opposing professionalism • LABELLING politicians views (pro-Russian • Low morality1. of Western journalists • IN-OUT GROUPING separatists) • The Ukrainian and Western media, especially • VOICE OF AUTHORITY 1. • Media used in the US and the EU, promote anti-Russian 1. • EVALUATION to misinform sentiment • INSTRUCTING society, lack of • Western countries influence their own societies • SIMPLIFICATION professionalism as well as that of Ukraine to believe that Russia is a • Assigning guilt for threat the tragedy to Putin • The West wants to poison the minds of Ukrainian
Media freedom people, to turn them against Russia—a country that has become non-submissive, powerful, and rich • The West wants to force Ukrainians and Russians into a conflict
13 Redefined values Redefined Questioning credibility credibility Questioning international agreements, agreements, international Russia unlike is not • The West international the following agreements • who setof those, rules international from is suffering • Europe U.S. actions of the the a by • The EU is plagued solidarity crisis violates • Ukraine Manipulative techniques Manipulative LABELLING SIMPLIFICATION FUTURE HYPOTHETICAL REPETITION OPPONENT: NEGATIVE in (on the conflict SILENCE (legitimising) AUTHORITY IN/OUT GROUPING • • • • EXPERTISE • • OF DIALOGUE PRINCIPLE (the EU and the COMPARING US) • not contextualising Ukraine, Russia, not sanctions against them) repeating • (as hypothetical of evils he least future) 14
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION INTERNATIONAL
audiences 1. Narratives used by Russian-speaking Russian-speaking by used Narratives subjected to “human rights abuses” “human rights to subjected •West. victim of the as the Russia described conflictto the Sanctions as an issue unrelated in Ukraine •for the peaceful voice Putin as the main process with • of the US mixed role The destructive support military provide to strategy clear the as the main portrayed Germany Ukraine; to to this opposition delegitimisation of the regime in Ukraine regime of the delegitimisation “coup for synonym • - a Colour revolutions an used by methods condemning d’etat”; “unnamed outside power” supporting democratisation expressing Russian authorities • Top the Western that in the fact disappointment Russia to is not listening world are states in Baltic the • Russian-speakers • Destabilization in other countries becomes becomes countries a in other • Destabilization problem common law • international the Russia following • in Russia; regime of the Legitimisation
1.
Narratives used by by used Narratives Western audiences Western The destructive role The destructive The focus on Poland, on Poland, The focus Russia is following the Russia is following mainPutin as the The US is constantly The US is constantly
to Ukraine; Germany Ukraine; to main as the portrayed to thisopposition • with US mixed of the to strategy clear the support military provide voice for the peaceful for voice process • France, Greece, Finland, and Germany international law international • law international • • theviolating Respect to international security and order and security international to Respect Values INTRODUCTION 1. The aim of the research project Redefining These four case studies are particularly Euro-Atlantic Values and Russia’s Strategic relevant to understanding how Russia has Communication in the Euro-Atlantic Space, managed its information campaigns during carried out by the Centre for Strategic Studies the crisis in Ukraine. In addition, each of these (CIS), is to identify the methods and resources cases illustrates a different aspect of Russia’s Russia employs in order to influence our use of strategic political communication. News understanding of Euro-Atlantic values in the coverage of the MH-17 catastrophe illustrates context of the crisis in Ukraine and redefine crisis management of an emerging situation,
the meaning of such core vales as democracy, but the other three events were pre-planned, 1. media freedom, human rights, freedom of making it possible to control narratives. speech, and others for various social groups All of the events examined here received in the Euro-Atlantic space. wide media coverage and were extensively Researchers followed the audio-visual discussed on both sides of the Atlantic. The platforms RT (formerly Russia Today) and cases themselves were used as key points in Perviy Kanal from April 2014 to January 2015. political communication by all sides. Perviy Kanal is the leading television channel The formula for calculating the data collection in Russia with more than 250 million viewers period was to begin with the date of the across the country. RT is a government-funded event and continue a minimum of 6 days. A television network with programs in several period of one-week was selected as the most languages aimed at viewers outside of Russia. appropriate for the analysis of first reactions to Viewership in western countries is small, but a changing agenda, identify the tools selected has growth potential. News stories related to for constructing the desired narrative/ the following four case studies were analysed message, and to study possible cooperation for this report: between RT and Perviy Kanal. The programmes 1) The MH-17 catastrophe; selected for analysis were RT International’s news programme Bulletin at 17.00 (sometimes 2) The implementation of counter- 18.00) Moscow time, RT America’s only news sanctions; bulletin and the prime-time news programme 3) The first ‘humanitarian convoy’; Vremja on Perviy Kanal. 4) The Minsk II agreement.
15 Each case study opens with a short and images used. All of these components have introduction to the event, followed by the an impact on the audience and are therefore main findings concerning the agenda and used to shape public opinion. values, including commonly used strategies From the large number of concepts used in of legitimation. critical discourse analysis6, this study focuses To carry out an in-depth analysis, an on ‘legitimation’7. Legitimation is one of the interdisciplinary theoretical framework was strategies used to influence public opinion developed. This paper begins with a catalogue and includes a large number of techniques of Euro-Atlantic values. For qualitative content used in strategic communications to ‘win analysis, case studies based on values—the hearts and minds’ and change political main topic of this research—were selected attitudes. T. Van Leeuwen argues that and analysed on the basis of Euro-Atlantic legitimation refers to the process by which values catalogue. speakers accredit or license a type of social The Euro-Atlantic values catalogue was behaviour8. He writes that, ‘the very act of developed, grouping values into four large legitimation per se implies an attempt to groups: justify action or no action or an ideological position on a specific issue’9. e) political values According to Leeuwen’s study10 there are f) economic values four main categories of legitimation:
1. g) moral values • ‘authorisation’ or legitimation by h) international relations and international reference to the authority of tradition, law custom, and law, and of persons in Qualitative analysis of the selected ‘messages’ whom institutional authority is vested was carried out according to the principles • ‘moral evaluation’ or legitimation by of critical discourse analysis, one of the most reference to discourses of value influential discourse analysis tools dealing with the power of language and imagery. It is widely
accepted that values and ideologies are socially 6 See more Van Dijk, T.A. (1998). Ideology. Lon- constructed, deconstructed, and reconstructed don: SAGE; and Van Dijk, T.A. (2008). Discourse Rea- through language in social interactions5. For der. London: SAGE. 7 See Van Leeuwen, T. (2007). Legitimation in example, in the audio-visual media space, the discourse and communication. Discourse & Communi- process of construction, reconstruction, and cation, 1(1), pp. 91–112; Reyes, A. (2011). Strategies of deconstruction takes place through the format, legitimizat–ion in political discourse: From words to ac- tions. Discourse and Society, 22 (6), pp. 781–807; Vaara, length, and timeslot of a given programme, E. (2014). Struggles over legitimacy in the Eurozone cri- the selection of topics or agenda-setting, the sis: Discursive legitimation strategies and their ideologi- cal underpinnings. Discourse and Society, 25(4), pp. 500 experts invited to participate, and the words – 518; and Oddo, J. (2011). War legitimation discourse: Representing “Us” and “Them” in four US presidential addresses. Discourse and Society, 22 (3), pp. 287 – 314. 5 See Rojo, M., van Dijk, T. (1997). “There was 8 Van Leeuwen, T. (2008). Discourse and Practice: a problem and it was solved: Legitimating the exclusion New tools for critical discourse analysis. Oxford: Oxford of illegal immigrants in Spanish parliamentary discour- University Press, p.782. se. Discourse & Society, 8(4), pp. 523 – 567; and Van 9 Ibid, p.783. Leeuwen, T. (2008). Discourse and Practice: New tools 10 See Van Leeuwen, T. (2007). Legitimation in for critical discourse analysis. Oxford: Oxford University discourse and communication. Discourse & Communica- Press. tion, 1(1), pp. 91–112.
16 • ‘rationalisation’ or legitimation by elements. M. Grabe and E. Bucy12 write that reference to the goals and uses of even prominent theories about news analysis, institutionalised social action, and to including agenda setting and framing analysis, the social knowledge that endows have virtually ignored the visual component them with cognitive validity of news broadcasting. For a well-developed • ‘mythopoesis’ or legitimation conveyed academic analysis of audio-visual examples, through narratives whose outcomes it is crucial to develop and use a model that reward legitimate actions and punish facilitates the identification of legitimation illegitimate actions strategies not only linguistically, but also at the semantic level, including consideration of the Therefore the examination of ‘value-shaping’ sound and video used to portray a message. in terms of redefining Euro-Atlantic values presented here focuses on the formation, The quantitative content analysis of video deformation, and reformation of legitimation done for this study was based on measuring during the crisis in Ukraine. the duration of footage showing a) death b) medicine and pain c) children and children Methodologically the research focuses both accessories d) weapons e) wrecked buildings on verbal and visual themes to identify f) older people g) fire i) sacred symbols and forms and meanings. Anthropologist David j) tears. Quantitative content analysis was Graber11 argues that visual scenes are more applied to one case study only. memorable than verbal ones. The results of this research are a significant
The first step was to collect media stories from 1. contribution to the debate on the security of media platforms relevant to the selected case the Euro-Atlantic space and serve as a tool for studies, including different events, actions, shaping the global Euro-Atlantic identity and and genres. The analysis of large amounts of invigorating its values in the societies of every text provides researchers with the general NATO and European Union member state. patterns and features of the ‘value-systems’ in play, and of the strategies and techniques By taking into account and implementing the used to promote these values. The second main conclusions of the research, it will be step was qualitative content analysis, studying possible to develop strategic communications agenda setting and identifying comparable in a way that consolidates and empowers data. The legitimation strategies used in the member states, and strengthens their each media story were identified, especially belonging to the Transatlantic Community focusing on ‘moral evaluation’. and its values of patriotism, democracy, freedoms, and human rights, all of which are The third step is an examination of the an indispensable part of the Western world. legitimation strategies used (scenarios, categories), mostly in the news. This step requires a further methodological explanation. Studies on legitimation are mostly based on textual analysis, setting aside audio and visual
11 Graber. D. (1990). Seeing is remembering: How 12 Grabe, M., Bucy, E. (2009). Image bite politics: visuals contribute to learning from television news. Jour- news and the visual framing of elections. Oxford Univer- nal of Communication, 40, 134–155. sity press, p. 6.
17 VALUES AND STRATEGIC POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 2. Values, the core object of this study, that the control of the agenda, topics and
2. transcend specific situations and guide our issues, for discussion, in the media and in selection and evaluation of behaviours and public, impacts public opinion17. events13. Values exist ‘not in isolation, but as It must be emphasised that changes to a systems’14; therefore they can be regarded system of values can be interpreted both as a fundamental basis for the functioning optimistically and pessimistically, but ‘the and coherence of any society. Values must loss of values can be regarded exceptionally be ‘inertial enough to lend stability and as a symptom of crisis’18. For this reason, evaluations and behaviour’15 since they every external attempt to bring change to can be regarded as a particular standard the system of Euro-Atlantic values must be of societal behaviour and people’s ‘specific addressed with the highest attention, since political attitudes’16. In turn, attitudes play this process may end with the loss of certain the main role in the studies of public opinion. foundational values and therefore with crisis Researchers of political communication argue in society.
13 See Schwartz (1992), Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and empiri- cal tests in 20 countries. In M. P. Zanna (Eds.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 24, pp. 1-65). New York: Academic Press. p. 4. 14 Feldmans, S. (2013) Political Ideology. In: Hud- dy, L., Sears, D.O., Levy J.S. (eds.) The Oxford Handbo- 17 See Dearing, J., Rodgers, E. (1996). Agenda-Set- ok of Political Psychology. Oxford University press, p. ting. SAGE Publications; Pratkins, A. (2007). Winning 603. the hearts and minds. In: (eds.) Arquilla, J., Borer, A. 15 Ibid. Information Strategy and Warfare: A Guide to Theory and 16 Clowson, R., Oxley, Z. (2013). Public Opinion: Practice. Routlege. Democratic Ideals, Democratic Practice. Sage Publica- 18 Joas, H. (1999). Die Entstehing der Werte. Suhr- tions, p.19. kampf., p.13.
18 Chart 1 “Correlation between values, public opinion and politics”
It has been widely discussed that authoritarian an authoritarian regime (Russia) has used the regimes use the media to set a political mass media to influence public opinion in 2. agenda and influence public opinion with the democratic regimes (Europe and USA) during help of manipulative techniques (See Chart 1. the Ukraine crisis. Correlation between values, public opinion Strategic political communication, understood and politics). It is also worth mentioning as ‘the careful planning of communication that political conflicts are not only about tools to meet very specific political values, but also about beliefs, perceptions, objectives’, is frequently developed in media and emotions as W. Saris and P. Sniderman environments. J. Manheim21 defines strategic conclude19. It must be emphasised that in political communication as ‘sophisticated democratic regimes, public opinion is centre knowledge22 about human behaviour to stage20, which is not the case in authoritarian mould information to accomplish very regimes. Although these ideas may seem specific, and often very short-term objectives. contradictory at first glance, they are very Their emphasis is mostly on controlling the important for establishing the main analytical messages that are sent, the circumstances of perspective of this research. Therefore, the their transmission, and the list of recipients.’ research combines both of these arguments Researchers argue that ‘the main point about and provides analysis on the ways and means
21 Manheim, J.B. (1991). All of the People, All of 19 See Saris, W., Sniderman, P. (2004). Studies in the Time: Strategic Communication and American Poli- Public Opinions: Attitudes, Nonattitudes, Measurement tics. Armonk, New York: M.E.Sharpe, p.7. Error, and Change. Princeton University Press. 22 Bakir, V. (2010). Surveillance, Media and Strate- 20 See Dearing, J., Rodgers, E. (1996). Agenda-Set- gic Political Communication: Iraq, USA, UK. New York: ting. SAGE Publications. Continuum, p.1.
19 agenda-setting is that the mass media does to establish Russia as the hegemonic power not tell us what to think; but that they do tell on the European continent’.27 Even NATO us what to think about and ultimately believe General, Sir Adrian Bradshaw has warned and act upon’23. With regard to television, the that ‘the alliance needs to develop both fast- power of the audio and visual components reacting conventional forces and capacities of a report, play a major role, beginning with to counter Russian efforts at coercion and identifying the topic of the message. propaganda, as seen in Ukraine’28 and ‘our information and warning system will be Knowing this, agenda-setting can be specifically attuned to the range of hybrid considered a type of ‘sub-propaganda’24 and threats including not only the deployment ‘facilitative communication’, or early stage of potentially hostile conventional forces, propaganda25. Values become an instrument but also political agitation and subversion, of propaganda. O’Shaughnessy wrote that cyber-attack, hostile propaganda and other propaganda does not try to destroy values, destabilising effects’.29 Thus, a question but attempts to conscript them26. Moreover, arises—why is it so hard for the West to messages that appeal to values are in strong design an adequate strategic communication demand by propagandists who follow the plan and respond rapidly and effectively? principle that ‘persuasion should speak to values’. Transforming values is a process The first complication is related to the current
2. that requires time because values are ‘not struggle being about influence, not territory. vulnerable to factual revision’. Russia does not use its massive propaganda budget to promote an alternative life model, Although scientific explanations about the as it did during the Cold War. Today Russia role and significance of the social value system spreads doubt, confusion, and dissatisfaction are clear and not new, empirically the Western with the values, facts, and realities the world faces great challenges in coping with Western mass media and political leaders are Russia’s strategic political communication, addressing and standing up for. The difficulty propaganda, and manipulative techniques lies in the fact that propaganda cannot be (which will be described later in this defeated by counter-propaganda, as was research). It is widely recognised that Russia’s possible during World War II and the Cold aggression in Ukraine indicates broader War, because it would mean the loss of certain intentions to undo the entire post-war aspects of Western democracy; freedom of security settlement, as well as the relevance the media would be the first to be curtailed. of its main institutions—NATO, the European Union, the OSCE, and the United Nations. Putin appears determined ‘to weaken the 27 Motyl, A.J. (2015) ‘The West Should Arm West economically, to split it politically, and Ukraine. Here’s Why—And How’, Foreign Affairs (10.02.2015), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/143056/alexander-j-motyl/the-west-should-arm- ukraine, last time accessed 15.02.2015. 23 See Larsen, Ch. (2012). Persuasion: Reception 28 Russian expansionism may pose existential and Responsibility. Cengage Learning. threat, says Nato general. The Guardian, 20.02.2015, 24 See Cunningham, S. (2002). The Idea of Propa- available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/ ganda. A Reconstruction. Praeger Publishers. feb/20/russia-existential-threat-british-nato-general, last 25 See O’Shaughnessy, N. (2004). Politics and time accessed on 21.02.2015. Propaganda: Weapons of Mass Seduction. Manchester 29 General Sir Adrian Bradshaw, NATO Deputy University Press. Supreme Allied Commander Europe; Speech at the Royal 26 Ibid, p.113. United Services Institute, 21 February 2015.
20 The second complication involves the clash the eyes of the enemy. Once a foe sees and of political systems; this is more dangerous understands one’s disposition of forces— than old-school Soviet propaganda, because political, military, informational, one’s inner Western societies welcome ‘alternative system and its principles, one becomes viewpoints’ and ‘second opinions’, and do predictable and therefore vulnerable. It is not necessarily recognise the ways in which easy to decipher and understand the basic Russia’s propaganda tries to redefine and principles upon which Western societies deconstruct the Euro-Atlantic values that are built. The West’s transparency is both form the very basis of Western democracy. its greatest achievement and its greatest vulnerability. The inner system of Western Third, the boundaries between war and peace democracy is open; therefore our judicial have become blurred, as the crisis in Ukraine system, decision-making mechanisms, and has shown. It is no longer clear if a sovereign principles of defence are generally visible state has been invaded, which leads to and understandable. In most cases they are information fog and information chaos. This known and embedded in international law, will be precisely illustrated in the following but Russia as a foe and an authoritarian chapters and by the case studies elaborated state remains unpredictable. The hsing or in this research. disposition of forces and inner system of Fourth, the Kremlin has created defence Russia is closed and difficult to decode. This mechanisms for itself within Western incompatibility of the inner systems is one
societies; it has identified various audiences, of the main reasons it is so difficult for the 2. their needs, and their specific habits of West to respond to Russia’s strategic political information consumption, and communicates communication properly. with these audiences using well-designed The next chapter clearly illustrates the wide tools and techniques that address their basic gap between Russian values and Western, or perceptions. This aspect is also analysed and Euro-Atlantic, values, and serves as a warning illustrated in the following chapters and case and a tool for understanding the propaganda studies. Russia used during it’s intervention in Ukraine. Fifth, the methods and actions, today described as hybrid-war or information war, in fact are nothing new. The same principles are an organic part of military strategy, and were accurately described 2,500 years ago by Sun Tzu in The Art of War. He wrote: ‘I determine the enemy’s hsing while I have no perceptible form’30. The Chinese term hsing can be translated as the enemy’s disposition of forces, pattern, or inner system. In other words, to win a war it is advisable to be ‘formless’, not to be a perceivable system in
30 Sun Tzu, trans. by R.D. Sawyer. (2001) The Art of War. NY: MetroBooks, p. 193.
21 THE EURO-ATLANTIC VALUES CATALOGUE: WESTERN AND RUSSIA’S INTERPRETATIONS 3. To carry out an in-depth analysis, The Euro- Each group of values includes indicators and
3. Atlantic values catalogue was developed, references to surveys and research. A similar categorising values into four large groups: catalogue was created for Russian promoted and disseminated values and their indicators a) political values in the Euro-Atlantic information space. This b) economic values highlights the wide gap between specific political attitudes, beliefs, perceptions and c) moral values emotions that are associated with the same d) international relations and international principles (values) in different spaces (Euro- law Atlantic and Russian). (See Summary: The Euro-Atlantic values catalogue: West’s and Russia’s interpretations).
SUMMARY: THE EURO-ATLANTIC VALUES CATALOGUE: WEST’S AND RUSSIA’S INTERPRETATIONS
Values Western interpretation Russia’s interpretation Good and functioning democracy comes Democracy loses when challenged with before good economic situation strong economy Support for competing economic Extremely low support for components on Economic environment the free market values Gender Equality in labour market Special preferences for men in labour market are broadly supported High value is given to economic freedoms and opportunities provided by the EU
22 High support for use of military force to Would like to see Russia implementing maintain global order, only when sanctioned independent foreign policy on a global scale, by the United Nations (Chapter VII of the UN without the interference of the EU and NATO. Charter) Imperialism NATO as the most important collective Low level of sympathy for NATO which basically defence organisation is considered as a hard power tool of certain International countries relations and Generally positive attitude towards the UN Generally positive attitude towards the UN international Events in Ukraine significantly affected Ukraine and the Western countries wage an law Russia’s image in the West information war against Russia Russia’s aggression in Ukraine is seen as a The Western countries try to force out the violation of the international law. Readiness Russian economy from the former Soviet to provide economic and political support to Union and to maintain control over the former Ukraine even if it would lead to a conflict with communist bloc and the republics of the USSR Russia
Moderate attitude toward use of military Strong element of external threat (Western force even in the case of Ukraine – most countries) of the countries support economic levers against Russia Values Western interpretation Russia’s interpretation Democracy is an uncontested value, the best Democracy is inferior to a strong leader able to political system possible resolve social and economic problems
Equally important are all dimensions of The concentration of power in the hands of democracy—electoral, liberal and social one leader is necessary for the Russian people 3. Human rights and freedom of the media Order and stability in a country is more import- regarded as highly important ant than respect for human rights Nationalistic trends and strengthening of xenophobia Political Free elections and accountability before the Freedom as a basic value, nevertheless values electorate, ability for different political views understood as ‘to be capable to live according (Democracy) to be represented in form of free opposition to your own will, without being dependent on any social restrictions —norms or laws’ Critically low interest about forms of public participation Freedom of speech Low interest in freedom of speech Interpersonal trust Low level of mutual trust State has a limited role The power is primarily held by the state itself; the top management and the officials are the ‘authorities’ which provide work for the government Individualism and solidarity Collectivism Value of human life State interests are seen as more important than the needs of an individual. Dehumanisa- tion Moral Belief in God is not a prerequisite of morality Link between morality and belief in God, and values conviction that church provides answers for what is moral and what is not High tolerance towards homosexuality Correlation between religion and morality is also present when looking at certain moral issues - homosexuality, abortion, premarital sex
23 systems32. In Russia the opposite is true, with as little as 29% of the population preferring 3.1. VALUES democracy compared to the 60%who prefer a strong leader capable of solving social and ORIENTATION economic problems33. IN WESTERN The 2008 European Values Survey34 (ESV) shows that along with being important in COUNTRIES Western countries, democracy is also called the best possible political system in the UK, GER, FRA, NL, and BE. Support for democracy as the best political system varies, but it is generally around 90%. In Russia democracy 3.1.1. Political is the best political system for 78% of respondents, while a military regime is Values considered to be the best political system by 17%. In Western countries only 2-5% support Democracy as an uncontested value a military regime, with the exception of the Western Europe countries (the UK, France, UK and BE where support stands at 10% and Switzerland, Germany, and the Netherlands) 8% respectively. ESV data also shows that 3. consider democracy an uncontested value Western countries consider democracy the and the best political system possible. And best political system, despite its deficiencies. according to 2012 data from the European Differing support for the different Social Survey31 (ESS), Western countries dimensions of democracy also have among the highest indexes of ‘democracy importance’ (8 out of 10 points). In Western Europe there is good knowledge Russia also exhibits relatively high support about the different aspects of democracy, for democracy as a political system, but and people look at it multi-dimensionally support is low compared to other countries supporting its different values. All three surveyed (6.5 out of 10). dimensions of democracy examined here are equally important—electoral democracy, i.e. Despite the fact that support for democracy free elections, a multi-party system, and the can be observed both in the West and in freedom of opposition; liberal democracy, Russia, there are substantial differences in the real value of this assessment when compared with other alternatives. According to the 2013 Transatlantic Trends (TT) data, 32 Transatlantic Trends. Key Findings 2013. Avai- lable at http://trends.gmfus.org/transatlantic-trends-2013/, 58% of Westerners prefer democracy to last time accessed 01.07.2015. the stability provided by other political 33 PEW Research Global Attitudes Project 2011. Confidence in Democracy and Capitalism Wanes in the Former Soviet Union. Available at http://www.pewglobal. org/2011/12/05/confidence-in-democracy-and-capital- 31 European Social Survey 2012. Europeans ism-wanes-in-former-soviet-union/, last time accessed understanding and evaluation of democracy. 01.07.2015. Available at http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/ 34 European Values Survey 2008. Available at permalink/800ea36f-3a8d-11e4-95d4-005056b8065f.pdf, http://www.atlasofeuropeanvalues.eu/new/zieeuropa. last time accessed 01.07.2015. php?year=2008, last time accessed 01.07.2015.
24 i. e. equality before the law, checks and Social values in democracy balances, media freedom, and the protection of minorities; and social democracy, i.e. Among all European countries, the social protection against poverty, and reduction of dimension of democracy is the least explicit; income inequality. However, there are national social values don’t enjoy as much support differences in how highly the three dimensions as their counterparts (fewer than 5 of 10 and their constituent elements are valued35. points). Both protection from poverty and the reduction of income inequality have Liberal values in democracy fairly low support indexes.
Within the framework of liberal democracy A comparison of these three dimensions of the highest value is attributed to the democratic values it seems that liberal values protection of minorities (index above 7), enjoy the greatest support among Western which highlights the importance of human societies as can be observed from the high rights in Western countries. Second among the support for different freedoms. Support for values of liberal democracy is media freedom democratic institutions and procedures, i.e. (index 6.5) followed by equality before the elections, political pluralism, comes second, law and media reliability (indexes 6 and 5 while social values have the least support. respectively). Another aspect that proves the This relatively low level of support can be maturity of democracy in Western countries explained by the minimal role of the state in is the emphasis on universal equality, which Western countries, quite common for liberal is ensured by helping and protecting society’s 3. most vulnerable members before tending to democracies. the needs of those who are better off. In comparison, ESS research reveals that in Electoral values in democracy Russia liberal values are equally important as social democratic values. This may be Most people expect free elections (index 9) explained by the correlation37 identified and accountability before the electorate (index between a country’s economic development 8), so the average Western European expects and its level of liberal democracy—the more from to be able to choose freely and elect prosperous a country is, the more explicit political representatives, as well as hold them liberal democratic values become. Requests accountable for their actions. In addition,free for social values indicate lower standards opposition or the ability to express different of living, reliance on the state, and the political views is also important (index above anticipation of social protection. 6)36. Political participation An additional favourable indicator of democratic values is a society’s engagement in the political process and the practice of its democratic freedoms and options. 35 European Social Survey 2014. Europeans understanding and evaluation of democracy. Available at http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/ permalink/800ea36f-3a8d-11e4-95d4-005056b8065f.pdf, last time accessed 01.07.2015. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid.
25 Involvement in social and political processes ‘Can you trust most people?’ 66.1% in NL, in Western countries has many different 60.1% in SWE, and 44.6% in GER said yes. The forms. exception was ESP with 19%41. In Russia only 27.8% are ready to trust others. Participation in elections as a method of deciding on a country’s political Trust in institutions development and important issues is one According to WVS 2011 and 2012 data, trust of the most common forms of political in different institutions is diffused in Western activism. According to the World Values countries. People place the most trust in the Survey’s (WVS)38 data on voter turnout, the media—press and TV, which has a combined share of people exercising their most basic trust of 91% in GER, 73% in NL, 58% in ESP and democratic right is 65.3% in GER, 73.1% in 85% in SWE. This is followed by the military NL, and 84.1% in SWE. Voting in elections (64% in GER, 50% in NL, 50% in ES and 51% is also the most common political activity in SWE). Political institutions—parliament, in Russia, but voter turnout is significantly political parties and public service—follow lower—41.8%. shortly after. The submission of applications and petitions While the numbers in Russia are similar, there is also a popular method of political activism are some nuances that deserve consideration. practiced by 42.7% in GER, 35.4% in NL, In Russia the army enjoys the greatest trust, 39 3. and 68% in SWE . The third most popular but it shares first place with the church, both political activity in Western countries is of which enjoy similarly high support—63%. participation in demonstrations. These This reveals a disposition towards stability and forms of political activism are also present, order in the daily and spiritual life. It should but much less prevalent in Russia; petitions not go unmentioned that in Russia, trust in have been submitted at least once by 11.1%, the army is combined with a low demand for strikes have been attended by 2.1%, and civic control of the army, 27% according to demonstrations by 12.1% of the people40. research carried out by PEW in 201142. Interpersonal trust The role of the State Interpersonal trust is considered to be In Western countries (FRA, GER, UK, ESP) an essential indicator when measuring more than half of the population (from democracy, because it shows the readiness of 55% in UK to 67% in ESP) think that the members of a society to rely on each other, state should have narrow functions and free themselves from stereotypes, and accept should primarily take care of those in need. diversity. The Situation in Western countries regarding interpersonal trust is not uniform, but in general this variable was above the average; when people answered the question 41 World Values Survey. Wave 6: 2010-2014. Available at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ WVSOnline.jsp, last time accessed 01.07.2015. 42 PEW Research Global Attitudes Project 2011. 38 World Values Survey. Wave 6: 2010-2014. Confidence in Democracy and Capitalism Wanes in the Available at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ Former Soviet Union. Available at http://www.pewglobal. WVSOnline.jsp, last time accessed 01.07.2015. org/2011/12/05/confidence-in-democracy-and-capitalism- 39 Ibid. wanes-in-former-soviet-union/, last time accessed 40 Ibid. 01.07.2015.
26 30-38% of respondents thought that the Support for economic freedoms and state should not intervene in the lives of opportunities citizens pursuing their goals43. According to the EVS 2008 data, in Western countries there is support for the market economy (indexed on a scale from 0 to 100— the lower the figure the higher the support; 3.1.2. Economic GER 29, UK 29, FRA 44, NL 39)47. Values It also shows that Westerners believe that even though there may be economic The WVS has identified a strong correlation problems in democracy, it still is superior to between state economic development and other systems. the attitudes towards democracy. The free A similar attitude is demonstrated in TTa 2013 market capitalism economic model and survey, in which 66% of citizens in the European attitudes towards labour market processes Union admitted that they’ve been hit by the demonstrate differences in individual values economic crisis, but despite that, they value related to democracy44. the EU and Transatlantic trade highly and don’t Democracy is superior to economic want to become protectionist48. prosperity in Western Europe A high value is also attributed to economic
PEW research shows that in Western freedoms and opportunities provided by the 3. countries demand good democracy more EU—freedom of movement, a free labour than a good economic situation (58% market, and the possibility to study abroad, in GER, 68% in ESP and 56% in UK)45. In supported by 27% of people surveyed in EU Russia democracy loses when confronted countries according to TT data for 201449. with a strong economy (14% versus 78%). This study also shows correlation between Meanwhile, if Russians could choose economic freedoms, economic integration, between democratic economic values (fair and democracy—41% in ITA, 35% in FRA, and judicial system, free and fair elections, 32% in GER and ESP believe that the EU is good freedom of speech) and personal wellbeing, because it’s a community of democracies. then democracy would lose to prosperity Openness to guest workers (supported by 71%)46. Peoples’ attitudes towards immigration and guest workers can also be used as an indicator
47 European Values Survey 2008. Available at 43 PEW Research Global Attitudes Project 2011. http://www.atlasofeuropeanvalues.eu/new/zieeuropa. Available at http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/11/17/ php?year=2008, last time acessed 01.07.2015. the-american-western-european-values-gap/, last time 48 Transatlantic Trends 2009. Key Findings accessed 01.07.2015. 2013. Available at http://trends.gmfus.org/transatlantic- 44 World Values Survey. Available at http:// trends-2013/, last time acessed 01.07.2015. www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp, last time 49 Transatlantic Trends. Key Findings 2014. accessed 01.07.2015. Available at http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2012/09/ 45 Ibid. Trends_2014_complete.pdf, last time accessed 46 Ibid. 01.07.2015.
27 for economic openness and freedoms. in Russia the figure is as high as 73.3%53. TT 2013 research shows that 44% of However, if the church is linked to moral issues Europeans consider immigration to be (what is good and what is bad), then the a problem, while 41% consider it an majority in Western countries think that belief opportunity, and 62% of Europeans do not in God is not needed to be moral (66% in GER, consider immigrants to be an economic 71% in ITA, 78% in UK and 85% in FRA); a trend threat50. Such economic tolerance is not too common globally. In Russia 55% agree persistent despite the TT 2014 data, which with the aforementioned statement54. The showed that 58% of Europeans consider same research also shows that it is common to their respective country’s immigration policy link morality to belief in God in economically to be ill advised51. less developed countries; a group which Equality in the labour market Western countries is not part of. In developed Western countries—Germany, According to the ESS 2008 data, the majority France, Spain, and the United Kingdom, 12- of Russians not only link morality to belief in 20% believe men should be given preference God, but also think that the church provides in the labour market. In Russia, 49% of the answers for what is moral and what’s not population supports special preference (76%). In contrast only 35% in the UK, 32% in for men in the labour market. Similar rates GER, 32% in FRA, 37% in NL, and 30% in BE 55 3. of support can only be observed in third agree with this statement . world countries, Muslim countries, and less The correlation between religion and morality developed economies52. is also seen when certain moral issues, which are either acceptable or unacceptable for different societies, are addressed. The most explicit differences between Russia and 3.1.3. Moral Values Western countries regards issues, on which the church has a strong stance. For example Morality and the Church homosexuality is unacceptable for 14% in FRA, 17% in UK, 8% in GER, and 19% in ITA, According to the WVS data, belief in God is while in Russia the figure reaches 72%. A quite common in Western countries. 62.9% similar attitude can be observed regarding of respondents in GER, 47.7% in NL, 71.1% in abortion, which is unacceptable for 14% ESP, and 40.9% in SWE believe in God, while in FRA, 25% in UK, 19% in GER and 41% in
50 Transatlantic Trends. Key Findings 2013. Available at http://trends.gmfus.org/transatlantic- 53 World Values Survey. Wave 6: 2010-2014. trends-2013/, last time accessed 01.07.2015. Available at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ 51 Transatlantic Trends. Key Findings 2014. WVSOnline.jsp, last time accessed 01.07.2015. Available at http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2012/09/ 54 PEW Global Research Attitudes project. Trends_2014_complete.pdf, last time accessed Worldwide, Many See Belief in God as Essential 01.07.2015. to Morality. Available at http://www.pewglobal. 52 PEW Global Research Attitudes Project. org/2014/03/13/worldwide-many-see-belief-in-god-as- Gender Equality Universally Embraced, But Inequalities essential-to-morality/, last time accessed 01.07.2015. Acknowledged. Available at http://www.pewglobal. 55 European Values Survey. Available at http:// org/2010/07/01/gender-equality/, last time accessed www.atlasofeuropeanvalues.eu/new/zieeuropa. 01.07.2015. php?year=2008, last time accessed 01.07.2015.
28 ITA (strong influence of the Roman Catholic 3.5% in SWE)59 and homosexuals (22.4% Church) and 44% in Russia. in GER, 6.9% in NL, 5.1% in ESP, and 3.7% in SWE). However this is likely to be an The attitude is similar concerning premarital individual attitude, because other surveys sex, which is seen negatively by 6% in FRA, reveal a general acceptance of these groups. 13% in UK, 6% in GER, but 30% in Russia56. Other less frequent answers are ‘people of Tolerance towards homosexuality another race’, ‘people with another religion’, and ‘people who are not married’. It shows Western countries demonstrate a high tolerance that stereotypes and prejudices are still toward homosexuality; 81-91% of respondents present in Western countries, but generally in Western countries find homosexuality ‘otherness’ is accepted. acceptable (81% in UK, 86% in FRA, 87% in GER and 91% in ESP). These are high numbers even In Russia the answers are very similar, but the in comparison to the US, where the acceptability percentages are significantly higher—32.2% rating is around 50%57. are against immigrants and 66.2% are against homosexuals as close neighbours60. Gender equality Gender equality is supported by 95-97% of respondents in the UK, FRA, ESP, POL, and GER. In Russia, gender equality is supported 3.1.4. International by 85%58, but people in Russia are less likely to think that change is needed to facilitate relations and law 3. gender equality. Tolerance and Multiculturalism dimension Tolerance toward other races, nations, and Use of military force to maintain cultures fluctuates and depends on the global order region. In answer to the WVS question ‘Who would you not like to have as neighbours?’ According to PEW in 2011, societies in the most frequent answers were immigrants Western countries expressed high support (21% in GER, 19.6% in NL, 7.5% in ESP, and for the use of military force to maintain global order (from 50% in GER to 70% in UK), but with the condition that use of force would be sanctioned by the United Nations (66% in FRA, 76% in GER)61. 56 PEW Global Attitudes Research project 2014. Global Views on Morality. Available at http://www. pewglobal.org/2014/04/15/global-morality/, last time accessed 01.07.2015. 57 PEW Research Global Attitudes Project 2011. 59 World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014. Available at http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/11/17/ Available at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ the-american-western-european-values-gap/, last time WVSOnline.jsp, last time accessed 01.07.2015. accessed 01.07.2015. 60 Ibid 58 PEW Global Research Attitudes Project 2010. 61 PEW Global Attitudes Research project 2011. Gender Equality Universally Embraced, But Inequalities The American-Western European Values Gap. Available Acknowledged. Available at http://www.pewglobal. at http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/11/17/the-american- org/2010/07/01/gender-equality/, last time accessed western-european-values-gap/, last time accessed 01.07.2015. 01.07.2015.
29 Attitude towards Russia popular support65. According to TT 2014 data, European Attitude towards the United Nations countries reacting to international events, Both Western countries and Russia have especially Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, similar attitudes towards the UN according see Russia less favourably with only 35% to a 2013 PEW survey66. The UN is supported of Western Europeans seeing Russia in a by more than half of the people in Western positive light. The US, which also has an active countries—65% in GER, 65% in UK, 63% in foreign policy, is one of the more positively FRA and 67% in ITA. In Russia a slight majority regarded actors on the international stage (53%) is also in favour of the UN. The biggest with 67% Europeans supporting its actions62. difference between the attitude of Russia NATO as a guarantor of security and Western countries towards the UN concernes the application of UN principles Despite a relatively conservative view on the to resolve international disputes. use of force in Europe, 61% of those residing in member countries still see NATO as the most Attitude towards the responsibility- important security guarantor according to TT to-protect 2014 data63. From all the European countries In Western countries, a UN sanctioned supporting NATO, 73% think that NATO humanitarian intervention in a foreign activities should be limited to protecting the 3. country to save people’s lives is supported territorial integrity of Europe and only 43% by 67% of the people, according to 2012 would like to see NATO as a global actor. data by TT67. In Russia, NATO is not highly valued as Attitude towards rogue states approximately half (47%) of its citizens in 2014 would like to see Russia implement It is also interesting to compare the attitudes an independent foreign policy, with no of Russia and Western countries toward the interference from NATO or the EU64. so-called rogue states in the Middle East (Iran, Syria) that challenge global peace and The US led war on terror security, as well as the solutions put forward The role of the US in the fight against to restrain these countries. For example, international terrorism is valued positively in in 2014 44% of the people in Western the EU. In general, 71% support the actions countries supported the idea of a collective of the US President in pursuing that goal approach to finding a solution to the (79% in GER, 74% in ITA, and 67% in UK). In Russia, American initiatives in the war on terror have garnered only 26% of the 65 Transatlantic Trends. Key Findings 2012. Available at http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2012/09/ TT-2012-Key-Findings-Report.pdf. last time accessed 01.07.2015. 66 PEW Global Research Attitudes Project. UN Retains Strong Global Image. Available at http://www. 62 Transatlantic Trends. Key Findings 2014. pewglobal.org/2013/09/17/united-nations-retains-strong- Available at http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2012/09/ global-image/, last time accessed 01.07.2015. Trends_2014_complete.pdf, last time accessed 67 Transatlantic Trends. Key Findings 2012. 01.07.2015. Available at http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2012/09/ 63 Ibid TT-2012-Key-Findings-Report.pdf, last time accessed 64 Ibid 01.07.2015.
30 problems plaguing the Middle East, while in Western countries (32%), followed by 41% supported an individual approach68. economic cooperation initiatives. Military In Russia, conversely, there is less support force, if all other options fail, is still supported for the collective approach69. by 50% of Western Europeans71. In Russia economic cooperation initiatives (23%) is Iran seen as the best solution, while economic Western countries have a generally negative sanctions are supported by 17%72. attitude towards Iran, as is revealed by Syria PEW 2012 data70. In UK 16%, in FRA 14% and only 6% in GER view Iran positively. In Western countries recognise the situation in comparison, in Russia 36% sympathise with Syria as a problem, but do not provide one Iran, a figure twice that observed in the answer as to how to solve the situation. 72% Western countries. of people from the countries surveyed by TT in 2013 admitted that they do not want Certain differences are also present when their countries to intervene in Syria73, while looking at opinions concerning Iran’s 22% said their states might intervene. At nuclear programme. In Europe there is the same time TT 2012 research shows that clear opposition—91% in UK, and 96% in even with a UN mandate most EU countries FRA and GER. In Russia a majority of 77% is wouldn’t support intervention to Syria74. also against Iran’s nuclear programme, but the opposition is not as unequivocal as in Interestingly enough Russia’s official stance Western countries. and the views of its people differ regarding 3. the situation in Syria. Similarly as with Iran, There are also differences between Western Russia does not want pressure to be applied and Russian respondents when asked what to on Syria, and it is an official state policy. do with Iran. In Western countries the most However, when ordinary Russians are asked, common answer is economic sanctions (79% 52% do not have an opinion at all regarding in UK, 74% in FRA and 80% in GER), while in Syria and 22% do not support Bashar al Russia economic sanctions are viewed as a Assad’s regime. The percentage of regime viable option by just 46%. The use of military supporters is similar - 27%75. force against Iran enjoys even less support in Russia (24%), while in Western countries more than half of the population (51% in UK 71 Transatlantic Trends. Key Findings 2014. and FRA and 50% in GER) would support it. Available at http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2012/09/ Trends_2014_complete.pdf, last time accessed TT 2014 data shows that economic sanctions 01.07.2015. against Iran are still the preferred option 72 Ibid. 73 Transatlantic Trends. Key Findings 2013. Available at http://trends.gmfus.org/transatlantic- trends-2013/, last time accessed 01.07.2015. 68 Transatlantic Trends. Key Findings 2014. 74 Transatlantic Trends. Key Findings 2012. Available at http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2012/09/ Available at http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2012/09/ Trends_2014_complete.pdf, last time accessed TT-2012-Key-Findings-Report.pdf, last time accessed 01.07.2015. 01.07.2015. 69 Ibid 75 PEW Global Research Attitudes Project 2013. 70 PEW Global Research Attitudes Project 2012. Widespread Middle East Fears that Syrian Violence A Global “No” to a Nuclear Armed Iran. Available at Will Spread. Available at http://www.pewglobal. http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/05/18/a-global-no-to-a- org/2013/05/01/widespread-middle-east-fears-that-syrian- nuclear-armed-iran/, last time accessed 01.07.2015. violence-will-spread/, last time accessed 01.07.2015.
31 Attitude towards Russia in the context in the ability to give up short term of the Ukraine crisis economic benefits for fundamental rights and freedoms. In Russia there is also As mentioned, according to TT 2014 data, a relatively high support for democracy, but events in Ukraine significantly affected just for one of the possible political systems Russia’s image in the West—it is the most and under the condition that it will resolve negatively valued country (35%). Western social and economic issues. countries consider Russia’s aggression in • Surveys conducted by WVS78 show a lasting Ukraine as a violation of the international tendency that democracy is strong in law and are ready to provide economic and societies with secularisation and values of political support to Ukraine even if it would self-expression. In Russia society is more lead to a conflict with Russia (admitted 58% of traditional (explicit traditional values) and respondents). It can also be seen in practice, survival values are also strongly present because the greatest support for sanctions (demand for economic prosperity and against Russia is in Western countries (GER social protection). 65%, UK 59%)76. Still western countries are • In Western countries liberal democracy cautious towards the use of military force values dominate with slight features of even in the case of Ukraine—most support social democracy (state should provide economic levers against Russia (68%) over for the least protected and for vulnerable military assistance to Ukraine (25%)77. 3. groups). Meanwhile, the state role is seen as minimal with strictly defined narrow functions (dominantly social), which 3.1.5. Value individuals don’t want to perform. • In Western countries there is both a demand Orientation in for democracy (the majority consider it to be the best political system) and that it Western Countries: is active (active political participation in various forms, demand for self-expression Conclusions and self-realisation). Meanwhile in Russia, according to PEW research, there’s a clear democracy gap79 Value Orientation in Western – Russians say they want Countries: Conclusions democracy but do not act to strengthen it and in reality prefer economic benefits. • It is explained by the disappointment • Reviewed research and sociological in democratic institutes and a negative data demonstrate a clear support for experience of democracy’s ability to democracy - its instituted and most common values in Western countries. Support for democracy is also shown 78 World Values Survey. Findings and Insights. Available at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ WVSContents.jsp, last time accessed 01.07.2015. 76 Transatlantic Trends. Key Findings 2014. 79 PEW Global Research Attitudes Project 2012. Available at http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2012/09/ Russians Back Protests, Political Freedoms. Available Trends_2014_complete.pdf, last time accessed at http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/05/23/chapter-3- 01.07.2015. attitudes-toward-democracy-2/, last time accessed 77 Ibid. 01.07.2015.
32 develop economic and social stability in the long term80. • Western countries can be considered as 3.2. VALUES generally tolerant. Despite the fact that some Europeans would like to distance ORIENTATION IN themselves from particular groups (homosexuals, immigrants), in general RUSSIA they are ready to accept them in society. • Data on the dimension of international relations and law show that in general, 3.2.1 Political Western countries are quite conservative towards the use of military force. If values necessary, they’re ready to accept it but only with a mandate from legitimate international organisations. The UN as Democracy as a value a global platform for global peace and If we examine the statistics concerning security maintenance is highly valued in Russian attitudes towards democracy, we Western countries, but from most of the can detect some similarities with views held tools the UN has – economic sanctions by Western Europeans, however, a closer and diplomacy are preferred. look reveals important differences. • Western countries are ready to use military force primarily to safeguard the legitimate The results of various research papers 3. goal – state territorial protection and showed that Russians are united in the maintenance of global peace and order, understanding that democracy can provide but only on condition that it has the social and economic benefits. 75% of support of international institutions. Russians associate democracy with raising • Russians also support the UN, but there the standard of living, providing welfare, is a selective approach, towards what it the possibility of improving one’s social should and shouldn’t do. UN member prospects, and improvement in quality of countries are supported in cases where life82. Russian opinions and their opinions coincide. But when UN countries would However, according to data collected by the like to limit an international aggressor, Levada Center in February 2013, only 38% which is also an informal partner of of respondents considered European-style Russia, then Russia is ready to use its democracy to be desirable83. 72% of those veto rights on the Security Council to interviewed believed Russians need a strong block unwanted actions (according to TT ruler, power concentrated in the hands 2012 data 54% supported a veto to block intervention in Syria)81. 82 Магун B.C., Руднев М.Г., (2010), Базовые ценности россиян в европейском контексте, Available at http://www.isras.ru/files/File/Publication/Bazov_ 80 Ibid. zennosti_St1_Magun_Rudnev.pdf, last time accessed 81 Transatlantic Trends. Key Findings 2012. 01.07.2015. Available at http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2012/09/ 83 Аналитический Центр Юрия Левады, survey TT-2012-Key-Findings-Report.pdf, last time accessed data about Feburary 2013, Available at http://www. 01.07.2015. levada.ru/, last time accessed 01.07.2015. 33 of one person, either constantly or under resident considers free access to health care specific conditions84. (74%), the prospect of finding a decent job and receiving a fair wage (58%), and equal When asked which political system seems treatment before the law and fair penalties more suitable for Russia, the number of (55%) to be the most valuable civil rights. Russians who preferred the Western model Very few found the right to participate of democracy decreased from 21% in January in public and state administration (4%), 2014 to 11% in May 2015. For comparison, freedom of assembly (5%), the right to preferences for the current political system vote and be elected (5%), the right to freely increased from 19% in January 2014 to express varying opinions (11%), and the 29% in May 2015—the opposite trend. The right to freedom of speech (18%)—the most survey also showed a significant number fundamental rights of the Western world— of people expressing sentimentality for to be important87. the Soviet regime. In March 2015, 34% of respondents stated that they considered the In 2014, 17% of respondents felt that Soviet system that existed until 1990 to be respect for human rights is important, while the best system85. 62% considered order and stability to be important, reaching a seventeen-year high. From this we can conclude that Western- According to data from January 201488, style democracy is not considered an only 15% of respondents saw defects in
3. indisputable high-priority value in Russian democracy and respect for human rights as society as it is in the West. affecting them personally89. Civil and Political Rights According to a survey conducted by the According to the 2013 data collected by Levada Center in March 2015, 39% of Russians the Department of Policy, Sociology and consider democracy to be primarily concerned Psychology at Moscow State University, with providing freedom of speech, expression, political values specific to Russian citizenry and belief. 27% believe the economic welfare are: peace (71.5%); safety (69.9 %); rule of of the state comes first in a democracy, while law (67.1 %); order (65.7 %); justice (61.7 %), 25% and 22% respectively consider order and and freedom (58 %)86. stability and strict observance of the law to be the fundamental tasks of democracy. The data also shows that the average Russian
Only 20% believe that democracy should 84 Аналитический Центр Юрия Левады, Общественное Мнение – 2013, Ежегодный сборник, M: 2014, стр.51. Available at http://www.levada.ru/ books/obshchestvennoe-mnenie-2013, last time accessed 87 Фонд Общественное мнение, Survey daya 01.07.2015. about July 2013. Available at https://fom.ru/Bezopastnost- 85 Граждане, государство и власть, 26.03.2015. i-pravo/11034, ast time accessed 01.07.2015. Available at http://www.levada.ru/26-03-2015/grazhdane- 88 «Достойные люди» против законов, gosudarstvo-i-vlast, last time accessed 01.07.2015. 22.12.2014. Available at http://www.levada.ru/22-12- 86 Селезнева А., Политические ценности 2014/dostoinye-lyudi-protiv-zakonov. last time accessed в современном российском массовом сознании: 01.07.2015. психологический анализ, Человек. Сообщество. 89 Всероссийский центр изучения Управление, No.2, 2014. Available at http://chsu. общественного мнения, Пресс-выпуск №2516, kubsu.ru/arhiv/2014_2/2014_2_Selezneva.pdf, last time 02.2014. Available at http://wciom.ru/index. accessed 01.07.2015. php?id=236&uid=114712, last time accessed 01.07.2015.
34 guarantee free and transparent elections of of oneself93. As stated in the report, The West state officials90. in Russian Mentality, this concept in Western languages can be directly translated as will, Right to Life volonte, wille. According to the Russian Formally, Western countries consider capital philosopher Fedotov, it means ‘to be capable punishment to be a fundamental violation of living according to your own will, without of Human Rights, despite the fact that some being dependent on any social restrictions— people support such forms of justice. Capital norms or laws. This type of freedom usually punishment is no longer practiced in Russia, reflects avoidance (escapism), but not a but support for capital punishment among way to found a new social order’94. Thus the Russian citizens is higher than before. 2014 authors of the report emphasize that this data collected by the Public Opinion Fund discrepancy in the way the two societies (Общественное мнение) shows that 63% understand freedom and democracy is one of of Russians considered capital punishment the sources of psychological incompatibility to be an acceptable means of delivering between Russia and the West. justice91. According to the Levada Center According to a survey conducted by the statistics from 2012, 54% of Russians Levada Center in 2013, 60% of Russians feel thought that capital punishment should be that they have ample freedom. Furthermore, reintroduced; 38% wanted to revert to the this indicator had not changed for five years95. situation as it was in the 1990s, while 16% As a 2012 study by the Institute of Sociology 92 were in favour of enhancing it . 3. of the Russian Academy of Sciences shows, Rights to Personal Liberty when choosing between a society with individual freedom and a society with social 66% of all Russian respondents recognise equality, 37% will choose the first option, freedom as a basic value, although it while 63% will lean towards the second is important to note that the Russian interpretation of freedom differs from that of the Western societies. In Russia the concept is associated more with ‘free will’, meaning that one should be free to be the only master
93 Магун B.C., Руднев М.Г., (2010), Базовые ценности россиян в европейском контексте. Available at http://www.isras.ru/files/File/Publication/Bazov_ zennosti_St1_Magun_Rudnev.pdf, last time accessed 90 Представления о демократии, 14.04.2015. 01.07.2015. Available at http://levada.ru/14-04-2015/pradstavleniya- 94 Diligensky G., Chugrov S.,(2000), The West o-demokratii, last time accessed 01.07.2015. in Russian Mentality, Office for Information and Press, 91 Фонд Общественное мнение, Отношение Brussels Institute of World Economy and International к смертной казни. Россияне о смертной казни и Relations, Moscow. Available at http://www.nato.int/ моратории на ее применение, 18.09.2014. Available acad/fellow/98-00/diliguenski.pdf, last time accessed at http://fom.ru/TSennosti/11722, last time accessed 01.07.2015. 01.07.2015. 95 Аналитический Центр Юрия 92 Аналитический Центр Юрия Левады,Общественное Мнение – 2013, Ежегодный Левады,Общественное Мнение – 2013, Ежегодный сборник, M: 2014, стр.22. Available at http://www. сборник, M: 2014, стр. 129. Available at http://www. levada.ru/books/obshchestvennoe-mnenie-2013, last time levada.ru/books/obshchestvennoe-mnenie-2013, last time accessed 01.07.2015. accessed 01.07.2015. 35 one96. This has something in common with with 39% of popular support, but in 2014 the 2008 data of the poll The Post-Soviet it secured only 30%, indicating a decline. Person and Civil Society (Постсоветский In 2015, Russian interest in freedom of человек и гражданское общество), which speech had fallen to 9%99. showed that 78% of respondents believed In 2013 only 18% of respondents considered that there is more freedom in a country that censorship to be unacceptable, supporting ‘takes comprehensive care of its citizens, the idea that people can decide themselves provides them with broad guarantees, and what to watch or read100. This corresponds controls the economy’97. with the results of the research Values Another important aspect is acceptance in Contemporary Russia (Ценности в of the superiority of state interests over современной России), which found that the needs and rights of an individual— most Russians see censorship as an effective sociologists often label principle the ‘Soviet and morally acceptable instrument101. mentality’. The Post-Soviet Person and Civil Considering the low importance attributed Society research found that only one in four to freedom of speech combined with high Russians is categorically against renouncing support for state control and restrictions his/her civil rights98. imposed on the liberal and democratic Equality dimension, we can conclude that freedom of
3. speech, a cornerstone of democratic society Lack of equality in public life is a characteristic in the Western ideal, will not receive much of Russian society. Even though equality is support in Russia. encoded into the law as one of the paramount human rights, in practice Russian society Political Participation supports hierarchy and group affiliation. Russian interest in public participation has Freedom of Speech been shown to be critically low. For example, data from the Russian Public Opinion Research In 2013 respondents to a survey conducted Center (Всероссийский центр изучения by the Levada Center were asked to list общественного мнения) shows that the the important human rights; according to index of public and political participation their data, freedom of speech ranked 5th
96 Институт социологии Российской академии наук, Социокультурные факторы консолидации российского общества, ИНАБ № 1 – 2013, Москва: Институт социологии РАН, стр. 27. Available at http:// 99 «Достойные люди» против законов, www.isras.ru/files/File/INAB/inab_2013_01.pdf, last 22.12.2014. Available at http://www.levada.ru/22-12- time accessed 01.07.2015. 2014/dostoinye-lyudi-protiv-zakonov, last time accessed 97 Л.Д. Гудков, Б.В. Дубин, Н.А. Зоркая, (2008), 01.07.2015. Постсоветский человек и гражданское общество, 100 Аналитический Центр Юрия Левады, Московская школа политических исследований,стр. Общественное Мнение – 2013, Ежегодный сборник, 19, 21. Available at http://www.levada.ru/sites/default/ Москва: 2014, стр.170. Available at http://www.levada. files/post-soviet_man.pdf, last time accessed 01.07.2015. ru/books/obshchestvennoe-mnenie-2013, last time 98 Л.Д. Гудков, Б.В. Дубин, Н.А. Зоркая, (2008), accessed 01.07.2015. Постсоветский человек и гражданское общество, 101 Фонд имени Питирима Сорокина, Фонда Московская школа политических исследований,стр. памяти Марии, Ценности в современной России,2007. 19, 21. Available at http://www.levada.ru/sites/default/ Available at http://www.sorokinfond.ru/index.php?id=78, files/post-soviet_man.pdf, last time accessed 01.07.2015. last time accessed 01.07.2015.
36 in 2014 was ‘-1’, taking the last place in the state’s power in the hands of one person, distribution of basic issues102. and 46% considered that it would be better if the power were divided among several Although elections are also considered a structures that would control and keep each desirable procedure for the transfer of power, other in check105. With regard to the question and the majority of Russia’s inhabitants see whether the ‘power vertical’ is beneficial or participation in elections as a civic duty, only detrimental to the state, 32% expressed an an extremely small portion—6% in 2005— opinion that there is some benefit while of the population considers elections to be a 40% considered that it works to the state’s means for controlling and influencing power103. detriment106. When asked whether there are Furthermore, 43% of respondents agreed with cases in which a powerful and imperious the statement ‘I vote for power even when I leader, with a ‘strong hand’ is necessary for don’t always support its actions’104. the people, only 20% were adamant that a As described in The Post-Soviet Person and Civil scenario in which all of state’s power would Society, Russians tend to see power as self- reside in the hands of one person should not sufficient and so it is present and can operate be permitted. Meanwhile 72% believed that regardless of society. A country’s inhabitants such a situation would be acceptable107. are seen as a resource for power, the property In order to explain the fluctuations in these of power, and they passively agree with the results, it is necessary to take two things practice of power. Russian citizens are more into consideration. First, there is a deep
likely to perceive voting as their duty to the 3. chasm between existing and ideal values state, rather than a mechanism to control state systems in Russian society. Second, there is power and elect representatives. Society’s an ideological disorder in the consciousness interest in other forms of political participation of the individual that ‘is displayed by the is low, and street protests, strikes, etc. generally changing perceptions about self-made provoke a negative attitude. manifestations of values and forms of A ‘strong hand’ realisation depending on the flows of information’108 In 2013, 39% of respondents admitted that . it would be preferable to have all of the
105 Аналитический Центр Юрия Левады, 102 Всероссийский центр изучения Общественное Мнение – 2013, Ежегодный сборник, общественного мнения. Available at http://wciom.ru/ Москва: 2014, стр. 43. Available at http://www.levada. fileadmin/Monitoring/2014/5/2014_123_6_Monitoring_ ru/books/obshchestvennoe-mnenie-2013, last time soc.pdf, last time accessed 01.07.2015. accessed 01.07.2015. 103 Реутов Е.В. (2007), Институт выборов 106 Ibid. стр. 45. в легитимации региональной власти, Hаучные 107 Аналитический Центр Юрия Левады, ведомости белгородского государственного Общественное Мнение – 2013, Ежегодный сборник, университета N.2(33),2007, стр. 76. Available at Москва: 2014, стр. 51. Available at http://www.levada. http://dspace.bsu.edu.ru/bitstream/123456789/1789/1/ ru/books/obshchestvennoe-mnenie-2013, last time Reutov%20E.V.%20Institut%20viborov.pdf, last time accessed 01.07.2015. accessed 01.07.2015. 108 Селезнева А., Политические ценности 104 Л.Д. Гудков, Б.В. Дубин, Н.А. Зоркая, (2008), в современном российском массовом сознании: Постсоветский человек и гражданское общество, психологический анализ, Человек. Сообщество. Московская школа политических исследований, стр. Управление, No.2, 2014. Available at http://chsu. 19, 21. Available at http://www.levada.ru/sites/default/ kubsu.ru/arhiv/2014_2/2014_2_Selezneva.pdf, last time files/post-soviet_man.pdf, last time accessed 01.07.2015. accessed 01.07.2015.
37 The role of the state at the present moment it is impossible to have any influence on government decisions113. The study, the Post-Soviet Person and Civil Society concluded that: ‘It is vitally important Another aspect that indicates the for the masses to understand that power in relationships between the state and its Russia is not identified as a guarantor of ‘law inhabitants could be described with the and an order’ or the people, but that power increasingly positive attitude towards Joseph is the ‘state’ itself—the top management Stalin. If in 2010 every third respondent and state officials—’authorities’ who provide thought that Stalin was a criminal, currently the work for government’109. only one in four people thinks the same. Furthermore, the number of those who According to the Levada Center data for 2014, think that the sacrifices made during the only 6% believe that the state should interfere Soviet period, especially the Stalin era, were as little as possible in the lives and economic justified in the name of the ‘greater good’ activities of its citizens, while 53% think that has considerably increased. If in 2012 25% of the state should care for all its inhabitants by respondents considered the statement to be ensuring an adequate standard of living110. true, in March 2015 this figure had climbed Additionally, 70% of respondents expressed to 45%114. their confidence that the majority of Russian society wouldn’t be able to survive without The data indicates that most Russians today
3. the regular help and protection of the state111. see the role of government as being similar It should be noted that in 2014, 47% of to that of the Soviet model of management Russians expressed their confidence that the in the form of a developmental state. But majority of Russia’s inhabitants wouldn’t be there is also a demand for personal care, able to protect their rights112. like that of ‘a strict, but caring ruler’ over his subordinates. This, combined with In 2015 49% of Russians believed that the the low level of popular interest in the state should take care of all its citizens and political process, provides fertile soil for ensure an adequate standard of living for patrimonialism to flourish in Russia. them. 25% think that the state can limit certain rights of certain individuals under special Mutual Trust circumstances. 78% of respondents think that Generally, Russians display a low level of interpersonal trust. According to the data gathered by Центр сравнительных социальных исследований in 2012, only 28.7% of the Russian respondents believed 109 Л.Д. Гудков, Б.В. Дубин, Н.А. Зоркая, (2008), Постсоветский человек и гражданское общество, Мо- сковская школа политических исследований,стр. 19, 21. Available at http://www.levada.ru/sites/default/files/ 113 Аналитический Центр Юрия Левады, post-soviet_man.pdf, last time accessed 01.07.2015. Bзаимодействие граждан и государства, 06.04.2015. 110 Ibid. стр.47. Available at http://www.levada.ru/2015/04/06/ 111 Ibid. стр. 49. vzaimodejstvie-grazhdan-i-gosudarstva/, last time 112 Фонд Общественное мнение, Готовы ли accessed 01.07.2015. россияне отстаивать свои права? Оценка готовности 114 Аналитический Центр Юрия Левады, Сталин россиян объединяться, чтобы постоять за свои права, и его роль в истории страны,31.03.2015. Available at 14.04.2014. Available at http://fom.ru/TSennosti/11455, http:// www.levada.ru/31-03-2015/stalin-i-ego-rol-v- last time accessed 01.07.2015. istorii-strany, last time accessed 01.07.2015.
38 that they could trust other people115. Data Fidelity to social institutes collected by the Public Opinion Fund In general, Russian fidelity to social indicates that 77% of the respondents in institutions is low. This low level of trust 2013 thought that most people cannot be directly explains society’s alienation from trusted, and only 19% of respondents held power. It also serves to explain the above- the opposite view116. mentioned perception of state power as This trend of decreasing interpersonal trust self-sufficient. in Russia is interpreted as the unfavourable The institution least trusted by the Russian result of the long decline into societal people (72% of respondents) is the police. decadence117. The old social capital that was Institutions closely associated with the lost during this process cannot be effectively democratic model, such as parliament and replaced because the ‘power vertical’ non-governmental organisations, are also hampers its formation. looked on with suspicion119. Some experts recognise that interpersonal Undoubtedly, the president is the only one trust is connected to economic consumerism, who enjoys a high level of trust. Sociologists which, in its current form, is not capable of have concluded ‘the trust conferred on the stimulating the growth of human wellbeing. president is sky high compared to trust in The problem lies in society itself, which is any of the other institutions, even other more inclined to wait passively for social 120 118 government institutions’ . equality to develop on its own . 3. Tolerance In a study conducted in 2008, Russians were asked to list the values that should be instilled in children; tolerance ranked fourth, while in the West it is usually among the most important values121. Russians, however, 115 Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики», Счастье mentioned ‘diligence’ as the most important связано с доверием к коллегам и соседям,01.10.2014. value. The results of the 2013 study Political Available at https://iq.hse.ru/news/177666684.html, last time accessed 01.07.2015. Values and their Perception in Modern 116 Фонд Общественное мнение,Survey data Russia (Политические ценности и их about November 2013. Available at http://fom.ru/ TSennosti/11253, last time accessed 01.07.2015. 117 Татарко А. Н. (2012), Cоциальный капитал современной России: психологический анализ,Вестник Московского государственного 119 Сасаки М., Давыденко В., Латов Ю., гуманитарного университета им. М.А. Шолохова, Ромашкин Г., Латова Н., Проблемы и парадоксы No.3/2012,стр. 72. Available at http://cyberleninka. анализа институционального доверия как элемента ru/article/n/sotsialnyy-kapital-sovremennoy-rossii- социального капитала современной России, Journal psihologicheskiy-analiz, last time accessed 01.07.2015. of Institutional Studies, No.1. 2009. Available at http:// 118 Татарко А. Н. (2012), Cоциальный cyberleninka.ru/article/n/problemy-i-paradoksy-analiza- капитал современной России: психологический institutsionalnogo-doveriya-kak-elementa-sotsialnogo- анализ,Вестник Московского государственного kapitala-sovremennoy-rossii, last time accessed гуманитарного университета им. М.А. Шолохова, 01.07.2015. No.3/2012,стр. 72. Available at http://cyberleninka. 120 Ibid. ru/article/n/sotsialnyy-kapital-sovremennoy-rossii- 121 Pоссия: ценности современного общества, psihologicheskiy-analiz , last time accessed 01.07.2015, 2008. Available at http://www.politcom.ru/7234.html, last стр. 79-80. time accessed 01.07.2015.
39 восприятие в современной России) shows they are opposed to the introduction of that tolerance in Russian society isn’t even same-sex marriage in Russia125. considered to be an actual value as it only Tolerance towards sexual minorities garnered 7.3% of popular support122. Data collected by the Levada Center shows Tolerance towards minorities and that the number of Russians who see marginalised groups homosexuality as immoral is almost three According to the data collected by the times that of Western countries. When Russian Public Opinion Research Centre asked about their personal attitudes towards (Всероссийский центр изучения homosexuals, 50% of respondents admitted общественного мнения), a low level that they view them with annoyance, of tolerance towards marginalised social disgust, or fear126. groups and minorities is typical of Russian Nationalism society. In 2014 the index of public tolerance towards these groups was 21123. Russian society also shows high level of intolerance towards ethnic and racial Russian intolerance is also exemplified by the minorities. According to 2013 data from fact that the prison sentence given to Pussy the Levada Center, 66% of Russians Riot was considered an adequate punishment interviewed supported the slogan, ‘Russia is by 56% of Russian respondents124. 127 3. for Russians’ and according to data from a Low level of tolerance towards LGBT people study conducted by the University of Oslo in is also common for the Russian society. 2013, only 25% of those respondents agreed As statistics testify, 37% of respondents that the concept ‘Russians’ applies to all consider homosexuals to be sick and in need citizens of the Russian Federation regardless of treatment, while another 26% were sure of their ethnic affiliation128. that their orientation is a result of poor In addition, data from a number of other upbringing, immorality or a harmful habit. research projects has highlighted significant Additionally, 84% of respondents claim that challenges in connection with increasingly nationalistic trends and heightened
125 Аналитический Центр Юрия Левады 122 Селезнева А., Политические ценности “Невидимое меньшинство”: к проблеме гомофобии в в современном российском массовом сознании: России. Available at http://www.levada.ru/15-05-2015/ психологический анализ, Человек. Сообщество. nevidimoje-menshinstvo-k-probleme-gomofobii-v-rossii, Управление, No.2, 2014. Available at http://chsu. last time accessed 01.07.2015. kubsu.ru/arhiv/2014_2/2014_2_Selezneva.pdf, last time 126 Аналитический Центр Юрия Левады, accessed 01.07.2015. Общественное Мнение – 2013, Ежегодный сборник, 123 Всероссийский центр изучения Москва: 2014, стр.115. Available at http://www.levada. общественного мнения, Пресс-выпуск №2725, ru/books/obshchestvennoe-mnenie-2013, last time 28.11.2014. Available at http://wciom.ru/index. accessed 01.07.2015. php?id=236&uid=115070, last time accessed 01.07.2015. 127 Ibid. 124 Аналитический Центр Юрия Левады, 128 Hale H. E. Russian, Nationalism and Logic of Общественное Мнение – 2013, Ежегодный сборник, the Kremlin’s Actions on Ukraine, 24.08.2014. Available Москва: 2014, стр.142. Available at http://www.levada. at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/29/ ru/books/obshchestvennoe-mnenie-2013, last time russian-nationalism-kremlin-actions-ukraine , last time accessed 01.07.2015. accessed 01.07.2015.
40 xenophobia in Russian society. Alarmingly, segmentation. This is most likely rooted in the trend in modern Russia is that being society’s high demand for the government ‘for us’ means simultaneously being ‘against to distribute welfare equally132. them’, against the other129. Private Property In the Western world, the right to 3.2.2. Economic private property is considered one of the prerequisites for the formation and values development of a free personality; its value is not in question. In comparison, private Components of the free market generally property enjoys only meagre support in have low support in Russia, even those that Russian society. are closely connected with the democratic In the West an individual can privatise values and ideals held by Russian society. For natural resources, but this idea has very 130 example, the results of the 2013 research low support among Russians—only 2% Political Values and their Perception in favour this idea133. A similar situation can Modern Russia (Политические ценности be observed in industry as well. In 2013, и их восприятие в современной России) 45% of respondents held that all large presented liberal economy as one of the manufacturing industries should belong to values least relevant to Russian society. the state, while 48% expressed confidence 3. According to the study The Morality of that all enterprises vital to the state’s Modern Russian Society (Нравственность interests should be under its control, while современного российского общества), the rest can remain private. Only 25% of Russians mostly consider the market respondents expressed absolute support of economy to be illegitimate and immoral131. private land ownership, while 55% would Statistics collected by the Levada Center for like to see property and use rights limited by 2013 testify that 51% of Russians interviewed the state134. would like to have an economic system that relies on state planning and market
132 Российская академия наук Институт 129 Institute of Modern Russia, Bruk B., (2014), психологии, ред. А. Л. Журавлев, А. В. Юревич What’s in the Name? Russian Understanding of (2012), Нравственность современного российского Patriotism. Available at http://imrussia.org/media/pdf/ общества. Available at http://www.ipras.ru/engine/ Research/Boris_Bruk__Russian_Understanding_of_ documents/document4057.pdf, last time accessed Patriotism.pdf, last time accessed 01.07.2015. 01.07.2015. 130 Селезнева А., Политические ценности 133 Российская академия наук Институт в современном российском массовом сознании: психологии, ред. А. Л. Журавлев, А. В. Юревич психологический анализ, Человек. Сообщество. (2012), Нравственность современного российского Управление, No.2, 2014. Available at http://chsu. общества, стр. 8. Available at http://www.ipras.ru/ kubsu.ru/arhiv/2014_2/2014_2_Selezneva.pdf, last time engine/documents/document4057.pdf, last time accessed accessed 01.07.2015. 01.07.2015. 131 Аналитический Центр Юрия Левады, Об- 134 Аналитический Центр Юрия Левады, щественное Мнение – 2013, Ежегодный сборник, Общественное Мнение – 2013, Ежегодный сборник, Москва: 2014. Available at http://www.levada.ru/books/ M: 2014, стр. 149. Available at http://www.levada.ru/ obshchestvennoe-mnenie-2013, last time accessed books/obshchestvennoe-mnenie-2013, last time accessed 01.07.2015. 01.07.2015.
41 Competition Individualism vs Collectivism Low level of support for a competitive It is generally accepted that the strong environment is common to the Russian tendency towards collectivism, which is society. According to data collected by the typical for Russian society, can be explained Higher School of Economics, Laboratory by a historical prevalence of collectivism of Socio-psychological Research (Bысшая over individualism. Sociologists further школа экономики, Лаборатория conclude that today’s collectivism exists in социально-психологических an amended form adding some elements of исследований) in 2008, less than 10% of individualism in order to be more applicable the interviewed Russians stated that they to today’s ideological orientations, primarily would want to live and work in a competitive dominated by individualism. It is also said market135. to be the same regarding individualism. For example, data shows that there is a clearly visible increase in individualistic values 3.2.3. Moral values among Russian people137. Compared to other states, ‘the average Russian possesses When it comes to moral values some individualistic values, concerned with researchers agree that there are ‘two caring for the wellbeing of other people, with equality and tolerance towards others
3. Russias’—the real and the virtual. This assumption is based on the observation as well as the care for the surrounding that Russians often claim to have practices environment also ranking high. Likewise, regarding certain values that differ from assigning extremely high importance to 138 reality. This can be explained by the fact, ‘egoistical’ values is typical’ . Nevertheless, that the system of values in Russia today in one cannot ignore the fact that there is a most cases is formed not by values, but by wide array of opinions circulating on this anti-values. However, society actually wants topic, so varying views and interpretations the state to be capable of exerting its power are common. and influence to change the values system Materialism to reduce the gap between ‘ideal’ and ‘real’. For instance, respondents believed that The 2013 study Political Values and their certain groups in society shape education Perception in Modern Russia (Политические and information policies based on the main ценности и их восприятие в современной social values on behalf of the government136. России) shows that materialistic values
137 Кибардина Л.Н., (2009),Индивидуализм коллективизм и социальное государство в современной Росси. Available at http://cyberleninka. 135 ГУ Bысшая школа экономики, Лаборатория ru/article/n/individualizm-kollektivizm-i-sotsialnoe- социально-психологических исследований. Available gosudarstvo-v-sovremennoy-rossii, last time accessed at http://www.opec.ru/docs.aspx?ob_no=88016, last time 01.07.2015. accessed 01.07.2015. 138 Магун B.C., Руднев М.Г., (2010), Базовые 136 Фонд имени Питирима Сорокина, Фонда ценности россиян в европейском контексте. Available памяти Марии, Ценности в современной России, at http://www.isras.ru/files/File/Publication/Bazov_ 2007. Available at http://www.sorokinfond.ru/index. zennosti_St1_Magun_Rudnev.pdf, last time accessed php?id=78, last time accessed 01.07.2015. 01.07.2015.
42 dominate and largely define the physiological needs of the Russian people139. 3.2.4. The Religion dimension of A study conducted at the turn of the 21st century shows that 70-80% of Russians international identify as Orthodox Christians, while only 40-60% believed in God. Thus being an relations and Orthodox Christian is more often a cultural rather than a theological affiliation. rights It is highly likely that this cultural self- Data from 2012 testifies that only 36% of identification explains the high level of trust Russians believed that the state should characteristically conferred on the church respect the decisions made by international as a social institution. For instance, in 2012 organisations. 51% expressed confidence 68% of respondents confirmed that they that Russia should pursue its own interests, trust churches. They also supported the idea even if it led to a conflict with other of different denominations working closely countries. At the same time it is worth with the state to positively impact the state’s noting that Russian inhabitants have higher system of values140. level of trust in international institutions
One can draw the conclusion that the than in their own state authorities (with the 3. high level of trust conferred on the church exception the president)141. together with the passive expectation of According to the World Public Opinion study ‘outside intervention’ is very similar to the from 2009, 54% of respondents believed common social attitudes Russians have international norms to be more important toward their president. than national interests. However, 38% of Russians justify deception in certain situations when the state is conducting global politics. When asked about Russian soldiers in Ukraine, they claimed that there was no proof of a Russian presence in Eastern Ukraine142.
141 Татарко А. Н. (2012), Cоциальный капитал современной России: психологический 139 Селезнева А., Политические ценности анализ,Вестник Московского государственного в современном российском массовом сознании: гуманитарного университета им. М.А. Шолохова, психологический анализ, Человек. Сообщество. No.3/2012,стр. 77. Available at http://cyberleninka.ru/ Управление, No.2, 2014. Available at http://chsu. article/n/sotsialnyy-kapital-sovremennoy-rossii-psiholog- kubsu.ru/arhiv/2014_2/2014_2_Selezneva.pdf, last time icheskiy-analiz , last time accessed 01.07.2015., last time accessed 01.07.2015. accessed 01.07.2015. 140 Фонд имени Питирима Сорокина, Фонда 142 Аналитический Центр Юрия Левады, памяти Марии, Ценности в современной России, Украинский кризис, 05.05.2015. Available at http:// 2007. Available at http://www.sorokinfond.ru/index. www.levada.ru/old/05-05-2015/ukrainskii-krizis, last php?id=78, last time accessed 01.07.2015. time accessed 01.07.2015.
43 The United Nations NATO According to the Public Opinion Foundation According to the 2011 data collected by the (Фонд Общественное мнение), the Public Opinion Foundation, 35% of Russians number of Russian inhabitants who see the considered NATO’s influence in the world to UN as a positive influence on contemporary have remained the same over the years leading up to 2011, while 31% considered it to have global politics has significantly decreased. increased and 7% saw NATO’s as decreasing In 2000 55% of respondents viewed the UN (compared to 12% in 2009). When answering positively, while 17% considered it to have the question ‘What is NATO’s mission?’, 24% a negative influence. In 2014, however, said that it is, among other things, ‘aggression only 24% saw UN’s contribution to the against other countries’; 17% answered that global affairs as positive, while 38% had an its primary aim was reducing and containing unfavourable opinion of the organisation. Russia and China; 19%—war against terrorism; Furthermore, only 23% of respondents 10%—countering drug trafficking; and 16%— supported state submission to UN decisions preventing the proliferation and distribution and authority. The number of people who of weapons of mass destruction144. believe the UN only reflects the views of Such ambivalence and lack of understanding certain countries has risen against those who among Russians can be attributed to
3. see it as representative of the global opinion. relatively poor knowledge about NATO (an In 2014 the ratio of these indicators was 22% average of 2.7 on a 1-5 scale), as noted by to 53% while in 2000 it was 37% to 38%. In the authors of Russians on NATO Russia, addition, 63% of respondents expressed Novgorod region (Россияне о НАТО Россия, the belief that the actions of the UN do not Новгородская область)145. serve the interests of Russia. Respondents also had a pessimistic outlook on Russian In general, Russians are known to have a influence on the UN—35% of respondents low level of sympathy towards NATO, which thought that Russia has minimal influence, is considered a hard power tool that serves while 24% said that it has a great influence143. the interests of certain countries, mainly the US. NATO is also often seen as playing Data from the Levada Center also shows a a zero sum game—containing Russia and low level of trust in the UN and specifies preventing it from fulfilling its geopolitical that 49% of respondents don’t trust the goals and ambitions. International Court of Justice—the principal judicial organ of the UN.
144 Всероссийский центр изучения общественного мнения, Россия и НАТО: реальность и перспективы взаимодействия, 2011. Available at http:// www.old.wciom.ru/fileadmin/news/2011/Nato.pdf, last time accessed 01.07.2015. 145 Информационное бюро НАТО в Москве, Новгородский государственный университет имени 143 Фонд Общественное мнение, Представления Ярослава Мудрого,Россияне о НАТО Россия. о роли ООН. Насколько влиятельна ООН в Новгородская область, 2013. Available at http:// современном мире? И влияет ли Россия на www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2013_ деятельность ООН? 14.08.2014. Available at http://fom. nio/20131202_131129-nio-survey-analytical.pdf, last ru/Mir/11664, last time accessed 01.07.2015. time accessed 01.07.2015.
44 Imperialism Increase in the international influence of Russia The results of a November 2014 survey show that 54% of respondents feel sorrow about Increasing Russia’s global clout and the fall of the Soviet Union. Still, only 13% competitiveness is, according to most would support the restoration of the USSR in Russians, one of the primary goals of the its previous form146. A survey from May 2014 country’s foreign policy; such policy is also points out that 49% of respondents consider necessary because a confrontation with the that the former Soviet states should be in West sometime in the future is not ruled out. the Russian sphere of influence147. In 2009 According to the study Russia and Russian 33.9% of Russians considered that in the Self-identification and the State of National 21st century Russia should see its status as Self-awareness (Россия и россияне a superpower restored148. самоидентификация и состояние As the report The Russian Elite in 2020 национального самoсознания), 78.3% (Российская элита 2020) states, over of respondents mentioned that Russia’s the years the geopolitical ambitions of increasingly important role in global politics the Russian elite have decreased, thus a during the first decade of the 21st century is military intervention is more and more often ‘among the most important historical events legitimised by reasons of different nature of the state’150. (after a ‘request’ of a former Soviet states; In 2014, 48% of respondents considered to protect Russia’s national interests; to 3. the main reason for the foundation of the protect Russians abroad, especially in the Eurasian Economic Community a ‘desire to territory of the former USSR)149. be competitive on the international stage’151. External threat The measurements of the Integration Barometer EDB (Интеграционный 146 Аналитический Центр Юрия Левады, Распад СССР в российском общественном мнении, барометр ЕАБР) in 2014 testify that only 01.12.2014. Available at http://www.levada.ru/01-12- 12% of respondents cannot name a country 2014/raspad-sssr-v-rossiiskom-obshchestvennom-mnenii, last time accessed 01.07.2015. ‘unfriendly’ towards Russia. But results 147 Аналитический Центр Юрия Левады, from the 2013 Global Barometer on Hope Отношение россиян к другим странам, 05.06.2014. and Despair by the Gallup International Available at http://www.levada.ru/2014/06/05/otnoshenie- rossiyan-k-drugim-stranam-6/, last time accessed Association point to essential differences 01.07.2015. between how residents of Russia and 148 Бызов Л., (2009), Внешнеполитические приоритеты новой Росии. Available at http://wciom.ru/ fileadmin/file/monitoring/2009/94/2009_6(94)_3_Byzov. pdf, last time accessed 01.07.2015. 150 Фонд развития гражданского общества, 149 Инглхарт Р. Ф., Циммерман У., Понарин Pезультаты социологического исследования “Россия Э. Д., Лазарев Е. А., Соколов Б. О.,Вартанова И. и россияне”: самоидентификация и состояние А., Туранова Е. Г. (2013), Аналитический доклад национального самосознания, 06. 05. 2014. Available грантополучателей Международного дискуссионного at http://civilfund.ru/mat/view/55, last time accessed клуба «Валдай», Российская элита 2020, стр. 28. 01.07.2015. Available at http://www.hse.ru/pubs/lib/data/access/ram/ 151 Исследовательский холдинг Ромир, Россияне ticket/20/142076421661ea68548f2141d764974c6b- поддерживают Евразийский экономический 05b4afad/Russian_elite_2020_rus.pdf, last time accessed союз, 17.09.2014. Available at http://romir.ru/ 01.07.2015. studies/595_1410897600/, last time accessed 01.07.2015.
45 Western Europeans understand and perceive the Levada Center also point to similar important world problems. The problem tendencies. Since 2009, the US is among brought up by Western Europeans the most those countries, which the interviewed (in 24% of cases) is the split between the rich Russians identify as unfriendly. As many and the poor. In Russia, where respondents as 69% of respondents expressed similar themselves are more likely to be near the sentiments in 2014. The US is followed by poverty line (19%), wars and armed conflicts Ukraine (30%), Lithuania (24%), Latvia (23%) were seen as the most significant problem and Estonia (21%)155. (18%). This idea is connected to a subjective In 2013 a Russian company Romir (Ромир) understanding of the external threat to together with a Canadian research and Russia’s inhabitants152. polling firm Leger conducted a study According to 2014 data from the Russian regarding the relations between Americans Public Opinion Research Center and Russians to get a clearer picture of how (Всероссийский центр изучения both nations perceive one another. 10% of общественного мнения), the index of respondents in Russia associated the US with the Russian army’s ability in the eyes of being an ‘Evil Empire’, having ‘conscienceless the people has reached a historic high (62 and dangerous elements’ and run by ‘those points); in addition to that, respondents saw yearning for world supremacy’. Another 10% the tactical efficiency of the Russian Army to associate the US with wars and aggression156. 3. have increased considerably as well. These indicators also specify that in the eyes of The Integration Barometer EDB data for the Russian society external threats seem 2014 specified that only 17% of respondents to be more real than 5-10 years ago as 52% in Russia believe that the EU countries are consider that there is a tangible threat from friendly towards Russia, but 30% of the other countries153. respondents expressed confidence that the relations with the EU resemble conflict, and Western countries as a source of threat involve risk to the country157. According to a 2013 research conducted by Having examined the threat as perceived Gallup International, 54% of respondents by the Russian people, it can be concluded in Russia see the US as the main external that this fear has now reached its peak. In threat154. The results of a research by January 2015, according to a survey by the Levada Center, 68% of respondents believe
152 Исследовательский холдинг Ромир, Мир that there is some sort of a military threat беспокоит коррупция, а Россию – бедность и вооруженные конфликты, 03.04.2014. Available at http://romir.ru/studies/554_1396468800/, last time ac- cessed 01.07.2015. 155 Исследовательский холдинг Ромир. Available 153 Абрамов К.,(2014), Вооруженные силы at http://romir.ru/studies/549_1395172800/, last time России: общественная оценка, Всероссийский центр accessed 01.07.2015. изучения общественного мнения. Available at http:// 156 Исследовательский холдинг Ромир, Россия www.old.wciom.ru/fileadmin/news/2014/army_wci- и США: любит – не любит, 11.12.2013. Available at om_2014.pdf, last time accessed 01.07.2015. http://romir.ru/studies/527_1386705600/, last time ac- 154 Аналитический Центр Юрия Левады, cessed 01.07.2015. Отношение россиян к другим странам, 05.06.2014. 157 Евразийский Монитор ,Евразийский банк Available at http://www.levada.ru/2014/06/05/otnosh- развития, Интеграционный барометр ЕАБР, стр.68. enie-rossiyan-k-drugim-stranam-6/, last time accessed Available at http://www.eurasiamonitor.org/rus/research/ 01.07.2015. event-251.html, last time accessed 01.07.2015.
46 to Russia158. of the Ukrainian conflict this indicator has markedly changed from February 2013 (-10) A similar survey conducted in April 2015 to November 2014 (+70). Data from 2014 reveals that 59% of Russians consider the US shows that 31% of respondents thought that a threat to Russia. However, it is worth noting a new conflict between Russia and the West that this index hasn’t grown significantly is quite possible, while 25% were sure that a since 2007 when 47% of respondents held new Cold War had already begun. The latter this view. ‘Obstructing Russia’s foreign group explained their position by stating policy’ is considered to be the biggest threat that ‘the US and Europe have already carried the US poses to Russia. Still the imposition out military operations’ (23%)161. of other values and ideas alien to Russia is seen as another potential threat by 36% of According to another poll, 85% of Russians respondents. Furthermore, as the results of were sure that Ukraine and Western the April survey show the negative attitude countries had started an information war towards the US has decreased considerably against Russia. In December 2014, 85% since January 2015. If in January 81% of of respondents expressed that they were Russians were negative towards the US, confident that Western countries practice a in May this indicator was 73%. It is worth hateful policy towards Russia162. 51% of them noting that in May 2014 this index was considered that such actions are manifested approximately the same—71%159. in the use of sanctions targeted against the Russian economy and business, 42%
Russian attitudes towards the EU are neither 3. explained it by the ‘information war’ against as negative nor as fluctuating as attitudes Russia, and another 40% think that Western towards the US. 64% of Russians held countries were trying to achieve control negative views about the EU in March 2015, over natural resources and the economy a figure that remained static for almost a of Russia. 31% are sure that ‘the Western year160. countries try to drive Russian economy out The Russian confrontation with the of the former Soviet Union and to maintain West control over the former communist block and the republics of the USSR’163. The Russian Public Opinion Research Centre conducted a study on the opinions of the In general, Russians support the idea of Russian people concerning the recently sharp and firm action taken by their state cooling relations between Western countries against the West. In addition to that, 78% and Russia through the prism of the so- of Russians are convinced that Moldova, called ‘index of Cold War’. In the context
161 Холодная война – скоро начнется или уже идет? 02.12.2014., Русская народная линия. Available 158 Аналитический Центр Юрия Левады, Служба at http://ruskline.ru/news_rl/2014/12/02/holodnaya_voj- в армии и военные угрозы, 21.02.2015. Available at na_skoro_nachnetsya_ili_uzhe_idet/, last time accessed http://www.levada.ru/2015/02/21/sluzhba-v-armii-i-voen- 01.07.2015. nye-ugrozy/, last time accessed 01.07.2015. 162 Аналитический Центр Юрия Левады, 159 Аналитический Центр Юрия Левады, Отношение россиян к другим странам, 05.06.2014. Отношение к другим странам. Available at http://www. Available at http://www.levada.ru/2014/06/05/otnosh- levada.ru/2015/04/02/otnoshenie-k-drugim-stranam/, last enie-rossiyan-k-drugim-stranam-6/, last time accessed time acessed 01.07.2015. 01.07.2015. 160 Ibid. 163 Ibid.
47 Georgia, and Ukraine supported sanctions Syria as they were making strides towards the EU. Levada Center data from June 2014 shows According to data from the Pew Global that 54% of the interviewed Russians Attitudes Research Project, 83% of Russians opposed the US led airstrikes against Daesh in the second half of 2014 supported Putin’s in Syria. 40% of respondents believed that foreign policy. Since 2012 this indicator has ‘the terrorists supported by the West will grown by 14%. Likewise, negative attitudes declare a bloody war against Syria’s official towards the US and the EU have reached a government’, while 26% considered that 166 historic high. These trends were illustrated there already is a civil war in Syria . during the Russo-Georgian war, when it Iran became clear that Russian society is ready Data from 2012 shows that 61% of to support the revisionist and aggressive respondents considered that Iran had the 164 policies of Russian power . right to block the Strait of Hormuz through Despite the aforementioned indicators, it which the majority of oil is transported to is worth noting that the Russian people the countries in the West from the Persian hold contradictory feeling about the West Gulf in retaliation to certain economic and possible Russian relations with it. 72% sanctions imposed by the West. More than half of respondents said that in 2012 Iran
3. of Russians consider that Russia should continue its current foreign policy despite was not a threat to the peace and stability 167 the sanctions, while 60% of respondents of the region . support a rapprochement between Russia Russia wishes to strengthen its influence in and the West by improving economic, the Near East and Eastern Europe to project 165 cultural and political relations . their power as a global player and to be There is one more aspect that should be able to adequately respond to the actions noted in this regard—a low demand among taken by the Western countries. According the Russian people for a democratic and to the interviewed Russians, the actions and accountable model of decision-making. This policies pursued by the West are limiting low demand explains the preference and or even outright ignoring the interests of prevalence of president’s unilateral decision- other parties. Russian citizens do not see making over that of democratic institutions. any efforts by western countries to uphold the international law and secure peace and stability in the world.
164 Всероссийский центр изучения общественного мнения. Available at http://wciom.ru/ 166 Аналитический Центр Юрия Левады. index.php?id=459&uid=114953 , last time accessed Available at http://www.levada.ru/05-06-2014/ 01.07.2015. otnoshenie-rossiyan-k-drugim-stranam, last time accessed 165 Аналитический Центр Юрия Левады, 01.07.2015. Позиции России на международной арене, 23.02.2015. 167 Аналитический Центр Юрия Левады. Available at http://www.levada.ru/23-03-2015/pozit- Available at http://www.levada.ru/28-11-2012/ sii-rossii-na-mezhdunarodnoi-arene, last time accessed rossiyanam-zagranitsa-ne-ukaz, last time accessed 01.07.2015. 01.07.2015.
48 • The interests of the individual, including universal human rights, are subordinated 3.2.5. Value to the interests of the state. The state, however, finds it more attractive to Orientation support social programs instead of in Russia: individual freedom. Russians themselves have come to prefer control and Conclusions regulation. • An individual’s freedom is not relevant for Russian society; this contradiction Using generalised data, it is possible to draw creates and entrenches a negative a conclusion that in most cases the values understanding of freedom. of the average Russian citizen tend to differ, rather than coincide with the values of • Russian society expects the state to the average resident of any given Western intervene in practically every sphere of country. In addition, inner contradictions life. Paradoxically, institutions that provide combined with the impulsive mentality of expected services enjoy very low levels of the Russian people are not conducive to trust, with the exception of the president. stable relationships and values168. • High support for the president and his An important aspect that distinguishes actions in addressing both domestic Russians is the considerable gap that exists and foreign policy issues, combined 3. between declared values, and relationships with society’s support for the vertical in practice. power system is conducive to running a Political values patrimonial state. • The elements of social capital in Russian • Democracy in Russian society isn’t society are still not strong enough to help perceived as a primary value. The choice further democratization and economic of political regime is subordinated to development. This can be explained by stability, order, and economic prosperity. low levels of mutual trust, lack of trust in • Generally, the indicators that show social institutions, and low levels of civil support for the various aspects of identification in general. democracy are criticized. Russian society • Civil values aren’t highly appreciated by has a markedly different understanding Russians. In turn, the frailty of civil society and interpretation of democratic values is another factor contributing to the high and the application of the democratic demand for a patrimonial system. processes than do Western societies. • Russians don’t consider tolerance to be an essential value. There is an alarming trend where the sense of being Russian 168 Diligensky G., Chugrov S., (2000), The West in Russian Mentality, Office for Information and Press, is inextricable from opposition to Brussels Institute of World Economy and International ‘otherness’; this is characterized not only Relations, Moscow. Available at http://www.nato.int/ acad/fellow/98-00/diliguenski.pdf, last time accessed by a split between different social and 01.07.2015.
49 ethnic groups, but it also shapes the way an interest in democratic values, but it the events in the international arena are is rather the economic achievements perceived. Russian society treats tolerance and the welfare of Western Europe that as an anti-value and itself is openly attracts Russia’s attention. intolerant towards things that diverge • In the political and security sectors from the norm or traditionally accepted Russian society sees significant external standards. Society is fearful, which in threats, mostly from Western countries, turn makes it more likely to threaten the in particular the US. stability of the international system. • One can conclude that Russian society Economic values does not think it important to respect • There is low support among Russian international organisations and people for such liberal economic values international law, and supports interference in the sovereignty of other countries if it as competition and private property. advances Russia’s interests and goals. Furthermore, the high value attributed to a hierarchical system results in a fictional • Dismissive Russian attitudes concerning equality in Russian society. There are the transparency and achievements of international organisations testify to also certain political components that their low support for these institutions. 3. significantly hamper the principles of Another aspect to consider is that free market economy from taking hold in Russia prefers absolute autonomy Russia. in setting its foreign policy agenda. Moral values Russian foreign policy is based on realism and the zero-sum principle; • The popularity of materialism and these ideas and principles also affect individualism in Russian society is social consciousness. Even if they are mostly determined by the satisfaction concerned with expanding democracy of people’s needs due to the low level of or anti-terrorism efforts, the actions of social capital in the country. the US and the EU are mostly perceived as a threat to Russia’s national interests. • Despite the fact that Russia is a In general, Russian society is disposed secular state, demand for the active to support the imperialistic aspirations involvement of representatives of church of the Russian Federation towards denominations can be observed in the the former republics of the USSR. realisation of state’s policies. Both revisionist actions, such as the The international dimension annexation of Crimea, and the assertive policies of the president are accepted as • Russians see their country’s geopolitical legitimate, mostly because the institution orientation on three levels—political, of president enjoys such a high level of economic, and cultural. While politically Russians see partners in the former USSR support. republics, in the economic and cultural spheres the desired partners are to the west. However, this does not come from
50 MANIPULATIVE TECHNIQUES OF RUSSIA’S STRATEGIC POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 4.
Legitimacy is named among other appeals The following techniques are described in commonly used in Psychological operations the field manual: Glittering Generalities; (PsyOps) and is understood as Authority; Transference; Least of evils; Name-Calling Reverence; Tradition and Loyalty. In this (in this research is used as Labelling); 4. study Legitimation and the strategies of Plain folks or Common man; Testimonials; legitimation are defined and used according Insinuation; Presenting the other side; to A. Reyes. He used five strategies: Simplification; Compare in contrast or for 1) emotions; similarities; Illustration and narratives; 2) rationality; Specific instances; Statistics; Explanations. 3) the voice of expertise; In the process of the research the 4) hypothetical future; placement (as an importance of the 5) altruism. agenda); hypothetical future (from the Techniques (and appeals) are defined strategies of legitimation), moral superiority according to PsyOp classification used in US and victimization also were included as Army169. The field manual says: “Techniques techniques frequently used by analysed are the methods used to present Russian media. Some new techniques were information (supporting arguments) to added (the role model; second screen). the TA. Effective techniques are based on Role model differs from the instructing the conditions affecting the TA and the technique, this technique provides a role type of information being presented”170. model on how to behave in a situation.
169 (2003). FM-3-05.301. Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. Washington. (2007). FM-3-05.301.Psychological Operations Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 170 (2003). FM-3-05.301. Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. Washington. 5-55. Available at https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-301. pdf, last time accessed 01.07.2015.
51 The other technique -“Second screen” In this research, following manipulative includes promotion of hashtags, social Kanal may be using other techniques in networks, and accounts to follow. It is used other cases linked to the crisis in Ukraine or also for discretization of some accounts/ about other events. The listed manipulative users. techniques can be used separately or combined to mutually reinforce each other.
THE MANIPULATIVE TECHNIQUES USED BY RUSSIA
Importance Presence of an issue in the agenda and its placement in a news Placement171 program Silence172 Avoidance of presenting contesting arguments Repetition173 Multiple mentions of an issue within a news programme, in either a single newsstory or multiple news stories presented on multiple days Authority174 The use of a person or institution, which has high level of trust and popularity (V. Putin). The use of other authorities (ministers or subject state institutions) depend on hierarchy and the need to reinforce the original message Expertise Referencing a person or institution holding a high level of trust Voice of expertise175 and popularity, e.g. V. Putin. Referencing other authorities, e. g. ministers or state institutions, depending on their place in the
4. hierarchy and the need to reinforce the original message Testimony176 Referring to quotes from a variety of sources, e.g. respected author- ities, the common man, that support or reject the message Simplification177 Simplification of complex processes and issues, and leaving aside difficult issues or significant details Unification178 Combining issues or processes that support the main narrative Labelling179 Specifically naming of issues or groups to construct the desired con- text, e.g. rebels – separatists; power in Kiev – government of Ukraine. In-out grouping180 Intentionally separating or uniting people into groups, supported by labelling Common man181 Referencing the opinions of ordinary people, like most viewers themselves, to create the sense that the views of the average man are heard, allegedly showing things as they actually are Comparing differenc- Orchestrating selective comparisons to help construct the desired es or similarities182 narrative, e. g. the Right Sector in Ukraine is very similar to the Nazis Moral superiority183 Justifying actions, opinions based on the idea of moral superiority, supported by selective comparison techniques, e.g. Russia is morally superior compared to the West Hypothetical Constructing a possible future scenario to be used as a guideline for future184 determining goals,e. g. what Russia can achieve as the key player, and threats, e.g. what Russia should avoid at any cost Pseudo plurality185 Presenting cherry-picked opinions as many and varied to support the main narrative. A sense of plurality is constructed according to the domi- nating message. Victimisation186 Labelling one side as the victim without providing context or factual assessment
52 187 Statistics171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181Legitimating182 183 184 185 186 187 188 an189 issue190 191 192 or point of view by providing a constant flow T of numbers and figures, with or without referencing the source The lesser evil188 Creating a false choice by presenting the desired solution as ‘not good enough’, but better than the current alternative Evaluation189 Providing evaluation without analysis; similar to labelling Instructing190 Offering advice to viewers on how to access ‘reliable’ information Role model Providing a role model showing how to behave in a given situation (integrity/solidarity)191 "Second screen"192 Promoting certain hashtags and social network users/accounts to follow, discrediting others
171 Based on the effects of agenda (setting). For examples see Borchers, T. (2013). Persuasion in the Media Age. Long Grove: Waveland Press. p. 63. Jowett, G., O`Donnell, V. (2015). Propaganda and Persuasion Sage Publication. p. 204. 172 Is listed as a counterpropaganda technique (see FM-3-05.301. (2003). Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Proce- dures. Washington.). 173 Is named among principles of preparation of PsyOp (see FM-3-05.301. (2003). Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. Washington.). Is named also as a tactic of intensifying of persuasion (For details see Simons, H., Jones, J. (2011). Persuasion in Society. Routledge.) 174 For examples of the authority in legitimation see van Leeuwen, T. (2007). Legitimation in discourse and communication. Discourse & Communication, 1(1), 91–112. Is mentioned in PsyOp manual but not as a technique (see FM-3-05.301. (2003). Psychological Opera- tions Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. Washington.). 175 Is adapted from the strategies of legitimation developed by A. Reyes (see Reyes, A. (2011). Strategies of legitimization in political discourse: From words to actions. Discourse and Society, 22 (6), 781–807). 4. 176 Is listed as a common PsyOp technique (see FM-3-05.301. (2003). Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. Washington.) 177 For examples of the effects see Woodward, R., Denton, E. (2014). Persuasion and Influence in American Life. Waveland Press. p. 27. Is mentioned in PsyOp manual but not as a technique (see FM-3-05.301. (2003). Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. Washington.). 178 See Thompson, J. a (1990). Ideology and Modern Culture: Critical Social Theory in the Era of Mass Communication. Stanford: Stanford University Press; Wodak, W, Cillia, R., Reisigl, M. Liebhart, K. (2010/1999). The Discursive Construction of National Identity. Edinburg: Edinburg University Press. Is not mentioned in the PsyOp manual FM-3-05.301. (2003). Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. Washington. 179 Is connected with PsyOp technique “name-calling” (Wodak, W, Cillia, R., Reisigl, M. Liebhart, K. (2010/1999). The Discursive Construction of National Identity. Edinburg: Edinburg University Press.), is connected with the discursive strategies (particularly - referencing). See Wodak, W, Cillia, R., Reisigl, M. Liebhart, K. (2010/1999). The Discursive Construction of National Identity. Edinburg: Edinburg University Press. 180 Is listed as an appeal (see FM-3-05.301. (2003). Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. Washington.) Is con- nected with the different discursive strategies (see Wodak, W, Cillia, R., Reisigl, M. Liebhart, K. (2010/1999). The Discursive Construc- tion of National Identity. Edinburg: Edinburg University Press). 181 Is listed as a common PsyOp technique (see FM-3-05.301. (2003). Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. Washington.) 182 Is listed as a common PsyOp technique (see FM-3-05.301. (2003). Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. Washington.) 183 Corresponds to the discursive strategy “Singularization” (see Wodak, W, Cillia, R., Reisigl, M. Liebhart, K. (2010/1999). The Discur- sive Construction of National Identity. Edinburg: Edinburg University Press.). Is listed among opponent propaganda techniques (see FM-3-05.301. (2003). Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. Washington). 184 Is adopted from the strategies of legitimation developed by A. Reyes, corresponds to “Cassandra Strategy” mentioned by Wodak. (see Reyes, A. (2011). Strategies of legitimization in political discourse: From words to actions. Discourse and Society, 22 (6), 781–807; Wodak, W, Cillia, R., Reisigl, M. Liebhart, K. (2010/1999). The Discursive Construction of National Identity. Edinburg: Edinburg University Press.) Is not mentioned in PsyOp manual. 185 Is connected to the democratic value, is a sense-providing technique. Is not mentioned in the PsyOp manual 186 Corresponds to the leading narrative of victim, is a sense-providing technique. Is not mentioned in the PsyOp manua 187 Is mentioned/listed as a common PsyOp technique (see FM-3-05.301. (2003). Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. Washington). Is connected with rationalization. 188 Is mentioned/listed as a common PsyOp technique (see FM-3-05.301. (2003). Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. Washington). Is connected with rationalization. 189 Is connected with black and white categories, moral judgment. 190 Is listed as a principle of preparation (see FM-3-05.301. (2003). Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. Washington). 191 Is close to instructing, but instructions are from a specific source – a role model. 192 The effect of the second screen is associated with the media multitasking (see Kirsh, S. (2010). Media and youth: a developmental perspective. Oxford: Wiley.). 53 MEDIA ANALYSIS: CASE STUDIES The Downing of MH-17 5.1.
The research covers the time period between April 2014 and January 2015, and analyses 5.1.1. COMMUNICATION the following audio-visual platforms: RT 5. (formerly known as Russia Today) and Perviy TOOLS USED AND Kanal. Perviy Kanal is the most popular TV channel among Russian speakers both REDEFINITION OF domestically and in Russia’s neighbouring countries. RT has a relatively low number AGENDA of viewers in Western countries but with increasing potential. About the event: Malaysian Airlines Boeing In this section the main findings on the 777 was shot down over Eastern Ukraine redefinition of agenda and the use of on 17 July 2014. All 298 passengers and information tools are presented. Firstly, crewmembers, who were on-board the the differences in the composition of news plane heading to Kuala Lumpur, perished. programs will be described. This is essential Politically, this event became a turning because the design of each news programme point in the West’s perception of Russia’s demonstrates the strategic political role in the conflict in Ukraine. Investigations communication used to shape the agenda and speculations about the party (how important the news was, the length, responsible for this act of terrorism evoked strategies of coming back to the news, significant changes in the strategic political etc.). Secondly, the main sub-topics of the communication of those involved in the catastrophe will be described to underline conflict. Media analysis took place for items some elements of the blame-game. published 17-23 July 2014.
54 The composition of news • alternative positions revolve around programmes as a tool of strategic the leading idea rather than standing political communication on their own, e.g. American critics comment on the safety of investigators In general, Perviy Kanal, RT America, and RT at the catastrophe site; International all had different approaches in shaping their news programs by choosing • a great deal of information is presented and accentuating different sub-topics of using specific and nuanced language, the event, labelling the involved parties, which is then followed by a short clear and using different strategies to legitimate message summing up the issue; a ‘new reading’ of values. However, the different ways of presenting the information • sub-topics are repeated from day to day had the same goal—defending the position and programme to programme. of the Russian government. Both RT International and RT America used The initial reactions of RT America and Perviy the repetition strategy. This follow-up Kanal were different. For RT America events method, returning to an issue discussed in the in Gaza were the breaking news on 17 July. previous program to add new information, Nevertheless, full coverage of MH-17 was can be observed in multiple techniques, broadcast first193. Even visualizations of the such as the use of the same graphics on catastrophe differed on the first day, even the background screen, presentation of the the first hours after the tragedy: Perviy Kanal same confrontational views and arguments, 5. chose to display a plane against clear skies on and rehashing the videos from previous the studio screen, thus presenting the news in programmes. a non-emotional, neutral, everyday context. This repetitive perspective on day-to-day Each channel mainly used a unique news basis is commonly used to help viewers programme. If the length of the news is understand the main issues addressed by the fairly constant for RT International and RT America—around 26 minutes, the length of news channels, but in this case the technique Vremya on Perviy Kanal varies depending on demonstrably is a clear attempt to form public circumstances. opinion and therefore influence the public agenda in favour of an authoritarian regime. For instance, during the conflict in Ukraine the length of the evening news doubled and Redefinition of agenda even tripled in order to explain and defend Perviy Kanal presented the greatest the stance of the Russian government, and number of subtopics related to the MH- president Putin in particular, to the people. 17 catastrophe. Just few hours after the Four main strategies that were used in the catastrophe a new agenda was created with prolonged programme: the following topics: • The repetition of one idea/message a. A civilian plane was shot down by the several times in a programme, e.g. Ukrainian armed forces back in 2001 Ukraine’s culpability; (broadcast on Perviy Kanal from 17 Jul);
193 RT International archived news bulletin was recorded before the event.
55 5.
b. The ‘lost Malaysian plane’ and possible The first sub-topic mentioned above—the technical problems (broadcast on civilian plane crash—was updated and further Perviy Kanal from 17 Jul); analysed by Perviy Kanal on a daily basis, while the second and third topics had disappeared c. Putin’s plane was the real target of the by the end of the period of analysis. Ukrainian armed forces (broadcast on Perviy Kanal from 18 Jul); The sub-topic about Putin’s plane as the real target of the Ukrainian armed forces was: d. Western media criticised for recalling the 1983 crash of a South Korean • supplemented by a quote from a plane caused by the Soviet air Ukrainian politician saying that Putin forces. was the target
56 5.
[In the proximity of air-base Eglin passengers are being evacuated and an empty plane will fly to the direction of Cuba. Over the territory of Cuba it will have to be shot down by the US Airforce, coloured in Cuban Airforce colours.]
57 • supported with information from an 1) Visualization; ‘anonymous source’ 2) Quotation (text and audio-visuals); • enhanced by graphics showing 3) Critical opinions of experts (both similarities of the Malaysian Airplane academic and professionals). and ‘Board Nr.1’ [TRANSLATION] “It is worth RT did not use this version at all, which mentioning that the Western mass might be considered as a proof of targeting media cover only two versions of the only the local audience via Perviy Kanal. catastrophe: the plane was hit either On the next day after the catastrophe, the by the pro-Russian militia or Russia. A line of “conspiracy theory” was further possibility of involving the Ukrainian developed, speculating about the possible combatants, who control the air space US involvement and the benefits US would over Donetsk, is not even considered”194 get from this event - both, politically (Perviy Kanal, Vremya, 18 July, 2014) and economically. The cases of 9/11 and reminding about the role of the US in the This statement is unsupported. The Western 9/11 case, i.e. a US air-force suddenly media is mentioned, but no example or source appearing in Cuba. The main idea behind is given, e.g. a video from the Western media the story (on Perviy Kanal) – this catastrophe or shots of the front pages of periodicals. The 5. is good for the US both politically and main strategy used here is unification, i.e. economically. labelling all Western media as low-quality. At the same time, RT America and RT Another issue that is important from a International had less sub-topics and the key strategic communication perspective emphasis also differs. From the first hours of is fostering a sense of disinformation news reports, the theme of safety of air traffic established by the Ukrainian side to be used and air control was featured as central (after by Ukrainian authorities, the Western media stories of human suffering). This is the leading and US intelligence services as ‘evidence’. topic supported by graphics (simplification Perviy Kanal addressed the alleged and rationalization) and experts being asked to disinformation. comment the catastrophe few days after the A number of experts were asked to comment event (authority). RT America, RT International on the lack of clear evidence. Perviy Kanal and Perviy Kanal have different ways addressed the following cases in more detail: of undermining the credibility of the Western media (blaming the media • a recording of a conversation for published articles and broadcasted between two pro-Russian separatists stories before the official investigation chatting about the downing of the had started). RT International paid more plane (audio); attention to the work of the Western media. It was on the agenda in every 194 In Russian: “При этом стоит отметить, news program, supported by: что западные средства массовой информации рассматривают только две версии катастрофы: самолет сбили ополченцы, или Россия. Возможность участия в этом украинских военных контролирующих небо над Донецком даже не рассматривается.”
58 • the relocation of a BUK system by Perviy Kanal and RT both used the same pro-Russian separatists (video). RT expert and the same video for the case of also mentioned these cases, but phone conversation. The title of this news provided neither context nor a piece was ‘Kiev pushes intercepted proof’ thorough explanation of the story; and was run three days in a row. • an expert authority that reveals the Another case fully ignored by Perviy Kanal, lies and falsehoods of the alleged and aired on RT is a story with the rebel ‘disinformation’; soldier and a toy. • graphics highlighting the word ‘Unconfirmed’. 5.
59 The news included information about the • Vox-populi—evidence presented as a negative reaction to a photo on twitter of a phone call by a local resident without soldier holding a toy next to the wreckage. a photo and a surname. This was used RT ran the full video with a title “What really to blame the US for not providing happened with the toy” showing the soldier satellite images of that area. crossing himself after putting the toy back In general, RT America paid more attention on the ground. For Perviy Kanal it was not to the reaction in the US. For example on an issue worth addressing, but RT placed it 18 July a story on American reaction was 5 to counter the disinformation and to show minutes long (usually a news story is around how easy it is to manipulate with footage 1.30 minutes long). RT America quoted and information if it is decontextualized. the US President, spokespersons of State A clear example showcasing the Department and Pentagon. Even though this disinformation created/introduced by Perviy was the longest and most in-depth news Kanal and RT was the story about the second story in that particular programme, it was military plane in the air just a few minutes not placed at the start of the news agenda. before the catastrophe. On Perviy Kanal this Even the analysis of lexical grouping/ issue was mentioned in the evening of 17 July naming (we/you) shows that there is a with a rumour that the pilot of the Ukrainian difference between the approaches taken by jet had already been arrested. On RT this issue 5. RT America and RT International. RT America appeared in a form of a short comment on 17 used the term ‘separatists’ in naming the July (RT America) with a more elaborate story pro-Russian group, calling them ‘anti-Kiev appearing only a few days later. separatists’, while RT International avoided Perviy Kanal used the following techniques using the term, preferring such terms as for justification of this version: local government, local militia, self-defence forces, rebels, opposition, anti-Kiev forces, • Rumour in the beginning or anti–government forces. • Military data (visualisations, maps) The territory held by the pro- • Authorities, experts Russian separatists is called the ‘self-
60 proclaimed Republic of Donetsk’, the deliver, explain anddefend the stance of Donetsk region, or the Luhansk region. the Russian government (president Putin, Any relationship between the pro-Russian in particular) to the masses. separatists and Russia and the Russian The RT approach was to provide different ‘footprint’ in Eastern Ukraine appear on agendas for international and US audiences. RT International only in quotes from the For the American audience quotes on MH- Ukrainian side or some Western politicians. 5. 17 mostly made by local politicians were In Russia the term ‘separatists’ appears only presented. In addition, examples from in quotation marks. RT America introduced American media were presented to illustrate the names used in the local public agenda, the lack of professionalism of the Western even if the official name is not in the Russian media. The strategic political communication interests and is not used on a national level. of Russia is adjusted and applied to suit Conclusions regarding the local agenda (applying common lexical communication tools used and grouping to avoid dissonance, providing redefinition of agenda ample space for quotes, copying only some of the content aimed at disinformation). There is significant cooperation between RT and Perviy Kanal in bringing issues that RT International was more active than RT are important for Russia to the forefront of America in representing Russian views on local and international agendas, such as the the tragedy, e.g. number of voices, quotes, 2001 case of Ukrainians shooting down of length, and content of news stories. a civilian plane or claiming there has been Perviy Kanal used an abundance of disinformation from the Ukrainian side to subtopics that repeated the same message convince the American authorities to blame several times within a single programme. RT the pro-Russian separatists. bulletins were better structured and did not Each channel mainly used unique set of address as many subtopics and themes. videos; showing the conflict in Ukraine In the case of MH-17 RT used more emotional doubled and even tripled the length of the videos containing children than Perviy Kanal. nightly news program Vremya, in order to The lack of such footage is surprising since
61 images and videos of children are among for this study and how they are manipulated the dominant elements of Perviy Kanal’s in Russian media. First, this section will coverage of events in Ukraine. The presence address values belonging to the political of children on-board MH-17 was established dimension, followed by those belonging through words instead of images of toys to the economic, moral, and international and children’s belongings. RT, on the other dimensions. It is worth remembering that the hand, used numerous emotional close-ups lines separating the values themselves and of children’s toys and other items belonging the articulation of these values in particular to or related to children. Perviy Kanal also contexts, e.g. economic and security threats avoided using blurred footage of bodies to in the international arena, are blurred. the same extent as RT did. While RT followed The political dimension the example set by other international platforms that used emotional footage The political values outlined in theCatalogue to emphasize the tragedy, Perviy Kanal are also the core values of democracy; these minimised the use of emotional footage. include media freedom and professionalism, the role of the state in society, and the rule of law. However, the main topics of 5.1.2. THE REDEFINITION OF concern presented for Russian-speaking and English-speaking audiences differ. In short,
5. EURO-ATLANTIC VALUES IN Perviy Kanal focused on the value of the THE CASE OF THE DOWNING presumption of innocence, i.e. some Western countries and Ukraine were accused of not OF FLIGHT MH-17 following this principle; RT America and RT International focused on the quality, or lack Several different tools and methods of thereof, of the Western media. ‘value de-legitimation’ were used when addressing Western English-speaking Media freedom and professionalism and Russian-speaking (the same as local Both Perviy Kanal and RT set out to answer Russian-speaking) audiences. The two sets the question: Is Western media free, of values promoted on RT for the English professional, and reliable? The content speaking audience and on Perviy Kanal for used to answer this question consisted of the Russian-speaking audience were quite negative examples. The redefinition of this similar, however, the intensity in appealing to value was organised in the following ways: each value and the strategies of legitimation used differed195. This section will focus on the 1. VISUALISATION values outlined in the catalogue developed 2. ISSUE PLACEMENT 3. EXPERT OPINION
195 The theoretical part for this research will address 4. SOURCE QUOTES AND EXAMPLES a brief overview of the strategies of legitimation used by A. Reyes. The set of tools used to manipulate with the 5. DEDICATED TIME information include 1) the use of emotions, 2) hypothet- ical future, 3) rationalization, 4) the voice of authority. 6. TEXTUAL STRATEGIES OF All these tools help to influence the audience and are used by a communicator to change or to strengthen the current DELEGITIMATION attitude.
62 From the day following the tragedy, Perviy particular case, journalists from Sky-news, Kanal criticized the Western media. The ADR (SOURCE QUOTES), The Guardian first critical comments were general, no (VISUALISATION), and AP (TEXTUAL particular media outlet or journalist was STRATEGIES in translation) were referenced named; no videos, prints, or screenshots as having presented evidence about the were dissected. Several possible reasons bad quality of the work done by the US for this approach are: (1) the convenience intelligence services. This was not used to of targeting the Western media as a whole, show the professionalism of the Western not just one journalist or news agency (2) media, but rather to support the earlier the Western media are not on the agenda claims of Russian experts pointing out fake and do not influence public opinion in Russia evidence from the Internet. (3) lack of familiarity with English and other Both American and International RT placed languages would require Russian translations the topic of unprofessional Western of screenshots and videos. media at the centre of its agenda (ISSUE A single story on Perviy Kanal used a SOURCE PLACEMENT). RT started to blame Western QUOTE from a specific journalist. The story media on 18 July. Still, the first news package was set up and introduced to show the critical of Western media was placed closer lack the fundamental moral values among to the end of the programme while on other Western journalists. days news stories concerning the quality of Western media were placed in the middle [TRANSLATION] “Introduction: 5. of the programme. The news package of 18 Many western journalists, who July also featured SOURCE QUOTES from US chase sentimental details, are politicians J. McCain and H. Clinton. overstepping moral values. Journalist: Yesterday, one of my so In general, RT used the issue of unprofessional called colleagues from Sky news media in Western countries to legitimate approached the material evidence its proclaimed guidelines: to tell more, to consisting of the passengers’ question more. RT used a large number of belongings, opened one of the visual materials (videos and screenshots), suitcases, and started rummaging highlighted titles, and quotes. The main through it. This was followed by a antagonist, portrayed on the front pages of video”196. newspapers was Putin. This visual material was in line with the titles of news stories and (Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 21 July 2014) quotes from anti-Russian texts. The main However, Western journalists were praised accusations against the Western media were: for criticizing the US intelligence services • presenting results even before the for their lack of professionalism. In that start of the investigation • not providing space for the opposing 196 In Russian: Многие западные журналисты, views of pro-Russian separatists or в погоне за душещипательными подробностями, переходят границы морали.] Journalist: [Вчера один the Russian Federation мой, уж не знаю как его назвать, коллега из Skynews вот так подошел к вещественному доказательству, это • assigning guilt for the tragedy directly вещи пассажиров, открыл один из чемоданов, и стал в to Putin нем рыться.
63 The main issue constantly reiterated by RT usually associated with democracy—e.g. journalists was identical to Perviy Kanal’s the separation of powers, the role of state message—it is unprofessional to assign guilt in society, the rule of law, trust in state before the investigation is over. Both RT and institutions, etc. The ‘pre-investigation Perviy Kanal dedicated airtime to repudiate blame game’ highlighted the following lines the arguments and evidence presented by of political communication: the US and Ukrainian sides. As aggressive • blaming sides—mostly the US and anti-Ukrainian rhetoric testifies,Perviy Kanal Ukraine and, after the UN meeting, failed to provide objective analysis and a the UK and France for violating the plurality of opinions. Their anti-Ukrainian main principles of democracy message was: • dividing the Western world on the • repeated several times in each basis of attitudes to democratic programme from the day of the principles tragedy • emphasising the commendable • supported by the statements of attitude of Russia and the pro-Russian military experts separatists towards these principles • supported by eyewitness evidence (investigation first); • emphasising the need for a reliable • supported by authorities, such as 5. and independent international representatives of the Ministry of investigation, while warning of the Defence dangers of the investigation becoming • enhanced through disinformation politicized • connected with particular past events First we will look at the strategies used to and experiences blame Ukraine, followed by a deeper analysis • enhanced through controversial of the legitimization of Russia`s attitude emotional videos showing the towards the presumption of innocence, and ‘actions’ of Ukrainian soldiers and finally we will outline the possible ways to authorities dividing the Western world. Securing credibility and discrediting the Blaming Ukraine (and the US) Western media is one of the core issues in RT America, RT International, and Perviy creating and transmitting propaganda: the Kanal all used the idea of presumption of more credible the source, the more influential innocence, yet each approach was different. the message. Delegitimizing and discrediting RT mostly focused on blaming the media one’s opponent plays a crucial role in strategic for violating the principle of presumption of political communication and the possible innocence (without using this term), and did dissemination of future propaganda. not openly assign blame. RT America used Presumption of innocence and ‘direct speech’, providing more quotes from blame-games the US president and State Department spokespeople. Perviy Kanal, on the other The presumption of innocence is another hand, minimised ‘direct speech’ and assigned value used on both RT and Perviy Kanal. This blame to the US and Ukraine. theme integrates a number of principles
64 In the first few hours after the tragedy The same quote was repeated over the next (INITIAL PHASE) Perviy Kanal used the couple of days on Perviy Kanal and was used strategies of rationalisation and the on RT. In the next news story Ukraine was expert opinion to blame Ukraine. During blamed for violating the presumption of the following days (AFTERSHOCK PHASE) innocence by prematurely proclaiming that emotions were added through video and the pro-Russian separatists are guilty. text. Perviy Kanal news programmes were Later Perviy Kanal changed its strategy. structured to support the rationale of their They doubled their efforts to prove that arguments, e.g. chosen aspects of the MH- the investigation, which is carried out, is 17 story were (1) repeated in multiple stories independent (bringing the fact up several within one news programme (2) supported by times in the programme, having experts and the lead (part of the news package, in-studio- authorities talking about the investigation) text) (3) supported by multiple authorities, and continued blaming Ukraine for violating experts and stakeholders, in one programme the presumption of innocence. in different stories (4) supported by Ukrainian experts who also blamed Ukraine for its weak Obama was presented as a leader, who forces, weak investigators. violated the rule of law. Although, linguistically such phrases as ‘it [TRANSLATION] Anchor: “In is likely’ or ‘it can be argued’ were used, addition, it looks like the American the majority of presented voices blamed administration is ready to name 5. Ukraine, with just few assigning blame the perpetrators. Obama: The to the pro-Russian separatists and Russia facts state that the plane was hit (repeatedly referring to the Poroshenko’s by a zemlja-vozduh (surface-to- quote and representatives of military forces). air) missile from the territory of It is, however, more common for a journalist Ukraine controlled by pro-Russian not to use precise quotes but to repeat the separatists. We also know that story in journalist’s own words. this is not the first plane downed in Eastern Ukraine. In the past few On DAY 2 18 July, the first news-story weeks the separatists have taken on Perviy Kanal was the readiness of down a Ukrainian transport aircraft, pro-Russian separatists to assist the a chopper, and have also taken international investigation by facilitating responsibility for taking down a the work of OSCE experts at the site of the Ukrainian fighter jet.”198 tragedy. The third news story in the same programme contained a statement from the (Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 18 July 2014) Russian President blaming Ukraine.
[TRANSLATION] Putin: “The country 198 In Russian: “Вместе с тем американская администрация, похоже, готова назначить виновных.] in which the tragedy happened is Obama: [Имеющиеся данные указывают, что самолет responsible for it.”197 был сбит ракетой Земля-Воздух. С территории Украины, которую контролируют поддерживаемые (Perviy Kanal, 18 July 2014) Россией сепаратисты. Мы так же знаем, что это не первый самолет, который был сбит за последние дни на востоке Украины. За последние недели сепаратисты сбили украинский транспортный 197 In Russian: “Государство над которым это самолет, украинский вертолет. И взяли на себя произошло несет ответственность за трагедию.” ответственность, что сбили украинский штурмовик.”
65 The same line is followed in the weekly международного расследования]. However programme Voskresnoye Vremya: this message did not reduce the rhetoric directed against the US for violating the rule of [TRANSLATION] Anchor: “The law. Moreover, the same line was used when catastrophe has led to sharp discussing the first results of intelligence service accusations showing that American analysis a few days after the tragedy. politicians, in general, have taken RT (America and International) worked a one-sided stance—to blame the more accurately. RT did not blame American militia and Moscow.”199 authorities or the intelligence services, (Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 20 July, 2014) but focused on 1) the media 2) Ukrainian authorities and 3) certain Western politicians. RT (America and International) did not Perviy Kanal did not show victims of the follow the same strategy. Moreover, the disaster, but did use footage of their grieving information presented on RT was almost relatives. For example on 18 JulyPerviy Kanal entirely different from what was shown aired a story from Kuala Lumpur in which on Perviy Kanal even if the event and the the victims’ relatives were demanding that underlying message remained the same. For the culprits be found and brought to justice, example, the correspondent said that the US while simultaneously showing a screen-shot was not ‘pointing finger at somebody’ just of a well-known Ukrainian politician. 5. yet (RT America, 17 July 2014). On July 18, approximately 1/5 of the news bulletin was Legitimizing Russia’s attitude to the dedicated to the US ‘authorities’ reaction presumption of innocence to the tragedy. The main narratives were Russian authorities and correspondents those of solidarity and investigation, not repeatedly stated that Russia was the first the presumption of innocence. ‘Concerns’ to call for an independent international about the results of the investigation were investigation. Only Perviy Kanal used the placed in a commentary on RT even on 17 ‘we were the first’ idea. RT repeated that July. Journalist’s text: {expresses concerns Russia together with the US and NATO called that the results} ‘could be politicised’. (RT for an investigation (RT International, 18 July America, 17 July 2014). 2015). On 19 July Perviy Kanal mentioned a The main issues presented on Perviy Kanal conversation between Lavrov and Kerry. were: Putin was first to inform Obama The same information was also repeated of the crash during a phone-call; Russia is on the fourth day (Voskresnoye Vremya, trying to influence pro-Russian separatists; 20 July 2014). The news anchor was stated Russia is ready to help with expertise, that the purpose of the conversation was to non-military assistance; the Malaysian ensure ‘independent, open, and international authorities are grateful for Russia’s investigation’ [беспристрастного, открытого и support. This background was established/ supported during coverage of the top story, and repeated throughout the entire news 199 In Russian: “Катастрофа вызвала шквал programme. For example, an authority, a обвинений, показательно то, что американские политики поголовно заняли одну позицию – во всем representative from the Ministry of Defence, виноваты ополченцы из Москвы.”
66 stated: Political attempts to quickly find Presumption of innocence – splitting someone to blame for this tragedy are not up the Western world (regarding correct. [Политические попытки сыграть Russian-speaking audience only) на этой трагедии, мгновенно определив The presumption of innocence was used by виновных, некорректны.] (Vremya, Perviy Perviy Kanal to delegitimise the Western Kanal, 19 July 2014) This was also meant to unity. The focus was on dividing the US show that Russia was not using this tragedy and other Western countries such as the to pursue its aims. Netherlands and Germany. Connecting it to The strategy to minimise the influence of the stage of total propaganda – it showed opposite views was also used. The claim that the presence of the main (and only) external Russia was responsible for the tragedy was enemy, separated from the West. Mainly frequently opposed by presenting quotes voices of authorities were used for (de) that cleared Russia’s name. The only people legitimation. For example, the news story on who commented on the disaster during the Netherlands states: ‘they are definitely the analysed period were such authorities in no hurry to draw conclusions’ [тоже не as Obama, Poroshenko or spokespersons торопятся с выводами]. And the quote used of the US, Ukrainian authorities and some from the press briefing of the Prime Minister European leaders. of the Netherlands is: It looks like the plane has been hit down, but to this moment we Trust in the military was also used to show still do not know what exactly happened. who the guilty side was. Perviy Kanal started 5. [Похоже, что самолет сбили, но мы до сих a news story with military information about пор не знаем точно что же произошло.] the second plane in the sky, blaming the (Perviy Kanal, Vremya, 18 July, 2014) Ukrainian armed forces. The correspondent stated: The same separation tactics can be identified in a news package from the UN on Perviy [TRANSLATION] “Irrefutable Kanal. Only two nations – Russia and China evidence, now that is objective – were shown to (in quotes) be calling for data! […] Usually data like this is the investigation to be over before definite stamped ‘Top Secret’, however, the conclusions are made, while the views and Ministry of Defence has published positions of other countries were retold all known information regarding the by the journalist. The representative of Malaysian aircraft.”200 Russia said that Ukraine was violating the (Perviy Kanal, Vremya, 22 July, 2014) international law and blamed Ukrainian authorities for not closing their airspace. France, the UK and the US were selected as a group of nations that blamed Russia and the pro-Russian separatists before the results of investigation were available. 200 In Russian: “Неопровержимые улики, вот что такое данные объективного контроля […] обычно эти данные имеют гриф «совершенно секретно», однако, в истории с малазийским лайнером, министерство обороны России опубликовало всю известную информацию.“
67 Journalist: separate the Western world was explicit in the examined period. [TRANSLATION] “Without providing any facts, yet with great confidence, The economic dimension: the US is they claim that the aircraft was fighting for its interests downed by a missile fired by the Economic values might be seen as quite Donetsk militia, and blame Russia distant from the MH-17 tragedy, yet both for supplying the weapons and platforms—RT and Perviy Kanal used the manpower.”201 topics to (re)define the economic values in (Perviy Kanal, Vremya, 18 July 2015) Western counties, Ukraine and Russia. At the same time, non-Western China was Common for both RT and Perviy Kanal was portrayed as a country that follows this core the narrative of Ukraine wanting to earn value of the Western World. Quoting the more money from those who were using representative of China: Ukraine’s air-space. Exclusively on Perviy Kanal a conspiracy theory, arguing that the US [TRANSLATION] “Our task for now is is acting according to its national interests, was to get the facts straight and it would addressed. The US was blamed (the voice of not be preferable to make any experts and reporters) for non-transparent and conclusions, statements or guesses. undemocratic actions to benefit economically 5. We support an independent and from 1) the conflict in Ukraine; 2) bad relations objective investigation. We also between Russia and European countries; 3) call on all the parties to provide any conflict with a country (i.e. Russia) who is assistance to the investigation.”202 selling energy resources. These messages were (Perviy Kanal, Vremya, 18 July 2015) legitimated by experts mostly with academic (and think-tank) background and supported by Both RT and Perviy Kanal undeniably used videos of pipelines and warfare. the MH-17 catastrophe to redefine core Euro-Atlantic political values. The main The economic issue was based on the issues underlined were linked to the rule following themes: energy market (the US of law, the presumption of innocence, and is interested in a conflict in Europe); weak media freedom. The quality of democracy dollar as a threat to the US economy. The US in the US and the UK (received the highest attitude towards the core value of openness attention among the Western countries) in the global trade was delegitimized by was severely questioned. The tendency to strategies and voices of experts, including by using means of rationalization. Vilification of the US also served to divide the Western 201 In Russian “Не приводя никаких фактов, world. Even on a lexical level the term ‘the они с большой долей уверенности заявляют, что самолет был сбит ракетой, которую выпустили West’ was not used. The US was blamed донецкие ополченцы. При этом в поставках оружия и for their attempts and efforts to keep the специалистов подозревают Россию. “ dollar strong and stable. This was legitimised 202 In Russian: “Наша задача сейчас – установить факты. Основываясь на этом сейчас нежелательно by rationalisation through international делать какие-либо выводы, строить предположения и organisations, such as the BRICS, at both the догадки. Мы поддерживаем проведение независимого и объективного расследования. И также призываем visual and verbal levels by showing footage оказать все стороны помощь в расследовании.“
68 of Putin and other presidents of the BRICS The value of human life, solidarity (video) and providing statements about with the families of the victims the readiness of other global currencies to Although there were differences in placement, challenge and take the dollar’s place. condolences for the families and friends of Summing up, the economic issue in the the victims were included in all programmes. context of MH-17 is almost inextricably A clear link was established between the linked with the other important international value of human life and solidarity with security issues. The economic interests of victims’ families and friends. Families/Friends the US were clearly linked to the MH-17 topic was connected with the two main tragedy. The US was presented as a threat to ‘techniques’: human stories (relatives and international economic order. friends) and prominent people (a well-known AIDS researcher or the relative of a Malaysian These messages were legitimated by experts authority killed in the catastrophe), as well as mostly with the academic and think-tank inclusion of authoritative opinions (opinions background and supported by video of on the catastrophe). The latter ‘technique’ pipelines and warfare archives. The need for was very popular as an opening part of the economic benefit was based on the following news on Perviy Kanal. lines: interest in the energy market (a conflict in Europe is in the interests of the US) and Perviy Kanal ran Putin’s reaction to the weak dollar as a threat to US economy. catastrophe several times. The visualisation
Enemysation of the US also served to split the used for that particular speech is worth 5. Western democracies. Even on the lexical level addressing, because it differed in the the term “the West” was not used. The US was ‘national’ (Perviy Kanal) and ‘exported’ (RT) blamed for attempts to save the dollar from versions. Perviy Kanal showed government instability. This statement was legitimised by authorities in ‘a meeting on economic issues’ rationalisation technique through mentioning [собрание по вопросам экономики], but international organisations (such as the BRICS), only in the background. Yet, for the English and at the visual level by showing president news the speech was edited to emphasise Putin and other presidents of the BRICS the presence of D. Medvedev in the room (video), stating the readiness to replace dollar during the speech. This could be explained with other global currencies. by the recent trend of associating theimage of Medvedev with liberalisation and keeping Summing up, the economic interests of the Medvedev ‘on the radar’, i.e. showing his US were clearly linked to the tragedy of MH- presence, even if he did not comment. 17. The US was presented as a threat to international economic order. Perviy Kanal emphasized ‘words of The moral dimension compassion’ from local Russian and international authorities. which can be The news analysis identified three main explained as: values from the catalogue dealing with the 1. the showcasing of hierarchy and moral dimension—the value of human life, collectivism, traditional to Russian extended to include the meaning of family culture and friends; solidarity; and the morality of personified states, including the issue of trust.
69 2. showing Russian solidarity on the for the families and nations of the victims, international stage and legitimising while the second part blamed Ukraine for its the figure of Putin by putting him inability to establish peace in its territory. among states like Germany, the US, [TRANSLATION] “The country in which the the UK tragedy happened is responsible for it.”203 3. avoiding human-interest stories— avoiding the emotional background (Perviy Kanal, Vremya, 18 July, 2014) of the tragedy and reframing it in the This message was repeated several times context of the Ukrainian conflict and during the analysed period, both as direct and later in the confrontation narrative indirect speech. between Russia and the US. On 18 July, the news story about the families While some stories shown on Perviy Kanal and relatives of the victims was placed closer to contained a personal or a human element, the end of Vremya. Social media was the main only a few stories concentrated on family source of footage and information. The stories and friends as a value together with human featured emotions expressed in text (words), life. Similar to the tradition of Soviet and in people’s voices, in close-ups, quotes, and Post-Soviet Russian television, stories about the repetition of the number of the children or containing authorities were placed at the who perished (80), tears of relatives, and in 5. beginning of the programmes. For RT, on the phrase ‘a heart broken forever’ [навсегда the other hand, the human-interest stories разбито cердце]. This story depicted world came first. On July 18, RT America allocated solidarity, but the following story began with time for the authorities—Putin`s speech and the claim that ‘Kiev is not keeping its promises’, Obama’s quote which called the events ‘a the state prevents the victims’ relatives from global tragedy’. going to the place of the tragedy. The theme The families and relatives of the victims of solidarity was used as a ‘bridge’ to the next were completely forgotten on Perviy Kanal. human-interest story describing the moral On the first day relatives and families were failings of the Ukrainian state. The programme not on the agenda. Words of condolence was composed to first encourage audiences to were not supported by quotes or videos. On sympathise with the relatives of the victims, the second day the theme was at the centre and then to illicit negative feelings in relation of the agenda. However, the main hero of to the presented villain. this emotional story was Vladimir Putin. The In the tradition of Western journalism, RT Perviy Kanal story featured: placed a story about the victims’ families at • Putin’s speech from the previous day the centre of their programme. The majority of news bulletins allotted significant time to • Putin’s face shown in close-up making each story and the correspondents working his emotions visible in the field. In these stories comments made • shots of other Russian authorities by relatives and friends were supplemented during the minute of salience Putin’s speech was divided into two parts: the first part contained words of comfort 203 In Russian: “Putin: Государство над которым это произошло несет ответственность за трагедию.”
70 by emotional videos with close-ups of are blaming everyone except flowers, tearful faces, and children’s toys. themselves.”204 The message about solidarity with the (Perviy Kanal, Vremya, 18 July, 2014) Netherlands—‘We are one big family’—was repeated time and time again. On July 22 the same line was supported by president Putin during the meeting of the Moral “quality” of states Security Council. Putin was underlining the Personalising countries mean connecting offensive actions of the Ukrainian forces during them also to moral categories. The moral the arrival of international investigators to the values/qualities of Ukraine and the US site of MH-17 tragedy. were discussed. Not trusting Ukraine was [TRANSLATION] Putin: “Experts, presented just few hours after the tragedy. who came to the crash site could The case of the crash of the civilian plane in not raise their heads. It is not like Ukraine in 2001 was used as a rationalisation the militia men are shooting at to: themselves; it is necessary to call 1) justify the inability to trust the upon the authorities in Kiev to Ukrainian authorities and the army; follow elementary norms and order, at last impose a short ceasefire. 2) support the high quality of Russian Clearly, we will do anything for the expertise (because in 2001 Russia was investigation to be fully carried the first who accused the Ukrainian 5. out.”205 armed forces being responsible for the crash, which later on turned out (Perviy Kanal, Vremya, 22 July, 2014). to be true). His speech is supported with video shots of To justify the inability to trust Ukraine, several the railway station in Donetsk, toddlers crying, topics were added to the news agenda: showing destroyed cars and holes in the ground from shelling. 1) poisoning of former Ukrainian president Yushchenko; Just few days after the catastrophe, the US was blamed for the lack of trust: the case 2) murder case of journalist Georgadze in with Powel regarding the evidence on Iraq in Ukraine; the UN was used both in the text and video. 3) the civilian plane crash in 2001 in Ukraine. A clear link connecting these past events with ongoing events was established. 204 In Russian: “я за последние несколько Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov was saying: месяцев правдивых заявлений из Киева не слышал (..), обвиняют всех и вся, кроме самих себя” [TRANSLATION] “For the past few 205 In Russian: “Putin: специалисты, которые months, I have not heard direct приехали на место трагедии, голову не могли высунуть. Ополченцы же не сами себя обстреливают, statements from Kiev (..), they нужно, в конце концов, призвать и киевские власти к соблюдению элементарных норм порядочности, ввести хотя бы на какое-то короткое время прекращение огня. Разумеется, мы будем делать все для того, чтобы расследование было полным”
71 The same case was recalled by an expert on International dimension: Relying on RT International, were he blamed the Western International organisations (with the media for not being professional. Moreover, connection to the rule of law and this case has been regularly used in the media international security) context in Russia. The main aspects of the international On Perviy Kanal some other cases of US trying dimension addressed in the studied period to cover up its actions were shown: after downing of MH-17 were the role of international organisations and institutions, 1) the intelligence service disguising a US the rules of international law and reliability/ plane flying to Cuba; credibility of those who set these rules. 2) lack of transparency regarding the 9/11 President Putin was the main voice legitimating case the key point that Russia was following the 3) even disguising a ship in the 19th rules of international law. The topic of respect century. to the international law was placed at the opening the news programs on Perviy Kanal All these cases were used to enhance the idea several days in a row. For example, of conspiracy and possible benefits for the US and Ukraine from the MH-17 catastrophe. [TRANSLATION] Putin: “We are strictly At the same time, the idea of the US gaining following the norms of international 5. from the MH-17 catastrophe is not mentioned law.” 206 on RT at all. However, the line of “who benefits (Perviy Kanal, Vremya, 22 July, 2014) from the catastrophe?” was discussed on RT America in a news package providing a point International security and order of view of Pentagon (RT America, July 18, “Colour Revolutions” in the speech of 2014). In general, aspects of investigation and president Putin were presented as a synonym evidence used by the US institutions are dealt of “coup d’état” (Perviy Kanal, Vremya, 22 with in categories, which are already examined July 2014). Simultaneously, the following lines in a section of this research on political values were provided: and will be presented later in this research in the section on international organisations. 1) de-legitimation of power in Ukraine: they are radical nationalists financed Summing up, this tragedy was shown with a human face for American and International from abroad, aiming for destabilisation audience, according to the Western media of the country; tradition. At the same time, information 2) legitimation of the regime in Russia; for the Russian-speaking audience first came from the authorities, supporting the 3) de-legitimation of methods Soviet tradition. Morality was also used used by an “unnamed power” to highlight the equality of Russia on the supporting “democratisation”. international arena and to assert Russia as a significant player together with the US, the UK and Germany. The moral quality of US and Ukrainian state were questioned 206 In Russian: “мы, со своей стороны, строго mostly by the national Russian channel. соблюдаем нормы международного права.”
72 Putin’s statement was followed by the They will use the so called comment of a journalist stating that problems competitive struggle on the (both political and economic) are a norm for international arena. This refers to any state. (Perviy Kanal, Vremya, 22 July 2015). economic and political spheres”208 Technique of rationalisation was applied by (Perviy Kanal, Vremya, 22 July, 2014) discussing the destabilisation in Ukraine and radicalisation of society becoming a common The next part of Putin`s speech is dedicated issue for everyone. This part of Putin`s speech to the tools supposedly used in the was reinforced by a video with events from democratisation process – delegitimising Ukraine. Video was emotional, showing NGOs, different channels of information and destroyed buildings and crying children. The other soft power tools. Finally, Putin concludes: underlining line is the hypothetical future, [TRANSLATION] because Russia is the next target of such “Apparently, all of “democratisation”. this is perceived as democracy in some countries.”209 [TRANSLATION] Putin: “That kind of methods will not directly work (Perviy Kanal, Vremya, 22 July, 2014) here, such “recipes” can work only The OSCE in failed states, torn by conflicts and contradictions. Our people, the The international institution mostly quoted/ citizens of Russia, will not let that mentioned/used to legitimate Russia’s 5. happen”207 point of view was the OSCE. It was the main “visualised” organisation (super close-ups (Perviy Kanal, Vremya, 22 July, 2014) on letters, press-conferences, filming of In this quote Russia is legitimated as a strong their field-work). However, it was impossible state without internal conflicts and the to understand whether the video material public opinion is presented as united. The was filmed on that particular day or came next quote of Putin in the same news-story from archives. demonstrates it. Positive assessment of the OSCE on the [TRANSLATION] Putin: “But attempts safety in the area controlled by pro-Russian to destabilise the political situation militia was used to underline the lack of in our society, attempts to weaken credibility of the Ukrainian side. Ukrainians Russia, to hit Russia in its weak spots will be attempted by those
who want to subdue Russia to 208 In Russian: “Putin: “Но попытки раскачать make it more flexible in terms общественно политическую ситуация, тем или of international decision-making иным способом ослабить Россию, ударить по проблемным местам, безусловно принимаются и (concerning other states). будут приниматься с тем, чтобы сделать нас более податливыми при решении вопросов в области других государств на международной арене. Будут использоваться механизмы в так называемой 207 In Russian: “Безусловно, в лоб такие методы конкурентоспособной борьбе на международной не пройдут, рецепты, которые действуют отношении арене. Это касается и экономической сферы, и слабых, не состоявшихся стран, пораженных политической.” противоречиями, конфликтами, у нас не сработают. 209 In Russian: “все это, видимо, в некоторых Наши люди, граждане России, этого не допустят.” странах воспринимается как демократия.”
73 were blamed for violating the ceasefire. 2) amplify Russia’s position (for example, Manipulation with the composition of the the only representative quoted is news program on Perviy Kanal helped to Russian ambassador, without direct undermine the credibility of the US. For speech of the US representatives); example, on 21 July three news packages 3) remind about sub-topics to the were placed in the following order: in the catastrophe convenient to Russia. first one the OSCE and an expert from the Netherlands were expressing gratitude to The EU locals from separatist-controlled territories; The Russian TV channels portrayed European the next news package contained criticism Union and European leaders under the of president Obama: pressure from the US. The European Union [TRANSLATION] “The separatists is not acting in the interest of the nations/ continue blocking the investigation, member states (Perviy Kanal, Vremya, July and they repeatedly got in the 18, 2014). The following quote illustrates the way of experts, who needed to line about the EU: gain access to the debris of the [TRANSLATION] “Americans are airplane.”210 constantly appealing to Europeans (Perviy Kanal, Vremya, 21 July, 2014) emphasising that the majority of
5. the deceased are citizens of the Old The third news package showed one of the World who must urgently revise leaders of the pro-Russian militia stating their stance over the Ukrainian that they are ready to do all in their power matter and support Washington’s to assist the investigation. Finally, the OSCE strict position in relation to representatives were mentioned in the Moscow.”211 context of negotiations with the contact group (Perviy Kanal, Vremya, 22 July, 2014). (Perviy Kanal, Voskresnoye Vremya, July 20, 2014) The United Nations In the same news story, Perviy Kanal went The role of the UN was not particularly on to undermine the authority of the EU: discussed; it appeared in the news as a platform for negotiations. On Perviy Kanal [TRANSLATION] Anchor: “Europe’s this platform was used to redefine the notion arguments that such development of democracy, to criticise the US, the UK and of events is not beneficial for France. For RT and for Perviy Kanal the UN Russia, that the evidence provided was shown as a platform to: by the American secret services cannot prove from which exact 1) legitimise Russia`s position; point in Ukraine the missile was
211 In Russian: “Американцы постоянно апеллируют к европейцам, подчеркивая, что 210 In Russian: Obama: “Сепаратисты большинство погибших – граждане старого света, продолжают блокировать расследование, они который должен срочно пересмотреть свою позицию неоднократно мешали экспертам получить доступ к по украинскому вопросу и поддержать жесткую обломкам” позицию Вашингтона по отношению к Москве.”
74 fired, are not taken into account in [TRANSLATION] Putin: “We will Washington. The main demand is to respond adequately to NATO’s punish Russia.”212 war structures encroaching on our borders. Same goes for the (Voskresnoye Perviy Kanal, Vremya, deployment of a global anti- July 20, 2014) missile defence system and the Perviy Kanal focused also on splitting up development of strategic, non- nuclear weaponry. We are often the EU by singling out particular countries being told that the anti-missile and leaders right from the first days of the defence system is meant only for MH-17 tragedy. However, in the second defence. It is nothing like that, it is part of studied period the EU as a single an attack system. This part of the organisation became more noticeable: offensive defence system of the firstly, as an organisation that is influenced US is brought out to the periphery. by the US (including conspiracy theories); Whatever our foreign colleagues secondly, as a counterpart of the US might say, we clearly see what is (Brussels and Washington as two sides of actually happening.”213 conversation mentioned by a journalist). This part of the speech is supported High Representative of the EU on foreign by showing missiles in action. The and security issues C. Ashton spoke on correspondent is summing up the message Perviy Kanal only on 22 July 2015. The main of the President, showing recent NATO themes were cooperation of the EU with 5. military exercises with the middle and close- Washington, discussion of sanctions and the up shots, making it possible to distinguish Mistral issue. the flags and emblems on the equipment NATO and uniforms. NATO was practically not named on RT Although NATO was not directly linked to (just a few times). For example, it was the issue of MH-17 catastrophe, RT named mentioned as an organisation calling for NATO among the key players calling for an international investigation. At the same investigation. time, NATO was named as a threat on On Perviy Kanal, when referring to the Perviy Kanal. The main voices talking meeting of the Russian Security Council (22 about the growing danger from NATO’s July), president Putin undermined NATO side were the voices of Russian authorities, without explicitly naming it. including the main voice of the President, thus legitimating the strengthening of the Russian military forces for defence purposes. 213 In Russian: “Мы будем адекватно и соразмерно реагировать на приближение военных структур НАТО к нашим границам. Не оставим без внимания развертывание глобальной противоракетной обороны и наращивание стратегического не ядерного оружия. Нам часто говорят, что система ПРО это 212 In Russian: “Anchor: Европейские доводы оборонительная система. Ничего подобного! Это о том, что России в первую очередь не выгодно наступательная система. Это часть наступательной такое развитие событий, что данные американских оборонной системы США. Вынесенная на спецслужб не могут точно указать из какой точки на периферию. Что бы не говорили наши зарубежные территории Украины выпущена ракета, в Вашингтоне коллеги, мы хорошо видим, что происходит на самом не слушают. Главное требование – наказать Россию.” деле.”
75 [TRANSLATION] Putin: “We are to the fact of openness and willingness to strictly following the norms of cooperate by the pro-Russian militia. international law and fulfilling our Downing of MH-17: Summary of commitment towards our partners redefinition of values (..) Russia, thank God, is not part of any alliances, which in a way is a The case of a not pre-planned event – the guarantee of our sovereignty. Any downing Malaysian civil airplane MH-17 country that joins an alliance, gives - was analysed in this chapter. Analysis away part of its sovereignty, and it shows the immediate reaction to this does not always reflect the national catastrophe, including the “first reaction” interests of this country.”214 and the manipulative techniques used. The main strategies of legitimation were based This speech was filmed on the prolonged on rationality: rationalisation and previous close-up shot, and president Putin was experience (including conspiracy theories, looking straight at the camera (at the viewer). the voice of authority, etc.). This speech was filmed during the opening of the Security Council. It was mentioned in the The general line for RT America was to commentary that usually such meetings are minimise the relevance of the catastrophe to held behind closed doors. In this statement the events in Ukraine. RT International was NATO was not specifically named but was used to show the reaction of the Western 5. implied, as well as the dominance of the media agenda. Perviy Kanal was minimising US in the “consensus-based alliance”. The the emotions (less emotional videos, stories technique of hypothetical future was used of victims’ families placed low on the by the president by illustrating potential agenda, no close-ups of tears and sadness) threat to Russia and showing the grim future and rationalised several issues. It overloaded for the alliance countries. the air with information by using multiple expertise (giving a sense of pluralism and Summing up, the techniques of RT and Perviy unity of experts in blaming Ukraine for the Kanal differed on how to represent the tragedy). international order, including international organisations and institutions. Perviy Kanal The role of Putin in this case was crucial, portrayed NATO as an enemy and a meddling even by using psychological elements of actor (due to US influence), whilst RT did imitating a face-to-face communication not bring much attention to NATO. Both RT between the viewer and the Russian and Perviy Kanal underlined the importance President. Perviy Kanal used repetition of of the OSCE, connecting the organisation one message in a single news program (to the extent that one could argue, if these were actually news). Both - national and
214 In Russian: “Мы со своей стороны строго international - platforms of the Russian TV соблюдаем нормы международного права, свои were evaluating the credibility of Western обязательства перед партнерами (..) Россия, Слава sources, in fact comparing itself with the Богу, не входит ни в какие альянсы, в этом тоже, в значительной степени, залог нашего суверенитета, Western media and demonstrating the любая страна, которая в альянсы входит, сразу часть contrast. своего суверенитета отдает. И далеко не всегда это отражает национальные интересы той или иной страны.”
76 5.1.3 REDEFINITION OF EURO-ATLANTIC VALUES: USED NARRATIVES IN THE CASE OF DOWNING OF MH-17 Messages for Redefined Messages for Manipulative Values Russian-speaking values Western audiences techniques audiences POLITICAL VALUES Results presented before Results presented before IMPORTANCE investigation has started investigation has started (placement) Space not provided Western journalists are REPETITION (from for an alternative view biased and influenced by Western media day to day) (rebels of Russia) politicians Media are not free, AUTHORITY Media is used to freedom professional and Media is used to misin- misinform, it is TESTIMONY credible form, it is unprofessional unprofessional UNIFICATION Assigning guilt for the Low morality of Western LABELLING tragedy to Putin journalists IN-OUT GROUPING Western media REPETITION violate the principle Western media of presumption of violate the principle COMPARING innocence by playing of presumption of DIFFERENCES blame-game before the innocence (countries) investigation is over UNIFICATION 5. Ukraine (and some (all american other countries and Mainly the U.S. and politicians) politicians) violate the Ukraine violate the prin- EXPERTISE principle of presumption ciple of presumption of of innocence, but the SIMPLIFICATION innocence U.S. is not yet “pointing AUTHORITY The West the finger at anyone” Presumption violates the (including putin) Dividing the Western Dividing the Western of innocence main principles TRANSFERENCE of democracy world on the basis of world on the basis of the attitude toward this the attitude toward this TESTIMONY principle principle IN- OUT GROUPING Rebels are ready to China is more assist the international LABELLING democratic that the U.S. investigation, cooperation COMMON MAN with OSCE HYPOTHETICAL Russian and the Western FUTURE Russia demonstrates the worlds demonstrate that need for a reliable and COMPARING there is a need for a independent investigation DIFFERENCES reliable and independent more often than the West investigation Obama (the U.S.) Obama – a leader who is RATIONALIZATION influences the violating the rule of law investigation THE VOICE OF The West is The rule of Contradictory message: EXPERTS violating the rule Concerns about law meeting between of law the results of the AUTHORITY Lavrov and Kerry hints international investigation at a possibility for open (“could be politicized”) international investigation 77 Messages for Redefined Messages for Manipulative Values Russian-speaking values Western audiences techniques audiences ECONOMIC VALUES Democratic Economic Ukraine uses the conflict Ukraine uses the conflict RATIONALIZATION ideals interests first to earn money by letting to earn money by letting ENEMYZATION embedded other states use its air- other states use its air- in economic space space CONSPIRACY system Energy market – the U.S. THEORY as the interested party in THE VOICE OF a conflict in Europe EXPERTS Weak dollar as a threat to the U.S. economy MORAL VALUES Value of Did not redefine Putin’s speech – reaction Putin’s speech – reaction COMMON MAN human life directly to the catastrophe – to the catastrophe CONSPIRACY visualised with a positive image of Medvedev IN/ OUT GROUPING More time devoted to Compassion from AUTHORITIES human stories than the local and international EXPERTISE opinions of authorities authorities, thus showing hierarchy and PLACEMENT
5. collectivism, traditional to Russian culture Taking Russian solidarity to the international stage and legitimising the figure of Putin Solidarity Did not redefine Human stories: solidarity Solidarity with families directly with families and friends and friends mostly ex- pressed by the authorities “Moral Moral Inability to trust the Inability to trust the SIMPLIFICATION quality” of argumentation Ukrainian authorities Ukrainian authorities TRANSFERENCE states about the trust and military and the military. Topics varies from added: poisoning of EXPERTISE a country to Yushchenko, Georgadze AUTHORITIES country case, the civilian plane crash in 2001 COMPARE IN CONTRAST Countries (Ukraine and Countries (Ukraine and US) are immoral the U.S.) are immoral COMPARE Supporting the high Supporting the high quali- SIMILARITIES quality of Russian ty of Russian expertize HYPOTHETICAL expertise FUTURE Conspiracy vs. morality: Conspiracy vs. morality: MORAL inability to trust the U.S., Inability to trust the SUPERIORITY OF lack of transparency US: the case of Powell RUSSIA regarding 9/11; the regarding the evidence intelligence service on Iraq disguising a plane flying to Cuba US benefits from the MH- 17 catastrophe
78 Messages for Redefined Messages for Manipulative Values Russian-speaking values Western audiences techniques audiences INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION International Credibility of The U.S. violating the Destabilization in other IN/OUT GROUPING security and those, who set international law countries becomes a LABELLING order international common problem rules is Russia following Russia following SIMPLIFICATION questionable international law international law HYPOTHETICAL Deligitimation of power in FUTURE Ukraine AUTHORITY Legitimation of the EXPERTISE regime in Russia Color revolutions - a REPETITION synonym of “coup d’etat” Delegitimation of methods used by an “unnamed power” supporting democratization Cooperation Did not redefine OSCE is the most OSCE is the most IN/OUT GROUPING with directly mentioned and mentioned and legitimate LABELLING international legitimate international international organisation organisations organisation SIMPLIFICATION 5. Ukrainians as the party HYPOTHETICAL violating the ceasefire FUTURE UN as a platform to UN as a platform to AUTHORITY legitimise Russia’s role, legitimise Russia’s role, EXPERTISE to explain Russia’s to provide Russia’s stance, and to remind stance, to remind about REPETITION about the sub-topics to the sub-topics of the the catastrophe catastrophe The EU is under pressure from the U.S.; the organisation is not working in the interests of the European nations NATO as an organisation NATO as a threat calling for international investigation
79 MEDIA ANALYSIS: CASE STUDIES
Implementation of Counter sanctions 5.2.
About the event: On 6 August 2014 Russian relations. Russian activities in Ukraine were Federation authorities announced food not highlighted as the reason of this sanctions- embargo (in the West usually called – on-sanctions conflict. RT America did not pay
5. counter-sanctions) against those countries the attention to this issue. At the same time which supported sanctions against Russia. RT International showed stories, re-defining On 7 August a list of the banned food items the role of Russia – Russia as a victim of was announced. In fact it was a response to Western sanctions giving its response. the third round of sanctions implemented In addition to victimisation, Perviy Kanal by Western countries after the downing of provided 1) consolidation of society MH-17. This is when the “sanctions war” (professional and general) in a win-win started on both sides, undoubtedly having an situation (the lack of negative assessment); economic and political impact on both sides. 2) splitting the West (the US against the EU); Dates for the analysis: 6 August – 11 August 3) splitting the EU (the more suffering vs. the 2014. less suffering EU members). Different voices of authorities, experts and common people (even without sub-titles of names and surnames) share supportive 5.2.1. COMMUNICATION evaluation. This case also demonstrated the lack of plurality - none of the experts TOOLS USED AND criticised the impact of sanctions for Russia. REDEFINITION OF If in other cases the work with visualisation was significant, in this case video is only AGENDA illustrative (not the main focus). Video is The general line of sanctions on both platforms repeated from a news programme - to the – there is no link to events on Ukraine. This news programme, graphics are used to issue migrated to the cluster of geopolitical emphasize statistics.
80 News programme composition as a tool In general, the length of news-packages of strategic political communication is common for RT and for Perviy Kanal. The structure of news-packages is also Only on Perviy Kanal news on sanctions traditional. What was not traditional was the
were opening the news programme and 5. use in the lead of Perviy Kanal of the verbal moved events in Ukraine further away in link to the hashtag #edimsvoje216. the programme. On 6 August it was a 4`30 min news package, followed by the news on At the visual level the main face of sanctions Ukraine. On 7 August a little bit longer package for the Western audience is Medvedev, and was presented in the very beginning of news for the Russian-speaking – both Medvedev programme, again followed by Ukraine. and Putin. At the same time for RT International it was Setting the agenda not the first news. Before each story on In short, there were two different agendas sanctions a number of stories from and about built up for the English-speaking audience of Ukraine were provided, including the story RT and for the Russian-speaking audience of on MH-17215. In this story an expert criticised Perviy Kanal. The agenda of RT was based the evidence and version of Washington for on the reasoning and reaction in the West. not being clear enough. The first story on At the same time the agenda ofPerviy Kanal sanctions (called in subtitles as “Negative was focused on redefinition of sanctions feedback”) is the next immediately after layout, the internal impact of anti-sanctions MH-17 story. Visualisation for this news is a and external reaction. collage of three parts – the US (the White House), Russia (Kremlin`s tower) and the At the linguistic level the re-defining of why (i.e. EU (flags). The Kremlin tower even at the the reason) the sanctions were introduced was visual level is separating the EU and the US. put in place. Sanctions were not associated with
215 RT International, 7 August 2014 216 Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 10 August 2014
81 Linguistic naming of the food embargo used for and covered in the news program. Perviy Kanal RT The second answer to the question “who will Ответны емеры Negative feed-back suffer the most from sanctions” was - average (Responsive “Proportional manner” EU and U.S citizens. measures) Tit-for tat sanctions Аккуратный ответ Responsive feed back The question of potential compensations (Accurate response) sanctions in the EU was raised very quickly. The three Embargo Mirror reaction Baltic states were not specially mentioned Ответ на among the suffering countries on RT (only агрессивную Lithuania was mentioned). However, on политику Запада (Response to Perviy Kanal Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia aggressive politics were repeatedly mentioned several times of the West) among countries the most harmed and More painful for news-packages were based on these three the West, even Voskresnoye beneficial for Russia countries. Even in the weekly Symmetric reaction Vremya in the story of the core correspondent, of Russia all collected materials on the reactions in the EU were based in Latvia, with the majority of the conflict in Ukraine. The background was interviews from Latvia.
5. around the last circle of sanctions. Moreover, In the centre of the agenda constructed for Perviy Kanal did not focus on clarifying the Perviy Kanal were prices in Russia, possible sanctions against Russia. deficit, and the period of time to normalize For RT the main issue was the impact the situation (from a month to two). Even of sanctions, and who will suffer most during the first seconds of announcing the (unhappy farmers) in countries harmed news on Perviy Kanal the anchor said: by the implemented food embargo. News [TRANSLATION] “Prices should not stories clarified why it happens, for example, rise”.218 by providing the voices of expertise. Why? (Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 6 August 2014) Experts: Anna Van Densky (presented as a political commentator for EU reporter At the end of the studied period more stories magazine) said that Putin “has to defend the appeared on the monitoring of prices in the Russian interests”, as Russia was not being regions219. The issue of prices is legitimised heard: “Europeans will pay the bill”. And the at the highest level – the prime minister, conclusion of the expert is it is not a bad ministers and local authorities. For example, news for Russians217. Perviy Kanal used the Medvedev was talking to the First Deputy same filmed material with the same expert. Prime Minister Shuvalov, but was watching in the camera – to the audience and a very The main way RT talked about loses are short answer of Shuvalov –“сделаем (will be graphics, experts, correspondent texts and done)”220. With regard to the potential deficit surveys (conducted on the RT web-page). It was a kind of vox-populi (poll) on RT webpage 218 In Russian: “Цены вырасти недолжны” 219 Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 11 August 2014 217 RT International, 7 August 2014 220 Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 11 August 2014
82 farmers were used, who were saying that “It Unhappy farmers was not the top story, will be enough, more than enough221”. it was a supportive element. First stories on the suffering side were presented on The next level of the news about sanctions is 7 August. This first story was based on how the sanctions will influence farmers in quotes from the leading European media Russia (happy farmers). Mostly farmers are (video quotes mostly) outlets. The text of expressing excitement, farmers are used as the correspondent was about the sums for a voice of expertise, they mainly are talking the EU and for separate countries. Here about a hypothetical future, which is the three main strategies were used: emotions main strategy applied. A local farmer said: (a story from France, were a farmer cannot [TRANSLATION] We here are not watch this happening “without pain”225; losing anything, we only will gain”. “A hypothetical future (losing jobs, outcomes, blessing in disguise.”222 credits, plans); and rationalisation. For (Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 11 August example: 2014) [TRANSLATION] “This is terrible. I have [TRANSLATION] “In Russia we have a many employees. In the morning I said powerful agricultural sector and it is they should not come to work. I do not capable of feeding the country”223 know what to do next.”226 (6 August 2014) [TRANSLATION] Andin, Bulgaria: Attitude towards EU importers and EU “These goods will definitely be lost. We 5. importers cooperation with supermarkets do not have anybody else to sell these 227 was described in the metaphor of war: goods.” [TRANSLATION] “It would be very (Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 11 August difficult to fight with them (the EU 2014) famers)”.224 One and the same farmer was shown on RT (6 August 2014) and Perviy Kanal several times. This was followed by some other stories about The quality of local food and the quality of new horizons of international cooperation. imported food was shown as a supportive These were supported by expertise (mainly issue of happy local farmers and unhappy experts were political scientists) and maps farmers from the countries suffering (where these countries are located). from sanctions. This issue was presented by the voice of local farmers, the voice
of common consumers and the voice of experts analysing the quality standards.
221 In Russian: ‘Хватит и перехватит.” Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 8 August 2014 222 In Russian: “Мы здесь ничего не теряем, мы только найдем! Не было бы счастья, да несчастье 225 Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 11 August 2014 помогло.” 226 In Russian: “Это ужасно, на меня работает 223 In Russian: “В России мощный аграрный много людей. Утром я сказал им не приходить на сектор и он в состоянии накормить страну.” работу. Я не знаю, что делать дальше.” 224 In Russian: ““Очень тяжело было с ними 227 In Russian: “Этот товар очевидно пропадет, воевать.” нам больше некому его продавать.”
83 For example: Local women without names or surnames are reinforcing the message: [TRANSLATION] “It is widely known that Russian standards are higher than [TRANSLATION] “We are patriots of 5. in many other countries. The imported our countries. We should do it not goods consist of many artificial just out of some sort of national ingredients, including antibiotics.”228 wrongdoing, but for the reason we are having a lot better goods [...] We (Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 6 August 2014) already have special experience of By the way, Belarus still follows this reminder “Bush legs”.”230 of the good quality of Soviet products and (Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 8 August 2014) high Soviet standards. In another example a food expert is saying that: As it was mentioned earlier about this case, none of the experts were having comments [TRANSLATION] “For example, in about negative influence of sanctions. In Canada natural butter should be added general, there were happy Russian expert in the plant oil, which in principle is sand those unhappy with potential risks. made of vegetables. For our country this is not acceptable.”229 (Vremya, PerviyPerviy Kanal, 7 August 2014)
228 In Russian: “Как известно, Российские стандарты выше чем во многих других странах, в импортной продукции много добавок, в том числе антибиотиков.” 230 In Russian: “Мы патриоты своей страны, не 229 In Russian: “Так например в Канаде в просто из какой-то там национальной вредности, а натуральное сливочное масло считается обязательным из-за того, что у нас на несколько порядков лучше добавлять рапсовое масло, которое, в принципе, является продукция [...]. У нас есть печальный опыт ножек растительным. Для нашего государства это неприемлемо.” Буша.”
84 For example, a Russian expert underlining: This is followed by a quote from LeFigaro (ZakMijar): [TRANSLATION] “The decree is to have more positive sides both for [TRANSLATION] “For the French it will
consumers and for producers, as be similar to death if export to Russia 5. the goods from many countries did is stopped. It is too important for not correspond to the quality of our keeping the balance of employment goods...”231 and trade. The EU is having a policy (of the polar issues). All external (Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 6 August 6 policy of Europe is one big myth about 2014) the power of Europe. It is utopia. The last – national (Russian) security, Everybody very well knows that, European security and potential crisis in the despite of these ridiculous sanctions, EU has to mentioned under this subsection any kind of war does not exist with of agenda, but it will be analysed in the Russia.”233 section of values. The anchor saying that (Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 9 August 2014) “Experts believe that Europe as a whole will suffer. Moreover, in some countries people complain about their authorities232”.
233 In Russian: “для французов будет 231 In Russian: “Указ однозначно со знаком смертиподобно посягнуть на экспорт в Россию, он плюс и для потребителей, и для производителей. слишком важен для поддержания трудовой занятости Ввозимая продукция из многих стран она: А) и торгового баланса. Евросоюз ведет политику из не соответствовала качеству даже внутренней огня да в полымя. Вся внешняя политика Европы – продукции, …” один большой миф о евромогуществе – целая утопия. 232 “Эксперты считают, что пострадает вся Все прекрасно знают что, несмотря на нелепые Европа в целом, при этом в отдельных странах уже санкции, не существует никакой войне против звучат обвинения в адрес властей” России.”
85 Main communication tools used in this case is encouraged not to challenge the state, study are employed mainly at the level of but rather to consolidate around the state verbal communication: starting from how and the governing elite. At the same time, sanctions are named to why sanctions there were also attempts to re-define Euro- were applied. Rationalisation of sanctions Atlantic values. These values are mainly is connected to two points: the gains for connected with economic and international Russia, suffering in the West. Something in dimensions. the middle is not commented/pronounced The political dimension either by experts or by locals, but is presented as an answer. The role of the state—Russia is defending its interests, patriots do not complain At the non-verbal level Russian locals (consumers, farmers), Russian experts and This issue was transmitted by both platforms, even authorities are smiling. They are happy but for Perviy Kanal it became a leading and talking not about the negative, but storyline. President Putin was the main about the positive future. At the same time source used to legitimate the role of the on faces of the Western farmers Western state in this case. He is seen as the primary authorities and experts one could see was defender of national interests, supported sadness or anxiety. by Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and the ministers who present specific plans 5. From the point of view of strategies of and actions. The news stories encouraged legitimating, every strategy was used. trust in state institutions. Putin declared Hypothetical future is among the main that there was a threat to the nation/state. strategies, combined with rationalisation The segment about Putin’s meeting the day through the voices of expertise. Nevertheless, before the introduction of counter-sanctions this was pre-planned consolidation of society when he called for the defence of Russia was around the state, and tools used (cooperation repeated several times. The sanctions are of RT and Perviy Kanal) was directed in a clear presented as ‘not the choice of Russia’. The way: 1) positive emotions of Russians are Speaker of Russian State Duma Narishkin shown exclusively for Russians, 2) negative said: reaction of the Western part shown for both; 3) no negative potential risks for Russia, only [TRANSLATION] “This is not our choice, rationalisation of gains. it is a forced measure.”234 (Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 7 August 2014) 5.2.2. RE-DEFINITION The idea that Russia is facing a threat to its national interests was also used to highlight OF EURO-ATLANTIC negative views about Western produce. For instance, the Head of the Association of VALUES Potato Farmers in Russia stated:
The key value defined for the Russian audience was the Russian state being at
the centre of everything. Russian society 234 In Russian: “Это не наш выбор, это вынужденная мера.”
86 “Они просто напросто душили наших In addition to reporting on new opportunities производителей.” “They (the Western for local farmers, Perviy Kanal was the only producers) were simply strangling our channel to report on the protection against producers.” low-quality (Western) food. RT did not discuss this issue. Another aspect of this (Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 7 August 2014) redefinition of the understanding of the free market was to focus on finding new markets Perviy Kanal showed a positive hypothetical to replace the sanctioned ones, like Latin future for Russia: increased social America for meat, Africa and Asia for fruit responsibility, new jobs, new trade contacts, and vegetables. new income, and even better quality of products—these views were mainly Counter-sanctions are legal legitimised by farmers. The notion that counter-sanctions do not Instead of focusing on Russian internal contradict international law was emphasized positivism, RT mainly focused on negative on both RT and Perviy Kanal. Both platforms storylines, a negative hypothetical future of used an authoritative voice to legitimate this hardships for Western small farmers. issue. For example, one expert stated that Russia did not violate the law, but answered Economic dimension in a ‘proportional manner’ to the sanctions A redefinition of values was also present imposed by the West. 235 in discussions about the economy—the 5. Statements about the legal aspects of the ‘aggressive’ export of produce by the West sanctions were also important for Perviy shows the real face of the ‘free’ market; Kanal. Those were legitimised by authorities: Western produce is of low quality and harmful to health; sanctions against Russia [TRANSLATION] “The Ministry of are not legally justifiable. Economy and Development has already announced that limiting Redefining the free market importation of agricultural produce in The market conditions before the response to sanctions is legally correct. implementation of counter-sanctions are According to Minister Lihachev, negatively portrayed. With the introduction Russia’s actions are, have been, and of counter-sanctions, aggressive Western will be in accordance with rules of the imports have been halted, and experts and World Trade Organisation.”236 farmers are happily talking about opening (Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 6 August 2014) new markets for the local Russian producers. In fact, one could observe free trade being redefined as a value for the Russian people. There is support for the economic freedoms of local farmers, but the presence of Western 235 RT International, 8 August 2014 products in the Russian market is harmful 236 In Russian: “В министерстве эконом(ического) развития уже заявили о юридической чистоте for both Russian farmers and the Russian ограничения ввоза сельхоз продукции в ответ на economy. санкции, по словам министра сельского развития Лихачева, действия России соответствуют, соответствовали и будут соответствовать базовым требованиям всемирной торговой организации.”
87 The same lines were repeated on 7 August, and the situation was such that but this time put in the words of a journalist. we were forced to retaliate.”237 International dimension (Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 6 August 2014) On Perviy Kanal the implementation of Europe is suffering because of the US counter-sanctions was connected with the On both RT and Perviy Kanal Europe was national interests and national security presented as the second victim in the of Russia at the level of the President. RT conflict of sanctions, Russia being the first. America did not cover this aspect in the Statistics and various graphics were used to studied period. demonstrate that the EU would suffer more RT and Perviy Kanal also differed in their from Russia’s food embargo than the US approach to singling out particular countries since the US does not have such close trade in their reports—Perviy Kanal mainly focused relations with Russia. on the Baltic States while RT focused on the In the words of both Russian and foreign impact of the ‘war of sanctions’ on Poland, experts the US was portrayed as interested Finland, Greece, France, and Germany. in draggin the EU into the ‘war of sanctions’ In the news reports the international against Russia. For example, Perviy Kanal dimension was linked to issues of security, showed a video quote from the ARD EU–US relations in the context of the ‘war programme where an expert says:
5. of sanctions’ with Russia, and organisations [TRANSLATION] “The Chancellor is like the WTO and the Customs Union. making a mistake by following Obama on A sign for ‘them’ (security issue) a leash. Obama talks continuously about economic sanctions. They are hitting us, Top authorities in Russia, including the not the US. Do they really understand President, the Prime Minister, the Chairman what price we will have to pay when our of Duma, and various ministers, were shown fruits and vegetables come under the expressing disappointment that the Western embargo, and this will be caused by the world did not listen to Russia. For example, same economic sanctions? What is it, Duma Chairman Narishkin expressed hope to your mind? What is the goal? This is that the Western leaders understand the some sort of childishness…”238 danger of ‘spinning the spiral of sanctions’ (‘раскручивание санкционной спирали’). (Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 7 August 2014) Sanctions implemented by the West were presented as the beginning of the ‘war of sanctions’, as if the West attacked Russia without any context of events in Ukraine. 237 In Russian: “Мы до последнего момента надеялись, что наши зарубежные коллеги поймут, что PM Medvedev said that: санкции—это тупиковый путь. Они никому не нужны. Но они не поняли и, ситуация сложилась так, что мы [TRANSLATION] “Until the very вынуждены идти на ответные меры.” last moment we hoped that 238 In Russian: “Ошибка канцлера заключается в том, что она идет на поводу у Обамы. Обама our foreign colleagues would постоянно говорит об экономических санкциях, они understand that sanctions lead to бьют по нам, а не по США. Понимают ли они какую цену нам придется заплатить? Когда, например, под a dead end. Nobody needs them. запрет попадут наши овощи и фрукты, и это решение But they did not understand, вызвано теми самыми экономическими санкциями. Что это? По-вашему, Цель? Это же просто какое-то ребячество”
88 In another example from Perviy Kanal a connections to the Russian market and journalist states: having to wait for compensation from the government. Greece was also featured on [TRANSLATION] “This high price was paid by the EU only because the EU did Perviy Kanal’s reports on this topic. RT used not go against the will of America.”239 Finland, Greece, and Ireland to demonstrate the crisis caused by counter-sanctions. (Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 7 August 2014) The World Trade Organisation Journalists on both platforms repeated the message that Europe is ‘blindly following On 11 August Perviy Kanal restated the the US’. words of the Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov: Russia’s actions are not against the Inside the EU: solidarity and crisis World Trade Organisation and are taken in Both platforms focused on the impact of the interests of national security. The WTO sanctions on the EU as a whole and on is used as an authority for the purpose of particular countries. Calculations about legitimation. which EU country would suffer most were Implementation of Counter sanctions: presented from the first day. Journalists Summary of redefinition of values collected videos from particular countries, which were presented as experiencing the This chapter elaborates the main greatest suffering from the Russian food narratives, manipulative techniques, and embargo. communication tools used in the case of 5. counter-sanctions. RT America ignored In addition to these calculations, the issues this issue (DIVERSION), RT International of compensation and solidarity arose. focused on the negative impact of counter- Would there be solidarity within the EU? sanctions on the Western countries The sanctions were portrayed as facilitating (RATIONALIZATION), and Perviy Kanal firstly economic and financial crisis in particular covered the positive impact on Russian countries, like Greece, and in the EU in market, and then the negative impact on general. Western economies (RATIONALIZATION and Perviy Kanal distinguished between the old EMOTIONS). and new EU member states, showing that The following main narratives were the new members would suffer more. Latvia identified: political self-defence, patriotism, was featured most in interviews and graphic the consolidation of Russia, the protection visualisations. This may be connected to of Russian market/producers; the protection the fact that the north-east European office of Russian consumers; questioning US–EU of Perviy Kanal is located in Riga. A typical cooperation; dividing the EU by reporting on video from Latvia shows very old tractors which member states would suffer most. and farmers saying that they are forced to re-orientate their business because of their Different tools and techniques were used in redefining Euro-Atlantic and Russian values. Some of the key elements are presented in the table below with regard to the particular 239 In Russian: “Эту высокую цену Евросоюз заплатил лишь за то, что не пошел против воли value under redefinition. Америки.”
89 5.2.3 REDEFINITION OF EURO-ATLANTIC VALUES: USED NARRATIVES IN THE CASE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF COUNTER SANCTIONS Messages Messages for Redefined Manipulative Values for Western Russian-speaking values techniques audiences audiences POLITICAL VALUES The role of The Russian Putin is the main REPETITION (legal state state is at the defender of national response, protection of centre; the interests local market, quality food) public must consolidate The West is a threat to LABELLING (the around it the nation/state aggressiveness of Western markets) Sanctions are not Russia’s Patriots do not choice IN-OUT GROUPING complain! (internal dimension— Defence of the state patriots; external and domestic market dimension—dividing US/ surrounded by positive EU cooperation, dividing emotions of Russians and the EU) negative emotions about the West SILENCE (not engaging in negative assessment, Cultivation of negative
5. ignoring the conflict in views about Western Ukraine as a reason) farmers AUTHORITY (Putin/ Medvedev/ministers in pseudo face-to-face communication, defence of national interests) POSITIVE HYPOTHETICAL FUTURE (for Russian producers and markets) COMMON MAN (impact on Russian and Western consumers and farmers) ECONOMIC VALUES International Counter- Counter-sanctions Counter-sanctions are not AUTHORITY (counter- law sanctions are are not contrary to against international law sanctions do not violate legal international law agreements and are not against the law) VICTIMISATION Russia does not Russian actions are in RIGHT TO RESPOND violate laws, but accordance, have been in responds in a accordance, and will be in ‘proportional accordance with the rules manner of the WTO
90 Messages Redefined Messages for Russian- Manipulative Values for Western values speaking audiences techniques audiences ECONOMIC VALUES Economic The free Support for economic SILENCE (on the freedoms and market is a freedoms and opportunities, advantages of the free opportunities disadvantage but only for local Russian market and on the farmers threats to the Russian market/economy) The presence of Western products in the Russian IN-OUT GROUPING market is harming Russian (constructing farmers dishonest competition/ aggression; suffering The ‘free’ market = pressure of the Russian farmers; to import Western produce grouping at the EU Protection against low- level—ordinary farmers quality Western produce vs. the ruling elite) Positive hypothetical future PSEUDO-PLURALITY for the Russian small farmer (the VOICE OF EXPERTISE does not Negative hypothetical future reference to the for the West Ukraine conflict, only one motive described Diversification of suppliers: as the reason for opening new markets in action) Latin America, Africa, and 5. Asia VICTIMISATION (conditions for the Counter-sanctions are Russian farmers before completely legal counter-sanctions) COMPARING (the quality of produce)
Messages STATISTICS Redefined Messages for Russian- Manipulative Values for Western COMMON MAN values speaking audiences (Russiantechniques and Western) audiences THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION International Europe is Division of EU Singling out the Baltic NEGATIVE OPPONENT security and divided member states, countries (principle of dialogue) order focussing on Poland, Finland, Top Russian authorities COMPARING (the EU Greece, France, expressing disappointment and the US) and Germany that the Western world does not listen to Russia SILENCE (about the conflict in Ukraine, Sanctions are the beginning lack of context for of a ‘war of sanctions’ sanctions against Russia) Russia is a victim of the West; sanctions are not AUTHORITY connected to the conflict in (legitimising counter- Ukraine sanctions) THE LEAST OF EVILS (as hypothetical future)
91 Trustworthiness Europe is not Europe is the Europe is the second victim COMPARING (the EU and reliability an indepen- second victim in in the conflict of sanctions, and the US) of international dent player the conflict of Russia is the first. organisations sanctions, Russia REPETITION (even is the first Statistics and graphics within a single news demonstrating that the EU programme) Statistics will suffer more than the US and graphics from Russia’s food embargo STATISTICS (verbalized demonstrating and visualized, often that the EU will The US is an interested with no clear source) suffer more than party involving the EU in VOICE OF EXPERTISE the US from sanctions against Russia (lack of plurality) Russia’s food Europe is blindly following embargo the US The EU will pay All orders come from the US a high price for introducing sanctions because it did not resist the will of the US The EU is Calculations Calculations concerning COMPARING (EU new/ divided, there concerning which which EU country will suffer old member states; is no solidarity EU country will the most suffering/not suffering) among mem- suffer the most bers COMMON MAN Finland, Greece, Divisions between the DISQUALIFICATION of 5. and Ireland are new and old EU members, the EU countries the new members will politics which will suffer suffer more. At the level of VOICE OF EXPERTISE most from visualisation and interviews, counter-sanctions Latvia was the leader HYPOTHETICAL FUTURE Sanctions are a Sanctions are a facilitating STATISTICS facilitating factor factor in the economic and in the economic financial crisis in countries and financial crisis like Greece and in the EU in in countries like general Greece and in the EU in general The WTO and Counter-sanctions are not the Customs against the WTO and are Union are in the interests of Russian supportive of national security counter-sanc- tions WTO is an authority
92 MEDIA ANALYSIS: CASE STUDIES
The First Humanitarian Aid Convoy 5.3.
About the event: On 12 August 2014 the • It was a pre-planned action by the Russian first Russian humanitarian aid convoy moved authoritiesthat was timed, situated, and from the Moscow area (Podmoskovje) to contextualized so as to support specially
5. Eastern Ukraine. Approximately 280 half- created and controlled narrative(s). empty trucks (numbers changed during the • It was not ‘breaking news’, but rather a operation) made their way to the Ukrainian continuing news story focussing on the border and subsequently entered the conflict where the convoy was located. zone in Ukraine. The Ukrainian side called it a border violation. The Russian side referred • This pre-planned action, and the to violated agreements by the Ukrainian side. context in which it took place, were strongly connected to a much-publicised Dates for the media analysis: 12 August until element of Russian foreign policy—the 24 August 2014. responsibility to protect compatriots suffering abroad. This is framed as a moral 5.3.1. COMMUNICATION duty, avoiding international context. The agendas of the news platforms promoted TOOLS USED AND analysis of the following blocks of analysis: 1) stories about the convoy; 2) stories REDEFINITION OF surrounding the convoy; 3) sub-themes in the news programmes. AGENDA The visual appearance of the convoy confirms detailed preparation and is worth The case of the humanitarian convoy differs mentioning: the trucks were white, the from that of MH-17 in many respects. The drivers were dressed in uniforms, some most important aspects from the point of trucks were carrying the Red Cross flag and view of strategic political communications the Moscow area flag, and many trucks are the following:
93 5.
carried a holy Orthodox icon behind their Crimea. Returning to the Motherland.220 windshields. According to the analysed News programme composition as a tool material, at least one film crew was travelling of strategic political communication with the convoy in order to film it in various surroundings and lighting conditions. The news about the convoy was featured in the middle of the news programmes. During Close-ups showed such elements as a flag, the analysed period RT International and RT a holy icon, and the smiling faces of the America opened their newscasts with news truck drivers. Close-ups of the interior of of the convoy. It became a leading story on the trucks showed packages, baby food, and the day the convoy entered Ukraine. For other ‘immediate needs’ goods. example, on 22 August RT International began The visual angle predominantly used by both its broadcast with the convoy story, subtitled RT and Perviy Kanal were wide shots of a ‘Humanitarian breakthrough’, although at chain of white trucks. The trucks were filmed that point Kiev had not given permission for travelling in an orderly convoy or parked in the convoy to cross the border. strict, symmetrical order. The lighting for some of the wide-angle shots were sunny- yellow, similar to the dominant visual effect in the Perviy Kanal propaganda movie 220 Крым. Путь на Родину., which can be viewed here with English subtitles: Available at: https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=t42-71RpRgI.
94 5.
On most days both RT America and RT contained mostly emotion-based videos International gave approximately one- and interviews; they contained videos from minute to this story, focussing on video the YouTube channels of the Donbas and materials and graphics. These segments Luhansk pro-Russian militia organisations; consisted of a short news briefing with the they also used unidentified YouTube videos anchor’s voice and part of the regional news- (no account or time specified), some of which package, supported by graphics. contained military propaganda. Perviy Kanal didn’t air a long daily story on Some videos contained violence and were the convoy either, but created the sense of shown without prior warning. Although a following this issue very closely. The dominant blurring effect was used, it was not very issues reported were the humanitarian accurate. Some videos were presented as catastrophe in Ukraine, the human side amateur videos, but the sound seems to be and the political side concerning Russian taken from other sources. and Ukrainian authorities in interaction, Setting the agenda and information linked to international organisations such as the UN, the Red Cross, The main issues emphasised by the and the OSCE. journalists and in selected segments from interviews with locals were needs and The following observations gleaned from the danger. The following narratives were newscasts indicate a planned psychological highlighted in the stories about the convoy operation: the opening stories about Ukraine and Ukraine: the growing humanitarian
95 5.
catastrophe through human interest stories; carried the subtitle:People in desperate need the offensive actions of the Ukrainian of aid in a city with no water, electricity. A military forces; the demoralisation bread factory worker was quoted as saying: of the Ukrainian military forces; the ‘There is no electricity and this also means dehumanisation of Ukrainian political no water.’221. Close-ups of scorched earth forces; and welcoming Russia through were used to show that the factory was no humanitarian aid stories and stories about longer functioning, and images of burned refugees. wheat fields were used to imply a dramatic hypothetical future. The next quote from The offensive military activities of the the factory worker was: ‘I have no idea who Ukrainian forces in the areas affected by is shooting at whom anymore. I’ve simply humanitarian catastrophe were emphasised stopped being afraid. If they shoot me, I’ll on both RT International and RT America. take it.’ They also reported on the destruction of cities and people going hungry. For example, on 22 August a news package from Luhansk 221 RT International, 22 August 2014 96 Moreover, in this analysed period several party Praviy Sektor (Правый сектор) was stories on Perviy Kanal were dedicated specifically mentioned222. Radicals from to propaganda from the Ukrainian side. other parts of the world also appeared on These stories were taken from a cluster RT’s agenda. Finally, a reoccurring theme of investigative reports that included in the news reports was the Ukrainian interviews with experts and examples of armed forces. Here the focus was on the misinformation. demoralisation of the Ukrainian forces, the lack of unity and clear command, as well as An analysis of the actors portrayed in the the lack of trust in the Ukrainian forces in the news stories demonstrates the lack of local community in all parts of the country. information about the pro-Russian militia forces; they appear only in those segments Self-defence forces went practically about ensuring safety. The main actors in the unmentioned on RT, with the exception of convoy story were Russia, the International a story where they were helping journalists Red Cross, Ukraine, and the USA. and demonstrated their readiness to create safe corridors through the conflict zone. On RT America devoted less airtime to the Perviy Kanal the self-defence forces received humanitarian convoy and to the crisis in little attention. They were only mentioned Ukraine in general. During the period of as a force helping the locals. analysis, news about the conflict in Ukraine was pushed out by the unrest in Ferguson, On Perviy Kanal news segments about the
ISIS, and Ebola. RT America first broadcast conflict contained several religion-based 5. a story about Ukraine appeared on 15 stories, such as the selection of the new August, reporting on the convoy stopping head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. On on the Ukrainian border. It was placed after RT religion was occasionally referred to in the segments on Ferguson and torture, 21 the background. minutes into the newscast. The convoy was For RT International counter-sanctions shown in wide-angle shots of the white were the first news item on 12 August, trucks on the background of a blue sky, with followed by additional material on Western the subtitle ‘Reached the border’. The short sanctions. The main emphasis was placed report on the convoy was followed by a news on the economic suffering in Europe and package concerning disinformation on social the substitution of imports from Europe and networks in relation to the crisis in Ukraine. US by products from new markets of Latin Social networking sites were criticised as America. Locals criticising the EU policy on unreliable sources of information and it was sanctions were interviewed in the streets also claimed that ‘some journalists’ cannot of Spain for the 15 August news. Other be trusted to provide proper evidence. countries mentioned were Poland, Latvia, Further in the programme the situation Greece, and several others. Sanctions were in the Eastern Ukraine was discussed, an important segment for Perviy Kanal as emphasising that some Western countries well. A significant number of the programmes had stated their intensions to take more analysed contained stories on sanctions. action against Russia. Another theme linked to the reports on the convoy and Ukraine was radicalisation, here the Ukrainian nationalist 222 RT International, 17 August 2014
97 RT International and RT America made a Non-verbal, emotional stories were used series of stories about detaining a Russian primarily at the top of the news. photographer. RT International placed this The theme of Ukraine as a failed state was story near the beginning of its programme actively presented by reports on: 1)political labelling it ‘breaking news’. For RT America events such as pseudo-parliamentarianism, this story was not important enough to air radical groups growing out of control, before the segment on Ferguson. Perviy oligarchy; 2) lack of order and trust at all Kanal did not make much of this event. levels—military, political, and societal; 3) Conclusions: Used communication lack of connection between Ukraine and tools and re-definition of agenda international organisations and accusations of Ukraine being in breach of international A wide tool-kit was used by both news agreements; 4) the Ukrainian government platforms at both verbal and non-verbal acting irresponsibly by exposing its people levels. The key tool for this particular case to economic and humanitarian suffering by study was the use of emotions. If in the case waging a war against its own people. These of MH-17 the technique of rationalisation topics were actualised and repeated in most was dominant, here we can observe a clear of the news programs on Perviy Kanal during transition to irrationality. the period analysed. On the verbal level, human-interest stories 5. were manipulated by linking them to a hypothetical future rationalised by the voices of experts. The main heroes in 5.3.2. RE-DEFINITION these stories were the ‘common people’. News stories were presented as pieces of OF EURO-ATLANTIC evidence reflecting the ongoing processes in the conflict area. Another storyline VALUES concerned the self-defence forces which The West is only passingly mentioned in the were not portrayed in a military context, but story about humanitarian aid. The main ‘glue’ rather in the context of humanitarian aid connecting the convoy story with the West by means of visual techniques and appeals is support for the Ukrainian state. However, to the emotions of the viewers through there is an indirect connection between the interviews with locals ‘in desperate need’ of values expressed in Ukraine and the values humanitarian aid223. expressed in Western countries that can be On the non-verbal level highly emotional detected in the stories about a homosexual images were used including tears, suffering Ukrainian politician or the dehumanisation children, and their lot during the conflict. of Ukrainian forces supported, or even RT used subtitles to stress the idea of insured, by the West. humanitarian catastrophe, e.g. ‘shell hell’, As previously discussed, these narratives implying that the Ukrainian forces were were constructed at the level of emotions. continuing to shell the affected areas. The key values under discussion are moral values, including human rights, religion, and tolerance. Ukraine was portrayed as a failed 223 16 August 2014
98 state from the political dimension. Sanctions DISORGANISATION VS. ORDER: managing were the main theme for the economic the order of news topics to compare dimension. The international dimension Ukraine unfavourably to Russia. AGENDA- was mainly addressed through in/out SETTING: selecting negative topics, ignoring groupings of the countries and international true plurality and creating a false or quasi- organisations engaging in various issues. plurality by cutting quotes from Ukrainian channels. Using the VOICE OF THE COMMON The political dimension MAN as evidence, discrediting the Ukrainian In general, the issues addressed to Russian- side and/or being supportive to Russian speaking and English-speaking international authorities. For example, one RT visual audiences are different, the same as it was in report shows text stating that ‘the people the case of MH-17. The analysis of the core have nothing to eat’ while inter-sound of values of democracy did not demonstrate bombing and on pictures a market is shown redefinition of the Western values in a direct (editing used at 6:55, onRT International, 22 way, but rather the Western responsibility August). And here is also the assessment of for the processes taking place ‘under the locals on Ukrainian authorities: cover of democratisation’. [TRANSLATION] “This crazy fool of First, the analysis of the political dimension ours says that all Russia is sending is a will focus on the tools used to redefine fig leaf. How come? 280 trucks are on the role of the state at the social, political, their way, and he calls it a ‘fig leaf’?”224 5. and military levels; second, we will analyse [TRANSLATION] “I am in favour of news coverage of the Ukrainian parliament; Poroshenko and his officers being and finally, given the RT’s strategic political recognised as war criminals.”225 communication concerning this particular question, media freedom will be examined (Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 20 August 2014) separately. Perviy Kanal showed Ukrainians engaged in Ukraine as a failed state anti-Kiev activism, e.g. the story of a mother trying to persuade President Poroshenko to As mentioned above, a number of narratives move forward on an investigation about the were devised and broadcast as ‘evidence’ death of her daughter. of Ukraine’s failure to act as a state; not fulfilling its social, economic, and political The rule of law was portrayed as either responsibilities towards its people. entirely lacking or dominated by criminals. Moreover, the Ukrainian government does This message was presented together with not even control its military forces, and the news about radical Right Sector activists. citizens in Eastern Ukraine were abandoned and forgotten. This message was promoted on RT and 224 In Russian: “Этот дурак наш долбанутый even more so on Perviy Kanal. How was this говорит, что все что Россия присылает – это фиговый done in terms of manipulative techniques? листочке. Как это так? Двести восемьдесят фур идет, а этот говорит «фиговый листочек»?” 225 In Russian: “Я за то, чтобы власть Порошенко и эго приставы были признаны военными преступниками.”
99 Statistics concerning casualties and Coverage of the Ukrainian armed forces refugees were used on both RT and Perviy on Perviy Kanal should be regarded as a Kanal by news anchors, correspondents, psychological operation. It consists of the locals, and authorities. Numbers were following messages: Ukrainian commanders provided to show loses sustained by the are abandoning their soldiers, detained Ukrainian military forces and civilians. RT Ukrainian soldiers are well-treated and used graphics to show a comparison to the quickly exchanged, the soldiers’ mothers total number of inhabitants in Donetsk226. and relatives are against their sons serving Statistics about refugees were used to in the Ukrainian armed forces, Ukrainian demonstrate the failure of Ukraine as a state soldiers are not ready to kill to fulfil the on highly emotional level, while other news orders of their commanders. Supporting stories showed gratitude to the supportive material included possibly faked interviews Russians. with soldiers, stories about soldiers’ mothers, babies without fathers, etc., which The offensive nature of the Ukrainian armed employed RATIONALISATION, EMOTIONS, forces was emphasised on RT and Perviy and HYPOTHETICAL FUTURE techniques, the Kanal through the words of correspondents, emotional opinions of locals, the cowardice captions, and locals providing testimonial of Ukrainian commanders based on evidence evidence. For example, on August 12, at the from locals and soldiers, and the supportive 7th minute of the news programme block 5. attitude of pro-Russian militia forcestoward on Ukraine, the caption ‘Endgame assault’ Ukrainian soldiers in captivity in a story appeared; another caption used by RT of successful captive release. There was was ‘Shell hell’. The Ukrainian forces were also a storyline suggesting that Ukrainian quoted as saying that this is ‘the final stage armed forces were breaking international of clearing Donetsk by bombing’. The video law by using prohibited munitions was showed dead bodies in the streets, destroyed visualised on-screen together with expert buildings, tears and children227. In another commentary. The question about munitions example the correspondent says: ‘Kiev calls used by Kiev was answered on RT with the this a large-scale anti-terrorism operation. subtitle ‘suspected incendiary bombing’. Anti-government fighters in the east said they were trying to liberate the region from RT focused on other narratives to remind occupiers. Yet, it is the civilians who are paying their viewers about ‘American military sins’. the highest price.228’ In another video an old The crimes of the US military were a popular local woman says through tears: ‘Dear God, topic on RT International, supported by when is this going to end? Why are people statistical data on sexual assaults, torture, being killed?’229. and so on230. In general, Ukraine was the main item on the agenda for Perviy Kanal. For RT International and RT America Ferguson unrest was at the top of the agenda.
226 RT International, 15 August 2014 227 RT International, 15 August 2014 228 RT International, 14 August 2014 229 RT International, 15 August 2014 230 RT International, 14 August 2014
100 Parliamentarian angle: electoral, liberal, Media freedom: Media literacy against and social chaos in Ukraine Ukraine and a missing photograph Focussing on certain political values helped The issues actualised for Russian-speaking communicate the message that the political and English-speaking audiences differed. system of Ukraine is out of control and unduly In short, RT emphasised the lack of influenced by external forces from the West. professionalism of the Western media, The electoral process and the legitimacy of e.g. spreading disinformation about a Ukrainian elite was mainly addressed on parallel military convoy, and Perviy Kanal Perviy Kanal. The following themes were created several full-length news packages actualised: a lack of parliamentarian culture, on Ukrainian propaganda, including one in offensive processes on liberal opposition, and a weekly programme. The last issue could be the lack of social responsibility on the part of regarded as part of a psychological operation the parliamentarians. The main concerned to provoke distrust in Ukrainian information out-of-control radicalism, oligarchs in power, sources. and lack of social responsibility and rule of law. The Parliament was portrayed as unable A common theme for both platforms was to solve problems and creating new ones the missing photographer. RT paid more due to its lack of professionalism. attention to this topic by popularising it with Internet hashtags. An emphasis on the dramatic situation in eastern Ukraine was used to portray Convoy in the Western media and a parallel 5. the Ukrainian Parliament not fulfilling its military convoy responsibilities towards the people. This If Perviy Kanal was paid little attention to was done through airing negative stories the information in the Western media, then about the Ukrainian armed forces, quoting for RT it was a key issue. On 13 August a experts from Kiev drawing a dramatic short story on the convoy subtitled ‘Russian hypothetical future legitimating the Russian convoy puts Ukraine in a difficult position’ assessment of the situation, and by showing pseudo-amateur videos about criminals and was followed by a segment on the reaction oligarchs coming to power. of the international media. The anchor said: ‘If the cargo is detained, then the Ukrainian The next issue to be addressed under this authorities will be accused of not caring for cluster of values is the lack of parliamentary the local people. The Wall Street Journal is culture in Ukraine, not only in terms of writing about it.’ These stories gave the sense verbal culture; both platforms showed of Kiev and the West being unsupportive to the infamous fist fights in the Ukrainian the people in need. Parliament. RT international broadcast the story on 14 August, and a very similar On 15 August a Perviy Kanal video was shown later on Perviy Kanal, but correspondent reported on the huge the quality was made less ‘professional’, interest of the international media reminiscent of an amateur video. On Perviy in the humanitarian aid convoy. Kanal the sense of never-ending fights was augmented by showing other fist fights in Rada, possibly taken from the news archives without a specific date.
101 In the same program there was a quote from The correspondent concluded that there The Times: was a problem with appropriate coverage of this topic in the Western media because the [TRANSLATION] “The Western countries information was being filtered in Kiev, which, are ignoring calls for help from the unlike Russia, was a party to the conflict. inhabitants of south-eastern Ukraine.”231 Ukrainian propaganda (Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 15 August 2014) Perviy Kanal examined the presence and The corresponded comments that: tools of Ukrainian and Western anti-Russian [TRANSLATION] “Not long ago leading propaganda. This was done primarily through European media outlets wrote almost the use of the VOICE OF AUTHORITY. Putin nothing about the tragedy of the reminded viewers about the role of the civilians in the Luhansk and Donetsk Western media in the information war: regions. But it becomes impossible [TRANSLATION] “The Ukrainian and to ignore the deaths of thousands Western media, especially in the US and of people, destroyed cities, and the the EU, have activated the information endless flow of refugees.”232 environment.”234 (Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 15 August 2014) (Voskresnoye Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 17
5. This statement was supported by a video August 2014) from the conflict zone. During the same program, an 11-minute The same technique was used to illustrate news package was dedicated to the an article from The Independent: ways propaganda is employed. EXPERTS commenting on a case study were used to [TRANSLATION] “If those in London, RATIONALIZE blame for propaganda. The Brussels, and Washington followed correspondent said: the developments in Luhansk or Donetsk regions as energetically as [TRANSLATION] “They want to they were following the crisis in the prevent viewers from applying critical Middle East, then neither hot nor cold thinking at all costs. They use strange confrontations with Russia would be video shots to influence the viewers happening now.”233 emotionally...”235 (Voskresnoye Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 17 231 In Russian: “Западные страны игнорируют August 2014) призывы жителей юго-востока Украины.” 232 In Russian: “Еще недавно ведущие европейские СМИ почти ничего не писали о трагедии мирного населения в Луганской и Донецкой областях. Но игнорировать гибель тысяч людей, разрушение городов и бесконечных колонн беженцев уже 234 In Russian: “Украинские и западные невозможно.” средства массовой информации, особенно США, 233 In Russian: “Если бы в Лондоне, Брюсселе, стран Евросоюза, активизируют информационное Вашингтоне так энергично следили бы за событиями пространство.” в Луганской и Донецкой областях как они следили, 235 In Russian: “У зрителей любой ценой хотят скажем, за кризисом на Ближнем Востоке, то ни отучить способность критически воспринимать холодного, ни горячего противостояния с Россией информацию. Странными кадрами воздействуя на сейчас бы не было.” эмоции.”
102 The opinion of an expert from V. Lomonosov’s (Voskresnoye Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 17 Moscow State University (MSU): August 2014) [TRANSLATION] “They show a picture Another voice of expertise, an author named that conveys not only some meaning, Shamir, says: but also particular values packed into [TRANSLATION] “Over the course the visual. That is why the influence of several years the media has of TV is so powerful – it is influencing been turned into an instrument of not only the mind, but also the mass manipulation. Waging war by subconscious.”236 proxy – bloody chaos in Iraq, Libya, (Voskresnoye Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 17 Afghanistan, and the civil war in Syria, and the collapse of the former August 2014) Yugoslavia – all of that speaks for Another expert, the Dean of the same itself… Our friends and loved ones University, continues within the same news in Ukraine, our relatives were also report: deceived, brought closer to the other side – this is something that was [TRANSLATION] “They are applying created externally and then blown the same techniques as before – out of proportion. One of their main this is part of the manipulation and goals is to set the people of Ukraine influencing of Ukrainian society. on Russia. A Russia, which has become
It contains specific messages: threats unyielding, powerful, and rich.”238 5. from neighbours, primarily Russia. In this sense it is an encitement (Voskresnoye Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 17 to nationalism and the transfer of August 2014) relationship management from The program provides advice on how to the rational to the emotional level. avoid becoming a victim of information Looking for an enemy, finding it, localising it, naming it, thus creating a warfare. The Dean of MSU goes on to say: ‘war of civilisations’ with this enemy.”237 [TRANSLATION] “…in this case the advisors are not taking into account the ancient ties that exist between Russia and Ukraine. They are not 236 In Russian: “…дают картинку, это не только taking into account many of our смыслы, это некие ценности, упакованные в виде картинки, и, собственно, потому воздействие common moments in history and телевидения такое сильное, что оно воздействует the particularities of our mentality. даже не сколько на уровне головы, сколько на уровне подсознание.” 237 In Russian: “Они отрабатывают те технологии, которые уже запущены, это просто часть 238 In Russian: “За несколько лет медиа тех технологий манипулирования и воздействия, с превратились в средства массовой манипуляции, вести одной стороны воздействия на население и общество войну чужими руками, кровавый хаос в Ираке, Ливии, украинское, с другой стороны – это такие вполне Афганистане, гражданская война в Сирии, ранее – конкретные месседжи, угрозы к соседям, в первую развал Югославии. Говорят сами за себя… Наши друзья очередь к России. В этом смысле разжигание вот и близкие на Украине, родные, тоже были таким образом такого национализма, это и есть перевод наших введены в заблуждение, уведены в другую сторону, это отношений из рационального в эмоциональный вещь, которая создается извне и раздувается, которая уровень. Поиск врага, нахождение, его локализация, приводится. И одна из ее главных целей – это натравить называние. И таким образом якобы происходит такая население Украины на Россию. Россию, которая стала цивилизованная борьба с этим врагом.” непокорной, стала сильной, стала богатой.”
103 It is impossible to repeat here what Stenin’s case: #freeandrew happened in Tahrir Square, or other RT revolutions of that sort... In this case created a story on Russian photojournalist the lack of consideration of the ancient Andrey Stenin, who went missing in eastern ties between Russia and Ukraine Ukraine at the beginning of August. Multi- demonstrates the absurdity of some media story telling techniques were applied or the majority of those stimuli, which by showing a flash mob and employing are thrown at the public.”239 hashtags. SputnikNews, another Russian government-controlled media outlet (Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 17 August 2014) targeting the international audience, was The reporter continues the topic by saying: also involved in the promotion242. [TRANSLATION] “All of this has a It is worth noting that the rally was held more powerful impact than the most by an anti-fascist organisation. This sophisticated techniques they use corresponds to the official Russian narrative to attempt to force Ukrainians and that the Euromaidan movement and the Russians into conflict with each other – new government in Kiev are fascists. The in essence, into a conflict against their rally took place in Serbia, a country that has own selves.”240 a special relationship with Russia. (Voskresnoye Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 17 This story of the missing photographer was 5. August 2014) supported by pre- and post- visualisations on RT, as well as an appeal to the international To illustrate the matter further, a short community. The core of the visualisation dialogue from the conflict area was aired consisted of photographs taken by Stenin or during the news on 20 August: of Stenin himself. The key image was of Stenin [TRANSLATION] “Which of Kiev’s with a half-naked toddler. Perviy Kanal also channels are you watching? - No, I don’t used this picture, but the toddler was cut out. watch, it is pure disinformation.”241 The reporting on RT and Perviy Kanal portrayed the Ukrainian government as irresponsible and deceptive, the message being that it is impossible to trust them. 239 In Russian: “... советчики в данном случае не However the Russian authorities were учитывают тех давних связей, которые есть между Россией и Украиной. Они не учитывают многих наших shown as having a high level of involvement исторических моментов. И не учитывают особенности through the following quote: менталитета. У нас же невозможно повторить то, что было на площади Тахрир, или там другие были [TRANSLATION] “Lavrov immediately соответствующие революции… В данном случае недочет вот этих давних связей между Россией и demanded clarification of the fate of Украиной показывает абсурдность некоторых простых, the journalist…”243 или большей части тех стимулов, просто которые подбрасываются.” (Perviy Kanal, 14 August 2014) 240 In Russian: “Все это работает сильнее самых изощренных технологий, с помощью которых хотят столкнуть украинцев и русских, по сути дела столкнуть нас с самими же собой.” 242 https://twitter.com/SputnikInt/sta- 241 In Russian: “А ты какие киевские каналы tus/502840172531027969 смотришь? - Нет, не смотрю, это дезинформация 243 In Russian: “Лавров немедленно потребовал полнейшая.” прояснить судьбу...”
104 The Economic Dimension RATIONALISATION through the OPINIONS OF EXPERTS—businessmen and politicians. The following economic issues are addressed For example, a Ukrainian expert asked: in this subsection—sanctions against Russia in Ukraine, the Russian counter-sanctions, [TRANSLATION] “…what can they negative economic prospects for Kiev, and replace it with? Only with their mental oligarchs ruling Ukraine. energy, generated from hate towards Russia.”246 Ukrainian sanctions against Russia (Voskresnoye Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 18 On 13 August the Perviy Kanal reported August 2014) on the Ukrainian sanctions against Russia, interpreting them as a violation of democratic Counter sanctions: undermining the principles and business rights. Journalists Western world. and experts were engaged in discussion: A large number of stories on Perviy Kanal [TRANSLATION] “…who forced the pro- were devoted to the Russian food embargo European government to create such (counter-sanctions). In the correspondent’s a piece of legislation contradicting the words, supported by EXPERT VOICES, the core values of democracy? Ukrainian ‘war of sanctions’ would opens new markets political circles are trying to respond to for Russian producers in Russia and abroad. this question. Expert: I think that there Importantly, the US was portrayed initiating
is one goal – since the current power in the sanctions against Russia (EXPERT 5. Ukraine is weak, and they cannot solve VOICES). Graphs were used to show that the their tasks in a completely legal way, US would not lose much from the counter they just tighten the screws.”244 sanctions, but the EU would. The campaign distributing apples in Poland was called (Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 13 August 2014) ‘hysteria on an international scale’247. The Another expert in the same report news reporters attempted to prove that the reinforced the narrative saying ‘it is a coming economic situation in the US is at the core dictatorship’245. of the conflict in Ukraine, making the war profitable for the US. Moreover, facilitating The main point conveyed through the the conflict was portrayed as the only way news reports was that the sanctions would the US could survive financially. Russian work against Ukrainians, not Russians. Member of Parliament and leader of the The main was appeals were made to the Communist Party, G. Zyuganov said: energy sector, applying the technique of [TRANSLATION] “Today the US has a huge debt – 15 trillion USD. It is 244 In Russian: “…что подтолкнуло про- almost impossible to manage without европейский кабинет министров к созданию такого, getting involved in war or seizing нарушающего основные демократические ценности, законопроекта, вопрос, на который сейчас пытаются new markets. Therefore, Americans ответить в политических кругах Украины. Эксперт: я думаю, что цель одна - поскольку реальная власть слаба, поскольку она не может абсолютно законным путем решать свои задачи, оставляют для себя 246 In Russian: “...чем заменят? Ну, разве что единственный путь – закручивать гайки.” психической энергией ненависти к России.” 245 Perviy Kanal, Vremya, 13 August 2014 247 Perviy Kanal, 17 August 2014
105 have set a goal of conquering the are widely used by the population of European market at any cost, in order the Russian Federation, do not rise.”250 to create a rift between Russia and (Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 17 August Europe. The situation in Ukraine is very 2014) convenient for that. Commanders with their policies and military leaders are The Economy in Kiev carrying out special operations in the First, a negative perspective was drawn by southeast, recklessly bombing their interviewing locals—the RATIONALIZATION own cities to contribute to this rift.”248 technique. Second, a NEGATIVE (Perviy Kanal, Voskresnoye Vremya, 17 HYPOTHETICAL FUTURE was created, one August 2014) of the main techniques applied, through appeals to fear. For example, locals were During Zyuganov’s intervention, a close-up recorded saying ‘we are fu**ed251’. of Putin was shown, followed by a long-shot at the mention of the US debt and before The situation in eastern Ukraine was the mention of war. described as a humanitarian catastrophe due to the Kievan government’s lack of Perviy Kanal also attempted to discredit the responsibility, but although Russia was impact of the Western sanctions by using is facing economic difficulties due to the
5. various statistics and public opinion surveys sanctions, it was nevertheless ready to to show that this action was pointless. provide humanitarian aid to locals and Perviy Kanal mentioned twice that 92% of refugees. inhabitants of Russia asserted that they did not feel the influence of sanctions. Consumer Moral dimension rights are under control: ‘As we ate, we are Perviy Kanal appealed to moral values more eating now.249’ Changes in the produce prices than the RT. The background information were addressed; some prices went down to the humanitarian convoy story focussed and price monitoring increased: on moral values such as solidarity and [TRANSLATION] “If the prices of oysters Christianity, addressing different societal will increase tenfold, we will endure groups, while the Ukrainian side was this unpleasantry. We need to ensure dehumanised. that the prices on those goods, which Solidarity Solidarity is mainly addressed through
248 In Russian: “Соединенные штаты Америки demonstrating the firm Russian solidarity сегодня имеют колоссальный долг, 15 триллионов (directly) and the lack of Western solidarity долларов США, его переварить или пережить (indirectly) by providing the voice of хотя бы без средней руки войны или захвата чужих рынков практически невозможно. Поэтому поставили американцы задачу любой ценой захватить европейский рынок для того чтобы прокопать ров между Россией и Европой, очень удобна ситуация на 250 In Russian: “Если цены на устрицу вырастут Украине. Есть начальники, их политики, их военные в десять раз, то неприятность эту мы переживем, командовали спецоперацией на Юго-Востоке, для нас нужно чтобы не выросли те товары, которые бесшабашно бомбят свои собственные города, потребуются населению Российской Федерации.” прокапывая этот ров.” 251 In Russian: “а вообще капец”, Vremya, Perviy 249 In Russian: “Как ели так и едим” Kanal, 19 August 2014.
106 expertise and evidence. The news reports scale of the catastrophe.”254 stated that the only helping side for the (Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 14 August 2014) people in need is Russia. Many locals were shown asking for help or being thankful The last words of this quote are illustrated for receiving help (the COMMON MAN with a close-up of an article with the title: technique). A separatist authority said that ‘Common Grief’. This issue was mainly ‘Russian aid was as necessary as oxygen’ for covered through human-interest stories, the local people. This message was repeated without any analysis of the economic twice—once on a weekday and once during impact. Human-interest stories are the Sunday programme. (Perviy Kanal, 17 visualized in an emotional manner—an August) Ordinary people are portrayed as interview with a woman from Saratov highly supportive of Russia’s actions. For holding a baby in her hands and later scenes example, drivers are not worried about of the baby playing with a kitten; another the traffic jam that the humanitarian aid protagonist in the same story sits at a table trucks are creating. One truck driver is displaying a religious icon, although atable quoted as saying that ‘we are being morally is an unusual place for displaying icons. supported’252. Later, local people are quoted expressing words of appreciation for Russia: The next aspect of solidarity is the attitude towards refugees. Different numbers [TRANSLATION] “Thank you, Russia, for reflecting the amount of refugees is given. On this support. We thank the nation that 5. 14 August Perviy Kanal gave an estimate of is supporting us.”255 733,000 people. The TV anchor said that locals It is important to note that both ordinary accommodated the majority of refugees and people and also government organisations approximately 500 people were located in provided assistance. A story was aired on a tent-city in Rostov, Russia. Numbers were 12 and 13 August concerning the assistance provided showing that 66 regions of Russia provided by the special units of the Russian were receiving refugee, and placing them was Ministry of Emergency Situations to help highlighted as a top priority for the state253. refugees with their baggage. The Chairman of the President’s Council for Religion and the Church Human Rights of the Russian Federation said: The case study concerning the humanitarian [TRANSLATION] “We cannot divide the convoy is the only one that places a strong responsibilities of state and society; it emphasis on religion. The topic of religion is is our common task, defined not only by our morality, because helping those in need is the moral obligation of every normal human being, but also by the 254 In Russian: “Мы не можем разделять ответственность, которая лежит на государстве и на гражданском обществе. Это наша общая задача, это определяется не только нашей моралью, потому, что помочь тому, kто нуждается в помощи – это моральный долг каждого нормального человека, это определяется еще масштабами беды.” 252 In Russian: “морально нас поддерживают”, 255 In Russian: “Спасибо России за эту (Perviy Kanal, Vremya, 12 August 2014 поддержку, спасибо народу, который нас 253 Perviy Kanal, 14 August 2014 поддерживает.”
107 covered in the stories directly, in the reports in Ukraine, since around 60 Russian orthodox on the humanitarian convoy and also in the priests had experienced similar abuse. The background stories about Ukraine. visualisation surrounding this news package contained churches burning as a result of Perviy Kanal exhibited the greatest use of shelling by the Ukrainian armed forces258. In religious symbols appealing to holiness. On the videos of the burning churches no dates RT references to religion could be found on or places were mentioned. both the verbal and non-verbal levels, e.g. in captions likeShell Hell, through mentioning Religious icons were shown displayed in the God in the interviews with locals, and by new homes of the refugees. For example in showing sacred religious items. Both channels the aforementioned video from 14 August, used some of the same video footage, e.g. where an icon was shown placed on the one showing a church on fire as the last table, one could spot cards and other table shot before the showing the convoy on the games under the same table. Russian-Ukrainian boarder256. On Perviy Kanal One piece shown on Perviy Kanal consisted the same picture was shown few days earlier. of an amateur interview, as if taken from Another commonly shown image was that the Internet, without showing the faces of an icon under the front window of an aid of the interviewees, giving any reference truck. Perviy Kanal even once showed two to place or date, or providing a link where 257 5. identical holy icons under one window . It it might be found online. The video stated is unusual to place two identical pictures of that the Ukrainian side was not following the a saint next to each other. religious calendar during this conflict. The correspondent said: Perviy Kanal aired the following news stories, linking them indirectly to the humanitarian [TRANSLATION] “Yesterday was the convoy—a story about the new Ukrainian Transfiguration of Jesus [Apple Spas], Orthodox Patriarch and the problems in the but in residential districts shots were church including the reaction of Russian being fired no matter what. Today is Patriarch Kiril, as well as the violence of Apple Spas but they are shooting on radicals during a religious service in Ukraine. this festive day.”259 These stories portrayed conflict between the (Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 20 August 2014) orthodox churches of Russia and Ukraine. Tolerance In addition Perviy Kanal reported a story filmed by several cameras including that On Perviy Kanal intolerance of homosexual of a journalist who provided the video for people was expressed in the context of www.borova.org, in which the protagonists Ukrainian political power. In the background were radical activists who attacked a Russian of the report on the humanitarian aid orthodox priest. The journalist claimed that convoy, a story on the Ukrainian Parliament such scenes had become a common practice
258 Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 16 August 2014 259 In Russian: “Накануне был яблочный спас, но 256 Newscast at 4:53, RT International. 21 August обстрели жилых кварталов продолжались несмотря 2014 ни на что. Сегодня же яблочный спас – они в 257 Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 12 August 2014 праздники стреляют.”
108 contained an analysis of the Members The main narratives used by RT were on of Parliament. A correspondent and an the use of prohibited weapons and the lack expert discussed the sexual identity of one of security for civilians. For example, on politician. The former TV anchor of Perviy 15 August RT reported on Kiev’s strategy Kanal, Mr. Dorenko, was the expert. He said: – to separate off parts of Eastern Ukraine. This information was provided without [TRANSLATION] “This is the game any links to quotes or naming sources. ‘It where Ljashko was needed, half- makes the situation really difficult from minded with an undoubtedly the humanitarian point of view’, said the complicated reputation, ambiguous, correspondent261. He pointed out that as at the same time an ardent [spending a result, RT has not been able to cover the several seconds searching for the recent situation, because it has become too word] muzhelozhec [bugger], an dangerous. inspired muzhelozhec.”260 How was the US linked to a ‘dehumanised (Voskresnoye Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 17 Kiev’? On 15 August RT depicted the US State August). Department’s reaction through commentary Muzhelozhestvo was an offence under the paired with captions ‘Dozens killed in army Criminal Law during the Soviet Era, when bombing’ and ‘We are generally supportive homosexuals were persecuted and treated of Kiev’s actions.’ However, it is also noted as criminals. RT did not report on this and that Washington tried to influence the 5. did not emphasise Russia’s attitude on this situation to avoid civilian deaths262. issue. The methods of depicting the offensive The Dehumanisation of Ukraine and the stance of Kiev: West—Kiev and Washington • Civilian targets. Stand-up on cemetery For RT the main issue during the analysed after attacks. A journalist reports on a period was not Ukraine, but Ferguson. house being destroyed near a school. He says: ‘Safety is not the only thing missing However, the de-moralisation of the in Luhansk’, referring to the lack of clean Ukrainian side was a significant enough water263. theme on RT. It was depicted through the words and emotions of journalists, the use • Stating the need for practically of stand-ups, interviews with locals, and everything. The news report selected videos. Journalists made emotional emphasized that although locals are statements rife with descriptors and non- not leaving, the authorities are not verbal communication, and then used providing enough humanitarian aid264. statistics and references to the OSCE to rationalise them.
261 RT International, 15 August 2014 260 In Russian: “Вот эта вот игра, где нужен был Ляшко, полоумный, с безусловной очень сложной 262 6:05, RT International, 2014 репутацией, двусмысленной, тем не менее яростный 263 RT International, 14 August, 2014 мужеложец, вдохновенный мужеложец.” 264 RT International, 14 August, 2014
109 • Aggressive Kiev versus peaceful Russia. After the first humanitarian aid convoy 5. Putin is shown in Crimea giving a speech crossed the border, the storyline changed while the RT correspondent comments and became more aggressive, accusing the that Russian foreign policy is peaceful Ukrainian side of changing the rules, wanting and Russia will not become a fortress or to delay the delivery of aid, sabotaging the break ties with its partners, but should convoy, violating international law, and being not stand by and let others patronise265. unwilling to trust international organisations such as the Red Cross. In addition, the The International Dimension Ukrainians were accused of intensifying International agreements military activity near the destination of the convoy. On 16 August RT used a caption Before the humanitarian aid convoy entered for its news report stating: ‘Russia said Ukraine, RT and Perviy Kanal reported on the Kiev purposely stalling the aid convoy convoy as an activity demonstrating Russia’s under flimsy pretence.’ RT also questioned readiness to negotiate with the Ukrainian whether Ukrainian side was ready to ensure authorities and provide aid to those in need. the security of the convoy on its territory266. This message was supported by quotes from the Russian and Ukrainian authorities. Pro- Perviy Kanal used international experts Russian militia forces were also shown as to discuss the international dimension willing to ensure the safety of the convoy of the humanitarian aid convoy. and the civilians.
265 RT International, 14 August, 2014 266 RT, 17 August 2014
110 5.
111 The opinion of American author and British commentator Charles Shoebridge journalist Paul Craig Roberts was used was used as an expert on RT International. following the news story on convoy: The same stories using almost the same visual material appeared on Perviy Kanal as [TRANSLATION] “Resistance from well, but a local expert was used instead of the Washington and its vassals and international to legitimize the accusation. marionettes in Europe and Kyiv against the delivery of humanitarian International organisations as significant actors aid for south-eastern Ukraine can be explained as a desperate effort by The International Red Cross was the the West not to keep the world from organisation most frequently mentioned understanding that it is Washington in the context of the first humanitarian aid and its marionettes killing peaceful convoy, affirming the legitimacy of the entire civilians, destroying houses, and other affair. Among others were the OSCE, the infrastructure in the former Russian UN, NATO, and even the European Court on territories.”267 Human Rights. In general, it was NATO and the ECHR that were criticized for the roles (Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 14 August) they played. Western attitudes toward international The first humanitarian aid convoy was agreements: background news legitimized by showing the symbols of 5. the International Red Cross and their Perviy Kanal reported that although some representatives, as well as by mentioning this international agreements are not in the organization in interviews with authorities interests of Russia, Russia complies with and experts. Naming the Red Cross seemed them. The US, however, was presented as to legitimize the entry of the convoy into the a country that breaks international law. The Ukrainian territory. missile defence system was used as the key illustration268. NATO Violation of International law RT and Perviy Kanal both presented NATO as incompetent source of information On 17 August 2014, RT Internationalreported and producer of disinformation. An RT that the Ukrainian armed forces were using correspondent said: ‘We also heard the ballistic missiles in the conflict. Close ups NATO chief saying that the alliance had and graphics of Soviet Era weapons were observed a Russian incursion into Ukraine shown under the heading ‘Report: Ukrainian military fired ballistic missiles at Luhansk’. [...] So far none of this these claims have been supported by any solid evidence.269’ On 23 August a person presented as a
267 In Russian: “Сопротивление предоставлению military analyst commented that if Russia гуманитарной помощи юго-востоку Украины со really had perpetrated a military invasion, стороны Вашингтона и его вассалов в Евросоюзе, then NATO must present proof. A second вашингтонских марионеток в Киеве объясняется отчаянными попытками Запада не допустить того, expert repeated the same idea and the чтобы мир понял, что именно Вашингтон и его opinion of a third expert was broadcast марионетки убивают мирных граждан, уничтожают дома и другую инфраструктуру на бывших российских территориях.” 268 Voskresnoye Vremya, Perviy Kanal, August 17 2014 269 RT America, 15 August 2014
112 with the caption ‘Invading Ukraine would be Putin agreed with this evaluation of EHRC, suicidal for Russia’. and said: If NATO was portrayed as an unsuitable [TRANSLATION] “Many of the decisions source on RT, then on Perviy Kanal NATO was it makes are politicised and far from framed as a threat. The VOICE OF AUTHORITY the original purpose of this court. It used to legitimate this version was President does not regulate legal relationships Putin, with other state authorities creating or protect rights. It merely fulfils some the background for his speech in Crimea. kind of a political function.”272 From the point of view of filming technique, (Voskresnoye Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 17 Putin was shown focusing his gaze on the August 2014) TV camera, the viewers, instead of on the Ministers present270. The European Union The European Court of Human Rights The EU was mentioned mostly in the context of sanctions, and as blindly supporting According to Perviy Kanal, the European the official Kiev version of events. The EU Court of Human Rights is politicised and was described as not understanding the biased. The ECHR was mentioned during a situation in Ukraine. Talks in Brussels on the news story regarding Putin’s visit to Crimea, humanitarian situation were presented with shown on 17 August. Chairman of the the following words of a journalist: Russian Duma Committee on Family, Women and Children’s Affairs Yelena Mizulina said: [TRANSLATION] “Only Kiev still does not see a humanitarian catastrophe, 5. [TRANSLATION] “It is fair to say that despite the fact that some European today the European Court of Human politicians have started using this Rights is not a symbol of justice. It expression in their comments on the has become an instrument of political subject of Ukraine, when the foreign pressure on Russia. Moreover, through ministers discussed the situation in its decisions, the court has become Brussels.”273 a channel of interference in Russia’s internal affairs.”271 (Voskresnoje Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 17 August 2014) (Voskresnoye Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 17 August 2014) The reporters emphasised a potential rift in Europe regarding the evaluation of the situation in Ukraine.
272 In Russian: “Он многие решения принимает очень политизированные и далекие от того, для чего 270 Voskresnoye Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 17 August он создавался, он не регулирует правовые отношения, 2014 и не защищает никакие права, просто исполняет 271 In Russian: “Следует честно признать, что какую-то политическую функцию.” сегодня Европейский суд по правам человека не 273 In Russian: “Только Киев до сих пор не видит является символом справедливости, он превратился гуманитарной катастрофы, хотя даже Европейские в превентивное орудие политического давления на политики начали произносить это словосочетание в Россию, более того, это канал вмешательства во своих комментариях на тему Украины, о ней в Брюсселе внутренние дела России через судебные решения.” говорили главы внешнеполитических ведомств.”
113 The OSCE appendix provides a detailed analysis of the visual components of selected news The OSCE was referenced on both platforms programs indicating the length of time an in multiple stories—in connection with emotional image was shown as a percentage ensuring safety for the humanitarian convoy, of the total length of the programme. Images the humanitarian situation in eastern Ukraine, used include destroyed buildings, children, and in associated background stories, such death, military munitions, tears, fire, and as the exchange of captured soldiers274. others. Overall, the OSCE is treated as an authority legitimising Russian action, as in the story The key messages on the newscasts’ agenda rebuking the claim that the humanitarian during the period analysed were: offensive convoy was actually a military convoy275. Ukraine, the humanitarian catastrophe, Russia’s readiness to help, Ukraine as a failed The UN state, the demoralisation of the Ukrainian Both RT and Perviy Kanal referred to the military forces, the dehumanisation of UN to legitimize the assessment of the Ukrainian political forces, the legitimacy humanitarian situation in Ukraine, critical of of counter sanctions, and attacks on the the government, and to provide statistics of Russian Orthodox Church. the dead and injured. The video materials used by both RT and Summary Perviy Kanal were taken from YouTube, often
5. without specifying a source. RT did a better This chapter examines the communication job with providing the names of the YouTube practices used in covering the issue of the accounts. first humanitarian aid convoy from Russia to Eastern Ukraine and the background Other manipulative techniques used were: created around this issue. This event was • Supporting the opinion/evidence of pre-planned and fully controlled, showing journalists or experts/authorities cooperation between the two platforms and the use of different techniques and tools to • Manipulating audio-visual materials— legitimize Russia’s position. editing the sound from an ‘amateur video’ before it is broadcast The verbal and visual techniques appeal directly to viewers’ emotions, particularly • Imitating amateur videos by means of fear and empathy for those suffering, devices such as cameraman narration evoking both sorrow and aggression. These, and hand-held style—vertical filming, mainly irrational, emotional elements poor focus, sharp movements encourage the perception of Russia—the Russian people, the Russian authorities, and • Promoting the second screen— the Orthodox Church—as morally superior, propaganda channels established to and to the demoralisation of the Ukrainian report on events in the region government, the Ukrainian president, particular Ukrainian politicians, the Ukrainian It should be noted that since Russian armed forces, and their Western allies. The television was banned in Ukraine, special Internet channels were established and popularized through traditional media.
274 Perviy Kanal, 15 August 2014 275 RT International, 18 August 2014
114 5.3.3 REDEFINITION OF EURO-ATLANTIC VALUES: USED NARRATIVES IN THE CASE OF THE FIRST HUMANITARIAN AID CONVOY Messages for Redefined Messages for Manipulative Values Russian-speaking values Western audiences techniques audiences POLITICAL VALUES The role of Ukraine as a The Ukrainian The Ukrainian government COMMON MAN (as state failed state government does does not fulfil its social, the main source of not fulfil its social, economic, or political information) economic, or political responsibilities towards its responsibilities towards citizens AUTHORITIES its citizens LABELLING Ukraine does not control Ukraine does not control its military forces. The its military forces. The IN-OUT GROUPING citizens in the Eastern citizens in the Eastern MORAL SUPERIORITY Ukraine are abandoned Ukraine are abandoned OF RUSSIA and forgotten, and have and forgotten, and have suffered many casualties suffered many casualties COMPARING Chaos vs. order: Chaos vs. order: DIFFERENCES (with comparing the situations comparing the situations Russia) in Ukraine and Russia in Ukraine and Russia COMPARING Discrediting the Discrediting the Ukrainian SIMILARITIES (with 5. Ukrainian side and/ side and/or being the West) or being supportive to supportive to Russian STATISTICS Russian authorities authorities Numbers show losses Numbers show losses of military forces and of military forces and civilians civilians The Ukrainian state is The Ukrainian state is unable to deal with the unable to deal with the refugees, its actions only refugees, its actions only encourage civilians to encourage civilians to flee flee The offensive nature of The offensive nature of the Ukrainian Armed the Ukrainian Armed forces emphasised forces emphasised Ukrainian commanders are leaving their soldiers; detained Ukrainian soldiers are treated well and are quickly exchanged; mothers and relatives are against their sons serving in the Ukrainian armed forces; soldiers are not ready to kill and fulfil orders of superiors
115 Messages Redefined Messages for Russian- Manipulative Values for Western values speaking audiences techniques audiences Electoral, liberal, The political system of COMMON MAN (as and social chaos Ukraine is under control the the main source of in Ukraine of Western external forces information) Lack of parliamentarian AUTHORITIES culture in Ukraine LABELLING Liberal offensive in Ukraine IN-OUT GROUPING Ukrainian Parliament is not fulfilling its responsibilities MORAL SUPERIORITY towards its people, it is not OF RUSSIA providing necessary support COMPARING Lack of social responsibility DIFFERENCES (with of parliamentarians Russia) Radicalism is out of control, COMPARING oligarchy is in power SIMILARITIES (with the West) The Parliament is not solving problems STATISTICS
5. Political Ukrainians do The level of political COMMON MAN (as participation not support participation of Ukrainians the main source of Kiev’s elite who don’t support Kiev information) AUTHORITIES LABELLING Rule of law Non-existent Non-existent or Non-existent or dominated EXPERTISE or dominated dominated by the by the ‘law of criminals’ by the ‘law of ‘law of criminals’ LABELLING criminals’ UNIFICATION Media Western and Lack of Several full news-packages, EXPERTISE (voice of freedom Ukrainian professionalism including one in a weekly academic experts, media are in the Western program, on Ukrainian journalists, field unprofessional media: propaganda experts) and dishonest disinformation The Ukrainian and Western VOICE OF AUTHORITY about a parallel media are conducting a (including Putin) military convoy campaign against Russia EVALUATION (of local The Western governments power on a missing are using mass media to photographer case) influence Ukrainian society INSTRUCTING (how and to threaten Russia. to assess information, One of the main goals of where to get the Western media is to information) turn the people of Ukraine SIMPLIFICATION (the against Russia. Ukrainian media lie, The Western media wish Russian media do not) to force Ukrainians and TRANSFERENCE Russians into conflict
116 Messages Redefined Messages for Russian- Manipulative Values for Western values speaking audiences techniques audiences ECONOMIC VALUES Economic Quotes from If the cargo is detained, COMPARING solidarity Western media in then the Ukrainian DIFFERENCES support of Russian authorities will be accused (Russian/Western propaganda about of not caring for the local economy/US) the humanitarian people (The Wall Street convoy Journal) AUTHORITY Western countries are COMMON MAN/ ignoring the calls for help ROLE MODEL from the inhabitants of (integrity) south-eastern Ukraine (The SOLIDARITY Times) Damaged houses and broken windows, you can feel how difficult it will be for Kiev to regain trust (CNN) Ukrainian Ukraine is a dictatorship, Sanctions against violating the values of
Russia are illegal democracy 5. Violation of business rights by Ukraine Counter sanctions Russia is opening markets to are splitting the internal trade Western world Russia is accessing new foreign markets Europe is suffering from counter sanctions, changing focus Latvia to Greece The US will not suffer from counter-sanctions, but the EU will Western countries selling poor-quality food to Russia Humanitarian Lack of responsibility for catastrophe Ukrainians in Kiev MORAL VALUES Tolerance Intolerance to Intolerance to homosexuals AUTHORITY homosexuality expressed in the context of Ukrainian political power and a certain parliamentarian
117 Messages Redefined Messages for Russian- Manipulative Values for Western values speaking audiences techniques audiences MORAL VALUES Solidarity Russian solidarity The only Russia is helping COMPARING and the lack of DIFFERENCES Western solidarity Russia is morally supporting the people of east Ukraine ROLE MODEL Superiority of The majority of refugees COMMON MAN Russia in attitudes were accommodated by the (locals in the towards refugees local Russian people region, Ukrainian 66 regions of Russia are refugees, Russian receiving refugees, and people) placing them is top priority SIMPLIFICATION Common grief Refugees are thanking Russia for its support EVALUATION Assistance is provided not REPETITION only by ordinary Russians, SILENCE (not a but also by different word of Ukrainian organisations support for Morality Religion is directly Verbal and non- Churches on fire—the eastern Ukraine) 5. connected with verbal religious last image shown before the convoy messages: captions the video about the STATISTICS such as Shell humanitarian convoy on the LABELLING Hell, God is often Russian-Ukrainian boarder. mentioned, sacred Later the survival of the IN-OUT items such as icons burning church is deemed a GROUPING and are shown in miracle TESTIMONIALS the videos Icon(s) under the windshields of the convoy trucks The Pope performing a sacred ritual Violence of Ukrainian radicals during the religious mass used to portray conflict between the Orthodox Churches of Russia and Ukraine Icons are placed in the homes of the locals
118 Redefined Messages for Messages for Russian- Manipulative Values values Western audiences speaking audiences techniques MORAL VALUES Humanism Dehumanisation Ferguson—the face of AUTHORITY of Ukraine and the the US government West THE VOICE OF Prohibited weapons EXPERT used by the Ukrainian side; lack of civilian security US State Department commentary on Ukraine paired with captions: ‘Dozens killed in army bombing’; ‘We are generally supportive of Kiev’s actions’ Civilian targets shown as destroyed People are shown in need of everything
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION 5.
International Ukraine violates Russia’s readiness to Russia’s readiness to aid LABELLING agreements international aid negotiations and negotiations and send agreements; send humanitarian aid humanitarian aid TESTIMONIALS Russia ready to aid EXPERTISE negotiations Ukrainians are Ukrainians are changing the SILENCE changing the rules, rules, violating international UNIFICATION violating international law, and sabotaging the law, and sabotaging prospect of aid; do not trust IN-OUT the prospect of aid; do international organisations GROUPING not trust international AUTHORITIES organisations Washington and its marionettes are killing civilians, destroying houses, and other infrastructure in former Russian territories of eastern Ukraine The West does Some international not comply with agreements are not in the international interests of Russia, but agreements Russia complies with them US behaviour in the international arena is an example of how international law is broken.
119 Redefined Messages for Messages for Russian- Manipulative Values values Western audiences speaking audiences techniques INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION
International Ukraine is violating Ballistic missiles are AUTHORITY law international law used by the Ukrainian armed forces in eastern VOICE OF Ukraine EXPERTS STATISTICS The trust and NATO and NATO is not an reliable Two organisations were reliability of the ECHR are source of information; criticised – NATO and the international not reliable it produces European Court of Human organisations organisations disinformation Rights The European Court for Human Rights is politicised and biased NATO is a threat Cooperation with Cooperation with the the International International Red Cross Red Cross legitimizes Russia’s actions legitimizes Russia’s actions
5. The EU is an The EU is an does not incompetent understand the situation in organisation Ukraine The OSCE Representatives of the The Russian Ministry of is a reliable OSCE give evidence Foreign affairs supports the organisation about the situation statements of the OSCE in east Ukraine which coincides with the Russian position The UN is The UN is used to The UN is used to legitimate a reliable legitimate statistics statistics concerning the organisation concerning the dead dead and injured and the and injured and the humanitarian crisis in humanitarian crisis in Ukraine Ukraine
120 MEDIA ANALYSIS: CASE STUDIES
The Minsk II Agreement 5.4.
On 11 February, the so-called Normandy Four met in Minsk to negotiate ending the 5.4.1. COMMUNICATION conflict in Ukraine. The so-called Minsk II Agreement was negotiated between the
TOOLS USED AND 5. leaders of France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine, as well as a group that included the REDEFINITION OF representatives of the s eparatist territories of Ukraine. While many remained critical, AGENDA the agreement was understood to be a successful step forward towards lasting Analysis of this event shows the different peace in Eastern Ukraine at the time. strategies used by RT and Perviy Kanal. The In addition to researching RT and Perviy main difference lies in the narratives. Three Kanal, this case study includes an analysis of main narratives appeared on the agenda, which the Sputnik audio-visual platform in English. were common to both RT and Perviy Kanal: Dates for the analysis were 11 February – 17 • blaming Ukraine for aggression in the February 2014. armed conflict • praising the success of Russian diplomacy • portraying Ukraine as the looser and the side violating the agreement One unique element, mainly used by RT, in this particular case study was the use if INFOTAINMENT to present the desired narrative.
121 Both platforms appealed to the rationality Affairs Committee K. Kosachev provided and irrationality of their audiences. Irrational commentary from the Russian side. One of appeals were based on emotions, ranging the key messages on RT was the assessment from stories evoking fear and anger to those that relations between Putin and Obama highlighting positive details about the Minsk were ‘pretty cold’276, even though Obama did II Agreement. Rational appeals were based not participate in the Minsk II negotiations. on reflecting the views of the experts, namely The relations between the US and Russia that Ukraine had violated and would continue were narrowed to the relations between to undermine any agreement, whereas the two leaders. On 12 February, the Minsk Russia was doing everything possible to process was the main news headline. Putin ensure that an agreement could be reached was positioned as the main voice or most and implemented. RT used music, graphics, important leader in the peace process. and numerous repetitions of humorous On 11–12 February, Perviy Kanal started its videos showing Lukashenko nearly pulling evening news program with a story about the chair from under Putin by accident and the Minsk II agreement, calling the conflict journalists sleeping in the pressroom (also in Ukraine a ‘slaughter’ (бойня). The report on Perviy Kanal) to provoke light-hearted, was framed so as to create the impression positive emotions. Perviy Kanal was less that the political leaders had come together oriented toward entertainment. in Minsk with the sincere intention to stop 5. The composition of news programmes the violence in Ukraine, or, more precisely, as a tool of strategic political to stop the violent Ukrainian government. communication For example, during the news report, a correspondent from the TV channel Rossija The importance of the news is measured was shown addressing the President in according to its PLACEMENT in the Minsk: ‘Mr. Poroshenko, why are your forces programme. This strategy is widely used bombing peaceful civilians?277’ to increase or decrease the seeming importance/relevance of a subject. On 11 Following the story on the Minsk process, February, the RT International first showed an editorial segment provided further a short news story on Ukraine followed by a corroboration of the intransigence of the block of news from Minsk. Ukrainian side. An opinion poll, specifically presented as containing data from various Both platforms portrayed the summit in parts of Ukraine, legitimized the previously Minsk as the last effort to bring peace to the expressed view that the Ukrainian region. A hypothetical negative future was government should be ‘brought to its drawn, portraying it in as even more negative senses’278. way than the actual reality. Methods similar to those described in the case study of During the remaining days monitored on the first humanitarian convoy were used: Perviy Kanal, reports concerning the Russian video, images, and audio techniques were leveraged to provoke viewer emotion. 276 RT International, 11 February 2014 Following the livestream broadcast from 277 In Russian: ‘Господин Порошенко, зачем Minsk, Russian Duma Head of the Foreign Ваши войска бомбят мирных жителей?’ 278 Perviy Kanal, 11 February 2014
122 5. economy competed for first place with German Chancellor’279. reports on Ukraine. On 13 February, the first Another playful moment showed on RT was news report was on the Russian economy, originally posted on Twitter, inter-textually linking the stability of the rouble to the displaying an image of a pseudo-kiss between peace process in Minsk. the leaders of France and Germany. On the second day of the Minsk process, RT’s INFOTAINMENT and distraction strategy RT started using a new strategy— was accompanied by a lack of any other news INFOTAINMENT. Graphics and pictures on about Ukraine. The reports on the Minsk RT, including Poroshenko yawning, were process were followed by unrelated news some of the elements. concerning Spain, a toxic alert, and Syria. The main strategy behind the use of During the reports on Minsk II, RT continued INFOTAINMENT was to distract the viewer to use the so-called SECOND SCREEN, from the greater discussion on the content of showing the development of the related this important agreement. Only some points hashtag. The question remains, whether the of the agreement were mentioned. For hashtag activity on the second screen was example, the focus was on the small details coordinated with organized trolls. of the work in Minsk, including pictures of President Lukashenko ‘serving drinks’ and VISUALISATION itself showed different ‘President Hollande playfully pushing the practices onPerviy Kanal and RT, presumably
279 RT, 12 February 2014
123 5.
suited for different audiences—the home a failed state, the Ukrainian president’s lack audience in Russia was addressed in a of ability, sanctions against Russia, Ukraine more traditional way, while RT used a more as a violator of international agreements. modern reporting style with visualisations, Whenever the Minsk report was accompanied interactive maps, hashtags, etc. by news about Ukraine, it was dramatic and Setting the agenda portrayed the offensive nature of Ukrainian actions, often through the testimonies of On both platforms the meeting in Minsk the locals. The ubiquitous message was was linked to generalised narratives about that Russia was not party to the conflict Ukraine—Russia’s role in establishing peace, but had some influence on the pro-Russian Western attitudes towards Russia, Ukraine as
124 ‘self-defence forces’. This message was On 14 February, the top news story on reinforced by the claim that Russia did not RT International was the countdown to know where the rebel forces were based, the ceasefire, which was to come into 5. but was ready to investigate. force at 00:00 EET on 15 February. The reports focussed on intensified fighting in Foreign expert Martin Sieff was quoted the Debaltsevo area as separatist forces claiming that the Minsk process was ‘very attempted an offensive to push out the constructive’, ‘extremely constructive’, and Ukrainian troops before the start of the ‘a crucial deal’, a view complementary to ceasefire. The reports did not show the that of Russia. This report also included an fighting, but rather the desperation of locals assessment of Western attitudes towards whose voices could be heard on the videos Russia, calling on the West to address the saying: ‘Why are they bombing us? Why are conflict rationally instead of emotionally. they killing us? Why are they destroying us? On 13 February, the main news story on both How can our President not be ashamed?’ This RT International and RT America in relation first story was fully based on video quotes. to Ukraine was the fake evidence spread When RT showed its visualization of the map by American senators about Ukraine; the of Debaltsevo, there was no information story concerned a senator who did not verify about the separatist forces encroaching on evidence provided by Ukrainian MPs. RT’s Ukrainian-controlled territory. case against the senators was supported The next story focused on Luhansk, by reminding viewers of the false evidence expressing concern that the Ukrainian side used by the US to start military campaigns would not observe the ceasefire agreement in Iraq and Libya. The objective was to since the Right Sector would not respect it. demonstrate that neither the Ukrainian nor A quote from Facebook was provided to the US government could be trusted. support this view: ‘The Right Sector thinks
125 5. that no agreements with the pro-Russian character was portrayed as the opposite of terrorists have any legal force. That’s why Putin’s. During the summit, Poroshenko was their implementation is not necessary.280’ shown as a weak president, lacking in self- This was followed by a journalist calling this confidence. Poroshenko was also discredited ‘a very, very bad sign’. as commander in chief of the Ukrainian armed forces by means of several videos Putin’s role was legitimized on both RT showing deaths incurred due to fighting in and Perviy Kanal. RT used the VOICE OF eastern Ukraine while ceasefire negotiations AUTHORITY quoting Chancellor Merkel in were taking place. the graphics saying that Putin was the one who pressured the separatists into signing Sanctions were another issue RT used in the truce. President Hollande was similarly connection to the Minsk process. Will the quoted as saying, ‘I am thankful to Putin281.’ sanctions against Russia be lifted after the Yet, the context of these statements was not full implementation of the agreement? provided. Kerry was mentioned as saying that further restrictions would be introduced if the truce RT used controversial portrayals of Germany were violated282. and France. Previously Western countries would have been blamed for destabilising This theme was also actualised on 16 Ukraine, but in this report Germany and February, showing how the sanctions France were used to legitimise Putin introduced against Russia were harming and increase his authority. Poroshenko’s the EU. Since the conclusion of the Minsk II agreement was not enough to lift the
280 RT International, 14 February 2015 281 RT International, 12 February 2015 282 RT International, 13 February 2015
126 sanctions,Perviy Kanal showed an interview To further discredit the Ukrainian side, with Russian singer Iosif Kobzon, popular Perviy Kanal showed reports on the low 5. during Soviet times, now on the EU sanctions morale of the Ukrainian armed forces, the blacklist. refugee issue, and Ukrainians who had been arrested284. Pro-Russian separatist leader He said: Zaharchenko spoke to the arrested Ukrainian [TRANSLATION] “I spit on these soldiers: sanctions, on these bans. This is my [TRANSLATION] “Your president has motherland.”283 betrayed you. You are nobodies to (Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 16 February) him, no matter how many you are— five or fifty thousand. You are a piece In addition, a comment from the Ministry of meat for Poroshenko. Put on your of Foreign Affairs was presented, where the hat. Feed them, quench their thirst.”285 main message was that ‘the sanctions go against common sense’. (Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 16 February 2015) RT also took the opportunity to undermine the credibility of the US Government in If refugees were identified by name in the context of the Ukraine by showing an the case study on the humanitarian aid exchange between Jen Psaky, spokesperson for the US State Department, and Associated
Press journalist Matt Lee. 284 Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 16 February 2015 285 In Russian: “Ваш президент вас предал. Вы никто. Хоть вас пять, хоть 50 тысяч. Вы для 283 In Russian: “Плевал я на санкции, на эти Порошенко кусок мяса. Одень шапку. Накормить, запреты. Это моя родная земля.” напоить.”
127 convoy, then in this case the majority of jokes, and funny videos were widely used
5. locals speaking in front of the camera were during reports concerning Minsk II. However, anonymous, without names or affiliations: this strategy was employed only for a short time. Later on grim pictures of war-torn [TRANSLATION] “The Ukrainians are Ukraine showing scenes of death and the bombing intensively. Why is that our abandoned ruins of bombed buildings fault? Why are we guilty in the eyes of replaced the INFOTAINMENT segments. Ukraine? We don’t understand.”286 Although Perviy Kanal used REPETITION (Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 13 February during one news programme, RT was 2015) consistent in not returning to the same Unconnected with Ukraine, but the top news topic. A number of diverse emotional on Perviy Kanal, was the Russian economy. tools and methods were used to discredit On 13 February, the TV anchor for Perviy Poroshenko, including LOCALS, UNNAMED Kanal linked positive gains made by the LOCALS, LOCAL AUTHORITIES, HUMOROUS Russian rouble with the Minsk peace deal. PICTURES and VIDEOS. Conclusions: communication tools used and the re-definition of the agenda To sum up, this was the only case study where emotions were provoked through INFOTAINMENT. Particular music, Internet
286 In Russian: “Украинцы бомбят страшно. В чем мы виноваты? В чем мы провинились перед Украиной? Мы не понимаем.”
128 5.
the conflict but tries to find a solution. The 5.4.2. RE-DEFINITION general message on RT was that unlike the other countries, Russia was complying with OF THE EURO- international agreements. In other words, this was an attempt to regain credibility ATLANTIC VALUES in the international arena. Meanwhile, this case demonstrated that, for the home audience on Perviy Kanal, a redefinition The main idea used to define Russian of international order was taking place by values and redefine the values of Ukrainian means of various strategies of legitimation. supporters was: Russia is for peace and is against violence; Russia is not involved in
129 Political dimension with a revelation that the information was provided to Senator Jim Inhofe by three The image and the role of the Ukrainian Ukrainian MPs. RT reported that the new president Petro Poroshenko was a major ‘evidence’ was used to get military assistance focus of the redefinition process. In addition for Ukraine, which could obviously only lead to discrediting his personal characteristics, to further escalation of the conflict. the news stories developed an image of a weak president, elected but not strong Perviy Kanal reported on the press enough to lead the country. The news stories conference held by the anti-Maidan pro- portrayed a local lack of trust in Poroshenko, Russian movement, followed by news about reported on his inability to control the armed an exhibition of emotional photos of the forces, and emphasized his dependency on destruction of war in Ukraine on 16 February Western advisers. to discredit the Ukrainian and American governments. Parallels were drawn with the Only Poroshenko was shown as yawning involvement of the US in the conflicts in Iraq during the lengthy Minsk process, while the and Syria, which was LABELLED ‘The face of other leaders were shown smiling and ready American democracy’. to work. Anna Van Densky, a commentator often used by the RT, stated that ‘Ukraine On both platforms, American democracy is is moving in the direction of a “failed state” distinguished from Euro-Atlantic democracy;
5. since Poroshenko does not control the it is presented as a pseudo-democracy that territory and the Ukrainian Parliament is not supports change of power in other countries a serious institution’. by means of force or deceit. Another news story used to discredit the Economic dimension Ukrainian Parliament was a physical fight The redefinition of economic values in 287 among the MPs . No context or details of the context of Russia–EU relations was the fighting were provided; only a video connected to the conflict in Ukraine. RT was shown to illustrate physical violence used the VOICE OF AUTHORITY to show that as a common practice in the Ukrainian Europe was suffering from the conflict and Parliament. the position of the European governments Insinuations about the lack of transparency in as not in the interests of the European the political life of Ukraine was underscored economy and ordinary Europeans. through stories about certain groups, The issue of liberal economy was not including nationalist radicals, seeking to discussed in the stories on the Minsk 288 influence the Parliament . agreement. Both RT and Perviy Kanal RT America, RT International, and Perviy Kanal made it clear that the US had not changed also portrayed the American government its position and sanctions against Russia as incompetent and untrustworthy. The remained in place. If the case study on the story about the senator spreading false counter-sanctions showed no overt links evidence about Ukraine was revitalised with the conflict in Ukraine, then in this case study the link was articulated on a number of different levels, mainly by AUTHORITIES 287 RT International, 13 February 2015 and EXPERTS. 288 RT International, 14 February 2015
130 Ukraine’s responsibility to develop the At the same time there was silence about economy in the so-called republics was problematic issues related to the actions of additionally discussed on Perviy Kanal. The the pro-Russian separatists. The Ukrainian Russian economy was one of the top items armed forces were dehumanised through on the channel’s agenda, e.g. on 13 February, techniques constructing the opinions of Perviy Kanal reported on currency exchange the COMMON MAN and the SEPARATIST rates, showing positive growth for the Russian AUTHORITIES. The reports were clearly rouble. An indirect VOICE OF EXPERTISE was biased focussing on the victimization of one used to link this fact with the growth of oil side, supported by testimonials and statistics prices and the peace process in Ukraine. about the dead and wounded. The Ukrainian army’s low morale was demonstrated by Moral dimension showing images of dead soldiers left behind The moral superiority of Russia and the by their comrades290. pro-Russian separatists was emphasised. Perviy Kanal gave voice to commander Kiwi, Their moral superiority was demonstrated a local separatist authority, to illustrate the by portraying Russia as a peaceful country, Ukrainian side’s violation of the ceasefire, supportive of finding a the peaceful and RT showed a dramatic video of a film resolution to the conflict, and the solidarity crew being rescued. of Russian citizens, who are ready to support Ukrainian refugees—the message here was The international dimension very similar to that in the case of the first 5. Russia’s role in the international arena humanitarian convoy). The idea of ‘one big and the grouping around the conflict in happy family’ was used as a metaphor to Ukraine were the main narratives used to show collectivism as an important value. redefine the Euro-Atlantic values listed in On 13 February Perviy Kanal showed a video the catalogue used for this study. First, a of a journalist interviewing a family in the specific international hierarchy was drawn; destroyed city of Gorlovka city with the sound second, the dependence of certain countries of bombing in the background. Such video on the US and the regionalisation of political clips were chosen to provide indirect evidence interests were presented; third, NATO was from the locals about the offensive activities of shown as violating international agreements. the Ukrainian army. One person asks: These points will be elaborated below. “Comrade President of Ukraine, where The main techniques used for legitimation is your ceasefire? Or since the ceasefire were HYPOTHETICAL FUTURE, EMOTIONS comes into force only on the 15th, have and the VOICE OF AUTHORITY. Among other you decided to erase Donbas from the prevalent techniques were GROUPING (for surface of the earth by the 15th?”289 the regionalisation of political interests); LABELLING and COMPARISON (pro- (Vremya, Perviy Kanal, 15 February 2015) American/independent); SIMPLIFICATION (conflating international relations with the relationships between political leaders); 289 In Russian: “Товарищ президент Украины, где ваше перемирие? Или это перемирие 15 числа, вы что, решили весь Донбасс до 15 числа с землей сровнять?” 290 Perviy Kanal, 16 February 2015
131 EXPERTISE (mainly journalists and HYPOTHETICAL FUTURE, RATIONALISATION, academics); and AUTHORITY (Putin as the and IN-OUT GROUPING, especially for leading voice). the domestic audience. Although the US was not present during the negotiations, International hierarchy and the it was presented as the other important personalization of international relations international actor, especially during news Russia was portrayed as one of the key actors items that discussed the regionalization of in the international arena. A bold example international relations. The TV anchor on is the reporting on the meeting of four RT characterized the relationship between presidents supported by infotainment stories Obama and Putin as pretty cold, thus encouraging positive emotions. Through drawing a parallel between the relationship placement and time devoted, Putin was of the leaders with the relationship between portrayed as the leading voice of the peace the two countries. process, while Poroshenko was portrayed Regionalisation as weaker than the other leaders as he was shown making phone calls, soliciting advice, Perviy Kanal constructed a sense of and having faulty information. regionalisation through reflecting on the relationships between various countries It was implied that the US government and the US. The channel appealed to ‘false played a destructive role as the main advisor
5. independence’ and called the relationship to President Poroshenko during the peace with the US a threat to Europe, esp. in the process since it clearly advocates providing context of Germany and France. The Eastern military support to Ukraine. Germany European countries were said to have close, was shown as the main protector against yet dependent relationships with the US. increased militarisation. Through such reporting, the EU and US are Coverage of the Minsk agreement shown as individual parties, not as a joint Euro- exhibited a high level of ‘personification’ of Atlantic community. The US was also shown international relations. The leaders of the as mischievous and aggressive, the salient so-called Normandy Four were the heroes implication being that Europe is not as bad. of infotainment materials—images of kisses The value of international agreements between President Hollande and Chancellor Merkel served to construct state politics NATO was portrayed as violating through personal relationships. Merkel and international agreements by expanding into Hollande were included in the discourse Eastern Europe. Sky News journalist drew a of a Russian political cartoon show ‘Mult link between the Minsk II negotiations and Lichnosti’ [Cartoon Personalities] developed the negotiations between NATO and Russia by Pervij Kanal. Romantic relationships in the 1990s, supported by an illustrating between the leaders and the countries were video. constructed in the news stories: kisses, touching, gifts of flowers, and so on. The international role of Russia was emphasised by means of such techniques as the VOICE OF AUTHORITY, the
132 5.4.3 REDEFINITION OF EURO-ATLANTIC VALUES: USED NARRATIVES IN THE CASE OF THE MINSK II AGREEMENT Messages for Redefined Messages for Manipulative Values Russian-speaking values Western audiences techniques audiences POLITICAL VALUES The role of The diminishing Poroshenko as a weak COMMON MAN state the role of president, elected but not President strong enough to lead LABELLING Poroshenko The lack of public trust in IN-OUT Poroshenko GROUPING Poroshenko’s inability to SIMPLIFICATION control the armed forces HYPOTHETICAL Ukraine as a Non-transparent Ukraine is not FUTURE failed state political life in Ukraine, independent, influenced influenced by radicals by the US COMPARING and others DIFFERENCES Ukraine is moving in the (countries) direction of a failed state The Ukrainian Fist fight among MPs The Ukrainian Parliament INSTRUCTING Parliament shown as common is not a serious institution ROLE MODEL
as a marginal practice in the Ukrainian 5. institution Parliament Washington’s American governance is American governance is support for a faulty faulty change in power American democracy is in Ukraine different from European democracy In those countries where Washington has supported a change of power, the result is armed conflict INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION
International Violation of NATO portrayed as NATO portrayed as IN/OUT agreements international violating international violating international GROUPING agreements agreements by agreements by LABELLING incorporating Eastern incorporating Eastern Europe Europe SIMPLIFICATION The link between the HYPOTHETICAL Minsk negotiations and FUTURE negotiations between AUTHORITY Russia and NATO in the 1990s concerning NATO EXPERTISE enlargement REPETITION Emphasising that the US COMPARISON did not take part in the Minsk peace process INFOTAINMENT SECOND SCREEN
133 Redefined Messages for Messages for Russian- Manipulative Values values Western audiences speaking audiences techniques INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION
International Russia as a key The leading role The leading role of Russia at the IN/OUT order actor in the of Russia at the Minsk negotiations emphasized GROUPING international Minsk negotiations through infotainment stories LABELLING arena emphasized through infotainment stories SIMPLIFICATION Putin as the main voice Putin as the main voice of the HYPOTHETICAL of the peace process peace process FUTURE President Poroshenko President Poroshenko AUTHORITY portrayed as not being portrayed as not being an equal an equal among equals among equals EXPERTISE The destructive role The destructive role of the US REPETITION of the US in the peace in the peace process, its plan COMPARISON process, its plan to provide military support to to provide military Ukraine; Germany as the main INFOTAINMENT support to Ukraine; protector against increased SECOND Germany as the main militarisation SCREEN protector against increased militarisation
5. Political leaders Leaders of the Leaders of the ‘Normandy as infotainment ‘Normandy Four’ Four’ portrayed as infotainment portrayed as heroes infotainment heroes Romantic relations Romantic relations between between the political the political leaders/countries leaders/countries constructed through showing constructed through kisses, touching, flowers, etc. showing kisses, touching, flowers, etc. Cold relations The cold relations between between the leaders Obama and standing in for relations Putin between Russia and the US as countries International Europe is Relations with the US are key solidarity divided to ‘regionalisation’: Europe falsely imagines itself to be independent from the US; relations with the US are a threat to Europe in the context of Germany and France. Eastern Europe has close relations with the US The West is The EU and the US are not divided Euro-Atlantic allies, they are divided The US is shown as aggressive and oriented towards legal violations, ready to present false evidence to further its goals
134 Messages for Redefined Messages for Manipulative Values Russian-speaking values Western audiences techniques audiences MORAL VALUES ‘The morality Russia is morally Russia is a peaceful REPETITION of states’ superior actor, supportive of the peace process UNIFICATION (good rebels) Solidarity Only by the Russians are ready to Russian side support refugees as if EXPERTISE shows solidarity they were relatives with the SIMPLIFICATION Ukrainian people (who violates ceasefire) Individualism Collectivism as ‘Family’ as a metaphor an important for collectivism—an AUTHORITY value important value (including Putin) Humanism Dehumanisation Silence on any TESTIMONY of the Ukrainian problematic issues armed forces connected with pro- IN- OUT Russian separatists, GROUPING grouping of radicals, the irresponsibility of the LABELLING Ukrainian armed forces, the victimisation of COMMON MAN one side of the conflict, HYPOTHETICAL 5. statistics on dead and FUTURE wounded civilians The bodies of colleagues COMPARING abandoned DIFFERENCES Ukrainian armed Pro-Russian separatists Pro-Russian separatists PLACEMENT forces violating are only responding to are only responding to the ceasefire the Ukrainian military the Ukrainian military offensive offensive Dramatic video of film crew saved from military action ECONOMIC VALUES Economy Conflict is Europe is suffering; the Despite the negative AUTHORITY embedded in harmful for conflict is not in the impact on the European Democracy the European interest of ordinary economy, the US wants TESTIMONY people or the European economy sanctions to remain in HYPOTHETICAL economy place FUTURE The Minsk peace process would normalize the PLACEMENT economy in the region Despite the negative impact on the European economy, the US wants sanctions to remain in place It is the responsibility of Ukraine to develop the economy in the self-declared eastern republics 135 CONCLUSIONS
If the idea of an ‘open society’ originally stood for the self-determination of a free society cherishing its openness, it now brings to most minds the terrifying experience of a heteronomous, hapless and vulnerable population confronted with, and possibly overwhelmed by forces it neither controls nor fully understands. Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Times: Living in an Age of Uncertainty 6.
The aim of the research “Euro-Atlantic Values Russia. The MH-17 catastrophe was not a and Russia’s Strategic Communication in the pre-planned action and it demonstrated Euro-Atlantic Space”, was to identify the ways the crisis management in communication. and means how Russia by the help of mass Other cases were pre-planned giving the
media affects the Euro-Atlantic values and possibility of controlling narratives. All cases 6. redefines the meaning of democracy, mass got wide coverage in the media and political media freedom, human rights, freedom of agenda on both sides of the Atlantic, and the speech and other values in the Euro-Atlantic cases themselves were used as key points in space for different societal groups in the political communication of all involved sides. context of the crisis in Ukraine. As the methodological basis for this research The research covered the time period from the Euro-Atlantic values catalogue was April 2014 to January 2015, and analysis developed, grouping values into four large of the following selected audio-visual groups: a) political values; b) economic values; platforms: RT (Russia Today), Perviy Kanal c) moral values; d) international relations and Sputniknews. The following case studies and international law dimension. Parallel, were selected for the analysis: a catalogue of values and their indicators 1. MH-17 catastrophe; which Russia promotes in the Euro-Atlantic information space by the use of mass media 2. Implementation of counter-sanctions; was created thus showing a wide gap between 3. The first humanitarian convoy, specific political attitudes, beliefs, perceptions 4. The Minsk-2 agreement. and emotions which are associated with the same principles (values) in different spaces These four case studies were considered (Euro-Atlantic and Russian). as particularly relevant for researching the crisis in Ukraine and Russia’s information The research shows big differences in the campaigns. In addition, each of the case understanding of democracy, freedom, the studies has different nature in the meaning role of state, free market, tolerance towards of strategic political communication of minorities and trust in international law and
136 international organizations. The gap between countries will go in protecting their interests these understandings and perceptions is so and values is a product of a political process. wide, that Russia’s attempts to redefine the In this process crucial are perceptions and basic Trans-Atlantic values can be regarded information politicians and society has about as a serious threat to the Western world. the particular situation, and understanding The research concludes that in redefining of causality – what kind of decisions and political values in all four cases the main actions lead to what kind of results. manipulative techniques applied by Russia Russia’s foreign policy shows clearly were common man, labelling, in-out group, that Russia is attempting to redefine the comparing differences and authority. For European and Transatlantic values, the post- moral dimension in addition to already Cold War borders and the post-Cold War mentioned were used such techniques as international order at large. Russia invests expertise, simplification and moral superiority massively in anti-European, anti-United of Russia; redefinition of international States and anti-Western activities and order was based on hypothetical future - to processes and tries to undermine the rule question the Western unity, to separate the of law, the authority of NATO and the value US from other Western countries, to split of democracy. It attacks, deceives, multiplies the European Union countries, to enemyze absurd conspiracy theories to create a fog – the US and other Western countries, to where no-one knows what is right and what downgrade the reliability of NATO, other is wrong, anymore. In other words – the international organisations and the European threats are “fluid”, and the response to them 6. Court of Human Rights, simplification and and policies should be shaped the same way. infotainment. The economic values were In order to respond the Russia’s strategic redefined by the use of the techniques communication properly and to defend the of common man, authority, comparison, societies, firstly, leaders and societies must silence and victimization. be aware that Western inner system is open The power of information is incredibly large. and vulnerable. The West must be aware Struggles over control of the infosphere can of means and tools used in the information be regarded as a significant external threat war and have to be ready for various to the security the Western world nowadays. development scenarios and action strategies The war in Ukraine and the hybrid war waged to defend the basic values in society. by Russia is splitting Western society, which Secondly – and this is equally important – can at least potentially lead to the leadership while exposed to the propaganda threats, crisis in Europe. the Western world should not give up the It is also evident, that the Western core values: the rule of law; gender equality; democracies face problems in defending media freedom; fundamental democratic their societies, their political and judicial values; and social and economic freedoms. systems, rules and norms in foreign policy. Democratic values in Western societies Big part of Western society still does not have been taken as granted not enough recognize that it is living in the middle of appreciating their power in preserving information war, and loses it. Countries peace, security and prosperity. Complexity rarely employ all the capabilities that of many crises surrounding transatlantic they have available, since the fact how far community has contributed to discussion
137 whether the existing set the values serves to imperative that citizens learn to judge the interests of democratic countries. reliability of news. Therefore, it is possible to Third, the solution to the current situation is argue that the illiterate of the 21st century to become less dependent on Russia. That will not be those who cannot read and would include reorientation of businesses, write, but those who cannot learn, unlearn, less economic dependence, energetic relearn and evaluate the credibility and independence, and also - informational reliability of information. A contemporary independence. media consumer has to be able to recognize the information, recognize the tools and Fourth, it would make sense to re-redefine to be able to critically analyze. On cannot the basic values in democracy for ourselves. be passive about news consumption, and It involves the principle of self-defending media literacy is a set of skills which can be democracy or the idea that also democracy taught and learned. has its own borders and the democratic state under certain circumstances can be It is responsibility of politicians, experts and regarded as an object of protection. If it is civil society to scatter the current information possible to indicate that there exist attempts fog and chaos, and the most important to change the nature and identity of state, challenge is to find adequate instruments elements of the state (territory, population, how to cope with Russia’s propaganda, institutions, national identity), the state order hoe to find “liquid” tools against “liquid” 6. (democratic order), the right of people to threats, and stabilize the societies. It is of exercise the sovereign power, the chain of the utmost importance to unite and solidarize democratic legitimacy, opposition, parties, the Euro-Atlantic community on the basis independent judiciary, guaranties of human of these principles; then region will be able and fundamental rights, the principle of self- to respond to external insecurities and to defending democracy should come into force. maintain the social and political security of Democratic order cannot directly prevent an its people continuously. anti-state or anti-democratic revolution but it could make it more difficult, in the long-term interest of the people. Also peoples’ right to resistance can be expanded, preventive constitutional safeguards and unchangeable core of the democratic order developed, as well as further development of international law foreseen in the way the basic Trans- Atlantic values are better defended. Fifth, the level of media literacy in the society is of the utmost importance. Uninformed opinion masquerades as news, lines are blurred between legitimate journalism and propaganda, entertainment, self-promotion and unmediated information appears on the Internet as true and verified information. This superabundance of information has made it
138 ACRONYMS
BRICS- the acronym for an association of PEW- PEW Research Global Attitudes five national economies: Brazil, Russia, Project India, China, and South Africa POL- Poland BUK- a medium-range surface-to-air pp- pages missile system developed by the Soviet PsyOp- Psychological Operation Union and its successor- Russian Federation. SWE- Sweden ECHR- the European Court on Human Rights TA- target audience EET- Eastern European Time TT- Transatlantic Trends e.g.- for example TV- television ESP- Spain UK- United Kingdom
etc.- and other UN- United Nations 6. EU- European Union US- United States of America EVS- European Values Survey USSR- the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics GER- Germany Vol- volume FRA- France Vs.- versus i.e.- that is WTO- World Trade Organization ITA- Italy WVS- World Values Survey Jul- July LGBT- the acronym for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender Mr- Mister MSU- Moscow State University NATO- North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGOs- non-governmental organizations NL- Netherlands OSCE- the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe p- page
139