Recovering Judicial Integrity: Toward a Duty-Focused Disqualification Jurisprudence Based on Jewish Law, 39 Fordham Urb
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Fordham Urban Law Journal Volume 39 | Number 2 Article 6 February 2016 Recovering Judicial Integrity: Toward a Duty- Focused Disqualification Jurisprudence Based on Jewish law Shlomo Pill Fordham University School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Judges Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, and the Religion Law Commons Recommended Citation Shlomo Pill, Recovering Judicial Integrity: Toward a Duty-Focused Disqualification Jurisprudence Based on Jewish law, 39 Fordham Urb. L.J. 511 (2011). Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol39/iss2/6 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The orF dham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The orF dham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [email protected]. PILL_CHRISTENSEN 5/10/2012 12:43 PM RECOVERING JUDICIAL INTEGRITY: TOWARD A DUTY-FOCUSED DISQUALIFICATION JURISPRUDENCE BASED ON JEWISH LAW ∗ Shlomo Pill Introduction ............................................................................................. 513 I. Judicial Disqualification in American and Traditional Jewish Law ................................................................................................. 514 A. The American Approach to Judicial Disqualification ...... 514 1. The Underlying Goals of American Recusal Jurisprudence ................................................................... 514 2. Grounds for Disqualification in American Law .......... 518 a. Bias and the Appearance of Bias ............................ 519 b. Financial Interest ...................................................... 521 c. Familial Relationships .............................................. 523 d. Bribes and Gifts ........................................................ 524 e. Prior Knowledge ....................................................... 527 f. The Due Process Clause ........................................... 528 B. The Traditional Jewish Law of Judicial Disqualification and Recusal ............................................... 530 1. Litigation, Courts, and Judges in the Halachic System: The Jurisprudential Aims of Jewish Disqualification Law ....................................................... 530 2. Grounds for Disqualification and Recusal in Jewish Law .................................................................................... 537 ∗ J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law 2012; B.A., Lander College for Men 2009. I extend my deepest appreciation to Professor Russell Pearce whose ad- vice on this project provided the perfect balance of creative scholarly license and ac- ademic discipline; to the Urban Law Journal editorial staff, whose challenging but constructive criticism has made this Note infinitely better; to my parents and grand- parents for their unending support for my scholarly endeavors; and to my dear wife, Tzivie, who after suffering the plight of a 1L wife and young mother has borne the Note-writing process with encouragement and understanding. Above all, I thank God, who has granted me the opportunity to begin understanding the law, His and our own; may He continue to do so more for many years to come. 511 PILL_CHRISTENSEN 5/10/2012 12:43 PM 512 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIX a. Disqualification to Maintain the Institutional Integrity of the Court ............................................... 538 i. Financial Interest ................................................ 538 ii. Familial Relationships ....................................... 540 iii. Bribes, Gifts, and Personal Favors ................... 541 iv. Advisory Opinions ............................................. 543 b. Voluntary Recusal to Preserve the Professional Integrity of the Judge ............................................... 544 i. Bias and the Appearance of Bias ..................... 544 ii. Prior Knowledge ................................................. 546 c. Judges’ Extralegal Duty to Treat Litigants Equally ....................................................................... 547 II. The American and Halachic Doctrines of Judicial Removal: A Comparison ............................................................................... 548 III. Moving in a New Direction: Toward a Duty-Focused Recusal Jurisprudence ................................................................. 553 A. Problems with the Current American Doctrine ................ 553 1. The Failure of Ad Hoc and Conclusory Recusal Doctrines to Adequately Protect Litigants from Biased Judgments ............................................................ 554 2. The Failure of Expansive Disqualification Doctrines to Promote Public Confidence in the Justice System .................................................................. 559 3. The Failure of Modern Recusal Law to Engender an Integrious Judiciary .................................................... 561 B. Duty-Focused Disqualification: Some Proposals .............. 563 1. Thinking About the Roles of Courts and Judges in the American System of Adjudication .......................... 563 2. Curtail the Role of Mandatory Disqualification in Eliminating Judicial Bias ................................................ 569 3. Expand Judges’ Professional Obligation to Voluntarily Recuse .......................................................... 570 4. Ensure Sound Legal Judgments and Promote Integrious Judging ........................................................... 571 Conclusion ................................................................................................ 575 PILL_CHRISTENSEN 5/10/2012 12:43 PM 2011] RECOVERING JUDICIAL INTEGRITY 513 One who grabs too much has not grabbed anything, but one that grabs just a little has surely grabbed that much. —Babylonian Talmud, Yoma 80a INTRODUCTION The United States Supreme Court’s ruling that West Virginia Su- preme Court Justice Brent Benjamin’s decision not to recuse himself from a case involving a major donor to his judicial election campaign violated Due Process1 sparked a storm of interest in the (in)adequacy of the judicial disqualification system.2 Contemporary recusal law makes conclusory determinations of actual or apparent judicial bias, resulting in an inconsistent doctrine that allows dishonest judges to resist recusal and supplant litigants’ legal rights in favor of their own personal agendas.3 The current approach also erodes public confi- dence in the justice system by under and over-enforcing bias-based recusal,4 and its focus on top-down mandatory disqualification fails to adequately encourage judges to be personally and professionally integrious.5 This Note suggests that these problems might be mitigated by comprehensively rethinking our approach to judicial disqualification based on halacha, traditional Jewish law.6 Halachic recusal law offers an alternative to the current American approach, a jurisprudence that is grounded in courts’ and judges’ personal and professional duties, and which empowers jurists to develop their own integrity by limiting mandatory disqualification and relying instead on judges’ duty- consciousness and self-disciplining decisions to voluntarily recuse.7 Part I of this Note reviews the jurisprudential underpinnings and substantive rules of American and traditional Jewish disqualification law. Part II briefly compares these two systems, highlighting the 1. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2256–57 (2009); see also infra notes 81–84 and 101–105 and accompanying text. 2. See, e.g., Gerard J. Clark, Caperton’s New Right to Independence in Judges, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 661 (2010); Raymond J. McKoski, Judicial Disqualification After Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company: What’s Due Process Got to Do With It?, 63 BAYLOR L. REV. 368 (2011); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Completing Caperton and Clarify- ing Common Sense Through Using the Right Standard for Constitutional Judicial Recusal, 29 REV. LITIG. 249 (2010); Symposium: Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 215 (2010). 3. See infra Part III.A.1. 4. See infra Part III.A.2. 5. See infra Part III.A.3. 6. See generally infra Part III.B. 7. See infra Part I.B.1. PILL_CHRISTENSEN 5/10/2012 12:43 PM 514 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIX principle differences between the American and halachic approaches to recusal, which stem from these doctrines’ respective foundations in rights-based and duty-focused jurisprudence. Part III develops a du- ty-focused alternative to contemporary recusal law by first highlight- ing some deficiencies in the current system, thereby demonstrating the need for reform,8 and by then reconceptualizing judicial recusal based on Jewish law’s moralizing, duty-oriented approach to remov- ing judges and promoting judicial integrity.9 I. JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION IN AMERICAN AND TRADITIONAL JEWISH LAW This Part provides necessary background for considering the rela- tive merits of contemporary American and traditional Jewish recusal law by explaining the jurisprudential underpinnings and substantive doctrines. Section I.A. discusses the American law of judicial disqual- ification, and Section I.B. lays out the basic contours of the halachic approach to removing judges. A. The American Approach to Judicial Disqualification This Section discusses the contemporary American approach to ju- dicial disqualification.