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Home , Amjad Farooqi, Bill Roggio, Masood Azhar, Rashid Rauf

july 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 7

Another U.S. national recruited to al- Al-Shabab is also coming under The Punjabi : Shabab, Omar Hammami (also known increasing pressure from other Somali Causes and Consequences as Abu Mansur al-Amriki), has emerged factions, particularly Hisbul Islamiyya as a high-profile media representative, (another of ’s Islamist of Turning Against the appearing in numerous al-Shabab organizations that emerged from the State propaganda videos and providing a collapse of the ICU). Tensions between foreign face to the group.25 the two groups intensified in October By Ben Brandt 2009 when Hisbul Islamiyya and al- Conclusion Shabab militants fought each other for the kidnapping and murder of former Each of these attributes—an increasingly control of the strategically important Inter-Services Intelligence officer and radical agenda, a centralized leadership town of Kismayo.30 Consequently, Usama bin Ladin confidant Khalid structure, refined propaganda al-Shabab’s efforts are now largely Khwaja in March 2010 generated machinery, and a foreign support focused on re-establishing its political a wave of analysis throughout the network—suggests that al-Shabab and military credentials, and vying for counterterrorism community.1 Although will continue to evolve into a greater influence alongside other factions in analysts have offered a variety of regional threat. Indeed, on July 15, Somalia’s Islamist movement. theories regarding both the nature of 2010, al-Shabab threatened further the “Asian Tigers” group that executed attacks against Uganda and Burundi in As such, while al-Shabab’s successful Khwaja and their motives in killing an audio statement aired on Mogadishu execution of sporadic, large-scale him, most have correctly noted that radio stations, in which al-Shabab attacks abroad seems quite feasible in the the incident is symbolic of a broader insisted that “what has happened in future, a protracted foreign campaign— splintering between Punjabi militants Kampala was only the beginning. We in which al-Shabab develops and retains espousing allegiance to the Pakistani will keep revenging what your soldiers external networks responsible for state and a younger generation that has remorselessly did to our people.”26 launching attacks against Ugandan and aligned itself with al-Qa`ida and Tehrik- Burundian targets—appears beyond the i-Taliban (TTP), turning their Concurrently, however, al-Shabab’s group’s present capabilities. guns on the Pakistani government and evolution into a more overtly the West. It is important to understand internationalist organization has Tim Pippard is Senior Consultant in the the manifestations of this fracture, undercut some of its appeal and support Security and Military Intelligence Practice as well as its causes and potential base within Somalia.27 Al-Shabab’s hard of IHS Jane’s, and is currently Research consequences, to better gauge the threat line interpretation of (in which Director of an IHS Jane’s study entitled posed to the by what is it is attempting to impose religious “Relationships and Rivalries: Assessing Al- frequently called the “Punjabi Taliban.”2 uniformity on Somali society at the Qa’ida’s Affiliate Network.” He is Assistant expense of traditional clan structures Editor of Perspectives on (the Various Manifestations of Anti-State and beliefs) has failed to resonate with journal of the Terrorism Research Initiative), Sentiment many Somali citizens.28 In addition, and former managing editor of Jane’s Khalid Khwaja’s execution is perhaps while al-Shabab’s increasingly brutal Terrorism and Insurgency Center (JTIC). the most graphic manifestation of a operational tactics—specifically suicide trend that has been occurring for some bombings targeting civilians—have time, particularly within terrorist enabled it to retain territory in central groups that had previously designated and southern Somalia, such tactics have or rival Muslim sects as their also caused public outrage and alienated targets. One of the best documented supporters, even in traditional al- fissures within a Pakistani terrorist Shabab strongholds.29 group dedicated to against India is that which occurred within Jaysh-

1 For details, see Rahimullah Yusufzai, “The Kidnapping 25 Andrea Elliott, “The Jihadist Next Door,” New York and Execution of Khalid Khwaja in Pakistan,” CTC Senti­ Times, January 31, 2010. nel 3:5 (2010); Nicholas Schmidle, “How Did A Pakistan 26 Mohamed Olad Hassan, “Al-Shabab Leader Threat- Ex-Spy End Up Dead?” The New Republic, May 4, 2010. ens More Uganda Attacks,” , July 15, 2 Hassan Abbas has defined the Punjabi Taliban as “a 2010. loose conglomeration of members of banned organiza- 27 “Somalia’s Divided Islamists.” tions of Punjabi origin” that work with Tehrik-i-Taliban 28 The International Crisis Group (ICG) has documented to execute attacks inside Pakistan. Abbas described the numerous instances of public disaffection at al-Shabab’s Punjabi Taliban as being primarily composed of mem- attempts to impose its extreme vision of Islam on Somali bers of the groups Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan, Lashkar-i- society. ICG researchers also note that public disillu- 30 Stig Jarle Hansen, “Faction Fluctuation – The Shift- Jhangvi, and Jaysh-i-; disaffected anti-statist sion with al-Shabab is being further fueled by its poor ing Allegiances within Hizbul Islam,” Jane’s Intelligence members of several other groups such as Harkat-ul-Ji- governance record in southern Somalia. See “Somalia’s Review, March 11, 2010. Tensions between Hisbul Is- had-al-Islam, Lashkar-i-Tayyiba, and Harkat-ul-Muja- Divided Islamists.” lamiyya and al-Shabab commanders have continued, hidin may be considered part of the Punjabi Taliban as 29 Ibid.; Mark Landler, “After Attacks in Uganda, Worry with clashes between the two groups occurring into mid- well. For details, see Hassan Abbas, “Defining the Pun- Grows Over Group,” New York Times, July 12, 2010. 2010. jabi Taliban Network,” CTC Sentinel 2:4 (2009).

6 july 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 7 i-Muhammad (JM) in 2002-2003. In The sectarian group Sipah-i-Sahaba ties to al-Qa`ida and the TTP.12 The 2002, members of JM were implicated Pakistan (SSP) has also seen members status of the sectarian group Lashkar- in a number of attacks targeting leave to attack targets associated with i-Jhangvi (LJ) appears to be similar to Pakistani Christians in Punjab, while the Pakistani state and the West.9 that of HuJI, as many of LJ’s amirs have in 2003 , the founder of been implicated in plotting attacks the group, expelled a dozen ranking It is important to note that most Punjabi against the state.13 JM members after revelations that they militants sympathetic to al-Qa`ida and had organized attacks against Western the TTP move away from their parent The role of Lashkar-i-Tayyiba (LT, and Christian targets in Pakistan groups in less dramatic fashion than or LeT), perhaps Pakistan’s most without his authorization.3 In July of JuF and HuMA, and many appear to prominent terrorist group following the same year, he reportedly informed maintain links with both their original the , is less the Punjab governor that he had made organization and al-Qa`ida and the clear. Although the LT’s leadership the expulsions, that he should not be Pakistani Taliban. A report last year has remained relatively loyal to the held responsible for the actions of the Pakistani military, members of the expelled members, and that the expelled “The July 2007 storming of group have broken away to assist in members should be arrested.4 attacks against the state. An example Lal Masjid (Red Mosque), of this can be seen in the case of Umar Azhar’s decision caused a major a notorious center of Kundi, an LT member who left after schism within the group, as members quarreling with the group’s leadership deserted Azhar and joined the expelled militant activity over its subservience to the Pakistani individuals to form Jamaat-ul- in , is frequently government and later assisted in attacks Furqan (JuF).5 Members of JuF were against Pakistani law enforcement and consequently arrested in connection and correctly noted as intelligence facilities.14 LT’s decision to to an assassination attempt against an important catalyst in establish a presence in Pakistan’s tribal then-Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz in areas and interact with al-Qa`ida and 2004, and , who helped Punjabi militants’ decision TTP members operating there has likely mastermind the 2006 liquid explosives to strike the state.” facilitated this process.15 plot that targeted trans-Atlantic flights, was described by an intelligence source A 2009 LT plot to attack the U.S. and as having utilized cooperation from UK embassies in Dhaka, Bangladesh has members of JuF.6 Today, JuF is thought chronicled the saga of a JM commander given rise to rumors about the emergence to constitute part of the so-called wounded in a while of a faction within the group advocating Punjabi Taliban, which has executed meeting with Taliban leaders. He was open attacks against Western interests. attacks throughout Pakistan; Maulana protected from arrest by his men while The fact that a retired Pakistan Army Abdul Jabbar, who previously served recuperating in Bahawalpur10 and was major affiliated with LT helped David as Azhar’s deputy, is described as being later believed to have sought refuge Headley plot a terrorist attack in involved with training fighters for JuF in a JM seminary.11 His case shows the Denmark last year further amplifies in North Waziristan.7 overlapping memberships that many these concerns.16 If elements within individuals hold in the region. LT continue to plot increasingly brazen Other Pakistani terrorist groups attacks against Western interests, it focused on have exhibited In the case of Harkat-ul-Jihad-al- could force an open schism within the noteworthy fissures as well. A group Islam (HuJI), the group’s leadership group, and drive members espousing calling itself Harkat-ul-Mujahidin al- appears to have been involved in the an anti-Western agenda into greater Alami (HuMA) emerged from Harkat- decision to turn against the state. Amir conflict with LT’s leadership and the ul-Mujahidin (HuM) in 2002, executing Qari Saifullah Akhtar and operational state. a string of attacks in against commander currently Western businesses, the U.S. Consulate, reside in Waziristan and enjoy strong and then-President .8

(HuMA),” located at www.satp.org. There is some de- 12 Bill Roggio, “Top Al Qaeda Leader Linked to 5 Ameri- 3 Amir Mir, “The Maulana’s Scattered Beads,” Outlook bate as to whether Harkat-ul-Mujahidin al-Alami rep- cans on Trial in Pakistan,” The Long War Journal, April India, September 1, 2003. resented a true splinter faction of Harkat-ul-Mujahidin, 17, 2010. 4 Ibid. or was merely a ruse used by the group to stage attacks. 13 LJ is closely affiliated with the SSP. For details, see 5 Ibid. Given the Asian Tigers’ recent vilification of Harkat-ul- “Obituary: Qari Mohammad Zafar,” BBC, March 2, 6 For more information, see the South Asia Terrorism Mujahidin and its long-time commander Fazlur Rahman 2010. Portal file on “Jaish-e-Mohammed (Army of the Proph- Khalil as “proxies” of the ISI, however, it appears reason- 14 Sabrina Tavernise and Waqar Gillani, “Frustrated et),” located at www.satp.org. able to assume that it represents a genuine splinter. Strivers in Pakistan Turn to Jihad,” New York Times, Feb- 7 Amir Mir, “South Punjab Threat,” The News Inter­ 9 Shahzad; Schmidle. ruary 27, 2010. national, October 25, 2009; Asif Shahzad, “Pakistani 10 is a major hub for Jaysh-i-Muhammad; 15 Stephen Tankel, “Lashkar-e-Taiba in Perspective: An Militancy Spreads to Country’s Heartland,” Associated Masood Azhar was born in the city and currently resides Evolving Threat,” New America Foundation, February Press, June 16, 2010. there. 2010. 8 For more information, see the South Asia Terror- 11 Matthew Rosenberg, “Taliban Wages War on Police 16 U.S.A. v. Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed, “Criminal Com- ism Portal file on “Harakat-ul-Mujahideen Al-alami in Pakistan,” Wall Street Journal, May 28, 2009. plaint,” Northern District of Illinois, 2009.

7 july 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 7

Causes for Splintering Among Punjabi Militant has noted that Abdul Rashid Ghazi Anger among members of Punjabi Groups stated two months prior to the storming terrorist groups was compounded by the Various factors have caused fissures of the mosque that organizations such Musharraf government’s acquiescence to within Punjabi terrorist groups and as SSP and JM were experiencing an the U.S. invasion, as well as its decision between these groups and the state. increasing number of defections among to assist the United States by curtailing The July 2007 storming of Lal Masjid their ranks.22 Multiple assassination militant operations in Kashmir to (Red Mosque), a notorious center of attempts against Musharraf in December improve relations with India.27 Members Deobandi militant activity in Islamabad, 2003 and other members of Pakistan’s scorned the corresponding acquiescence is frequently and correctly noted as an military and government by members of many leaders of terrorist groups to important catalyst in Punjabi militants’ of Punjabi terrorist groups prior to July Musharraf,28 despite their previous fiery decision to strike the state.17 This point 2007 also illustrate this phenomenon. denunciations of the United States.29 is graphically illustrated by the massive One particularly cutting comment on increase in mass casualty terrorist The relationship between many Punjabi this subject came from ranking JM attacks in Islamabad, Lahore, and terrorist groups and the former Taliban member Abdullah Shah Mazhar, who since mid-2007. According government of is another gave as his reason for leaving the group: to data provided by the U.S. National cause for the ongoing rifts within “Maulana [Masood] Azhar has nothing Counterterrorism Center, for example, Pakistan’s jihadist community. During to do with jihad anymore and that terrorist attacks in Lahore killed a the Taliban’s rule of Afghanistan, a was why we broke away from him.”30 total of 30 people from May 2004-July large number of Deobandi terrorist Similarly, Punjab Law Minister Rana 2007, yet have killed approximately groups established strong relations with Sanaullah has stated that when leaders 229 people from August 2007-June al-Qa`ida and the Taliban government of SSP and LJ were flown in to negotiate 2010.18 Similarly, terrorist attacks in (which shared their adherence to with former members of their groups Islamabad killed 25 people from July Deobandi Islam23), established training when the latter attacked the Pakistan 2004-July 2007, yet 171 people since.19 camps in the country, and fought Army’s general headquarters last year, The significance of the attack on Lal alongside the Taliban against the the leaders were reportedly told, “You Masjid is also illustrated by the attack Northern Alliance and ethnic minorities are traitors, you have left the right on the Manawan Police Training School such as the Hazara.24 The tight linkages path.”31 outside Lahore in March 2009, where between the Pakistani groups and the attackers reportedly shouted “Oh red Taliban regime were exemplified by A final factor that may cause splintering mosque attackers, we have come” HuJI’s Qari Saifullah Akhtar’s reported among Punjabi terrorist groups is during their assault.20 Similarly, the status as political adviser to Mullah the influence of al-Qa`ida, which has Ghazi Force, which has staged several Omar, as well as by Masood Azhar’s visit to Mullah Omar following his attacks against the Pakistani state, was 27 Amir Mir, “The Jihad Lives On,” Asia Times Online, release from an Indian prison.25 The named for Abdul Rashid Ghazi, one of March 11, 2005; Tim McGirk, “The Monster Within,” U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in the two brothers who served as heads of Time Magazine, January 19, 2004. Musharraf noted in 21 2001 engendered strenuous resistance Lal Masjid. his autobiography, In the Line of Fire, that Mohammed by many Punjabi terrorist groups; Jamil, a suicide bomber who attempted to kill him in (a member of HuJI later Despite the likely role of the Lal Masjid 2003, swore an oath against him after becoming embit- tied to an assassination plot against assault in furthering breaches between tered after fighting NATO forces in Afghanistan. Ahmed Musharraf) reportedly led fighters into militants, other factors have contributed Rashid described Jamil as a member of Jaysh-i-Muham- Afghanistan to battle NATO forces.26 as well. Journalist Nicholas Schmidle mad in his book Descent into Chaos. Some reports also suggest that members of Lashkar-i-Jhangvi joined with 17 The Deobandi militant groups reacted more ve- al-Qa`ida due to Musharraf’s decision to ban Lashkar-i- hemently to the storming of Lal Masjid than did LT. Jhangvi and engage in a major crackdown on the group. First, because LT is an Ahl-e-Hadith organization and For details, see Lakshman. therefore was not as well-connected to the pro-Taliban 22 Schmidle. 28 One example is Azam Tariq, then-amir of Sipah-i- Deobandi elements at Lal Masjid. Second, because of 23 LT did not enjoy similarly close ties to the Taliban Sahaba, who was released from prison and allowed to its Ahl-e-Hadith identity and organizational history of leadership due to its adherence to the Ahl-e-Hadith sit in Pakistan’s National Assembly, providing political abjuring attacks in Pakistan, LT was also less involved sect, but did train in the Afghan provinces of Kunar and support to Musharraf’s government until Tariq’s assas- with the Deobandi actors who constituted the already Nuristan during the 1990s. For details, see Daan Van Der sination by a Shi`a activist in 2003. brewing insurgency. This information is based on per- Schriek, “Nuristan: Insurgent Hideout in Afghanistan,” 29 According to the Indian government, Azhar called sonal interview, Stephen Tankel, July 2010. Terrorism Monitor 3:10 (2006). for “jihad” against the United States upon his release 18 Worldwide Incidents Tracking System, U.S. Nation- 24 See, for example, Ahmed Rashid, Taliban (New Ha- from an Indian prison. Similarly, Fazlur Rahman Khalil al Counterterrorism Center, accessed June 16, 2010. ven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001); Peter Bergen, Holy of Harkat-ul-Mujahidin was a signatory of Bin Ladin’s 19 Ibid. War Inc. (New York: Free Press, 2001); Kanchan Laksh- 1998 fatwa that called upon Muslims to kill Americans. 20 Sabrina Tavernise, Waqar Gillani, and Salman man, “Deep Roots to Pakistan’s Sectarian Terror,” Asia Also see Steve Coll, “Time Bomb,” New Yorker, January Masood, “Rampage in Pakistan Shows Reach of Mili- Times Online, July 9, 2003. 28, 2008. tants,” New York Times, March 30, 2009. 25 Amir Mir, “HUJI Chief Still at Large,” The News Inter­ 30 Muhammad Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations 21 Abdul Rashid Ghazi was killed in the security assault national, September 23, 2008. in Pakistan (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2004). on Lal Masjid. For details, see Animesh Roul, “Little- 26 Bill Roggio, “Taliban Claim Responsibility for Attack 31 Shahzad. Amir Mir reported that Fazlur Rahman Known Ghazi Brigade Now a Major Player in the Punjabi on Pakistan Army Headquarters,” The Long War Journal, Khalil of HuM and Mufti Abdul Rauf, younger brother of Jihad?” Terrorism Monitor 8:28 (2010). October 10, 2009. Masood Azhar, were flown in to negotiate as well.

8 july 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 7 preached violence against both the Afghanistan were directly affected by Qa`ida risks further alienating these West and the Pakistani government.32 the U.S. invasion in 2001. groups by drawing closer to anti-statist As noted previously, members of elements. Al-Qa`ida’s affiliation with Punjabi terrorist groups developed Consequences and Future Trends the TTP and Punjabi militants has also ties to al-Qa`ida during their sojourns Various outcomes can be anticipated significantly damaged its image in the in Afghanistan, interacting with and from splintering within Punjabi eyes of : the Pew Research training alongside each other and thus terrorist groups and the alignment of Center recorded that the number of creating an opportunity for ideological many of their members with al-Qa`ida Pakistanis who viewed al-Qa`ida cross-fertilization.33 Lashkar-i-Tayyiba and Pakistani Taliban groups. The favorably dropped from 25% in 2008 possesses additional bonds with al- mainline factions of groups wishing to to 9% in 2009.41 This affiliation could Qa`ida, such as its adherence to avoid conflict with the state will likely potentially erode the group’s credibility the Salafi-like sect Ahl-e-Hadith, become marginalized as they continue among Muslims worldwide as well, and the reported role of al-Qa`ida- to hemorrhage members to anti-statist particularly if the Punjabi militants affiliated individuals in its founding.34 groups. A recent estimate from a minister aligning themselves with al-Qa`ida are Additional personal ties were forged in Punjab estimated that between 10- granted official permission to use the during the exodus of jihadists from 20% of JM, SSP, and LJ members have al-Qa`ida brand. A precedent for this Afghanistan following Operation joined the Punjabi Taliban.37 At the can be seen in the group’s previously Enduring Freedom. It is reported that same time, many dissidents may remain unpopular affiliation with Abu Mus`ab Amjad Farooqi developed ties with al- involved with their former organizations al-Zarqawi in Iraq.42 Qa`ida operations chief Abu Faraj al- to some extent, and attempt to co-opt Libi in this period, later leading to the their resources and personnel.38 The The consequences of the decision by two working together in attempts to extensive training of many members many Punjabi militants to turn against assassinate Musharraf.35 Al-Qa`ida’s of Punjabi terrorist groups and their their state sponsors and frequently away uncompromising adherence to struggle access to the resources of their former from their own militant organizations against the United States and its allies organizations helps augment the ability will continue to play out in the months in the Pakistani government likely of al-Qa`ida to train Westerners for and years to come. Although the proved attractive to Pakistani militants attacks overseas, and may help it activities of these groups and individuals frustrated with the relative inaction of mitigate the effects of drone strikes that may weaken al-Qa`ida’s global appeal their own leadership.36 Similarly, al- have killed many of the group’s most in the long-term, they pose challenges Qa`ida’s call for a global jihad against experienced operational commanders.39 to Pakistan’s internal stability and to the West gained stronger resonance As illustrated by the aforementioned LT the security of the United States in the when Punjabi groups operating in plot against the U.S. and UK embassies interim. in Dhaka, Punjabi militants aligned 32 Usama bin Ladin reportedly called for Musharraf’s with al-Qa`ida could potentially use Ben Brandt is currently a threat analyst overthrow in 2002, and Ayman al-Zawahiri did so in their organizations’ resources to strike in the private sector, prior to which he 2003, four months before twin assassination attempts against Western interests throughout monitored South Asian extremist issues against Musharraf. South Asia. at the NJ Office of Homeland Security and 33 As is well known, a 1998 cruise missile strike against Preparedness, and researched terrorist training camps in Afghanistan associated with Bin Ladin At the same time, many analysts have attack planning methodologies at Booz killed a number of Harkat-ul-Mujahidin members, while argued that al-Qa`ida’s involvement with Allen Hamilton. He holds an MA in Security Nicholas Schmidle reports that Qari Saifullah Akhtar ar- Pakistani militants engaged in bloody Studies from Georgetown University. ranged a meeting between Bin Ladin and Maulana Ab- attacks against Muslims has strained dullah of Lal Masjid in 1998. its relationship with its longtime allies 34 These include, for example, Usama bin Ladin’s men- among the and the 40 tor `Abdullah `Azzam and Bin Ladin associate Abu Ab- Afghan Taliban. If this is true, al- dul Aziz “Barbaros.” For details, see Bill Roggio, “Paki- stani Court Orders Release of Lashkar-e-Taiba Leader,” 37 Shahzad. It should be noted that the minister in ques- The Long War Journal, June 2, 2009; Evan F. Kohlmann, tion, Punjab Law Minister Rana Sanuallah, has been “Expert Witness: Synopsis of Testimony from Regina v. criticized for his ties to Sipah-i-Sahaba. Mohammed Ajmal Khan, Palvinder Singh, and Frzana 38 There is precedent for this form of cooption in the de- Khan,” NEFA Foundation, undated. cision of many Pakistani terrorist groups to recruit at the 35 Roggio, “Taliban Claim Responsibility for Attack on annual ijtema of the apolitical Deobandi movement Ta- Pakistan Army Headquarters.” blighi Jama`at. Similar trends have been spotted in other 36 The leadership of some groups, however, was in- theaters of operations as well: Noordin Top exploited his Fishman, “The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Con- volved in tacitly assisting al-Qa`ida directly after 9/11. connections with Jemaah Islamiya to build his splinter flict in North Waziristan,” New America Foundation, LT’s leadership directed elements within the organiza- group al-Qa`ida in the Malay Peninsula. April 2010; David S. Cloud and Julian S. Barnes, “Some tion to provide safe houses and other forms of logistical 39 The impressive tradecraft displayed by both David U.S. Officials See a Growing Taliban-Al Qaeda Rift,” Los support to foreign fighters, including members of al- Headley’s reconnaissance efforts and by the subsequent Angeles Times, May 11, 2010. Qa`ida, fleeing Afghanistan after 9/11. Personal - inter LT assault on Mumbai are indicative of the skills Pun- 41 “Pakistani Public Opinion,” Pew Global Attitudes view, Stephen Tankel, July 2010. Tankel is conducting jabi militants could conceivably leverage on behalf of al- Project, August 13, 2009. research for his book, Storming the World Stage: The Story Qa`ida. 42 “Confidence in ,” Pew Global Atti- of Lashkar-e-Taiba. 40 Anand Gopal, Mansur Khan Mahsud, and Brian tudes Project, 2009.

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