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The Punjabi Taliban: Causes and Consequences of Turning Against JULY 2010 . VOL 3 . ISSUE 7 Another U.S. national recruited to al- Al-Shabab is also coming under The Punjabi Taliban: Shabab, Omar Hammami (also known increasing pressure from other Somali Causes and Consequences as Abu Mansur al-Amriki), has emerged factions, particularly Hisbul Islamiyya as a high-profile media representative, (another of Somalia’s Islamist of Turning Against the appearing in numerous al-Shabab organizations that emerged from the State propaganda videos and providing a collapse of the ICU). Tensions between foreign face to the group.25 the two groups intensified in October By Ben Brandt 2009 when Hisbul Islamiyya and al- Conclusion Shabab militants fought each other for the kidnapping and murder of former Each of these attributes—an increasingly control of the strategically important Inter-Services Intelligence officer and radical agenda, a centralized leadership town of Kismayo.30 Consequently, Usama bin Ladin confidant Khalid structure, refined propaganda al-Shabab’s efforts are now largely Khwaja in March 2010 generated machinery, and a foreign support focused on re-establishing its political a wave of analysis throughout the network—suggests that al-Shabab and military credentials, and vying for counterterrorism community.1 Although will continue to evolve into a greater influence alongside other factions in analysts have offered a variety of regional threat. Indeed, on July 15, Somalia’s Islamist movement. theories regarding both the nature of 2010, al-Shabab threatened further the “Asian Tigers” group that executed attacks against Uganda and Burundi in As such, while al-Shabab’s successful Khwaja and their motives in killing an audio statement aired on Mogadishu execution of sporadic, large-scale him, most have correctly noted that radio stations, in which al-Shabab attacks abroad seems quite feasible in the the incident is symbolic of a broader insisted that “what has happened in future, a protracted foreign campaign— splintering between Punjabi militants Kampala was only the beginning. We in which al-Shabab develops and retains espousing allegiance to the Pakistani will keep revenging what your soldiers external networks responsible for state and a younger generation that has remorselessly did to our people.”26 launching attacks against Ugandan and aligned itself with al-Qa`ida and Tehrik- Burundian targets—appears beyond the i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), turning their Concurrently, however, al-Shabab’s group’s present capabilities. guns on the Pakistani government and evolution into a more overtly the West. It is important to understand internationalist organization has Tim Pippard is Senior Consultant in the the manifestations of this fracture, undercut some of its appeal and support Security and Military Intelligence Practice as well as its causes and potential base within Somalia.27 Al-Shabab’s hard of IHS Jane’s, and is currently Research consequences, to better gauge the threat line interpretation of Islam (in which Director of an IHS Jane’s study entitled posed to the United States by what is it is attempting to impose religious “Relationships and Rivalries: Assessing Al­ frequently called the “Punjabi Taliban.”2 uniformity on Somali society at the Qa’ida’s Affiliate Network.” He is Assistant expense of traditional clan structures Editor of Perspectives on Terrorism (the Various Manifestations of Anti-State and beliefs) has failed to resonate with journal of the Terrorism Research Initiative), Sentiment many Somali citizens.28 In addition, and former managing editor of Jane’s Khalid Khwaja’s execution is perhaps while al-Shabab’s increasingly brutal Terrorism and Insurgency Center (JTIC). the most graphic manifestation of a operational tactics—specifically suicide trend that has been occurring for some bombings targeting civilians—have time, particularly within terrorist enabled it to retain territory in central groups that had previously designated and southern Somalia, such tactics have India or rival Muslim sects as their also caused public outrage and alienated targets. One of the best documented supporters, even in traditional al- fissures within a Pakistani terrorist Shabab strongholds.29 group dedicated to jihad against India is that which occurred within Jaysh- 1 For details, see Rahimullah Yusufzai, “The Kidnapping 25 Andrea Elliott, “The Jihadist Next Door,” New York and Execution of Khalid Khwaja in Pakistan,” CTC Senti­ Times, January 31, 2010. nel 3:5 (2010); Nicholas Schmidle, “How Did A Pakistan 26 Mohamed Olad Hassan, “Al-Shabab Leader Threat- Ex-Spy End Up Dead?” The New Republic, May 4, 2010. ens More Uganda Attacks,” Associated Press, July 15, 2 Hassan Abbas has defined the Punjabi Taliban as “a 2010. loose conglomeration of members of banned organiza- 27 “Somalia’s Divided Islamists.” tions of Punjabi origin” that work with Tehrik-i-Taliban 28 The International Crisis Group (ICG) has documented to execute attacks inside Pakistan. Abbas described the numerous instances of public disaffection at al-Shabab’s Punjabi Taliban as being primarily composed of mem- attempts to impose its extreme vision of Islam on Somali bers of the groups Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan, Lashkar-i- society. ICG researchers also note that public disillu- 30 Stig Jarle Hansen, “Faction Fluctuation – The Shift- Jhangvi, and Jaysh-i-Muhammad; disaffected anti-statist sion with al-Shabab is being further fueled by its poor ing Allegiances within Hizbul Islam,” Jane’s Intelligence members of several other groups such as Harkat-ul-Ji- governance record in southern Somalia. See “Somalia’s Review, March 11, 2010. Tensions between Hisbul Is- had-al-Islam, Lashkar-i-Tayyiba, and Harkat-ul-Muja- Divided Islamists.” lamiyya and al-Shabab commanders have continued, hidin may be considered part of the Punjabi Taliban as 29 Ibid.; Mark Landler, “After Attacks in Uganda, Worry with clashes between the two groups occurring into mid- well. For details, see Hassan Abbas, “Defining the Pun- Grows Over Group,” New York Times, July 12, 2010. 2010. jabi Taliban Network,” CTC Sentinel 2:4 (2009). 6 JULY 2010 . VOL 3 . ISSUE 7 i-Muhammad (JM) in 2002-2003. In The sectarian group Sipah-i-Sahaba ties to al-Qa`ida and the TTP.12 The 2002, members of JM were implicated Pakistan (SSP) has also seen members status of the sectarian group Lashkar- in a number of attacks targeting leave to attack targets associated with i-Jhangvi (LJ) appears to be similar to Pakistani Christians in Punjab, while the Pakistani state and the West.9 that of HuJI, as many of LJ’s amirs have in 2003 Masood Azhar, the founder of been implicated in plotting attacks the group, expelled a dozen ranking It is important to note that most Punjabi against the state.13 JM members after revelations that they militants sympathetic to al-Qa`ida and had organized attacks against Western the TTP move away from their parent The role of Lashkar-i-Tayyiba (LT, and Christian targets in Pakistan groups in less dramatic fashion than or LeT), perhaps Pakistan’s most without his authorization.3 In July of JuF and HuMA, and many appear to prominent terrorist group following the same year, he reportedly informed maintain links with both their original the 2008 Mumbai attacks, is less the Punjab governor that he had made organization and al-Qa`ida and the clear. Although the LT’s leadership the expulsions, that he should not be Pakistani Taliban. A report last year has remained relatively loyal to the held responsible for the actions of the Pakistani military, members of the expelled members, and that the expelled “The July 2007 storming of group have broken away to assist in members should be arrested.4 attacks against the state. An example Lal Masjid (Red Mosque), of this can be seen in the case of Umar Azhar’s decision caused a major a notorious center of Kundi, an LT member who left after schism within the group, as members quarreling with the group’s leadership deserted Azhar and joined the expelled Deobandi militant activity over its subservience to the Pakistani individuals to form Jamaat-ul- in Islamabad, is frequently government and later assisted in attacks Furqan (JuF).5 Members of JuF were against Pakistani law enforcement and consequently arrested in connection and correctly noted as intelligence facilities.14 LT’s decision to to an assassination attempt against an important catalyst in establish a presence in Pakistan’s tribal then-Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz in areas and interact with al-Qa`ida and 2004, and Rashid Rauf, who helped Punjabi militants’ decision TTP members operating there has likely mastermind the 2006 liquid explosives to strike the state.” facilitated this process.15 plot that targeted trans-Atlantic flights, was described by an intelligence source A 2009 LT plot to attack the U.S. and as having utilized cooperation from UK embassies in Dhaka, Bangladesh has members of JuF.6 Today, JuF is thought chronicled the saga of a JM commander given rise to rumors about the emergence to constitute part of the so-called wounded in a drone strike while of a faction within the group advocating Punjabi Taliban, which has executed meeting with Taliban leaders. He was open attacks against Western interests. attacks throughout Pakistan; Maulana protected from arrest by his men while The fact that a retired Pakistan Army Abdul Jabbar, who previously served recuperating in Bahawalpur10 and was major affiliated with LT helped David as Azhar’s deputy, is described as being later believed to have sought refuge Headley plot a terrorist attack in involved with training fighters for JuF in a JM seminary.11 His case shows the Denmark last year further amplifies in North Waziristan.7 overlapping memberships that many these concerns.16 If elements within individuals hold in the region. LT continue to plot increasingly brazen Other Pakistani terrorist groups attacks against Western interests, it focused on Kashmir have exhibited In the case of Harkat-ul-Jihad-al- could force an open schism within the noteworthy fissures as well.
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